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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE POSTURE OF UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

Thursday, April 10, 2025

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1 TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE POSTURE OF UNITED STATES INDO-2 PACIFIC COMMAND AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA IN REVIEW OF 3 THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2026 AND 4 THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM 5 Thursday, April 10, 2025 6 7 8 U.S. Senate 9 Committee on Armed Services 10 Washington, D.C. 11 12 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., 13 in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Roger 14 Wicker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 15 Committee Members Present: Senators Wicker, Fischer, 16 Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Budd, 17 Schmitt, Banks, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, 18 Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, Duckworth, Rosen, Kelly, and 19 Slotkin. 20 21 22 23 24 25



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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER WICKER, U.S. SENATOR
 FROM MISSISSIPPI

Chairman Wicker: The hour of 9:30 has arrived and 3 4 this hearing will come back to order. We have already had 5 a classified part of the hearing, beginning at 8 a.m. б But at this point, we hold a hearing on U.S. Indo-7 Pacific Command and U.S. Force Korea. At the outset, I 8 would like to thank Admiral Paparo and General Brunson for 9 their distinguished service to our country. 10 Last year at this hearing, I stated that the balance 11 of power in the Indo-Pacific was shifting in China's favor. 12 Since then, the Chinese Communist Party has significantly 13 increased its coercive activity toward Taiwan and the 14 Philippines. Last week, the Chinese conducted an exercise 15 called Strait Thunder 2025A. This exercise demonstrated 16 the extent to which the People's Liberation Army could 17 execute a maritime blockade of Taiwan and pummel it with missile strikes. As China conducts more exercises with 18 19 Taiwan in mind, it also escalates the rhetoric against the 20 Last week, a Chinese military officials called island. 21 Taiwan's democratically elected president a "parasite."

The Chinese have also substantially increased their harassment of our Filipino allies. China's vast Maritime Militia, backed by the PLA Navy and Chinese Coast Guard, is using increasingly aggressive tactics to advance its



expansive claims in the South China Sea. The Second Thomas 1 2 Shoal remains a major flashpoint. Chinese maritime militias have tried to keep the grounded Filipino Navy 3 4 ship, the Sierra Madre, from being resupplied. Secretary 5 Hegseth recently visited the region. I was pleased to see 6 that he reaffirmed our Mutual Defense Treaty with the 7 Philippines, reminding the world that the treaty applies to 8 attacks on the Filipino armed forces anywhere in the South 9 China Sea. Even so, it is clear that the Chinese have been 10 emboldened by 4 years of weakness during the past 11 administration.

12 There is another reason China has become so confident 13 in its malign schemes. Xi Jinping has steadily modernized 14 his military, and that hardware has made him more brazen. 15 China boasts the world's largest navy. It also has an air 16 force that is capable of denying the U.S. air superiority 17 in the First Island Chain. We will certainly want to ask 18 about that, gentlemen. Its missile force can saturate our 19 theater defenses. China has been expanding its nuclear 20 arsenal at a pace that far outstrips our own. Multiple 21 STRATCOM commanders have called China's growth 22 "breathtaking." In just a few short years, Beijing has 23 built more intercontinental ballistic missile launchers 24 than the United States. Meanwhile, our own modernization 25 programs languish from past neglect.



1 But China is not the only urgent threat in the Indo-2 Pacific. The Biden administration chose to ignore North Korea. It allowed Kim Jong Un to increase his nuclear 3 4 arsenal and project his military into the European theater 5 to aid Vladimir Putin in Russia's war against Ukraine. Kim б Jong Un has abandoned the goal of unification of the Korean 7 Peninsula -- and again, we will want to talk about that --8 and has declared South Korea to be the principal enemy. 9 The North Korean nuclear and missile arsenal continues to 10 grow and diversify, with the rogue nation adopting a strategic doctrine that embraces nuclear first use. 11

12 Kim will surely seek remuneration for his support to 13 Moscow. The Russian technology transfers and military assistance Kim receives will help him to further strengthen 14 15 his strategic missile forces. The continued demonstrations 16 of Russia, China, and North Korea aligning and cooperating 17 should be of great concern to all in the West. This concern should then lead to action. If we are to maintain 18 19 global peace and stability, we must continue taking steps 20 now to rebuild our military and reestablish deterrence. 21 As I noted in my Peace Through Strength report last

May, it is time to make a generational investment in our national security -- and I do believe that view is bipartisan. We must be able not only to deter and defeat the People's Liberation Army, but also to maintain



deterrence in other theaters. Our adversaries, led by
 Beijing, are playing a global game. We must be smarter and
 more agile than they are across the board.

4 Last year, INDOPACOM's unfunded requirements list 5 totaled \$3.5 billion. This year's unfunded requirement 6 list was \$11 billion, and virtually none of that was funded 7 under the full-year CR. This is unacceptable, and also, I 8 hope we are going to get from everyone an accurate and full 9 assessment of the various unfunded requirements. We need 10 real growth in the fiscal year 2026 budget request, in 11 addition to a historic defense reconciliation package.

12 We need more survivable long-range munitions, more 13 assured U.S. command and control systems, and an improved 14 ability to counter China's increasingly capable cyber and 15 space systems. We need a wholesale overhaul of our 16 logistics infrastructure and a rapid deployment of unmanned 17 systems. We need a renaissance in our camouflage and 18 deception programs, and we need a drastic improvement in 19 our shipbuilding. The risk is simply too high for us to 20 avoid making these changes.

21 So I look forward to hearing our distinguished and 22 well-informed witnesses and having a candid conversation 23 about what this committee and this Senate and this Congress 24 can do this year to address these challenges.

25 Senator Reed.



STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE

2 ISLAND

Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Paparo, General Brunson, welcome. Thank you for
appearing today, and please convey our thanks to the men
and women serving under your commands and defending us.

7 This is a challenging time for our forces in the Indo-8 Pacific. China is deploying a wide range of military, 9 economic, and political pressures against its neighbors 10 while aggressively challenging America's leadership in the The United States does not seek conflict with 11 region. 12 China, but we have deep economic and security interests in 13 the Indo-Pacific that must continue to be protected through 14 strong deterrence and smart competition.

15 Several months ago, I traveled to Guam, South Korea, 16 and the Philippines to assess our posture in the region. Ι 17 observed a number of joint military exercises, met with 18 allied leaders, spoke with foreign business leaders, and 19 inspected our military infrastructure. Overall, I was 20 impressed with our progress, particularly the development 21 of our partnership with the Philippines and the remarkable 22 emerging partnership between Korea and Japan. These 23 relationships should inspire us to redouble the development 24 of networks like the Quad, AUKUS, and ASEAN as we bring 25 other nations into our security cooperation efforts.



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Indeed, as countless U.S. military leaders and diplomats
 have told me, the key "asymmetric advantage" our nation has
 over China is our network of allies and partners.

4 With that in mind, I am concerned that the Trump 5 administration is quickly unraveling much of the progress б we have made. Many observers fear that President Trump may shrink the U.S. troop presence in Korea and Japan, reduce 7 8 our military exercises with both nations, and scale back 9 plans for our Joint Force Headquarters in Japan, despite 10 the fact that Korea and Japan contribute significantly to 11 burden sharing and hosting our forces. Although the 12 President has temporarily suspended tariffs against our 13 closest allies and partners, the last few days have 14 undoubtedly sown seeds of doubt about America's stability 15 and trustworthiness, feelings that would be amplified if 16 the President decides to reinstate the sanctions after 90 17 In addition to dismantling America's soft power days. 18 tools like the U.S. Agency for International Development, 19 President Trump's actions serve only to push our friends 20 away from us, and that is not appropriate.

Admiral Paparo, General Brunson, you engage with our foreign partners every day, both as a matter of diplomatic leadership and military necessity. I am interested in your views on how tensions with our allies would disadvantage your forces and American interests in the region.



1 Admiral Paparo, Taiwan remains the most dangerous 2 flashpoint in our competition with China. We have seen a recent surge of aggressive Chinese military exercises 3 4 around Taiwan's airspace and territorial waters, and the 5 world has a right to be concerned. In several consecutive б National Defense Authorization Acts, this Committee has 7 provided new security assistance tools to help develop 8 Taiwan's capabilities and strengthen our own posture. In 9 particular, the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative and 10 the Indo-Pacific Campaigning Initiative should enable greater support and training for Taiwan, and facilitate 11 12 INDOPACOM's increased exercises and freedom of navigation 13 operations, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. 14 However, your command has once again had to divert ships 15 and aircraft for prolonged and intensive operations in the 16 Middle East. Admiral Paparo, I would like to know your 17 assessment of INDOPACOM's readiness to carry out your 18 missions, as well as United States' broader strategy in the 19 region.

Key to America's success in the Indo-Pacific is the posture of our forces in South Korea. As I mentioned, I am encouraged by the recent progress we have seen in the trilateral relationship among South Korea, Japan, and the United States, and I hope that developments like these will provide more opportunities to engage other regional



1 partners.

2 As we do so, we must continue to manage the threat posed by North Korea. We know that Kim Jong Un continues 3 4 to view nuclear weapons as "the ultimate deterrent against 5 foreign intervention," and he intends to gain international acceptance as a nuclear-armed state. North Korea's 6 7 relationship with Russia also continues to grow, especially 8 in light of North Korea sending troops and weapons to 9 support Putin's invasion of Ukraine, and Kim Jong Un is likely receiving technical assistance from Russia for 10 missile and nuclear capabilities. General, I would 11 12 appreciate your view on the current threat from North 13 Korea, and how your forces are maintaining readiness 14 through training and exercises with their South Korean 15 counterparts.

16 Thank you, again, to our witnesses. I look forward to 17 your testimonies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 Chairman Wicker: Thank you. We will now recognize 19 each of our panelists for opening statements. And General 20 Brunson, you went first in the closed session. Would you 21 like to do that again?

General Brunson: My boss says yes, so I do. Thank you for giving me at least the illusion of choice.

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STATEMENT OF GENERAL XAVIER T. BRUNSON, USA,
 COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/ COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/
 UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

General Brunson: Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. I am honored to appear before you for my first posture hearing in front of this Committee as the Commander of United States Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command, and United Nations Command.

11 I would like to take a moment just to simply thank you 12 all for your steadfast leadership, your friendship, and 13 your critical support to our servicemembers, their 14 families, our civilians, and the contractors who support us 15 around the globe. But I especially want to thank you for 16 your continued time and attention to the people of the 17 Republic of Korea and the soldiers, sailors, airmen, 18 Guardians, and Marines who serve there on the peninsula.

I would also like to thank the Korean people right now for their continued resilience through challenges and hard times. I would like to thank them for their dedication to our alliance, and I would also like to thank them for their continued provision of an environment that allows us to build, sustain, and retain the readiness that we develop on the peninsula.



1 In my career, every opportunity that I have had to 2 lead our nation's men and women has been an honor. It is a privilege to serve alongside Admiral Paparo, our friends, 3 4 our partners and allies in the region, working to 5 strengthen our ties to further security, freedom, and б prosperity amongst the nations. For over 75 years, we have 7 invested our national treasure in the Republic of Korea, 8 and remain the last U.S. fighting force on the continent of 9 Asia.

10 The return on investment of U.S. forces being 11 stationed in Korea is not measured only in dollars but in 12 terms of access, forward-basing, and during partnerships 13 and deterrence. In 2024, the DPRK focused on advancing 14 their cruise missile and Hypersonic Glide Vehicle research 15 and development programs, launching 47 ballistic missiles 16 with 1 failed satellite launch attempt. Kim Jong Un also 17 has two highly publicized visits to nuclear sites, and over 18 the past year and a half, DPRK has exported munitions and 19 troops to support Russia, demonstrating the ability to 20 provide external support while simultaneously advancing 21 domestic capabilities.

In the coming year we expect the DPRK to further develop hypersonic and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle, MIRV, capabilities to complete his 8th Party Congress goals. Kim Jong Un's leadership has shifted



1 focus from reunification to declaring sovereignty. This 2 change is evidenced by the hardening of DPRK's southern 3 border, the rejection of reunification discussions, and the 4 destruction of unification monuments and buildings. 5 The DPRK continues to build its nuclear weapons 6 programs, and boasts a Russian-equipped, augmented, 7 modernized military force of over 1.3 million personnel. 8 Lastly, DPRK's cyber threat is increasingly

9 sophisticated, as demonstrated by the recent theft of 10 approximately \$1.5 billion in cryptocurrency.

In contrast to that, I would speak to the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral efforts, which are bearing much fruit, not only in ballistic missile defense but in training and readiness developed on the peninsula.

I thank you all for allowing me again to appear before you. I look forward to your questions, and thank you.

17 [The prepared statement of General Brunson follows:]

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1	Chairman	Wicker:	Thank	you,	General.	Admiral	Paparo.
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STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL SAMUEL J. PAPARO JR., USN,
 COMMANDER, UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND
 Admiral Paparo: Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed,

4 and distinguished members of the Committee, thanks very
5 much for the opportunity to appear.

6 With me, over my right shoulder, is United States 7 INDOPACOM Senior Enlisted Leader, Fleet Master Chief 8 Special Operations Dave Isom. This is his last hearing. 9 He is retiring after 38 years of selfless service as a SEAL 10 and Special Operator.

11 Speaking of asymmetric advantages, the NCO Corps of 12 the United States of America is one of the Joint Force's 13 absolute asymmetric advantages. Fleet Isom's leadership in 14 this critical duty has been exemplary. It has been 15 indispensable to my own transition as the Commander of 16 USINDOPACOM. He has been indispensable to me personally. 17 I honor his service.

18 In a region that is home to over half the Earth's 19 surface and half the operational joint force, INDOPACOM 20 faces a confluence of challenges. China's unprecedented aggression and military modernization poses a series threat 21 22 to the homeland, our allies, and our partners. In 2024, 23 the People's Liberation Army demonstrated growing 24 capabilities through persistent pressure operations, with 25 military pressure against Taiwan increasing by 300 percent.



China's increasingly aggressive actions near Taiwan are not
 just exercise. They are rehearsals. And while the PLA
 attempts to intimidate the people of Taiwan and demonstrate
 coercive capabilities, these actions are backfiring,
 drawing increased global attention and accelerating
 Taiwan's own defense preparations.

As General Brunson said, North Korea's development of advanced nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles pose a direct threat to our homeland and our allies, and are executing a deepening cooperation with Russia.

11 Russia's growing military cooperation with China adds 12 another layer of complexity, creating a compounded 13 challenge with a deepening cooperation among China, Russia, 14 and North Korea, and China's and Russia's Pacific fleet is 15 a growth enterprise.

USINDOPACOM deters these challenges to regional stability in competition and crisis while maintaining the availability to prevail, but that margin is eroding, as the Chairman and Ranking Member have discussed.

In 2024, we conducted 120 joint exercises, among them 20 major joint exercises, including not just the U.S. Joint 20 Force but allies and partners. We continue to strengthen 23 the relationship with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the 24 Philippines, India, Taiwan. he ASEAN nations, Pacific 25 Island countries, and, in fact, European partners are



1 active in the theater.

As the first priorities, we must be dominant in space an across the information environment, leveraging capabilities to counter the PRC's command, control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting complex. This will enable us to gain a non-linear advantage over potential adversaries, in fact, to maintain and increase the non-linear advantage.

9 To maintain credible deterrence, INDOPACOM require 10 additional sustained investment in long-range survivable 11 fires, in integrated air and missile defense, in force 12 sustainment, with an emphasis on autonomy and AI-driven 13 systems.

14 China is outproducing the United States in air, 15 missile, maritime, and space capability and accelerating 16 these. I remain confident in our deterrence posture, but 17 the trajectory must change. The Pacific Deterrent 18 Initiative should counter the China threat by investing in 19 key readiness and capability which would, in fact, if 20 funded, advance the intent of this initiative and deliver 21 major posture improvement. Deterrence remains our highest 22 duty. However, that must be backed up by the real 23 capability to prevail in combat.

The Joint Force remains confident, resolute, and determined to prevail.



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1 Chairman Wicker: Thank you both for your testimony 2 and for your service. Let's start with General Brunson. 3 Just quickly yes or no. North Korea continues to expand 4 its nuclear weapons arsenal. Correct?

5 General Brunson: Yes, sir.

6 Chairman Wicker: And they continue to expand their 7 delivery systems of nuclear weapons. Is that correct? 8 General Brunson: Yes, sir.

9 Chairman Wicker: Okay. You know, you never know 10 whether to believe what you read in the newspapers and see 11 on the media, but there are reports that some midlevel 12 officials in the Pentagon are considering reducing our 13 military presence on the Korean Peninsula to focus instead on the China threat in defense of the U.S. homeland. 14 Τf 15 our strategy in Korea is to deter war and win it if we have 16 to, would that be a good or bad idea?

17 Senator, Chairman, to reduce the General Brunson: 18 force becomes problematic, and I will not speak to policy. 19 But what we do provide there, sir, is the potential to 20 impose costs in the East Sea to Russia, the potential to 21 impose costs in the West Sea to China, and to continue to 22 deter against North Korea as it currently stands. I am 23 trying to focus right now on the capabilities necessary to 24 do all those things, that we might participate routinely in 25 the campaign that my boss is fighting, which is to prepare,



1 deter, and then prevail in conflict, should it come. But 2 the forces in Korea play an important role. In over 75 3 years they have done the same.

Chairman Wicker: Admiral, a significant reduction of
our military presence on the Korean Peninsula, good or bad?
Admiral Paparo: Inherently it would reduce our
ability to prevail in conflict.

8 Chairman Wicker: And for both of you, would a 9 conflict on the Korean Peninsula likely involve China? 10 Admiral Paparo: My belief is that there would be a 11 risk that it would involve China and would have to be 12 conducted carefully if it were so. And so that risk has 13 got to drive our calculus.

14 Chairman Wicker: And General Brunson?

General Brunson: Sir, our preparedness would prevent them from entering in any conflict, because of the potential to take them off their own party goals.

18 Chairman Wicker: Okay. Who wants to take the 19 question about the air superiority of the PRC over ours in 20 that theater?

Admiral Paparo: Chairman, the People's Republic of China have an order of battle of 2,100 fighters, an order of battle of over 200 H-6 bombers, and they are producing fighters at a rate of 1.2 to 1 over the United States. Furthermore, their advanced long-range air-to-air missiles



also present a tremendous threat. If you do not hold the high ground along the first island chain you are vastly limited in your ability to operate. I think everybody knows the importance of the high ground. So ceding air superiority is not an option if we intend to maintain capability against our adversaries and the ability to support our allies.

8 Chairman Wicker: Admiral, is it a fact that China is 9 now capable of denying U.S. air superiority in the first 10 island chain?

11 Admiral Paparo: Yeah, I give them high marks in their 12 ability to do that. I have some game, too. And air 13 supremacy is the complete mastery of the air. Neither side 14 will enjoy that. But it will be my job to contest air 15 superiority, to protect those forces that are on the first 16 island chain, such as 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, and 17 also to provide windows of air superiority in order to 18 achieve our effects.

19 Chairman Wicker: Admiral, Kim Jong Un is not 20 motivated by charity in helping Russia in Ukraine. What 21 does he expect back? What is he likely to get back?

Admiral Paparo: Chairman, he expects concessions. He and those is doing it order to gain concessions, and those concessions would be modernization of their air defenses, specifically the MiG-29, the SU-27, advanced health of



their surface-to-air missiles, quieting technology for their submarines, additional help in order to instantiate a ballistic missile submarine, as well, and then likely propulsion help and potentially even help with the reentry vehicles for their burgeoning nuclear program.

6 Chairman Wicker: Okay. Thank you. We will take 7 another round. Let me just make sure that people 8 understand General Brunson. You are USA Commander, United 9 Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States 10 Forces Korea. You do not answer at all to the United 11 Nations headquartered in New York City, do you?

General Brunson: No, sir. Those authorities go through the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense and then on to the President.

15 Chairman Wicker: Okay. Totally different 16 organization. Thank you very much, and the distinguished 17 Ranking Member is recognized.

18 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 19 First, let me begin by thanking the Command Master Chief 20 for his dedicated service to the nation. Thank you, Chief. 21 And let me associate myself with Admiral Paparo's comment 22 that our asymmetric advantage, one of the keys is our 23 noncommissioned officers.

General Brunson, you have indicated the importance of our forces on the Korean Peninsula. Can also elaborate on



1 the support and the magnitude of the burden-sharing that 2 the South Koreans contribute to us?

General Brunson: Yes, Senator Reed. So first I would 3 4 like to say that forward presence provides unmatched 5 access, unmatched deterrence, at minimal cost comparatively 6 speaking, by other forces that are stationed forward. We 7 recently received help from the Department of Defense with 8 our tour normalization, which brings tours in Korea on part 9 with other OCONUS locations, which changes our exposure to 10 the region and our understanding of the adversaries 11 therein.

I would also say that 2,100 U.S. companies have ties to the Republic of Korea. That is 450,000 jobs that are a part of that. That is a piece that I think is critical to know and understand.

And I would also say that we receive about half a billion dollars a year in Korean-related construction. That builds the brand-new school on Pyeongtaek at Camp Humphreys, that builds additional towers to house our families in quality housing, that also builds SCIFs for us right now in the Republic of Korea that we might be able to do the important work to stay tied to INDOPACOM.

I would also like to say that in kind, the overall contribution in the past fiscal year was about 1.4 trillion won, which works out to be close to a billion dollars'



1 worth of support that we receive in kind.

I would also mention the continued and growing maintenance repair and overhaul facilities that exist on the East Sea and the West Sea, that we have utilized most recently to bring the Wally Schirra back out of an overhaul, and looking better than ever. The Cesar Chavez also visited recently.

8 But there is a lot that we get. Some of it is fiscal 9 and monetary. Others of it is materiel that is 10 irreplaceable.

Senator Reed: All right, General Brunson, again, in previous National Defense Authorization Acts we have established a manpower floor of 28,500 troops as a demonstration of our unwavering commitment to the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance, and also the strategic reasons you said. Would you suggest we include such language again?

18 General Brunson: Yes, sir.

Senator Reed: Thank you. And Admiral Paparo, can you
give us your perception, as the overall commander, of the
value of the South Korean forces to us and the presence of
our troops on the peninsula, together with the
contributions they are making, the South Koreans.
Admiral Paparo: Ranking Member, in addition to the

25 elements laid out by General Brunson, Korea makes



1 significant contributions outside the Korean Peninsula, and 2 that is in their participation in multilateral exercises, including Pacific partnership among many others. And so in 3 4 the ability of that force to deter conflict, the ability of 5 that force to avoid from having two conflicts at once, by 6 dint of the strength of the capability, and by what they 7 are doing in the trilateral relationship with Japan, that 8 growing trilateral relationship with Japan, and on their 9 path to become a global pivotal state, they are a key 10 partner in the Western Pacific, with a purview that goes 11 far beyond just the Korean Peninsula.

12 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, sir. I mentioned 13 in my opening statement that currently you have forces that 14 have transferred into CENTCOM, the Carl Vinson carrier 15 group. Open sources suggest six B-2 bombers, Diego Garcia 16 with supplementary tankers. What effect do these have on 17 your capabilities?

18 Admiral Paparo: Presently, for Carl Vinson, we do 19 have George Washington coming out of Yokosuka very shortly, 20 and Nimitz is at sea. But we have to maintain a high state 21 of indications and warning so that we can get those forces 22 back if there is a crisis with greater exigence than there is one in the CENTCOM AOR. And I owe the Secretary and the 23 24 President constant vigilance on this, and a constant 25 awareness of that force's ability to FLET, which is a sign



1 to USINDOPACOM, its Carl Vinson strike group, and a Patriot 2 battalion if need be they return to the INDOPACOM theater 3 for a higher priority threat.

Senator Reed: Thank you very much, gentlemen. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.

6 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator7 Cotton.

8 Senator Cotton: Gentlemen, welcome back. Admiral, 9 let's take a step back to first principles. We have talked 10 a lot here about the threat that China poses Taiwan and 11 what you are doing to try to address that threat. I would 12 like you to explain why that threat is so severe. Some 13 people might look at the map and say, well, Taiwan is a 14 small island, and it is really far from us, and it is 15 really close to them, and China has marched into Tibet in 16 the past, and they have marched into Hong Kong in the past, 17 and that was bad, and they should not have done those 18 things. But it did not lead to a World War, and it did not 19 lead to a Great Depression.

20 On the other side you have got one of your ancestors, 21 so to speak, Douglas MacArthur, who said at the dawn of the 22 Korean War that "the domination of Taiwan by an unfriendly 23 power would be a disaster of utmost importance to the 24 United States." He was speaking then, as we do today, of 25 Communist China. Ian Easton, a Naval War College professor



and one of the military's leading experts on Taiwan, says that "it's possible that the Chinese invasion of Taiwan would cause a 21st century version of the Great Depression." And the famed investor, Ken Griffin, put it more bluntly: "It's an immediate Great Depression."

6 So why is it that Taiwan is different? Why is Taiwan 7 such a hot flashpoint? Why could it lead not only to a 8 catastrophic war but also a global Great Depression? Why 9 should Americans care about an island on the other side of 10 the world?

11 Admiral Paparo: Senator Cotton, that last point is 12 quite salient. Many a research organization postulate that 13 conflict in the Western Pacific over the Taiwan question 14 would result in a 25 percent GDP contraction in Asia, and a 15 knock-on effect of 10 to 12 percent GDP reduction in the 16 United States of America, with unemployment spiking 7 to 10 17 points above base, and likely 500,000 excess depths of 18 despair above base, as well.

And this is just the importance of the regional stability to the world economy and its effect on people's lives. And this is viewed as a function of freedom of navigation. It is a function of the world dependency on semiconductors.

In the longer term, for the United States, our
strategic center of gravity is our network of alliances and



partners. The sum total of 350 million peoples' talent,
 130 million Japanese, 130 million Filipinos, 25 million
 Australians, not to mention 500 million in Europe, as well
 as partners across the globe.

5 The knock-on effect of the brittleness of that network 6 of alliances and partnerships means that some of the states 7 could confer and submit to the PRC's mode of exploitation 8 enroute to their long-range goal of setting the rules of 9 the world and reaping the benefits of that.

And then finally, some nations in the area of responsibility will submit, but others it would never happen, just because of the historic tensions. And in that case, the proliferation question comes to mind, with nuclear-armed states that are treaty allies with the United States, and minimal warning for launch among those nuclear states. It is a vital interest for the United States.

My job is to have a force ready to make those choices. Wy job is to have a force ready to make those choices. You know, I don't make the choices on whether or not it is important or not. I am explicating how it is. And my job is to present those options to the commander in chief to be ready to fight and win.

22 Senator Cotton: And to be clear, a lot, of not all of 23 those consequences, would follow whatever the outcome of a 24 conflict over Taiwan, whether China succeeds in going for 25 the jugular or fails, or there is some kind of indecisive



outcome. Simply having the conflict over Taiwan, which is
 such a center of gravity in the modern economy, could lead
 to many of the consequences you just outlined.

Admiral Paparo: Yes, sir. I cannot quote the source.
I will later. But most of the things I have studied
indicate that American intervention would have that impact.
A successful American intervention would potentially do so.
So still a grave result, but half as grave with savings of
a lot of human misery.

10 Senator Cotton: So the key then is to prevent the war 11 from happening in the first place. We do not want to be in 12 a situation where we have to win a war over Taiwan. We 13 want to stop it from happening, and the way to do that is 14 through strong military and resolute, confident leadership. 15 What do you need most, that you do not have right now, 16 to deter that conflict from happening in the first place? 17 Admiral Paparo: Senator, counter-C5ISR capabilities 18 in cyber, space, counterspace, to ensure that the United 19 States can see, understand, decide, act, assess, learn 20 faster than the PRC can, to enhance our ability to blind, to deceive, and to destroy the adversary's ability to see 21 22 and sense. And then, in addition, the requirement to 23 effect those long-range fires and effects that make the 24 Joint Force effective in attacking centers of gravity, the 25 platform that they ride on, the sustainment that sustains



them, absolutely key and critical foundation. And then the critical infrastructure across the theater that enables the force to reach the principles of expanded maneuver and puts geography on our side, which it is.

5 Senator Cotton: Thank you.

6 Senator Fischer: [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator
7 Cotton. Senator Hirono, you are recognized.

8 Senator Hirono: Thank you. Welcome Admiral Paparo. 9 It is always good to see you. Thank you for your 10 leadership.

11 While successive administrations have identified China 12 as the pacing threat and the Indo-Pacific as the priority 13 theater, you still identified \$11 billion in unfunded 14 priorities this past year. You talked about just now the 15 importance of deterrence, because a conflict over Taiwan 16 would have massive negative effects. Is some of this \$11 17 billion having to do with the deterrence that you talked 18 about regarding Taiwan?

Admiral Paparo: Yes, Senator Hirono, thank you. Absolutely right. Deterrence must be backed up by the real capability to fight and win. The United States of America enjoys key advantages in space, counterspace, command and control between the Kármán line and the surface, and undersea dominance. But that margin is shrinking, and we must regain the margin and increase the margin. And that



ability to fight and win is what will make sure that our
 adversaries do not execute any aggression to do so.

3 Senator Hirono: What would happen if this very large
4 funding gap is not addressed in this year's NDAA?

5 Admiral Paparo: The trajectory that I am discussing б continues. The Joint Force has an eroded capability to 7 prevail. It manifests itself in lost people, in lost 8 capability, in lost money, and in lost time, and it confers 9 to the confidence of the PRC and inherently erode 10 deterrence as they see, more and more, they see the potential of their prevailing in the conflict themselves 11 12 and achieving their goals by aggression.

Senator Hirono: Admiral Paparo, by the way, thank you for explaining to this Committee the importance of the Taiwan situation, because often I get asked, why should our country care about Taiwan, so thank you for that.

17 Regarding the dismantling of USAID and the impacts on 18 us, whenever the United States creates a void, such as by 19 ending foreign aid such as through USAID, it has an impact 20 on our asymmetric advantage, which also includes our 21 partners and allies. How does ending foreign assistance 22 programs and other regional aid efforts impact INDOPACOM's 23 security cooperation missions and the command's 24 relationship with partners in the region? 25 Admiral Paparo: Senator, those other instruments of



national power are very important and they are critical to our ability to fight and win. My understanding is that USAID is under review, and I continue to advocate for it. The loss of that, the PRC would see the opportunity and they would seize it, and they frequently do. Wherever they see a void, they fill it in, in order to confirm more influence to their own national power.

8 Senator Hirono: So indeed if China is our pacing 9 threat, we know that every time we create a void in any 10 part, particularly in the INDOPACOM area, including, by the 11 way, providing assistance to our compact nation friends, 12 that China just steps right in and fills that void.

General Brunson, you raised an important point in your opening statement regarding North Korea hackers stealing \$1.5 billion, and probably more, in cryptocurrency to fund their military. And at the same time, the Justice Department has disbanded a team of prosecutors targeting crypto crimes. Does that concern you?

19 General Brunson: Good morning, Madam Senator. First, 20 that does not bother me at all. What I am thinking about 21 is all the instruments of military power that have to be 22 brought to bear to stop illicit activity. That is only one 23 of the illegal things they are doing. We have talked a lot 24 about what is North Korea getting from Russia. One of the 25 things they are getting is the ability to circumvent



1 sanctions, and that theft is a piece of that. Ma'am, I am
2 also encouraged by the fact that we can see what is going
3 on.

Senator Hirono: Do you have an awareness of
Department of Justice's team that targeted, basically was
able to prosecute to the tune of billions of dollars crypto
crimes? Are you aware of that team, highly successful
team, that is being disbanded?

General Brunson: Yes, ma'am, I am aware of that team.
However, I believe that we have the instruments to continue
to proceed to prosecute these crimes.

12 Senator Hirono: That is somewhat reassuring, but I 13 think that with all of the crimes that are going on in the 14 crypto space, I think that we should not be disbanding any 15 efforts that we have in that space.

16 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Fischer: Thank you, Senator Hirono. SenatorErnst, you are recognized.

Senator Ernst: Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for being here, Admiral Paparo and General Brunson. Chief, good luck to you in your retirement. Thank you so much for your service.

I will go ahead and start with INDOPACOM. Admiral, thank you so much. As you have clearly laid out for the Committee today, the Indo-Pacific is growing very



dangerous. It is extremely complex. Our deterrence 1 2 depends not just on our warfighting capability but also on the ability to sustain our operations. I started my career 3 4 as an engineer, became a transporter, and ended my career 5 as a logistician -- not a big, sexy topic here in this б Committee, but it is absolutely necessary that we talk 7 about it. If we wish to win the fight, we have got to 8 sustain the fight.

9 So, Admiral, what gaps still exist in our theater logistics network that put our forward posture at risk? 10 Admiral Paparo: Good morning, Senator. 11 Significant 12 gaps in sealift. First, the combat logistics force in 13 total is about 60 percent of the actual requirements. We 14 account for that by hiring Consol tankers and by 15 contracting other capabilities. But when the unforgiving 16 hour comes, the only ships that we will be able to commit 17 to areas to put into harm's way will be "gray ships," and 18 as I utter these words, 17 of those combat logistics force 19 ships are laid up for lack of manpower.

In addition, I discussed in the previous committee, we have to have many millions of pounds of fuel, of jet fuel, in the air for every capability. So our tanker fleet is below what we need. We account for that for some contract air services, as well. But once again, those same factors obtain, you have to have a "gray tail."



And then, finally, just cargo lift and the number of short tons of C-17 lift. For instance, just having moved a Patriot battalion into the CENTCOM AOR, it took 73 C-17 loads to move that Patriot battalion.

5 Senator Ernst: Seventy-three.

6 Admiral Paparo: What is that?

7 Senator Ernst: Seventy-three.

8 Admiral Paparo: Seventy-three of one battalion of a 9 force element. So our lift requirements must be paid 10 attention to. And I share your passion for sustainment. 11 That is what won World War II.

12 Senator Ernst: Absolutely. So those logisticians, 13 the maintenance dudes and dudettes that are out there, 14 working every day to make sure that our warriors are able 15 to fight the good fight. So with that, you talked about 16 contractors, and we use them extensively. But how can 17 Congress help accelerate the improvements necessary in 18 INDOPACOM when that hour comes?

Admiral Paparo: Well, I think we have got to get at the problems of why we do not have enough combat logistics force, and that is shipbuilding, why we do not have enough labor, and those are looking hard at pay and incentives in order to recruit and retain those people, rates of production, and diversifying the tanker fleet is key. And then continuing on to find alternatives of lift capability



1 that we can order into harm's way. And then over top of 2 all of this, we are incorporating artificial intelligence tools with command and control tools so that it is not an 3 4 on-demand system, but so that we are executing that 5 absolutely indispensable joint function as effectively as б we possibly can. You know, we are an AI-enabled 7 headquarters, and that is important too. But you cannot AI 8 your way out of a materiel deficiency.

9 Senator Ernst: Right. I agree completely, and we 10 need to spend more time on this topic. But just very briefly, General Brunson, I apologize. I have got 30 11 12 seconds. We rely heavily on allies, neighbors, friends --13 they are force multipliers -- but so do our adversaries. 14 We have heard that there are North Koreans now that are 15 fighting the fight over in Ukraine. Can you tell us, what 16 are the North Koreans learning from this experience, and 17 what will they take back to your region?

18 General Brunson: Ma'am, I have said several times 19 now, in several hearings, that we cannot confuse the 20 tactical lessons that they are learning with strategic 21 benefit. What we have got to understand is that they have 22 gone over, they have done some things, there has been 23 strategic movement, there has been operational maneuver 24 that they are learning some things. But it is the 25 technology that is coming back in that is a threat to the


1 Republic of Korea and the world.

2 Senator Ernst: Wonderful. Thank you, gentlemen, very 3 much.

Senator Fischer: Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator
King, you are recognized.

Senator King: Thank you, Madam Chair. General
Brunson, without our presence on the Korean Peninsula would
Kim invade the South?

9 General Brunson: Sir, I would tell you that I do not 10 believe he would. But what I would tell you is he would 11 take advantage of other weapons and systems that he has, 12 conventional, to limit the Republic of Korea's great growth 13 that has taken place over the past 75 years. I think that 14 if we look at the hardening that has occurred on his border 15 at the present time, the fences have been raised, mines 16 have seated in the Demilitarized Zone. I think that what 17 we see is --

Senator King: Why is he doing that? Is there any threat that the South Koreans are going to invade North Korea?

General Brunson: Sir, I think it is as much about the things that he has broadcast in open source that he is a sovereign nation. He is not looking to work at reunification. He has blown up all the means of industry in the DMZ.



Senator King: I thought you said in your opening
 testimony he is not talking about reunification; he is
 talking about one whole country. Doesn't that imply an
 invasion of the South?

General Brunson: No, sir. He considers himself
sovereign north of the MDL, sir, which he claims is his
southern boundary now.

8 Senator King: So he has accepted the boundary, in 9 which case if you testified he would not invade, then why 10 are we there?

Admiral Paparo: Senator, I do not think it is a matter of whether he will invade or not. I think that these intentions to cordon off North Korea could very well be temporary. So to say will he invade or won't he invade, you know, we are talking about probabilities. With the loss of the force on the Korean Peninsula there is a higher probability that he would invade.

18 Senator King: Well, that was my expectation when I 19 asked that question. I would assume that if we were not 20 there it would encourage him to take steps to try to 21 cripple the South.

Admiral Paparo: I think it is essential. We have a treaty ally. It is the number 10 economy in the world. Our economies are very much intertwined. KJU's intentions could shift with the wind, and he has built a military that



is designed to impose tremendous costs directly on South
 Korea. It is very important we maintain that deterrence
 posture.

Senator King: I agree, and to the extent that the
South Korean economy is somehow affected or diminished,
that would be against our interest because of the
relationship that we have.

General Brunson: Yes, Senator, and I misheard you.
9 So please forgive me. But as I mentioned previously, 2,100
10 U.S. companies tied to the Republic of South Korea, 450,000
11 jobs, as well.

12 Senator King: Thank you. this is sort of an 13 intelligence question, General Brunson, but I know you have 14 intelligence. I did not mean that the way it sounded. I 15 know you have access to intelligence assets. How is that? 16 Better, yeah.

Do the North Koreans know the extent to which they are being screwed by the regime? We have all seen the famous picture of no lights in North Korea and South Korea is full of energy and prosperity. Do the North Koreans have any inkling of the way that their opportunities in life are being diminished by this regime?

General Brunson: Senator, I would answer that, having fully listened to the question that I might answer it correctly this time, I would fully answer that by looking



1 at the forces that they sent to Ukraine, to that fight.
2 Absolutely died-in-the-wool idealogues who are tied to and
3 believe in that regime that exists there. I think a great
4 many of the people are not witting to what is going on
5 there, but the elites, as long as he maintains control of
6 the elites.

7 There was a recent article that talked about the 8 things that he is doing to circumvent sanctions and other 9 things, to continue to bring luxury goods into his country. 10 Senator King: Those luxury goods do not go to the 11 people.

General Brunson: No, sir. The point I am making is that as long as he can sort of provide a palliative to the elite, the other folks will not. There is no way that they get communications in or out. One of the things that was coming from the NGOs going to the north was radios, and those things then begat feces balloons and garbage ballons back to the South.

So I would say that the rank and file, everyday people, other than those within his Special Operations Units, are not witting to anything outside of their country.

Senator King: That certainly is my impression.
Admiral, final question. If we pulled back in terms of our
support for Ukraine, would that incentivize Japan, South



Korea, to develop their own capacity, including a nuclear
 capacity?

Admiral Paparo: Senator, I am ignorant of the policy. I do not know the policy that is going on. It is another theater. But I will say that Russian failure --

6 Senator King: I am sorry. Did I say Ukraine? I 7 meant Taiwan.

8 Admiral Paparo: Okay.

9 Senator King: If we withdrew our support from Taiwan, 10 would that incentivize Japan and South Korea to develop 11 independent capacity including the possibility of nuclear 12 weapons?

13 Admiral Paparo: My assessment is yes.

Senator King: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 Chairman Wicker: [Presiding.] Admiral, go ahead and
 answer that question with regard to Ukraine.

Admiral Paparo: So I am in the Indo-Pacific so I donot have perfect knowledge of the ongoing.

19 Chairman Wicker: I understand.

Admiral Paparo: But my assessment, and it is, to a very deep extent, backed in the intel record, is that Russian failure and/or Russian success has the effect of deterring or emboldening the People's Republic China, and they have already taken notice of the tremendous costs that Russia has endured.



Senator King: Mr. Chairman, thank you for that,
 because that is a question I would have asked if I had had
 another 10 seconds. Thank you.

Chairman Wicker: And it only took us 59 seconds.
Thank you very much. Senator Scott, you are recognized.
Senator Scott: Thank you, Chairman. I thank both of
you for what you do. Thank you for the men and women you
serve with.

9 So Admiral Paparo, how much of your time do you spend
10 trying to anticipate or counter actions by Communist China?

11 Admiral Paparo: Senator Scott, that consumes my 12 duties, which is a constant stare, the constant analysis of 13 intelligence course, of open-source sources, and then the 14 physical movement on the ground, to be able to see and 15 understand, to anticipate, and to be able to pace their 16 actions that look to coerce Taiwan and to demonstrate the 17 prospect of settling the matter by force, and number two, 18 their encroachment on treaty allies in the Philippines as 19 well as encroachment on partners in the South China Sea, 20 with their excessive and illogical claims and their nine-21 dash line claim.

22 Senator Scott: And their continuing ability to build 23 ships, airplanes, weapons, all these things, does that 24 cause you to spend more time and money?

25 Admiral Paparo: Yes. Yes, sir, absolutely. They



build combatants at the rate of 6-to-1.8 to the United
 States. And I could go through every force element that we
 are talking about.

Senator Scott: Before they joined the World Trade
Organization and before we allowed them to basically sell
whatever they wanted to this country, did they have a
military that you had to spend a lot of time worrying
about?

9 Admiral Paparo: Just by dint of the weight of the 10 civilization we worried about it. You know, we have had to 11 worry about this now since 1949. But it is step-level 12 change. In the last 20 years they have increased their 13 military 10- to 15-fold.

14 Senator Scott: So if they did not have the economy 15 they have, which is completely created by selling goods and 16 services to the American citizens, they would not have the 17 resources that you would have to spend your time and money 18 to try to counteract.

Admiral Paparo: The society has grown greatly. That was a matter of design for the international community. But unanticipated was the aggression and the buildup that followed.

Senator Scott: So your life would be better if no
American bought any Chinese product or used any service and
no American dollar went to Communist China.



Admiral Paparo: I will say that China's inability to pump resources into its national defense enterprise, which is bolstered by its trade position, is a direct corollary to the success of their business model.

Senator Scott: So would you recommend American
citizens stop buying Chinese products and stop using
Chinese services?

8 Admiral Paparo: I would recommend that we build 9 greater resilience and that we beat them on market 10 principles. And so I do not want to go beyond my remit as 11 a military officer.

12 Senator Scott: All right. Let's talk about naval 13 readiness and specifically the C-130s. The Marine Corps 14 and Air Force are 100 percent recapitalized on the C-130s. 15 The Navy needs over 30 C-130s, and you have to program for 16 this critical tactical airlift platform. The Navy now, I 17 think, only has one under contract. Does that concern you, 18 and should we be doing something about it?

Admiral Paparo: As discussed with Senator Ernst, sustainment is, in fact, what won the Second World War. That is what our would-be adversaries believe and have studied. And everything that confers to our ability to execute lift, that C-130 is one of a kind. With its short field operations, with its capacity, it remains absolutely relevant and indispensable today. And we cannot neglect



1 it. It is a key priority for INDOPACOM.

Senator Scott: Do you think there is a role for dualuse, uncrewed airlift capabilities in a contested logistics environment?

5 Admiral Paparo: I think, you know, the precept of б unmanned is never send a human being to do something that a 7 machine can do. And so inherently, we are moving in that 8 direction, and I would welcome the ability to execute that 9 lift. And it would also give me the ability to diversify 10 the places that we do bring smaller payloads into 11 simultaneously smaller maneuvering units, and would enhance 12 our ability to sustain by the speed it would confirm.

Senator Scott: General Mahoney testified before the Readiness Subcommittee that only 13 of 32 amphibious ships are ready. How does the state of the amphibious fleet impact your ability to do your job?

Admiral Paparo: The amphibious fleet is indispensable. You know, the whole principle of sustaining and moving a force, ships exist to move people, mass, and energy from one place to the other place efficiently. And our amphibious force is under-resourced and not ready enough.

23 Senator Scott: Thank you.

24 Chairman Wicker: Thank you very much. Senator25 Shaheen.



1 Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 2 you both for your service and for being here today. Admiral Paparo, I think I understood you to say in your 3 4 opening statement that we must be active across the 5 information environment. So one of the things that has б happened in the last month is that we have stopped -- we 7 have pulled the plug on Voice of America and Radio Free 8 We had a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee Asia. 9 earlier this year where it was pointed out to us that China 10 is spending over a billion dollars a year -- billion with a B -- on information systems and efforts to provide mis- and 11 12 disinformation across the region and across the world.

13 So what are we doing to counter that, and how does the 14 loss of something like Radio Free Asia affect our ability 15 to counter what the PRC is doing?

Admiral Paparo: China and its Political Works Division and its United Front is incredibly active, effective, and untruthful in the information space, and the delivery of truthful information, really bolstered by free speech, having respect for everybody and everybody's ability to discern truth from lies, is absolutely vital.

We do have an effort that is where Special Operations Command is nested within this unit, with their capabilities, to execute information operations, but it is focused in the military space as it should be, given the



fact that we are in the military. But in my opinion, we must work hard to counter PRC misinformation and disinformation, and our own principles of free speech greatly enable us to have faith in people to be able to suss out truth from lies.

6 Senator Shaheen: And can you talk about why that 7 matters when we are talking about military conflict?

8 Admiral Paparo: It matters because in order for us to 9 achieve the effects of expanded maneuver, our network of 10 alliances and partnerships is the strategic center of 11 gravity of the United States of America. And so, 12 inherently, because governments are accountable to the 13 people they serve, that public opinion will have a great 14 bearing on whether or not those allies and partners are a 15 party to enable a coalition, because the bigger the 16 coalition, the greater legitimacy, the greater capability, 17 the greater access spacing and overflight.

18 Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Clearly we need to do 19 better.

General Brunson, South Korea and Japan recently renewed negotiations with the PRC toward free trade talks that have been stalled since 2012. I am concerned that the tariffs that have been announced and withdrawn, then announced and withdrawn are pushing our allies toward closer trade and integration with countries like China, and



1 that poses security risks. So from an integration and 2 cooperation perspective, do you see any challenges that 3 would be posed by renewed economic talks between China and 4 our closest allies in Asia?

5 General Brunson: Ma'am, I will answer by what I am 6 seeing on the peninsula right now. My concerns would be my 7 hackles would raise, if you will -- and I will let my boss 8 answer for the wider region -- if we were not continuing to 9 move along the pathway for the bilaterally agreed upon 10 OPCOM transfer. If we were not able to move on that path 11 by way of economic challenges facing the nation, that would 12 bother me. If we had impacts that led to lessening human 13 and procedural interoperability, coupled with technological 14 interoperability being lost, that would concern me.

15 Senator Shaheen: And I think Admiral Paparo made a 16 very good case on the economic circumstances earlier, in 17 response to Senator Cotton's question. But I want to ask a 18 follow-up on this with respect to the political dynamics in 19 the Republic of Korea, which you referred to in your 20 opening testimony. The democratic process is playing out, 21 but we expect an election. And are there concerns that, 22 depending on the outcome of that election, that it will 23 affect our relationship with ROK?

General Brunson: Ma'am, the realities of the region, where Korea sits, the adversaries which they can impose



costs upon, is going to keep us in good stead, going
 forward.

3 Senator Shaheen: Thank you. Thank you both. 4 Thank you very much. Senator Budd. Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Chairman. And again, thank 5 Senator Budd: б you all both for being here. Good to see you again. 7 So last weekend, a fresh rotation of fighter units 8 arrived at Kadena Air Base, including the 336th Fighter 9 Squadron from Seymour Johnson Air Force Base. Can you speak to their mission while deployed and how they fit into 10 the larger strategy, Admiral? 11

12 Admiral Paparo: Senator Budd, good morning. Kadena 13 Air Force Base and the wing there is a critical, mobile, 14 dynamic capability that is just not fixed in Kadena but has 15 the ability to move throughout the area of responsibility 16 under the principles of agile combat employment. And so 17 this is our on-point contact layer, immediate ability to 18 impose costs, immediate ability to achieve ephemeral air 19 superiority in the AOR, and it is a foundation on which the 20 larger forces that would flow in, in the event of a 21 conflict, rests. And the Fifth Air Force, of course, is 22 the headquarters in Yokota, with the wing in Misawa and the 23 wing in Kadena, so it is absolutely crucial.

24 Senator Budd: Thank you for that. And, heaven 25 forbid, I mean, we hope this never happens, but should



deterrence fail in the region does the Strike Eagle have a
 role to play that cannot be accomplished by other fighters?

Admiral Paparo: Yes, sir, it does. And, I mean, with F-15EX coming on board, and what that portends with its dominant electronic warfare capability in addition to the already dominant elements of range, speed, sensors, and payload of the "Mighty Eagle" -- I am a former Eagle pilot myself, on exchange -- but without being a homer for it, indispensable.

10 Senator Budd: Thank for that, and I will switch gear 11 a little bit. Can you both elaborate on the demand for 12 Special Operations Forces and how you are currently 13 resourced to meet those demands? General, we will start 14 with you in Korea.

15 General Brunson: Sir, Special Operations Command 16 Korea is augmented within our headquarters by some very 17 particular intelligence assets, I would call them, that 18 help us to best see, sense, and understand on the peninsula 19 itself. SOCKOR is commanded presently by one-star National 20 Guard officer. A very capable formation in terms of 21 ensuring that our partners around the region, not just the 22 Koreans but all forces that come to the peninsula to train, 23 maintain great awareness of not only the region but the 24 discreet activities that might occur should they need to 25 happen. Most recently in the West Sea, we were able to,



during Freedom Shield, conduct an air assault, while being in the daytime. It allowed us to take the Korean forces and bring them to a higher state of readiness than they had achieved previously.

5 Senator Budd: Thank you, General. Admiral, you have 6 talked about previously being underinvested in SOF. Do you 7 care to expand on that?

8 Admiral Paparo: Senator, currently have a 9 counterterror operation that is ongoing in the South 10 Philippine Islands, Operation Pacific Eagle. In addition, the Special Operations Forces are a critical contributor to 11 12 our counter command and control information, surveillance, 13 reconnaissance, and targeting efforts. In addition, 14 Special Operations Forces actively augment and are a part 15 of our intelligence collection, and this is all 16 notwithstanding the immediate ability to do some of the 17 more traditional roles as direction action. So I have been 18 working closely with General Fenton on this to be able to 19 define to him exactly how much Special Operations Forces 20 that we have.

But I believe that we want -- well, I know I want, and we need more, and I can gain a lot of early leverage and a lot of deterrent capability with more SOF.

24 Senator Budd: Thank you, Admiral. General, does the 25 increased military cooperation between DPRK, Russia, and



China concern you as it relates to containing escalation on the Korean Peninsula? And if so, what does that mean for the role of SOF in prevention?

4 General Brunson: Well, it does worry me. It worries 5 me by virtue of the fact of the things that I am seeing б that SOF helps us to see, whether that be with them 7 operating their own UAS or whether that is them doing 8 operations in the region. Most recently, during Freedom 9 Shield, we saw Chinese ships violate and come across the 10 Northern Limit Line in the West Sea, and in the East Sea we had violation of the Korean Air Defense Identification Zone 11 12 by the Russians. And seeing them work together, along with 13 the information, what was going on in the information 14 environment, SOF helps me to counter some of those things. 15 Because what happened was North Korea said, "Hey, they 16 need to stop these illegal exercises, working together with 17 the U.S. and the ROK coming together." And then you had 18 these two other adversaries take actions in the region, 19 which have to be countered. And I do not mean countered in 20 a kinetic fashion, but there are non-kinetic things that that SOF corps allows us to do, that we might counter in 21 22 the information space and other domains to continue on with 23 our mission.

24 Senator Budd: Thank you both.

25 Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Budd. Senator



1 Kaine.

2 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to 3 our witnesses. Admiral Paparo, I would like to direct this 4 question to you. The discussion has had an awful lot, as 5 it should, about North Korea, about China. I want to ask 6 you about the cooperation that we are seeing some of our 7 adversaries engage in.

8 So in the INDOPACOM, talk about joint activities 9 between Russia, China, and North Korea and the growing 10 closeness of the relationship and the threats that pose to 11 the work that we do with our allies.

12 Admiral Paparo: Good morning, Senator Kaine. It is a 13 transactional symbiosis where each state fulfills the other state's weakness to mutual benefit of each state. You 14 15 know, a for-instance is that China has provided 70 percent 16 of the machine tools and 90 percent of the legacy chips 17 that have enabled Russia to rebuild its war machine. And 18 then coming back to China is potentially submarine quieting 19 help as well as other help in some of the areas where 20 Russia is strong.

In addition, you have North Korea that are sending thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands of artillery shells and thousands of KN-24 short-range missiles to Russia with, as General Brunson said, the expectations of concessions coming back in the form of air defense, surface-to-air



missile help, quieting, help with their Kilo submarine
 fleet, and so forth.

And then finally, in the physical space, this last summer, a saw the longest-range joint patrol of PLA navy and Russian Pacific fleet formation in the Bering Sea. And so they are deepening their ability to operate together, and they are demonstrating that by going further afield and in bigger formations.

9 Senator Kaine: Quickly, I just would like to ask for 10 your impression of the importance of AUKUS framework in the 11 Indo-Pacific.

12 Admiral Paparo: AUKUS is going to confer a 13 generational advantage on both countries, but I cherish the 14 advantage it confers on the United States of America. So I 15 will say, first of all, the ability to operate out of 16 Stirling, in Submarine Rotational Force West in Stirling, 17 gives the American submarine force an Indian Ocean port. 18 It gives us the ability to range the Indian Ocean without 19 limitation in the Straits of Malacca, the Lombok or the 20 Sunda Strait. It is a straight shot to the South China 21 Sea, closer and faster than Hawaii; San Diego; Bangor, 22 Maine. And then Australia's contribution into the defense 23 industrial base, a \$3 billion investment in the submarine 24 defense industrial base.

25

Senator Kaine: Yeah, and imagine Congress having that



debate about whether we would invest \$3 billion in the
 Australian workforce. It would be a very tough discussion
 here.

4 Admiral Paparo: It would be worth it.

5 Senator Kaine: It would be worth it, but the fact 6 that the Australian Parliament made that investment in the 7 U.S. workforce demonstrates the degree to which they are 8 concerned about China.

9 Let me just do one last thing here. I have filed a 10 resolution, with a number of my colleagues, to turn off the 11 global tariffs imposed by the President last week, which 12 are now somewhat on pause. There is still a 10 percent 13 tariff. I am not going to ask you about the policy.

14 But I just want to point out one of the reasons I 15 filed the motion. Primarily it is because it is a tax increase on American consumers. But I do not think we 16 17 should treat allies badly. Use Australia as an example. 18 You talk about how AUKUS is very important. The President 19 has imposed a tariff on Australia. We have a trade surplus 20 with Australia, not a deficit. We have a trade surplus 21 with Australia. So why put a tariff on their products? 22 How about other allies? Japan, 25 percent tariff on 23 Why 25 percent? The measure of the tariff was not Japan. 24 Chinese trade barriers. It was the trade deficit that we 25 have with Japan, measured by deficit in goods. It did not



include the full trade picture, goods and services. If you
 add in services, all these trade deficits actually get
 narrow because the U.S. is such a great exporter of
 services.

5 But even if there is a trade deficit in goods with 6 Japan, of course there is. We buy more of their stuff than 7 they buy of our stuff. Our population is three times the 8 size of the Japanese population. So yes, we buy more 9 Japanese goods, with 340 million people, than 120 million 10 people buy of American good. So we are going to punish 11 them for that? It makes no sense.

12 The primary I filed the challenge is because I do not 13 want to tax American consumers with a big national sales 14 tax. But the tariff strategy that punishes allies is no 15 way to be strong in an international world where the U.S. 16 has built allies over decades, that provide some of our 17 greatest edge, qualitative edge, against our adversaries. 18 So that is just an editorial comment, but thank you 19 for your --

20 Chairman Wicker: It surely is. And under the First 21 Amendment you are entitled to that. But I did not hear a 22 question so we will move along to Senator Duckworth.

Senator Duckworth: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, although
I do endorse my colleague from Virginia's editorial
statement. Admiral Paparo, General Brunson, thank you for



being here today and for sharing your assessment of our posture, capabilities, and readiness in the Indo-Pacific. one of my major priorities. Everyone knows I am TRANSCOM's biggest advocates, so I cannot go through a posture hearing like this without asking questions about the logistical environment that we will face if our nation's darkest days come and we must fight a war in the Pacific.

8 Preparing for the difficult realities of large-scale conflict is not only critical for the "Fight Tonight" 9 scenario but it is also key to deterrence. 10 We must demonstrate to our adversaries that we have the capability 11 12 to sustain a fight, if necessary, even as they seek to 13 contest that, to make it clear that such a war would be 14 costly for all of us. And I applaud both of your efforts 15 to improve the logistical readiness of the force and with 16 our allies and partners, but I do think there is more to 17 do.

18 And I am going to start off with medial readiness. We 19 must improve our ability to provide lifesaving care to 20 wounded servicemembers, including to regional hospital 21 access and effective aeromedical evacuation. We have 22 partners in the ROK, in Thailand, in the Philippines, that 23 have medical facilities that meet U.S. hospital 24 certification standards. Those are opportunities for us to 25 develop those relationships.



1 The Indo-Pacific's vast distances, logistical 2 challenges, and maritime environment present a much less 3 permissive environment for the medical mission than the 4 global War on Terror did. And as I have said before, long 5 gone is the golden hour, and we must do comprehensive 6 planning to ensure that our warfighters have foreign 7 medical facility access in the Indo-Pacific.

8 This is why I secured a provision in the fiscal year 9 2025 NDAA to establish an Indo-Pacific Medical Readiness 10 Program. Admiral Paparo, General Brunson, as you implement 11 this program, what are the primary barriers that hinder the 12 necessary medical cooperation, and how can this Committee 13 help as you begin that effort?

Admiral Paparo: Good morning, Senator Duckworth. I strongly endorse your viewpoint and I also strongly endorse what is essentially a concept of operation within what you are saying, which is put the medical expertise of our allies and partners to ensure that that can augment what our own medical providers can execute.

20 So one is MEDEVAC capability in order to get to the 21 location, the agreements to do so, the ability to practice 22 and exercise, so it is not the first time that we do it if 23 the unforgiving hour comes. So I think some of the 24 barriers are physical, and that is lift, medical lift, 25 MEDEVAC lift, and then some of the barriers are, I should



1 say, authorities. And we hope for more authorities to be 2 able to broaden our ability to plan for bringing to bear 3 the medical capabilities of our allies to care for the 4 wounded in conflict. So thank you.

Senator Duckworth: Thank you. General Brunson?
General Brunson: Ma'am, one of the things that you
know, and I know you are full well aware of this, is our
health care comes from the community.

9 Senator Duckworth: You have the only agreement in the 10 ROK, yep?

11 General Brunson: Yes, ma'am. So we get tremendous 12 amounts of care there. What we are trying to do at Allgood 13 Hospital at the present time is have greater access to 14 PROFIS doctors routinely. I need them to be on the 15 peninsula in times other than crisis or conflict. In 16 competition, we want to bring them to the peninsula, so 17 that they better understand the medical landscape and what 18 might be required of them.

We are also looking to UN Command. There are several nations that provided hospitals during the Korean conflict. We want the Italians to come back with their hospitals again. We want the Dutch to come back with their hospitals again, as well. And those things, we think, we then provide to the greater INDOPACOM family, that we might be another resource used in time of conflict.



1 Senator Duckworth: Thank you. I want to pivot to the 2 critical platforms we need to project and sustain forces in a contested logistical environment, especially our sealift 3 4 fleet. Admiral Paparo, do you agree that INDOPACOM would 5 benefit from the ability to surge replacements of naval б auxiliary vessels or to conduct battle damage maintenance 7 of these vessels within the region, closer to the point of 8 need?

9 Admiral Paparo: Strongly, I urge for that, Senator.
10 Senator Duckworth: Because I am concerned that in a
11 war, naval auxiliary vessels would be easy targets. We are
12 going to have to fight our way in and fight our way out.
13 What can we do to help you with that effort?

14 Admiral Paparo: Well, as we enhance our protection 15 capability, we enhance our ability to see/understand the 16 operational environment, to build windows of opportunity to execute sustainment capability, you know, nine classes of 17 supply, medical, and so forth, in those areas. So first it 18 19 is just the quantities, the quantities of TA/Kes, Aos, the quantity of "gray tails," C-17s, tankers. 20 That is 21 critical, and then the ability to exercise it.

Senator Duckworth: What about close sustainment with our allies, like Japan or the ROK, of those vessels, because they certainly have the capabilities, especially the auxiliary vessels.



1 Admiral Paparo: When we game this we frequently rely 2 on one another to do this. And then while operating at sea, sometimes, actually, the necessity of having one leads 3 4 us to use a Japanese oiler, or for an American oiler to 5 refuel a coalition ship. And so we have to be able to sum б all of those sustainment capability among us, have the 7 authorities to do so, so we can turn to it with alacrity. 8 But I would be more comfortable with our own ability, to 9 contribute to that effort with U.S. capability.

Senator Duckworth: Thank you. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.

Senator Kaine: [Presiding.] The momentary substituteChair recognizes Senator Rosen.

14 Senator Rosen: Well, thank you, momentary substitute 15 Chair. Thank you actual Chair, Senator Wicker, and of 16 course, Ranking Member Reed, for holding, of course, a 17 really important hearing. I want to thank Admiral Paparo 18 and General Brunson for your service, for your support and 19 your care in everything that you do. Thank you. Thank 20 you.

21 So I want to talk a little bit about attacks on 22 digital infrastructure by the PRC. Admiral, our growing 23 concern about the vulnerability of Taiwan's digital 24 infrastructure is highlighted by the frequent attempted 25 sabotage of undersea internet cables. These events are



part of a larger trend of gray zone operations, where actions short of war, often involving non-military forces or proxies, are used to exert pressure or destabilize regions. The PRC's reckless, coercive, and aggressive activities pose a threat to democracies around the globe, and its sabotage of those undersea cables has emerged as a particularly alarming tactic.

8 These cables are essential for our global 9 communications, transmitting around 95 percent of global 10 internet traffic. They facilitate financial transactions, 11 bolster our security and the security of our partners and 12 allies.

13 Admiral, while some experts view incidents like the 14 damage to Taiwan's undersea cables as merely a test or low-15 level enhancement, others warn they could be part of a 16 broader Chinese strategy to prepare for future coercion or 17 even invasion of Taiwan. So given this, what do you see is 18 the actual threat these incidents pose to U.S. national 19 security, and what steps is the U.S. taking to effectively 20 counter these digital threats?

Admiral Paparo: Senator Rosen, you know, as ever you are quite astute in identifying this threat. Most certainly that is an element of the intention and an element of the design. They would do so likely with People Armed Forces Maritime Militia, which enables them to



execute this operation without potentially signaling an
 intent to go to war, but by weakening the information
 enterprise of the states over whom they are executing
 aggression.

5 And I think, well one, I think the first is the б ability to penetrate from an intelligence standpoint and to 7 be there in the locations where they would be otherwise 8 cutting those cables in order to deter that activity. 9 Second of all is the resilience to have other redundant 10 networks that enable those states and their partners, including the United States -- Guam, Hawaii, and so forth -11 12 - to achieve what we need to do in the information 13 environment, and that is proliferation in low Earth orbit, 14 and not just one single constellation but multiple 15 constellations.

16 Senator Rosen: Talk about how we can help Taiwan 17 bolster its digital infrastructure. What do you think we 18 can do to help them be sure?

Admiral Paparo: Yeah, I think training them to be able to -- I should not say training them, but enabling them to build that resiliency that is required, that if we are unsuccessful in our efforts to thwart their cablecutting that there are other spectra and other means for information technology, so they have the proper bandwidth to prioritize those functions that they have to within that



bandwidth and latency that you get out of low Earth orbit,
 middle Earth orbit, among the many commercial

3 constellations that are going into orbit.

Senator Rosen: Thank you. I want to talk a little
bit about North Korean support to Russia, because we see a
growing alliance between North Korea and Russia,
particularly in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine.
It presents new challenges for us in the United States and,
of course, for our allies.

10 So we know North Korea is providing troops and 11 munitions to Russia, and the partnership has potential to 12 fuel the conflict and challenge the global order. It 13 raises concerns about the effectiveness of existing 14 diplomatic strategies and economic sanctions.

So to both of you, the partnership between North Korea and Russia poses a serious threat to global stability. In each of your views, how should the U.S. respond to North Korea's military assistance to Russia, and what diplomatic or military strategies should we pursue to prevent further destabilization, not just there but within the international community? General, we will start with you.

General Brunson: Senator, one of the things that we have to do is what we are doing presently. We have got forces there, on the peninsula, that can impose costs on them. We also maintain lines to continue communication so



that we might not have miscalculation in the region writ large, whether that be on the MDL or across the Northern Limit Line and the West Sea. I think that we have to continue to try to communicate out, but make sure that we are always prepared in the event of a miscalculation.

Senator Rosen: Thank you. Admiral?

7 Admiral Paparo: Senator, hundreds of thousands of 8 artillery shells, thousands of KN-24 missiles, and manpower 9 is leaving North Korea with the intent of gaining 10 concession back. So first, exposure in the international community is one, which is to not be shy about exposing 11 12 this naked aggression, using all instruments of national 13 power to impose costs on individuals to build the deterrent 14 from this activity.

And then, as General Brunson has talked about earlier, being wary of what is coming back, and to be able to be in generations of overmatch with what is coming back, if it is submarine quieting, if it is air defense, if it is missile technology. But it is an area we need to work really hard. Senator Rosen: Thank you. I appreciate it. I yield back.

22 Chairman Wicker: [Presiding.] Thank you very much.23 Senator Banks.

Senator Banks: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral,
great to see you again. I enjoyed our visit in my office



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1 last week. And we talked about SLCM-N quite a bit. But I 2 wanted to ask you in this setting, SLCM-N, as we talked 3 about, will be one of the best tools to deter China in the 4 Pacific. But can you talk a little bit about the 5 capability gaps that it fills, why it is so important to 6 INDOPACOM?

7 Admiral Paparo: Good morning, Senator. First, I am a 8 strong advocate of SLCM-N at the soonest possibility, just 9 because of the doubt that it imposes, the potential to 10 execute tactically. You know, presently there is a gap 11 between low tonnage and high tonnage, on which the United 12 States, that gap is a critical vulnerability, from 400 13 kilotons and below. And it gives us a choice of either 14 suicide or surrender when we have to default straight to 15 strategic weapons. So it gives us the ability to close 16 that asymmetry. It also imposes doubt throughout the 17 force, and would change the calculus of aggression 18 inherently, just because of the nature of those weapons.

We use nuclear weapons every single day because they deter, and we use them by not using them, by having them be a potential deterrent. And I am quoting Dr. Brad Roberts on that, who is quite expert.

23 Senator Banks: Can you talk for a minute, how does 24 that affect the Chinese mindset or decision-making? How 25 does it deter them?



Admiral Paparo: It raises the costs and the implications of attacking any unit, because it raises the stakes. So inherently it provides more stability on each side, because there is not an asymmetry to exploit.

5 Senator Banks: As you know, last year's NDAA directed б the Navy and the NNSA to deploy SLCM-N no later than 2034. 7 That is 9 years from now. Part of that delay came from the 8 Biden administration saying that SLCM-N was not needed. Do 9 you agree that there needs to be stability and a commitment 10 from Congress, the DoD, and the Navy to SLCM-N to speed up that process and get it here before the 2034 deadline? 11 12 Admiral Paparo: I agree. 2034 is too late. Sooner, 13 please.

14 Senator Banks: Good. I agree with that, as well. 15 Admiral, the Army says that it will field a long-range 16 hypersonic weapon with the U.S. Army Pacific Forces this 17 fall. That would be the first U.S. hypersonic weapon that 18 we have put into the field. How will this new hypersonic 19 capability help you deter China, as well?

Admiral Paparo: Senator, the nature of a hypersonic weapon is to close, in time, any actor's kill chain, and if your adversary can strike you five times faster than you can strike your enemy, then it incentivizes first strikes with this capability. So, you know, the coin of the realm in the 21st century is speed. Who does things faster wins.



1 So the ability to close distance and execute before counter-fire can come, the ability to execute and then move 2 in order to thwart counter-fire, and your ability to act on 3 4 ephemeral intelligence for a target, to be able to reduce 5 that cycle time from find, fix, target, track to engage. б Hypersonic is critical to that, and it is an asymmetry that 7 exists right now, and we must close it soonest with all 8 elements of hypersonics, including the Navy's Conventional 9 Prompt Strike, which is also not moving fast enough for my liking. 10

Senator Banks: Let's talk about that for a minute.
How much more will it help you when the Navy deploys its
hypersonic weapon too?

Admiral Paparo: I mean, it is step-level change in our ability to gain early leverage in any engagement and really any conflict.

Senator Banks: Very good. Thank you. I yield.
Chairman Wicker: Thank you. I think Senator Kelly is
next.

20 Senator Kelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, you 21 were just discussing SLCM, and I do understand the need and 22 desire for a tactical option in theater certainly provides 23 a certain level of deterrence. I get that. One concern I 24 have with upgrading Virginia-class submarines with this 25 capability is how it impacts the conventional kinetic



effect of that submarine. Admiral, would you agree one of our areas of overmatch with the Chinese is in our submarine attack force?

4 Admiral Paparo: I strongly agree, Senator.

5 Senator Kelly: Do you have any concerns about the 6 magazine depth for conventional torpedoes, if we were to 7 add a tactical nuclear capability to Virginia-class 8 submarines?

9 Admiral Paparo: Inherently it would occupy some of 10 the vertical launch system that would be in a Virginia-11 class submarine, so there would be a cost.

Senator Kelly: It would be a cost involved. And do agree that the likelihood of using a tactical nuclear weapon is significantly less than the likelihood of using a conventional torpedo?

Admiral Paparo: Most certainly. There would be a very high threshold to employ it.

Senator Kelly: And are you concerned with having to take Virginia-class submarines temporarily out of the fleet and out of the AOR in order to refit this capability?

Admiral Paparo: My assessment is that there are ways where we can do it quickly. However, you know, I would rather not lose the availability of the platform.

24 Senator Kelly: And how about the amount of security 25 that would have to be put on the ship and how that affects



1 the overall operation of the conventional attack role for 2 the Virginia-class subs?

Admiral Paparo: My assessment is we have done it before. You and I lived in that Navy. And I am in favor of executing it and moving fast on the security requirement.

Senator Kelly: All right. Well, thank you. I do understand the need and the deterrence factor. I am concerned that we might go down a path and we find out, especially in a conflict, that, boy, I wish we had, that each of these Virginia-class subs were full of conventional round. So thank you for that, Admiral.

13 And General Brunson, there is recent reporting that 14 the United States is considering withdrawing as many as 15 10,000 troops from Eastern Europe, which would signal to 16 Putin our commitment to our allies and partners in that 17 theater is waning. Additionally, EUCOM handed control of 18 the key logistics hub in southeast Poland over to other 19 NATO forces, again highlighting this idea of wavering U.S. 20 commitment to our allies.

And to underpin all of this, there are rumors within the DoD that the Department will direct a reduction of U.S. presence in South Korea or retask these forces to focus on the threat from China. So General Brunson, I acknowledge you cannot comment on the policy -- I understand that --



but from a strategic lens what impact would a force reduction or a retasking of forces have on your ability to deter North Korean aggression?

4 General Brunson: Senator Kelly, the 28,500 troops 5 that we have in the Republic of Korea are responsible б wholly for preserving peace on the peninsula, in the 7 region, in northeast Asia. They are a critical component 8 to ballistic missile defense in the region. They are a 9 critical portion of helping the INDOPACOM command see, 10 sense, and understand in the north and to deter a great 11 many adversaries.

The NDT that we share with Republic of Korea does not mention an adversary. That has always been the way it is. Should an adversary arise, the troops that are there are prepared well, along with our Korean allies, to meet any mission.

Senator Kelly: And do you feel your force is the right size?

19 General Brunson: For the missions as given, yes.
20 Senator Kelly: And what do you assess the impact
21 would be to our relationship with South Korea and partners
22 in the region if we downsized the force on the peninsula?
23 General Brunson: What I think we ought to do,
24 Senator, is remember that there is diplomacy and defense on
25 the peninsula currently. We share the unique focus of



being able to look at our partners eye-to-eye. We recently received instructions to move assets. We were able to talk through those things. So we have got to make sure that we use strategic clarity to explain what is being asked of our forces.

6 Senator Kelly: All right. Thank you, General. Thank7 you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Senator Schmitt: [Presiding.] That would be me for9 right now, so I will recognize myself.

Admiral Paparo, it is great to see you. I always appreciate your testimony. It is very clear-eyed, to the point.

13 So I have long been very concerned about the Chinese presence in the Panama Canal and what they might be able to 14 15 do with that if, heaven forbid, something were to happen. 16 Could you just elaborate a little bit on how the closure of 17 that -- let's just assume that would happen -- the closure 18 of that or an interruption in it availability, how that 19 would affect the flow of both combatants and support 20 vessels to the region.

Admiral Paparo: Good morning, Senator. I mean, inherently the geography, you know, the alternative being all the way south around the Horn, that is about a 2-week transit. Think about how critical it is to get forces on front, when the PRC's intention is a short, sharp war that


provides a fait accompli to the international community.
 And so inherently, anything that slows us down over time
 and distance is bad for us.

Now consider that all of the shipbuilding in the
United States of America is east of the Panama Canal, but
the preponderance of the threat is in the Pacific. And
that just shows the inherent logic of the requirement for
the Panama Canal as ever.

9 Senator Schmitt: Yeah, and I think, yes, the concerns 10 that we had when it, I think, mistakenly sort of given 11 away, are even more concerning now as our orientation, I 12 think, shifts to the Indo-Pacific in a more meaningful way.

13 General Brunson, it is good to see you. I wanted to 14 ask you, and I know that Admiral Paparo got a question 15 somewhat related to this, but concerns about airlift 16 capabilities, and we do not have enough aircraft, and many 17 of our C-130s do not have the survivability in a contested 18 environment. Could you speak a little bit to the current 19 limitations we would have supporting forces in the Korean 20 Peninsula, given our current inventory?

General Brunson: It is just the amount of -- as we look at tipfit flows, sustainment, and those things that are required to prosecute, in the KTO it is why we have begun to move. It is the recognition of that is why we have begun to move with a combined logistics command. It



is why we have begun to look at how can we set the theater now, looking at the stores of munitions, some of which will expire soon. How do we get those replaced, and in quick fashion, so that we do not provide drain for sustainment things in order to prosecute the campaign.

б I am readily aware of the fact that I am fighting 7 until help comes. That is what we are expected to do there 8 myself and the Republic of Korea forces as well as the 9 forces apportioned to UN Command. We are fighting until 10 they get there. So a great many of the exercises that we 11 do, Senator, are all aimed at understanding what magazine 12 depth needs to be resident on the peninsula, so that we do 13 not have to count on external support coming too, so that 14 we might not drain from the overall effort.

15 Senator Schmitt: But it is fair to say that a lot of 16 those plans that are being drawn to account for that are 17 meant to address the fact that we probably do not have the 18 inventory that we need right now. Is that fair to say?

19 General Brunson: That would be accurate, and we are 20 challenging those assumptions every day, Senator.

21 Senator Schmitt: All right. Okay. Admiral Paparo, I 22 wanted to go back to you. I think it is related as far as 23 maintenance and availability and execution in the Indo-24 Pacific. There was recently I think a big win for the U.S. 25 and our allies with the tanker mission in South Korea, and



then we are also seeing this obviously with submarine maintenance in Australia. To you, what is the next big step? Because you have articulated, I think rightly, that speed is going to matter, but the logistical hurdles in the vast expanse of the Pacific, I think it is hard for people to really actually put their mind around it until you put a map up, and you see just the expanse.

8 So what is the next big step to address those 9 logistical challenges for us?

10 Admiral Paparo: Senator, first enrich the kind of 11 work that we are doing in our partnership yards. So beyond 12 the standard voyage repairs is to do deeper, deeper repairs 13 for our forward-deployed naval force is one step. And then 14 if we can get into this space of production of that 15 capability, of enhancing the Korean worldwide ship 16 capacity, which is I think 23 percent of global total is 17 built in Korea. Japan is 15 percent of global 18 shipbuilding. The United States of America is 1 percent of 19 shipbuilding. This confers immediately to speed.

20 So more maintenance being executed at these partner 21 yards, where it makes sense, and then the next step, I have 22 heard a lot of talk about this from all throughout 23 government, which is to avail ourselves of our partners' 24 unique shipbuilding expertise, and then while we regain our 25 own shipbuilding expertise in the United States.



Senator Schmitt: Thank you. Senator Peters.

Senator Peters: Thank you. Gentlemen, thank you for
being here today, and certainly thank you for your service
to our country.

5 Admiral Paparo, as you know, exercise Northern Strike б in Michigan brings over 6,300 participants from all across 7 the United States as well as our international partners, to 8 Michigan's National All-Domain Warfighting Center. It is 9 the largest training area east of the Mississippi. In past 10 briefings before this Committee you discussed the 11 importance of exercise Northern Strike to INDOPACOM, and 12 particularly our ability to cooperate with our partners in 13 the region.

Could you elaborate on your prior comments and discuss the importance of Northern Strike to supporting INDOPACOM's mission, please?

17 Admiral Paparo: Senator, without giving more of the 18 details of what is executed on Northern Strike, it is a key 19 point of leverage. And I have this, even from my 20 interlocuters, who report that those personnel that 21 returned from Northern Strike are changed. And so I 22 treasure it, and I want more of it, and I want to expand 23 it, and I thank the state of Michigan for their diligence in it. 24

25 Senator Peters: Well, that is great to hear. I am



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happy to hear that, and yeah, you will know that I am
actually cosponsoring a proposal for the NDAA with Senator
Slotkin to make Northern Strike permanent, and funding
permanent, and I certainly look forward to working with
members of this Committee to do that, and your words of
encouragement I hope will help that process move along.

7 General Brunson, as you know, Russia is strengthening 8 military ties with North Korea through a mutual defense 9 pact, troop deployments to the Ukraine, and efforts to 10 modernize North Korea's conventional forces. Meanwhile, 11 China is mounting a pressure campaign on South Korea 12 through political interference, economic pressure, maritime 13 disputes, cyber operations targeting critical 14 infrastructure, and the list goes on.

15 So my question for you, sir, is how is USFK adapting 16 its force posture or training to counter the hybrid nature 17 of threats, including military, cyber, and disinformation 18 that is now posed by both Russia and China in this region?

19 General Brunson: Yes, Senator. One of the things 20 that I believe in the future, whether it is in competition, 21 conflict, or crisis we have got to be able to do, is we 22 have got to be able to protect, we have got be able to 23 sustain, and we have got to recognize that our posture, 24 which entails our organization and a host of capabilities, 25 has all got to be in the right place. Part of doing that



is by utilizing the assets that are disposable and the
 authorities inherent in other nations that come to join us
 on the peninsula.

4 So to sort of keep this clean, if you will, we are 5 able to leverage the Special Operations Forces within the 6 Republic of Korea. We are able to leverage our own forces, 7 whether that be a military information support team that 8 operates inside embassy spaces, or whether it us using them, along with our J-39, to ensure that we are not only 9 10 hardening access to ports but we are also testing all our 11 line.

As you know, Senator, we fight off of the CENTRIX-K network. It is important that we stay on that network with cyber defense teams and then encourage our partners to do the same thing, which is what we are doing right now to ensure that we limit access to our networks, protect our information properly, and look at those whole host of threats and how we might counter them on the peninsula.

Senator Peters: Very good. From your perspective, is there a risk that China and Russia could coordinate actions on the peninsula to distract or perhaps divide U.S. attention from other strategic challenges, including Taiwan or Ukraine? How concerned are you about that? General Brunson: I am concerned about that from the perspective of how they might enlist the DPRK to aid in



some form of subterfuge, nefarious activity, or anything
 else that might happen in the region to keep us from
 focusing wholeheartedly on the mission of INDOPACOM in
 maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.

5 Senator Peters: Thank you. Admiral Paparo, Congress 6 created the Pacific Deterrence Initiative in fiscal year 7 2021 National Defense Authorization Act to strengthen our 8 military capabilities and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific 9 region. The PDI is aimed to boost deterrence against China 10 by investing in force posture, in logistics, missile 11 defense, allied cooperation.

12 Sir, could you share some specific examples of how PDI 13 funding has improved the U.S. force posture or our 14 readiness and what steps can we take to enhance or fully 15 operationalize PDI?

16 Admiral Paparo: Senator, an example is the Joint 17 Fires Network and our ability to move fast in order to 18 execute the fires function among Joint Fires faster. Our 19 materiel improvements throughout the theater have enabled 20 us to move faster. And enhancing Pacific Deterrence 21 Initiative, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is an advisor to the 22 process. The services choose which elements that they do 23 is Pacific Deterrent Initiative. And as the AOR is 53 24 percent of the world, almost any Joint Force element that 25 is acquired is applicable to the Pacific.



So more agency for United States INDOPACOM, and able to close the seams throughout the service, would enhance the already good effect of Pacific Deterrent Initiative. Senator Peters: Great. Thank you. Thank you again. Chairman Wicker: [Presiding.] Thank you. Senator

6 Sullivan.

Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, Admiral, General, I want to first begin by
thanking you for your decades of service, both of you. You
both do a great job. I think sometimes we do not always
say that. The same with your staffs.

12 I have shown this chart to many, many, many folks here 13 in the last few months. This is the action that is happening in the North Pacific, Admiral, as you know, up in 14 15 the Arctic. Very, very aggressive Russian and Chinese 16 actions into our ADAs, into our EEZ. And the unprecedented 17 element of this is the joint task force nature. Russia and 18 Chinese joint strategic bomber task forces last summer in 19 Every summer now, last 3 years, we have joint our ADAs. 20 Russian and Chinese naval task forces in our EEZ, very aggressive, pushing out, you know, Alaskan fishermen from 21 22 their grounds. So everybody has testified we need more 23 infrastructure up there.

Admiral, you, in a classified hearing, said we need to reopen this very strategic port, Navy base, ADAC. By the



Scheduling@TP.One www.TP.One 800.FOR.DEPO (800.367.3376) 1 way, I did a little geography test. It is over 1,000 miles 2 west of Hawaii. Most people have no clue about that. It 3 is also the gateway to the Arctic. NORTHCOM Commander has 4 testified we need to reopen ADAC. The CNO has testified. 5 Why do you think ADAC is so important, Admiral?

6 Admiral Paparo: Senator, it is a further western 7 point which would enable, and along with Erickson, in order 8 to gain time and distance on any force capability that is 9 looking to penetrate. Russia's Pacific fleet in Russia 10 frequently takes that Great Circle route through Alaska. 11 Senator Sullivan: Yeah.

Admiral Paparo: And it would enable up to 10X the maritime patrol reconnaissance aircraft coverage of that key and increasingly contested space.

Senator Sullivan: So you testified in the classified hearing you think that we should reopen that. Just now that we are in an unclassified hearing, do you want to say that in an unclassified setting too?

Admiral Paparo: We should reopen ADAC, and we shouldenhance the ability to operate out of Erickson.

Senator Sullivan: So thank you on that. It has 3 piers, two 8,000-foot runways, a big hangar, 22 million gallons of fuel storage, one of the biggest fuel storage depots anywhere on the Planet Earth. The CNO just sent a team up there -- Navy, the State of Alaska, the Aleut



Corporation -- and the NORTHCOM Commander just reached out to me 2 days ago, saying they are going to have a final report completed in the next 2 weeks on a low, medium, to high reopening scenario. Can you commit to this Committee to work with NORTHCOM Commander to get that report out in the next 2 weeks?

7 Admiral Paparo: I commit.

8 Senator Sullivan: And then you also have plans, with 9 regard to Northern Edge, in terms of that really important 10 exercise, using ADAC. Can you talk a little bit about 11 that, to the extent you can in an unclassified setting?

Admiral Paparo: The United States Air Force's concept of agile combat employment is the means by which we achieve more dynamism among the force. So the Eleventh Air Force is based in Alaska. That is an assigned force to the United States INDOPACOM.

Senator Sullivan: Eleventh Air Force, with over 100fifth-generation fighters up there.

Admiral Paparo: The preponderance of INDOPACOM's fifth-generation fighters is in Alaska. So we will be exercising the agile combat employment concept in this summer's Northern Edge exercise.

23 Senator Sullivan: And ADAC is going to be part of 24 that?

25 Admiral Paparo: They will operate out of ADAC.



Senator Sullivan: Great. Let me mention one other thing. You know, when the President, after his election, he actually put a statement out saying, "We want to ensure Alaska gets increased defense investments as we fully rebuild our military, especially as Russia and China are making menacing moves in the North Pacific." So that is a quote from the commander in chief.

8 I know I have raised this with you, but it is a little 9 bit of an issue just in terms of the urgency. As I 10 mentioned, the State of Alaska, the Aleut Corporation that 11 is the Great Alaska Native corporation that owns the land 12 there, and the U.S. Navy were at ADAC a couple of weeks 13 ago, doing a site assessment. They are going to get that 14 to us soon. The Aleut Corporation I have talked about --15 and these are great patriotic Americans, Alaska Natives, 16 served at higher rates in the military than any other 17 ethnic group in the country -- they would love to do a deal 18 with the Navy, 99-year lease or something like that.

But you know who checks in with them once a year,Admiral, about leasing ADAC?

21 Admiral Paparo: I would guess it is not a friendly 22 power.

23 Senator Sullivan: It is not. It is a Chinese 24 shipping company that is certainly, in my view, a front 25 company for the PLA. So how embarrassing would it be to



1 the Pentagon or the Navy -- these guys would never do it. 2 The Aleut Corporation is all patriotic. But let's assume they were not, and somehow they signed a 100-year lease 3 4 with a, quote, "Chinese shipping company" that is always 5 out there looking at ADAC, do you think that would be б embarrassing for the U.S. Navy and the Pentagon? 7 Admiral Paparo: On substance I think it would be bad, 8 because this is the modus operandi in the Belt and Road 9 Initiative. Imagine having the Belt and Road Initiative include Alaska. 10 11 Senator Sullivan: And one of the most strategic ports 12 in the world. 13 Admiral Paparo: Amen. 14 Senator Sullivan: So we have a sense of urgency on 15 this, and I look forward to working with you and the 16 Committee, Mr. Chairman, on this important issue. Thank 17 you. 18 Chairman Wicker: I sense a sense of urgency. 19 Senator Sullivan: Yes, sir. 20 Chairman Wicker: Senator Blumenthal. 21 Senator Blumenthal: Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 22 both for your service. Admiral, I want to ask you some 23 questions based on your extraordinarily impressive 24 experience as an aviator as well as combatant commander. 25 We are building new aircraft carriers, at huge expense.



Scheduling@TP.One www.TP.One 800.FOR.DEPO (800.367.3376) Are you concerned about their vulnerability in light of the increased Chinese capabilities that you mentioned in your testimony -- AI, cyber, hypersonic missiles? My guess is the everyday American sees an aircraft carrier as a huge sitting duck out there in the middle of the Pacific. Are you concerned?

7 Admiral Paparo: It is a moving duck with the ability 8 to defend itself, unique among airfields as a mobile 9 capability. It is not uniquely vulnerable, but it is 10 uniquely valuable, and the PRC seeing that value have made it a focus, because they have every other fixed, land-based 11 12 targeting complete. Its value lay in the enormous variety and the enormous mass of fires. So it is not more uniquely 13 14 vulnerable to the PRC. It is more uniquely threatening to 15 the PRC, which is why they are working so hard to strike 16 And I hear people say, well, in war games we lose it. 17 these aircraft carriers. The war games must have a 18 terrible Paparo simulator, because I am going to put them into harm's way judiciously, and when they can strike, and 19 20 it will be my job to return those aircraft carriers to 21 their home bases after they have done their duty.

22 So I am no more concerned about aircraft carriers than 23 I am about destroyers, submarines, squadrons, wings, 24 battalions, regiments. But those fires, the mass of fires 25 that they bring are absolutely unique, step-level change



1 above any other particular single unit. And you pay me to 2 find ways to protect those aircraft carriers, along with 3 everything else that is in the Joint Force. For every one 4 maritime-oriented missile there are eight others that are 5 designed to strike land targets.

And so I note that. You know, this topic comes up frequently. But you have my opinion on it, is that instead of waxing into a culture of, well, we should give up on this capability, no, we should do something about it. And we are doing something about it, and that is well-included in my integrated priorities list that I presented to the Committee.

Senator Blumenthal: I think that answer is extremelycompelling, and thank you for it.

Turning to submarines and asking the same question in a different form, are submarines more vulnerable today than, say, 3 years ago, 5 years ago, because of those advanced detection and countermeasures that the China or other adversaries could have?

Admiral Paparo: The PRC is growing in their capability on anti-submarine warfare, which I would expect them to do. I respect them for doing it. They are more vulnerable than they have been before, and that equally confers the responsibility for the command, to take the steps that gain more margin. I mean, the United States has



a generational lead on undersea warfare, and it remains
 critical, absolutely one of my highest priorities.

The introduction of quantum computing could well 3 4 enhance the PRC's ability to flood the zone and to target 5 submarines and to take that away. They are pushing sensors 6 into the sea to find them. They are working very hard to 7 find them, and they are working very hard to counter them. 8 I have an equal duty to protect those and to preserve the 9 unusual, the outsized combat capability of those submarines, and I take a similar view of refusing to quit 10 11 on a unique capability.

12 And on that front, if I leave the space between the 13 surface and the Kármán line, our adversaries are going to 14 flood that space with capability and become even more 15 effective against our submarine force.

16 Senator Blumenthal: Well, I thank you for both of 17 those answers, which again, I find very persuasive. We 18 cannot quit on those weapons platforms. We just need to 19 make them more capable and stronger, and I look forward to 20 working with you on that mission. Thank you very much, 21 Admiral. Thank you both for your service to our nation. 22 Thank you, all. Senator Slotkin Chairman Wicker: 23 will be in in just a moment. Let me ask you, in a follow-24 up to Senator Blumenthal's line of questioning on 25 submarines, we still need a lot more submarines, do we not?



1 Admiral Paparo: I strongly agree. We have to 2 increase our production rates. We have to invest in the submarine industrial base. We have to increase the rates 3 4 of the number of submarines, and we have got to increase 5 the availability of our submarines. б Chairman Wicker: And you had a valuable exchange with 7 Senator Banks about nuclear weapons. And I understood you 8 to say they are useful to us every day because of their 9 deterrent effect. Is that correct? 10 Admiral Paparo: Yes, sir. Chairman Wicker: And also, just because we do not 11 12 often hear about this, the doctrine of the United States, 13 for years, has been not to rule out a first strike. Is 14 that correct? 15 Admiral Paparo: I affirm that. 16 Chairman Wicker: Okay. Thank you very much. Senator 17 Slotkin. 18 Senator Slotkin: Thank you. Apologies for being 19 late. Welcome. Glad to have you here. 20 I would just like to talk about strategy vis-à-vis 21 China and Taiwan. I am sure you have gotten a lot of 22 questions on this. I am trying, as the co-chair of the 23 bipartisan Taiwan Caucus, to understand what our approach 24 is, given that we talk about the Chinese threat, right, to 25 Taiwan, we talk about that we are in a period of



1 vulnerability, right. We want to make sure to be 2 particularly watchful about what is going on in Chinese military intentions. But at the same time, we are calling 3 4 into question the commitments by allies and partners, who 5 we would need, I think, in any Taiwan contingency scenario, 6 I think even the Trump administration's interim right. 7 National Defense Strategy talks about the importance of 8 allies and partners. And I have seen public reports from 9 CSIS and others that say that actually if there was a war with China over Taiwan, if they tried to take over Taiwan, 10 we could not manage that situation to satisfaction if 11 12 allies and partners were not with us in that fight. That 13 we are so far away, the tyranny of geography, what we 14 always talk about.

And I am just concerned that our approach to allies and partners is threatening the very thing that I think we believe in, on a bipartisan basis, on this committee, that we need to have a muscular deterrent approach.

So can you tell me about the value of allies and partners to whatever you need to do in that region, understanding we are in an unclassified space, and the dependence we have on other nations hosting our forces, allowing operations from their land. Can you walk me through it, please?

25 Admiral Paparo: Senator, good morning. Allies and



1 partners have an outsized effect. It is the strategic 2 center of gravity of the United States of America. And by having access basing and overflight with our allied 3 4 partners we have the ability to achieve the principles of expanded maneuver, and that is to have multiple attack 5 6 vectors across multiple domains. Where our adversary would potentially just be focused on the one point, there would 7 8 be threats coming from multiple points. It confers 9 legitimacy on the force. It confers greater access basing, 10 overflight, freedom of movement of the force. And then to 11 the extent that allies and partners are participating in 12 the operation, it enhances your fires capability, as well. 13 So all across those front allies and partners are critical.

You do pay me to build a plan that does not fall on the loss of a partner, but the cost, the bill comes in the form of people, capability, money, and time. The more partners and allies that we have, the less it will be to bill across those four domains.

19 Senator Slotkin: So I guess my confusion comes with 20 my view -- again, my view as a Senator here -- that this 21 Administration is implementing a strategy of cozying up to 22 our adversaries and kicking our allies in the teeth. And I 23 say that as someone who is a border state and lives right 24 next to Canada. You know, we can go to a concern in 25 Canada. The idea that we need partners to make deterring



1 China affordable and approachable, but that we are going to 2 attack our allies, put significant tariffs, on again, off 3 again, on these allies, we are going to humiliate them in 4 public, speak badly and speak ill of them, including 5 countries we share intelligence with, is, to me, the most 6 strategic thing I have seen in a national security approach 7 to China.

8 So for all someone claims they care about deterring a 9 military threat from China, if your approach -- and thank 10 you for your incredibly articulate description of how our 11 allies and partners are the center of gravity, your words. 12 I believe it to my core -- I cannot, for the life of me, 13 say with a straight face that for all the huff and puff 14 this Administration puts on about China that they actually 15 give a crap about deterring them, because then you would 16 not be alienating all the allies and partners who live 17 around China.

And I am watching the Chinese put in a base in Cambodia. Sounds like a terrible vulnerability for us that other allies and partners are cozying up to China.

So I deeply appreciate the work that you do. We depend on you. We need you all to do your work well. But for the life of me I think whatever bravado this Administration has about China, the play is actually being undermined every day by the way that they kick our allies



1 in the teeth.

I yield back. Chairman Wicker: Thank you, Senator Slotkin. That concludes the hearing. We appreciate the testimony, both in the closed session and in this open session. And with that this hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

