

Testimony of Michael B. Donley
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Supporting the Warfighter of Today and Tomorrow

Thank you, Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed for holding this series of hearings. My testimony will focus on the roles and relationships between Military Departments and the Combatant Commands, and two areas – command arrangements and resource allocation – where these components interact to produce warfighting capabilities. I suggest specific areas for DoD and congressional review and also offer other recommendations for reducing resource intensive Military Department and Combatant Command headquarters, and better preparing joint and Service headquarters for the demanding 21st century security environment. The context for these recommendations is Section 346 of the FY16 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires DoD to report on planned reductions to its major headquarters activities by March, 2016.

Military Departments

The role of Military Departments is to recruit, organize, train, and equip (OT&E) forces for assignment to Combatant Commands. The three Military Departments, composed of four Services, are organized around the land, maritime, and aerospace domains.¹ These are DoD's largest operating components with the longest history and they serve as the foundation for the US military – the places from which the full scope of military capabilities are derived and sustained.

In the broader scheme of defense organization, the Services maintain critical relationships with OSD and the Joint Staff, DoD's two staff components whose broad purpose is to advise the Secretary of Defense on strategic direction of the armed forces. The Services must also maintain relationships with the 28 Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities that provide centralized support.² In these relationships, the Services are both customers of such agencies, and also providers of uniformed personnel and other resources to those same agencies. Most importantly, the Services must maintain close relationships with the warfighters, the nine Combatant

¹ For simplicity, this paper will hereafter refer to Military Departments as "Services" and summarize their common functions as "OT&E" responsibilities. Descriptions of component responsibilities are from Title 10, US Code, and DoD Directive 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, December 2010.

² This paper will hereafter refer to these collectively as "Defense Agencies".

Commands that conduct joint operations with forces assigned by the Secretary of Defense from the Services.

Service Strengths and Weaknesses. The Services are the primary and best sources of expertise on their respective domains of warfare; on the training and readiness status of their forces; on force and weapon system capabilities and limitations; and on tactics, techniques, and procedures for force and weapon system-level employment. They are essential sources of advice for Combatant Commanders charged with integrating the best mix of capabilities to fulfill their assigned missions, and all DoD components depend on the Services' deep institutional knowledge and technical expertise.

In programming and executing roughly 80% of DoD's budget, the broad scope of the Services' OT&E responsibilities and military functions provides the first level of integration in assessing the appropriate balance of capabilities and resources. This includes the size and composition of the force (i.e. multiple military functions and force elements) and the balance between today's readiness and investments for the future. Given the resources available, it is the Services that must balance capacity across military functions, among and between active duty and reserve components, between personnel and equipment, between combat and support elements, between training and readiness and quality of life, and between current operations and acquisition of new technology for the future. All must be considered, weighed, and provided for in proper balance.

Despite the central role of the Services in defense organization, DoD is so large and complex that, institutionally, the Services can be lacking in joint or defense-wide perspectives. For example, Service personnel sometimes lack a full appreciation for the role of Defense Agencies, seeming to overlook that this is where they get their Intelligence support, fuel to operate their equipment, health care, education for their children in remote locations, and their paycheck, among other things.

More importantly, the Services often lack the ability to convince each other that, as a Service, they can impartially and effectively lead other Services in joint activities, or perform defense-wide roles as executive agents for the Secretary of Defense. Goldwater-Nichols' emphasis on joint education and joint experience as preconditions for advancement to senior assignments, and over 30 years of combat experience under joint commands, have done much to strengthen joint perspectives in the Services, but not so much that effective joint operations could be assured if there were no Unified Combatant Commands.

Military Departments and Combatant Commands: Supporting the Warfighter of Today and Tomorrow

The role of Combatant Commands is to provide authoritative direction and exercise command over assigned forces to carry out assigned missions. This includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics; and prescribing command relationships, assigning functions to

subordinate commanders, and employing assigned forces. DoD's nine Combatant Commands include six regional commands (NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, PACOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, and AFRICOM) and three functional commands (TRANSCOM, STRATCOM, and SOCOM).

Combatant Commanders are in the operational chain of command, which runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders. The Chairman, JCS, among other roles, transmits communications to and from the President and Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders, and vice versa. The CJCS also oversees the Combatant Commands and serves as their spokesman, especially on the operational requirements of their commands.

The Services interact with Combatant Commands in many ways on many levels to support joint operations. I would highlight two -- command relationships and resource allocation -- as representative of how Services support the warfighters of today and tomorrow.

Command Relationships are at the intersection of how Combatant Commands choose to organize subordinate commands, and how Services internally organize and present forces.

In general, regional Combatant Commands choose to organize forces in Land, Maritime, and Air domains within their assigned area; but both regional and functional Combatant Commands also task organize, with sub-unified commands or task forces for sub-regions, specific missions or functions.

Within the Air Force, Major Commands (MAJCOMs) exercise administrative command of Service forces in a regional or functional area, overseeing *inter alia* assigned units and personnel, training, logistical support, installations and housing, programming and budget execution, and administration of military justice. MAJCOMs may also be designated as component commands of the Combatant Commands, presenting a single face and administrative command structure through which to provide forces. For example, AF Special Operations Command is also the AF component command to SOCOM.

Within the MAJCOMs, Numbered Air Forces (NAFs) provide the operational level of command that are often designated or assigned joint operational responsibilities by the Combatant Commander. Within Pacific Air Forces, for example, the Commander, 5th AF is dual-hatted as the Commander, US Forces, Japan. Within AF Space Command, the Commander, 14th AF is designated by STRATCOM as the Joint Functional Component Commander for Space.

These "dual-hatting" relationships make great sense as an efficient way to bridge the Service and Combatant Command command elements. At the same time, they deserve close scrutiny to ensure there is no unnecessary layering or duplication and,

within the Services, that MAJCOM- and NAF-equivalent responsibilities are well-defined.

Secretary Gates' 2011 mandate for greater efficiencies spurred the Air Force to re-examine its headquarters overhead at all levels, including the Secretariat and Air Staff, MAJCOMs, NAFs, and down to the Wing level.

Numerous reductions and realignments were made in the Secretariat and Air Staff, and some functions were moved to Field Operating Activities or assigned to MAJCOMs, with overall net reductions in personnel.

Personnel management functions at the Wing and MAJCOM levels were moved and consolidated within the Air Force Personnel Center. MAJCOM installation support functions, along with separate services, contracting, and engineering agencies, were moved and consolidated in a new AF Installation & Mission Support Center attached to Air Force Materiel Command.

NAFs were restructured, focused in part on situations where MAJCOM and NAF headquarters were co-located. As a result, PACAF and USAFE eliminated 13th and 17th AF respectively, realigning their functions within the MAJCOM headquarters with a net reduction in personnel and general officer billets. These changes were coordinated with the respective Combatant Commanders to ensure consistency with the Commanders' organizational scheme for subordinate commands.

The Air Force also consolidated various ISR units and intelligence support activities into a new NAF – 25th AF, assigned to Air Combat Command, providing better, cleaner force presentation to all Combatant Commands and the Intelligence Community for ISR support.

All these changes resulted in net personnel reductions enabling the AF to achieve an overall 20% reduction in its major headquarters activities as one part of the 5-year, \$34 billion in AF efficiencies achieved under Secretary Gates' initiative.

In summary, the intersection of Service and Combatant Command command relationships is critical to the proper alignment of Service forces under unified command. The Services need to create internal command arrangements that satisfy both efficiency in their administrative command and OT&E responsibilities, and effectiveness in their presentation of forces and in satisfying the operational command requirements as defined by the nine Combatant Commanders.

Reviewing this intersection between the command relationships of four Services and nine Combatant Commands is very pertinent to Congressional and DoD interest in improving the efficiency of DoD's major headquarters activities.

Recommendation: DoD and Congress review Service and Combatant Command command relationships, with four important caveats. 1)

Avoid generalizations: command relationships are unique to each Service and Combatant Command. 2) Don't assume that complex command arrangements reflect duplicative or unnecessary staff: dual-hatting (even triple-hatting where allies are involved) often makes good sense. 3) Don't assume opportunities for major savings: review and take stock of previously harvested savings and efficiencies. And 4) Congress should not legislate command relationships.

Resource Allocation: Balancing Today's Readiness and Tomorrow's Capabilities.

Warfighter needs are expressed through multiple channels in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system– DoD's primary resource allocation process. For example, Combatant Commands express needs through Requests for Forces (RFFs), Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), and Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs), and occasionally in less formal submissions as well. And Service component commanders and staff bring insights into the Combatant Commands' force and capability requirements from their Service and, in effect, advocate for the Combatant Commanders' needs in developing the Service's annual Program Objectives Memorandum (POM).

At the DoD level, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is charged with integrating the Combatant Commanders' needs, serving as their spokesman; preparing resource constrained strategic plans; advising the Secretary of Defense on strengths and deficiencies in force capabilities, force and capability requirements; and (when necessary) providing the Secretary with alternative program and budget recommendations that would better conform to Combatant Command needs. The Chairman does this through various channels, including the Joint Staff Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J-8), a critical link with OSD's Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) as OSD and the Joint Staff together review Service program and budget proposals in the PPBE process.

Among the critical resource allocation choices for the Services are those between the capacity and readiness of today's forces, and investing in more modern capabilities for the future; and Combatant Commands are customers for both.

To the extent today's needs are not being met due to shortages (e.g. Low Density / High Demand (LD/HD) forces), Combatant Commands favor building more capacity, because more capacity would increase their prospects for receiving more assigned forces, and for mission success. Combatant Commanders also expect that forces assigned from the Services are ready, not lacking in training or sustainability; and that the Services will fulfill this obligation. Especially in the current strategic environment, where there are multiple on-going operations and high demand for forces, sustaining capacity and readiness are urgent Combatant Command needs.

To the extent Combatant Commands can see and understand the benefits of future capabilities or technologies, they favor their development and acquisition. But here, the Combatant Commands are largely dependent on the connectivity between their

Service components, Service R&D elements, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to keep them informed of emerging technologies and their potential benefit to future operational capability. Combatant Commanders and staffs also understand that the Services and DARPA may be seeking their endorsement for new programs to gain advantage in the broader competition for scarce resources. As new technologies mature, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and its link with the USD(AT&L) in the acquisition process, provide additional Joint input during review of Service-proposed procurement programs.

The bottom line, however, is that while Combatant Commands play an important role in setting demand signals by defining force and capability requirements, and are consumers of ready forces, strategic decisions on how to allocate resources and risks ultimately belong to the Secretary of Defense based on the advice of his OSD principal staff assistants and military advisors (i.e. the CJCS/JCS/Joint Staff), and the Services' senior civilian leadership.

Overall, DoD's ability to support the warfighters of today and tomorrow is dependent on sufficient appropriations from Congress. But in the context of roles and functions across DoD's major headquarters activities, these assigned responsibilities and the organizational relationships established in DoD's key management processes ensure there is joint input and review in Service resource allocation and acquisition. They provide Combatant Commands a necessary link and voice, but are also intended to keep Combatant Commands focused on their deterrence, warfighting, planning, and engagement responsibilities, minimizing the need for these headquarters to have large programming staffs duplicating the work of their Service force providers.

At the same time, the Combatant Commands need J-8 functions to interact with the Joint Staff and Services on matters related to program evaluation and resource allocation. The size and scope of Combatant Command J-8s will vary according to the command's mission, and especially so for the functional commands – SOCOM, STRATCOM, and TRANSCOM.

Recommendation: In review of major headquarters activities, recommend DoD and Congress review the purpose and size of Combatant Command J-8 functions to ensure they are not duplicating program and resource activities that are the primary responsibilities of others.

Other Issues Concerning Military Departments and Combatant Commands

Do We Need to Establish New Services for Space, Cyber, or Special Operations?

Periodically, it is asked whether we need to create new Services in response to a rapidly changing technology and security environment. There is no agreed test or threshold for establishing a new Service, nor is there a clear and consistent history

that suggests when this organizational option is appropriate. In 1947, for example, the Department of the Air Force was established in response to 40 years of rapid, astonishing advances in aviation technology and the progressive growth and evolution of air doctrine, culture, and organization within the US Army. But there was no new Service created with the discovery of nuclear fission, or when further advances in aviation and missile technology opened up the domain of space.

Institutional responses to new threats or technology can take many forms.

Important factors to consider might include:

- Maturity of the mission / function / domain and readiness to assume the full scope of OT&E functions performed by the Services (e.g. doctrine, training, logistics, infrastructure, R&D, Procurement, etc.)
- Relative size in personnel needs / resources – Does this exceed the capabilities, or is it overwhelming other military functions, of the existing Service host(s)? And,
- Whether this activity can be separated out of the Services without disrupting their ability to fulfill other assigned functions.

Often, the motivation for a new component is more attention and more money: the belief that a new component out from under its current host, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, would be more likely to get the management attention and resources perceived by its advocates as essential to a new, important area.

The arguments in favor of a new Service would be that it requires dedicated, component-level focus, resources, and leadership for critical capabilities that would otherwise receive insufficient attention within a larger component with multiple responsibilities. As a central feature of DoD's organizational design, however, establishment of a new Service has been and should remain a very high threshold, and we should consider all the alternatives.

If the needs related to this activity were oriented toward the integration of its warfighting elements, then new command arrangements in the joint system might be a better solution. Alternatively, where new, emerging needs are focused on supporting capabilities and more efficient resource management with more business and less military content, then a Defense Agency might be an appropriate course of action. Importantly, whatever structural or organizational solution(s) are considered best, linkages with the roles and responsibilities of other DoD staffs and components should be identified, de-conflicted, and made clear.

Given the current management and resource environment, however, I find the arguments opposing new Services more persuasive. Further sub-division of the four Services to create another Service would yield more headquarters, duplicating OT&E and staff functions already provided for; and each new component further complicates the coordination required among and across DoD's approximately 45 components. And any new Service would further spread scarce budget resources

across more organizations and weaken integrated decision-making. This would further complicate the work of DoD leadership, pushing more resource tradeoffs upwards to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

In each of the cases at issue (space, cyber, and special operations), DoD has made reasonable choices focused on the integration of warfighting capabilities, creating joint command arrangements and leaving the development of capabilities and OT&E responsibilities to the four Services.

Creation of a new Service seems a deeper, more expensive, and more permanent commitment. In recent practice, in response to new technologies or the need for new capabilities, creating new staff functions, agencies, and command arrangements has thus far proven to be more attractive and flexible over time.

Can the Services be operated more effectively and/or efficiently? I support consolidation of the Secretariat and Service staffs within each Military Department to promote greater effectiveness and efficiency.

Current arrangements have a long history and the benefit of strong alignment with the existing structure of a separate OSD and Joint Staff at the DoD level, with their undersecretaries and a common military staff structure, respectively. Nonetheless, the abiding presence of two staffs in the same headquarters (three in the Department of the Navy) has periodically been a source of both tension and confusion, both internally within the respective Services, and externally to those with whom the Services interact. It is duplicative in several areas and, generally, inefficient.

Various recommendations for reduction or elimination of staff duplication in the Service headquarters were proposed by the 1960 Symington Committee, the 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, and the 1978 Ignatius Report. During the consideration of Goldwater-Nichols, House legislative drafts favored the integration of Service headquarters while the Senate opposed it; and the final agreement left separate staffs intact with some changes. The 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces concluded that Service Secretaries and Chiefs would be better served by a single staff of experienced civilians and uniformed officers; and the 2004 CSIS *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* Phase 1 Report echoed this recommendation.

Some useful changes have been made without legislation. Indeed, current law provides some flexibility for Service Secretaries to assign and/or move functions between the two staffs. Since 2002, the Army has sought a closer integration of its two headquarters staffs through General Orders. A recent Air Force decision to move its A-8 programming function to the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management was a sensible step that closed a seam between programming and budgeting databases -- providing more coherence and efficiency in resource allocation and budget execution. However, more fundamental changes offering greater effectiveness and efficiency will require changes in law.

Consolidation of the Service headquarters staffs within individual Military Departments would help eliminate some unnecessary or counter-productive seams. For example, separation of the Secretariats' Acquisition functions from Service staffs' Logistics functions runs counter to sound life-cycle management for weapon systems. In this instance, staff consolidations could potentially present a single Service office to interact with the USD(AT&L), and with the Services' own major commands which perform both acquisition and logistics functions. Another example is the unnecessary effort to distinguish policy and oversight in the Secretariats from Service staffs' management of nearly identical functional areas of responsibility, such as Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel.

Historically, when the subject of consolidation has arisen in the past, the civilian appointees are concerned the military staff is trying to eliminate the Secretariat, and the uniformed military is concerned the presence of civilian appointees in a single staff will interfere with what they perceive as a clear command chain within the military Service staff. The results have been strained civil-military relations and only limited progress toward greater efficiency.

Going forward, once again considering consolidation, Congress could increase the prospects for success by sustaining the principles of effective civilian control and independent military advice and ensuring Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff have universal access to all elements of the single headquarters staff.

The system of civilian Service secretaries and assistant secretaries should be retained because they are net value added to the Secretary of Defense and to the Service headquarters. While it is true that the Secretary of Defense exercises civilian control through delegated authority to Under Secretaries of Defense and other OSD officials in various functional areas, none of these Under Secretaries has the full scope of responsibilities necessary to oversee a Military Department. And working together in the most optimistic circumstances, these OSD officials bring many disparate views to the table. In short, I do not believe the Secretary of Defense can exercise effective civilian control over Military Departments through the OSD staff alone.

Based on my experience in both OSD and the Air Force, the size and scope of the Military Departments and the issues that arise within them warrant a parallel structure of civilian control in OSD and the Services. Ensuring the Secretary of Defense's direction and intent is understood and implemented at the Service level, overseeing the promotion and assignment of senior personnel, overseeing resource allocation and program execution, and holding senior civilian and military officials accountable for their performance and conduct are among the leadership functions that benefit from strong civilian control within the Military Department headquarters.

Provide the Service Chief unfettered access to any and all Military Department headquarters staff for the purpose of developing military advice as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is an essential element of any Service headquarters consolidation and can be accomplished through a legislative provision to that effect. Specifically, it would ensure that the Service chief would have access to military personnel within any staff function without interference, regardless of whether such function is led by an Assistant Secretary or another senior civilian. In practice, this should present no issue since the Plans and Operations functions on the military staff have no counterpart in the Service Secretariats and would likely continue to be led by General/Flag Officers.

Maintain a Mix of Appointees, Uniformed Personnel, and Career Civilians. In addition, it is important to recognize that creating a single headquarters staff is not a choice between civilian or military staffs. The Secretariats include many uniformed officers, including senior officers in functions designated in law as the sole responsibility of the Secretary – for example, Acquisition, Financial Management, Legislative Affairs, and Public Affairs. Likewise, the military staff contains Senior Executive Service civilians who provide deep expertise and continuity, compensating for the high personnel turnover associated with military rotations. And civilian appointees bring different and useful DoD, congressional, or industry experience and skill sets, currently atypical in a military career, that complement those of uniformed leaders and career civilians.

In my experience, the Service Secretary benefits from a strong partnership with the Service Chief, and the Service Chief benefits from having a strong civilian partner in the Service Secretary. Overall, the Service headquarters benefits from this mix of political appointees, uniformed personnel, and career civilians.

Consolidation of Military Department headquarters staffs has been in the "good idea, but too hard" box for many years and will require a careful approach. It has a long history and great potential for missteps. Congress should take a deliberate approach, provide time for the Services to carefully prepare legislative proposals, and take a closer look at the details before signing up to the concept. Congress should, as much as possible, also provide for uniformity across the Military Department headquarters as was done during Goldwater-Nichols, while accommodating the special circumstances of two Services in the Department of the Navy.

Recommendation: Consolidate Military Department headquarters staffs as proposed to help improve unity of effort, effectiveness, and efficiency; and present a single Service headquarters structure to the field. Retain the benefits of strong civilian alignment with OSD and military alignment with the Joint Staff and other military staffs.

Does DoD Need More, or Fewer, Combatant Commands? The US military needs Unified Combatant Commands. Over 60 years of combat experience has proven that no single service can conduct effective operations without assistance from others,

and more recent experience demonstrates that 21st century warfare crosses multiple domains and regions.

Moreover, we have tried the alternatives. Experience showed that “specified” combatant commands led by a single service (e.g. Strategic Air Command and Military Airlift Command) did not produce sufficient integration of effort and, of necessity, needed to evolve to a higher, unified level. And ad hoc task forces for multi-service operations did not work as well as joint commands with trained staffs and a full-time focus on joint force integration (e.g. the evolution from Rapid Deployment Force to Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to CENTCOM).

Current concerns are focused on the number of Combatant Commands and the size of their headquarters staffs.

Service Chiefs, as members of the JCS, have important roles to play in weighing the pros and cons of new joint commands and advising the Secretary of Defense. This is because any new Combatant Command will need to be staffed by personnel from across the Services. In addition, the Services act as Executive Agents for Combatant Command headquarters with responsibility for funding and administration of these activities on Service installations.³ In this sense, the Services act as an internal brake on unconstrained growth in the joint system.

Informally, it appears DoD has been limiting its Unified Command Plan (UCP) to around 9-10 commands. The post 9/11 creation of NORTHCOM in 2002 was part of a restructuring that disestablished SPACECOM and assigned space functions to STRATCOM, resulting in no net increase in the number of commands. Importantly, other 2002 UCP changes included the assignment of countries previously outside the purview of any regional command; thus for the first time providing the UCP with global coverage.

In considering whether to split-off Africa from EUCOM’s area of responsibility and find the resources for a new headquarters, the creation of AFRICOM in 2008 was ‘on the cusp’. With continuing instability in the horn of Africa, the emergence of Al Qaida-affiliated groups in the Maghreb, a growing war on terrorism, and the need to develop indigenous African military capabilities, it was clear there were multiple political-military issues to address in a new command. But it was also clear that a new AFRICOM would not have assigned forces (though USSOCOM assets would routinely operate within the region), and its headquarters would be different from other commands, staffed with more non-military, interagency personnel.

And in 2010, when Secretary Gates’ efficiency initiatives included a review of joint headquarters, it was determined that the UCP could live without Joint Forces Command. Thus, AFRICOM was last “in” and JFCOM was last “out”.

³ DoD Directive 5100.3, *Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands*, February 2011.

In assessing the future of the six regional commands, I would not recommend any changes. It has taken a long time to achieve global coverage in a reasonable configuration, which should be considered important progress; and adjustments on the boundaries can be expected in the normal course of business. The option of merging NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM into an "Americas" or "Western Hemisphere" command mixes very different missions and would dilute necessary focus on the homeland. Given the dynamic strategic environment in Europe, it doesn't make sense to reverse course and reassign AFRICOM to EUCOM, and the US would pay some political price with new African partners if it did so.

Among the functional commands, CYBERCOM – currently a sub-unified command within STRATCOM -- appears poised to emerge as the tenth Combatant Command. This long-debated development involves highly complex relationships between DoD and the Intelligence Community, and within the UCP itself. Some of the UCP implications are discussed below.

What changes to the Joint system should be considered? Given this perspective that the number and type of Combatant Commands is roughly correct, the preferred way to manage them is to maintain close control over assigned forces and LD/HD assets, and how well their staffs are resourced. Congress should expect DoD to carefully review the size of Combatant Command headquarters and each of their staff directorates, and make choices on which to staff more or less robustly according to their mission and need.

I would not recommend DoD change, nor Congress legislate, staff structure (i.e. J-1 thru J-x). The existing structure provides an important, common framework across all military staffs and provides basis for communication and process interaction in both operational and administrative contexts. Sizing decisions for staff directorates simply need to accommodate differences in Combatant Command missions, and between the Combatant Commands and other components. In addition to differences in the J-8 functions previously discussed, for example, a Combatant Command J-1 (personnel office) performs a substantially smaller and more discrete personnel function than is found in Military Departments. Finally, any such review of Combatant Command headquarters should ensure all commands maintain sufficient resources to support their core capabilities for planning and executing joint operations.

Joint Intelligence Operations Centers and the regional centers for security studies, such as the George C. Marshall Center in EUCOM, and the Asia-Pacific Center in PACOM, also deserve close attention. These are subordinate components or direct-reporting units, technically not part of the Combatant Commands' headquarters but nonetheless resource-intensive elements within Combatant Commands' scope of responsibilities. I strongly support the alignment of these intelligence and security studies centers within their respective commands. Nonetheless, due to their size, I

recommend they be re-validated as necessary and appropriate for Combatant Commands.

Recommendation: DoD and Congress should review the size and composition of each Combatant Command headquarters and their supporting elements.

Just as President Eisenhower noted in 1958, and Goldwater-Nichols later reinforced, that “*Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever...*” we should recognize today that single theater warfare has been rapidly fading in the shadow of transnational threats and globalization. In addition, new and more demanding roles for Combatant Commands have emerged that should be recognized and accommodated.

More important than how many or what type of commands DoD has is how well they work together -- a matter of increasing urgency given the current security environment.

Hybrid warfare, constant cyber attacks, and terrorists and non-state actors with global reach crisscross artificial regional command boundaries and keep CYBERCOM and SOCOM continuously engaged in world-wide operations. Attacks on the US could well begin in the silent domains of space and cyber with effects in NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility. And regional military commands are but one element in a larger fabric of US government and international engagement and collaboration in meeting contemporary challenges and threats to international security.

The Combatant Commands’ role in “engagement” has evolved since the 1986 enactment of Goldwater-Nichols. They are still responsible for integrating joint US combat and support capabilities, but now in addition they are serving as senior US military representatives in developing international partners and conducting planning for coalition operations. This role helps extend the international reach of the CJCS in counterpart relations, providing for more regular interaction with regional allies and partners at the strategic level, and deeper military-to-military relationships in critical areas such as missile defense.

I strongly endorse this role for the Combatant Commanders. Critics note the US military can become too dominant in regional affairs that more properly belong to the State Department. Where that may occur, the answer is not to diminish the military engagement, but to increase diplomatic and other interagency capabilities and resources necessary to support the full scope of US interests in the region.

Today’s security environment requires us to take joint commands to new levels of operational competency, including more coordination and collaboration with other US government agencies, and increasing collaboration with international partners and allies. And we need to move in these directions, if possible, without increasing the total number of personnel in Combatant Command headquarters.

Recommendation: DoD and Congress should support the evolution of Combatant Command headquarters to accommodate increasing collaboration with US government agencies and international partners.

We also need to recognize that, in the current security environment, cross-domain, cross-regional, and cross-functional operations put higher demands on our ability to integrate the work of multiple Combatant Commands, further complicating the web of “supported- supporting” command relationships.

Within the current UCP, STRATCOM, in addition to its foundational mission of nuclear deterrence, has multiple global missions/responsibilities to bring to bear, including Space, Global C4ISR, Cyber, Counter-WMD, Global Missile Defense, and Global Strike. And much-needed, integrated perspectives on how these domains and missions should be defended and exploited in today’s complex environment are still in development. Under current arrangements, while the relationships among STRATCOM’s many global missions and their “supporting-supported” relationships to other Combatant Commands have not been developed to their full potential, these global tools have at least been kept in the same Command bag. Thus, any realignment of global functions (such as CYBER) away from STRATCOM will create additional command seams that will need to be addressed.

In this context, the US needs to enhance strategic planning for global operations in which multiple regional and functional commands will be operating simultaneously. And in the midst of this demanding environment, we need robust gaming, joint training, and exercises across Combatant Commands that will facilitate the test and evaluation of new operating concepts and validate plans.

Recommendation: In the aftermath of disestablishing JFCOM, Congress should ask whether DoD has in place the mechanisms and resources for joint experimentation.

The question arises: who has the responsibility for integrating the Combatant Commands’ work and do they have sufficient authority and resources for this purpose? In my judgment, the Chairman, JCS, in coordination with the USD(P), has the responsibility and sufficient authority for this work. The Chairman is responsible for overseeing the Combatant Commands, for being their spokesman, and for developing resource constrained strategic plans. The Chairman establishes rules and procedures for the Joint community, including areas such as the Joint Strategic Planning System, and Joint Doctrine. The Chairman also functions within the chain of command and assists the President and Secretary of Defense in their command functions.

Together, I believe these assigned duties are sufficient for the Chairman to coordinate and direct the integration of Combatant Command planning; and if not, sufficient authority is only a short distance away through a targeted delegation of

authority from the Secretary of Defense. A contrary view, however, is that the Chairman needs to be in the chain of command – requiring a change in law -- to exercise this authority.

Recommendation: DoD and Congress ensure the responsibility for development of strategic, integrated planning across all Combatant Commands is properly assigned with the necessary authorities and resources to support this work.

Conclusion

I support the consolidation of Service headquarters staffs, and reviews of Service and Combatant Command command arrangements, and Combatant Command staffs and support components, for greater efficiencies.⁴ We must also act to ensure the necessary responsibilities, authorities, and resources are in place within the joint system to meet the demands of the current security environment.

Congress should partner with DoD in all this work, choose carefully and jointly to set priorities, generate mutual confidence, and enhance prospects for successful implementation of any resulting reforms. Not all improvements require new law, and many opportunities for improvement fall within DoD's existing authorities.

However, the biggest problems in supporting the warfighter are not in the headquarters, they are in the corridors of Congress. Specifically, the inability of Congress to reach consensus on stable funding for defense sufficient to respond to a rapidly changing threat environment, improve readiness, and finance badly needed modernization across the force; and Congressional opposition to base closures and force structure adjustments recommended by military leaders that would permit the Services to shift scarce resources to meet changing needs and accelerate the acquisition of new capabilities.

There will always be a need for greater efficiency in DoD, and I commend the DoD leadership and Congress for keeping up this pressure. And there will always be shortages: we have never had the resources needed to do everything that prudent and cautious military leaders think necessary to do. Transferring the savings from headquarters efficiencies and other reforms to combat capabilities is a model we should pursue, but these savings and efficiencies alone will not close the business case. To meet the demands of the current strategic environment and support the warfighters of today and tomorrow, DoD will need more resources and flexibility to sustain and in some areas increase capacity, to rebuild readiness, and to modernize the force.

Thank you for this opportunity to present my views.

⁴ While not considered for this hearing, I also recommend close review of OSD, Joint Staff, and Defense Agency headquarters.