Advance Policy Questions for Frank G. Klotz, Nominee to be Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy, and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration

Duties and Qualifications

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)?

I served on active duty in the U.S. military for nearly 39 years. The majority of my assignments dealt either with nuclear field operations—including maintenance, security, and safety—or with nuclear policymaking at the national and international levels.

I have also had extensive experience leading large organizations with technically-complex missions and a diverse, highly-skilled workforce. As the first commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, I helped establish and lead a brand-new organization that merged responsibility for all U.S. nuclear-capable bombers and missiles under a single chain-of-command. Within the space of only 14 months, we defined the organization's vision and values, recruited 800 highly-talented professionals into a new headquarters, took charge of 5 major installations and 23,000 people; and strengthened accountability at all levels. Earlier in my career, I was second-in-command of Air Force Space Command when it had responsibility for the Nation's intercontinental ballistic missile force. At that time, AFSPC comprised 39,400-persons charged with responsibility for developing, acquiring and operating a global network of launch, satellite control, communications, and missile warning facilities.

Since retiring from active duty, I have worked as a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and participated in several "Track 2" conferences and workshops, most notably with the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. These activities have deepened my understanding of the nuclear capabilities and policies of other nations, as well as the dangers posed by nuclear proliferation, regional arms races, and the threat of nuclear terrorism.

All of these experiences bear directly on NNSA's broad mission set, as well as the challenges of leading an organization of its size and scope. I am grateful to President Obama and Secretary Moniz for their trust and confidence in providing me an opportunity to continue to serve and contribute to the critically important tasks of ensuring that our Nation's nuclear arsenal remains safe, secure and effective, and enhancing nuclear security across the globe.

What changes, if any, do you anticipate in these duties, if you are confirmed for the position?

I do not anticipate any changes to these duties of Under Secretary for Nuclear Security or NNSA Administrator if I am confirmed.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?

Based on my previous operational and policymaking positions within the Nation's nuclear enterprise—including leadership of large, technically complex organizations—I personally believe that I am ready now to assume the duties of Under Secretary for Nuclear Security. However, I have always believed in the need for and value of life-long learning and constantly seeking new, innovative solutions. If confirmed, I will immediately and continuously engage with all elements of the NNSA enterprise — specially the directors of the national security laboratories, plants, headquarters, and field offices — to broaden and deepen my understanding of NNSA's capabilities, requirements, and challenges. I also intend to regularly consult with members of Congress and their staffs to better understand their concerns and to benefit from their insights on NNSA, its mission, and its issues.

Assuming you are confirmed, what additional or new duties and functions, if any, do you expect that the Secretary of Energy would prescribe for you other than those described above?

The Secretary of Energy has not indicated to me that he intends to prescribe any additional or new duties and functions. However, if confirmed, I would serve at the pleasure of the President and Secretary of Energy and in accordance with the laws enacted by Congress, and would obviously perform any additional or new duties and functions they might assign.

Relationships

If confirmed, how will you work with the following officials in carrying out your duties:

The Secretary of Energy

I share Secretary of Energy Moniz's strong belief in the importance of NNSA's mission and its many contributions to the Nation's security, as well as the urgent need to address program management, cost overruns, and security. If confirmed, I will work with him in a collaborative manner and, as stipulated in the NNSA Act, "subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary."

The Deputy Secretary of Energy

If confirmed, I will also work closely with Deputy Secretary Dan Poneman and subject to the "authority, direction and control" delegated by the Secretary to the Deputy Secretary in accordance with the NNSA Act.

The Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration

I consider the Deputy Administrators—along with the directors of the national security laboratories, plants, and field offices—as an integral part of NNSA's leadership team. If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy Administrators and Associate Administrators to promote better internal communication and collaboration; clarify lines of authority, responsibility and accountability; eliminate duplication of effort and streamline processes; and, professionally develop the NNSA workforce and recognize its employees for their important contributions to the organization and to the Nation.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the USD (AT&L) on a wide range of issues, including sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; countering the threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation; and, enhancing capabilities to manage nuclear incidents both domestically and abroad. Additionally, I am committed to fostering a renewed sense of trust and partnership between the NNSA and the Department of Defense, both through the effective operation of the Nuclear Weapons Council, as well as open and collaborative interaction by the staffs of both departments. I have worked closely with OSD (AT&L) in the past and have enormous respect for the expertise and professionalism of its leadership and personnel.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

If confirmed, I will work closely with the USD (P) in providing technical advice on nuclear weapons systems and capabilities to help inform their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on issues related to the Nation's current and future nuclear weapons requirements, countering the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and providing assistance and extending deterrence to allies and partner nations. I have worked closely with the USD (P) in the past, including Under Secretary Jim Miller, and have enormous respect for the expertise and professionalism of its leadership and personnel.

The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Navy and Air Force. Both are major "customers" of NNSA. In addition to formal interaction though the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) and the NWC's Standing and Safety Committee, I will emphasize the importance of maintaining open lines of communications between NNSA headquarters, the national security laboratories, and the plants, on the one hand, and the military services, on the other, to ensure the latter's requirements are fully understood and properly met in NNSA's plans, programs and operations.

The Commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command by building upon past associations and understanding of their mission, and promoting collaboration in dealing with current and future requirements.

During the course of my military career, I worked extensively with USSTRATCOM on several different levels, including as commander of its Task 214 and as commander of a major service component. I also previously worked with USNORTHCOM in developing plans for nuclear/radiological incident response and consequence management, and participating in NORTHCOM-led exercises.

In addition to formal interaction with the Vice Chairman, JCS, and USSTRATCOM though the NWC, I will emphasize the importance of maintaining open lines of communications between the NNSA, the national security laboratories and the plants, on the one hand, and USTRATCOM and NORTHCOM, on the other, to ensure the latter's requirements are fully understood and properly met in NNSA's plans, programs and operations.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the ASD (SOLIC) on matters related to joint DOD-NNSA capabilities to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism. Though I have not yet been briefed on the details, I understand that the partnership between the special operations community and NNSA is unique in government, and vital to protecting our national security interests.

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs

If confirmed, I will work closely with the ASD (NCB) on key issues on the agenda of the NWC and its Standing and Safety Committee. I have worked closely with ASD (NCB) in several past assignments, including Assistant Secretary Andy Weber, and have enormous respect for the expertise and professionalism of its leadership and personnel.

The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

As the implementation arm of the DoD's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and as a major research and development partner, it will be essential to maintain a close and productive working relationship with the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. I understand that cooperation between NNSA and DTRA is facilitated through regular program coordination meetings under which a variety of working groups collaborate on specific program development, ranging from joint research to developing the most effective ways to implement border security programs. I have worked closely with DTRA in the past, including its Director Ken Myers and have enormous respect for the expertise and professionalism of DTRA's leadership and personnel.

The Director of National Intelligence and other senior leaders of the Intelligence Community

I understand that NNSA has a close and long-standing relationship with the Intelligence Community based on NNSA's unique understanding of nuclear weapon capabilities and the contributions of the national security laboratories to broader national security missions. If confirmed, I will continue and strengthen this relationship.

Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with responsibilities for nuclear homeland security matters

I understand that NNSA has a close and long-standing relationship with the Department of Homeland Security based on NNSA's unique understanding of nuclear weapon capabilities and the contributions of the national security laboratories to broader national security missions. If confirmed, I will work closely with DHS officials on nuclear counterterrorism issues, radiological/nuclear incident consequence management, and support to National Operations Center (NOC).

Officials in the Department of State with responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation matters

If confirmed, I will coordinate closely with the Department of State on issues related to arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, export controls, securing nuclear and radiological materials worldwide, and border security. I have worked closely with the State Department in the past, including serving as Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State, two assignments to overseas diplomatic posts (U.S. Mission to NATO and U.S. Embassy Moscow), as a consultant to Acting Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, and currently as a member of the Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board (ISAB). I have enormous personal respect for the expertise and professionalism of its leadership and personnel.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the NNSA?

The NNSA has a unique responsibility for pursuing two different, but complementary principles that have traditionally guided American nuclear weapons policy. The first is that the United States must continue to lead international efforts to limit and reduce nuclear arsenals, prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and secure nuclear materials across the globe. The second is that appropriately-sized nuclear forces still play an essential role in protecting U.S. and allied security interests, even as the United States seeks to reduce the overall number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security policy. As President Obama and leaders in Congress have repeatedly emphasized, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, security and effective nuclear arsenal.

In discharging this responsibility, NNSA performs enormously important work each and every day. Its successes go largely unheralded. It has made tremendous progress in helping to achieve the President's goal of securing vulnerable nuclear materials around the globe. It is delivering the life-extended W76-1 warhead to the Navy on schedule. And, it is currently transferring work at the Kansas City plant into a new, modern facility that will greatly improve efficiency—and that was constructed on time and on budget.

That said, escalating costs in several major programs and capital construction projects are cause for serious concern, especially as pressures on government spending continue to mount. Additionally, a widely-publicized security lapse at a key NNSA facility last year raises questions about the overall health of the security and safety culture within the broader enterprise.

Restoring trust in NNSA's ability to deliver on its commitments requires strong leadership focus on managing costs to deliver capability for less expense. It also requires re-building partnerships between the headquarters and the field; between federal employees and the contractor workforce at the laboratories and plants; and between NNSA and the Congress and the Department of Defense.

It is critical that all of these issues are addressed while placing a strong priority on improving security and safety across the NNSA enterprise.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

To accomplish those things, NNSA must improve its accountability; performance—including project management, planning and cost estimating processes; improve the way it does business; and invest in the future of its enterprise. The NNSA must meet a host of nuclear security requirements while ensuring the best value for taxpayer dollars and balancing priorities among many unique nuclear security activities.

I expect to draw upon my recent experience as the first commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. In the wake of security incidents and cost overruns, NNSA currently faces a situation similar in many respects to what the Air Force encountered in 2007 when several widely-publicized lapses raised concerns about its stewardship of the nuclear enterprise. When we subsequently established Global Strike Command, our first task was to establish clear lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability. We also placed strong emphasis on strengthening the safety and security culture, while at the same time streamlining processes and eliminating needlessly burdensome, non-value-added activities that stood in the way of our people and their incentive to innovate. Finally, we continually emphasized that everyone in the organization, regardless of job, or rank, or seniority was a valued member of the team and that her or his work was absolutely essential to success. If confirmed, this is the leadership approach I intend to bring to NNSA.

The military services often say that people are their most important asset. It's true; and, it applies to NNSA as well. Highly trained, experienced and motivated scientists, engineers, technicians and security personnel are essential to performing the many highly complex and technically challenging tasks associated with the nuclear security enterprise. If confirmed, I will be guided by the principle of "Mission first, people always." To this end, I will be an unrelenting champion for the professional development and personal welfare of everyone associated with NNSA—including recruiting and mentoring the next generation of leaders and experts.

If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

If confirmed, I will place immediate emphasis in working with the Secretary, as well as the directors of the national security laboratories, plants and field offices, to (1) clarify lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability within the entire NNSA enterprise, and (2) identify steps to streamline business processes and eliminate needlessly burdensome, non-value-added activities that stand in the way of NNSA's people and their incentive to innovate. I will likewise focus with intensity on adopting measures to dramatically improve NNSA's capabilities for cost estimation, program management, and oversight of capital construction projects. I will ensure full attention is being devoted at all levels to ensuring the safety and security of NNSA's people and facilities, particularly in light of the security breach at Y-12 National Security Complex last summer. Finally, I will personally reach out to as many NNSA employees as possible and in as short a time as possible to communicate the continued importance of NNSA's work, to hear their views and concerns, and to thank them for their contribution to our Nation's security.

Do you believe it is important to ensure a unique organizational identity for the NNSA within the Department of Energy? What steps would you take to ensure such an identity if confirmed?

I do. Through the NNSA Act, Congress established NNSA as a semi-autonomous part of the Department of Energy. In my past assignments, I have always been an ardent champion of the organizations and people entrusted to my leadership and care. I am committed to doing the same as Under Secretary for National Security and NNSA Administrator. At the same time, I also believe that common, enterprise-wide standards and best practices that reduce costs and improve efficiency, safety and security should be adopted and implemented when they make sense. I will work closely with the Secretary of Energy and consult with members of Congress and their staffs in considering such opportunities while at the same time and ensuring that NNSA fulfills its unique role and responsibilities.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish to address the issues that confront the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the NNSA?

If confirmed, my highest priority will be to ensure that NNSA delivers on its commitments to national security objectives. This includes ensuring the Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile is safe, secure and effective now and in the future. It also includes working to ensure the NNSA is conducting leading-edge scientific research, preventing nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists and would-be proliferators, supporting the Navy's nuclear reactor program,

modernizing NNSA's capabilities and organization in today's fiscally constrained environment, and in protecting the safety and security of its sites, its employees, and the public.

Overall Management

What is your view on the relationship and the relative duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of Energy as found in the Atomic Energy Act and the Administrator of the NNSA?

By statute, the Secretary of Energy is responsible for establishing policy for the NNSA and may also direct DOE officials who are not within the NNSA to review the programs and activities of NNSA and to make recommendations to the Secretary regarding administration of those programs and activities, including consistency with similar programs and activities of DOE. The provisions governing the duties and responsibilities of the NNSA Administrator provide broad authority to manage the Administration, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary. I fully share Secretary Moniz's strong commitment to ensure that NNSA fulfills mission tasks enumerated in Sec. 3211 of the NNSA Act, while ensuring that all operations and activities are consistent with the principles of protecting the environment and safeguarding the safety and health of the public and workforce of NNSA.

Do you believe that there are any organizational structure issues in the NNSA that should be addressed to improve management and operations of the NNSA, or that you would address if confirmed?

NNSA faces several challenges, from concerns with project management and cost overruns to serious security lapses, which will need to be addressed. If confirmed, I plan to draw upon my recent experience as the first commander of Air Force Global Strike Command to establish clear lines of authority, responsibility and accountability, while also placing a strong emphasis on strengthening the safety and security culture. Additionally, I believe the partnerships between the headquarters and the field, and between federal employees and the laboratories and plants must be strengthened.

The NNSA and the Department of Energy have been plagued by cost overruns and project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear facilities, nuclear weapons modernization programs, and nuclear stockpile stewardship facilities.

How serious are these cost overruns in your view?

It is critical that NNSA's weapons modernization and infrastructure modernization efforts, including capital asset projects, deliver on cost and schedule; otherwise, it puts at risk its fundamental ability to execute its mission.

I understand that NNSA has recently taken steps designed to improve acquisition and project management for capital asset projects, and that projects less than $750M have been removed from GAO's High Risk List. If confirmed, I will focus on how the NNSA can apply the same acquisition and project management rigor to projects over $750M.

With regard to weapons modernization, the United States now has the oldest stockpile in its history and the smallest stockpile since the Eisenhower administration. As the NNSA enters a period increased work activity not seen since the Cold War, it must incorporate sound engineering judgments in even its earliest cost estimates. If confirmed, I will remain committed to these project management principles across all of NNSA's acquisitions and projects.

What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure they are not repeated in the future?

If confirmed, and in following the Secretary's vision, I will support strengthening and improving contract and project management across NNSA by:

- Strengthening rigorous and well-justified alternative assessments and evaluations;
- Strengthening cost estimating;
- Providing independent dedicated acquisition, project management, and oversight that aligns contract incentives with taxpayer interests;
- Providing clear lines of authority and accountability for federal and contractor personnel;
- Managing assigned projects within the original scope and cost baselines, ensuring completed projects meet mission requirements; and
- Improving cost and schedule performance.

Do you believe that the expertise of Department of Energy personnel serving outside the NNSA can be helpful to you if confirmed? If so, how do you expect to utilize this expertise if you are confirmed?

Yes. DOE possess a wealth of talent and innovative ideas across its entire enterprise. Its laboratory, plant and Federal employees work on some of the most technically complex projects in the Nation, delivering high quality projects safely. The NNSA should draw on DOE best practices, especially in the areas of planning, cost control, and project delivery.

Are you aware of any limitations on your authority, if confirmed, to draw on that expertise?

I am not aware of any limitations on my authority, if confirmed, to draw upon that expertise.

What is your view of the extent to which the NNSA is bound by the existing rules, regulations, and directives of the Department of Energy and what flexibility, if any, do you believe you would have in implementing such rules, regulations, and directives?

I understand the Department of Energy has an order that governs program and project management for the acquisition of capital assets. While I have not been briefed, pending confirmation, on its detailed application to NNSA activities, I certainly agree with the precept that rigorous project management principles should be applied and that the Federal staff must be given the tools they need and then be held accountable and responsible for delivering the work.

NNSA, in large measure, was created in response to security lapses at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. However, security lapses, particularly in 2012 at the Y-12 nuclear plant, have continued to occur. Section 3212(b)(10) of the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act provides that "the Administrator has authority over, and is responsible for all programs and activities of the Administration, including administration of contracts, including the management and operations of the nuclear weapons production facilities and the national security laboratories."

If confirmed, what would be your plan to make sure that security lapses do not continue at the NNSA facilities?

The 2012 security incident at Y-12 was totally unacceptable. The accounts of the DOE Inspector General, the "three wise men," and Major General Sandy Finan describe a security culture in which responsibility for the protective force and the physical security system was divided, security equipment was not repaired in a timely fashion, compensatory measures were inadequate and improperly executed, multiple nuisance alarms led to an attitude of complacency, and security was neither rigorously nor routinely exercised and evaluated. Security and safety are, in my opinion, paramount. If confirmed, strengthening security at NNSA facilities will be the top priority. I intend to draw on my experience as the first Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command to address the security culture that exists at NNSA. Working with the Secretary of Energy, I will ensure that authority is aligned with responsibility and effective communication exists between the NNSA headquarters and the field, and that there is accountability for performance at all levels. My understanding is NNSA is in the process of implementing improved oversight mechanisms, which include clarifying roles, authorities, and functions for the organization.

If confirmed, what policies would you institute to improve the manner in which managers of NNSA facilities deal with security matters?

Security of the nuclear enterprise is the responsibility of every employee of NNSA, regardless of job or rank, or in the field or headquarters. If confirmed, I will insist on strict adherence to DOE security standards and clarify lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability for meeting and maintaining those standards. The status of security systems (including all outages and estimated time of repair) will be monitored daily at NNSA headquarters; security deviations and corresponding compensatory measures will be reviewed by Federal officials both at the field and headquarters levels; security procedures and responses to alarms will be rigorously trained, exercised, and evaluated.

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs

What do you see are the highest priorities of the nuclear nonproliferation programs at NNSA?

One of the NNSA's most critical roles and responsibilities is developing policies and programs with other departments on behalf of the U.S. Government to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, materials, technology, and expertise. This includes international and domestic activities such as removing and eliminating excess weapons usable material; consolidating and securing vulnerable nuclear material; strengthening physical protection and material control; implementing a second line of defense to interdict nuclear trafficking; and controlling the export and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expertise. The NNSA is nearing completion of a remarkable four-year effort to implement the vision and call to action by President Obama and the Nuclear Security Summits. I understand NNSA is intently focused on a strategy and game plan for nuclear nonproliferation program for the coming years. If confirmed, I will fully support and champion these critically important mission.

The United States recently renewed the bilateral agreement with Russia for joint nuclear nonproliferation activities but a growing number of programs are focused on states other than the former Soviet Union.

Do you believe that there are additional opportunities for cooperation with states outside of the former Soviet Union, particularly the Middle East and North Africa? If confirmed what would be your priorities in these areas?

Yes. I understand that NNSA is actively engaged in more than 120 countries, including in the Middle East and North Africa, with projects to secure and remove nuclear and radiological materials; convert civilian research reactors and medical isotope production facilities from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU); safeguard and secure nuclear materials from theft; control the spread of WMD-related material and expertise; cooperate on Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence; and detect and interdict nuclear and radiological

trafficking. If confirmed, I would continue to prioritize nonproliferation efforts and ensure that NNSA programs achieve sustainable threat reduction.

What do you believe is the greatest challenge in the nuclear nonproliferation programs with Russia?

The greatest challenge with Russia is to ensure that Moscow fully assumes responsibility for all aspects of its own nuclear security by the end of 2017 (a deadline for the CTR Russia programs established in the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act). While Russia has made, and continues to make, significant improvements in its support for nuclear security, there is concern about the long-term ability and willingness of the Russian government to adequately fund nuclear security needs at the site and national levels. The level of risk-reduction achieved with U.S. support is significant and has been maintained through continued U.S. engagement and sustainability assistance. Continued engagement at the highest levels of government will be extremely important. If confirmed, I will ensure that NNSA continues to work with its Russian counterparts to prepare as fully as possible for the phase-out of U.S. financial assistance.

What do you believe are the greatest challenge in nuclear nonproliferation programs with countries other than Russia?

I believe there are a number of challenges outside of Russia, including significant stockpiles of HEU, global inventories of plutonium, and high-activity radiological sources that remain vulnerable to theft around the world. The existence of this material, in combination with the increasing sophistication of trafficking networks and the continued interest by states and non-state actors in acquiring nuclear materials, poses a serious threat to the security of the United States and its allies and partners.

Another significant challenge lies in promoting the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy while reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation. To this end, NNSA works in over 70 countries around the globe to strengthen nuclear safeguards and security and works closely with DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy to ensure that new technology and security advance together.

Finally, a major challenge NNSA faces in many of its international programs is the lack of infrastructure, resources, and technical capabilities in partner countries that often inhibit the level of cooperation or amount of assistance a country can or is willing to absorb.

In your view what are the three greatest unmet nuclear nonproliferation problems? Would you propose to address these needs if confirmed? What resources or cooperation would you need to meet such needs?

In my view, the three greatest unmet nuclear nonproliferation problems are: (1) non-compliance with international agreements and UN Security Council Resolutions, particularly by Iran, North Korea, and Syria; (2) ensuring terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon or weapons-usable material; and (3) minimizing the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear energy, including limiting the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology and ensuring that newcomer states have the resources and training to develop safe and secure nuclear programs.

If confirmed, I will work hard to ensure that NNSA maintains the technology, policy, and implementation competencies needed to inform and support a whole-of-government nonproliferation strategy as well as the rapid-response ability needed to mitigate threats at a moment's notice. The national security laboratories play a critical role in this regard.

Megaports

The megaports program is coordinated with other work that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is carrying out in foreign ports.

In your view are there opportunities to improve cooperation with DHS?

I understand that NNSA's Office of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) and DHS' Container Security Initiative (CSI) closely coordinate on their complementary yet distinct efforts at foreign seaports. To formalize this cooperation, SLD and CSI developed and implemented a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) document in December 2012. This SOP outlines areas of cooperation and specific actions that each program can undertake to ensure continued close cooperation and coordination. If confirmed, I will monitor this SOP to ensure it provides the necessary framework to ensure close cooperation between the SLD and CSI programs.

One of the continuing challenges to the megaports program, as well as other programs designed to detect nuclear and radiological materials, is that the materials that could pose the greatest risk, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, are the most difficult to detect. NNSA has the responsibility for basic detection research and development programs. While other agencies, such as DHS, have responsibility for near term development efforts, and the Department of Defense has responsibilities as well.

Are the various detection efforts fully coordinated, or do you believe that additional efforts at coordination are needed?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that NNSA's detection efforts are well coordinated among NNSA, DHS, and DoD. I understand that NNSA maximizes the equipment it currently deploys to focus on this type of material.

Nonproliferation Research and Development

In addition to the detection technologies mentioned above, NNSA has responsibility for a broad range of research and development efforts.

If confirmed what would be your nonproliferation research and development priorities?

If confirmed, I will ensure that NNSA will continue to prioritize research and development that supports implementation of the President's nuclear security priorities and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. This R&D includes developing technical capabilities to detect foreign nuclear weapons development, detect nuclear detonations, detect the movement or diversion of special nuclear materials, monitor compliance with nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agreements, discourage the unnecessary spread of enrichment technology, and inform policymakers of current and future technical capabilities available for meeting potential nuclear nonproliferation and arms control treaty objectives.

Do you believe that there are research and development areas that need more attention or funding?

NNSA seeks to sustain commitment levels for research and development of both unilateral and multilateral technical capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize foreign nuclear weapons programs, the illicit diversion of special nuclear materials, and foreign nuclear detonations. For this last focus area, NNSA must sustain funding that permits production of nuclear detection satellite payloads at a rate in accordance with the delivery schedule negotiated with the Air Force.

Fissile Materials Disposition

The United States and Russia have each committed to the disposition of 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium so that it will not be used for weapons purposes. This is a very expensive program and has had many difficulties associated with it.

What is your understanding of the current status of the U.S. and Russian efforts to agree upon a mutual date to complete disposition of the respective 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium?

The United States is fully committed to eliminating surplus nuclear material and to the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). While I understand that the PMDA provides a target start date and minimum annual rate of disposition, it is silent on a completion date.

What plans are there to dispose of additional amounts of weapons grade plutonium?

I am aware of the U.S. 2007 declaration of additional surplus plutonium beyond the 34 MT covered by the PMDA and that the PMDA does include provisions whereby the United States and Russia could dispose of additional material. However, I am not personally aware of any agreement between the U.S. and Russia to dispose of additional material above the 34MT.

Weapons Programs Personnel

If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the contractor workforce?

The key to recruiting and retaining top-flight personnel, in my mind, is to provide them challenging and intrinsically interesting work, as well as world-class laboratory equipment and diagnostic tools. Additionally, leaders at all levels—both in Washington and in the field—must regularly communicate the importance of NNSA's mission and that they value the contribution NNSA people make to the organization and to the Nation. NNSA also needs to support a strong connection with the academic community to ensure future generations are trained in technical areas relevant to NNSA's mission.

Do you support retaining the capability to re-manufacture every component expected to be found in the stockpile in the near term?

Nuclear deterrence and responsiveness depend on the immediate capabilities of NNSA's people and infrastructure. Many components can be re-used to support stockpile requirements in the near-term, and in those instances I will advocate for that option. However, the current stockpile is the oldest in the nation's history and may require a cost-effective option to re-manufacture certain components to meet specific needs. As such, NNSA must preserve the fundamental capability to re-manufacture components, when necessary to support a lean, modern, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile.

What is your understanding of the most pressing re-manufacturing needs?

Today, NNSA faces several critical needs (in terms of its total re-manufacturing capability). However, it is my understanding that the most pressing capability at

this point is the means to re-manufacture plutonium pits. Additionally, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed the need for a modern physical infrastructure that can support the base workload and provide a modest capacity to surge production if directed to do so by the President. NNSA has implemented management strategies, to include improved energy sustainability that ensures existing facilities and infrastructure are sustainable, safe, efficient, and reliable. These facilities include the recently constructed Kansas City Responsive Infrastructure Manufacturing and Sourcing (KCRIMS); the High-Explosive (HE) Pressing Facility (which will become the DOE Center of Excellence for HE pressing when complete in 2016); the planned Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project; and implemented Tritium Responsive Infrastructure Modifications.

Stockpile Stewardship Program

The Stockpile Stewardship program has successfully supported the annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 20 years.

What impact do you believe not achieving sustained ignition or burn at the National Ignition Facility will have on the stockpile stewardship program?

Scientific experiments that probe the physical properties and dynamics of nuclear weapons are vital to ensuring confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile. A broad range of experimental facilities develop the data that underpin the assessments of the current health of the stockpile and approaches to life extension programs. These include NNSA's Inertial Confinement Fusion facilities—the NIF at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Z machine at Sandia. The ability to correctly model ignition processes is an important part of that evaluation. While ignition has not yet been achieved at NIF, experiments conducted at the facility are still vitally important to developing the scientific understanding of the nuclear weapons characteristics that is essential to successfully implementing the stockpile stewardship program.

If confirmed, what are your long term plans for the National Ignition Facility?

NIF will remain an essential experimental capability for understanding of the physical properties and characteristics of nuclear weapons that cannot otherwise be accessed short of a resumption of nuclear testing.

Other than the National Ignition Facility what capabilities, if any, would be needed to ensure that the stockpile is safe, secure and reliable without nuclear weapons testing?

I am aware that the directors of the national laboratories rely on the data provided by a wide array of capabilities located throughout the enterprise to assess different

aspects nuclear weapons and their safety, security and effectiveness. While on active duty, I had an opportunity to visit several of these facilities, including NIF; Los Alamos National Laboratory's DARHT; the Nevada National Nuclear Security Site's U1a complex, JASPER and Device Assembly Facility; and Sandia National Laboratory's Z facility. These and other NNSA capabilities are essential to ensuring that the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons testing.

In your view is the Stockpile Stewardship program fully coordinated with the Department of Defense?

It is my understanding the NNSA is meeting its customer's requirements in partnership with the DoD and through the Nuclear Weapons Council, while managing scope requirements and fiscal constraints. NNSA has continued to issue the biannual Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, the most recent version having been signed out by Secretary Moniz in June 2013.

The Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out a schedule over the next 20 years that involves numerous demands on the NNSA, these are the B-61 life extension program, the interoperable warhead, the W-88 / 87 joint fuse program, the warhead for the long range stand off weapon, in addition to the maintenance of the existing stockpile systems (W-88, W-87, W-76, W78, B-61, B-83 and W-80).

What issues do you see in this ambitious schedule that concern you?

Our Nation is currently facing an acute dilemma brought on by the need for continued investment in an aging nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure in a fiscally-constrained environment. The specific budget measures and higher-than-anticipated program costs have led the NWC to agree to defer needed modernization efforts. If confirmed, I will ensure that the NNSA commits to a series of programmatic decisions for future improvements by base-lining the alignment of nuclear delivery platforms with warhead life extension programs and supporting infrastructure; supporting implementation of a long-term vision for the stockpile; and embarking upon a series of key modernization initiatives. The sheer number of life extension programs and modernization efforts planned over the next 20 years will create a significant workload. Adhering to carefully laid out schedule will be a critical factor in achieving success. Programs must stay on track, and that in turn requires constancy of purpose, as well as consistent and predictable funding levels.

Are you concerned this schedule is achievable if sequestration continues?

Yes. Absolutely. Any organization executing technically complex, unique, and long-term acquisitions needs sufficient and stable funding so as to plan and execute the agreed upon program of work. Sequestration is just one challenge.

I'm well aware from my military experience that continuing resolutions also exact a toll by increasing uncertainty while reducing flexibility for program adjustments as activities are completed and new ones need be initiated. This is particularly harmful to life extension programs having multiple phases of work. I am sure it will be a great challenge, if not downright impossible, for the NNSA to meet current commitments to the Department of Defense if sequestration continues. Yearly sequestration cuts cause additional, unnecessary and costly work to re-plan the complex integration between design laboratories and production plants supporting each of the LEPs and other sustainment activities as well as to re-negotiate delivery schedules with the DoD. I am also greatly concerned that additional delays may be unavoidable in the event of FY 2014 sequestration. Adequate budgets and budget stability and sustainment are essential to meeting program delivery objectives.

The NNSA is in the early stages of an effort to develop an interoperable warhead for the W-88 and W-78 systems.

If the cost of the interoperable warhead become prohibitive would you support life extensions of the existing systems?

This should be a decision made by the Nuclear Weapons Council, reflecting military requirements, technical feasibility, and cost and schedule risk. I fully support the need for life extension programs to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile. I understand that the W78/88-1 LEP is the first interoperable warhead concept supporting the 3+2 nuclear strategy of three ballistic missile warheads and two air-launched warheads to reduce the numbers and types of nuclear weapons, consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review. I understand work is underway that will culminate in a Weapon Development and Cost Report which would inform a decision to continue the program as scoped or pursue alternate courses of action.

Do you support the current scope of the B-61 mod 12 life extension program (LEP)?

As a former commander who had direct responsibility for the long-range bombers capable of delivering the B61, I fully support the need for the B61-12 life extension program. I understand that the Nuclear Weapons Council evaluated options ranging from a full scope LEP to replacing only aging components, and ultimately chose the lowest cost option to meet military requirements. In addition to providing for both strategic deterrence and extending deterrence to our allies, the currently envisioned LEP will also result in fewer total weapons and less material in the nuclear stockpile.

Are you concerned about the overall cost of the B-61 mod 12 life extension program and if so what particular issues are of concern?

While I understand current cost estimates for the B61-12 LEP are significant, modernizing the nuclear stockpile is critical to achieving the President Obama's direction to maintain a safe, secure and effective deterrent while reducing the overall number of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, I understand that the B61-12 was chosen as the lowest cost option to meet threshold military requirements; Delaying this LEP would almost certainly drive up lifecycle costs and could necessitate additional LEP activities in order to maintain credible strategic and extended deterrence capabilities.

The Senate Appropriations Committee has proposed a reduction of $168 million to the President's FY 2014 request for the B61 life extension program. What impact would this reduction have on the B61 LEP in terms of cost and schedule? And how might it affect other planned LEPs?

While I am aware of proposed cuts to the B61-12 LEP from the public record, I am not yet privy to the details of the potential impacts. Based on my experience in previous assignments, I am sure, if sustained, they would most certainly affect schedule and cost, as well as other LEPs employing the same facilities and workforce.

Facilities and Infrastructure

In Fiscal Year 2013, the NNSA "deferred for at least five years" the construction of the Chemistry, Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF).

Do you support this deferral?

I understand that the decision to defer the CMRR-NF construction for at least five years was necessary at the time due to reductions in the NNSA's budget request in the fiscal year 2012 cycle, competing priorities, and a further reduction of funding under the Budget Control Act. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring the NNSA can deliver the plutonium capabilities—including the underlying analytical capabilities and infrastructure—required to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear weapon stockpile.

What impacts is the CMRR-NF deferral likely to have on the plutonium sustainment mission at Los Alamos when the existing CMR building is scheduled for removal in 2019?

Though I am not yet privy to all the details, I understand that the NNSA has developed a plutonium strategy, that if executed, would ensure continuity in plutonium operations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Due to this uncertainty with the deferral, are you concerned about retaining the core competency of plutonium scientists and other specialized personnel at Los Alamos related to it plutonium mission and what will you do to improve it?

Maintaining the core competency of the workforce at each site must be a priority for the NNSA, particularly as many scientists, engineers and technicians are approaching retirement. I firmly believe that the key to recruiting and retaining top-flight personnel is to provide them challenging and intrinsically interesting work, as well as world-class laboratory equipment, diagnostic tools, and facilities in which to work. Additionally, leaders at all levels—both in Washington and in the field—must regularly communicate the importance of the mission and that they value the contribution NNSA people make to the organization and to the Nation. Implementation of a plutonium strategy will allow for continuity in plutonium operations at Los Alamos and will assist in the retention of critical skills related to plutonium dependant missions. If confirmed, I will closely consult with members of Congress and their staffs on the requirements for maintaining the Nation's plutonium capabilities and expertise.

If alternative construction strategies such as a modular approach to CMRR-NF prove feasible will you strongly advocate for them?

I understand that the NNSA and Department of Defense are developing a business case analysis of the potential alternatives to constructing CMRR-NF, including the so-called modular approach. If confirmed, any approach I advocate will be based on this joint analysis and consultations with the Secretary of Energy.

DOE and NNSA often build one of a kind or first of a kind buildings, the most recent being the Uranium Processing Facility. The NNSA recently found the project underestimated the floor space needed and had to raise its roof by some 13 feet, increasing the cost by at least $500 million. The General Accountability Office estimates to complete the full scope of the project as envisioned would be $10 billion vice the upper bound of $6.5 billion.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that NNSA construction projects are managed to be completed within budget and on time?

I have always subscribed to the principle that hiring the right people and giving them the tools they need to do their jobs is critical to achieving mission success.

If confirmed, I would be committed to assigning certified Federal Project Directors (FPDs) to all projects at the point where the important planning and design work leading to baseline development is accomplished. I understand that the NNSA has revised change control procedures to achieve visibility on potential scope increases, allowing the NNSA to manage the work proactively. As the

project progresses to the construction phase, NNSA will ensure the FPDs have the appropriate training, experience, and certification level to lead the project through successful execution. NNSA has also adopted a peer review process to provide critical independent assessments of its work throughout the project life cycle.

In addition, if confirmed, I would want the NNSA to take full advantage of contracts and contract language to ensure that the best interests of all stakeholders are being met through performance requirements. NNSA has recently issued a policy that requires nuclear facilities achieve 90% design completion prior to the establishment of the project's baselines. The NNSA will need to clearly articulate its expectations to the contractor partners and to use the contract to hold them accountable for deficient work.

What additional costing, project management, and design skills do you believe are needed in the NNSA?

NNSA must develop its Federal infrastructure and workforce to better estimate project costs, to rigorously analyze alternatives, and to more effectively manage design and construction contracts. If confirmed, I will direct NNSA's Office of Acquisition and Project Management to ensure NNSA has a solid and executable plan in place for bolstering Federal expertise in this area.

I understand that NNSA, in the interim, has an agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that will allow NNSA to draw upon the Corp's experience to support NNSA in terms of Subject Matter Expertise. NNSA is also using a Enterprise Construction Management Services contract to place Subject Matter Experts, with commercial design and construction experience, in the field to mentor and train NNSA's Federal Project Directors and Integrated Project Teams in the skills necessary to effectively manage NNSA's capital assets.

At what point in the Critical Decision timeline do you believe an independent cost estimate should be performed for a construction project, and why?

I understand NNSA's current position is that an independent cost estimate should be completed at Critical Decision 2 which is the point at which the project's cost and schedule baseline is determined. At this point, the design should be sufficiently mature to more realistically estimate the total project cost.

Operational Safety

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that nuclear and other operational safety issues are fully addressed in the design of new NNSA buildings?

If confirmed, I will be absolutely committed to the safe operation of NNSA facilities and to the protection of workers who work in them and the people who reside in the surrounding communities. I will be actively engaged in ensuring that safety is incorporated into the design and construction of NNSA nuclear facilities. Key elements would clearly include the selection of qualified nuclear design and construction firms to lead these projects, as well as a properly staffed and technically-capable federal project team. Ensuring that appropriate safety systems and controls are identified early in the design process and are validated throughout construction is also critical to reducing rework and controlling costs during design and construction.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that nuclear operational safety issues are identified by the Defense Nuclear Safety Board early in any construction design process and promptly resolved?

I understand that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has a statutory responsibility to review the design of new Department of Energy defense nuclear facilities before construction to ensure adequate protection is afforded to public health and safety. If confirmed, I would welcome DNFSB input and advice on the safety aspects of the design and construction of NNSA nuclear facilities. As indicated previously, I believe that the identification of required safety controls early in the design process is an important element to ensuring safety and to controlling project costs. I would work closely with the DNFSB to identify any significant design concerns early in the design process and meet routinely with the Board to ensure that issues are resolved in a timely and effective manner.

Notification of Congress

If confirmed, would you commit to promptly notifying Congress of any significant issues in the safety, security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?

If confirmed, I am committed to promptly notifying Congress of any significant issues affecting the safety, security, or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

I agree.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?

I agree.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

I agree.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

I agree.