

Statement of Anne Harrington
Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
National Nuclear Security Administration
U.S. Department of Energy
on the
Fiscal Year 2013 President's Budget Request
Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

June 12, 2012

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Portman, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for opportunity to testify before you today on the President's Fiscal Year 2013 budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs. I will also share with you a brief summary of the successful achievements from the Nuclear Security Summit which concluded in Seoul, South Korea in March 2012.

One of our most important missions at NNSA has been to support the Administration's commitment to secure the most vulnerable nuclear material across the globe in four years. Our accomplishments in securing plutonium and highly enriched uranium around the world have made it significantly more difficult to acquire and traffic the materials required to make an improvised nuclear device, and I am proud to say that we are on track to meet our goals to remove or dispose of 4,353 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in foreign countries, and equip approximately 229 buildings containing weapons-usable material with state-of-the-art security upgrades.

The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget request, and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, as passed by the full Senate Armed Services Committee, provides the \$2.46 billion needed to continue these and other critical nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts. Our continued focus on innovative and ambitious nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts is vital. The threat is not gone, and the consequences of nuclear terrorism and state proliferation would be devastating. Detonation of a nuclear device anywhere in the world would lead to significant loss of life, and overwhelming economic, political, and psychological consequences. We must remain committed to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and state-based proliferation.

But there is no silver bullet solution, which is why we will continue to implement a multi-layered strategy to strengthen the security of nuclear material around the world by removing or eliminating it when we can; consolidating and securing it, if elimination is not an option; reducing the civilian use of highly enriched uranium--particularly for research and medical isotope production--where low enriched uranium options exist or can be developed; and maintaining our commitment to detecting and deterring nuclear smuggling. Many of you are

familiar with the significant contributions that NNSA's Second Line of Defense program has made to the worldwide effort to combat nuclear trafficking. In light of the constrained budget environment that we find ourselves in, NNSA has initiated a strategic review of the program to evaluate what combinations of capabilities and programs make the most effective contribution to national security.

We will continue to research and develop tools and technologies to detect the proliferation of nuclear materials as well as nuclear detonations. We will provide technical support and leadership to our interagency colleagues during the negotiation and implementation of arms control treaties, as we did with NEW START. We will expand on our ongoing efforts to strengthen the capabilities of our foreign partners to implement international nonproliferation and nuclear security norms, and support the critically important work of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We will continue to play a supporting role in the negotiation of Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (so-called 123 Agreements), which are so crucial for achieving our nuclear nonproliferation and trade objectives.

The President's FY13 budget request also keeps focus on our commitment to eliminate U.S. excess weapons materials and supports the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and Waste Solidification Building at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. The \$569.5 million committed to the MOX program and related activities this year will lead to the permanent elimination of enough plutonium for at least 8,500 nuclear weapons, which will be matched by similar commitments by the Russian Federation. We have eliminated the line item for a Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility from the MOX program, opting instead for a preferred alternative approach to producing feedstock that is much less costly by utilizing existing facilities at the Savannah River Site and Los Alamos National Laboratory.

The President's proposed budget for FY2013 provides the funding necessary to carry out all of these activities; however, given the current fiscal constraints on all government agencies, we have stepped up our efforts to identify areas where our interagency partners and other nations can help share the costs associated with this important work. I am pleased to report that since Congress granted NNSA programs the ability to accept international contributions in FY2005, we have received nearly \$80M from Canada, the United Kingdom, Finland, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands. In addition, our nuclear and radiological security and Second Line of Defense activities with Russia have moved to a cost sharing basis with Russia assuming a growing share of the installation and sustainability costs of these projects. The full value of cost sharing with our international partners can be difficult to estimate precisely, but the financial, technical and diplomatic resources that they bring to these efforts have enabled and accelerated important nuclear security efforts and saved the U.S. Government millions of dollars over the last several years.

Nowhere is the positive impact of the international collaboration more demonstrated than in the Nuclear Security Summit process. The Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul issued a Communique, supported by 53 Heads of State and Government, as well as representatives of the IAEA and Interpol, all of which unanimously agreed that nuclear terrorism continues to be

one of the most challenging threats to international security. Countries not only reported on their very substantial accomplishments since the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, they pledged additional actions to strengthen the IAEA; securing, accounting for, and consolidating nuclear materials; securing radioactive sources; enhancing the security of materials in transport; combating illicit trafficking; improving nuclear forensics capabilities; fostering a nuclear security culture through education and training; protecting sensitive information and enhancing cyber security measures; and engaging in international cooperation to achieve all of these goals. NNSA has been and will continue to be at the forefront of supporting efforts in all of these areas.

Every country attending the Summit announced its accomplishments in a number of critical areas. Each statement in its own right was significant, but taken together they constitute a tremendous leap forward in the global effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. These achievements would not have been accomplished in such a short amount of time without the high-level attention that President Obama and his counterparts have focused on this issue. Some of the most impressive accomplishments announced at the Summit included: the United States, Mexico, and Canada working together to remove all HEU from Mexico; the United States, Russia, and Ukraine announcing the removal of the final HEU from Ukraine; and the removal of all plutonium from Sweden to the United States. As a result of these shipments, 22 countries have now been cleaned out of all HEU and Plutonium. It took 13 years to remove all special nuclear material from 13 countries prior to the President's April 2009 Prague speech announcing the 4-Year Effort. With the momentum of the Nuclear Security Summit process, 9 additional countries have been cleaned out of HEU and Plutonium, bringing the total to 22 countries.

A key to our efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is minimizing the civilian use of HEU. Our agreement with Belgium, France, and the Netherlands to eliminate the use of HEU in medical isotopes production while concurrently assuring the reliable supply of these isotopes to patients in need, makes a meaningful contribution to this effort. The President also announced a previously secret program with Russia and Kazakhstan to remediate vulnerable nuclear material from the former Semipalatinsk Test Site. In addition, there were several key illicit trafficking deliverables, including the creation of counter nuclear smuggling teams in countries such as Jordan and a counter nuclear smuggling center of excellence in Lithuania. Finally, nearly 20 countries also ratified key nuclear security and nuclear terrorism treaties: the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). There is much more to add, but this hopefully gives you a flavor of the positive and constructive framework that the Nuclear Security Summit process provides.

In conclusion, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the NNSA's contributions to nuclear security. Working in concert with other U.S. government programs and partners around the world, we are making concrete contributions to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and building a more secure future. Thank you for the tremendous support

that our programs have enjoyed over the years from this Committee and the Congress. I welcome any questions you may have.