

Advance Questions for Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN
Nominee for the Position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Defense Reforms

On previous occasions you have answered the Committee's policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the last time being in connection with your first nomination to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your last confirmation hearing?

My views have not changed. I have served in various joint capacities throughout my naval career and I've now had the privilege to serve two years as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My recent experience confirms the tremendous advancements created by this landmark legislation. I do not see a need to change the provisions of this legislation at this time.

In light of your experience as Chairman, do you see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what modifications do you believe would be appropriate?

Reflecting on my recent experience, I do not believe changes to Goldwater-Nichols are necessary at this time. However, if confirmed, I will remain alert to opportunities or shortcomings that might indicate that changes to the legislation are warranted.

Duties

Based on your experience as Vice Chairman, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions set forth in section 154 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the Department of Defense, that pertain to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff in general?

If confirmed, I do not foresee recommending any changes to the law. I will, however, remain attuned to potential issues and opportunities for improvement.

Relationships

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him and other such duties as may be assigned by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, in the

absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the absence or disability ceases. These duties would include providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense. The Vice Chairman may also provide the Secretary of Defense advice upon the Secretary's request in his capacity as a military adviser.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as assigned by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, or during the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing my close working relationship with the Chairman.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L))

Title 10, United States Code and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. With particular regard to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Vice Chairman serves on many deliberative panels focused on resource decisions, including the Deputies Advisory Working Group as its Vice Chair and as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work very closely with the USD(AT&L) on continuing improvements to the requirements process and providing senior-level focus on key acquisition programs.

The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C))

I recognize the importance of the Vice Chairman working closely with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in appropriately managing and providing oversight of the budgetary and fiscal processes of the Joint Staff required to achieve the budgetary goals prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))

The Vice Chairman and USD(P) work together to represent defense and military interests in interagency affairs. They often co-lead or serve together on various ad hoc committees or projects as directed by the Congress or as assigned from time to time by Secretary of Defense or by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, such as the Nuclear Weapons Committee or the DMAG. The Vice Chairman and USD(P) also serve together on the Deputies Committee, monitoring the

work of various interagency policy committees as well as supporting the Principals Committee and the National Security Council. If confirmed, I plan to continue my frequent interaction with the USD(P).

The other Under Secretaries of Defense

Within their assigned areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions and interact frequently with the Joint Staff. They may issue instructions and directive-type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Under Secretaries of Defense.

The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

Title 10, United States Code, and current DOD directives establish the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation as a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials of the DOD on cost assessment and program evaluation. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work closely with the Director under the auspices of the Vice Chairman's resourcing and requirements functions, as well as benefitting from the extensive and independent analysis provided by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office towards making informed resourcing decisions.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks and Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that of working with the Under Secretaries.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Title 10, United States Code, Section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces assigned to unified and specified commands.

The Chairman, or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the requirements of the combatant commanders. The Vice Chairman has numerous interactions with the service

Secretaries in the various management forums within the Department. Finally, in his role as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Vice Chairman has considerable interaction with the service Secretaries' acquisition staffs. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing my close and productive working relationship with the service Secretaries and their staffs.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations

The service chiefs serve two significant roles. First, they are responsible for the organization, manning, training, and equipping of their respective services. Without the full support and cooperation of the service chiefs, no combatant commander can be ensured of the readiness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the President and Secretary of Defense. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they are advisors to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective services. The service vice chiefs play a key role on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, chaired by the Vice Chairman. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the service chiefs and their vice chiefs to fulfill the combatant commanders' warfighting and operational requirements, and on other relevant policy matters.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau

The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of the Department of Defense and is the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs and plans affecting more than half a million Army and Air National Guard personnel. Appointed by the President, he serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. He is also the principal adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all National Guard issues. As National Guard Bureau Chief, he serves as the department's official channel of communication with the Governors and Adjutants General. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to provide support as required.

The Combatant Commanders

The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. The Chairman provides a vital link between the combatant commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense and, as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman when interacting with the combatant commanders. Having served as a combatant commander, I have clear insight into the capabilities and limitations of combatant command staffs. If confirmed, I will continue to work

closely with the combatant commanders to enable their warfighting capabilities and provide other support as required.

Major Challenges

What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you have faced in your first term as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

In a world of accelerating change that is growing more rather than less dangerous, I have faced a number of challenges in what I have labeled the three portfolios of policy, investment, and people.

In the policy portfolio, we have been grappling with a host of threats to our national security interests . . . in Afghanistan, Iran, and the Korean Peninsula; with the continuing evolution of al-Qaeda and its affiliates; in the aftermath of the Arab Awakening in Libya, Syria and Egypt; and within the increasingly complex cyber domain. Maintaining a balanced approach to securing our interests in these areas in a declining budget environment requires constant effort.

In the investment portfolio, we continue to struggle with budget challenges that are quietly eroding our readiness to defend this nation today and have impacted our ability to prepare for tomorrow. I was confirmed on the day the Budget Control Act was passed, and have discovered that the Vice Chairman has a unique role in encouraging the various elements of the Department in coming to grips with the reality of decreasing budgets

In the people portfolio we are trying to manage the enormous uncertainty to which our military and civilian members and their families are exposed as congress struggles to come to agreement on a budget. We have also expended considerable effort to ensure proper care for our wounded, ill, and injured members, as well as finding every lever we can to eliminate the pernicious insider threat of sexual assault.

Much remains to be done in all three of these portfolios. If reconfirmed, I look forward to continuing to serve this great nation in uniform, and pledge to work with this committee to strike the right balance among ends, ways, and means of protecting our country and its interests.

What new challenges do you expect to face if you are confirmed for a second term?

If confirmed, my foremost challenge will be to continue supporting the Secretary and Chairman in guiding the force through fiscal contraction while sustaining readiness and protecting our nation and its security interests. The challenges I listed above will persist—indeed, they may become worse as the Department’s fiscal uncertainty deepens—and require constant attention and visionary leadership. As always, new problems will emerge: new crises and contingencies; new hurdles in tending to the capability, capacity and readiness of the force; and new challenges faced by our most important resource, namely our people.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will renew my efforts to support the Chairman and Secretary. There is much to be done. There is more progress to be made balancing the ends, ways and means of strategy—particularly in preserving as many of our “ends” as possible by refining our “ways” as the “means” continue to decline—this means new ways of applying force and refreshing our plans on how and where we do it. We need to continue our press for a more efficient Department, leveraging congressional assistance where possible in doing so. We must ensure our people navigate the shoals of a changing financial and operational environment—and we need to remain persistent in our determination that they perform to the highest possible standards in terms of integrity, conduct, and respect for taxpayer dollars. Finally, I will use my leadership of the JROC and the budgeting and acquisition sides of the investment triangle to find the right balance among the capability, capacity and readiness of our force. In these and other ways I will lend my best efforts to ensuring our nation is safe.

Priorities

Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you identified in the section above, would you set for your second term as Vice Chairman?

There are a number of specific areas I will maintain high on a list of priorities. Among these are:

- Working closely with inter-agency stakeholders, Central Command and ISAF to ensure the trajectory of our efforts in Afghanistan remain on track.
- Ensuring the Department is fully prepared to support the President regarding any decision he may make regarding use of force in any of several areas where it may become necessary.
- Maintaining unrelenting emphasis on every possible aspect of conquering the insider threat of sexual assault in our ranks.
- Continuing to ensure the Department’s budget decisions are based on strategy and that they emphasize improved efficiency before reducing military capability, capacity or readiness.
- Highlighting the importance of readiness in an environment where it will be tempting to preserve politically-attractive capacity and capability at its expense.
- Maintaining emphasis on wounded warrior programs even as the number of new wounded members declines due to the transition in Afghanistan – these heroes require care long after they return home.
- Building on a good trajectory of requirements and acquisition reform and remaining vigilant regarding current and future programs – there is much to be done in this area.
- Ensuring the Department maintains a collegial and influential relationship with the NNSA to ensure the needs of our nuclear infrastructure are met
- Pressing for high-leverage technical innovation that is relevant to the current and future warfighting environment.
- Working closely with my fellow senior military leaders to ensure we all serve with distinction and integrity.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council

As you know, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which has the responsibility to review and validate Service requirements.

Are there any recommendations that you would make to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?

I do not believe additional formal changes or modifications to the JROC, its authority, or the requirements process are needed at this time. The JROC's authority as detailed in 10 USC 181 is sufficient to allow the JROC to carry out its responsibilities for overseeing the joint military requirements process. We continue to make every effort within existing authorities to improve JROC processes and products.

Has the 'trip-wire' process, to bring troubled programs back to the JROC for a review and to consider performance trade-offs to mitigate further cost growth and/or schedule delays before the program faced a Nunn-McCurdy review, been regularly employed on large programs that have experienced significant cost growth and schedule delays?

The trip wire process continues to function well. We have expanded the trip-wire process to include both schedule delays and quantity changes, in addition to cost growth, when validating capability documents. Only a few programs have recently exceeded trip-wire values. The most recent case was a review of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2 for an IOC schedule delay of greater than 12 months.

However, rather than waiting for trip-wires to be breached, we try to proactively engage programs and their requirements. I recently signed out a Key Performance Parameter (KPP) Relief JROCM (015-13) which was intended to encourage acquisition managers, in coordination with the appropriate requirements sponsors, to officially request requirements relief where KPPs appear out of line with a cost-benefit analysis. This has resulted in KPP changes for the Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (3DELRR), Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), and Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV).

Has the JROC altered requirements, either for performance or procurement quantities, as a result of such reviews?

As previously stated, only a few program reviews have been required as a result of their exceeding trip-wire values. In the case of Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) acknowledged that the schedule delay was driven primarily by the extension of fielding schedules and funding alignment and no change was made to performance or procurement quantities.

On the other hand, there have been performance parameter changes due to cost-benefit analysis resulting from the Key Performance Parameter (KPP) Relief JROCM, which encourages

requirements reviews when appropriate. Whether for a trip-wire breach or a proactive scrub of the requirements, we have recently made KPP changes to the following programs: Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B), Joint Strike Fighter, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike, Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, WIN-T, Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar, Common Point Ground System, Air and Missile Defense Radar, and Global Positioning System Modernization.

Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) required the Secretary of Defense to ensure that trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as part of the requirements development and approval process. Such analyses enhance DOD's understanding of what performance factors are the critical ones driving costs and schedules.

What is your view of the modifications to the JROC process made by WSARA?

I fully support the major revisions to the joint warfighting requirements process that were made in early 2012. This includes updates to governing documents and the means by which supporting bodies carry out their responsibilities in accordance with 10 USC 181 and applicable portions of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (primarily sections 105 and 201). We critically assess the impact of requirements on the cost, schedule and performance of programs as a matter of routine when those programs are in front of the JROC.

What additional steps do you believe that Congress or DOD should take to ensure that trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance objectives for major weapon systems are made at an appropriately early point in the acquisition process?

DoD is striving to push capability gap information out to industry earlier in the acquisition process. By partnering early with industry and providing timely insight into our vision for future capabilities, DoD is better able to leverage industry science and technology (S&T) efforts and, informed by early S&T development, provide feasible and affordable options for acquisition decisions. A recent example of this approach is the Army's Future Vertical Lift (FVL) Initial Capabilities Document which defined capability gaps in the 2030 and beyond Joint Operational Environment. There is no doubt more we can do in this area.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) also considers cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs as early as the analysis of alternatives (AoA) review.

Are there any other recommendations that you would make to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?

I do not believe additional changes or modifications to the JROC, its authority, or the requirements process are needed at this time. The JROC's authority as detailed in 10 USC 181 is sufficient to allow the JROC to carry out its responsibilities for overseeing the joint military requirements process. That said, we continue to make every effort within existing authorities to improve internal JROC processes and products.

How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the DOD acquisition process?

The changes to the JROC process have enabled a much closer relationship with USD(AT&L) by ensuring that requirements and their associated costs are continually evaluated through the acquisition life-cycle. We currently have an excellent relationship with USD (AT&L), to include their participation as one of the statutory experts invited to JROC meetings. Their insights are most valuable as we consider requirements alternatives, while at the same time we work closely with them to ensure requirements are kept under control and, in some cases, prudently trimmed as informed by a cost, schedule, performance and warfighter needs.

What is your vision for the role and priorities of the JROC in the future?

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is our key body shaping the future Joint Force (10 USC 181). The priorities for the JROC and the JCIDS process are to: (1) debate strategic and operational requirements and make difficult choices earlier; (2) strive for better upfront fidelity on cost/schedule/performance tradeoffs; (3) require greater analytic rigor and risk/portfolio analysis; and (4) ensure a more dynamic/iterative process throughout a program's lifecycle. Additionally, the JROC could play an important role in re-tuning system requirements in the face of the dramatic resource reductions stipulated by the full BCA caps.

Do you believe the JROC process is sufficient to understand and identify where there are opportunities for multi-service collaboration or where programs could or should be modified to take advantage of related acquisition programs?

Yes. We developed and expanded opportunities for multi-service collaboration for several programs during the past couple of years, including ground and amphibious combat vehicles and long range air search radars. This is always a difficult issue for the individual services, but we have managed to make progress in this area thanks to a group of open-minded service vice chiefs.

What principles guide your approach to inviting, and helping ensure the sufficient participation of other stakeholders in the JROC?

Over the past several years, the JROC has been refined into a more lean executive body where key leaders and advisors have frank and open discussions. In addition to the statutory members and advisors, Combatant Commanders participate when appropriate. I strongly believe in the importance of including these stakeholders, and I turn to them with an offer to speak on every issue, and they have been forthcoming. In short, we have created a smaller more intimate forum that still includes the major stakeholders, which has led to a more fulsome discussion of requirements issues.

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS)

What is your perspective on the responsiveness of the JCIDS process in addressing joint capabilities needs?

We work requirements based on urgency: life/death requirements for current conflicts are worked in days; requirements to address conflicts that appear to be imminent are worked in weeks to ensure that systems can be fielded in time; enduring warfighting requirements are worked as quickly as possible using our streamlined Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS). While we still look for ways to continuously improve the JCIDS process, it has been dramatically enhanced and addresses requirements through a more efficient and interactive process. Combatant Commander input is better incorporated to ensure joint capabilities produced are more timely, precise and needs-based. The most recent changes to the process consolidate guidance documents, streamline procedures, mandate shorter document lengths, and reduce timelines to increase effectiveness and responsiveness.

What level of involvement in the joint requirements process and the JROC do you believe is appropriate for the COCOMs?

As the primary customers for the capabilities delivered by acquisition, the Combatant Commanders play a critical role in the joint requirements process at all levels, to include the JROC. Combatant Command input during the requirements-generation process helps ensure that joint-capability outcomes more accurately match the current and future needs of the dynamic security environment. As such, we closely review Combatant Commander Integrated Priority Lists and they are invited to participate in every meeting. It is the norm for these commanders to have a representative in a meeting that covers a topic of importance to them.

Do you think that JCIDS needs to be changed? If so, what are your views on the how it could be improved to make the process more responsive to users' needs while efficiently investing resources in a fiscally constrained budget environment?

Revisions made in early 2012 were a big step forward in improving JCIDS, and the next scheduled review and revision of key documents is ongoing. These documents include: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5123.01 (JROC Charter), CJCSI 3170.01 (JCIDS Instruction), and the JCIDS Manual. Recent changes to JCIDS emphasize flexibility and speed in requirements generation, review, and validation. The changes also enable, when necessary, reassessment and adjustments to previously validated documents when poorly crafted requirements and timelines are identified. Preserving, and building upon, these JCIDS revisions will promote greater efficiencies and future success. In addition, we are working closely with USD (AT&L) to ensure that the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Requirements processes are tightly synchronized and integrated to ensure that requirements are valid, feasible and affordable.

The requirements development process is not a stand-alone process, but instead is required to work collaboratively with the acquisition and budgeting processes.

What steps are needed to better align the requirements development process with the acquisition and budgeting processes to make for a more efficient and effective process for delivering capabilities?

The pending update to the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 and the revisions to JCIDS guidance documents will improve coordination between our requirements and acquisition processes. Additionally, I initiated and attend a quarterly leadership forum with USD (AT&L) and Director-CAPE to help align requirements, acquisition, and resourcing. These meetings have included macro discussions on the process as well as a few individual programs, and I look forward to expanding the concept. Developing a more synchronous and flexible relationship between military requirements, acquisition, and budgets will enable DoD to deliver its warfighter capabilities at more reasonable costs.

Acquisition Reform and Acquisition Management

What is your view of the changes made by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA)?

The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 has been important in making sure new defense programs start on a sound footing to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition process. It also helped foster a culture within the Department of Defense focused on the continuous improvement of our acquisition processes and their associated outcomes. I am very encouraged by the cooperation we have built with USD (AT&L), which was encouraged by the tenets of the WSARA.

What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in the oversight and management of acquisition programs after requirements have been established?

The JROC has an enduring Title 10 oversight responsibility to ensure that an acquisition program's requirements are realistic and relevant throughout the life of the acquisition. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) also required the Secretary of Defense—via the Chairman and the JROC—to ensure that trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as part of the requirements development and approval process. We are seeing this play out, as the JROC has made several mid-stride adjustments to requirements to reflect emerging realities during acquisition, always ensuring warfighter needs are fully considered.

What role if, any, do you believe the JROC should play in reviewing the progress of major defense acquisition programs or other acquisition programs?

The progress of major defense acquisition programs is monitored by the JROC often through Milestone C. JROC oversight is required to ensure that an acquisition program's requirements throughout its life are realistic and relevant. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) also requires the Secretary of Defense—via the Chairman and the JROC—to ensure that trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as part of the

requirements development and approval process. A good example of this is the JROC's continuing interest in the F-35, to include the helmet associated with the aircraft. The JROC requires periodic and detailed updates on JSF performance, cost and schedule to ensure Key Performance Parameters are appropriate in light of cost.

Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition management processes?

No, I do not see a need for any change at this time.

What is your view of the role played by Configuration Steering Boards in preventing cost growth due to requirements creep?

Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs) provide an important senior level forum for acquisition and requirements officials to review and assess requirements to achieve balance between weapon system performance and affordability over a program's lifecycle. They institutionalize Military Service, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff review of potential requirements trade-offs. While the CSBs are gathering momentum, my understanding is that USD(AT&L) is very supportive of using this process to help identify areas where requirements may need refinement.

What do you see as the proper relationship between Configuration Steering Boards and the JROC in managing requirements for acquisition programs?

Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs) provide an important senior level forum for acquisition and requirements officials to review and assess requirements to achieve balance between weapon system performance and affordability over a program's lifecycle. A key output of a CSB could be a recommendation to the appropriate validation authority—the JROC in the case of Key Performance Parameters—to review or relax a requirement in order to achieve a better balance between performance and affordability.

What is your view of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements for Major Defense Acquisition Programs that fail to meet cost, schedule, and performance objectives?

The Nunn-McCurdy requirements have introduced rigor into our processes and better scrutiny of Major Defense Acquisition Programs regarding cost, schedule, and performance objectives. I particularly appreciate the flexibility within the process to account in particular for price increases solely due to quantity decreases.

What do you see as the proper relationship between the JROC and those DOD officials charged with implementing the Nunn-McCurdy requirements?

I do not recommend any changes at this time. The current relationship between the JROC and DoD officials charged with implementing the Nunn-McCurdy requirements is appropriate. The

JROC's role is to validate the criticality to national security of the systems based on the estimated increase in cost.

Urgent Needs Processes

In your view, what specific steps should the Department take to better manage the joint urgent needs process?

The Department exercises sound management of the Joint Urgent Needs process. DoD Directive 5000.71 (Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs) was recently approved. It established the Warfighter Senior Integration Group to lead and facilitate agile and rapid responses to validated combatant commander urgent operational needs. In addition, we recently added the ability for Combatant Commanders to request rapid capability fielding if conflict is imminent (rather than ongoing) through a Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEON) document. I believe we have struck the right discipline and balance between addressing truly urgent and emergent warfighter needs and merely using the system to circumvent the rigor of the deliberate process (while at the same time we are streamlining the latter process).

What is your sense of where the DOD might consolidate urgent needs entities and/or processes and how cost savings could be achieved through such consolidation?

This is an area where we have taken many steps, and seen important results, over the past several years. To further improve upon our efforts, the Department is reviewing the entities and processes that we use to fill urgent capability gaps in light of our drawdown from Afghanistan. Without pre-judging any results, it is possible we could consolidate these entities, and we will remain vigilant for such opportunities. The goal will be to ensure the Department is still poised to quickly address evolving threats as we draw down from our wartime footing, while ensuring the efforts are properly-scaled for anticipated future requirements.

Do you believe that the Joint Staff should take steps to integrate the Joint Urgent Needs process with the individual services' processes? If so, please explain?

We are currently reviewing our urgent needs processes, to include seeking efficiencies and deconfliction between the services' processes and joint processes. Despite the success of our joint processes, I believe we will find that each service will still need a way to address critical needs that are specific to their component.

Nuclear Weapons Council

If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will continue to serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)?

Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal is a key priority in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), central to the responsibilities of the NWC. I have worked closely with the other NWC members to develop a plan for the Nuclear Enterprise that is responsible and affordable to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for the long term. The refinement and execution of this plan continues to be my priority. We will need to remain vigilant, as the effects of potential full sequestration levels of funding on the Enterprise are not yet fully understood.

Additionally, I will continue to work with other NWC members to ensure modernization of our aging nuclear facilities and investment in nuclear enterprise-related human capital, to accelerate dismantlement of retired warheads, and to improve our understanding of foreign nuclear weapons activities.

What changes if any would you recommend to the organization, structure, or function of the NWC?

I have served as a member of the NWC for the past two years and have no firm change recommendations at this time. However, if confirmed, I will continue work with the NWC chairman and members to assess the organization, structure and function of the NWC, and where warranted, provide recommendations for changes to increase effectiveness and value in support of the nuclear mission for national security. I will also remain alert for any need to adjust governance of the Nuclear Enterprise's activities.

Integration of Space Programs

What is your view on the need to institute a more integrated approach to both the military and intelligence sides of the space community?

I believe we are making progress in this area. The military and intelligence space communities participate in a number of joint forums and joint program development. We expect senior leaders to be innovative in identifying and implementing integrated programs. This is necessary for efficacy and efficiency in a much more constrained budget environment. However, when the needs of either community diverge to the extent that joint solutions impose impractical cost and risk, careful consideration should be given to viable independent, yet complementary solutions.

Space Program Management

In many instances the military and intelligence space programs have experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties. In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with establishing realistic, clear, requirements and then maintaining control over the integrity of the requirements once established. If confirmed as chairman of the JROC you will be involved in determining these requirements.

How in your view can or should the space systems requirements process be improved?

All weapon systems requirements are closely scrutinized to best meet the needs of the joint force in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. If confirmed, I will continue to work with senior leaders to improve early and continuous coordination between OSD, the military, and intelligence communities throughout the space acquisition requirements process. The active participation of the United States Strategic Command Commander has been most helpful in this regard.

In general, space programs take many years to move from conception to launch. The result is that the technology in the satellites is significantly outdated by the time the satellites are launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to a decision to terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as sunk costs are never fully amortized.

How in your view can this cycle be addressed?

The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) is designed to help ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost and schedule impacts of fixing problems later in the acquisition process.

Some aspects of this phenomenon will be very difficult to fix, as satellites by nature of their complexity and rigorous requirement for reliability take considerable time to design, build, and launch. However, I believe we can make improvements in our space programs by ensuring early, ongoing and rigorous reviews of costs, requirements, and performance, and their alignment. Again, bringing the expertise available from the United States Strategic Command Commander will be a key element in placing this cycle on a tighter rotation.

Space Cooperation

Do you support arms control limitations on space capabilities?

I continue to support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, which states that the United States will pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space. The Department should only consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures that are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.

Would you support the United States signing the so-called European Union Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities?

The Department is currently supporting the State Department in negotiations on the European Union's proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. This is an effort to develop a pragmatic first set of guidelines for safe activities in space. If confirmed, I remain

committed to continuing our support to evaluating proposed drafts of the Code and considering appropriate steps to establish rules of the road for space operations that are consistent with our national security interests and access to space.

Operationally Responsive Space

Do you support the concept of operationally responsive small satellites and what do you see as the most promising opportunities for small satellites?

I support resilience in space programs and we are continuing to review and support programs that best meet the needs of the joint force in future conflicts and given fiscal constraints. Given unlimited funding I would want to push further and faster on this program. Under the current environment we will need to be very selective in pursuing operationally responsive space, and should select only those that provide best value. The most promising concepts would be for rapid reinsertion of communications and surveillance capability in the wake of the initial stages of a conflict with a space-capable adversary.

Do you believe that smaller less complicated less expensive satellites can play a role in providing resiliency or redundancy for space systems?

I support resilience in space programs and we are continuing to review and support programs that best meet the needs of the joint force in future conflicts, within fiscal constraints. Such programs could include smaller less complicated less expensive satellites, and it could also include adding payloads to other satellites.

Prompt Global Strike

The DOD is currently working on technologies that if successful could lead to the decision to develop and deploy conventional, non-nuclear, prompt global strike capability.

Do you believe that a prompt global strike capability should be developed and deployed?

Although a decision has not been made to deploy such a capability, I believe it would have potential utility in a variety of time-sensitive scenarios and would thus provide greater flexibility to the President for taking kinetic action if required. There are potential future circumstances that may require a capability to address high value, time sensitive and defended targets from ranges outside the current conventional technology. Therefore, we continue to look for affordable technology risk reduction and maturation of engineering concepts.

If your answer to the previous question is yes, what is your vision of the capability that should be developed for prompt global strike and the types of targets that would underpin the need to develop the capability?

If a decision is made to develop and deploy a capability, it should have specific attributes. The capability should influence, dissuade, or defeat an adversary using conventional weapons to rapidly penetrate or circumvent access-denied areas. It could be useful in situations ranging from a rapid strike against a known terrorist leader, to hitting a rogue regime's mobile missile that is positioned for launch, to quickly interfering with the ability of an adversary to target one of our space assets. This is an example of how we are actually trying to constrain requirements so we don't end up with gold plated systems we can't afford. So while it should be both prompt and accurate, not requiring the capability to hit any target on the globe or hit hard and deeply buried targets should allow us to hold an adequate set of targets at risk at lower cost.

Nuclear Weapons

If confirmed you will continue to be a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, and work closely with the National Nuclear Security Administration and its Stockpile Stewardship Program.

What, in your view, are the longer-term Stockpile Stewardship Program goals and what are the key elements that should be addressed from a DOD perspective?

Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons explosive testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to the Congress the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

I believe these goals are appropriate and the program is effective; today's stockpile has been certified without a need for further nuclear testing. But the stockpile is aging. The Nuclear Weapons Council has developed a long term plan that includes life extension programs to address aging concerns and enhance safety and security in a responsible manner. I believe the plan is executable and affordable. If confirmed, I will work across the interagency to ensure this plan is continuously updated and implemented.

In your view is the Stockpile Stewardship Program providing the tools to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing and if not what tools are needed?

I believe that the Stockpile Stewardship Program provides the requisite tools, as attested to by the national security lab directors in their annual assessment letters. These tools are critical as we life-extend our aging nuclear weapons. As we sustain the program, it is important these tools allow us to assess the full range of life extension programs to include: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.

Do you believe the Administration's 1251 report sets forth an appropriate road map for the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and the strategic delivery systems?

The Administration's Section 1043 report, which has replaced the 1251 report, describes an appropriate roadmap for ensuring the future safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear stockpile and associated delivery platforms as well as for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. The plan described in the 1043 report represents a strong commitment to the nuclear mission and is an important element of assurance that the U.S. deterrent remains strong. Additionally, this plan reflects the work of the Nuclear Weapons Council in developing an executable and affordable long-term plan for the Nuclear Enterprise.

Do you agree that the full funding of the President's plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?

Funding of the 1043 report, which has replaced the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority. The President's FY14 Budget Request again includes a significant commitment from the Department of Defense to modernizing the nuclear weapon complex and supporting the long term plan for extending the life of the weapons in our enduring stockpile. If confirmed, I will support the continued modernization and sustainment of our nuclear weapons delivery systems, stockpile, and infrastructure.

Prior to completing this modernization effort do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START Treaty limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?

U.S. objectives in future negotiations with Russia must consider multiple factors. It is my view that any reductions in the numbers of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, either strategic or non-strategic, would need to be negotiated in a manner that strengthens deterrence of potential adversaries, maintains strategic stability with Russia and China, and assures our allies and partners. The timing and size of reductions, if any, would have to be closely coupled to the status of the modernization effort. If confirmed, I will support the Department's continuing assessment of the proper force size and capabilities required for an effective nuclear deterrent.

New START Treaty and Future Reductions

The New START Treaty has now entered into force. Under the terms of the treaty both sides have 7 years to come into compliance with the treaty.

Do you believe that there is any opportunity to come into compliance in less than 7 years and what would be the conditions under which such compliance could be achieved?

I believe the U.S. will be compliant by the February 2018 deadline although we have not made a final decision on the compliant force structure. Continued funding support from Congress is required to ensure the required activities of the department and the services can be executed in a

timely fashion for compliance. While achieving the limits on delivery vehicles will take nearly the entire compliance period, it may be possible to accelerate other elements of compliance, such as achieving the total deployed warhead limit of 1550 up to a year early.

Do you believe that reductions in the total number of warheads, both reserve and operationally deployed, is feasible prior to the expiration of the New START Treaty and, if so, under what conditions?

The Treaty requires the Parties to ensure their strategic offensive forces are at or below the Treaty's three central limits seven years after entry into force, which will occur on February 5, 2018. DoD is on schedule to comply with this obligation. The Treaty expires in 2021 and may be extended one time for 5 years if both the US and Russia agree. Once we are in compliance with the central limits, it is technically feasible to further reduce the total number of warheads; however I would only recommend such reductions through negotiations with Russia.

Nuclear Triad Modernization

Under the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Administration has committed to begin modernization of each leg of the nuclear triad including development of new nuclear cruise missiles and extending the life of nuclear weapons. This process will continue over the next 30 years and longer, and will be very expensive.

If confirmed, would you agree to review the requirements and cost of these initiatives, identify any opportunities for cost savings, and report back to the committee on a periodic basis if you identify such opportunities?

Yes, this falls under my responsibilities as Vice Chairman, and I would be pleased, if confirmed, to report any opportunities for cost savings to the Committee. I am currently paying close attention within the bounds of my authority to development of the Long Range Strike Bomber, and intend to do the same for the new SSBN. I serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council and have contributed over the past two years at developing an affordable and executable strategy for the Nuclear Enterprise that includes life extension programs of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy

President Obama recently issued new guidance on nuclear weapons employment strategy, consistent with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

Do you support the President's new nuclear weapons employment guidance, and did you have an opportunity to provide input to the formulation of the new guidance?

Yes, I support the President's new guidance. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command and I and our staffs both participated in the analysis process. The two of us and General Dempsey participated in senior leader meetings during development of the guidance, where, based on the

recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of United States Strategic Command we provided our military advice to both the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Do you agree with the President's assessment that the United States can ensure its security, and the security of our allies and partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons below the level established in the New START Treaty? Please explain your views.

Yes, I agree with this assessment: We can ensure our security and that of our allies and partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while pursuing further reductions beyond the New START Treaty central limits. However, to be clear on this point, we must continue to adequately invest in the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure as long as nuclear weapons exist. Further, my advice is that further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, beyond the New START Treaty Central Limits, should occur as part of a negotiated position with Russia. Both General Dempsey and I have made this recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

Please explain the risks and benefits of pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons, including the implications of the vast disparity in tactical nuclear weapons between Russia and the U.S.

From our post-Nuclear Posture Review analysis and close work with USSTRATCOM, the Navy, and the Air Force, I am confident we can ensure our security and that of our allies and partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent while pursuing further reductions beyond the New START Treaty central limits. However, to be very clear on this point, we must continue to adequately invest in the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure as long as nuclear weapons exist. Also, further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, beyond the New START Treaty Central Limits, should occur as part of a negotiated position with Russia in order to preserve strategic stability.

As we negotiate further reductions with Russia, to include their larger number of non-strategic nuclear weapons, I'm encouraged by the administration's efforts to expand the scope of those reductions to include both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons that are both deployed and non-deployed. I believe this is a prudent approach that will maintain strategic stability with Russia and adequately meet the President's goals of reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons.

Strategic Systems

Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next 15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.

Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the rest of the DOD commitments?

Yes, I am concerned that in the current budget environment will we be challenged to complete these modernization programs; thus, if confirmed, I will be paying very close attention to these programs as they develop and mature. The modernization of the strategic delivery systems and sustainment of the strategic nuclear enterprise is important to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and is essential to deterring potential adversaries and assuring our allies. As with any funding choices in a fiscally constrained environment we will make decisions that will provide the best possible systems that are fiscally prudent while managing appropriate risk.

If confirmed will you review the modernization and replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective?

Yes, this falls under the responsibilities of Vice Chairman and I will continue to review the modernization and replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective. I am already closely monitoring the Long Range Strike Bomber program and am satisfied that it is currently on track.

The Department will begin to issue guidance from the recent decision to revise the Nuclear Employment Strategy.

Do you support this change in Strategy?

Yes. As Vice Chairman I had the opportunity to participate, along with the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, in the discussion of the new Strategy and to provide the inputs from the Joint Chiefs.

Will you keep the Congress fully informed of additional guidance issued in response to this changed strategy?

Yes, I have and will continue to fully inform the Congress of additional guidance issued as a result of the change in the Nuclear Employment Strategy.

Future Technologies

During the Cold War, the DOD pursued three key technologies to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces: precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-based navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces unparalleled superiority until now. Our technology edge, however, in these areas is beginning to erode. Last year DOD published seven strategic science and technology priorities.

Do you believe these priorities are still relevant today?

Yes. The Joint Staff participated in a DoD process in 2011 to publish seven strategic science and technology priorities: electronic warfare/protection, data to decisions, engineered resilient systems, cyber science and technology, counter WMD, autonomy and human systems. These seven priorities are still relevant today in assuring our leadership and superiority in future conflicts.

If not, what additional technology priority areas should DOD be pursuing?

These seven strategic areas remain fully relevant. We need to ensure that several key capabilities remain included within research and development in these areas, including greater cyber capability (with emphasis on network protection), fully protected precision navigation and timing that is semi-independent of the GPS constellation, high speed standoff weapons, and improved ability for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance through adverse weather and foliage.

Ballistic Missile Defense

Do you agree that the current Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, with interceptors deployed in Alaska and California, provides defense of the entire United States – including the East Coast – against missile threats from both North Korea and Iran, and do you have confidence in that system?

Yes, I agree that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, supported by other elements of the ballistic missile defense architecture, provides defense of the United States from both a limited North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile attack. I am confident in the system and say this even in light of the recent failure of a CE I missile test, of which we have now had three of four tests execute successfully. We still believe in this program and are determined that it succeed.

On March 15, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a series of initiatives to improve our homeland ballistic missile defense capabilities, including the planned deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska, to help stay ahead of the long-range missile threat from North Korea and Iran.

Do you support the initiatives announced by Secretary Hagel, and do you believe they will help us stay ahead of the threat from North Korea and Iran?

Yes, I support Secretary Hagel's initiatives and believe they will improve DOD's ability to counter future missile threats from Iran and North Korea, while maximizing the benefit from increasingly scarce taxpayer resources.

As indicated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the Administration is pursuing a "fly before you buy" approach to missile defense, and will test systems in an operationally realistic manner to demonstrate they will work as intended before we deploy them. Since a

GBI flight test failure with the Capability Enhancement – II kill vehicle in 2010, the Missile Defense Agency has been working to fix the problem and plans to conduct an intercept flight test in the spring of 2014 to demonstrate the fix.

Do you agree with the “fly before you buy” policy, and do you agree with Secretary Hagel that, before we deploy the additional GBIs, we need to test and demonstrate the fix so we demonstrate its capability and have confidence that it will work as intended?

Yes. I agree with the “fly before you buy” approach to test systems in an operationally realistic manner. It is essential to correct system issues before they affect the deployed forces.

Section 227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requires an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for possible future homeland missile defense sites in the United States, in case the President determines to proceed with such a deployment in the future. That EIS process is expected to be complete in early 2016.

Do you agree that the EIS process should be completed prior to making any decision relative to possible deployment of an additional homeland missile defense site in the United States, including possibly on the East Coast?

I agree the Department must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act and conduct an EIS prior to the actual deployment of an additional missile defense site in the U.S. It follows that it would be wise to obtain the results of the EIS before making any decisions.

Do you agree with the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense that there is currently “no validated military requirement to deploy an East Coast missile defense site”?

Yes. Technically there is currently no validated military requirement to deploy an East Coast Missile Defense Site. However, that could change based on the trajectory of the threat from Iran, so we continuously analyze this assessment and will update it as required if we conclude differently.

Do you agree with their assessment that “investment in Ballistic Missile Defense System discrimination and sensor capabilities would result in more cost-effective near-term improvements to homeland missile defense” than deploying an East Coast missile defense site?

Yes. The MDA Director has made a compelling case that, along with reliability improvements to the interceptor, better sensor and discrimination capability would reduce the number of interceptors required to engage a given target. Thus, I believe this is the more cost effective approach and so agree with their assessment, which is consistent with the Department’s analysis. However, if the threat achieves a trajectory that would indicate greatly increased capacity for producing ballistic missiles, it could be necessary to deploy an East Coast missile defense site, so we continue to assess the requirement.

Do you agree with the following statements regarding a potential East Coast missile defense site:

General Jacoby (Commander, Northcom): “A third site, wherever the decision is to build a third site, would give me better weapons access, increased GBI inventory and allow us the battle space to more optimize our defense against future threats from Iran and North Korea.”

General Formica (Commander Space and Missile Defense Command): “Certainly, it brings increased capacity and increased capability than we have at Fort Greely.”

National Research Council: “A GBI site located in northeastern United States would be much more effective and reliable and would allow considerably more battle space and firing doctrine options.

I fully agree with the first two statements. The question is whether or not a third site will be required given the trajectory of Iran’s ability to produce quantities of ballistic missiles that can threaten the United States. I generally agree with the third statement, except a GBI site in the United States will not increase reliability—only improved interceptors and sensors and other technical improvements will accomplish that objective.

Do you agree that Presidents Bush and Obama put in place policies that called for additional missile defense sites in Europe to better defend against threats to the United States from Iran?

Yes.

Is this presidentially directed requirement still valid and if not, what has changed to permit the elimination of this requirement for a third interceptor site?

We have subsequently determined that, while maintaining our commitment to the defense of our NATO allies in Europe, it would be wiser and more fiscally prudent to invest in ballistic missile defense capability in terms of improved sensors and increased capacity at existing sites, while we evaluate the need for a third site in the United States. Engagement geometry and cost both favor this approach.

You have focused on improving the cost effectiveness and affordability of our major weapon systems, including missile defenses. Missile defense systems are limited in quantity primarily by their very high cost, which is exacerbated in the current financial environment that includes sequestration.

What are your views on whether and how we can make missile defenses more cost-effective and affordable, and how we can manage our missile defense capabilities in a manner that best meets the needs of our combatant commanders?

We remain mindful of the fact that we are on a negative economic glideslope regarding regional ballistic missile defense, in which the offense is able to use relatively cheap missiles that are countered by relatively expensive defensive systems. In this regard, we should apply greater emphasis on more economic passive defense measures such as dispersal and hardening in order to make the most of our more complex defensive assets. We should also emphasize interoperability on a Joint and Coalition basis in order to use the full spectrum of offensive and defensive capabilities in a comprehensive Joint manner so as to provide the best defense with the most economical use of resources. Candidly, we have more work to do in this regard, but are making progress. I have favored encouraging our coalition partners, including those in the Arabian Gulf region and the Western Pacific, to invest in ballistic missile defense capability in order to free resources for our own ballistic missile defense needs. Finally, I also favored moving a THAAD battery to Guam, which not only provides defense for Guam but also yields an asset that is globally deployable operating day-to-day in an actual operational environment in which it defends U.S. territory.

U.S.-Iraq Strategic Relationship

What is your assessment of the development of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship since the withdrawal of U.S. military forces at the end of 2011 consistent with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement?

The development of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship since 2011 has been a slow and deliberate process. The conflict in Syria, the Arab awakening, internal sectarian divisions, and Iran's ambitions for influence have dominated Iraq's focus. Sectarian violence and authoritarian moves by PM Maliki have also hindered some efforts. In many areas, U.S. and Iraqi strategic goals align, but in areas with less common ground such as Syria we continue to engage the Iraqis in order to transform them into true regional partners. Iraq's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program offers a strong foundation to develop this strategic relationship, and the \$14.3B in committed Iraqi national funds to FMS cases is a clear indication of the desire to continue to nurture our strategic relationship.

What areas, if any, do you see for the enhancement of the military-to-military relationship between Iraq and the United States?

The main areas to enhance the U.S.-Iraq military-to-military relationship are the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET), and bilateral or multilateral exercises. The FMS program provides an avenue for Iraqi Security Forces to train on U.S. equipment and, in part, inside the United States. The IMET program helps develop Iraqi leaders through intermediate and senior level development education and long-term relationships with counterparts in the U.S. military. Both programs offer the opportunity to continue and enhance our military-to-military relationship. The U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement

and Joint Military Cooperation Agreement help ensure our mil-to-mil relationship remains on track.

In your view, does the Office of Security Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy in Iraq have the right staffing levels and personnel to carry out its mission?

Based on assessments from the Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq (OSC-I) and the U.S. Ambassador, I believe we have sufficient personnel to execute a coherent strategy between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. With the transition of Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq training sites during calendar year 2013 and the continued transition to FMS funded training, the previous need for 250(+) personnel in OSC-I has dissipated. I think we are on track to have the right number of personnel at the end of September 2013, using the glide path plan agreed upon by DoD, the U.S. Mission Iraq, and Main State. The Chief of OSC-I and the Ambassador will reassess the manning requirements once the last four sites transition later this year.

What safeguards can be used to ensure Iraq does not employ F-16's in a way that increases sectarian strife within Iraq?

In addition to political influence based on our bilateral relationship, we would also retain the option of withholding F-16 training, support equipment, spare parts, or munitions. Iraqi misuse of F-16 aircraft would also complicate and potentially jeopardize Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Individual Military Education and Training – which provides a credible deterrent. However, this issue offers no easy solution, and it is a challenge we face to some degree when we sell weapons systems to any partner.

Security Situation in Afghanistan

What is your assessment of the current security situation in Afghanistan?

The security situation in Afghanistan continues to improve, and the ANSF is proving they are willing and capable of assuming the lead in security operations. U.S. and Coalition forces, working side by side with our Afghan partners, have reversed the Taliban's momentum and pushed insurgents out of population centers. The ANSF and ISAF continue to deprive the insurgents of key safe havens, command and control nodes, and support zones. They are now less capable, less popular, and less of a threat to the Afghan government than a year ago. Despite this degradation, safe havens in Afghanistan and sanctuaries in Pakistan continue to provide Taliban senior leadership some freedom of movement and freedom of action. Additionally, Afghan Taliban and all its subgroups, including the Haqqani Network, remain capable of conducting isolated high profile attacks that, as intended, capture disproportionate attention. However, sustained counterterrorism pressure continues to degrade this ability.

Transition of Security Responsibility in Afghanistan

In February of this year President Obama announced that by February 2014 U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan will be reduced to 34,000. In June, the Afghan National Security Forces achieved Transition Milestone 2013, assuming the lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan.

Do you support the President's decision to reduce U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan to 34,000 by February 2014? Why or why not?

Yes. Transition Milestone 2013 represents a significant shift for our mission in Afghanistan. Over the past 11 years, the U.S. and our partners have led combat operations. Now the Afghans are taking the lead for their own security. ISAF's primary focus has shifted from directly fighting the insurgency to supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). We match troop levels to the mission and our new mission requires fewer troops on the ground. The President's decision to drawdown U.S. forces was made based on the ISAF Commander's input, the real and tangible progress of the ISAF military campaign, and a comprehensive assessment of conditions on the ground, including an increasingly capable and confident ANSF.

What is your understanding regarding the pace of those reductions in U.S. forces?

Troop reductions are based on our mission, ANSF capability and conditions on the ground. We are on path to meet our objective of 34,000 troops by February 2014, to include troops, bases, and equipment. It is important for the ISAF Commander to have the flexibility to meet his mission and sustain the right forces through this fighting season and he has the latitude to manage the glideslope from now to the end of the year as we settle into a supporting role.

Do you support the June transition to the Afghan security forces of lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan?

I support the transition of responsibility for security to a capable and confident ANSF. ANSF improvement has enabled us to achieve transition Milestone 2013. There are occasional setbacks and deficiencies, but the ANSF continues to demonstrate its ability to defeat the Taliban and provide security to the Afghan people.

In your view, is the campaign on track for the completion of the International Security Assistance Force mission and the assumption by Afghan security forces of full responsibility for the country's security by December 2014?

Yes, the ANSF are at the forefront of the fight and are now responsible for maintaining and expanding security in the face of the insurgency. In late 2009, a concerted effort to grow the ANSF was initiated with the goal of generating and fielding trained and equipped Afghan combat elements and getting them into the fight. Unit partnering between Afghan and ISAF forces - enabled by the U.S. troop surge ordered by President Obama - provided the ANSF the space to develop combat capabilities and leadership skills from the tactical level on up. Moving into the 2013 fighting season, the insurgency now confronts a combined ANSF and Afghanistan

Local Police (ALP) force of nearly 350,000 personnel who have secured over 87 percent of Afghanistan's population, and are leading 93 percent of all conventional operations. The only conventional operations they are not leading are a small number of unilateral conventional operations including security patrols around ISAF bases, route clearance patrols, and retrograde operations. These forces are operating with growing confidence, improved leadership, warfighting capability, and a vision for the future. They are a source of security, confidence, and pride for the Afghan people - factors the insurgents must consider as their influence and effectiveness in Afghanistan wanes.

Building the Afghan National Security Forces

In your view, is the current end strength level of 352,000 for the ANSF the appropriate level to provide security and stability in Afghanistan beyond 2014?

In my view, the 352,000 ANSF force level should continue beyond 2014. The extension of the ANSF "surge" force has been instrumental in breaking Taliban momentum. This force structure also enables our own troop reductions and retrograde operations. It is too early to assess the duration of this surge, but at a minimum, this extension would likely be necessary for at least two years following the end of the ISAF mission.

What in your view are the greatest challenges to completing efforts to build the capacity of the ANSF to assume responsibility for Afghanistan's security?

Although not insurmountable, the main challenges we face in building the capacity of the ANSF are attrition, leadership, limited literacy and low technical competence. Low literacy rates, in particular, hamper the ANSF ability to meet goals in more technical areas. This is of greatest concern in the Afghan Air Force. Under current conditions, the creation of a fully functional Afghan Air Force is still four to five years off. ANSF has made great strides and is showing significant improvement, but these issues continue to undermine positive recruiting, training, professionalization, and competency goals. These are not problems that can be solved in the short term, but ISAF is continuing to work with the MoI and the MoD to address training the force in areas of professionalism, leadership, literacy, and technical competency. Over time, and with our assistance, we are confident that the ANSF address these challenges.

A recent audit report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) raised concerns about Department of Defense plans to purchase PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters for the Afghan Special Mission Wing and recommended suspending the contracts for these purchases. The Department of Defense and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission—Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan did not concur with the SIGAR's recommendation on contract suspension.

What is your assessment of current plans to equip the Afghan Special Mission Wing with PC-12 aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters?

Our strategy in Afghanistan includes reducing the reliance on U.S. enablers by building the capability of the ANSF. Developing the Afghan Air Force and the SMW is a key element in reducing our requirement to provide aviation support to the ANSF. The fact is that Afghans are better able to fly and maintain these systems, which will be a necessary capability for the ANSF to prevail over the Taliban.

What is your assessment of the impact to Afghanistan counterterrorism efforts if Mi-17 helicopters are not acquired?

It is critical for us to support a robust helicopter capability within the ANSF. Analysis shows that the Mi-17 is the best all-around helicopter for them. The ANSF is familiar with the Mi-17, which is well suited for transporting combat-ready Afghan troops throughout remote, high, hot, and rugged terrain with minimal ground support. It is easier for the ANSF to maintain this helicopter than more sophisticated aircraft. While it is unfortunate that the Mi-17 is the optimal vertical lift solution for the ANSF, we view it as critical for successful transition of security to the ANSF.

Do you support the SIGAR recommendation to suspend the contracts to acquire these aircraft and helicopters for the Special Mission Wing? Why or why not?

We support the SIGAR audit in general but not the specific recommendation to suspend contracts for the Special Mission Wing. We, to include COMISAF, believe that we can overcome the difficulties of maintenance, training and personnel that were identified in the audit. It is in both Afghan and U.S. interest that the Afghans develop their own counterterrorism and counternarcotics capability on a timeline that supports our transition. These aircraft are essential for these tasks. That said, we acknowledge the maintenance and operational challenges that SIGAR identifies. We will work through these in concert with COMISAF. We cannot afford, however, the sequential approach that SIGAR recommends. Training, maintenance, personnel and aircraft procurement will continue apace with governing management to ensure coordinated fielding of ready capability. Notably in this context, the Mi-17 is the best aircraft to meet the SIGAR identified challenges. The Afghans have over thirty years of experience with the Mi-17 to include current operations. Any other aircraft would substantially worsen the challenges reported in the audit and set back fielded capability by years.

Enduring Strategic Partnership with Afghanistan

Do you support maintaining an enduring strategic partnership between the United States and Afghanistan beyond 2014?

Yes. We remain committed to an enduring strategic partnership with Afghanistan. Such a partnership is in our national interest, and critical to our objectives of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaida and preventing its return to Afghanistan, and denying the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.

How would you describe the main U.S. strategic interests regarding an enduring relationship with Afghanistan and in that region?

We are committed to a long-term partnership with Afghanistan. It is in our national interest to ensure that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for Al Qaida or its affiliates that pose a threat to our homeland.

Special Operations in Afghanistan

Special operations forces depend on general purpose forces for many enabling capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; and medical evacuation. Admiral McRaven, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, has said “I have no doubt that special operations will be the last to leave Afghanistan” and has predicted that the requirement for special operations forces may increase as general purpose forces continue to be drawn down.

If confirmed, how would you ensure adequate enabling capabilities for special operations forces as general purpose forces continue to draw down in Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I would work to ensure adequate enabling capabilities to support the SOF mission by working collaboratively with CENTCOM and NATO to determine requirements and fill them to the maximum extent possible. These enabling capabilities would be tailored to support our post-2014 mission and would be based on force levels that have yet to be decided.

In April 2012, the U.S. and Afghanistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the “Afghanization” of direct action counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan - reflecting the shared intention of having Afghan security forces in the lead in the conduct of such operations with U.S. forces in a support role.

What is the status of efforts to put Afghan Special Operations Forces in the lead for such operations and why do you believe such a transition is important?

The ANSF SOF continue to make significant progress in operational effectiveness, and their independence, capacity, and competence. One hundred percent of ANA Special Operation Forces missions are Afghan led, and approximately sixty percent of Provincial Response Company police missions are Afghan led. With our mentorship, their ability to execute these types of missions continues to grow in sophistication. This capability is critical for GIRoA to demonstrate its ability to lead security operations.

The Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs – both U.S. Special Operations missions – have been consistently praised by U.S. military leaders as critical elements of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

What are your views on the value of these programs and do you believe they should be part of the long-term strategy in Afghanistan (i.e. post-2014)?

These programs represent a visible expression of local security to many Afghans, particularly those in remote and isolated communities. GIROA has identified VSO/ALP as a necessary pillar of its own long-term strategy. These programs provide a vehicle for GIROA to extend governance to the local level.

Pakistan

What is your assessment of the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan?

Our military-to-military relationship has improved in the past year, emerging from the crisis that occurred subsequent to the cross-border incident in late 2011 and subsequent closure of the ground lines of communication through Pakistan used for our logistics in Afghanistan. While Pakistan defines its interests in ways that overlap but are not identical to ours, our military-to-military ties allow us to engage Pakistan in areas of shared concern such as maintaining regional stability, curbing violent extremism, and countering the threat of improvised explosive devices. The Chairman, the Central Command Commander, and the ISAF Commander have frequent interaction with General Kayani, and the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan has close ties with counterparts. Pakistani counterinsurgency operations against extremist organizations have been helpful to our efforts in the region. Security assistance, Coalition Support Fund reimbursements, and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan forces have helped enable these operations. The Pakistani military has also hosted several U.S. delegations this year to discuss the IED problem and other issues.

Should that military-to-military relationship be enhanced, and if so, what steps would you recommend for doing so, if confirmed?

Military-to-military ties with Pakistan are an important aspect of the broader bilateral relationship. A key moment in this relationship will occur when General Kayani transitions out of his job this fall. The Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan plays an important role in building and sustaining military-military ties with security assistance programs. As Pakistan's democratic consolidation progresses, we must ensure we maintain our military-to-military ties. Security cooperation cannot succeed without the buy-in of Pakistani military leadership and continued support of the U.S. Congress. I meet with Pakistani representatives when they are in Washington, but normally leave the central personal interactions to the Chairman, the Central Command Commander, and the ISAF Commander in order to keep under control the number of different voices the Pakistani leadership hears. However, if confirmed, I will focus on ensuring our relations remain smooth and stable during the transition to General Kayani's successor, along with ways in which we can work productively with Pakistan to enhance security along the shared border with Afghanistan and stability in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Iran

Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and has failed to provide full and open access to all aspects of its current and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed by Iran?

Iran's persistent, though often clumsy, efforts to undermine our partners and spread its influence pose a significant potential threat to the United States, our allies and partners, and our regional and global interests. Countering Iran's destabilizing hostile behavior requires addressing multiple threat vectors, including conventional military, unconventional state-sponsored terrorism, and nuclear challenges.

- **Conventional Military Challenges.** Iran is actively investing in the development of a range of conventional capabilities, including air, missile, and naval assets that have generated regional anxieties and could threaten our interests and personnel in the region. Iran continues to publicly threaten to use naval and missile forces to close the Strait of Hormuz or target U. S. interests and regional partners in response to increasing sanctions or an attack on the country.
- **Unconventional Challenges.** Iran is also one of the main state-sponsors of terrorism, proxy and surrogate groups, and unconventional attacks, including against U.S. personnel and interests. Over the past three decades, Iran has methodically cultivated a network of terrorist and militant groups capable of targeting regional and global targets. Iran also continues to provide arms, funding, and paramilitary training to extremist groups.
- **Nuclear Challenges.** Iran continues to pursue an illicit nuclear program that threatens to provoke a regional arms race, and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. Iran is proceeding with uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor activities in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions, and Iran continues to develop ballistic missiles that could be adapted to deliver nuclear weapons.

Iran's security threats toward Israel will persist, and there remains a high potential that Iran will make a serious miscalculation of US resolve leading to rapid escalation of conflict. Politically, Iran will seek to use its capabilities to enable greater influence in the region, particularly with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners and in the border nations of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – where US presence has decreased in recent years.

What is your assessment of U.S. policy with respect to Iran?

I fully support the US policy of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The United States is also pursuing a multi-vector strategy that I have labeled a strategic progression. This strategy initially began with outreach which, while unsuccessful, established the foundation required for pressuring Iran under the most intrusive sanctions regime in history. This pressure also includes diplomatic isolation through UN Security Council Resolutions, diplomatic engagement through the P5+1, and military pressure through contingency preparations and exercises. Should Iran fail to meet its obligations regarding cessation of nuclear weapons

development, we have additional options to coerce Iran into doing so using military force that are available to the President. Meanwhile, we continue to sustain pressure on Iran's other nefarious activity, and we are reassuring partners through our presence in the Arabian Gulf region and through various security commitments.

What more do you believe the United States and the international community can and should do to dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons?

We should maintain the current strategic progression, which is currently in what I would describe as the "pressure" stage. Should pressure not work and Iran continue to progress, it may become necessary to further increase pressure or transition to a more coercive stage. That is a policy question best addressed by President's national security team, in which the Chairman and I participate. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we are well prepared to pursue all military options necessary to achieve this end.

In your view, what are the risks associated with reducing U. S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by Iran?

A precipitous reduction of U.S. force presence in the Middle East would negatively impact our ability to deter aggression and assure our partners. We still maintain a large number of forces deployed to the region, and have managed minor reductions – such as a recent restoral of aircraft carrier presence to more traditional levels – by messaging our continued resolve, through our known ability to restore presence, and through our global strike capability. I would add that our ability to respond to an Iranian provocation is impacted more by the decline in readiness associated with budget reductions under the sequester mechanism than by a reduction in presence.

In your view, what has been the effect of sanctions against Iran – how effective have they been and should additional unilateral or multilateral sanctions be levied against Iran?

Because of these sanctions, Iran's financial, trade, and economic outlook has deteriorated significantly. Inflation and unemployment are also growing. International sanctions have hindered Iran's weapons procurement efforts and driven up the costs of obtaining necessary components for its military. Sanctions also appear to have slowed Iran's progress on its nuclear program, making it increasingly difficult for Iran to import needed materials or skills. That said, should Iran maintain its defiance of the international community and continue to develop a nuclear weapon, it may be necessary to step up sanctions even further.

In your view, what role should DOD play in countering Iran's support of international terrorism?

Iranian support for proxy terrorist activities around the world constitutes a serious threat not only for the stability of our partners and Allies who are directly impacted by these activities, but also for U.S. interests. The Department of Defense counters Iran's destabilizing activities in multiple ways. The Department supports diplomatic and intelligence efforts that inhibit activities of Iranian proxy and terrorist groups. Additionally, we use DoD presence in the region to deter

and, when directed by the President, disrupt Iranian aggression. Further, we use our strong security cooperation relationships with regional and global partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities. We will continue to work with the intelligence community and our many regional partners to maintain awareness of—and where feasible disrupt—Iran's asymmetric efforts.

Do you agree with President Obama that all options, including military options, should remain on the table with respect to Iran?

Yes. We keep all options credibly on the table to inhibit Iranian aggression and nuclear ambitions by maintaining a robust regional presence, conducting prudent planning for all contingencies and exercising independently and with our many partners.

What is your assessment of whether sanctions as currently enacted will stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability?

The Departments of State and Treasury have put in place wide-ranging and unprecedented international sanctions. I believe they are having a dramatic effect on the Iranian economy and should continue. They appear to have made some difference, though not yet a decisive difference, in the Supreme Leader's calculations. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these sanctions will alter Iran's course. We have plans in place to take additional action if required.

Syria

What is your assessment of the situation in Syria and its impact on the region?

The crisis in Syria is a dynamic, complex and unlimited sectarian struggle between two sides who believe that to lose means the most severe end state. It is manifesting deep ethno-sectarian divisions across the region. The conflict risks the spread of chemical weapons and the emergence of a terrorist group that could threaten U.S. interests, and it has already cost the lives of over 100,000 Syrian people and the displacement of many more. Its regional impacts extend in varying degrees to Israel, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Competition between and among states with regional interests continues to fuel the violence from afar, deepening Sunni-Shia and Sunni-Sunni tensions within Syria and beyond.

We continue to provide military options to the President and to work with our interagency and regional partners to address the destabilizing effects of this crisis.

In your view, what is the most appropriate role for the United States in assisting regional friends and allies respond to the situation in Syria?

The U.S. is pursuing a diplomatic solution in Syria with the goal of a transitional government with full executive power by mutual consent, and is providing considerable humanitarian and non-lethal support to the forces opposing the Syrian government. The U.S. military is providing support to the surrounding countries through multilateral planning efforts, exercises, and some

humanitarian assistance. We are continuously engaged with key regional partners such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq to provide assistance, technical knowledge, and military contingency planning. We have placed a number of F-16s and a Patriot battery in Jordan to demonstrate our commitment to that nation's security.

In your view, what – if any – role should the United States military play with respect to the situation in Syria?

There is a broad spectrum of potential roles the U.S. military could play in Syria. These include helping provide humanitarian assistance, providing security assistance to Syria's neighbors, and providing non-lethal assistance to the opposition, including essential provisions such as food and medical supplies—all of which we are currently doing. The military could support an international effort to dismantle Syria's chemical weapons program in a permissive post-Assad environment. Although there are legal hurdles involved, additional U.S. military involvement could include training, advising and assisting opposition forces from outside Syria—forces carefully selected to minimize the chances that they would abuse the power we would provide. At an unclassified level, the U.S. military could also conduct a broad spectrum of kinetic options in Syria, ranging from different types of limited kinetic strikes designed to achieve a variety of objectives, to different varieties of no-fly zone or humanitarian safe zones. All of these options have been presented to the National Security Staff for consideration by the Principals and the President. Each comes with costs, risks, legal hurdles, and opportunity costs. Notably, given the degradation of U.S. Air Force readiness due to the effects of the FY13 sequester, the higher levels of kinetic response would impose severe opportunity costs for potential contingencies elsewhere in the world.

In your view, what role – if any – are Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah playing in the current conflict in Syria?

Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah continue to provide support to the Assad regime.

Russia continues to provide arms, diplomatic and financial support to the Syrian regime. I defer to the intelligence community for specifics. Though it has recently held off on providing the S-300 surface to air missile system, it could reverse this decision at any time. Russia's continued support for the regime has cost it considerable credibility in the region.

Meanwhile, in order to support its client Hezbollah and sustain a hostile state on Israel's border, Iran provides the Assad regime with financial support, weapons, training, and advice regarding how to conduct the fight against the opposition forces.

Hezbollah has provided advice and has injected a considerable number of forces directly into the fight, providing a decisive capability in some cases, though sustaining serious losses. Again, I would defer to the intelligence community for specifics.

In your view, what are the prospects of a negotiated solution in Syria?

Clearly, a negotiated settlement is the preferred path to achieving our policy objectives.

However, its prospects are diminished by the sectarian and “total war” character of the conflict. The intelligence community has indicated that this type of conflict only is resolved through negotiation when both sides are exhausted or the dominant side is forced to the table by a major patron state. The former will likely take many years, and the likelihood of latter occurring is questionable. Greatly complicating the likelihood of a negotiated settlement is the factious nature of the opposition forces—despite intense pressure by its international patrons to coalesce politically, the opposition is still not united.

In your view, is the momentum currently on the side of the Assad regime or the forces fighting to overthrow Syria?

The Assad regime – with direct support from Hezbollah, and weapons provided by Iran and Russia – has recently regained control of several areas previously in dispute or under the control of opposition forces. Momentum can ebb back and forth in these types of conflict, and it would appear to have shifted towards the regime in that part of the country.

Are there asymmetric options that bypass Syria’s integrated air defense system rather than kinetically neutralize it, such as standoff weapons and/or stealth, and what is your assessment of those options from a military perspective?

We have a range of military options. These are best discussed in a classified setting.

Al Qaeda

What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda affiliates to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?

A decade of relentless counterterrorism pressure has degraded al-Qaida’s ability to operate. They are less capable of staging sophisticated, complex attacks against the West. Despite these setbacks, al-Qaida retains its intent to plan and conduct terrorist attacks against the West. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula remains the AQ associated group most likely and capable of attempting an attack on the U.S. in the near-term. Other groups, such as Al-Qaida in Iraq, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, and others are more preoccupied with struggles internal to the areas in which they operate. However, to varying degrees they still have the intent and capability of conducting an attack on the United States or its people.

The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force

What is your understanding of the scope and duration of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)?

The United States is in an armed conflict against Al Qaida and its associated forces. An associated force is defined as a group that (1) is an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside Al Qaida and, (2) is a co-belligerent with Al Qaida in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. These are the same terrorist threats that perpetrated the attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, and the AUMF still serves as the legal basis under U.S. domestic law to employ military force against these threats.

What factors govern Department of Defense determinations as to where the use of force is authorized, and against whom, pursuant to the AUMF?

In May 2013, the President promulgated Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) governing direct action against terrorist targets located outside the United States and areas of active hostilities. This establishes procedures for DoD to conduct these types of military operations. The PPG and its derivative operational plans formalize DoD standards, policies, and determinations concerning where, how, and against whom military force may be utilized outside the United States and areas of active hostilities. DoD meticulously follows the procedures of the PPG to ensure we make well-informed and ethical/legal decisions based on the most up-to-date intelligence and the expertise of our national security professionals. Senior commanders and their legal advisors carefully review all operations for compliance with U.S. and international law before a decision is rendered by the Secretary of Defense or the President.

Are you satisfied that current legal authorities, including the AUMF, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at the level that you believe to be necessary and appropriate?

The AUMF in its current form provides necessary and sufficient authorities to counter Al Qaida and its associated forces. If a terrorist threat emerges that does not fit within the AUMF, the DoD would consult with Congress and the Executive Branch on the question of authorities.

Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen and what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that strategy?

Our overall engagement strategy with Yemen is solid. It combines diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives to improve stability and security and assist president Hadi during this period of transition. Building an enduring partnership with the Yemeni military is key to addressing critical security threats, including the campaign against AQAP. The security situation in Yemen remains fragile and we must continue our partnership and support.

Given the continuing political instability and slow progress of reforms to the military in Yemen, what are your views on the U.S. continuing to provide security assistance – most significantly DOD section 1206 funding – to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?

A stable Yemen that is free of violent extremist remains in our best interest. AQAP elements seek to exploit instability and pose a legitimate threat to the United States, our assets in the region, and the transitional Yemeni government. While progress has been slow, President Hadi and the military are taking steady steps to reform and restructure the military as part of the overall political transition process. They continue to engage the United States for support and advice on the military reorganization. The 1206 funds remain critical to building the capacity of Yemeni counter terrorism forces to disrupt and degrade the AQAP operational space.

Somalia and Al Shabab

What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Shabab?

While Al-Shabaab remains on the defensive, it has demonstrated a continued willingness and ability to conduct complex attacks against Western interests and Somali government targets in Mogadishu. This trend will likely continue throughout the rest of 2013, despite increasingly public disputes amongst Al-Shabaab senior officials and the efforts by the Somali government, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and Ethiopian National Defense Forces to maintain pressure on the group.

In your view, does al Shabab pose a threat to the United States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational area?

Al-Shabaab does pose a threat to allied interests in East Africa, but it does not pose a direct threat to the Homeland or Europe at present. Al-Shabaab merged with al-Qaida in February 2012 and shares al-Qaida's global jihadist objectives. However, the group continues to focus its efforts on defending territory in Somalia against the coalition of the Somali government, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and Ethiopian military forces – as well as conducting attacks in East Africa.

Should the United States establish military-to-military relations and consider providing assistance to the Somali national military forces?

If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure we are prepared to establish military-to-military relations with the new Somali National Army in support of the State Department efforts to recognize and strengthen the Somalia Federal Government. Meanwhile, we plan to continue assistance to our partner nations in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and explore ways to assist the Somali National Army. Somali stability in the near-term depends on AMISOM. Long-term, their security would be strengthened by a professional and accountable Somali National Army.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?

Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies have proven resilient despite the French-led military intervention in Mali. They are exploiting the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali for safety. Although these groups no longer control key strategic towns, they retain the capability to launch sporadic attacks within Mali and neighboring countries, expand their safehaven, and attract recruits in pursuit of a hardline Islamic state based on al-Qaida ideology. AQIM will likely continue to bolster its ties to al-Qaida-associated terrorist groups throughout the region, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, in order to influence and support attack planning. AQIM will continue to pose a local and regional threat into 2014, as North African governments struggle to disrupt AQIM movement across expansive, porous borders.

In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational area? What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions threatening U.S. interests?

In my view, the U.S. Homeland is not significantly threatened by AQIM. We see no indications the group places a priority on attacks outside North Africa and the Sahel, at least in the near term. However, the group remains a credible threat to U.S. and Western interests within North and West Africa, where it has conducted or attempted attacks in several countries (i.e. Mali, Niger, Algeria, Mauritania), and possibly in Europe. AQIM will likely continue to bolster its ties to al-Qaida-associated terrorist groups throughout the region, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, in order to influence and support attack planning.

In your view, what has been the impact of the recent expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali on the group's capacities and aims?

The expansion of al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali between early 2012 and January 2013 increased the group's capacity as it collaborated with splinter groups al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad in West Africa (TWJWA), al-Mulathamun battalion, and Tuareg rebel group Ansar al-Din (AAD) to enlarge its area of operations to several cities in northern Mali and enforce Sharia law. Although the group expanded in size, this growth has not changed the group's regionally-focused aim of establishing Sharia throughout North Africa. Following heavy losses in the subsequent French-led intervention, AQIM largely retreated to its traditional safehaven in the Tigharghar mountains, where it continues to regroup and remains capable of conducting attacks in the region.

Combating Terrorism

The Administration recently released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to

augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked threats “that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia.”

How do you view the DOD’s role under the new National Strategy for Counterterrorism?

DOD’s role is one element of a comprehensive government approach that integrates our unique capabilities with those of our interagency partners and allies. In support of our strategic goals to combat Al Qaeda-linked threats in South Asia and beyond, DOD is building partner capacity by training, advising, and assisting partnered forces to confront mutual threats. DOD will also continue to conduct lethal action against terrorist networks within rigorous guidelines, accountability methods, and standards.

What is your understanding of the impact of the Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism on DOD’s role within the U.S. Government’s counterterrorism strategy? Will DOD see its role increase or decrease? Will DoD require any new authorities or any increased capabilities or capacities?

I feel our current authorities are sufficient to play our part in defending the nation against existing terrorist threats. Counter-terrorism is a deeply inter-agency effort that includes intelligence, law enforcement and defense capabilities, and our success stems in large part from the exceptional cooperation in this regard that has developed over the years. It remains to be seen, but it is possible the DoD role could increase under the PPD. The recently signed Presidential Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism is a codification of policies and procedures that have been applied for some time. The PPG and its derivative operational plans formalize the standards, policies, and determinations of DoD concerning where, how, and against whom military force may be utilized outside the United States and areas of active hostilities.

U.S. military capabilities are but one part of our comprehensive counterterrorism effort. We will continue to enable our allies to develop the capability to counter terrorists within their borders. When direct action is necessary, DoD meticulously follows the PPG procedures to ensure we make well-informed decisions based on the most up-to-date intelligence and the expertise of our national security professionals. The Department implements a rigorous, transparent and accountable review process. We will scrupulously adhere to the rule of law and the highest ethical standards in implementing the strategy and guidance.

Are there steps DOD should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other federal departments and agencies?

I believe that improved interagency cooperation is one of the signature accomplishments of the struggle against terrorism over the last decade. Nonetheless, improving interagency coordination was a key finding in our Decade of War study, and it is essential that we continue to raise the bar. At the national level, the Joint Staff participates in both the National Security Staff’s Counterterrorism Security Group and the President’s Counterterrorism Board of Directors. At the regional level, our Geographic Combatant Commands advance our efforts by working closely with U.S. embassies, interagency partners and local actors. The Department continues to

work with our interagency partners to assess and integrate lessons learned into our doctrine, training, planning and operations

What do you view as the role of the DOD in countering al Qaeda and affiliated groups in cyberspace?

We view cyber as an essential capability for Joint Force 2020. Similar to our other counter-terrorism efforts, we recognize that defense of cyberspace requires an integrated approach to providing the best protection possible for our nation. Working with intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement partners, we will remain alert to the potential for cyber attacks on our homeland conducted by terrorist groups. Meanwhile, opportunities exist for DoD to assist in the exploitation of cyberspace to counter extremist messaging through military information support operations. We have processes in place to identify and defend against cyber attacks, and share information with industry to mitigate effects.

Special Operations Forces

The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces (SOF) and enablers that directly support their operations.

Do you believe that QDR directed growth in the size of SOF should be retained despite current budgetary pressures?

Growth in our Special Operations Forces capability was necessary to meet the demands of the conflicts in which we have been engaged over the past decade. While some of the growth has supported countering terrorism, the principle share of increased capacity has been used to support counter-insurgency (COIN) campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have planned to use the SOF capacity released by the reduction in COIN demand in Iraq and Afghanistan in two ways: 1) to rest and reset the force and 2) to grow our building partner capacity efforts worldwide. However, given the financial downturn we face, we must balance the need for SOF capabilities with our need to address other capability demands in light of increased budgetary pressures. Accordingly, I support maintenance of only programmed SOF resourcing, shifting priorities inside the community in order to best establish the capabilities, capacities and readiness required to meet our most pressing needs—most notably continuing to counter terrorism—while doing the best we can to service other missions.

In recent years, special operations forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to U.S. Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) Title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities special operations forces are carrying out around the world.

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?

At this time, I do not recommend changes to USSOCOM's Title 10 missions. In coordination with the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff uses a range of processes – such as the Unified Command Plan, Guidance for the Employment of the Force, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan – to assess missions and responsibilities assigned to USSOCOM on a continuing basis. SOF remain uniquely suited to conducting certain information and intelligence operations. The language in Section 167 of Title 10, United States Code, provides the President and the Secretary of Defense flexibility to meet changing circumstances.

Are there any additional missions that you believe USSOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

I do not recommend USSOCOM gain any additional missions at this time, pending a review of strategic planning documents. SOF are well-positioned to provide an appropriate range of capability to Joint Force Commanders. We will continue to use lessons from our Decade of War studies to better integrate SOF and the General Purpose Force.

What can be done to ensure that indirect special operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

The Chairman has placed emphasis on many aspects of foreign internal defense in his Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and has developed specific Joint Doctrine on Unconventional Warfare. If I am confirmed, one area that I may examine for enhanced legislative authorities is greater opportunities for non-SOF units to undertake building partner capacity tasks, which will relieve some of this burden from SOF forces in a severely restricted budget climate.

Special Operations Authorities

Reportedly, the Commander of USSOCOM has sought more control over the deployment and utilization of special operations forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense recently modified policy guidance for the combatant commands that gave USSOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the geographic combatant commanders and special operations forces assigned to them. It has been reported that the Commander of USSOCOM is also seeking new authorities that would allow him to more rapidly move special operations forces between geographic combatant commands.

Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.

Special Operations Forces undertake operations only with the approval of the requisite authorities, including the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Geographic Combatant Commanders, and, where appropriate, the Chiefs of Mission. The SOCOM commander has made it clear that the changes he is recommending are not intended to infringe upon the authority of the Combatant Commanders – and as a former commander, I remain sensitive to this. Rather, he is trying to provide better capability to the Combatant Commanders such that they may use SOF forces more efficiently and effectively. I believe the proposed changes enhance the global force by networking with our US interagency counterparts as well as our foreign allies and partners. If I am confirmed, I would support a more efficient and effective ability of our Special Operations Forces to respond to global demands in the future.

U.S. Cyber Command manning and training

U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), as a combatant command, executes offensive and defensive military operations in cyberspace under title 10. CYBERCOM, in conjunction with the Military Services, is defining its personnel requirements, which will result in a requirement for the Services to provide thousands of personnel with high levels of training and skill in a technically demanding area. This force requirement could grow substantially in future years as DOD learns more about the cyber capabilities of potential adversaries and as more countries gain sophisticated cyber warfare expertise and capacity.

What are your views about programming the majority of these personnel under the Military Intelligence Program (MIP)?

U.S. Cyber Command is a sub-unified command. The significant amount of the work to provide planning and options in cyberspace is going to require intelligence personnel, not unlike the work conducted by our airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. We are taking a very close look at the mix of personnel, both military and intelligence, required to execute missions in cyberspace and intend to strike the right balance. The services are in the process of building our initial target of 133 cyber teams from existing force structure. Based on how the services are currently manned, trained, and equipped, MIP personnel in two services, the Army and the Navy, will be in the majority, while in the Air Force and Marine Corps, MIP personnel will be in the minority. As we normalize cyber operations, we believe those differences between services will decrease over time, and across the entire force we would expect MIP personnel to be in the minority overall, just like the other domains. However, we also expect MIP personnel to be a larger percentage of the cyber force due to the significant requirement for ISR support in the cyber domain.

Are cyber offensive and defensive operations intelligence missions?

No, cyberspace operations are not inherently intelligence missions, though they can require intelligence if they are to succeed. DOD cyberspace operations are designed to operate and defend DOD information systems, support the defense of non-DoD systems, and to project power in and through cyberspace in order to satisfy national security objectives. Like all operational military missions, cyberspace operations, both offensive and defensive, are supported by mission-tailored-all source intelligence. As such, cyberspace operations include the conduct of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and operational preparation of the environment in support of mission objectives. However, a substantial portion of the offensive and defensive work is not an intelligence mission.

Will programming of CYBERCOM personnel under the MIP budget also lead to policy and resource oversight by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?

Like any domain, there are both military operations and intelligence aspects of cyber operations that demand policy and oversight from both the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Both are active in this area. I would defer to OSD for further guidance on oversight requirements.

Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Services to generate and retain the required numbers of skilled and highly trained personnel to support CYBERCOM?

Because manning, training and equipping the force, and then retaining highly skilled personnel, is always a core concern, the services are closely managing their provision of critical cyber personnel. The services recognize this as a key priority and seem to be on track to provide the required personnel. As the Department gradually transitions to a Joint Information Environment, we should be able to transition more billets that are involved in simply managing networks into support more advanced CYBERCOM missions. We will continue to look to USCYBERCOM to define a joint training standard. Cyberspace personnel managed by each service to meet the service's unique requirements must also meet the Department of Defense's established common standards and qualifications. It is imperative that these personnel exhibit exceptional knowledge of technical fundamentals and tactical tradecraft, and be able to employ that expertise as part of an integrated warfighting team. We have advanced our ability to generate skilled cyberspace professionals in a short amount of time, but must continue to provide the right incentives to retain these personnel in the current budget environment as we attempt to compete against industry for highly trained and skilled personnel.

Should training for the CYBERCOM mission teams be conducted by the National Security Agency, by the Military Services, or in joint training facilities?

There is some training associated with specialized cyber operations tasks that is common to both an intelligence and an operational function, and that is best conducted in close coordination with the National Security Agency. There are also service training venues established that have the ability to produce some of the necessary skills required for USCYBERCOM Mission Teams. Going forward, it will be important for the Joint Staff, the services, and USCYBERCOM to work together to build joint training standards and determine the best way to train to those standards.

Have you considered whether the Commander of CYBERCOM should have authorities over Service personnel decisions affecting the cyber mission that are similar to those enjoyed by statute and by DOD regulation by the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command?

The Department is examining this option as one of many possible ways to enhance the effectiveness of cyber forces. For now the current way in which personnel authorities are structured is working satisfactorily. However as CYBERCOM evolves there may be merit in mirroring some of the approaches we have taken with USSOCOM, including personnel decisions.

Are there adequate cyber test facilities to support CYBERCOM's offensive missions, taking into account that such missions may involve permanent damage to targets?

There are currently a number of test ranges and facilities available to conduct such testing. The quantity is currently adequate, but the need could grow – clearly, financial limitations and uncertainty could constrain additional of additional facilities should they be required. The real issue is the joint alignment and management of those resources to facilitate testing and training on an annual basis. The need for cyber facilities for testing and mission rehearsal of advanced offensive capabilities remains a critical enabler for USCYBERCOM mission effectiveness. We continue to review the offensive testing and evaluation requirements, especially in light of the approved cyber mission force build out. These requirements are often blended with training, exercise and certification requirements to drive cyber range solution sets across DoD.

Defense Science Board report

The Defense Science Board (DSB) in January 2013 released a Task Force report on “Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat.” This report concluded that the effects of cyber warfare on civilian infrastructure could be as severe as some forms of nuclear attack, and suggested that nuclear forces should play a role in deterring devastating cyber attacks.

What are your views on whether nuclear weapons could and should be used as an element to deter severe attacks on critical infrastructure?

As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. We have other means to credibly deter cyber attacks against the U.S., to include both non-kinetic and kinetic means.

The DSB report also recommended that DOD segregate a portion of its long-range advanced conventional strike capability and greatly enhance its resistance to cyber attack to ensure that the President retains options below the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a cyber attack that compromised our conventional forces or the means of controlling them.

What are your views on the reasoning of the DSB Task Force regarding the severity of the potential threat to our conventional forces and the means of controlling them, and whether prudence dictates extraordinary protections for portions of our military forces?

I do not believe we need to segregate any quantity of conventional forces strictly in anticipation of a cyber attack. Anticipated budget restrictions will stress our conventional operations capacity enough, and segregating more of these forces will hinder our ability to use them for other contingencies. Rather, we should ensure we continuously assess the security and robustness of the networks we use to exercise command and control over these strike capabilities. The networks supporting our long-range advanced conventional strike capability already employ robust protection measures, particularly those platforms that are nuclear-capable. Additionally, we maintain redundant forms of communication, to include analog systems, and routinely train and exercise to minimize the extent to which cyber or electronic warfare attacks degrade our capabilities. Again, however, we should not rest on our current capability, and improved security and survivability of our command and control systems is a matter I take very seriously.

The DSB report also concluded that DOD has an inadequate understanding of how conflict in cyberspace would or could develop, what actions and reactions might ensue, and how conflict could escalate. To help address this deficiency, the Task Force urged the Department to develop the capability to conduct large-scale modeling and simulation of cyberwarfare.

What are your views on this issue?

Conflict in cyberspace will indeed be complex. As we have seen over history, it would be hubris for anyone to claim a complete understanding of how a new technology will perform in combat or will influence a conflict. We can only do the best we can to understand it in advance. As such, developing and conducting large-scale modeling and simulation exercises would expand our understanding of cyberspace conflict, decision thresholds, escalation concepts, and decision uncertainty. We are taking steps to improve our cyber test and training range capacity and capabilities to ensure we can train our cyber forces in exercises like CYBER FLAG and CYBER KNIGHT. The major cyber ranges are receiving an increase in funding in FY14 to meet an expected demand in training and testing. The services and Combatant Commands continue to aggressively incorporate cyber into exercises at the direction of the Secretary. We are also incorporating cyber into our large scale modeling and simulation capabilities to better understand the domain. The Joint Staff tested for the first time in a recent USNORTHCOM exercise a simulation capability that presented to the training audience degraded network effects from cyber activity. The Defense of Department has also taken steps by issuing orders, policy, and doctrinal guidance to the joint force as seen in new joint doctrine, updates to the Standing and Supplemental Rules of Engagement (SROE), and guidance about exercising cyberspace operations with the other operating domains. These actions, combined with the lessons garnered through future large-scale modeling and simulation, should improve our understanding of the dynamics of conflict in cyberspace.

Intelligence collection and analysis

After 9/11, intelligence collection and analysis focused on discovering, identifying, locating, and defeating terrorists and insurgents. These missions involve “finding needles in haystacks,” and were addressed in part by human intelligence operations and by applying advanced information technology to collect and combine and sift through vast amounts of information from many unconventional sources. These intelligence capabilities are applicable to a range of transnational security challenges, but are less useful for supporting more traditional forms of military operations against nation-states.

Do you think it is necessary to evaluate the current posture and plans of DOD’s intelligence components to ensure that capabilities and capacities for supporting military operations against elusive, networked adversaries and against conventional military establishments are appropriately balanced?

Balancing intelligence collection between threat networks and nation-states is continually evaluated at the theater level by Combatant Commanders and reflected in both their collection management process and their inputs into SecDef’s management of the force guided by the Force Allocation Decision Model (FADM).

This balance is also scrutinized at the national level by the intelligence community as guided by the President’s National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) in concert with experts in Congress and the NSS.

Since 2001, we have presided over a growing enterprise of ISR systems and operations. Some of these systems, while extremely effective in relatively permissive environments, will likely be unsuitable for operations against a modern military force. Therefore, as we build ISR in Joint Force 2020, sensor and platform diversity will be critical to successfully operate against a wide variety of target sets and in a variety of threat environments—permissive, contested, and denied.

That said, there are a few key similarities between countering elusive, networked adversaries and conventional military establishments, particularly when trying to find, fix, and finish critical elements of that conventional force, such as asymmetric capabilities (including weapons of mass destruction) and command and control nodes. In such cases, we will benefit from the advances we have made over the past decade.

Information Operations

The Government Accountability Office reports that DOD has “spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year” to support its information operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are in support of operations in Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) from United States Special Operations Command also deploy to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Further, the geographic combatant commands are increasingly moving into this operational space.

What are your views on DOD’s military information support operations and influence programs and their integration into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?

We continue to assess and improve our information operations activities because winning the narrative remains a critical element of advancing our national security. I view Military Information Support Operations as traditional military activities that a global combatant commander uses to support theater security cooperation and underpin theater campaign plan objectives. Influence programs and activities are also a means to support broader U.S. foreign policy objectives.

DOD's military information support operations and influence programs are integrated into Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) and country team objectives and programs. Synchronization across government is critical, and GCCs continue to improve coordination with the State Department, USAID and Country Teams by conducting monthly and quarterly working groups/VTCs and reports to share information.

What is the role of DOD versus the intelligence community and the State Department?

DOD continues to work alongside DOS and USAID in support of foreign policy objectives. DOD information operations can complement and reinforce DOS and other government agency efforts by focusing on military audiences and ensuring information operations themes and messages are derived from and synchronized with DOS public diplomacy.

DOD conducts periodic working groups with the intelligence community and the State Department to deconflict and synchronize information operations and military information support operations (MISO) activities at the GCC, Joint Staff and OSD levels.

How do you believe the success of these programs should be measured, especially in light of the constrained budget environment?

Measuring success of these programs remains a challenge. The information space is inherently complex, but should not be yielded to an adversary. It is not always easy to discern whether a change is due to an information program or some other activity more closely associated with actions on the ground. However, DOD continues to develop and monitor measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) for these programs. We are incorporating these lessons in our doctrine, training, planning and reporting.

Department of Defense Counternarcotics Activities

On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1.5 billion to support the Department’s CN operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that DOD “does not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.” This is the second such finding relating by GAO to DOD CN

in the last decade.

What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?

DoD's counternarcotics activities operate in an inherently complex environment in which it can be difficult to determine with precision whether generated effects are due to DoD efforts, other U.S. interagency efforts, host nation efforts, or factors beyond the control of these entities. I believe it would be hubris for anyone to claim the ability to create a system that would accurately track the progress of any effort in the complex arena. We do believe that DoD's CN program is critically important to enabling the broader U.S. interagency and foreign partner counternarcotics efforts. Our foreign and interagency partners with counterdrug responsibilities continually ask for DoD training, equipment, exchanges of information, planning, infrastructure, transportation, analytical, aerial reconnaissance, communications, and related support to build the capacity of foreign security services with counterdrug responsibilities. These roles and activities are appropriate and effective in strengthening law enforcement, governance and rule of law institutions.

In your personal view, should DOD continue to play a role in stemming the flow of illegal narcotics?

Yes, though current budget limitations will present an enormous challenge to our ability to do this while addressing our many other security responsibilities. With the potential for the convergence of violent extremist organizations with drug trafficking organizations, I see DOD's continued support to law enforcement as a necessary component of our National Security.

In your position as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, what was your assessment of the DOD CN program as it related to Mexico and the Caribbean?

The CN efforts of the United States, Mexico, and Caribbean nations have achieved major and sustained progress against cocaine use and distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere. United States NORTHERN Command furthers this effort by achieving unprecedented cooperation with the Governments of Mexico and Caribbean nations in our efforts against the threat, and I expect continued cooperation in future years. I believe these roles/relationships are essential to our policies and strategies in the region. However, this progress is deeply threatened by current budget decreases and uncertainties, as resources will likely be diverted from this area to address our many other security needs.

In your position as the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, were there any activities that you had hoped to be able to conduct using DOD CN funding, but were not able to do and that you, if confirmed, would recommend DOD seek the authority to conduct?

I found that I had sufficient authorities to serve an effective supporting role to other U.S. government agencies and foreign partners with counternarcotics responsibilities. Should I be confirmed, I will remain supportive of leveraging our current authorities and longstanding relationships within the region to support our partner nations and defend the Nation from transnational criminal organizations.

Responsibility to Protect

The U.S. Government has recognized the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) – that is, the responsibility of the international community to use appropriate means to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, by encouraging states to protect their own populations, by helping states build the capacity to do so, and by acting directly should national authorities fail to provide such protection. In its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of Defense names “preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities” as one of a long list of potential contingencies that DOD might be called on to address. DOD has begun to explore some of the implications of R2P, by considering “mass atrocity prevention and response operations” (MAPRO).

In your view, how high a priority should the “responsibility to protect” be for the U.S. Government as a whole?

The “responsibility to protect” is not currently viewed by the United States as a legal basis for the use of military force. Our nation may call on us to prevent human suffering, initially using means other than force, and could use military force as a last resort if other instruments of national power fail. We work closely with our international military partners, where needed, to emphasize professionalism, commitment to the rule of law, and strengthen their capacity to protect their citizens. Without legal standing, it is not a practice we would rank order by priority, though we would be prepared to act if called upon by the President to do so.

In your view, what should be the role of DOD, if any, in fulfilling the responsibility to protect?

The use of military force is only one of many instruments of national power. We should always view use of force as a last resort, to be considered only when all other instruments of national power have failed and used under appropriate legal authority. We should ensure we are doctrinally prepared to execute a mission if called upon to do so. The role of the Department of Defense in fulfilling the responsibility to protect, should it be cited as a *casus belli*, would be to provide the President with a full range of options and be prepared to act if called upon to do so.

In your view, what is the proper application of R2P doctrine with respect to the situation in Syria?

R2P has been mentioned as a potential legal basis for the use of force in Syria, but to my knowledge a decision has not been taken to activate this basis. Using R2P as a basis would be a political vice military decision. Meanwhile, the U.S. Government is working with allies and partners and with the Syrian opposition to provide humanitarian assistance within Syria and across the region. The United States is providing nearly \$815 million in aid to help the victims of this conflict, including emergency medical care and supplies, food, and shelter. The recent addition of more than \$300 million in humanitarian aid will increase food aid, medical care,

clean water, and provide shelter and other relief supplies for families suffering in Syria and neighboring countries.

Operation Observant Compass & the Lord's Resistance Army

Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) – including Joseph Kony – continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide.

In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?

Operation Observant Compass aims to: (1) protect civilians, (2) promote DD/RRR (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, and resettlement), (3) increase humanitarian access/support, and (4). This is a whole-of-government effort across a range of U.S. Government agencies and partners. DoD is the primary agent for assisting the UPDF in removing Kony and other senior LRA leaders from the region.

I acknowledge the operational challenges of this mission in the context of competing demands and higher priorities. U.S. Special Operations forces do accompany UPDF partners on missions in the Central African Republic, remaining clear of combat action with LRA elements, but they are not doing so in Sudan or the disputed region due to diplomatic concerns.

Do you support the continuation of DoD's current level of support to this mission?

The current level of support is appropriate. DoD is currently weighing future options, as we prioritize limited resources among numerous competing priorities.

International Peacekeeping Contributions

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 29, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States "is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to UN peacekeeping operations."

What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute more military personnel to both

staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

If confirmed, I would be willing to consider opportunities to support peacekeeping missions, including key staff officers and military observers, if such a course of action aligned with our national security interests. However, this mission must of necessity compete within the spectrum of other national security interests, including counter-terrorism, that are often a higher priority.

If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the United Nations?

We have made additional contributions in this area over the past two years, as the appointment of Army Brigadier General Hugh Van Roosen to force chief of staff for the United Nations Mission in Liberia has demonstrated. We have also worked closely with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to overcome administrative obstacles to the assignment of U.S. service members within the U.N. Secretariat. I am confident we will continue to improve upon our processes and support of multilateral institutions. We may be able to bring more capacity to bear as we draw down from Afghanistan, keeping in mind that the force will be shrinking with budget cuts and we need to allow the force to rest. Our U.S. service members bring battle-tested experience and expertise that enhance these types of organizations in the execution of their vital global missions.

Global Peace Operations Initiative

The Global Peace Operations Initiative was established after the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit to address growing gaps in international peace operations. In most cases, DOD plays a supporting role in the implementation of this train and equip program.

What is your understanding and assessment of this program?

The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a key component of our government's strategy to build the capacity of U.S. partners to carry out peacekeeping operations. Through small investments in training and equipment, we can prepare motivated partners for successful participation in peacekeeping. GPOI has directly trained over 175,000 peacekeepers from 38 countries and enabled the training of another 52,000 instructors since 2005. Over two dozen peace operations have benefited from the program. GPOI is a strong example of the results we obtain when the Departments of State and Defense work together to promote our nation's security.

Would you support additional DOD contributions – in the form of U.S. military trainers – to support this program?

The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) has been successful in building partnership capacity in large part because of its flexibility. Our combatant commanders have made excellent use of this program to tailor assistance to the specific needs of individual partners. While GPOI underwrites training delivered by both contractors and military personnel, our experience has

shown that service members produce more effective and longer-lasting results than contract instructors. If confirmed, I would consider this factor, subject to the demands of our other operations overseas and against the backdrop of the severe budget restrictions we face under the Budget Control Act.

National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime

Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as “an abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,” and stated that “rising drug violence and corruption are undermining stability and the rule of law in some countries” in the Western Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the strategy is “enhancing Department of Defense support to U.S. law enforcement.”

What is your understanding of the President’s strategy to combat transnational criminal organizations?

The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime integrates all elements of national power, including the military, to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security. Ultimately, within our capacity to do so, the strategy seeks to reduce transnational organized crime to a manageable public safety concern.

What is your understanding of the Department’s role within the President’s strategy?

The Department of Defense is not the lead agency responsible for combatting transnational organized crime. DoD instead plays an appropriate and important role in supporting law enforcement to counter threats to national security.

In your view, should DoD play a role in providing support to the U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters related to transnational organized crime?

The Department of Defense is often able to provide unique supporting capabilities to address the full range of transnational criminal threats, including: military intelligence support to law enforcement, counter-threat finance, military-to-military capability development, and military operational activities against threats to the U.S. Some of the capabilities DoD has developed over the last decade of war are applicable to countering transnational organized crime. DoD should provide support to U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community as part of a whole of government approach, consistent with current authorities.

Mass Atrocities Prevention

President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10.

Among interagency partners, what is DoD's role in addressing atrocity threats, and what tools does DoD have for preventing or responding to atrocities?

DoD has developed Joint Doctrine for conducting Mass Atrocity Response Operations and conducted a comprehensive review of DoD training. Atrocity prevention and response is now part of DoD plans and planning guidance. In addition, DoD is working with the UN to strengthen that organization's ability to respond to atrocity events.

Has DoD developed planning processes toward this effort so that it will be able to respond quickly in emergency situations?

Yes, DoD has developed planning processes toward this effort.

In your view, is the situation in Syria a mass atrocity?

My view is consistent with the White House Fact Sheet of May 1, 2013.

Future of NATO

As a result of coalition operations in Afghanistan, Libya, and elsewhere the NATO alliance has achieved unprecedented levels of integration and interoperability.

If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have for capturing the lessons learned from recent coalition operations and maintaining the capabilities developed as a result of those operations?

Both the U.S. and NATO have been capturing incorporating lessons learned into education, training and preparations for future operations and missions. Within the Joint Staff, our J-7 Directorate for Joint Development has the DoD lead on lessons learned. Our J7 works with NATO, Allied Command Transformation, headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, which has the lead on lessons learned from Alliance operations (with most of NATO's work performed by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) located in Monsanto, Portugal).

I am keenly aware of the potential for diminishing interoperability and readiness as operations in Afghanistan draw down. If confirmed, I intend to continue our efforts through the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) to ensure all NATO forces and those of capable partners remain ready and interoperable. Subject to funding, this will include expanded education; increased training and exercises; and better use of technology. Additionally, the increased support for the NATO Response Force (NRF) to which we have committed in the wake of our drawdown in Europe will

provide excellent opportunities for maintaining our coalition warfighting capability. Finally, a broad array of exercises will help inhibit the atrophy of this important capability.

In your view, what existing or new missions should be the focus of NATO's strategic efforts over the next five years?

In my view, NATO operations in Afghanistan will remain a key focus of NATO's strategic effort over the next five years. This includes successfully concluding the ISAF combat operation by the end of 2014 and ensuring that NATO is ready to commence its new train, advise, and assist mission, known as Resolute Support, on 1 January 2015. The task of that mission will be to ensure that Afghan National Security Forces are sustainable, credible, and capable of maintaining security in Afghanistan under responsible and efficient Afghan Security Institutions, operating within appropriate civilian and political controls.

That said, NATO must also anticipate future threats or enhance its preparedness for threats we already understand. These include continued emphasis on ballistic missile defense, an understanding of the transformation of terrorist groups, and cyber defense to the extent it is collectively feasible. Given the evolution of terrorist threats, it may be wise to consider an alliance capability to respond quickly to terrorist events that threaten member citizens overseas.

What steps, if any, could or should NATO take, in your view, to reduce tensions with Russia?

NATO has made significant progress in reducing historical Cold War animosities and suspicions by focusing on cooperation in addressing common security threats in the areas such as Afghanistan stabilization, counter-piracy, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation. Such cooperative efforts are spearheaded through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC should continue to explore new forms of transparency and confidence building to augment the level of trust and goodwill between NATO and Russia. Enhancing military-to-military contacts at all levels is always beneficial, as we discovered during the conflict in Georgia; while Russia can be grudging in developing these contacts, NATO should play a role in fostering this aspect of the relationship.

But long term improvement in relations has as much to do with changed perceptions within Russia as with any NRC project or initiative that can be accomplished. A shift in Russia's own strategic calculus will take time and firm, consistent NATO engagement.

In your view, how should NATO proceed on the issue of further enlargement of the alliance over the next five years?

The further enlargement of the alliance is a political decision that can be made only by the NATO Heads of State and Government. I continue to believe, however, that nations able to meaningfully contribute to the security of the alliance should be given favorable consideration, consistent with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Prevention of and Response to Sexual Assaults

In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more than 3000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including 2558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports (restricted, meaning that, in accordance with the victim's request, they were handled in a confidential manner and not investigated). Moreover, a recent survey conducted by the DOD indicates that the actual number of sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1 percent of active duty women and 1.2 percent of active duty men surveyed reported having experienced an incident of unwanted sexual contact in the previous 12 months.

What is your assessment of the current DOD sexual assault prevention and response program?

In short, while we have established a strong sense of urgency and put a host of important initiatives in place, I would be the first to acknowledge that we have a long way to go to achieve our goal of a culture in which such assaults simply cannot occur. We are aggressively pushing forward under the five pillars of Prevention, Advocacy, Investigation, Accountability, and Assessment, and we will not rest until we have solved this problem.

We have taken strong action to bring perpetrators to justice, address a military culture that became too complacent of corrosive climate, and hold commanders accountable for both. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs are personally committed to eradicating sexual assault within our ranks. We will continue to improve processes and programs as part of our comprehensive approach.

The services have achieved progress, to include specialized training for investigation and litigation, access to victim's advocates and counsel through special victim's programs, and Highly Qualified Experts to advise on program progress.

What is your view of the provision for restricted and unrestricted reporting of sexual assaults?

Our foremost concern remains the safety and well-being of the victim. If a sexual assault occurs, we would rather the victim provide an unrestricted report, which allows for thorough investigation and delivery of justice as appropriate.

However restricted reporting must remain an option for victims, permitting access to services to meet their personal needs without the additional stress of a criminal investigation. I am personally committed to developing a climate across our joint force that makes victims comfortable and confident in unrestricted reporting.

We are starting to see what we believe are higher rates of unrestricted reporting. Our initiative to move initial disposition authority to O-6 commanders or higher has increased unrestricted reporting. Access to Special Victim's Counsel and advocates has increased those victims willing

to change a restricted report to an unrestricted report. We will continue to pursue these and other measures with the victim's interest always in mind.

What is your understanding of the adequacy of DOD oversight of military service implementation of the DOD and service policies for the prevention of and response to sexual assaults?

I believe DOD oversight of policy implementation is adequate and improving, but I recognize we still have gaps to close in collecting timely data and changing behavior in the force from top to bottom.

The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office oversees the Department's sexual assault policy. I have developed significant confidence in this office and its leadership, and I personally rely on them for advice and information. SAPRO works with the services' offices to execute the services' sexual assault prevention and response plans. SAPRO also works with the civilian community to develop and implement aggressive prevention and response approaches to the programs. They continue to lead on this issue by informing and advising commanders at all levels and closing the gaps as we detect them.

What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?

My experience has always been that commander accountability is the cornerstone of unit mission success and discipline, with commanders at every level upholding the standards of trust and respect that all of our men and women in uniform deserve. This is a consistent and important element of our military culture: the commander is held responsible for the climate in his or her unit. Sexual assault in the military found root in a climate that had become complacent. We are changing that, swiftly. We have already amended our command climate assessments by updating the surveys to include service members' evaluation of their commanders on climate and sexual assault response. We will ensure that senior leadership has access to the results of those surveys. We have moved initial disposition authority for incidents of sexual assault to O-6 commanders or higher. But to make all of these efforts take hold and change the unit culture, the role—and accountability—of the commander remains essential.

In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?

We hold a unit commander responsible for everything the unit does or fails to do, on or off duty, whether CONUS or deployed in remote expeditionary circumstances. That kind of responsibility is best served by authority that aligns with it. Commanders receive extensive training in their unique legal responsibilities and continue to regularly consult with their judge advocates on all issues, including whether (or not) to prosecute alleged sexual assault offenses. If a commander and his or her judge advocate disagree, the decision will be reviewed at the next higher level. Removing commanders from the military justice process would send a harmful message that commanders cannot hold their people accountable and are not themselves accountable for everything in their unit. We could have removed this authority from commanders when we were

struggling with equal opportunity and drug issues, but we didn't—and we got it right because commanders are the ones who fix problems in their units. I've had women commanders come up to me and insist we not take this out of the chain because they don't believe they can demand higher standards if they cannot enforce them.

Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice requires the convening authority to take action on the sentence issued by a court-martial and authorizes a convening authority, in his sole discretion, to take action of the findings of a court-martial, including setting aside a finding of guilty or changing a finding of guilty to a finding of guilty of a lesser included offense.

What is your view about the authority of a convening authority to set aside or modify findings of guilt and authority to reduce a sentence imposed by court-martial?

Article 60 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice currently grants broad authority and discretion to convening authorities to dismiss findings of guilt after trial. I have already endorsed Secretary Hagel's proposed amendments to Article 60 that remove a convening authority's ability to modify Court Martial findings or sentences for qualified offenses. A convening authority should continue to have the discretion to dismiss minor offenses under appropriate circumstances, such as to prevent an accused from the burden of a felony conviction when found guilty of minor misconduct but acquitted of major offenses. A convening authority should have the flexibility to adjudicate such offenses in an alternate fashion, and should retain the ability to modify sentences, which is an essential component of our plea bargain process.

During the recent full-committee hearing on sexual assault, it was suggested that the terminology used in the Workplace and Gender Relations Surveys have resulted in difficulty in providing an accurate picture of the prevalence of sexual assault within the military. Specifically, use of the term "unwanted sexual contact" comprises such a broad spectrum of behavior that some have questioned the value of the survey.

What is your view concerning the methodology and terminology used in the Workplace and Gender Relations Surveys and what changes would you recommend to improve the survey as a basis for better understanding the prevalence of sexual assault in the military?

I feel we need to improve our methodology to provide more detailed—and more frequent—information about the prevalence of sexual assault and the conditions under which it occurs. Many of the survey terms we have used for years are too broad in scope and cover a broad spectrum of behavior—a choice that was made for understandable reasons at the time. However, we have learned from our efforts over the past decade and see the need for both aggregate and discrete data to inform our programs. Common terminology throughout the government and private sector will also help both communities talk about the same thing and better share effective practices.

Religious Guidelines

In your view, do policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

Yes. We value the service and sacrifices of those members of the Joint Force who hold deep religious faith, and those of no religious faith, equally – and commit to provide each with a climate that promotes mutual respect and trust. DODI 1300.17, “Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military Services” states that “The Department of Defense places a high value on the rights of members of the Military Services to observe the tenets of their respective religions or to observe no religion at all.” We take the words “high value” seriously. As a result, policies ensure that each of the services allows individuals to request accommodation of religious practices. Each request is considered on a case by case basis. The commander values the service member’s free exercise of religion, while ensuring that approval of requests does not adversely affect mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, good order, discipline or any other military requirement.

Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact unit cohesion and good order and discipline?

Yes. Standing policies ensure commanders consider requests for accommodation of individual expressions of belief, to include apparel, grooming and worship practices. Requests are given equal consideration as long as they do not negatively impact mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, good order, discipline or any other military requirement.

There have been reports of incidents in which individuals in the armed services have not been accommodated in the free exercise of religion.

What actions, if any, have you directed to address these reports?

While I’m not personally aware of any service member who has been denied accommodation of his or her free exercise of religion, I do know that in each of the services, commanders carefully consider each individual request for accommodation and take these matters seriously. If an individual’s request for accommodation is denied, then policies are in place that allow the member to appeal that denial all the way up to Service Headquarters level. Our policy is actually to approve these requests whenever possible. The bottom line is that military leaders place a high value on each service member’s individual religious freedoms and we do our best to accommodate those freedoms.

Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve

What is your understanding and assessment of the Reserve Components as an operational reserve, as opposed to its long-standing traditional role as a strategic reserve?

As budget pressures tighten, the Reserve Component role will evolve along with that of the Active Component, which could alter the current shape of both Components in ways yet to be determined. However, we know that sustained engagement in combat operations has transformed the Reserve Components of our Armed Forces. Repeated combat deployments, as well as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and homeland defense missions, have produced a force more operationally capable and experienced than any time in our nation's history.

I remain confident that given sufficient predictability of the next deployment, the vast majority of Reserve Component forces and capabilities can be accessed systematically long into the future. National Guard and Reserve members expect to deploy periodically to meet the nation's security needs, and many have volunteered with this understanding. This operational force is a direct result of the substantial investment in resourcing commitments and the personal sacrifice of members, their families, and their civilian employers.

In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the National Guard and Reserves as a relevant and capable operational reserve?

Our current budgetary challenges and the steady decline of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding will challenge our ability to maintain current levels of readiness in the National Guard and Reserves. With respect to the National Guard, we must be sensitive to responsibilities for State missions when considering the use of these units for operational employment overseas. While remaining a strong supporter of our nation's Reserve Component, I am concerned that a singular focus on maintaining the Reserve Component at high readiness will degrade Active Duty readiness--our most responsive force. We are already seeing this with the requirement now in law for Air Guard units to be maintained at full combat readiness, which in a difficult budget environment has accelerated a decline in Active Component squadron readiness.

What are your views about the optimal employment in generating forces for combat missions of the National Guard and Reserve?

We have seen a significant change in Reserve Component use over the past twenty years and have developed a Total Force – Active, National Guard and Reserve – to meet sustained Combatant Commander requirements around the globe. This evolution and the broad range of security and financial challenges on the horizon require us to make smart decisions about Total Force roles and missions to ensure we have the forces needed to defend and advance our national interests.

The recently published report to Congress on *Unit Cost and Readiness for Active and Reserve Components of the Armed Forces* examined this issue in depth. The report concluded that the factors used to determine the proper mix and employment of Active and Reserve Component

units differ greatly not only among the services but also for individual missions and unit types. These findings will inform the next Quadrennial Defense Review which will ultimately determine the optimum mix and employment models for our Total Force.

In your view, should homeland defense or other global or domestic civil support missions be assigned exclusively to the National Guard?

No, this should be a full-spectrum effort, and it would be a disservice to our citizens if any one element capable of providing a response were to be excluded for political or other reasons. I believe each component of the Total Force – Active, Guard, and Reserve – has an important, layered, and interdependent role in the successful execution of homeland defense and civil support missions. We have taken steps to enhance this system through, for example, the Dual Status Commander concept. The Council of Governors has been most helpful in bringing perspective to and gaining understanding of the complexities of this process. I believe we should bring the most appropriate force to respond to any challenge the nation faces, whether the issue is foreign or domestic.

For domestic response, the National Guard is deeply embedded in our communities. In many cases, these soldiers and airmen possess unique skills, qualifications and experiences that enable rapid responses to natural and manmade disasters and provide invaluable contributions to homeland defense missions. In other cases, an Active Component or Federal Reserve unit may be able to provide the right response more quickly due to their unique capabilities and/or proximity to an incident area.

National Guard

What is your understanding and assessment of changes in the global and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the National Guard Bureau?

In military operations since 9/11, the nation drew extensively upon the Reserve Components to meet operational requirements, and they have integrated seamlessly with the Active Component on the battlefield for over a decade. The placement of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on the Joint Chiefs of Staff formalized this operational relationship. Though the tempo of operations for the Reserve Component will reduce as operations in Afghanistan draw to a close, some operational use of the Reserve Component will persist. The National Guard Bureau has tremendous experience in domestic operations, so it will be an important voice for ensuring a seamless response across military components and interagency partners.

In your view, should there be a requirement that the position of Commander, U.S. Northern Command or Commander, U.S. Army North, the Army component commander, be filled only by a National Guard officer? Please explain.

While I would welcome assignment of a National Guard officer to one of these commands, I believe senior leadership positions should be filled with the best, most fully qualified officer

available at the time for that position. National Guard officers who possess the required qualifications for these positions should be considered equally with their Active Component and Federal Reserve counterparts. I believe that restricting the selection pool to only National Guard officers could arbitrarily eliminate a more qualified officer for the position, which is contrary to our goal of finding the absolute best candidate for the job.

What steps need to be taken, in your view, to ensure that a “deep bench” of National Guard general officers is continually being developed?

Building a deep and capable bench of general officers is extremely important for all components of the Total Joint Force, including the National Guard and Reserves. Key factors in developing a deep bench of general officers include education, deliberate officer development, and experience. We currently make education opportunities available to all our Reserve Component officers, allowing them to attain the same qualifications as their active counterparts. The Services, National Guard Bureau, and the Federal Reserves maintain effective officer development and management programs to ensure the right people are receiving the right education and experience at the right time. The “Chairman’s 18 Reserve Positions” - eighteen general and flag officer billets throughout the Joint Force designated for Reserve Component officers - is having a powerful and positive impact providing Reserve Component officers the requisite experience required to be effective leaders at senior levels in the Total Joint Force. Inclusion of a 3-star National Guard officer as the Deputy Commander at USNORTHCOM and as the Deputy Director of the National Guard Bureau have enhanced our ability to provide senior positions for Guard officers.

Rising Costs of Medical Care

In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that “medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.” In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force Base that “health care is eating the Department alive.” In recent years, the Department has attempted to address the growth in overall health care costs by identifying efficiencies as well as by proposing increased cost shares for military retirees.

What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future Department of Defense plans?

Health care consumes nearly 10% of the department's budget and could grow considerably over the next decade, taking an ever larger bite of our ability to invest in enhanced war fighting capability. The healthcare benefit is an important component of retention for our men and women. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Service and Department leaders and with this Congress to find reasonable and responsible ways to stem this growth while still fairly providing for the needs of our men and women. This will require finding efficiencies and encouraging healthier lifestyles, and may require increased cost shares from the constituents of the system.

If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?

Through the last two budget cycles, Congress has permitted small increases in the TRICARE Prime enrollment fees. These adjustments were an important step to managing costs, but they are not enough to sustain the benefit in the long term. If confirmed, I will continue to seek to better manage costs by building a shared Joint Force commitment to behaviors that promote health and continuing to look for savings where practical. We may also need to increase constituent participation in paying for this system. Given today's budget environment, it is critical that we find an acceptable compromise to reduce costs while maintaining the quality of care our personnel and veterans expect.

What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health care?

We are continuing to look at FY 2014 options that would slow the growth of health care costs while preserving its quality and range. We're looking at options such as facility consolidations and civilian-military personnel mix changes, as well as initiatives that increase cost-sharing with beneficiaries, such as increased co-pays and other fee adjustments. If confirmed, I will continue to review initiatives for controlling the costs of military health care while always keeping in mind the importance of providing quality service to our people.

Systems and Support for Wounded Warriors

Service members who are or have been wounded and injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty when appropriate, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of significant numbers of returning wounded service members. Despite the enactment of legislation and continuing emphasis, many challenges remain, including a growing population of service members awaiting disability evaluation.

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured service members and their families?

I feel we've made amazing progress in medical care over the last 12 years of war. We've achieved revolutionary medical advances, including joint battlefield surgical care, and advanced rehabilitation provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs. But we've been advancing more slowly in other areas, particularly those surrounding family and transition. We're making progress, but I recognize we have work to do. If I am confirmed, I will keep my focus on this critical area. My wife Mary has played a key role both by being active in finding ways to

enhance care for our wounded warriors and their caregivers and in enhancing my own understanding of the problems we face.

What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?

We will look to expand research and treatment through collaboration between the private medical research and healthcare sectors and our Centers of Excellence. Many of our Wounded Warriors have successfully returned to service through such programs. We must also continue to grow our day-to-day collaboration with the Department of Veterans Affairs. We are close to achieving our goal of 100% certified medical records accompanying a service member transitioning to the VA.

What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?

One key area for improvement is individual case management when a service member transitions from the active force to DoD retiree or eligible veteran status. Streamlining this process relies on a single electronic health record, to follow the service member through transition, and a single tracking tool for case management. Our communication across our bureaucracies continues to be an area of frustration. We also have more work to do in ensuring the best possible opportunities exist for our wounded warriors, to include jobs and continued care for their mental and physical disabilities.

If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded service members and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

We need to continue our progress in tracking and assisting our wounded warriors and their caregivers, and in finding opportunities for meaningful employment, physical rehabilitation, and mental health. If confirmed, I will remain vigilant for new opportunities to help these American heroes, especially when and where they are frustrated by bureaucratic issues.

Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). The Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) was established to integrate the Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs disability systems to improve and expedite processing of service members through the disability evaluation system.

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the DES?

I support the recommendations of Senator Dole's and Secretary Shalala's commission, to regain patient focus within each department's core competencies. Otherwise, IDES has developed to its limit to have the separate processes operate as if unified. We have recently made progress in this area by setting—and nearly achieving—a goal of having 100% certified complete medical records for transitioning service members.

If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?

If confirmed, I will continue to work to accelerate transition and disability processing within the bounds of the law, principally by working to ensure no bottlenecks exist on the DoD side of the equation. Our governance process improvements with the VA are integral to streamlining the process.

Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Resources

The numbers of suicides in each of the Services continues to concern the Committee.

In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all service members and their families, including members of the reserve components?

In general, preventing suicides falls under the service secretaries' and service chiefs' Title 10 responsibilities. However, the Joint Chiefs must collectively approach the critical issue of military suicides with the same urgency we have given to protecting the lives of our men and women in combat. One way to do this is through shared understanding among the services – which the Joint Chiefs can and will promote, similar to sharing best practices regarding prevention of sexual assault. The Department continues to work across the interagency and the White House to better understand the factors leading to suicide, and to ultimately enable all our Veterans and their families to enjoy the future they have sacrificed so much to secure.

Each of the services has a comprehensive suicide prevention program dedicated to evaluating the impact on force readiness, informing senior leaders, and providing guidance and oversight for program implementation. The Department currently has a number of programs in place designed to build resilience, provide adequate mental health resources, increase help-seeking behaviors, and offer a variety of additional services aimed at helping service members deal effectively with stressors.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to service members in theater, and to the service members and their families upon return to home station?

If confirmed, I will work in concert with the service chiefs to maintain, and increase where needed, effective treatments for mental health issues, traumatic brain injury, and combat stress. The extensive behavioral health resources already available to our forces in Afghanistan represent an important foundation upon which we will continue to build. I will also continue to support service efforts to remove lingering stigmas or barriers to treatment for service members and their families. We will ensure commanders encourage seeking help by highlighting examples of service members who have benefitted from mental health assistance or counseling.

Military Quality of Life

The Committee is concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD faces budget challenges.

If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to military quality of life programs would you consider a priority in an era of intense downward pressure on budgets, and how do you envision working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to achieve them?

If confirmed, I will continue to support essential areas, such as mental health counseling, fitness, child care, and spouse employment. I believe we can sustain a reasonable level of essential services only if we continue to reduce overlaps and seek other efficiencies in the way we apply our declining resources. However, we also need to provide security to the nation and sustain the quality of the All-Volunteer Force. The entire military enterprise is under scrutiny. We can only achieve balance and priority through honest discussion and tough choices regarding which services foster successful recruitment, retention, and career progression while achieving fiscal sustainability for the military of the 21st century.

Family Readiness and Support

Military members and their families in both the active and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for service members and their families?

According to recent surveys, Military families are most concerned about pay and benefits and retirement. DoD engages military families on this issue via the Pay & Retirement Working Group. The working group's input is addressed through the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Executive Committee.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

If confirmed, I will continue to place military family needs among my highest priorities. We must examine every warrior and family support program to ensure that we target funding at the most impactful programs and reduce duplicative efforts. To do so, we will continue current studies with DODEA, DECA, and a number of university partnerships that are focused on best practices and the return on investment of existing programs.

Among these efforts, we must also include the restructuring of medical facilities to make them more efficient, without sacrificing quality or continuity of care.

How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end strength?

If confirmed, I will continue to work with the services to meet the changing needs of our military families. The Joint Staff is building – with the White House and the services – sustainable community-based partnerships and initiatives that improve education, employment, and wellness support for current and transitioning members.

DoD has also adjusted force size and rotation, redoubled transition support, and invested in world-class health care for our families. This includes: (1) fielding effective treatments for mental health issues, traumatic brain injury, and combat stress; and (2) continuing the effort to reduce the stigma of service and family members seeking mental health services.

If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

We must ensure that every family has access to quality resources, regardless of component or location. Current efforts include the services' effort to leverage: (1) public/private partnerships within the communities; and (2) the State Joint Force Headquarters of the National Guard to help members access child care, mental health services, and employment opportunities. If confirmed, I will continue my support of these critical efforts.

If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for the services caring for our families. Today, Family Support Working Groups, Resource Management Decision Working Groups, and other venues are actively attempting to ensure program effectiveness, share best practices, and reduce duplication of efforts. America's citizens have also stepped forward—from the local to the national level, thousands of organizations, higher learning institutions, and businesses have partnered to support our Military Family. However, there will always be new ideas and initiatives to enhance family support. I will be most interested in those with high leverage that provide dramatically enhanced support without further deepening our fiscal crisis.

Counter Threat Finance

Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant national security threats could have an outsized impact on confronting these threats. In August 2010, the Department issued a Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy Directive which recognized the CTF discipline as an essential tool in combating criminal networks and terrorist organizations and called for the integration of

CTF capabilities into future force planning and the continued support to interagency partners conducting CTF operations.

What is your assessment of the Department's efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?

We learned the importance of CTF through our success in Iraq and Afghanistan with the Threat Finance Cells. Identifying and upsetting financial supply lines are a proven means of disrupting threats to US national security. DoD Directive 5205.14 (CTF), which was updated in November 2012, drives the institutionalization of CTF within DoD.

Threat Finance Cells - which are comprised of intelligence, law enforcement, and defense personnel - play a supporting role in identifying insurgent, criminal, and terrorist finances; disrupting front companies; developing actionable financial intelligence; freezing/seizing illicit funds; and building criminal cases. Ultimately, success in CTF will depend on DoD's continued ability to integrate with, support, and complement other USG, multinational, and host nation activities.

What is your assessment of the current ability of the Department to provide support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?

DoD currently supports the interagency with its unique capabilities, including long term planning, network analysis, intelligence analysis and tools, and the integration of intelligence into operations. The result is a well-coordinated, capable and robust CTF posture. If confirmed, I do not anticipate an immediate need to expand the support that DoD is providing, but we will continue to remain fully engaged in the interagency process to counter threat finance activities.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD's current counter threat finance efforts?

The Department is examining its current counter threat finance efforts and identifying ways to strengthen it, incorporate lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, and further institutionalize DoD's capability. Possible recommendations may include further training and education for the force. However, budget reductions will likely make it difficult to significantly expand this program.

Law of the Sea Convention

You have previously expressed your support for U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Do you still believe that the United States should join the Law of the Sea Convention, and, if so, why?

Yes, I support the United States acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention. My career as a Naval Officer intermixed with joint tours drives home the importance of this orderly set of laws governing activity on the sea - a set of rules that benefit our maritime nation greatly. Our accession would increase our credibility and influence in defending the Convention's existing norms that enable the access, mobility, and sustainment of our military forces and commercial fleet. Our non-party status detracts from our ability to lead developments in the maritime domain, and enables emerging powers to advance their contrary interpretations of the Convention. As the global security environment changes, it will become increasingly important for the United States, as the world's foremost maritime power, to use all elements of national power and lead from inside the framework of the Convention rather than observe from the outside.

Treatment of Detainees

The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.

If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant Department of Defense directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable to U.S. forces fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 of the Detainee Treatment Act and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes. If confirmed, I would continue to take steps to ensure that all relevant DoD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable to U.S. forces fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 of the Detainee Treatment Act and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes. I support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations and in DoD Directive 2310.01E.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.