

Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA
Nominee to be Commander, United Nations Command,
Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command,
and Commander, United States Forces Korea

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the war fighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

No. I do not see the need for modifications at this time.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Not Applicable.

Duties and Qualifications

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea and what is your understanding of how these different command responsibilities interrelate?

The Commander, United Nations Command (UNC), serves as commander of the International Command and is responsible for maintaining the United Nations Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. The Commander, UNC is also responsible for the operational control, strategic direction and combat operations of the UNC member nations' forces during contingencies. The Commander, UNC acts in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions and directives; and also the directives of the United States government as transmitted by Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, keeping the US Pacific Command Commander informed.

The Commander of Combined Forces Command (CFC) leads the bi-national US-ROK force and is responsible to support the Armistice Agreement, to deter aggression against the ROK and if deterrence fails, defeat the external threat to the ROK. The commander acts on the direction from the US-ROK Military Committee, which is the strategic interface between US and the ROK national authorities.

The Commander, US Forces Korea, is a sub-unified command of US PACOM and is responsible for all duties and functions assigned by Title 10, United States Code and the Unified Command Plan. The Commander, USFK, supports the Armistice Agreements, provides forces to Commander, CFC and UNC, and provides administrative and logistic support necessary to maintain their readiness. Commander, USFK reports through the US Pacific Command Commander to the Secretary of Defense.

These three commands mutually support each other's missions. The Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea can both provide support to the Armistice functions of the UNC. Similarly, both USFK and UNC can provide support to CFC for the latter's deterrence and defense missions. International support to the CFC is coordinated through the UNC. The close consultative partnership with our ROK ally and the member nations of UNC ensure that these commands are leveraged in a complementary fashion in order to support the national interests of the Republic of Korea and the United States.

What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

If confirmed, my first priority as the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander must be to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined joint and combined forces that are prepared to fight and win. My extensive experience in operations and in command, and with multiple operational deployments prepared me well to assume these duties. I have commanded troops at battalion level during operational deployments to Africa and Bosnia; as deputy division commander of 1st Armored Division in Iraq; the 82d Airborne Division Commander/and Commander of RC-East in Afghanistan, a multi-national command with 26,000 troops and responsible for approximately 40% of Afghanistan including the key border region with Pakistan; and most recently in Afghanistan as the US I Corps/ ISAF Joint Command Commander responsible for the day to day operations of a multi-national force with contributions from 50 Nations. Between these command experiences, I've served in key joint leadership positions such as the Operations Officer for US Central Command and now as the Director of the Joint Staff. These joint, coalition and inter-agency experiences provide me the knowledge, skills and insight necessary to lead a large complex, multinational organization and to ensure their readiness to meet the demanding mission in Korea.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

I have gained invaluable experience serving as the Director of the Joint Staff, and during my previous command of the U.S. Army I Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. I also recognize that there are many individuals in both the ROK and U.S. governments who have vast experience and knowledge of the ROK – U.S. Alliance. If confirmed, I will seek in depth discussions with experts in our government, the ROK government, Non-governmental organizations and educational/research institutions to develop my personal political, military, economic and cultural knowledge. Also, if confirmed, I will continuously build strong professional relationships that are essential to success as the USFK, UNC and CFC Commander.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea with the following officials: The Secretary of Defense, The Deputy Secretary of Defense, The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Secretaries of the Military Departments, The Chiefs of Staff of the Services, Commander, United States Pacific Command, Other Combatant Commanders.

The Secretary of Defense

The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, Department of Defense Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities, organizations, and commands established or designated by law, or by the President or by the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with sections 111, 113, and 192 of Title 10, United States Code. The functions of the heads of these offices are assigned by the Secretary of Defense in accordance with existing law. The Commander UNC reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and through the Secretary of Defense to the President, while at the same time keeping the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities. A validated combined U.S.-ROK document provides further guidance on Commander CFC's unique relationship with the ROK National Command and Military Authorities and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the authorities contained in Title 10 United States Code, and except as expressly prohibited by law or order of the President or Secretary of Defense, has full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense upon any and all matters concerning which the Secretary of Defense is authorized to act pursuant to law.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy, and the integration and oversight of Department of Defense policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Commander UNC communicates through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments, including: recruiting; organizing; supplying; equipping to include research and development; training; servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering to include the morale and welfare of personnel; maintaining; construction, outfitting, and repairs of military equipment; and the construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities as well as the acquisition, management, and disposal of real property and natural resources.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of the Services under Title 10, United States Code. Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. The Service Chiefs of Staff also provide military advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Commander, United States Pacific Command

The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, as commander of a sub-unified command of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), reports directly to Commander, USPACOM, on matters directly pertaining to USFK areas of responsibility. Commander, United Nations Command and Commander, Combined Forces Command, keep the Commander, USPACOM informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities.

Other Combatant Commanders

The Commanders of the Combatant Commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to them and shall exercise command authority over assigned forces as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions within the chain of

command by transmitting to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands the orders of the President or the Secretary of Defense.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

Based on my study of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and vital U.S. national interests in Northeast Asia, there are four major and enduring challenges that confront any UNC, CFC, and USFK Commander.

The first challenge is to maintain the Alliance Agreements and to deter the DPRK. Second, to ensure force readiness to fight and win a war with North Korea and to simultaneously prepare for the consequences of a DPRK regime collapse. Third, to maintain a strong US-ROK Alliance to achieve the Security Objectives on the Peninsula. Finally, to execute a cohesive and effective transformation of the Alliance in accordance with the Strategic Alliance 2015. This transformation includes an OPCON transition as outlined in Strategic Alliance 2015 Base Plan (SA 2015).

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

If confirmed, I will build strong relationships with the ROK leadership in order to ensure strength, cohesion and confidence in our alliance and our strategy.

If confirmed, I will focus on the readiness of the U.S. and ROK forces in Combined Forces Command to fight tonight and emphasize challenging, realistic and effective joint and combined training required to ensure readiness.

If confirmed, I will work closely with the ROK leadership to develop detail and agreement on the planning, conditions, and metrics required to succeed in the transition of operational control in accordance with Strategic Alliance 2015.

Finally, if confirmed, I will work closely with our Ambassador to provide the leadership necessary to realize US and ROK objectives.

North Korea

North Korea represents one of the greatest near term threats to regional security and stability. The seriousness of the threat is seen by North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Even without these capabilities, however, North Korea's conventional military force coupled with its history of aggressive and unpredictable behavior underscore the dangerousness of the situation.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

I believe North Korea remains the primary threat to security in Northeast Asia. Over the past few years, the security situation on the Peninsula has reached high levels of tension following the March 26, 2010 attack on the ROK navy vessel Cheonan and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on 23 Nov 10. In recent months, North Korea defied the will of the international community by conducting tests associated with its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

North Korea has hindered the progress of Six-Party denuclearization talks; adopted a policy of provocative actions in an attempt to secure concessions and continues its nuclear program. Although its conventional force threat continues to decline, it has compensated by repositioning and redistributing its inventory of conventional artillery, while investing in asymmetric capabilities, such as ballistic missiles, special operations forces, and cyber technology.

I believe our primary concern is the potential for additional North Korean provocations, which is a tool of choice as part of its coercive diplomatic strategy designed to safeguard the regime, maintain internal control, and extort foreign aid. Also, Kim Jong-un's youth and inexperience increase the likelihood of miscalculation, as does the imperative for him to maintain credibility with the military hardliners. These factors make him less predictable in the near-term.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to South Korea, Japan, and the United States by North Korea's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities?

North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear programs pose a direct threat to security in Northeast Asia and could provide an increased threat to the U.S. Homeland in the future. The Kim Regime continues to use these two programs to shape conditions and to gain leverage during negotiations, to extract concessions, and ensure regime survival. North Korea views its WMD and theater ballistic missile (TBM) programs as sources of international power and prestige, strategic deterrent against the ROK, US and Japan, a means of exerting regional influence, and a source of currency derived from export sales.

North Korea possesses extensive short and medium range ballistic missile programs with an inventory of several hundred ballistic missiles. North Korea continues to build these missiles of increasing range, lethality, and accuracy, while enhancing the survivability of its missile forces. North Korea's research and development of an Intercontinental ballistic missile, and possible fielding of an intermediate range missile, is a threat to the western United States, Okinawa, Guam and Alaska. The successful space launch in December 2012 demonstrates an increasing capability as well as an intent to target the US.

Despite severe fiscal difficulties, North Korea commits significant resources to develop and produce ballistic missiles for both deployment within North Korea and export. This missile development program presents a threat which cannot be ignored.

North Korea reaffirmed its ability to produce a nuclear weapon with its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013 at Punggye. The intelligence community assesses that North Korea has sufficient plutonium to produce weapons.

Additionally, there are indications that North Korea has pursued a highly enriched uranium program in the past, and it is likely the effort continues today. In November 2010, North Korea displayed a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon to foreign visitors. The facility's purpose, ostensibly, is to produce fuel for a light water reactor currently under construction at the facility. However, this capability could provide an alternative source of highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.

What is your assessment of North Korea's conventional capabilities and readiness?

North Korea conventional capabilities (particularly air, naval, ground mechanized and armor) continue to decline due to shortfalls in equipment modernization and advanced training. However, North Korea boasts the fourth largest Army in the world with more than 70% of its forces near the DMZ. I also understand that North Korea has adjusted its strategy to focus on asymmetric capabilities with deployments and development of new ballistic missiles and increased emphasis on specialized light infantry and special operation forces.

What, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean Peninsula?

I believe the most important factors in strengthening deterrence on the Korean Peninsula are the maintenance of a strong U.S.-ROK Alliance and the readiness of our Joint and Combined Force. Both the ROK and U.S. continue to invest in improved military capabilities while working toward the transition to a ROK-led allied defense of the Peninsula. In order to strengthen deterrence, the Alliance needs to increase the interoperability between ROK and U.S. forces, refine C4I relationships and capabilities following OPCON transition, and improve the ROK's ballistic missile defense capability.

Do you believe you have adequate resources to defend our allies and national interests if North Korean forces were to move across the DMZ?

Yes, as I understand it, the US contribution to the combined defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) is adequate to deter North Korea aggression and to provide decisive joint reconnaissance and operational fires in support of South Korean ground forces if deterrence should fail. Also, the ROK ally has made great strides in modernizing and improving their military readiness. If confirmed, I will conduct a careful and thorough review of the command's readiness and available resources as well as the impact of fiscal realities to ensure we have what is needed to defend our allies and national interests.

What capabilities are the most critical to mounting an effective defense against a North Korean move across the DMZ?

There are several critical capabilities important in mounting an effective defense, the first of which is a trained and ready ROK force. Also, the US provides critical Ballistic Missile Defense, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, C4I, and joint operational fires capabilities in support of the Alliance. The CDR United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command Commander, and the US senior leaders, provide vital leadership for the combined ROK-US Alliance.

I am aware of the command's ongoing day-to-day engagements with our ROK civil and military counterparts that seek to balance US contributions against existing and emerging ROK capabilities and US National priorities. US augmentation of in-place USFK capabilities also remains an essential component to defeating a potential North Korean aggression and restoring stability to the Korean Peninsula.

What do you perceive are the differences, if any, between Kim Jong Un and his father?

As I understand it, the main differences between Kim Jong-un (KJU) and his father, Kim Jong Il (KJI), are in the areas of leadership of the military and experience with internal politics. There is a lot we do not know about the new leader. KJU's youth, inexperience, and lack of a track record make it difficult to predict his intentions, actions, and reactions. There is a generational shift, and KJU has been balancing his ideals with a regime effort to reflect his grandfather, Kim Il Sung. Overall, however, I do not believe there has been any significant shift in North Korean regime interests, and do not anticipate any near-term changes in North Korean pursuit of nuclear or missile capabilities.

How do you think increased assertiveness by South Korean and Japanese leadership affects the situation on the Peninsula?

Cooperation between South Korea and Japan is vital for stability and security in Northeast Asia, and United Nations Command rear bases in Japan are critical for the defense of South Korea. Along with U.S. Ambassador Sung Kim, I will, if confirmed, continue to encourage South Korean and Japanese bilateral and multilateral security cooperation despite recent public friction. I understand the historical and territorial disputes that hinder public support for Korea-Japan bilateral initiatives. However, I am confident that in time of crisis and conflict with North Korea, the United Nations Command will have Japanese support, and the ROK and Japan will work closely together. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage close military cooperation but recognize these issues are heavily dependent upon bilateral discussions between Seoul and Tokyo.

Do you think budget cuts and sequestration will result a reduced carrier presence and U.S. warship presence in the Pacific, and if so, do you think that makes Kim Jong Un more likely to miscalculate or to be more militarily aggressive?

I know that the Department of Defense is committed to the rebalance to the Pacific. However, the effects of full sequestration may lead to a reduction of US warship presence. The presence of U.S. warships in the Pacific has a significant deterrent effect on North Korean military aggression. Pyongyang has not committed a major provocative action when a U.S. carrier group was present in the Korean Theater of Operations. North Korean rhetorical threats against U.S. warships and other U.S. capabilities clearly indicate their concern, for which they have no viable military response.

What is your assessment of China's role in managing North Korean behavior and ambitions?

The China-North Korea relationship has a major impact on North Korean behavior and ambitions. The U.S. and South Korea continue to pursue diplomatic and security dialogue with Beijing on North Korea issues. I understand China recognizes and shares our interest in stability and a nuclear-free North Korea. It is important for China to recognize the benefits of close coordination with the international community in its efforts to prevent North Korean aggression and encourage responsible behavior.

North Korean Nuclear Program

In 2010, North Korea disclosed that it has a functioning uranium enrichment program and earlier this year it announced the intention to restart plutonium production at Yongbyon. These developments, coupled with its underground nuclear tests – the third of which was conducted this year – make it clear that North Korea is determined to pursue nuclear weapons. So, while there may be disagreement on the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, there is general consensus that North Korea will eventually possess nuclear weapons, if they do not already. Moreover, North Korea has a history of proliferating missile and nuclear technology. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a means to interdict suspect shipments, including shipments of nuclear or missile items to and from North Korea.

Would you recommend any improvements to the organization or capability of the PSI member nations to improve the ability to interdict prohibited shipments to and from North Korea?

I fully support this initiative, and if confirmed, I will emphasize the need for multinational cooperation, interest, information sharing, and commitment to preventing the proliferation of WMD.

Proliferation prevention is a critical issue for the Korean Theater of Operations. The Republic of Korea has demonstrated their commitment to and leadership in the PSI through their participation in multiple multinational planning events and training exercises, including the EASTERN ENDEAVOR LIVEX Table Top Exercise in September 2012, and the U.S.-UAE LEADING EDGE 13 exercise this past February.

Recent events have reinforced the need for multinational support in combating the proliferation of WMD. This month, a North Korean-flagged ship was intercepted by the Panamanian military carrying what appeared to be ballistic missiles and other arms en-route from Cuba to North Korea¹

In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take, including with our allies and partners, to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and nuclear technology to countries such as Syria, Iran and others?

¹ Derived from an open source article in *The Korean Times* published on 17 Jul 2013.

If confirmed, I will assess whether U.S. or Combined ROK-U.S. forces can more effectively contribute to the PSI, or other U.S. Pacific Command initiatives. Further, effective counter-proliferation requires interagency and international cooperative efforts integrated with the critical intelligence assets. To effectively deter North Korea's proliferation efforts, it is vital that the current sanctions levied against North Korea be maintained and enforced. This includes not only the U.S. but also regional and international partners.

In your view, how does the lack of progress in diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program inform or guide U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy in the region?

North Korea continues to make progress in its pursuit of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. We need to be consistent and persistent, and we need to continue our diplomatic efforts to close gaps and increase pressure in the regime. I understand the Department is holding ongoing bilateral Extended Deterrence Policy Committee meetings to develop a new ROK-US Alliance tailored deterrence strategy to deal with this growing challenge. I support diplomatic efforts to denuclearize North Korea, and if confirmed, I would ensure that we are prepared to deter and defend against any North Korean nuclear threat.

Do you think North Korea poses a near-term, mid-term or long-term nuclear threat?

I believe North Korea's nuclear capabilities pose a long-term threat to U.S. interests.

USFK Ballistic Missile Defense Priorities

Recent developments in the North Korean ballistic missile program – the successful space launch of a satellite in December 2012 and the display of a road-mobile missile launcher during a parade last year – coupled with the unpredictability of the North Korean regime place a premium on a robust, coordinated missile defense capability in the region.

What is your assessment of the highest priority missile defense needs of U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command?

As I understand it, the levels of interoperability we achieved with our partners in the Korean Theater during the most recent North Korean missile launch was unprecedented, however, there is more work to be done. Our ballistic missile defense needs an organic Upper Tier ballistic missile defense capability such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) or Theater Ballistic Missile capable AEGIS ships in order to fully address the North Korean missile threat. While THAAD's temporary deployment to Guam bolsters the PACOM AOR overall ballistic missile defenses, it does not specifically address the ballistic missile defense shortfalls for the Korean Theater of Operations.

What missile defense capabilities do you believe are needed in the near term to meet the operational needs of these commands, and what systems are available to provide such capabilities?

As I understand, the evolving ballistic missile threat in Korea requires an integrated, layered ballistic missile defense approach. The addition of an upper-tier intercept capability such as the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) or ballistic missile defense capable AEGIS ships in the near term would complement the Patriot's existing terminal defense capability and significantly enhance ballistic missile defense on the Peninsula. Also, I understand the US and ROK teams continue to identify improvements to the missile defense capability. If confirmed, I will conduct a thorough review of the missile defense capabilities to ensure we are prepared to defend against the North Korea missile threat.

In addition to the deployment of Patriot, THAAD, and Aegis BMD capable ships to the Pacific, what other steps, if any, do you think are necessary to provide adequate protection for U.S., partner, and allied assets?

We must continue to work on the interoperability and integration of existing and emerging ballistic missile defense systems with our allies and partners. The ability to rapidly and seamlessly share ballistic missile warning, tracking, and engagement information is crucial to providing a missile defense that maximizes protection while preserving scarce resources.

The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review established a policy of pursuing a Phased Adaptive Approach to regional missile defense, including in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. This approach is intended to provide timely and effective defense of existing and emerging missile threats with a flexible set of missile defense capabilities, tailored to each region.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, and do you believe it is an appropriate approach to providing missile defense capabilities for the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula?

Yes, I do support the Phased Adaptive Approach and believe that it is the appropriate approach to continue to improve the missile defense capabilities on the Korean Peninsula.

In Europe the Phased Adaptive Approach is geared towards protecting additional territory of partners and allies as the Iranian threat capabilities grow.

Since the North Korean capability already threatens partners and allies, what are the phases of the Phased Adaptive approach in the Pacific?

Specific to the Republic of Korea, I understand that Phase I has been completed through the stationing of U.S. and ROK Patriot forces to defeat short and medium range missiles. Phase II, which is underway, involves increasing partner capabilities and integrating capabilities. The Republic of Korea has committed to upgrading its Patriot forces, and we have made significant strides towards the integration of our ballistic missile defense systems. Phase III is the addition of upper-tier systems such as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) or AEGIS BMD and more powerful sensors such as AN/TPY-2 to defeat medium and intermediate range missiles.

Do you believe it would be in our security interests to seek a cooperative missile defense relationship with South Korea as a means of enhancing security on the Korean Peninsula and the region?

Yes, I believe it is in our interest, and I understand that the command is actively seeking a cooperative missile defense relationship. If confirmed as Commander of U.S. forces in Korea, I would continue to follow through on Alliance agreements reached during the Counter-missile Capabilities Committee to enhance an integrated, comprehensive Alliance counter-missile capability based on a strategy of detecting, defending against, disrupting, and destroying North Korean missile assets.

Role of Other Regional Countries

North Korea's provocative behavior threatens not just security and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but also the security and stability of the entire region.

In your view, what are the roles and responsibilities of other regional countries in helping to manage the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs?

Not only regionally but internationally, countries have a responsibility to help deter against the North Korean threat. This is why, if confirmed, I would strengthen the role and visibility of the United Nations Command. I believe there is deterrent value in highlighting the UNC role and presence – the Alliance is prepared to fight tonight, but the entire international community has a stake in stability in Northeast Asia.

United States - Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance

Since the end of World War II, the U. S. - ROK alliance has been a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.

What is your impression of the current U. S. security relationship with the ROK?

It is my understanding the current U.S. security relationship with the ROK is very strong, based on mutual respect and trust and grounded in the Mutual Defense Treaty. In June 2009, the U.S. and ROK signed a Joint Vision statement that commits both nations to building an alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world at large. And recently, President Obama and President Park validated the Joint Vision Statement during their 2013 summit, issuing a Joint Declaration that add impetus to our efforts to modernize and strengthen our Alliance in the service of both of our nation's interests.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?

I will, if confirmed, continue the work of my predecessors focused on sustaining strong ties with the ROK military and other security-related organizations in the ROK government. Regular and

consistent, in-depth engagement at multiple levels is essential to building mutual understanding and habits of cooperation that will serve our mutual interests and maintain a strong and vibrant relationship in a complex environment.

If confirmed, I will also work to build broader and deeper relationships with the Korean people. In particular, I will encourage continued exchange and cooperation activity between the Command and the people of local Korean communities – activity that form strong Americans and Korean bonds.

Finally, I will work closely with the U.S. Ambassador to Korea and other elements of the U.S. government to take a flexible, adaptable, and expansive approach to designing and executing Alliance-building initiatives that promote the continuation of a strong U.S.-ROK security relationship.

What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in ROK equipment and training?

The ROK military remains a capable and motivated force. However, I understand recent USFK assessments indicate the ROK military has critical capability gaps across all the services in interoperability, materiel, manning, and training. The ROK government in recent bilateral talks has committed to an acquisition timeline and training plan to resolve capability shortfalls. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ROK leadership to assess and validate ROK progress during annual combined joint exercises and other bilaterally agreed forums. Meanwhile, the US will bridge capability gaps until the ROK military has acquired the capability. There are U.S. capabilities like extended deterrence that the U.S. will provide for the duration of the Alliance.

What is your understanding of the command relationships between U.S. and ROK forces?

Based upon my understanding, the current command relationships provide very close cooperation, collaboration, and transparency to fully leverage combined capabilities. The U.S.-ROK command relationships are structured to address the distinct requirements of Armistice, crisis, and wartime conditions. Our crisis action relationships provide the required flexibility to allow a tailored Alliance response to a military crisis on the Peninsula. Today, the ROK Chairman is responsible for the conduct of ROK forces and the defense of South Korea in the Armistice environment. In wartime, the current Alliance command relationships dictate that a U.S. General, Commander of CFC, exercise operational control of Alliance forces, both U.S. and ROK.

Since the 2010 North Korean attacks against the ROK – the sinking of the South Korea Navy ship CHEONAN and the artillery attack on the South Korean island – South Korea has been adamant that it will responded “firmly” to the next such provocation. A main topic during subsequent U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings has been the development of a joint counter-provocation plan, which was reportedly formalized earlier this year.

What is your understanding of how the attacks on the *Cheonan* and on Yeonpyeong Island changed the ROK and U.S. security posture on the Peninsula?

These attacks highlighted the threat from North Korea. The Command has since signed a combined Alliance counter-provocation contingency plan that improved the readiness posture and allows for a timely, decisive, proportionate, and coordinated Alliance response to future provocations. CFC/USFK/UNC lines of communication with ROK JCS, US DOD and US National Command Authority (NCA) have been improved and exercised as a result of these two most recent provocations. If confirmed, I would continue such efforts to ensure we are always improving deterrence and, in the event of another provocation, our ability to respond.

What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe the U.S. armed forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?

Under the Mutual Defense Treaty and through our Alliance, we have deterred a major North Korean attack, and maintained our commitment to defend South Korea from external aggression. There are a number of plans that outline specific US commitments and South Korean obligations to coordinate responses to a North Korean provocation or attack.

Transfer of Wartime Operational Control

In June 2010, the U.S. and ROK agreed to further delay the transfer of OPCON until December 2015. This delay was purportedly agreed to because of the evolving security situation on the Peninsula and in order to more closely synchronize the transfer with other transformation initiatives. According to a recent article in the Washington Post, the ROK has reportedly requested to delay the transfer of beyond December 2015.

Do you favor transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK no later than December 2015?

Yes, I do favor the transfer of wartime operational control no later than December 2015. The very real threat presented by North Korea, however, dictates that this transition be executed in a manner that does not accept any unnecessary risk to the national security of the ROK. In short, the ROK must meet a detailed set of certification requirements that are, I understand, in accordance with our Strategic Alliance 2015 plan. Although these requirements are based on meeting milestones leading to December 2015, it is important to note that the transition is conditions-driven.

If confirmed, what will you do to help ensure full OPCON transfer is not delayed beyond December 2015?

If confirmed, I will continue to execute our Strategic Alliance 2015 plan as directed by agreement of the Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense. A principle objective of the theater exercise program in Korea is to train and certify OPCON transition, and I

do not anticipate that will change. If confirmed, I will work aggressively with the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet Strategic Alliance 2015 milestones and report progress to the U.S. Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the ROK Minister. As we continue forward with OPCON transition, if confirmed, I will continue to provide the best military advice to senior civilian leadership.

Following the decision to delay OPCON transfer to 2015, the U.S. and ROK entered into an agreement referred to as Strategic Alliance 2015 which is described in the U.S. Forces Korea October 2010 Strategic Digest as “an overarching and synchronized Alliance transformation roadmap, containing mutual Alliance end states and milestones, ensuring a smooth transition of the lead for the combined defense of the Republic of Korea.”

What is your understanding of the ROK’s current and projected military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater role in the defense of their homeland including responsibility for command and control of the readiness, operations and war fighting of their own forces in wartime ("OPCON Transfer")?

It is my understanding that the ROK has a highly trained and capable military that is continuously improving. Their ground force is fully capable of defending the ROK from aggression and defeating a North Korean conventional attack, and they possess an outstanding Fires force that is fully digitized and stands ready to neutralize enemy artillery. ROK Naval forces are highly trained and rapidly expanding capabilities to operate in deeper waters. The addition of AEGIS-class destroyers aids their ability to control local seas and also improves ballistic missile defense. The ROK Air Force has made great progress in both training and capability in recent years and is fully able to integrate with US Air Force to form a decisive team that, I understand, provides perhaps our largest advantage over our adversary. In the coming years both ROK Marines and ROK Special Forces will vastly increase their capability and capacity levels, enabling an even more lethal joint and combined team.

With regard to assuming a greater leadership role, I understand the ROK already lead much of the operation in Korea. During routine operations, ROK JCS commands and controls its armed forces. They are responsible for the day to day training and readiness of the force. During contingency operations the ROK provides leadership for the ground component. As we move toward OPCON transition, I understand their role in leading theater contingency operations will continue to expand until they assume the overall command and control lead in late-2015.

What is your understanding of the purpose and scope of the Strategic alliance 2015?

I understand that, in 2009, the U.S. and ROK Presidents agreed the leadership role of defending the ROK in wartime would transfer from a U.S.-led combined command to a ROK-led combined defense structure. To meet this, U.S. and ROK civilian and military leaders developed the Strategic Alliance 2015 initiative to provide an overarching Alliance roadmap containing joint endstates and milestones. It is my understanding that SA 2015 combines the transition of wartime operational control with other Alliance transformational initiatives including the relocation of U.S. forces south of Seoul and the consolidation of U.S. forces in Korea into two enduring hubs.

How will it help ensure that the OPCON transfer takes place no later than December 2015, as it is now scheduled?

In addition to identifying and programming the milestones required to achieve the transition of wartime operational control, Strategic Alliance 2015 also includes a bilateral governance process that allows Alliance civilian and military leadership to monitor and assess progress. This process enables Alliance leadership to engage across the ROK and US governments as necessary to gain and preserve the required commitments of energy and resources to keep this transformation on track. If confirmed, I will be an active and energetic leader in this process.

South Koreans may be concerned as much or more about U.S. commitment than South Korean capabilities in December 2015.

What steps do you recommend to assure South Korea of U.S. commitment?

I understand South Korea has raised a number of questions about US commitment in light of the US rebalance to Asia, our fiscal situation, and plans to transition to a ROK-led defense of South Korea. I firmly believe the U.S. should reassure our ally by maintaining a credible, ready U.S. force posture and the capability required to meet our Alliance commitments. The U.S. should also continue to support robust and realistic training exercises, which assure our ROK ally and deter North Korea. Finally, we should sustain close communication through forums such as the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, the Counter-missile Capabilities Committee, and the Military Committee Meetings.

Consolidation of U.S. Forces

The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) is consolidating the combat brigade and supporting elements of the 2nd Infantry Division in and around Camp Humphreys, south of Seoul. U.S. costs associated with implementing the LPP are estimated at \$3.2 billion, and that does not include hundreds of millions of dollars in transition costs for sustaining facilities until the move is completed. The Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) proposes to move most of the U.S. forces currently stationed at Yongsan compound in Seoul to Camp Humphrey as well. The YRP relocation is to be largely funded by the Republic of Korea (ROK) Government, but the United States will face potentially significant costs as well.

What is the current status of the two consolidation plans and the timeline for completion?

It is my understanding that both the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP) are on track to meet Strategic Alliance 2015 milestones. Construction will be complete by the end of 2015 and unit moves complete by the end of 2016. This multi-billion dollar bilateral program is receiving close USFK oversight that is accountable to both the US and Republic of Korea governments in order to continue to keep it on track. If confirmed, I will continue to provide critical oversight of these relocation efforts.

In your opinion, does the consolidation better support the warfighting mission? If so, how?

Yes, consolidation better supports the warfighting mission in several ways: it postures forces, specifically the 8th Army and 2nd Infantry Division, to increase readiness through better coordination, synchronization, and oversight of its subordinate units; postures forces to better execute contingency missions; and, through co-location, it increases the cohesiveness of our force in Korea. I do have a couple concerns for specific units. If confirmed, I intend to review these planned moves.

What do you anticipate to be the total costs, including transition costs, to be incurred by the U.S. Government to carry out the two consolidations?

The estimated U.S. appropriated costs related to the LPP program are \$884.6 million, which includes U.S. MILCON, moving services, furniture, fixtures, equipment, and C4I requirements. These cost estimates were recently validated by the Army Staff in March 2013. The remaining costs are paid for through host nation burden sharing or directly by the Republic of Korea Government. The costs for executing YRP will be funded completely by the Republic of Korea Government. I understand this is a sensitive issue. If confirmed, I will conduct a thorough review of the associated costs to ensure the judicious use of taxpayer funds.

Given that the US-ROK Status of Forces Agreement states that the US is not obligated to restore facilities and areas to their original condition when they are returned to the ROK, to what extent do you believe the United States should compensate the ROK for the costs related to environmental clean-up at bases being vacated as a result of the LPP?

I take environmental protection, human health and public safety issues very seriously. The Department of Defense policies are straight forward and clear regarding overseas environmental remediation. If confirmed, I will ensure those policies are fully implemented. It is also my understanding that the Republic of Korea and United States governments have an established and effective means of communication regarding environmental issues. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to cooperate closely and transparently with the Republic of Korea on all environmental matters.

During its review of U.S. costs and allied contributions to support U.S. military in Korea and elsewhere, the Senate Armed Services Committee reviewed the full list of construction projects under consideration at Camp Humphreys. Some of those projects appear to be of questionable value and necessity. Others raised questions as to whether they were the most economical way to meet requirements.

If confirmed, what would you do to ensure that the full list of construction projects planned at Camp Humphreys is focused on meeting mission critical requirements and doing so in the most cost effective way?

If confirmed, I will review the SASC report, review our plans, and ensure all construction resources are focused on the highest priority U.S. operational and force readiness requirements across all services and all bases in Korea. USFK's comprehensive campaign plan, to include the theater infrastructure master plan, appears to be an effective mechanism to prioritize these requirements.

Host Nation Burden-Sharing Programs

The United States and ROK currently operate under a “Special Measures Agreement” (SMA) in which the ROK contributes toward U.S. costs associated with maintaining U.S. forces in the country. A recent Senate Armed Services Committee review, entitled Inquiry into the U.S. Costs and Allied Contributions to Support the U.S. Military Presence Overseas, found that ROK SMA contributions are not keeping pace with the growth in U.S. costs.

What is your assessment of the current level and quality of the burden-sharing arrangement?

It is my understanding that the ROK provides cost sharing support for U.S. forces stationed in Korea through the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) program. SMA contributions are divided into three categories: labor, supplies and services, and construction. SMA support plays a key role in developing and maintaining force readiness by providing the Korean workers needed to support the force, making valuable supplies and services available, and building and modernizing facilities. Since negotiations are underway over a new SMA, I will refrain from commenting on this issue, but believe that the ROK should provide an appropriate level of support to maintain U.S. forces in Korea.

The Department has said that it expects negotiations for a new SMA to begin this summer.

What steps will you take to ensure those negotiations result in a fair sharing of the costs of maintaining the United States’ military presence in ROK?

It is my understanding that the United States is pursuing a requirements-based approach during on-going State Department led negotiations over a post-2013 SMA. If confirmed, I will examine opportunities to ensure that our ROK ally provides fair and appropriate levels of cost sharing support.

A significant percentage of burden-sharing funds in recent years have been used to carry out construction supporting the consolidation of U.S. forces at Camp Humphreys.

Do you believe this funding trend should be continued, or that funding should be spread to critical requirements at other U.S. bases in the ROK?

I have been informed that some ROK SMA contributions will continue to go to U.S. construction obligations under the Land Partnership Plan into 2014. This allows the U.S. to meet its obligations under the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan and the Land Partnership Plan. My intention, if confirmed, is to use ROK SMA contributions to continue to resource the highest priority U.S. operational and force readiness requirements across all services and all bases in Korea. USFK’s comprehensive campaign plan, to include the theater infrastructure master plan, appears to be an effective mechanism to prioritize these requirements.

The Committee’s review of U.S. costs and allied contributions to support U.S. military in Korea and elsewhere raised concern about the manner in which USFK accounts for host nation contributions in some cost benefit analyses. For example, the economic analyses of certain projects at Yongsan do not consider costs paid with host nation contributions, in effect, treating those contributions as “free” money.

Do you agree that, in conducting cost benefit analyses, USFK should account for host-nation contributions, whether they be in cash or in-kind, in the same manner as appropriated funds?

I believe these contributions are a vital component of covering the costs of stationing U.S. forces in Korea. This valuable resource must be managed in a responsible and effective manner. If confirmed, I will ensure that I understand how ROK burden sharing funds are incorporated into cost benefit analysis that support proposed courses of action.

What steps would you propose to improve oversight of how host nation funds are spent in the ROK?

I agree that oversight of host nation cost sharing support is essential to ensure this valuable resource is used in the most effective and efficient manner. If confirmed, my intention is to comply with all policy and statutory requirements. Additionally, I intend to ensure we continue oversight procedures for U.S. military planning efforts in the ROK in close coordination with United States Pacific Command, the Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense.

Training of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea

One of the challenges for the U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula is training, particularly the access to training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires and for close air support missions.

What is your understanding of the training challenges for U.S. forces in the ROK, including the availability and access to training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires, close air support, and other Air Force training requirements?

Availability and access to training ranges, I understand, continues to create significant challenges for Air Force Units on peninsula. The limited number of ranges and the requirement to share range time with our ROK partners causes significant training shortfalls. Range restrictions further limit opportunities to maintain proficiency in certain mission sets. 7th Air Force units mitigate these shortfalls through off-Peninsula deployments and training exercises.

For ground, maritime, naval, and special operations components, I understand, ranges and training areas are sufficient to achieve both service standards in training as well as unique mission training requirements with few exceptions. Live fire and maneuver training is conducted on U.S. Army, ROK Army, ROK Air Force, ROK Navy, ROK Special Forces, and ROK Marine Force ranges and training maneuver areas. The training areas notably include maritime forcible entry operations (over the beach maneuver) as well as blue water maneuver areas.

In your view, are the ranges in Korea adequate to meet the training requirements of U.S. forces?

It is my understanding that conditions for a fully trained force are met across all the components through innovative training both on and off the Peninsula. For all components, CFC is capable of executing tremendous live, virtual, constructive, and gaming capabilities to exercise bilateral, joint, and combined operations. This capability is showcased biannually during exercises KEY RESOLVE and ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN, and the result is a highly trained force at the operational and high tactical level of war.

For ground, maritime, naval, and special operations components, ranges and training areas are sufficient to achieve both service standards in training as well as unique mission training requirements with few exceptions. Live fire and maneuver training is conducted on U.S. Army, ROK Army, ROK Air Force, ROK Navy, ROK SOF, and ROK Marine Force ranges and training maneuver areas. The maneuver and live fire exercise training areas are capable of supporting reinforced Company size elements. The training areas notably include maritime forcible entry operations (over the beach maneuver) as well as blue water maneuver areas.

The air component has the greatest challenges with on-Peninsula training ranges due to local restrictions and language barriers on the ROK-only ranges. The 7AF has mitigated these challenges through innovative use of the two dual-use ROKAF and USAF training ranges and integration of off-Peninsula training exercises to cover local training gaps.

How will the overall readiness reduction of U.S. forces due to budget cuts and sequestration, as forecast by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Service Chiefs, impact U.S. force capabilities in Korea?

US force capabilities in Korea are inherently Joint and require contributions from all services across all domains. I understand that USFK depends on Service providers to meet capability requirements; any impact to the Services will impact current theater capabilities, and the capabilities of planned reinforcements which are instrumental to mission accomplishment.

Tour Normalization in South Korea

Prior to 2012, the Defense Department had contemplated full tour normalization for U.S. military personnel assigned to the Korean Peninsula. In March 2012, USFK's Commander said that DOD was "not able to afford Tour Normalization at this time."

Do you agree that full Tour Normalization is unaffordable? Please explain.

Yes, Tour Normalization is unaffordable and unnecessary considering USFK's mission and posture. USFK determined that the cost of the initiative is not affordable, and there may be other options to improve readiness. USPACOM agreed with the assessment and removed it from the USPACOM 2012 Theater Posture Plan. Subsequently, DOD stopped pursuing Tour Normalization as an initiative for Korea.

USFK continues to face the challenge of funding infrastructure to support the large increase in Command Sponsored Families that resulted from Phase I of Tour Normalization – including the cost of family housing. The Committee’s recent review of U.S. costs and allied contributions to support U.S. military in Korea and elsewhere concluded that approval of the U.S. Army’s plan for a public-private partnership to build family housing at Camp Humphreys “would substantially increase long-term costs for U.S. taxpayers and set a troubling precedent for future military housing plans.”

Given the unaffordability of the previously proposed Army’s plan for family housing at Camp Humphreys, if confirmed, will you investigate alternate plans for providing family housing for service members assigned to Camp Humphreys?

Yes, if confirmed, I will investigate alternative plans, which is necessary to meet USFK’s readiness requirements.

Quality of Life

Through investment in quality of life amenities, to include housing, health care, and recreation, the Department has worked to achieve the goal of making South Korea an "assignment of choice" for U. S. Forces.

What do you consider to be the most essential quality of life programs for soldiers and their families stationed in Korea and, if confirmed, what would be your goals in this regard?

I believe the most essential quality of life programs for Service Members and their families serving in the Republic of Korea are access to quality living and working conditions and facilities, quality health care, and quality educational opportunities for dependent family members. If confirmed, I will advocate for and take actions to provide our Service Members and family members with the best possible living and working environment, health care services, and educational opportunities for dependent family members.

What is your understanding of the capacity of DOD schools in South Korea to accommodate the increase in families/children associated with tour normalization?

I understand the schools in Korea are being constructed to support a student population based upon the currently authorized 4,645 command sponsored families.

Medical Care for U. S. Forces in Korea

One of the most important quality of life issues in Korea is ensuring access to high quality medical care for service members of all military branches and their families. Separate medical chains of command responsible for providing health care, and the presence of non-command-sponsored family members who need health services, among other factors, have presented challenges.

If confirmed, how would you assess the management and delivery of health care services in South Korea for both command and non-command sponsored family members?

Command sponsored family members are enrolled in TRICARE Prime and receive the same health benefits as active duty service members and activated National Guard/Reserve members. Additionally, the host nation system accepts TRICARE and is robust enough to provide care to both Command Sponsored and non-Command Sponsored Families.

I understand South Korea's advances in specialty care - to include surgical care, imaging, and therapeutics - is among the best in the world, with six institutions with whom U.S. Forces Korea conducts business certified in the Joint Commission International Surveys the last two years.

If confirmed, I will continue to monitor and assess the availability and quality of health care for our Service Members, Civilians, and their families serving in the Republic of Korea.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Department of Defense and the military services have developed comprehensive policies and procedures to prevent and respond to incidents of sexual assault, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, numerous incidences of sexual misconduct involving military personnel continue to occur. In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more than 3000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including 2558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports. Moreover, a recent survey conducted by the DOD indicates that the actual number of sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1 percent of active duty women and 1.2 percent of active duty men surveyed reported having experienced an incident of unwanted sexual contact in the previous 12 months.

What is your assessment of the current sexual assault prevention and response program in USFK?

USFK takes the prevention of sexual assaults very seriously. Sexual assault is a crime that violates basic human dignity and the standards of decency that we are sworn to uphold and protect. We cannot allow sexual assaults to injure our service members and families, erode trust in each other and our institutions, or compromise readiness.

All Services have commander-driven programs, with engaged leadership at all levels. These programs focus on education and culture, positive changes to the environment, and strict enforcement of standards to eliminate sexual assaults in our formations.

Commanders will continue to aggressively investigate every allegation of sexual assault and hold accountable those who cannot live by our standards.

In your view, does the current sexual assault prevention and response program in USFK adequately address issues regarding sexual assaults involving DOD contractor personnel?

Yes, as I understand it, the sexual assault prevention and response program in USFK adequately addresses issues regarding sexual assaults involving DoD Contractors.

I understand that DoD Contractors serving in Korea have access to USFK sexual assault prevention and sexual assault response training resources and command policies. Additionally, contractors that are sexual assault victims have access to most USFK victim advocate resources. In Korea, I understand the Command often partners with local law enforcement in investigating and prosecuting sexual assaults committed by contractor personnel and either they will be prosecuted under Korean Law or they will be returned to the United States and prosecuted by the Department of Justice under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA).

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault in the USFK area of responsibility?

I understand that the training and resources in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault in the USFK area of responsibility is high-quality. US Criminal Investigation Command (CID) recently stationed a Sexual Assault Investigator in Korea who provides direct guidance, review, and management of all CID sexual assault investigations in Korea. Each CID office in Korea has assigned multiple agents trained for interviewing sexual assault victims in support of sexual assault investigations. Trial Counsel works closely with agents as the agents investigate these offenses. If confirmed, I will closely review the adequacy of these resources.

What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults? Are you aware of any problem with the manner in which confidential reporting has been implemented and applied?

I agree with the current reporting options and am not aware of any systemic problem with the manner in which confidential reporting has been implemented and applied.

Protecting victims is paramount to ensuring that we get timely reports of sexual assaults and gain confidence within our ranks that leadership will do what is right. The recent change in DoD strategic plan guidance has helped eliminate barriers to reporting sexual assaults within our formations.

The use of restricted and unrestricted reports serve as valuable options to our overall sexual assault program. They improve the military justice process to ensure more timely, thorough and efficient reporting, investigations and accountability.

What is your view of the willingness and ability of commanders to hold assailants accountable for their acts?

Commanders care very deeply about this issue and they are up to the task. The commander is central to all we do in military units. We entrust them with tremendous responsibility and special trust and we must hold them accountable for reinforcing the highest standards of respect and trust. A foremost responsibility of all Commanders is to maintain good order and discipline. Sexual assault eats at the core of the trust, respect, cohesiveness, and readiness that sustains our military. There is no doubt that all Commanders must redouble their efforts to eliminate this problem; there are no shortcuts. I am confident, though, of the ability and willingness of our commanders to tackle the problem.

What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?

Commanders at every level are responsible for the behavior of their personnel and for the climate in their unit. Leaders must lead by example and instill the importance of standards, values and discipline in our formations.

I understand USFK Headquarters has established a USFK Sexual Assault Task Force co-chaired by the USFK Deputy Chief of Staff and Command Sergeant Major. Established in June 2012, this working group meets monthly to coordinate efforts with components and experts on prevention measures, training factors, and sharing of best practices. Results and required actions are briefed directly to the USFK Commander.

If confirmed, I plan to use this working group to review policies and programs that directly affect our sexual assault prevention and response program.

In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?

The commander's role in military justice is long-standing and essential to the effectiveness of command in our forces. Removing commanders from the military justice system would signal a lack of confidence in our commanders that would undermine good order and discipline. It would foster doubt in our Service members in the competency and abilities of their commanders that are entrusted with their lives. The maintenance of good order and discipline is the responsibility of the Commander. Removing this responsibility would certainly erode the ability of a commander to effectively command his unit.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults and to hold assailants accountable for their actions?

If confirmed, I will lead by example. I will immediately review the associated policies and regulations and ensure effective prevention, reporting and response; including the establishment of critical and prioritized reporting requirements that ensure my immediate awareness of an assault in the command.

I am confident that commanders take the responsibilities and authorities they have under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, with the utmost seriousness and will hold assailants accountable for their actions.

If confirmed, I will publish in writing and communicate in multiple means my priorities and guidance.

I will personally check the execution of my directives and the health of the environment through personal engagement with Service Members and Commanders.

I will emphasize the importance of a healthy command climate and require accountability of commanders for their environment.

I will form a multi-functional team that continuously explores prevention and response actions to close gaps and the implement best practices.

Prevention of Human Trafficking

Following media reports connecting prostitution and human trafficking in Korea to U.S. military forces, Commander, U. S. Forces Korea, in 2004 instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal activities of prostitution and human trafficking. Under this policy, all USFK personnel, military and civilian, as well as contractors and their employees, are expected to comply with prohibitions, including observance of curfews and laws regarding off-limits areas and establishments, aimed at curtailing these practices.

What effects have changes in U.S. policy, as well as new criminal laws implemented by the ROK, had on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking in Korea?

It is my understanding that US and USFK policy has significantly increased education and awareness of prostitution and human trafficking activity, but recorded incidents are too few to note statistically meaningful changes.

USFK maintains a zero tolerance policy and places establishments suspected of prostitution and/or human trafficking activity off-limits via the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board process.

The Air Force component has been especially aggressive in recent months and has been successful in eliminating prostitution and human trafficking activity in the majority of establishments outside one base, and are aggressively pursuing action at another location. USFK heads a Combating Trafficking in Persons Task Force and works closely with each component and the US Embassy staff to monitor prostitution and human trafficking activity and work cooperatively to combat it.

What further changes, if any, to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and military regulations are needed in your judgment to ensure maximum effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

I believe the Uniform Code of Military Justice is well equipped to meet the challenges of indiscipline in our armed forces, to include allegations of prostitution and human trafficking. It is a crime under The Uniform Code of Military Justice to engage in pandering and prostitution, and patronizing a prostitute. While the Uniform Code of Military Justice does not specifically address human trafficking, human trafficking crimes are prosecuted under the UCMJ through charges of unbecoming, violation of a General Order, or violation of existing Federal laws criminalizing trafficking through assimilation.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to further enhance the effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

If confirmed, I will reinforce efforts of the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board which is the Department of the Defense program to address problems with off-post establishments, through training and public awareness efforts. I will ensure my area commanders continue to work with local communities to eliminate prostitution and human trafficking.

North Korea-POW-MIA Recovery Efforts

From 1996-2005, the United States worked with the North Korean military to recover and repatriate the remains of American service-members who perished on the Korean peninsula. In the spring of 2005, the United States halted the program and, despite efforts last year to restart the program, there has been no recovery operations since.

In your opinion, under what conditions should the United States work with North Korea to repatriate the remains of American service-members found in North Korea?

Although I cannot speak for national-level policy makers, from an operational perspective, I believe that a successful resumption of remains recovery operations in North Korea should be based upon North Korean guarantees for the safety and security of the U.S. service members and civilians participating in the recovery operations and that the repatriations should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

Regional Posture

In your opinion, how should the U. S. employ its forces in ROK to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to best respond to regional threats, provide support for out-of-area contingencies, and maintain readiness?

Readiness to "Fight Tonight" is the number one priority and focus for USFK. I understand US forces in the ROK currently provide regional presence and engagement through participation in regional exercises.

Employment must primarily support Deter, Defend, and Defeat in armistice and crisis on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. and ROK force employment will remain flexible enough to support US Pacific Command Theater Security Cooperation in limited increments, in order to support response to regional threats and out-of-area contingencies.

Employment and regional exercises will continue to promote regional peace and support US regional partners and allies. These engagement efforts will best train our forces for contingency operations to respond to regional threats and also maintain readiness.

What adjustments, if any, do you anticipate having to make to your strategy if current budget cuts and sequestration cuts remain in place?

I believe the fundamental strategy of UNC, CFC, and USFK will remain unchanged – we will continue to deter, maintain readiness, and engage with our ROK Allies and UN Sending State partners. We will, however, have to carefully prioritize our resources to maintain readiness and capabilities within cost constraints.

What additional strategic risks do you think you will have to assume over the next five years in your area of responsibility if the current budget cuts and sequestration cuts remain in place?

I see increased risks in terms of Alliance military readiness to meet increasing North Korean investments in asymmetric capabilities in various areas, including cyber and nuclear-capable missiles. Additionally, a reduction in resources could erode the confidence of our ROK Allies in the strength of our deterrent and warfighting capabilities, and our commitment to their defense.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes, I do

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes, I do.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

Yes, I do.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes, I do.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes, I do.