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THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

MADELYN CREEDON
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
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Introduction

Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of the Department's Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 budget request for missile defense. Ballistic missile defense is a critical capability for the United States with important ramifications for several of the Department's mission areas.

The President's budget requests $9.2 billion in FY 2014 and $45.7 billion over the Future Years Defense Plan to develop and deploy missile defense capabilities that protect the U.S. homeland and strengthen regional missile defenses. The Administration remains committed to developing proven and cost-effective missile defense capabilities through the phased adaptive approach to regional missile defense. This approach puts emphasis on a flexible military toolkit with forces that are mobile and scalable so that they underwrite deterrence in peacetime, but can be surged in crisis to meet defense requirements.

I will begin with a discussion of the ballistic missile threat, and then focus on our progress on three key policy priorities: sustaining a strong homeland defense, strengthening regional missile defense, and fostering increased international cooperation and participation.

Ballistic Missile Threat

We continue to see well-established trends associated with ballistic missile development, including larger numbers, greater ranges, and more advanced systems. There is also evidence that such weapons are becoming a convention of contemporary warfare, as evidenced most recently by the use of ballistic missiles in the crisis in Syria.

Iran

The Intelligence Community (IC) assesses that Iran is developing nuclear capabilities to enhance its security, prestige, and regional influence and give it the ability to develop nuclear weapons, should a decision be made to do so. Although we do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons, Iran has developed technical expertise in a number of areas – including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles – from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons.

The IC assesses that Iran would likely choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon, if one is ever fielded. Iran has demonstrated an ability to launch small satellites, and has worked to develop larger space-launch vehicles and longer-range missiles.

Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its arsenal. Iran's growing ballistic missile inventory and

its domestic production of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and development of its first long-range, land-attack cruise missile provide capabilities to enhance its power projection.

Syria

While Syria does not pose a ballistic missile threat to the U.S. homeland, the Asad regime does possess short-range ballistic missiles, and has shown a willingness to use them repeatedly against the Free Syrian Army. Additionally, the IC assesses that Syria has an active chemical warfare (CW) program and maintains a stockpile of sulfur mustard, sarin, and VX nerve agent; along with a stockpile of munitions – including missiles, aerial bombs, and possibly artillery rockets – that can be used to deliver CW agents.

North Korea

North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the United States and to the security environment in East Asia, a region with some of the world's largest populations, militaries, and economies.

North Korea's long-range ballistic missile capabilities have advanced rapidly during the last year. The increased pace of this emerging threat required the United States to adapt its homeland defense capabilities. North Korea displayed what appeared to be a road-mobile, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in April 2012, which it may have taken initial steps to deploy, and announced in February 2013 that it had conducted its third nuclear test. North Korea also used its Unha-3, based on the Taepo Dong-2 ICBM, to put a satellite in orbit in December 2012, thus demonstrating long-range missile technology, and may conduct additional missile tests in the near future.

These programs demonstrate North Korea's commitment to develop long-range missile technology that could pose a direct threat to the United States. North Korea's efforts to produce and market ballistic missiles raise broader regional and global security concerns, by threatening the United States' allies and partners and increasing our concerns about ballistic missile technology proliferation

Homeland Defense

The U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential limited ICBM attacks from States like North Korea and Iran by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. This system consists of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), early-warning radars, sea-based radar systems, and a sophisticated command and control architecture.

We are committed to maintaining an advantageous position vis-à-vis the threats from North Korea and Iran. This requires continued improvement to the GMD system, including enhanced performance by the GBIs and the deployment of new sensors.

We have also developed and maintained a hedge strategy within our GMD program to address possible delays in the development of new missile defense systems and the possibility that the projected ICBM threat could begin to emerge faster or in larger numbers. This desire to maintain a hedge led to decisions in previous budgets to complete eight additional silos in Missile Field 2 and maintain six silos originally slated for decommissioning in mothball status in Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely, Alaska. Additionally, we continued the development of the two-stage GBI.

The steps we have taken in the FY 2014 budget request will help to ensure that the United States possesses the capability to counter the projected threat for the foreseeable future. The budget maintains funding for ongoing efforts to improve the GMD system, such as:

- a GBI reliability improvement program, which includes the rigorous testing of the Capability Enhancement-II version of the GBI kill vehicle;
- upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system;
- emplacement of an additional In-Flight Interceptor Communications System Data Terminal on the U.S. East Coast by 2015; and
- upgrades to the Early Warning Radars at Clear, Alaska by 2017, and Cape Cod, Massachusetts, by 2018.

As a result of the increasing threat from North Korea and delays due to funding cuts to the SM-3 IIB program, the President decided to exercise the hedge options described below. DoD is implementing the President's decision to strengthen the U.S. homeland missile defense posture, as announced by Secretary of Defense Hagel on March 15, 2013.

First, DoD will deploy eight additional GBIs in the existing silos in Missile Field 2 in Fort Greely, Alaska. Second, DoD will refurbish and harden the six mothballed silos in Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely and then emplace six additional GBIs in the refurbished silos. The combination of these steps will add 14 interceptors to the GMD system for a total of 44 deployed GBIs defending the U.S. homeland. When these 14 additional GBIs are deployed in 2017, we will have increased the number of GBIs by nearly 50 percent.

Third, DoD will evaluate at least three locations, and prepare environmental impact statements (EIS), for a potential additional GBI site in the continental United States. Although the Administration has not decided to proceed with an additional GBI site, if such a decision were made in the future, doing this work now would shorten the timeline for construction.

Fourth, in order to maintain a robust testing program and sufficient operational spares, DoD will procure 14 additional GBIs to replace those test and spare GBIs that will now be deployed in Fort Greely, Alaska.

Fifth, with the support of the Japanese Government, the United States will deploy an additional AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan. This will provide improved early warning and tracking of any missile

launched from North Korea at the United States, and improve regional defenses, including the protection of Japan.

Sixth, DoD is restructuring the Standard Missile (SM) -3 IIB program into a technology development program focusing on common kill vehicle technology for both the GBI and the SM-3 family of interceptors. Focusing on next generation kill vehicle technology development will improve our ability to address emerging threats and thus ensure protection of the United States, our Allies and partners, and our deployed forces overseas. By consolidating future kill vehicle technology development efforts, MDA will work with industry primes and suppliers to define the best technical approach for a modular, open architecture that yields improvements for reliability and performance at a lower cost.

We had planned to deploy the SM-3 IIB for the defense of the United States from Aegis Ashore sites in Europe. The timeline for deploying this program, however, had been delayed to at least 2022 due to funding reductions from the requested amount. As a result, we have decided to shift resources from this program to fund the additional GBIs, as well as new advanced kill vehicle technology. This step will allow us to improve our defense against missiles from Iran sooner than we otherwise would have, while also providing additional protection against the North Korean threat. As a result, no money is being requested in FY14 for the SM-3 IIB program.

DoD also determined that the continued development of the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) was too high-risk in terms of budget and schedule, and is terminating the program. We will continue to evaluate options to determine the most effective way to meet our missile defense sensor requirements.

Regional Missile Defense

DoD's budget request for FY 2014 continues to implement regional approaches that are tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific regions. These regions vary considerably in their geography, history, and character of the threat faced, and in the military-to-military relationships on which we seek to build cooperative missile defenses. Because the demand for missile defense assets within each region over the next decade will exceed supply, the United States is developing and fielding capabilities that are mobile and capable of being redeployed to different locations as necessary.

Missile defense is an integral part of a comprehensive U.S. effort to strengthen regional deterrence architectures, and plays a central role in the strategic guidance DoD released in January 2012.

Phased Adaptive Approach Implementation: Europe

The elements of the first phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) are in place. We have maintained a sea-based missile defense presence in the region since March 2011. An AN/TPY-2 radar was deployed to the Turkish military base at Kürecik in 2011. Additionally, associated command and control capabilities, such as the U.S. Air Operations Center at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, are now in operation.

In Phase 2, the architecture will be expanded with a land-based SM-3 site in Romania, and with an upgraded Aegis BMD Weapons System and SM-3 Block IB interceptors that will be deployed on land and at sea. The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (BMDA) with Romania entered into force in December 2011, so the groundwork has been set for the site to become operational in the 2015 timeframe. Ground breaking on that site will occur later this year.

We have also taken steps to meet the requirement in the EPAA for sea-based BMD capabilities. In 2011, Spain agreed to host four U.S. Aegis destroyers at the existing naval facility at Rota. These multi-mission ships will support the EPAA, as well as other U.S. European Command and NATO maritime missions. The first two ships are scheduled to arrive in 2014, and the final two ships will arrive in 2015.

In Phase 3, a second land-based SM-3 site will be deployed in Poland in the 2018 timeframe. The more capable SM-3 Block IIA interceptors will be deployed on land and at sea, extending coverage to all NATO Allies in Europe. The ballistic missile defense agreement with Poland entered into force in September 2011.

The restructuring of the SM-3 IIB program to focus on the development of common kill vehicle technology means that we are no longer planning for Phase 4 of the EPAA, the primary purpose of which had been to augment missile defense protection of the United States from a site in Europe. As Secretary Hagel emphasized in his announcement in March, our commitment to NATO missile defense "remains ironclad" as demonstrated by our strong support for the BMD capabilities either already deployed, or being developed for Phases 1 through 3 of the EPAA. Phase 3 will still be capable of providing coverage of all European NATO territory. We have discussed this decision with our NATO Allies, and the initial reaction has been positive.

NATO Missile Defense Implementation

As we continue to implement the EPAA, we are also supporting the President's commitment to contribute the EPAA capabilities to NATO missile defense. We are working in close collaboration with our NATO Allies to develop an advanced network of sensors and interceptors – on land and at sea – to protect NATO territory.

This Administration has made the missile defense protection of Europe a central feature of transatlantic security policy. At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal, President Obama and his fellow NATO Heads of State and Government approved a new Strategic Concept, which took the historic step of committing to the defense of European NATO populations and territory against the growing threat of ballistic missiles. At the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, the assembled leaders announced that the Alliance had achieved an interim BMD capability – in other words, an operationally meaningful ballistic missile defense capability.

The United States and our NATO Allies have worked together to make significant progress on the development of collaborative, networked missile defense systems. Vital command-and-control capabilities for missile defense are now operational. The NATO command-and-control backbone, the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) system, has reached an interim operational capability, and will evolve toward full capability between 2018 and 2020.

We continue to carry out exercises designed to hone our Alliance missile defense capabilities. A key missile defense exercise involving NATO is NIMBLE TITAN, a biennial, global campaign. The NIMBLE TITAN 12 exercise included 14 participant nations – including the United States, many NATO countries, Japan, Australia, and the Republic of Korea.

As we begin planning for NIBLE TITAN 14, which begins later this year and will carry into 2014, 21 nations have already signed on to participate. Nimble Titan 14 will include tabletop exercises involving threats in Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia, as well as a capstone event involving all participants on a global scale.

Phased Adaptive Approaches in Other Regions

We are also working to implement the principles of the phased adaptive approach in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East region, building on the existing foundations of U.S. defense cooperation in these regions. These approaches must be tailored to the unique mix of threat and geography in each region. In the Asia-Pacific region, the security environment is largely maritime in character, with vast distances between some of the states that make up the region, requiring both maritime assets and defenses against longer-range missiles. The Middle East region is far more compact, and the threat comes from missiles of short- and medium-range. The footprint of United States military presence is different in each region, and will evolve in different ways over the coming decade. The potential threat to the United States homeland from regional actors varies, and the role that regional defenses plays in protection of the United States and our deployed forces and assets will change as well.

These regional approaches to ballistic missile defense should allow stronger partnerships with our allies and partners in meeting emerging security challenges, and provide opportunities to build partner capacity.

International Cooperation

Europe

The United States encourages continued Allied contributions to NATO missile defense. EPAA host nations (Poland, Romania, Spain, and Turkey) will provide the basing rights and external security for the facilities where EPAA assets are located. The Netherlands has committed to spend up to 250 million Euro to upgrade the SMART-L radars on four of their frigates so they can contribute to NATO BMD in the 2018 timeframe. The Netherlands and Germany have also committed Patriot PAC-3 systems to NATO missile defense, including through the ongoing NATO deployment in defense of Turkey. France and Italy intend to contribute the SAMP/T air and missile defense system, scheduled to become operational in 2013, to NATO BMD. France is also planning to provide its Spirale satellite detection system and a long-range radar. Looking to the future, the United States will continue to encourage its NATO Allies to do even more to cooperate and invest in missile defense. Several Allies have modern surface combatant ships that could be upgraded with a BMD sensor or interceptor capability. A number of NATO Allies also have proposed concepts for a multinational interceptor "pool" concept, whereby Allies collectively purchase interceptors such as the SM-3 to support NATO missile defense. Additionally, some Allies are considering the purchase of Patriot PAC-3.

Asia-Pacific

The cornerstone of our security and diplomacy in the region has historically been our very strong bilateral alliances, including with the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Australia. All three of these nations play an important role in our regional efforts to achieve effective missile defense.

The Republic of Korea obviously has an immediate, proximate stake in preventing missile strikes from the North. We have worked very closely with the ROK to ensure that we maintain the capacity and interoperability to do just that. The United States deploys PAC-3 batteries in South Korea to defend U.S. and South Korean forces.

In addition, the ROK is taking steps to enhance its own air and missile defense systems, which include sea- and land-based sensors and Patriot PAC-2 batteries.

We have been consulting closely with the ROK about how it can upgrade its missile defense capabilities. Enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance through the potential South Korean purchase of Global Hawk would contribute to a more robust posture. We are mutually committed to sustain and strengthen protection against the North Korean missile threat.

Japan has acquired its own layered missile defense system, which includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile-3 interceptors, PAC-3 batteries, early-warning radars; and sophisticated command-and-control systems. In addition, Japan is a critical international partner for BMD development. One of our most significant cooperative efforts with Japan is the co-development of an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3 Block IIA. In addition, we have

deployed an AN/ TPY-2 radar – which provides early warning and tracking – to Japan, and, as previously mentioned, we plan to deploy a second AN/TPY-2 to Japan.

With regard to Australia, we signed a memorandum of agreement on missile defense cooperation in 2004, and have formed a close partnership on research and development – most notably with regard to sensors. In addition, Australia is involved in one of our two trilateral discussions on missile defense in the Pacific involving the United States, Australia, and Japan; the other is with the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.

These trilateral discussions are part of our efforts to expand international missile defense cooperation, strengthen regional security architectures, and build partner capacity. We have already seen the value of these multilateral approaches. For example, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States successfully tracked two near-simultaneous launches of ballistic-missile targets as part of the multilateral PACIFIC DRAGON exercise last summer. In December 2012, we cooperated very closely in tracking the North Korean Unha-3 space launch.

Going forward, we will continue to emphasize the importance of developing a regional ballistic missile defense system that includes the sharing of sensor data among Allies.

Middle East

The United States maintains an exceptionally strong defense relationship with Israel, including on missile defense, which has resulted in one of the most comprehensive missile defense architectures in the world. Israeli programs such as Iron Dome, the David's Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United States, create a multi-layered architecture designed to protect the Israeli people from varying types of missile threats. Missile defense figured prominently in the AUSTERE CHALLENGE exercise we conducted with Israel in the fall of 2012, the largest U.S.-Israeli military exercise in history.

The United States is also working with a number of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States on missile defense, including supporting the purchase of missile defense systems through the Foreign Military Sales program. For example, the United Arab Emirates is procuring the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. This is in addition to the UAE's earlier purchase of Patriot systems. These capabilities will significantly enhance the UAE's defense against ballistic missile attack.

This past year, U.S. Air Force Central Command initiated a series of regular exchanges between United States and GCC air defense officers at the Combined Air Operations Center located at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.

Finally, at the inaugural U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in Riyadh, GCC foreign ministers and then-Secretary of State Clinton highlighted the threat that ballistic missiles pose against critical military and civilian infrastructure. One result of these high-level talks was that the ministers agreed on the need to deepen U.S.-GCC BMD cooperation which they see as an essential element of their effort to promote peace and stability in the region.

Russia

The United States continues to seek cooperation with Russia on missile defense, both bilaterally and with our Allies through the NATO-Russia Council. We are pursuing this cooperation because it would be in the security interests of all parties and could strengthen the defensive capabilities of both NATO and Russia. Allies embraced such cooperation with the hope of advancing broader strategic partnership with Russia. The United States has pursued missile defense cooperation with Russia with the clear understanding that we will not accept constraints on our missile defense systems, we will implement the EPAA, and Russia will not have command and control over NATO ballistic missile defense efforts. NATO would be responsible for the defense of NATO, and Russia would be responsible for the defense of Russia.

The United States has kept the Congress and our Allies informed about our efforts with Russia on missile defense cooperation, which have included the proposal to establish missile defense cooperation centers in Europe. The United States has been open and transparent with Russia about our plans for European missile defenses, and explained in detail why U.S. missile defense systems in Europe will not negate the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent.

Although we have had no breakthroughs, the Administration remains committed to pursuing substantive missile defense cooperation with Russia because it remains in our security interests to do so.

Conclusion

The ballistic missile threat – to the United States, to our Allies and partners, and to our forces overseas – is evolving, and so we must adapt our responses to mitigate this threat.

I have touched upon a number of policies that we and our allies have pursued to address and counter this threat. We have had some very significant successes over the last several years, but this Administration has emphasized from the beginning that we cannot afford to stand still. To the contrary, we need to re-evaluate the threat continually and adapt as necessary. The President's budget request for FY 2014 reflects DoD's goals of retaining the flexibility to adjust, and to enhance our defenses as the threat and as technologies evolve. Our most vital security commitments – the defense of the United States and the protection of our allies and partners and our forces around the world – demand nothing less.

I want to thank you for having me here today, and I look forward to your questions.