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STATEMENT OF MS. MADELYN R. CREEDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS
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EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES (SR-222)

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Introduction

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to testify today about the recent progress the Department of Defense (DoD) has made in carrying out the full range of the Department of Defense's efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction (CWMD).

The Department has a solid record of achievement in supporting whole-of-government efforts to prevent the proliferation and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials, protect the United States and its allies and partners from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats, and respond to WMD threats should prevention fail. DoD accomplishes these objectives by supporting the global, multilateral WMD nonproliferation regime, robust partner engagement and capacity-building efforts, as well as further developing U.S. capabilities to counter WMD. I am pleased to be here, today, with two colleagues whose efforts are vital to countering the threat of WMD: Mr. Kenneth A. Myers III, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); and Ms. Anne M. Harrington, the Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Together, we are working to make the world safer from WMD threats.

In my role as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I oversee Defense efforts to counter WMD, as well as setting Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Space Policy and Cyber Policy. My team develops strategies and policy guidance to counter WMD, sets Departmental priorities, and participates in interagency groups and international relationships, all on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. DTRA, as ably led by Mr. Myers, implements our CWMD guidance by managing and executing the CTR Program and other efforts to counter WMD. Mr. Andrew C. Weber, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, provides acquisition guidance and oversight for DTRA's work. Together, we work with the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and the Services to execute DoD's CWMD responsibilities.

DoD's efforts are well coordinated with Ms. Harrington and her team at NNSA, as well as with our colleagues at the Department of State and other U.S. Government departments and agencies. It is through the close collaboration, teamwork, and dedication of the men and women at each of our agencies that we are effective and able to succeed in our mission to ensure the security of the United States and its citizens.

The Global Threat Environment

There is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states and their pursuit by violent extremists. We know that both state and non-state actors continue to seek WMD and related materials and expertise. This fact, combined with advances in nuclear, chemical, and life sciences, as well as increases in access to scientific information and expertise, pose new and growing challenges to preventing potential adversaries from acquiring WMD.

The global security environment continues to change, and has become more unpredictable as the global order has become more unstable since the end of the Cold War. Instability anywhere in the world could present us with new challenges, and underline the need to enhance U.S. capabilities and international partnerships to counter the WMD threat. The instability or collapse of a WMD-armed state, such as Syria, is among the most troubling security concerns in the world today. Such an occurrence could lead to rapid proliferation of WMD material, weapons, and technology, and could quickly become a global crisis posing a direct physical threat to the United States and all other nations. Threats like this are at top priorities for the Department of Defense. Whether they emanate from Syria or elsewhere, I can assure you that DoD is committed to efforts to prevent the proliferation or use of WMD, protect the United States and our allies from WMD threats, and respond to WMD threats should our prevention efforts fail.

Strategic Guidance

DoD's efforts to counter WMD are guided by the national-level, White House-issued strategy guidance, including the *National Security Strategy of the United States* and the *National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats*. The guidance contained therein informs the Department's strategy documents, including the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, the *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, Secretary Panetta's January 2012 strategic guidance, "*Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century*," and the *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*.

The *National Security Strategy* outlines a comprehensive nonproliferation and security agenda, including reducing the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the role of nuclear weapons, promoting regional stability, and ensuring the effectiveness of our deterrent and defensive capabilities.

The *National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats* guides our efforts to prevent and respond to the proliferation and use of biological weapons by states or non-state actors through increasing worldwide capability to detect outbreaks of disease, whether intentional or natural, through the application of targeted and proven tools for biological risk management.

The *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* establishes "Preventing Proliferation and Countering WMD" and "Defending the United States and Supporting Civil Authorities at Home" among the Department's six key mission areas.

The *Nuclear Posture Review* better aligns our nuclear policies and posture to our most urgent priorities –preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation while ensuring the maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century provides us with the latest strategic vision from the Secretary of Defense on how to prioritize our efforts in a resource-constrained environment, while still carrying out our essential mission to defend the nation. The guidance firmly envisions countering WMD as one of the ten primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Finally, the 2011 *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* aligns the activities of the Armed Services and Combatant Commands to the National Security Strategy, the QDR, and other top-level guidance.

Together, these documents emphasize the need to have the capabilities to both prevent WMD proliferation to state and non-state actors, and respond to proliferation or use, should those efforts fail. We also will continue to build the capacity and capabilities of our partners to participate jointly in these efforts and reinforce the effectiveness of the global, multilateral WMD nonproliferation regime.

The DoD Response

As I stated previously, DoD works to prevent the proliferation of WMD and build our and partner nations' capacity and capability to prevent and respond to WMD threats. These efforts include the necessary research, doctrine development, training and education to ensure that these capabilities remain effective components of the response by DoD and our partners. DoD protects the homeland and our allies and ensures that our troops, along with those of our coalition partners, can fight and win in an environment contaminated by WMD hazards.

1. Reinforcing the Global WMD Nonproliferation Regime

The United States has worked with our allies and partners to support and enhance a global nonproliferation regime to share the costs and increase the effectiveness of our collective efforts to reduce our vulnerability to WMD. Each part of the global regime reinforces the others. For instance, the Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) help set global norms against biological and chemical weapons proliferation and nuclear proliferation. Agreements, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol (IAEA AP) and the as-yet unratified Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and a potential Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), raise and reinforce the barriers to WMD proliferation. Other international bodies, such as the United Nations Security Council, seek to establish norms for proliferation prevention and build roadblocks for potential proliferators. Regional agreements, such as nuclear weapon free zones, and regional security organizations, such as NATO, and other efforts, such as the Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits, and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction provide forums to focus

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efforts and attention on reinforcing the norms and behaviors associated with the global WMD nonproliferation regime.

We see real benefit in strengthening the global regime, both to set the example of good global citizenship, and to build support for global action when countries cheat. Unilateral approbation can be a powerful tool in seeking compliance, but our efforts are stronger when the rest of the world agrees and acts with us against cheaters and proliferators. Of course, some countries, such as Syria, Iran, and North Korea, refuse to play by the rules and continue to challenge international norms of good behavior. The United States will continue to uphold the highest standards of nonproliferation and hold cheaters and proliferators to account.

The norms against biological weapons, stated in the BTWC, are among the strongest. The parties at the December 2011 BTWC Review Conference agreed to an ambitious Intersessional process to strengthen implementation. The BTWC bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, or transfer of biological weapons. The number of countries that have not signed or ratified the Convention, however, is too long. In addition, some countries do not fully participate in the BTWC confidence building measures. DoD's efforts include supporting expert discussions and providing information on DoD facilities and activities as part of the confidence building measures. DoD also has taken steps to increase the transparency of our biological defense activities. We hosted the Chairman of the BTWC at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Maryland, in 2011, and we have invited select BTWC Ambassadors to visit USAMRIID later this year. The United States encourages other BTWC parties to do the same and provide transparency to their bio-defense efforts.

The parties at the NPT Review Conference in 2010 achieved consensus on an Action Plan that reinforces the Treaty's role as the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and commits to specific action to improve its effectiveness during the intersessional process. The Action Plan calls for strengthening the three pillars of the Treaty – improving safeguards to ensure nuclear nonproliferation, working towards nuclear disarmament, and sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United States has demonstrated leadership in pursuing nuclear reductions -- most notably by bringing into force the New START treaty with Russia -- and DoD actively participates with our colleagues at State and the NNSA in supporting proposals and activities to fulfill the commitments contained in the Action Plan. In addition, DoD implements certain U.S. Government commitments under the IAEA Additional Protocol – an important facet of U.S. compliance with its nonproliferation obligations – including providing information on non-sensitive DoD facilities and activities, and supporting managed access visits.

The Administration is committed to seeking ratification of the CTBT and its entry-into-force. The CTBT bans the testing of nuclear weapons, thus creating another barrier to non-weapon states that may seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The CTBT also hinders existing nuclear powers from developing new, potentially destabilizing types of warheads. The United States demonstrates our commitment to entry-into-force by maintaining a nuclear weapons testing moratorium and supporting the development of on-site inspection procedures and the International Monitoring System. The ability of both the international community and the

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United States to detect nuclear tests has improved greatly since 1999 when the Senate first considered the Treaty. And the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent without nuclear tests. CTBT remains fully in America's national security interest. The United States continues to seek a FMCT, and is working in Geneva at the UN Conference on Disarmament towards a negotiation to ban production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. DoD provides experts to form interagency positions on the FMCT, supports discussions, and participates in discussions among technical experts.

President Obama in 2009 announced a goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide. The President hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010 to focus world leaders on nuclear security and to secure concrete commitments for action. At the second Nuclear Security Summit, held in Seoul in March 2012, participants reported the progress they have made in meeting their 2010 commitments – an analysis by the independent Arms Control Association indicates that 90 percent of these commitments were completed. In one such success, President Obama stood with President Medvedev of Russia and President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan to announce the imminent completion of a trilateral project, managed for the United States by DoD's Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), to secure hundreds of kilograms of vulnerable nuclear material at the former Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan. The project represents the most visible, but far from the only, DoD contribution to the President's four-year effort to lock down vulnerable nuclear material globally.

The Department supports various nuclear security conventions aimed at preventing global nuclear terrorism and proliferation, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), which addresses terrorism involving nuclear weapons and other radioactive materials; the Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which addresses the physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes; and the Two Protocols to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, which address the potential use of maritime vessels or platforms for terrorism or WMD transport. In 2008, the Senate unanimously provided its advice and consent to ratification of all four treaties. The Department of Defense encourages the passage of implementing legislation currently before Congress that will allow the United States to ratify these agreements to bolster our efforts to protect the American people against proliferation threats.

In May 2011, the President submitted the protocols to the Treaties of Pelindaba and Rarotonga to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. DoD supports U.S. accession to the Protocols to both of these Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) – in Africa and the South Pacific, respectively – because both are consistent with the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and enhance U.S. security by furthering our global nonproliferation and arms control objectives. Neither Protocol requires any changes to U.S. law, policy, or practice, nor would they require any changes to our defense plans or posture. We hope the Senate will take up the Protocols for both Treaties for consideration and provide its advice and consent for ratification. Looking further forward, we have reached an agreement in principle that resolves our concerns regarding the Protocol to the Southeast Asia NWFZ Treaty by completing a revised Protocol. We will

continue our efforts to clarify remaining questions over the Protocol to the Central Asian NWFZ Treaty.

Finally, we engage with regional partners to leverage further our countering WMD capabilities. One such partner is NATO. The NATO Strategic Concept, adopted in Lisbon in 2010, provides the roadmap for further developing NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The United States ensured that the Concept included direction to improve the capacity of allies to counter proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

2. Working with Partners

DoD also responds to global WMD threats by working with allied and partner nations. This includes robust partner engagement efforts to leverage existing capabilities and build partner capacity through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, the International Counterproliferation Program (ICP), and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

In terms of our threat reduction and capacity-building efforts, I would like to refer specifically to the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program – a highly-effective effort to work bilaterally with partner governments around the world to reduce and eliminate existing or past WMD programs on their territory. The Nunn-Lugar CTR Program is the primary DoD mechanism that supports the President's goal of improving the security of all nuclear material world-wide. For two decades, the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program has reduced the threat emanating from the legacy WMD programs of the Soviet Union. In recent years, the program has adapted to go beyond the former Soviet states and take on new and emerging WMD threats in other regions. CTR's many achievements are extraordinary; however, I will focus my remarks on our most recent achievements and our future goals and plans.

For Fiscal Year 2013, the Department of Defense has requested \$519.1 million for the CTR Program; this includes \$99.8 million for the Global Nuclear Security (GNS) Program; \$32.4 million for the Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP), and \$276.4 million for the Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP). Congressional support for this request will enable the Department to continue its important contributions to reducing nuclear and biological threats.

During 2011, the CTR program continued to expand globally to build new partnerships to support our nonproliferation efforts, managing its largest one-year budget in its history, and making more new political commitments than ever. We increased CTR's reach with new partnerships in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, focused on improving responsiveness and stewardship of the program. We have adapted CTR to meet emerging threats with agility – identifying enduring partnerships with countries focused on providing sustained effort, adjusting our efforts where attention is not as focused, and enhancing our engagement across DoD and the interagency.

In Russia, CTR's Global Nuclear Security (GNS) program remains focused on improving the site and transportation security of nuclear weapons and related materials. Naturally, this

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includes close cooperation with the Department of Energy, building on our joint experience improving local capacities to sustain and improve security systems. Since 2010, the GNS program has helped Russia consolidate its nuclear warhead storage, maintain and improve nuclear weapon storage security and accountability, transport highly-enriched spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned submarines for disposal, increase nuclear security training capacity, and assess new security technologies and methods.

The Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence is another important effort that builds a sustainable partnership to support nuclear nonproliferation. DoD, through the CTR program and in partnership with DOE, is providing technical expertise and a modest level of resources to support the Center of Excellence for Nuclear Security in China. We also are discussing a partnership with India in the nuclear security component of its Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership and providing some initial facilitation support to Kazakhstan's nuclear security center of excellence. These Centers will allow us to exchange nuclear security best practices, demonstrate security equipment, contribute to national and regional training programs, and collaborate on the research and development of nuclear security technologies.

Our strategy requires a layered defense against proliferation threats. The WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (PPP) is CTR's means to enhance our partners' ability to detect and interdict WMD on-the-move through the provision of detection, surveillance, and interdiction capabilities. CTR's increased engagements in Southeast Asia, the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Moldova are critical to assist in developing the capability to detect and interdict WMD and related materials in transit.

Although not an element of CTR, the ICP is a DoD activity that complements the capital-intensive investments of the CTR/PPP program through its modest, yet effective "train-and-equip" efforts. ICP is unique in that its legislative authority explicitly directs a partnership with the FBI and U.S. Customs and Border Protection to deter WMD proliferation in priority countries and regions. ICP and PPP are coordinated closely with complementary programs managed by our interagency partners, to include the State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program.

DoD also participates in the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction as an important mechanism to coordinate and de-conflict international threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance. This year the United States is serving as chair and seeking to strengthen Partnership efforts and focus on creating tangible deliverables to increase global bio-security. The United States is working to strengthen global efforts to counter biological threats by working with vitally-important international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the Organization of Animal Health, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, each of which are dedicated to reducing risks and detecting outbreaks early. As an example of our cooperation, the United States has entered into a memorandum of understanding with WHO to improve global health security.

While the Global Partnership has made it easier to share work on threat reduction projects with like-minded international partners, thanks to CTR's legislative authority to receive funds from outside contributors, we now have greater flexibility also to share costs. Let me give you

one example. Pursuant to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, I am currently seeking the determination of the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to enter into memorandums of understanding (MOU) with the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands in pursuit of cooperative threat reduction goals of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The specific CTR projects and scope of work to be funded will be mutually decided by DoD and outside contributors on a case-by-case basis once the MOUs are in place. We anticipate that the priorities for such contributions will include cooperative biological engagement work in the former Soviet Union, Iraq, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

The most dynamic area of CTR activity continues to be biodefense engagement through the CBEP. The CBEP counters the threat posed by especially dangerous pathogens, related materials and expertise, and other emerging infectious disease risks in accordance with the *National Security Strategy for Countering Biological Threats*. This includes strengthening global health security, obtaining timely insight on emerging outbreaks, reducing the potential for exploitation of life sciences material and technology, and reinforcing norms of safe and responsible conduct. CBEP focuses its work in four program areas: 1) Secure and consolidate collections of especially dangerous pathogens; 2) Enhance partner country's capability to prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or accidental release of biological weapons-related materials; 3) Enhance partner country's capability to detect, diagnose, and report epidemics, bio-terror attacks, and potential pandemics; and 4) Ensure that the capabilities are sustainable within each partner country.

Defending against infectious disease outbreaks, whether an attack or natural, is a global concern that requires a multinational effort and response. All governments share mutual goals of protecting their populations from infectious disease and, in doing so, they protect the global community in the process. This is why DoD, through the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program, is building partner capacity in critical regions around the world that elevates the concern over bio-security risks and bio-surveillance for potential weaponized outbreaks alongside the broader global commitments to public health. In addition, CTR's legacy work eliminating the threat posed by the former Soviet bio-weapons enterprise, and DoD's own work developing the means for our soldiers to conduct operations in bio-contaminated environments, provides the DoD enterprise with unique skills and interests in reducing bio threats.

Recently, the CBEP program has shifted from an FSU focus to areas of emerging bio-threats, such Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. With global connectivity bringing people from all parts of the world to U.S. shores every day, we cannot afford to ignore the threat that the combination of endemic or unsecure pathogens and terrorists seeking bio-weapons material or expertise poses. As CBEP has expanded beyond the former Soviet Union, it has adapted its approach to meet the unique regional needs and concerns to reduce overall footprint requirements and find lower-cost, more sustainable solutions for storage and research on these pathogens. As an example of CBEP's emphasis on emerging threats, a number of high-impact projects are underway in Kenya, including improvement of perimeter fences and security procedures, analysis of pathogen repository needs for over 100 unsecured freezers at one facility, and cooperative biological research on some of the most challenging endemic diseases in the

country. We will continue to assess the program's approaches and adapt to partner capacity and collaborative opportunities with other Global Partnership countries.

DoD has led efforts with our interagency colleagues to make the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) a durable and effective effort to prevent the proliferation of WMD. Since its founding in 2003, 98 countries have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, and many of these partners work with the United States through military exercises, workshops, and training to improve interdiction and coordination capabilities. Building on these activities, the United States has proposed the Critical Capabilities and Practices effort for PSI. This effort seeks to take advantage of the significant work PSI partners have done to identify interdiction-related tools and ensure all PSI-endorsing nations have access to those tools. Examples of these tools include WMD and ballistic missile -related identification manuals, legal analyses and model legislation for seizing illicit goods, interdiction related training, and guidelines for sharing information related to cargoes. Related efforts over the next year include major multilateral PSI exercises such as Leading Edge co-hosted by the United Arab Emirates, which will send a significant deterrent message to proliferators.

The benefit of these efforts to work collaboratively with partner and allied nations was demonstrated in the overwhelming U.S. response to the March 2011 Japanese tsunami and its aftermath through Operation Tomodachi. While this was not a response to a WMD attack, Operation Tomodachi highlighted DoD's unique ability to bring vast expertise and resources to aid allies in the event of a radiological accident or incident. DoD's extensive military infrastructure in the Pacific, our close working relationship with Japanese military and civilian partners, and vast experience in nuclear and radiological consequence management allowed us to quickly and effectively provide assistance where it was most needed, including radiation monitoring of the Fukushima Power Plant, support for humanitarian relief efforts, assist in search and rescue, and help in containment and decontamination. We were able to augment domestic Japanese response capabilities in key areas where we have greater capacity and expertise and assist a close ally in their critical time of need. This response also served as a good opportunity to work with our interagency partners and identify where there was a need for improved coordination.

3. Building U.S. Capabilities

Finally, DoD responds to global WMD threats by looking internally to improve DoD capabilities and capacities to counter WMD. Over the last several years, DoD has invested significant time and resources to develop and enhance capabilities for detection, interdiction, elimination, and consequence management operations.

We have gained important experience and learned valuable lessons from our efforts to field specialized consequence management response forces for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) events. Complementing the evolution of earlier force structures, DoD and the National Guard are building the CBRN Response Enterprise (CRE), which will achieve full operational capability by October 2012. The CRE is a Federal and state military construct designed to decrease response times, save more lives, and standardize training, evaluations and exercises. The Homeland Response Force (HRF) is the centerpiece of National Guard portion of

the CRE and provides a regional response capability to each of the ten FEMA regions. The 556-person HRFs are prepared to deploy 12 hours or sooner after notification to support civil authorities with emergency medical, decontamination, and search and rescue assets.

As a Department, we take very seriously our responsibility to protect the force and ensure it is able to operate fully within WMD environments, as well as defend the homeland from WMD attacks. To accomplish these objectives, we are building an integrated, layered defense, which includes working with the Department of Homeland Security to enhance the protective posture of the homeland; coordinating with the intelligence community to better identify likely proliferation pathways and illicit procurement networks; and, looking across the U.S. government to invest in new capabilities to detect and characterize chemical, biological, or nuclear WMD threats.

For instance, to counter the nuclear threat, DoD is looking both internally at how we should organize and invest to ensure an effective response as well as supporting NSS-led efforts to develop a whole-of-government response plan. Faced with an unpredictable security environment, we are working towards a whole-of-government, synchronized response to detect, interdict, and contain loose nuclear weapons and related materials. This would include activities such as securing material at the source, intercepting material on the move, and increasing defenses to protect against an attack on the homeland. Our work at DoD has focused on how U.S. military units would coordinate with other U.S. agencies and with allies and partners in the face of such a “loose nuke” threat scenario. These efforts are critical to both preventing terrorists from obtaining or acquiring nuclear weapons or significant nuclear material, and ensuring we are prepared and postured to effectively respond should the worst case materialize.

We also must enhance our ability to respond quickly to an attack should these efforts fail. In this regard, the President’s budget request includes new resources to improve capabilities for technical nuclear forensics technologies and the fielding of new capabilities, including funding for air sample collection, in order to support the rapid source attribution of a terrorist attack. For Fiscal Year 2013, we have requested \$6.5 million to accelerate integration, testing, evaluation, and certification of new particulate air sample collection systems, and we are conducting a comprehensive review of the overall nuclear sample collection requirements to inform future-year efforts. This study is due to be completed later this month.

DoD plans and operations must reflect the dizzying pace of change, the limits on U.S. action, the challenges to intelligence in rapidly-changing situations, and enduring technical hurdles related to WMD detection. These challenges, among others, have led DoD to establish a Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination (SJFHQ-E) to serve as a permanent, joint advocate for refining tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance our ability to locate, characterize, and secure WMD threats, to dissuade their use, and to remove or neutralize them if necessary, especially in non-permissive environments. SJFHQ-E also ensures that these capabilities are integrated into doctrine, training, and exercises across DoD. On February 3, 2012, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command activated the SJFHQ-E. The headquarters, which will reach full operational capabilities in fiscal year 2013, will integrate DoD counter WMD assets, including nuclear disablement teams, CBRN Response Teams, radiation assessment teams, deployable laboratories, and tactical intelligence. It will greatly increase

DoD's capability to locate, characterize, secure, and disable or destroy hostile WMD programs in a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment. It also will provide a focal point for working with allies and partners to build their awareness and capacity for WMD elimination operations worldwide.

Emerging biological threats are no less dangerous than chemical or nuclear threats. An important priority of the *National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats* is increasing capability to conduct effective and timely disease surveillance worldwide. CTR, as I described earlier, is addressing this threat through CBEP, which collaborates with DoD's overseas medical research laboratories to leverage their technical expertise and regional relationships. CBEP provides expert technical training to CTR partners and conducts cooperative biological research to discover novel pathogens or characterize pathogens that are not generally found in the United States. Within the military medical community, these DoD overseas medical research labs are well-known for their intrepid work protecting U.S. military members from disease.

DoD also is seeking to address new and novel threats resulting from the revolution in biotechnology and the chemical industry. While this revolution can provide tremendous benefits in medical science and economic growth, it also can undermine our confidence in existing chem-bio defenses. With growing access to expertise, equipment, advanced technology, and the precursors needed to produce new chemical or biological compounds, we continue to devote more resources to research, doctrine development, training and education to develop improved countermeasures, personal protection gear, and new decontamination techniques to mitigate the effects of novel chemical and biological agents.

Conclusion

The threat posed by WMD continues to evolve, and so do our efforts to combat it. These efforts span a range of unilateral and multilateral counter-proliferation and non-proliferation responses. The efforts I have outlined today keep DoD ahead of WMD threats. We continue to coordinate our efforts within the interagency and with our international partners to prevent and protect against these most dangerous threats. But none of the efforts I have described to you today would be possible without the continuing support of Congress. The authorities, budget, and personnel that you provide allows DoD to participate in the most important mission I can imagine – to protect the American people from a WMD attack. I thank you for your support for our FY 2013 budget and look forward to continuing to partner closely with Congress to counter these threats.