NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

STATEMENT

OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL KENNETH J. GLUECK JR.
DEPUTY COMMANDANT
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION &
COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND

AND

MR. THOMAS P. DEE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
EXPEDITIONARY PROGRAMS AND LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

OF THE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

MARINE CORPS MODERNIZATION

MARCH 11, 2015

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Lieutenant General Kenneth J. Glueck, Jr.

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration; Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command

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Lieutenant General Glueck was designated a Naval Aviator in May 1976 and reported to Marine Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMA) 169 at Camp Pendleton, California. During this tour he deployed both with HMA-369 to Okinawa, Japan and with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-265. In February 1980 he was reassigned as a Primary Flight Instructor at Training Squadron Three, NAS Whiting Field, Milton, Florida. In July 1983, Lieutenant General Glueck reported to Marine Helicopter One (HMX-1) at Quantico, Virginia where he was designated a Presidential Command Pilot.

Following Marine Corps Command and Staff College in August 1987, Lieutenant General Glueck was assigned to Okinawa, Japan for duty as Air Officer with the Special Operations Training Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force. In June 1989, Lieutenant General Glueck reported as Executive Officer for Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadron-269, MCAS New River, North Carolina. In June 1990, he was reassigned as Executive Officer for Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-365 (HMM-365) participating in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In June 1991, Lieutenant General Glueck assumed command of HMM-365 and deployed in support of Operation Provide Promise in the Balkans.

Lieutenant General Glueck relinquished command in February 1993 and attended NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. He was subsequently assigned to Allied Forces Southern Europe as Amphibious Planner in February 1994. In February 1997, Lieutenant General Glueck reported to Headquarters Marine Corps, Programs and Resources. In August 1998, he assumed command of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and deployed for Landing Forces Sixth Fleet deployments 2-99 and 3-00. His units participated in the NATO bombing campaign (Noble Anvil), provided security to refugee camps in Albania (JTF Shining Hope), conducted peace support operations in Kosovo (Joint Guardian), and provided disaster relief following the earthquake in Turkey (Avid Response).

In June 2001, Lieutenant General Glueck reported to Marine Corps Combat Development Command as Director, Expeditionary Force Development Center in Quantico, Virginia. In July 2003, he served as the Commanding General, 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Deputy Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, Japan, participating in tsunami relief efforts with CTF-536 and FHA and disaster relief efforts in the Philippines as Commander JTF-535.

In April 2005, Lieutenant General Glueck served as the Chief of Staff, United States Southern Command. In June 2006, he assumed command of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, II MEF at MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina. In April 2008, Lieutenant General Glueck was designated the Chief of Staff for Multi-National Force Iraq in Baghdad. In August 2009, he reported to U.S. Africa Command where he served as Director of Operations and Logistics until 1 January 2011. In January 2011, he reported to Okinawa Japan where he assumed command of III Marine Expeditionary Force and U.S. Marine Forces Japan. In March 2011, he also commanded JTF-505 in support of Operation Tomodachi. Lieutenant General Glueck assumed command of Marine Corps Combat Development Command on 8 August 2013.

Lieutenant General Glueck holds a Bachelor of Science degree from MacMurray College, Jacksonville, Illinois and a Master of Science degree in Business Management from Troy State University, Alabama.

(Current as of October 2013)

Thomas P. Dee

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Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Expeditionary Programs and Logistics Management) Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition)

Mr. Tom Dee assumed responsibilities as DASN (E&LM) on 29 Dec 2012. He serves as principal advisor to ASN (RD&A) on matters relating to expeditionary capabilities, urgent needs processes and acquisition logistics. His portfolio includes U.S. Marine Corps ground programs and Navy expeditionary programs to include combat vehicles, explosive ordnance disposal, counter-IED, and multiple other programs that support our Naval expeditionary forces.

Mr. Dee joined the civil service in 2007 following a 26 year career as a Naval officer. Upon his retirement from the Navy he assumed duties as the first Director of Defense Biometrics within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On behalf of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering, he executed Secretary of Defense Principal Staff Assistant responsibilities for oversight of all aspects of the DOD biometrics enterprise. In March 2009, Mr. Dee was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and served as the Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. While there he oversaw the resolution of immediate warfighting needs as identified by the Defense Department's Combatant Commanders. He concurrently served as the Executive Secretary to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy's Management Action Group (DMAG) where he coordinated the preparation of strategic issues for executive decision.

While on active duty from March 1980 until his retirement in Jan 2007, he held a variety of worldwide leadership positions spanning operations Desert Storm, SFOR and KFOR in the Balkans, and operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn, and Operation Enduring Freedom. In Washington, he served on the SECNAV's USS Cole Task Force, the Joint IED Defeat Task Force / Organization, and as the CNO's Requirements and Resource Sponsor for Expeditionary Force Protection capabilities including EOD, Naval Coastal Warfare, and Navy non-lethal weapons. He culminated his Naval career as Commanding Officer, Naval EOD Technology Division in Indian Head, Maryland where he was responsible for executing science and technology, acquisition, and information programs for the joint service EOD community and providing material and information support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. Dee holds a master's of sciences degree (national resource strategy) from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University; a master's of arts degree

(international relations) from University of Southern California; and a bachelor's of arts degree (history) from New York University. In 2011 he was awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Civilian Service for his support of warfighter requirements.

Introduction

Today, the Marine Corps remains the Nation's premiere expeditionary force-in-readiness. We are the most ready when the Nation is least ready to answer the call globally and to respond to unforeseen events. We operate capably and freely throughout the spectrum of threats, whether they are conventional, irregular or the uncertain hybrid areas where they overlap. Our ability to deploy from the sea in austere environments at a time and place of our choosing - a significant asymmetric, strategic and operational advantage- remains our most important characteristic.

To execute this vision we must achieve balance across our five pillars of readiness; high quality people, unit readiness, capacity to meet combatant commander requirements, infrastructure sustainment, and equipment modernization. Since the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 imposed significant reductions in defense spending, the Marine Corps has chosen to protect the investments and programs that are critical to executing our core competencies, and that support our deployed forces. We have done so at a cost. We have disrupted the balance required by ensuring we maintain the most well trained and ready force to meet the needs of the Combatant Commander at the cost of equipment modernization and investments in future technologies. The longer that we are required to make these difficult trades, the greater the cost becomes. This cost will manifest itself both in terms of dollars required to repair and refit aging legacy systems, the costs to procure future systems, and the additional time it will take to procure the modern capabilities we will require to succeed on the future battlefield. While we have protected investments in our highest priority programs, the imbalance in the portfolio will soon cause us to make unacceptable trades that put at risk our abilities to fully support the National Defense Strategy.

The investments that are made in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President's Budget submission allow us to achieve this precarious balance during the year of execution. However, the costs not only in the out years, but now encroaching on the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) are unsustainable. Funding the Marine Corps at the levels imposed by the BCA would cause us to impose unacceptable trades between readiness and modernization. The full weight of

sequestration would preclude the Marine Corps from serving as the force in readiness that the nation demands, and cause us to reevaluate our ability to execute our Title X responsibilities.

Operating Environment

Globally Engaged

The Marine Corps ended its combat mission in Afghanistan in 2014 with the turnover of responsibility of Regional Command Southwest. We are supporting the ongoing development of the Afghan Security Forces by sourcing advisors and trainers to the NATO partnership mission. As we transition out of Afghanistan, your Marine Corps remains a forward stationed and forward deployed force operating "in every clime and place." Throughout the last 15 years of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, the Marine Corps never ceased our rotational deployments aboard naval vessels. Today these Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) remain the nation's most-flexible, forward postured forces. Our adaptability and flexibility provide unmatched capabilities to combatant commanders, whose demand for these forces routinely exceeds our current resources.

In an effort to meet this growing demand, the Marine Corps has stationed additional forces in the form of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force- Crisis Response (SPMAGTF-CR) ashore in support of AFRICOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM. These forces provide the combatant commanders a capability that can support U.S. and partner security interests throughout the theaters of operation, to include embassy reinforcement, non-combatant evacuation operations, and tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel even in periods of absence of naval shipping. The lack of amphibious shipping availability required us to base these forces at fixed sites ashore. Although lacking the advantages of sea based Marine forces, SPMAGTF-CR brings a much needed capability to the combatant commander. They demonstrated their capability following the deterioration of the security situation in South Sudan last January. Upon receiving notification of their mission, SPMAGTF-CR staged their forces at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti on the Horn of Africa after traveling over 3,400 miles non-stop from Spain. More recently these forces assisted in Libya and Yemen to ensure the protection and evacuation of our embassies. While this is a great example of responsiveness, it required the approval of the government of Spain – a pre-condition that seabased forces do not require.

We remain a maritime nation with global interests. Nowhere is this more evident than in the vast expanses of the Pacific. The Marine Corps remains a central part of the rebalance toward the Pacific called for in our National Defense Guidance. We currently have 22,500 Marines west of the International Date Line. Our operations in the Asia-Pacific theater include theater security cooperation exercises, bilateral training events, and crisis response operations. We are adjusting our force laydown in the Pacific

Future Environment

If one characteristic defines the future operating environment it is uncertainty. Crises, whether natural disasters or manmade, will continue to arise at an ever increasing pace. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review correctly states that "the international security environment remains uncertain and complicated. The United States will likely face a broad array of threats and opportunities and must prepare to address both effectively in the coming years." Exacerbating these future threats is the nature of our adversary's capabilities. We continue to see the power of disruptive technologies distributed to more diffused and decentralized actors. In what has been described as a 'new normal,' extremism, economic disruption, identity politics and social change generate new potential security threats at an accelerating pace.

A year ago we published Expeditionary Force 21, our Marine Corps capstone concept, which establishes our vision and goals for the next 10 years and provides a plan for guiding the design and development of the future force that will fight and win in this environment. It is informing decisions regarding how we will adjust our organizational structure to exploit the value of regionally focused forces and provide the basis for future Navy and Marine Corps capability development to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. Developed in close coordination with the refresh of the maritime strategy, Expeditionary Force 21 provides guidance for how the Marine Corps will be postured, organized, trained, and equipped to fulfill the responsibilities and missions required around the world. We plan on updating Expeditionary Force 21, in order to continually guide refinements to how we operate from the sea and provide the right sized force in the right place, at the right time.

A key attribute of this force will be its requirement to remain flexible, with the capability to arrive from a variety of platforms and seamlessly aggregate to serve as a leading edge of the

United States response or assume command of a Joint Task Force (JTF). In addition these forces will operate over even greater distances and be employed in even smaller packages to include the increased reliance on independent company sized units. This diffusion of combat power will place increasing demands on our command and control, communication, and logistics support architecture.

Reset and Reconstitution

Since August 2012 we have been executing a deliberate Ground Equipment Reset Strategy to guide our efforts to repair, replace or recapitalize our war-torn equipment and rapidly return it to our operational forces and strategic equipment programs to improve readiness, while at the same time upholding our enduring commitment to being good stewards of the Nation's resources. As of February of this year 100 percent of our equipment has been withdrawn from Afghanistan and approximately 56 percent of our total reset requirement has been completed. With Congress's continued support we anticipate completing reset by the end of fiscal year 2017.

Our reset strategy is enabling our overall reconstitution effort. While we reset our force, we are simultaneously working to right-size and balance our ground equipment inventory to ensure it is optimally aligned to operational requirements and our post-war force structure. Our reconstitution effort will ensure that we are optimally organized, equipped and postured to remain the nation's most-ready, forward postured forces.

Equipment Modernization

With the smallest modernization budget in the Department of Defense, the Marine Corps continually seeks to leverage the investments of other services, carefully focusing our modernization resources to those investment areas which are the most fiscally prudent and those which promise the most operationally effective payoffs. Our highest priority modernization efforts are those associated with our amphibious forcible entry and crisis response capabilities. These core competencies require continued development of our capabilities for surface and air ship-to-shore movement, sea based command and control, operational reach, and Marine Expeditionary Units and Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces.

The Marine Corps has seen a consistent decrease in funding for modernization and installations since FY 2013, while increasing the percentage of the top line for manpower and holding near-term operational readiness funding steady. This was a conscious choice as we maintained a high level of operational readiness for the current force, while accepting risk in modernization for the future force. The percentage of overall Service funding for Manpower has grown from 59 percent to 61 percent from FY13 and FY16, while over the same period the figure for equipment modernization has dropped from 10 percent down to 9 percent. The difficulty in making reductions of this magnitude is that the major investment programs (i.e. ACAT-I) are on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars, and their funding profiles must be stabilized in order to maintain program viability. Even then, funding reductions to those programs have resulted in quantity and/or capability reductions or delays. In other cases, legacy capabilities have accepted high levels of risk in order to prioritize modernization programs; the funds planned for the legacy systems are reduced so that the Marine Corps has tradespace with which to pursue modern capabilities. For example, the Marine Corps has had to cancel the High Mobility Multi-Purpose, Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) Sustainment Modification Initiative program in order to fund the higher priority the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program. . Similarly, the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) Survivability Upgrade Program (SUP) was discontinued in order to ensure full funding of the LAV Anti-Tank Modernization program.

The trades between modernization and the sustainment of legacy equipment, which is what Marines have in their hands today to execute today's missions, creates further risks to Marine Corps readiness if modernization efforts are not continued on schedule. In earlier years, this risk was largely in the "out-years." However, as we have continued to accept risk in modernization or improvement in successive budgets, those "out-year" impacts have become "near-term" and our readiness is now at risk as we are unable to fund both the sustainment of our legacy capabilities and properly invest in the programs intended to replace them.

The implications of the imbalances described above are that we've had to make some hard choices to fund only the most critical modernization programs and sustainment capabilities, while choosing to discontinue and unfund a number of lower priority capabilities. While these requirements remain valid, we simply cannot fund them all. In FY2015 and FY2016, we have

unfunded 13 programs, primarily within the maneuver and C2 portfolios, while making painful reductions to others.

We have accepted "good enough" and reduced the quantities of modernized equipment we are procuring. As a result, units or Marines may be required to draw equipment from an allowance pool prior to deployment rather than fielding equipment quantities for individual issuance. We have also accepted risk in certain capabilities in order to use all available tradespace to pursue only the most critical threshold capabilities. Our intelligence and logistics portfolios have taken the majority of these decrements and cannot withstand further reductions without eliminating capabilities.

An example of this risk is our Networking on the Move (NOTM) program. NOTM systems extend secure, non-secure and coalition Internet Protocol (IP) routing (Non-Classified Internet Routing Protocol (NIPR), Secret Internet Protocol Routing (SIPR), and mission specific network connectivity from a fixed location to units operating in the air and / or on the ground while on the move and at the halt. This allows users to access common C2 applications, E-mail, chat, and collaboration tools for the real-time exchange of voice, video, and data. Although we have an acquisition objective of 140 systems, due to budget pressures, we've had to truncate our procurement at only 59 systems.

Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicles (GCTV)

The Marine Corps GCTV portfolio modernization programs account for approximately 50 percent of the Marine Corps ground modernization investment. The overarching priority within the GCTV portfolio is the replacement of the legacy Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) with modern armored personnel carriers (APCs) through a combination of complementary systems. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program is the Marine Corps' highest ground modernization priority and will use an evolutionary, incremental approach that consists of two increments, ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2. Increment 1.1 will field a personnel carrier; Increment 1.2 will improve personnel carrier capabilities over Increment 1.1 and will deliver command and control (C2) and recovery and maintenance mission role variants.

The AAV SUP improves AAV capability in four of the 10 amphibious vehicle companies, in order to support MEU deployments and when globally sourced, provide the essential capacity

necessary for the assault echelons of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. ACV Phase 1.1 modernizes two of our 10 amphibious vehicle companies. ACV Phase 1.2 will modernize the remaining four of 10 companies. This combination of a modern amphibious armored personnel carrier alongside the improved AAV generates a complementary set of capabilities to meet general support lift capability and capacity requirements of our Ground Combat Element.

In parallel with these modernization efforts, a science and technology portfolio is being developed to explore a range of high water speed technology approaches to provide an affordable, phased modernization of legacy capability to enable extended range littoral maneuver. These efforts will develop the knowledge necessary to reach an informed decision point in the mid-2020s on the feasibility, affordability, and options for developing a high water speed capability for maneuver from ship-to-shore.

The second highest priority within the portfolio remains the replacement of a portion of the HMMWV fleet that is most at risk; those trucks that perform a combat function and are typically exposed to enemy fires. In partnership with the Army, the Marine Corps has sequenced the JLTV program to ensure affordability of the entire GCTV portfolio while replacing one third of the legacy HMMWV fleet with modern tactical trucks prior to the fielding of ACV 1.1.

These core Marine Corps modernization efforts have been designed in a manner to ensure their affordability. However, if the budget is fully sequestered in FY 2016 or beyond, it will jeopardize both the timing and resources required to undertake this strategy and greatly affect our ability to achieve our requirements in both vehicle fleets.

Amphibious Combat Vehicle 1.1

Leveraging demonstrated mature technologies, ACV Phase 1.1 will be acquired as a modified non-developmental item (NDI) and is approved to enter the acquisition phase at Milestone B. A request for proposal will be released in the spring of this year with an expected Engineering and Manufacturing Design (EMD) contract award to two vendors in the fall of 2015 and a competitive down-select for production in FY2018. The acquisition objective (AO) of 204 vehicles will provide lift for two infantry battalions and will achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY 2020. The aggressive acquisition schedule for ACV 1.1 requires full funding and support from Congress. A return to sequestration level funding will cause this

program to be indefinitely delayed. There is insufficient trade space within the modernization account to afford a generational investment such as a combat vehicle replacement program, even one conducted incrementally, under the full burden of budget control act limitations.

AAV Survivability Upgrade Program (AAV SUP)

AAV SUP is a well-defined program to increase the capability of the current vehicle by providing force protection upgrades to counter current and emerging threats to the underside of the vehicle. Specifically, the program will provide improved armor, spall liners, blast mitigating seats and protected fuel storage. These improved AAVs will play an essential role in facilitating ship-to-shore mobility until replaced via a future phase of the ACV program. A contract was recently awarded to conduct this work. Funding supports continuation of the EMD phase and associated prototyping and testing. The AO for the program is 392 vehicles with IOC in FY2019.

Approximately 29 percent of the planned AAV upgrades are currently unfunded (and the upgrade plan only includes roughly one-third of the legacy fleet), resulting in a loss of economic order quantities and inability to maintain cost threshold. Operationally, the delay to the upgrade of an already overaged fleet will result in a reduced capacity to conduct forcible entry operations.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)

The Department remains firmly partnered with the U.S. Army in fielding a JLTV that lives up to its joint name, while also being affordable. JLTV will deliver a modern reliable truck with M-ATV protection and unarmored HMMWV land mobility and transportability performance to begin replacing the highest risk portions of our light fleet in 2018. The JLTV has effectively controlled ownership costs by maximizing commonality, reliability, and fuel efficiency, while achieving additional savings through effective competition in all stages of program execution. The program is scheduled to complete the Engineering and Manufacturing Development stage later this year, down-select to one of three competing vendors and begin the production and deployment phase. Funding for major activities in this budget includes test and evaluation, procurement of 109 Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) assets, and associated government furnished equipment procurement, publications and technical data.

The JLTV Program will procure only 5,500 vehicles by the year 2022, with the Marine Corps GCTV Strategy requiring a fleet of 17,860 by the year 2035. Fiscal constraints compounded by years of sequestration curtailing modernization and sustainment will make achieving the procurement very challenging. We planned to mitigate risk through the HMMWV Sustainment Modification Initiative (SMI) to upgrade and maintain 13,000 HMMWVs in the legacy fleet, but further fiscal pressure forced a subsequent decision to cancel the HMMWV SMI program. The resulting risk is that the legacy HMMWV fleet will be degraded from this point forward, with no planned upgrade or replacement until JLTV is fielded, beginning in FY2018. The reduced JLTV procurement will result in a gap in battlefield mobility for those units not included in the JLTV fielding plan.

Ground Force Command and Control

Critical to the success ashore of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is our ability to coordinate and synchronize our distributed C2 sensors and systems. Our modernization priorities in this area are the Ground/Air task Oriented radar (G/ATOR) and the Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S) Increment I. These systems will provide modern, interoperable technologies to support real-time surveillance, detection and targeting and the common C2 suite to enable the effective employment of that and other sensors and C2 suites across the MAGTF.

Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR)

G/ATOR will support air defense, air surveillance, counter-battery/target acquisition, and aviation radar tactical enhancements; the final evolution will also support the Marine Corps' air traffic control mission. G/ATOR Block 1 provides air defense and air surveillance capability, achieved Milestone C in 2014 and is currently procuring LRIP units. G/ATOR Block 2 provides counter-battery/target acquisition and is in the EMD phase of acquisition. Funding in this budget includes RDT&E funding for testing of G/ATOR Block 1, development and testing of G/ATOR Block 2 software, procurement funding for the LRIP of two G/ATOR Block 1 systems and four G/ATOR Block 2 systems.

If we face a sequester capped budget in the case of G/ATOR , irregular production schedules and cancellation of the Block 2 capability (Ground Weapons Locating Radar) will cause the

Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) to increase by 75 percent which equates to an increase by nearly $40M per radar. Compounding this issue the legacy TPQ-46 radar that is scheduled to be replaced by G/ATOR Block 2 is not programmed to be sustained. This would mean that Marines would be relying on ever aging platforms, with limited to no funds allocated to sustain them if pressed into service to respond to a major contingency. By 2018, the Marine Corps would be unable to maintain interoperability with critical Navy systems through our Composite Tracking Network, which links fire-quality data provided by the G/ATOR radar to Navy and Joint Integrated Air Defense systems. The Marine Corps will not be able to extend the air defense portion of the Navy Sea Shield concept, reducing the Naval Service's ability to conduct operations in an Anti-Access/Area Denial environment.

Common Aviation Command and Control System (CAC2S)

Phase I Limited Deployment Capability was achieved 2nd Quarter FY2012 and the initial fielding of was complete during 4th Quarter FY2013. Phase 2 addresses the remaining Air Combat Element (ACE) Battle Management and C2 requirements. Phase 2 is currently in the EMD Phase with a Milestone C scheduled for the second quarter of FY 2015. Funding in this budget supports the assembly and Initial Operational Test and Evaluation of the first four Limited Deployment Units. Phase 2 completion will result in the delivery of the full CAC2S Increment I capabilities and is planned to begin fielding in FY 2017. The approved AO is 50 systems.

Combat Operations Center (COC)

For the past 10 years, the Combat Operations Center (COC) has provided the Marine Corps with a common, modular, scalable, and Jointly interoperable operational facility (OPFAC) within the Command Post to facilitate an expeditionary C2 capability centered around execution of the Six Warfighting Functions (C2, Fires, Maneuver, Intelligence, Logistics, Force Protection) and the Marine Corps Planning Process both in combat and non-combat operations.

The COC provides facilities from which the commanders from Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)/JTF down to the battalion/squadron direct, interact and coordinate with higher, adjacent and subordinate units/agencies across the MAGTF and Joint/Coalition partners. Additionally, the COC provides a deployable common, modular, and scalable C2 facility that acts as the 'nerve

center' where information is aggregated, organized, and displayed in order to aid MAGTF commanders and staffs with the facilitation and integration of critical Information Exchange Requirements employed in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission throughout the full Range of Military Operations.

The President's Budget for FY2016 requests $21.3M to continue hardware and software refresh efforts necessary to maintain the system as a secure and relevant command and control capability.

Other Ground Programs

Individual Marines are the foundation of the Marine Corps, the MAGTF and our expeditionary capability. In addition to the major programs described above, this budget supports the continued delivery of required warfighting capabilities to our individual Marines and our flexible MAGTF structure in a timely and affordable manner. The Marine Corps continues to invest in the weapons, individual protective equipment, tactical radios, training systems, and information technology necessary to ensure an effective and efficient fighting force and keep faith with our commitment to those individual Marines who shoulder the burden and privilege of being America's expeditionary force in readiness. As has been previously stated, it is within this large portfolio that a majority of the hard trades have been made to preserve readiness. Further reductions in these areas will only reduce both our capacity and capability, while driving up costs for future innovation.

Conclusion

On behalf of the Marines and Sailors who provide the Nation with its forward deployed crisis-response force, we thank you for your constant support in an era of competing challenges. We are proud of our reputation for frugality and we remain one of the best values for the defense dollar. These critical modernization investments, among many others, will ensure our success not if, but when future conflict occurs. Fiscal uncertainty has threatened both our capacity and capabilities, forcing us to sacrifice our long-term operating and training health for near-term readiness. Recognizing these fiscal challenges, we remain committed to fielding the most ready Marine Corps the Nation can afford.

The priorities reflected in the FY2016 budget are the modernization efforts that we must have to remain an affordable insurance policy for the American people. These efforts will allow the Marine Corps to remain a highly efficient and effective hedge against global and regional tensions that cause instability. Forcing additional cuts by imposing sequester level cap both exacerbates the precarious balance that we have worked to achieve and dramatically increased both cost and risk to the future force. As always, we will continue to provide our nation's leaders with the time and decision space they need by responding to today's crisis, with today's force…today.