

Advance Questions for Dr. Kathleen H. Hicks
Nominee for Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

1. Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

I believe there is no need to modify the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time. The Act was a very significant piece of legislation that, over the course of more than two decades, has led to dramatic improvements in the effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Please see my response above.

2. Relationships

What do you see as the relationship between the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense

Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), as the USD(P)'s principal assistant, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as a staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy provides support to the Deputy Secretary similar to that provided to the Secretary, as described above.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy (PDUSD(P)) is the principal assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and is responsible for assisting the USD(P) in carrying out all responsibilities, fulfilling functions, managing relationships, and exercising authorities provided for in law to the USD(P). The PDUSD(P) advises on and supports the USD(P) with all responsibilities in providing advice to the Secretary of Defense in interagency fora (such as National Security Council deliberations), engagement with international interlocutors, and in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes inside the Department, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and annual program and budget reviews.

The other Under Secretaries of Defense, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy works closely with the other Under Secretaries of Defense and their Deputies, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, to achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy input, as appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of responsibility.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

Pursuant to the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy (PDUSD(P)) works closely with Assistant Secretaries of Defense across the Department to achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy input, as appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of responsibility. As the USD(P)'s principal assistant, within the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy, the PDUSD(P) provides oversight of Assistant Secretaries on issues and at times as directed by the USD(P). The Policy team works together to provide the USD(P) and the Secretary with advice and recommendations on the full range of policy issues under consideration in the Department and provides policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary's guidance and decisions are implemented properly.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of issues, including strategy development, force planning, and other areas in which the Military Departments are critical stakeholders.

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the General Counsel on all policy issues that involve a legal dimension. This generally requires significant and regular coordination on a broad range of issues.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council, the Chairman has a unique and critical military role. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, and to help ensure that military advice is taken into account in an appropriate manner across a broad range of issues relating to strategy, force development, force employment, and other matters.

The Commanders of the Regional and Functional Combatant Commands

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy also works closely with the Regional and Functional Combatant Commanders to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations.

The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy works with the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in support of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's oversight of strategy for nuclear weapons and forces, as well as USD(P)'s role on the Nuclear Weapons Council.

3. Duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Section 134a of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the performance of his duties. Department of Defense Directive 5111.3 emphasizes that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy advises and assists the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, particularly on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of Department of Defense plans and policy with overall national security objectives.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under current regulations and practices?

My understanding is that, as the principal assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for assisting the USD(P) in advising the Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy, and for assisting the USD(P) in carrying out all USD(P) responsibilities outlined in Section 134(b) of Title 10. This includes, but is not

limited to, strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of Department of Defense plans and policy with overall national security objectives.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy would prescribe for you?

If confirmed, I expect that my duties and functions would include advising and assisting the Under Secretary for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on strategy formulation, contingency planning, and the integration of Department of Defense plans and policy. I expect that this would include involvement in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) system, and in major departmental reviews such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I look forward to speaking with the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy further about how I could best support their efforts.

4. Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

During the past three years, I have been honored to serve as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Strategy, Plans, and Forces (SPF). In that capacity, I advise the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on matters pertaining to the development of U.S. national security and defense strategy. I lead Policy's efforts to provide strategic guidance and implementation oversight to the Department's planning, programming, and budgeting process, including the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. I also oversee the efforts to guide, review, and assess military contingency plans and the plans for the day-to-day military activities of Combatant Commanders; various force development, force management, and corporate support processes; and the integrated assessment of U.S. military posture, force structure, and associated defense activities and capabilities.

Prior to serving as DUSD for SPF, I spent fifteen years working on a wide range of defense and national security issues, both in and out of government. For thirteen years, I was a career civil servant in OSD Policy, beginning as a Presidential Management Intern and eventually joining the ranks of the Senior Executive Service. During that time, I held a broad range of responsibilities across the Policy organization, from Deputy Director for Resources, to Director for Strategy, Director for Strategic Planning and Program Integration, and Chief of Staff for the Quadrennial Roles, Missions and Organizations Team. I participated in the 1997 and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews and authored follow-on planning guidance to implement the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. From 2006 to 2009 I was a Senior Fellow at a national security and international studies think tank, where I directed research and task forces on defense governance, capabilities-based planning for stability operations, the future of U.S. civil affairs forces, and nontraditional security assistance. I hold a PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a master's degree from the University of

Maryland's School of Public Affairs. I believe that my substantive expertise and experience would allow me to serve the country well if confirmed as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

5. Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning

One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. DOD Directive 5111.3 specifically assigns a major role to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for those important matters.

What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

The role of civilian leadership is not only statutorily mandated, but critical in the formulation of defense strategy and planning. Civilian defense leadership is particularly vital in translating broad national security policies and principles into the strategic ends that ultimately drive military planning.

More specifically, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD(P)) assists the Under Secretary for Policy (USD(P)) in supporting the development of the President's National Security Strategy, leading the development of the defense strategy, establishing realistic objectives and guidance to form the basis for contingency planning, and reviewing DoD plans and programs to ensure they support strategic objectives. In addition to the provision of written guidance, an important civilian leadership role is to review contingency plans submitted by the Combatant Commanders for approval. The PDUSD(P) also assists the USD(P) in facilitating interagency coordination on contingency planning efforts, as necessary.

In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning?

I believe that the current level of civilian oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning is appropriate.

What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning?

The Department of Defense should continue to fortify its capacity for strategic thinking and strategic planning to ensure that it not only deals with the challenges of today but is also well prepared for those of tomorrow.

The recently released DoD strategic guidance is evidence that the Department thinks critically about strategy formulation and its associated resource implications. If confirmed, I will continue to work to reinforce these competencies within OSD(Policy). If confirmed, I would also strive to

provide the best advice possible to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense in fulfilling their responsibilities to provide written policy guidance and to review contingency plans. Finally, I would coordinate closely with the Joint Staff to develop further opportunities to collaborate on planning guidance and strategic reviews, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review.

6. Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

If confirmed as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I look forward to playing an important role within the Department and the interagency process in developing policy in a number of key areas, including: defeating al Qaeda and countering the continuing threat of violent extremism; transitioning security responsibility in Afghanistan in a way that protects U.S. vital interests; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the cases of Iran and North Korea; strengthening alliances and partnerships globally to strengthen U.S. and international security; maintaining stability in Asia and other key regions; advancing U.S. interests in the context of dramatic changes that have unfolded and are unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa; continuing to strengthen the U.S. defense posture globally, as well as in cyberspace and outer space; and most importantly, ensuring that the United States and its vital interests are secure from attack (this requires continued effort in all of the above-noted areas, as well as sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent, missile defenses, and homeland defense capabilities). A key challenge will be to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary of Defense, and the U.S. Government in resolving these and other issues – and pursuing opportunities – in the context of significant fiscal pressures.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I would address these challenges by undertaking the development and implementation of both DoD and interagency strategies, policies, and plans for key regional and functional issues. I would continue to work closely with other components of the Department of Defense in support of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary of Defense, and our interagency partners, U.S. Allies and partners, and where appropriate, the private sector and non-governmental organizations. I would seek to ensure that strategies, policies, and plans are updated as needed to reflect new challenges and new opportunities. I would work to support the President and the Secretary's guidance to shape a Joint Force for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be flexible, agile, ready, and technologically advanced. I would work with counterparts in other departments and agencies and across the Department to rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region and place a premium on the Middle East, while remaining the security partner of choice across the globe.

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Department of Defense pursues a strategic and balanced approach consistent with the recently released Defense strategic guidance. I would also ensure a strong connection between strategy and resources – supporting the Secretary in making disciplined decisions based on our priorities – and ensure effective working relationships with both military and civilian counterparts throughout the Department and with other Federal departments and agencies. Top priorities would include addressing the challenges listed in my answer to the previous question, including defeating al Qa’ida, ensuring the success and effective transition of the mission in Afghanistan, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, and protecting the U.S. homeland. Continuing to strengthen our Alliances and partnerships, and ensuring that the United States engages through forward presence and is the partner of choice globally, would also be key priorities.

7. Department of Defense Strategic Guidance

The new Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” announced by President Obama on January 5, 2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century and the key military missions for which the DOD will prepare.

What role, if any, did you play in the preparation of the new DOD strategic guidance?

As the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces, I provided advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and worked closely with other civilian and military components including the Joint Staff. More specifically, I participated actively in the conceptualization and writing of the guidance, including the description of the projected security environment, the key military missions for which the Department of Defense must prepare, and prioritization of the key capabilities associated with succeeding at those military missions.

In your view was the strategic review and decision process comprehensive, inclusive, and transparent?

Begun under Secretary Gates and continued under the leadership of Secretary Panetta, the Department's strategic review and decision process were comprehensive, inclusive, and transparent. The review developed a revised defense strategy and accompanying investment priorities over the coming decade, including the identification of priority missions and associated capabilities essential to safeguarding U.S. and allied security interests in light of the range of challenges posed by the future global environment. The conduct of the review included routine discussion among and input from all OSD principal staff assistants, the Chairman and Vice

Chairman, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Service Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders.

Do you agree with the defense priorities set out that guidance? What changes, if any, would you recommend to those defense priorities?

I agree with the defense priorities set out in the guidance, and would not recommend any changes at this time. As with all strategies and guidance, I believe that it will be important to review our approach and, if necessary, adapt it as shifts in the strategic environment require.

The new DOD strategic guidance includes a new emphasis on U.S. security interests and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, the Department is taking steps to shape U.S. forces relative to the air and maritime demands of the Far East and deemphasizing readiness for prolonged or large-scale stability operations.

What is your understanding and assessment of the new strategic guidance's shift of emphasis to the Asia-Pacific and away from large-scale stability operations, and the implications of this shift for shaping U.S. force structure?

The defense strategic guidance noted that, "given that we cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve with absolute certainty, we will maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility" across a wide range of missions. The Department's decision not to divest from the capability to conduct any mission reflects a recognition that the future security environment is uncertain.

The defense strategic guidance also recognizes that the future strategic environment will require even greater flexibility and agility in projecting power to accomplish the nation's security objectives. The United States has important and enduring interests in the Asia-Pacific region. We will maintain, and in some areas enhance, our military presence in the Asia-Pacific region by making our posture more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. To that end, the Fiscal Year 2013 budget request protects and, in some cases, increases investments that are critical to our ability to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, including our ability to project power. For instance, this budget funds the development of the next-generation bomber and new aerial refueling aircraft.

The ability of our ground forces to ensure access, reassure allies, deter adversaries, build security capacity and interoperability with partners, and, ultimately, respond to and succeed in crises and contingencies remains an indispensable component of U.S. military capabilities. U.S. forces will retain sufficient capacity to undertake limited counterinsurgency and stability operations, if required. Equally important, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recognizing the uncertainties of the international environment, we will also ensure that we have the ability to

mobilize and regenerate forces if a larger-scale stability operation becomes necessary in the future.

If confirmed, what changes, if any, in DOD manning, training, force structure, and equipment would you recommend are necessary to meet the requirements of the new strategic guidance?

Under the new strategic guidance, although the U.S. armed forces will be smaller in number, we must ensure that they are ready, agile, flexible, and capable forces, with a forward presence that positions them to respond quickly in the event of threats or contingencies. Toward that end, the President's FY13 budget request preserves or enhances investments in key areas of continuing urgency, such as counterterrorism efforts and counter-WMD efforts, and areas that will grow in prominence in coming years, such as cyber, missile defense, special operations forces, and long-range ISR and strike.

8. Strategic Reviews

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD processes for analysis, decision making, and reporting results for each of the following strategic reviews:

The National Defense Strategy;

The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10, United States Code);

The Quadrennial Defense Review (section 118 of title 10, United States Code);

Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10, United States Code);

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (section 118b of title 10, United States Code).

Each of these efforts serves as a lever to help senior Defense officials steer the Department, ensuring that Components are moving forward with common goals and objectives and understanding of the security context. They also provide ways to convey information about the defense strategy and program to the Congress and American people.

I have been involved, directly and indirectly, in many of these reviews. With the exception of the National Military Strategy, for which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible, the Secretary of Defense determines the processes and decision-making bodies for developing and approving the results of these strategic reviews. Although a wide range of approaches and mechanisms have been employed for these purposes over the years, each review is based on candid advice from senior military and civilian leaders and informed by relevant data and

analyses. It is my assessment based on my past three years in the Department that the processes for analysis, decision making, and reporting on each of the above-mentioned reports are outstanding.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) examines what the Department of Defense will do to support the President's national security strategy, which articulates the Administration's views on national security interests and sets priorities. Specifically, Title 10 provides that the QDR should be a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States, with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. The QDR therefore articulates the national defense strategy and the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities to execute it. The QDR 2010 process included broad stakeholder involvement and significant, quality analysis that helped to inform the national defense strategy and its link to U.S. force structure, plans, and programs. Transparency and analytic rigor were also hallmarks of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance development and decision processes.

The National Military Strategy must be reviewed biennially by the Chairman in concert with a risk assessment and submitted to the Congress with the budget. If risk is significant, the Secretary's Risk Mitigation Plan accompanies it; the most recent review was completed and submitted in February 2012. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy played an important role in the review of the National Military Strategy and in the development of the Secretary's Risk Mitigation Plan.

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) focuses on key organizational and capability aspects of how the Department can best meet its responsibilities. Title 10 requires a comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions of the armed forces and the core competencies and capabilities of the Department of Defense to perform and support such roles and missions. The development of the 2010 QDR and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance has significantly influenced its assessment of military roles and missions.

The Department issues an annual Global Defense Posture Report to Congress. DoD continually assesses U.S. defense posture in an iterative and cooperative manner, informed by the defense strategy and supporting operational requirements. To that end, the Department has organized a senior executive council, composed of representatives from across the community of interest, including OSD, the Joint Staff, the Military Department and Service staffs, the State Department, and the Combatant Commands, to formulate recommendations on global posture to the Secretary of Defense.

If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve DOD's processes for analysis, policy formulation, and decision making relative to each review above?

In general, I have found that the following factors have been associated with successful strategic reviews:

- All relevant stakeholders are represented in formal review and decision-making fora. These stakeholders generally include Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, leadership of Components, and the Combatant Commanders.
- Leadership of working groups and review groups is assigned to organizations with the predominant expertise and involvement in the issue areas under examination. Generally, this entails co-chairing arrangements that involve, at a minimum, key offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.
- The deliberations and findings of working groups are transparent and are vetted with stakeholders before being presented to top leadership.
- The Secretary establishes and maintains “hands-on” oversight of the overall effort from start to finish.

Also critical for the success of any strategic review is the maintenance of a vibrant, ongoing set of analytical efforts that continually assess the ability of current, programmed, and projected forces to accomplish key missions. If confirmed, I would recommend that insights gained from previous reviews, along the lines of those outlined above, be applied to upcoming reviews, including the development of the next Quadrennial Defense Review.

9. Afghanistan

Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?

I believe that the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. I also believe that, over time, the Administration should continue to assess and adjust as necessary its implementation of the overall strategy based on conditions on the ground. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting with Congress, and with our Allies and partners in this regard.

Do you support the President’s decision to withdraw the 33,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan by the end of this summer?

Yes. I support a responsible, conditions-based drawdown as called for by the President. The United States has already withdrawn the first 10,000 surge forces, and the remaining 23,000 will be withdrawn by the end of September. The key to success in Afghanistan is the ability of Afghan National Security Forces to provide security. The surge has allowed the Afghans to develop a more operationally capable and professional force and, in doing so, has established conditions that will support the reduction of forces as planned.

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to our strategy in Afghanistan as a result of the drawdown of U.S. forces?

I believe that the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan is sound, and I do not recommend any changes at present. I believe that the strategy for Afghanistan (and other strategies and plans) should be regularly assessed, with coordinated adjustments made as necessary.

If confirmed, what recommendations would you make on the pace of further drawdowns in U.S. forces in Afghanistan after the end of this summer, when the full U.S. surge force will have been withdrawn from Afghanistan?

It is my understanding that decisions on further drawdown of forces beyond the recovery of the "surge force" have not been made. Future decisions on the pace and scale of force drawdown should be based on assessments of operational conditions, and the resources needed to continue progress toward our objectives. If confirmed, any recommendations I make will be based on future assessments of these factors.

10. Afghanistan Transition

Do you support the goal adopted at the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon of transitioning lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces by 2014?

Yes, I do support that very important goal.

In your view, what are the main challenges to the success of the transition to an Afghan security lead throughout Afghanistan by 2014?

Safe havens for insurgents in Pakistan and Afghan capacity in the governance and development areas remain the most challenging aspects of transition. The limited capacity of the Afghan Government to govern effectively and to fill government positions at the national and sub-national levels hinders its ability to assume leadership on these lines of operation. Efforts in these areas must underpin the success of the security transition in the effort to achieve durable stability in Afghanistan.

11. Afghanistan National Security Forces

What is your assessment of the progress in developing professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)?

ANSF operational effectiveness is improving and the ANSF are demonstrating increasing capability. Currently, 13 of 156 ANA Kandaks or Battalions have the highest possible rating, "Independent with Advisors." However, the more critical measure is the number of units rated at "Effective with Advisors" and "Effective with Partners," which are the levels necessary to support transition. Since December 8, 2011, the percentage of ANA units rated as "Effective with Partners" or higher grew from 85 percent to 91 percent. Although the ANSF are currently not ready to operate independently of ISAF in most areas, they are assuming an ever-increasing

leadership role in operations across Afghanistan, and are on schedule to meet the 2014 goal for transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government.

What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF to assume lead security responsibility by 2014?

A first challenge is to continue to build out the full complement of 352,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and to continue to improve the quality, readiness, and performance of these forces. We need to continue ongoing programs to expand ANSF literacy, and continue to provide financial and advisory support to the institutional training centers and existing Afghan training cadres that are currently building leadership and technical capacity of both the Army and the Police. A second challenge is for the ANSF to develop a greater capacity for critical enablers, including logistics support; mobility (e.g., rotary wing); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and operational planning. Third and most broadly, the ANSF must continue building its self-confidence through operational success in taking the lead responsibility for securing transitioned areas and protecting the Afghan people.

If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges?

If confirmed, I would continue current efforts to simplify and accelerate the distribution of ANSF goods and services, support the continued provision of U.S. enabler support as a bridging strategy, and continue the mentoring of Afghan leadership and other training and education programs.

General Allen has testified that options are under consideration for reducing the size of the ANSF after 2014, including a proposal to cut the ANSF by one third from 352,000 in 2012 to around 230,000 after 2014.

What do you see as the main challenges for sustaining the ANSF through 2014 and beyond, and if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing these challenges?

A sustained and well-organized international effort to train, advise, and assist the ANSF will be critical to their success both before and after transition in 2014. Building ANSF “enabler” capacity, as noted in my answer to a preceding question, will also be critical. And continued improvement in the functioning of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, including sustained progress in fighting waste and corruption, will be essential. The United States and other coalition partners must continue to provide the requisite fiscal and personnel support. Maintaining the international community’s support for the ANSF through 2014 and beyond is critical to ANSF sustainability and ensuring that the ANSF remain able to provide security for Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense in their efforts to develop a focused international engagement strategy, in conjunction with other elements of the United States Government, leading up to the NATO Summit in Chicago in May. The Chicago Summit will serve as a key milestone in solidifying

the international community's long-term support and commitment to the ANSF, first established in Lisbon and reaffirmed in Bonn, through 2014 and beyond.

Do you agree that the security conditions on the ground in Afghanistan should be a determining factor in considering any future reductions in the size of the ANSF after 2014?

I do.

12. U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership

In your view, how important to the success of our strategy in Afghanistan is the conclusion of a Strategic Partnership Declaration between the United States and Afghanistan setting out our bilateral relationship over the longer-term?

I assess the Strategic Partnership to be of great importance to our long-term success in Afghanistan. A Strategic Partnership has important benefits for our campaign in Afghanistan and our broader relationship with Afghanistan, and it is important to note that the Strategic Partnership encompasses U.S. actions and intentions as well as those of the Government of Afghanistan. As a long-term, broad strategic framework for future U.S. and Afghanistan relations, the Strategic Partnership will send a critically important message to the Government of Afghanistan, the Afghan people, and enemies of the Afghan state that the United States remains committed to the security and stability of Afghanistan and the welfare of its people. Of critical importance, it emphasizes that we will not abandon the Afghan people while clearly signaling to al-Qaeda and its affiliates that Afghanistan will not once again become a safe haven for their use.

13. U.S. Relationship with Pakistan

What is your assessment of the current U.S.-Pakistan security relationship?

Our relationship with Pakistan is challenging but critical to our national security and our regional interests. Over the past year, the relationship has suffered a number of setbacks and, until recently, our relationship has been nearly frozen. If confirmed, I look forward to assisting the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense in their work with Pakistan to define and develop a more constructive and durable relationship once the Government of Pakistan informs us of its plans to implement the recommendations for the bilateral relationship that Pakistan's Parliament put forth.

Historically, the U.S. military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like our overall relationship, has seen good and bad phases. However, we still have important shared objectives. A core U.S. national security goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida and its affiliates to ensure that they do not find safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to mitigate the threat to the United States, our allies and partners, and our interests abroad. Pakistan has suffered more than 12,000

military personnel killed or wounded and more than 36,000 civilian casualties in recent years from terrorist actions. The Pakistani military is operating currently against some, but not all, militants that enable the safe havens, and we are committed to working with Pakistan to address this persistent threat. As President Obama has said, “We have killed more terrorists on Pakistani soil than anywhere else, and that could not have been done without their cooperation.” Pakistan also has a clear stake in Afghan stability and will be an important participant in the process that ultimately brings the conflict to a successful conclusion.

If confirmed, what recommendations would you have regarding the nature and extent of U.S. engagement with Pakistan going forward on issues of counterterrorism and other security matters?

As President Obama has stated, “We will continue the work of devastating al Qaeda’s leadership and denying them a safe haven.” The conditions that allow the group to maintain its safe haven and regenerate – including its ability to capitalize on relationships with militant affiliates – can only be addressed through a sustained local presence opposed to al-Qa’ida. Therefore, we will defeat al-Qa’ida only through sustained cooperation with Pakistan. Greater Pakistani-U.S. cooperation across a broad range of political, military, and economic pursuits will be necessary to achieve the defeat of al-Qa’ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan as we work to change the conditions on the ground that give rise to safe havens.

If confirmed, I would continue to support the Department of Defense’s efforts in coordination with our interagency partners for a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan, aimed at advancing shared national security objectives.

14. U.S. Assistance to Pakistan

The United States has provided significant military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing (FMF) and training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The United States has also provided significant reimbursements to Pakistan through the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) for support that Pakistan has provided to U.S. operations in Operation Enduring Freedom. Currently, both U.S. military assistance and reimbursements to Pakistan have been largely suspended.

In your view, under what conditions, if any, should the provision of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan under FMF and PCF be resumed?

Please see combined answer below.

In your view, under what conditions, if any, should the provision of reimbursements to Pakistan under CSF be resumed?

In my view, our current capacity-building programs with the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important component in improving the Pakistan military's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities in order for Pakistan's military to fight extremists whose safe havens enable terrorists that threaten the United States. Our assistance has also helped to improve cross-border coordination. Going forward, it is vital that Pakistan live up to its responsibilities, including to cooperate fully in counterterrorism matters, and to expand its counterinsurgency campaign against all extremists and militant groups that have found safe haven inside Pakistan. In the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid, the Administration asked Pakistan to take a number of concrete steps to demonstrate its continued commitment to a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship. Future provision of all security-related assistance will be informed by Pakistan's response to these requests and to the overall restart of our relationship in the wake of the November 26, 2011 cross-border incident that resulted in the deaths of 24 Pakistan Army soldiers. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure that the support the United States provides to Pakistan yields the results we seek.

15. Iraq

President Obama has said that the December 31st, 2011, withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Iraq marked the beginning of a “new chapter” in the U.S.-Iraq relationship.

What in your view are the highest priorities for the U.S.-Iraq security relationship going forward?

Developing a long-term security relationship with Iraq, as part of a broader enduring commitment to regional peace and security, is one of our highest priorities. This relationship should include consultation on regional security issues, and the continued development of appropriate Iraqi military capabilities.

What in your view are the greatest opportunities for U.S.-Iraq security cooperation going forward, and, if confirmed, how would you recommend that the Department of Defense pursue those opportunities?

The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), under Chief of Mission authority, is the cornerstone of the long-term U.S.-Iraqi strategic security partnership. It will serve as the main vehicle to expand our security cooperation relationship with the Iraqis. On a daily basis, the OSC-I coordinates security assistance and security cooperation activities, and conducts training to support the development and modernization of the Iraq Security Forces.

The Defense and Security Joint Coordination Committee (DSJCC), established under the Strategic Framework Agreement, is another vehicle to strengthen bilateral relations, including security cooperation. The DSJCC, the next meeting of which will take place in late May, will be co-chaired by the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control.

If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in advancing both of these important vehicles for expanding our security cooperation.

What do you see as the greatest challenges facing the Department with regard to our security relationship with Iraq and, if confirmed, how would you recommend meeting those challenges?

Ensuring Iraq's integration into the regional security framework will remain an important task. The Department will need to continue strengthening its security relationship with Iraq through security cooperation activities, while helping to expand Iraq's military engagement with key regional partners.

If confirmed, I will support the DSJCC and will seek to bolster the U.S.-Iraq defense partnership on a wide array of security matters.

16. Transatlantic Relationship and NATO

In your view, how important to U.S. national security interests is the U.S. transatlantic relationship with our European partners?

NATO remains of vital importance, and is a net provider of global security. As President Obama has said, Europe remains the cornerstone of our engagement with the world, and NATO is the most capable Alliance in history.

The transatlantic relationship is of critical importance to U.S. national security, and the transatlantic community has never been more closely aligned in confronting the challenges of a complex, dangerous, and fast-changing world. In Libya, NATO Allies came together with Arab and other partners to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, and to support the Libyan people. In Afghanistan, with nearly 40,000 Allied and partner forces alongside our own, we have built and sustained NATO's largest-ever overseas deployment. As Iran has continued to defy its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions, the United States, Europe, and other partners have put in place the toughest sanctions yet.

In your view, what is the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance in meeting U.S. security interests?

The United States has important stakes in a strong, mutually supportive NATO Alliance, and the President has stressed his strong desire to rebuild and adapt transatlantic security relationships to meet 21st century security challenges. NATO's new Strategic Concept is an important step in ensuring that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring the common security of its members, including in meeting U.S. security interests, and it will guide the next phase in NATO's evolution.

What are the greatest challenges and opportunities that you foresee for NATO over the next five years?

Over the next five years, the top NATO-related challenges include achieving durable progress and a successful transition in Afghanistan, implementing missile defense in Europe, and stemming the deterioration in European military capability. Many of our NATO Allies have been under-investing in defense capabilities, especially when it comes to deployable expeditionary forces. Many have significantly reduced their national defense budgets in response to the global economic crisis, and some are planning further cuts. A key challenge – and a key opportunity – will be for Allies to determine which capabilities must be sustained, and how that can be done in a more cost effective manner.

Should NATO consider an expanded role for Israel within the organization?

Israel is an active and valued partner of NATO through the Alliance's "Mediterranean Dialogue" program, which includes practical cooperation as well as political dialogue, both bilaterally with NATO and multilaterally including the other six Partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue. The United States supports and encourages this partnership, and encourages other Allies and partners to do so as well. The Mediterranean Dialogue includes an "Individual Cooperation Program," developed between NATO and Israel, which outlines Israeli desires for engagement with NATO.

17. Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, the Defense Department has requested and Congress has approved a number of temporary authorities to build the capacity of partner nations or provide security assistance. These include the "Section 1206" global train and equip authority, targeted authorities to build capacity in Yemen and East Africa, and the Global Security Contingency Fund.

In your view, what are the strategic objectives and priorities for the Department's programs for building the capacity of partner nations?

In my view, the primary strategic objective of the United States in building the capacity of foreign partners is to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries' internal security and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn, mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States, and serves to build a base of countries that can effectively participate in multinational coalition-based operations.

Successfully countering violent extremist networks requires that we develop and sustain a global network of allies and partners that is capable and interoperable. Additionally, once partners become capable and have sufficient capacity, they are able to help bolster regional security in a way that supports U.S. interests. In some cases, participation by these partner nations' forces

provide cultural and linguistic advantages that afford them better access and effectiveness than U.S. forces executing the same mission. For example, today Colombia provides justice sector and security force assistance to other U.S. partner nations in the Americas and Africa.

Finally, efforts to build partner capacity promote interoperability between U.S. and other nations' forces, and enable the U.S. military to establish personal connections and long-term relationships with foreign counterparts. We can never be certain where in the world U.S. forces may be required to operate. Enduring relationships with partner nations are at the core of a multinational coalition's strength, helping to secure shared access to facilities and territory, information, and diplomatic support.

What improvements, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to the strategic direction, oversight, and management of the Department's programs for building partner capacity to ensure that these programs are executed consistent with U.S. national security goals and objectives?

If confirmed, I would continue to support DoD capabilities and investments that encourage and enable partners to develop capable security forces and institutionalize the Department's capacity to provide high impact security force assistance. I would provide recommendations to the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense that enable them to make informed choices with regard to the location and frequency of DoD activities that build partners' security capacity. It is essential in this era of shifting focus and constrained resources that we carefully prioritize which partners we engage with, how often, and to what end.

Also if confirmed, I would continue to assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in implementing process improvements in the delivery of defense articles and services for urgent and emerging needs.

What is your assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of the Department's programs for building partner capacity in achieving U.S. national security goals and objectives?

In general, the Department's capacity building programs are useful tools that contribute significantly to the achievement of our national security goals and objectives. These programs are most effective when they are closely aligned with the Department of State's foreign policy objectives while addressing critical needs as identified by our foreign partners. This is best demonstrated by several examples.

First, our security force assistance programs with the Philippines military over the last several years have enabled those forces to conduct effective domestic counterterrorism operations and to contribute to regional maritime security. Specifically, we have improved their surveillance, tracking, and interception capabilities, and provided tactical equipment that has been used in numerous operations against extremist organizations in the Southern Philippines. Importantly, the provision of radars has been a catalyst for Philippine interest in acquiring secure communications methods, which will enable information sharing with U.S. Pacific Command on

radar and intelligence operations. The Government of the Philippines recognizes the importance of these investments and is now sustaining its newly acquired capabilities through national funds and Foreign Military Financing (FMF)/Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs.

Colombia is another good example of where more than a decade of security force assistance has enabled a partner to combat internal destabilizing elements effectively -- in that case, the FARC. In particular, we have provided support to aviation training, intelligence and operational fusion, operational planning, riverine operations, logistics, command and control, security, and medical training. Now, we are encouraged to see that Colombia is in turn providing justice sector and security force assistance of their own to other U.S. partner nations across the Americas and in Africa.

Finally, Georgia is an example of how our coalition support authorities have enabled a relatively small partner nation to serve in Afghanistan, not only deploying there with battalion-sized combat units that operate without caveats, but punching well above their weight class while doing so. The provision of high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, night vision goggles, communications equipment, and training has enabled Georgian forces to make a significant contribution to coalition operations, in turn lessening the burden on U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan.

In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis the State Department and other civilian departments and agencies, in efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces?

The United States will be more successful at deterring and responding to security challenges when allies and partner security forces act in a way that is complementary to U.S. goals and objectives. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, our continuing efforts to counter violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal organizations, and our preparations for future contingencies clearly illustrate the need for capable partners who can apply capabilities complementary to U.S. military objectives. In that vein, I believe that the Department of Defense should sustain and grow the capability to develop partner security forces, especially forces to train, advise, and assist partners during conflict.

Building the capacity of foreign security forces is a shared responsibility within the executive branch, particularly by the Departments of State and Defense. Close collaboration between the Departments is a key characteristic of the Section 1206 authority, and one of its greatest strengths. The Global Security Contingency Fund epitomizes this shared responsibility, and represents an opportunity for DOS and DoD to plan for contingencies jointly, and to establish a new business model for interagency planning of security sector assistance.

18. Russia

What is your assessment of the current U.S.-Russian security relationship?

In September 2010, then-Secretary Gates and Russian Minister of Defense Serdyukov advanced the U.S.-Russia defense relationship by establishing the Defense Relations Working Group (DRWG). Through its eight sub-working groups, the Department engages with the Russian Ministry of Defense across a spectrum of cooperative defense activities – missile defense, defense technology, social welfare, training and education, as well as regional and global security, and defense policy. These efforts have helped each country gain important insights into one another’s defense establishments. Reciprocity is a key element of this engagement. The defense relationship and military-to-military activities are focused in part on helping Russia’s efforts to reform its Armed Forces, and a reformed Russian military is a positive goal worth pursuing. These efforts are not enhancing the combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces.

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) cooperation continues to be a steady component of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Although the international agreement that governs CTR cooperation with Russia (i.e., the CTR “Umbrella Agreement”) is due to expire in June 2013, the Administration looks forward to an extension of this agreement and a continuation of its work with Russia.

What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russian security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?

The United States and Russia should be able to cooperate effectively in the many areas where we share common interests; communicate effectively in areas where we have competing interests; and negotiate reasonably in areas where we have overlapping interests.

Among the most important areas where the United States and Russia have common interests is in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. We have had significant cooperation on – for example – Iran. The Russians cancelled a major weapons sale worth several hundred million dollars to Iran in 2010 and supported UNSCR 1929, which imposed international sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs. I believe that the United States should continue to seek Russian support to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons. Similarly, Russia is a key player in reversing North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and shares common interests in this regard. As a third example, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program continues to be one of the most successful cooperative programs in the U.S.-Russia relationship. Finally, the United States and Russia share strong interests in reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, as reflected in the New START Treaty.

Russia also has an interest in stability in Afghanistan. U.S. efforts in Afghanistan have benefited greatly from improved security relations with Russia. The Northern Distribution Network has been critical to continued operations given the closure of our Pakistan ground lines of communication. Russia allows our military personnel, supplies, and equipment to transit its territory by air and rail and will soon allow for reverse transit from Afghanistan. Russia has also been forward-leaning in identifying possible areas of cooperation on counternarcotics, and we have been engaging Russia to develop these ideas.

What are the greatest challenges in the U.S.-Russian security relationship?

The United States has developed a constructive relationship with Russia over the past several years. Despite mutual cooperation, challenges remain and progress has been uneven in some areas. Georgia, conventional arms control in Europe, and missile defense are some of the more challenging issues in our bilateral security relationship.

In the case of Georgia, the United States is holding Russia to the letter of the Medvedev-Sarkozy Agreement, urging it to restore international monitors to the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Department would like to see more transparency on Russian military activity in the region. Together with our European partners, we will maintain our support for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders and will continue to support international efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the dispute over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

We would like to see more progress on conventional arms control in Europe and Russia's full implementation of its existing commitments. The United States is committed to revitalizing the conventional arms control regime in Europe and continues to consult on a way forward with Russia and our other Treaty partners.

Finally, differences remain on missile defense. As President Obama has stated, the United States is committed to finding the right approach to enable missile defense cooperation with Russia. A U.S.-Russia agreement to cooperate on missile defense would remove a major irritant from the relationship. We continue to believe that cooperation with Russia on missile defense can enhance the security of the United States, our allies in Europe, and Russia. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in working with Russia to define the parameters of possible cooperation.

In your view, what policy steps should DOD take to improve security relations with Russia? For instance would you support increased military-to-military relations and exchanges with Russia?

DoD has been a proponent and a beneficiary of the reset with Russia. The OSD-MOD Defense Relations Working Group and the Joint Staff-General Staff Military Cooperation Working Group revived U.S.-Russia defense and military relations from the low-point after the Russo-Georgia War.

As a result, DoD has a robust military-to-military work plan and is constantly looking for ways to improve the relationship and contribute to greater security in the Euro-Atlantic space. The 2012 Military Cooperation Work Plan includes more than 100 events and comprises a variety of activities such as cadet exchanges, exercises, senior leader visits, and conferences. Over time, cooperation on a wide range of issues may help to build a foundation for more concrete and substantive cooperation with Russia.

One way to improve cooperation would be a U.S.-Russia agreement to cooperate on missile defense. Such an agreement would remove a major irritant from the relationship, send a strong signal to Iran that development of long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons would be a waste of resources, add to the effectiveness of our missile defense system, and could help re-cast perceptions U.S.-Russia relations on both sides.

Would you support any joint development or other programs with Russia?

If confirmed, I would be interested in supporting joint programs that would benefit the United States. Through the Defense Technology Cooperation Sub-Working under the Defense Relations Working Group, DoD has been looking for such opportunities. Before undertaking any joint programs, the United States and Russia would need to conclude a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement, which has been in negotiation for some time.

19. Iran

The President said: “America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no option off the table to achieve that goal.”

Do you agree that we should leave all options on the table with respect to Iran? If so, why? If not, why not?

Yes, I agree with the President that all options should remain on the table to address Iran’s illicit activities. It is DoD’s responsibility to plan for all contingencies, and through prudent military planning we continue to refine options to protect U.S. and partner interests from Iranian aggression. However, we continue to believe that diplomacy and economic pressure are the most effective tools for changing Iranian behavior at this time.

In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense for advancing the President’s policy with respect to Iran?

The Department of Defense plays a supporting role in the whole-of-government strategy of engagement and pressure toward Iran, which is led by the Departments of State and Treasury. In addition to DoD’s support of interagency efforts, it is the responsibility of the Department of Defense to plan for all contingencies, and to provide the President with a wide range of military options should they become necessary.

20. China

China’s defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of military growth is to be expected for a country experiencing the kind of economic growth that China has had over about that same period,

the types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China's intentions in the region.

How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China?

The senior-most leaders of our two countries have consistently affirmed the need for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. I would describe the relationship as simultaneously possessing elements of cooperation and competition. The United States, including the Department of Defense, continues to pursue opportunities to cooperate where there is a mutual benefit, while pursuing frank discussions in areas where we may have differences.

What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program?

China appears to be building the capability to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery, and also to counter intervention by third parties. Its near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, and deterring or denying effective intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery. China's growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear forces, and is improving other strategic capabilities, such as in space, counter-space, and computer network operations.

How should the United States respond to this Chinese military growth and modernization?

I believe the United States should continue to monitor developments in China's military concepts and capabilities, while encouraging Beijing to be more transparent about its military and security affairs. The United States has been and should remain the pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region in order to preserve the conditions that have fostered peace and prosperity. The U.S. response to China's military modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our alliances and partnerships.

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

As Secretary of Defense Panetta and China's Vice President Xi affirmed in February, a healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship is an essential part of President Obama's and President Hu's shared vision for building a cooperative partnership.

I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region to discuss the peacetime interaction of our respective military forces so as to minimize the risk of accidents, and to press China to partner with the United States and our Asian allies and partners in addressing common security challenges.

Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly work if China is equally committed to open and regular exchanges. If confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.

By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air, and space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in particular is China's increased aggressiveness in asserting its excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea.

What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea?

The United States is a Pacific nation with a national interest in freedom of navigation and overflight, open access to Asia's maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law, including in the South China Sea. In my view, the United States should not take a position on the competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea; all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with international law, without resorting to the threat or use of force.

The United States should continue to call upon all parties to clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms consistent with international law. Accordingly, claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.

How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation?

The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the South China Sea. I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain its presence and assert our freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary international law.

Preservation of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea depend largely upon their continual exercise. Around the world, U.S. military forces conduct operations to challenge excessive maritime claims asserted by coastal States. In the South China Sea, we have expressed our desire for respect for freedom of navigation and overflight for many decades, through operational assertions against excessive maritime claims asserted by several nations. Of note, we challenge excessive maritime claims asserted by any nation, including excessive claims by allies and partners.

Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential conflict situation.

If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack?

If confirmed, I would work with other parts of DoD and the U.S. Government, including the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Commerce, to facilitate a coordinated approach to cyber threats, not only from China, but from others as well. We must work together as governments not only to defend, but also to develop options to respond to and impose costs on cyber threat actors so as to deter future exploitation and attack. The President stated in his International Strategy for Cyberspace that the United States reserves the right to use all necessary means – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law -- in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests against hostile acts on cyberspace. In my view, we should continue to prepare to do so as necessary, while continuing to strengthen international norms of behavior regarding this essential area.

21. North Korea

Even with the recent death of long-time leader Kim Jong-il, North Korea remains one of the greatest near-term challenges to security and stability in Asia, and deterring conflict on the Korean Peninsula remains a top priority. On April 12, 2012, North Korea launched what it said was satellite launch vehicle, despite broad international condemnation and in contravention of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874.

Despite the failure of the April 12th launch, what do you see as the implications for regional security and stability of North Korea's continued refusal to curb its provocative behavior?

North Korea's April 12 missile test will not be its last. Not only the United States, but every country in the region recognizes that such actions, in contravention of UN Security Council

resolutions 1718 and 1874, pose a threat to regional stability. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in working closely with our allies and partners to strengthen security cooperation and ensure optimal readiness against North Korea's unpredictable and reckless behavior.

What is your understanding of the threats posed to the United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities?

North Korea's missile and WMD programs pose a direct and serious threat to our regional allies and partners, and have the potential to become a direct threat to U.S. territory. As we witnessed in 2006 and 2009, North Korea continues to flight-test theater ballistic missiles, demonstrating the capability to target South Korea and Japan. North Korea also continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), which Pyongyang claims to have tested in a space launch configuration, but which could also reach the United States if developed as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

The United States must continue to monitor carefully North Korea's WMD and missile development programs and related proliferation activities. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DoD continues to work closely with other parts of the U.S. Government to address these and other emerging threats, to reduce our vulnerabilities and those of our allies and partners, and to work cooperatively with our allies to ensure our contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.

What concerns you most about North Korea and, if confirmed, what would you do to address those concerns?

North Korea maintains a large, forward deployed conventional military, continues to develop long-range ballistic missiles, seeks to develop nuclear weapons, and engages in the proliferation of ballistic missiles contrary to international norms and UN Security Council resolutions. North Korea has also conducted provocative attacks against the Republic of Korea. What concerns me most is that this range of threats comes from a single state standing on the outside of the international community. If confirmed, I will ensure that we sustain and advance our military readiness and coordination with allies and partners, and explore all avenues for shaping North Korean behavior.

22. Republic of Korea

What is your understanding of the current status of the U. S.-South Korean security relationship?

In my view, the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance remains one of the cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and is as strong and viable today as it has ever been. Our security relationship is based on a mutual commitment to common interests, shared values,

continuous dialogue, and combined planning, all of which ensure a comprehensive strategic Alliance.

What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this transition takes place as planned?

The United States and the ROK have a comprehensive way forward to transition wartime operational control from the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff by December 2015. If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in working with ROK counterparts, and with others in the U.S. and ROK governments, to complete this process under the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework and ensure that the combined defense posture remains strong and seamless throughout the transition process.

What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?

The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces from north of Seoul and from the Seoul Metropolitan area to locations south of Seoul, primarily U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys and Daegu. The movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han River provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to the political sustainability of our forward presence, and improves force protection and survivability by placing the majority of personnel and equipment outside of the tactical effective range of North Korean artillery.

Since the North Korean attacks last year – the sinking of the South Korea Navy ship CHEONAN and the artillery attack on the South Korean island – South Korea has been adamant that it will responded “firmly” to the next such provocation. A main topic during recent U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings was the Joint Operational Plan for responding to future North Korean provocations.

What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe the U.S. armed forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?

My understanding is that, under the Mutual Defense Treaty, when the political independence or security of the ROK or the United States is threatened by external armed attack, the United States and the ROK will consult together and develop appropriate means to deter the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of North Korean provocations, the two sides should continue to consult closely so that responses are effective.

23. Japan

How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship?

The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security in East Asia. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in the region. Our Alliance has held fast through the turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and at times contentious trade disputes, and now stands poised as a truly global Alliance. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a complicated realignment process that is part of a larger Alliance Transformation agenda that also includes a review of roles, missions, and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability, and cohesiveness of the Alliance for the next several decades. In terms of our military-to-military relationship, the shared experience of U.S. and Japanese forces, working should-to-shoulder in response to the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis of last spring, validated our continuing close cooperation and mutual respect.

What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

Japan is already a close Ally and strong security partner with the United States, and is increasingly contributing to international security activities; however, the changing security environment in Asia will present new challenges. The United States needs to continue to work with Japan to deal with these challenges, including greater interoperability between our armed forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would encourage Japan's development of joint doctrine and organizations that will enhance Japan's ability to undertake complex missions to build security in East Asia. I would also encourage trilateral security cooperation with the United States, Japan, and both the ROK and Australia, as these kinds of activities effectively strengthen the functional capacity of the emerging regional security architecture. Regarding international security activity, Japan has actively participated in combined counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, is participating in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and has been a significant donor to ongoing Afghanistan reconstruction. I believe participation in such international security operations are very positive developments, and would encourage future Japanese participation in such missions.

The U.S. and Japan have decided to revisit some of the terms of the 2006 Roadmap Agreement as they relate to the realignment of U.S. Marines on Okinawa and to delink the movement of Marines off Okinawa from the plan to build a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab. It appears that, while the number of Marines leaving Okinawa will not change, fewer will be relocated to Guam.

What is your understanding of the current plans for U.S. military forces on Okinawa and Guam?

Plans for U.S. military forces on Okinawa and Guam should result in a force posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. A significant number of U.S. Marine Corps forces will move from Okinawa to Guam, which is a strategic hub

that supports our ability to operate forces from a forward location. At the same time, we will maintain forces in Okinawa to provide deterrence and rapidly respond to security challenges in areas around Japan.

Although planned posture shifts will result in a rebalancing of our forces, they will not negatively affect our ability to respond to contingencies or meet treaty obligations in Asia. They demonstrate our commitment to allies and to fulfilling our agreements with allies and partners.

How does delinking the movement of Marines off Okinawa from the construction of the FRF impact the realignment of Marines in Northeast Asia?

Delinking the movement of U.S. Marines off Okinawa will allow the United States to move forward with the realignment of the Marine Corps in Northeast Asia, which is in our strategic interests as we seek to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Specifically, de-linkage will allow the United States to establish a force posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.

The United States and Japan remain committed to constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) as the only viable alternative to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, and are working together in taking the next step prior to the start of construction: securing the Governor's approval for the landfill permit.

What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?

I believe that the Government of Japan (GOJ), like the U.S. Government, remains committed to the principles of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap, and although both governments have acknowledged that the Futenma Replacement Facility will not be constructed by 2014, as originally planned, there appears to be incremental but positive movement towards the construction of a replacement facility at Camp Schwab. The GOJ submission of the environmental impact statement to the prefectural government of Okinawa in December 2011 was a necessary and politically significant step forward. The U.S. Government is committed to working with the GOJ in taking the next step prior to the start of construction -- securing the Governor's approval for the landfill permit.

If confirmed, how would you work with the Commander, Pacific Command, and the military services to update U.S. military force posture in Japan and the Pacific Theater?

If confirmed, I would engage frequently and proactively with the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, and the Military Departments, as well as the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to update U.S. force posture in Japan and the Pacific. I firmly believe that maintaining a strong and comprehensive relationship with my military counterparts is essential to creating a force posture that makes sense both strategically and operationally.

24. India

What is your view of the current state of U.S.-India security relations?

Today, U.S.-India defense ties are strong and growing, including a robust slate of dialogues, military exercises, defense trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments cooperation. The strong ties between our two militaries reflect this. Over the past decade, there has been a rapid transformation in the U.S.-India defense relationship. What was once a nascent relationship between unfamiliar nations has evolved into a strategic partnership between two of the preeminent security powers in Asia.

A close, continuing, and expanding security relationship between the United States and India will be important for security and stability in Asia and for effectively managing Indian Ocean security in the twenty-first century. Having said this, India has a long history of non-alignment and is firmly committed to its policy of strategic autonomy. The continued growth of our partnership should be focused on working closely on common interests in a true partnership.

If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

If confirmed, I believe our priorities for this relationship should focus on increasing maritime security cooperation, expanding the military-to-military relationship, and deepening cooperation on defense trade, including cooperative research and development. There is potential for increased cooperation on counter-proliferation, collaboration on humanitarian assistance and disaster response, countering piracy, cooperation on counter-terrorism, greater intelligence sharing on common threats, and working towards stability in Afghanistan and the broader Indian Ocean region.

What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and Pakistan?

India and Pakistan have a long and complex history characterized by animosity, mistrust, and conflict. Support by elements of Pakistan's military and intelligence services for violent extremist organizations targeting India has the potential to result in military confrontation that could rapidly escalate to a nuclear exchange.

Current efforts toward a renewed comprehensive dialogue have yielded few concrete results on the core security issues, especially regarding the resolution of territorial disputes; however, the efforts have increased people-to-people exchanges and trade relations between the two nations, and have provided each side greater insight into the other's positions. Although progress is slow, the trajectory is positive and offers the promise of increased confidence-building measures.

In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?

India's actions in South and Central Asia generally align with U.S. goals: increasing economic growth and political stability through strengthened democratic institutions, and developmental assistance to help prevent radicalization. Regional stability ultimately depends on cooperation among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Transparency in the India-Afghanistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relationships is critical to reduce misunderstanding and mistrust between India and Pakistan. The ongoing transition of lead responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan forces, and the strategic partnerships Afghanistan has been negotiating with the United States and other international partners are important steps toward demonstrating long-term commitment of the international community, addressing conditions that create uncertainty, and stabilizing the region.

What effect, if any, do you anticipate that India's successful test launch of the Agni V rocket on April 19, 2012, will have on India-U.S. relations?

India's successful test launch of the Agni V rocket demonstrates that India is increasingly capable of developing its indigenous weapons systems and has a role to play in international nonproliferation forums. India has a strong track record on nonproliferation issues, both of missile and WMD technology. We continue to urge all nuclear-capable states to exercise restraint regarding nuclear and missile capabilities, and continue to discourage actions that might destabilize the South Asia region.

25. Republic of the Philippines

What is the current state of U. S.-Philippine military-to-military relations, including efforts to increase the number of rotational U.S. forces operating from the Philippines?

The Philippines is one of the United States' five treaty allies in the Pacific and remains a committed security partner facing regional challenges characteristic of current geo-strategic realities. In my view, the Alliance is strong and is the foundation of our security partnership. The U.S. military-to-military engagement with the Philippines is mature and focused, allowing the Philippines security forces (military, coast guard, and police) to address security needs more effectively as evidenced by enhanced counter-terrorism performance, expanded maritime security activities, increased multilateral engagement, and effective participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

What is your assessment of recent U. S. military efforts in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U. S. assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against insurgent groups?

U.S. military efforts and assistance in the Philippines are in support of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to which both sides are committed. The United States, however, does not assist the Philippines in its fight against insurgent groups (e.g., the New People's Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front). The Philippines was the first country in Asia to support the

United States after 9-11 in fighting terrorism. In this regard, U.S. military assistance is focused on helping the Philippines fight terrorism by assisting with the development of skill sets that are no different than those needed to help and protect its civilian population. It is the Philippine Government's prerogative to assert its capabilities and resources where needed in conducting its internal security operations.

Do you anticipate a reduced or increased U. S. military footprint or change in mission for U. S. military forces in the Philippines in the near to mid-term?

The United States and the Philippines are discussing arrangements that would allow greater flexibility for U.S. and Philippine security forces to train and work together. This may increase U.S. military engagement with the Philippines in the near to mid-term.

26. Indonesia

What is the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?

In 2010, Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono inaugurated the U.S.-Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership. A key element of this broad partnership is the security component. Our defense relationship with Indonesia – a pivotal country to U.S. national interests – is managed through the Defense Framework Arrangement and facilitated through several forums and mechanisms. Our military-to-military relations with Indonesia are robust and continue to progress and mature, with nearly 200 theater security cooperation activities scheduled for this fiscal year. These security cooperation engagements include a wide range of activities focused on four main areas of emphasis: Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief, Peace Keeping Operations, Maritime Security, and continued Professionalization / Reform of the Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI). Beginning with the normalization of the military-to-military relationship in 2005, engagements have increased in number and evolved from initial small-scale bilateral exchanges into more complex bilateral and multilateral activities.

In addressing the current state of military-to-military relations with the Indonesian Army Special Forces (Kopassus), it is worth noting that this unit has undergone a near-complete transformation over the past decade and is at the forefront of TNI professionalization and adherence to human rights standards. Following a 12-year hiatus in bilateral activities, at the direction of then-Secretary Gates, U.S. Pacific Command established a measured and gradual program of security cooperation activities with Kopassus. These security cooperation activities have consisted of key leader engagements and small-scale subject matter expert exchanges in areas such as military decision making, medical planning, law of war, and safeguarding human rights. I anticipate that these types of activities will continue and gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the demonstrated progress in TNI transparency and reform efforts. Chief among these reform efforts are the fulfillment of commitments made by Indonesian leaders to the Department of Defense in 2010 to continue to safeguard human rights and accountability throughout the Indonesian

military through the unequivocal investigation and prosecution of those military personnel accused of human rights abuses and, if convicted, their removal from military service.

Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-military contact within the context of the Comprehensive Partnership, guided by close consultation between the Departments of State and Defense, and within the boundaries of existing legal mechanisms. I believe close military-to-military relations with Indonesia are integral to achieving numerous stated U.S. national interests in the region. I also believe that one of the most effective methods for encouraging reform is through interaction between Indonesian and U.S. service members. Interactions with U.S. service members reinforce professional military practices, including respect for human rights and the rule of law. Increased interactions facilitate greater understanding and reinforce professional values.

27. Global Force Posture

As the Defense Department continues its assessment of projected budget cuts on its end strength, force structure, and other programs, it must also consider the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the permanent stationing of military forces in countries around the world. Based on a series of reports by the Government Accountability Office, evidence indicates that the Department is challenged in its ability to comprehensively and reliably estimate the cost of our global defense posture.

What is your understanding and assessment of the cost and benefits of the U.S. global defense posture and the stationing of U.S. military forces overseas?

There is high value in U.S. military presence overseas. The United States maintains a posture overseas in order to defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests—which are global in nature—as well as to deter aggression, ensure regional stability, demonstrate commitment to the security of Allies and partners, and facilitate working alongside Allies and partners to address security challenges. There is a clear value in deterrence, assurance, and rapid crisis response, though these benefits are often difficult to quantify precisely.

Sustaining U.S. military presence using forces stationed in the United States incurs rotational costs on top of the basic basing and facilities costs associated with every unit, regardless of where it is stationed. Conversely, sustaining this presence using forces stationed overseas often incurs higher basing, personnel (through allowances such as Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA)), and facilities costs. The Department employs a continuous review process to determine the appropriate balance between U.S.-based and overseas-stationed forces, taking account of the conditions in each region and the operational demands on U.S. forces.

In light of the force structure reductions associated with the Department’s planned end strength cuts, and potentially even deeper future end strength cuts, if confirmed, how would you propose to allocate those reductions between forces based within the United States and forces stationed outside the United States?

Our plans for global force presence are directly linked to our Defense Strategic Guidance. The Department employs a continuous review process to determine the appropriate balance between U.S.-based and overseas-stationed forces, taking account of the conditions in each region and the operational demands on U.S. forces. If deeper end-strength reductions are required by Congress, our current defense strategy, and our associated global posture, will need to be reviewed.

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD methodology and assumptions used to evaluate the relative cost of overseas posture compared to stationing forces in the United States?

The Department employs a continuous review process to determine whether our strategic and national interests are best served by U.S.-based or overseas-stationed forces. Considerations include: operational requirements articulated by the geographic and functional Combatant Commanders, consistent with current strategy and assigned missions; the political-military dynamics and the risks and implications of change; force management and force structure efficiencies and effects; issues relating to the executability of stationing; and costs, including the offsets provided by some host-nation governments. The Department believes there is a high value provided by maintaining forces forward; further, stationing forces forward can yield significant efficiencies in force structure and force management.

If confirmed, what actions would you take or changes would you recommend, if any, to DOD’s methodology and assumptions in determining the cost of overseas force posture compared to forces stationed in the United States?

Working with the Congress and the Government Accountability Office over the past several years, the Department has improved its global defense posture management process, which is now on a strong, positive trajectory. In particular, the Department has made significant improvements to the theater posture planning and decision-making process, including enhanced cost reporting and improved consideration of costs. If confirmed, I would endeavor to keep the Department on this positive trajectory and ensure continuation of improved cost accountability in our overseas posture decision-making.

28. Combatting Terrorism

The Administration recently released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda’s core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups “that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia.”

If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to combating terrorism?

If confirmed, I would be the deputy principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy, including counterterrorism policy. My role, if confirmed, would be to formulate, coordinate, and present the views of the Secretary on counterterrorism policy issues. Currently these are mainly oriented on the effort to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa'ida, which includes operations and activities against its allies, adherents and affiliates, but we also recognize that there are other terrorist groups that may seek to cause harm to the U.S., its interests and allies.

I would work closely in performance of these duties with the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Department of Defense General Counsel, the Joint Staff, and the regional and functional Assistant Secretaries in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, particularly the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, who has the Department lead for all special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. I would carefully consider the views of our interagency colleagues and international partners to consider whole of government solutions to counterterrorism problems.

On September 22, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton launched the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) with 30 founding members from around the world. The GCTF is a major initiative within the Obama Administration's broader effort to build the international architecture for dealing with terrorism. The primary focus of the GCTF is capacity building in relevant areas and aims to increase the number of countries capable of dealing with the terrorist threats within their borders and regions.

What is your understanding of this initiative?

The GCTF is a multilateral platform that will provide a venue for countries to meet and identify counterterrorism needs and mobilize the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs and enhance global cooperation. The GCTF is intended to complement ongoing efforts with the United Nations, as well as other regional and sub-regional bodies. I understand that the September launch of the GCTF was positively received by all of the countries involved.

Given the emphasis on building partner capacity, what is your understanding for the role of the DOD – and in particular special operations forces – in this initiative?

Special Operations Forces will continue to have a leading role in our operations and activities to defeat al-Qa'ida. The Department is prepared to sustain a significant number of deployed SOF around the world, working closely with allies and partners to develop the capabilities and capacities they need to rid their territories of terrorists and prevent their resurgence. The Department sees this as predominantly an advise and assist mission, but the United States should always reserve the right to take direct action in order to defend itself from a terrorist attack.

The defeat of al-Qa'ida cannot be achieved without bringing together the expertise and resources of the entire U.S. Government – intelligence, law enforcement, military, and other instruments of national power – in a coordinated and synchronized manner. If confirmed, I would seek strong relationships with DoD's interagency partners – in particular, the National Counter Terrorism Center, the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications – to maximize DoD's efforts to counter violent extremism. The GCTF, as a State Department-led effort, is one example where SOF's counterterrorism and security cooperation activities can support and inform interagency partners' efforts in counterterrorism.

29. Department of Defense Counternarcotics Activities

On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1.5 billion to support U.S. CN operations, build the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?

Drug trafficking and associated transnational organized crime pose multidimensional challenges to U.S. and international security interests. In addition to the impact on our nation's public health and economy, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source for terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate governments, and contribute to international instability.

DoD counternarcotics efforts support global DoD national security objectives by building partner nation capacity and working with U.S. law enforcement agencies such as DEA, CBP, FBI, and ICE to disrupt narcotics trafficking. These cost-effective, small-footprint efforts are consistent with the Department's January 2012 strategic guidance.

Terrorist groups and insurgent movements are increasingly turning to criminality -- including narcotics and other illicit trafficking -- to perpetuate and expand their activities. This is certainly the case in Colombia and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the insurgency uses the narcotics trade as a critical source of revenue, and therefore, DoD focuses its efforts on degrading narco-insurgent networks through sustained counternarcotics operations and building the capacity of Afghan counternarcotics forces and judicial system. If confirmed, I would continue to work with interagency partners to provide support to counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan to mitigate or eliminate the narcotics threat, which endangers our objectives and undermines the viability of the government of Afghanistan.

There is some evidence of criminal organizations, such as Mexico-based drug cartels, adopting terrorist tactics in their operations. Criminals and terrorists are also directly working together. We only need to look at the recent Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington by engaging the Los Zetas transnational criminal organization to see this trend. In

different circumstances, the links between crime, terrorism, and insurgency may range from full integration, to occasional cooperation, to drawing on overlapping networks of money launderers, weapons providers, corrupt governmental officials, and other facilitators. Even when there is no direct nexus between drug trafficking, terrorism and insurgency, these and related threats tend to feed on and worsen conditions of weak governance.

DoD provides critical training, equipment, infrastructure, information sharing, technology research and development, transportation, communications, analytical, reconnaissance, and related support to U.S. and foreign counterdrug law enforcement agencies and other security services. In doing so, DoD seeks to provide one element in wider whole-of-government strategies to reduce drug trafficking, build rule of law, extend effective governance, and stabilize endangered regions. Within the United States, DoD provides counternarcotics support primarily through the National Guard, but also provides other domestic law enforcement support in specialized areas. As a matter of law, DoD also has the lead responsibility in the U.S. Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. Even in this mission area, however, DoD cooperates with U.S. and foreign partners.

What is your understanding of the Department's CN authorities?

Since the enactment of 10 USC 124 in 1989 and Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 1991, the Department's counternarcotics authorities have allowed the Department to provide critical support for U.S. and partner nation law enforcement efforts to confront drug trafficking into the United States. Today, these and subsequent counternarcotics authorities provide the Department with critical tools to confront the association and convergence of narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and related transnational organized crime, that pose a growing threat to our national security interests.

These authorities allow the Department to enhance the capabilities of State, local, tribal, Federal, and international law enforcement partners. The Department's counternarcotics authorities support the National Guard's counterdrug activities in 54 States and territories and the theater campaign plans of all six geographic combatant commands. These authorities are often invaluable in achieving strategic national security objectives. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure that these authorities are sustained.

Should the United States reassess ongoing efforts to combat the trafficking of illegal narcotics in the Western Hemisphere given the increasing concerns of many of the nations in the Hemisphere about the lack of results from the decades old war on drugs?

The U.S. Government, including the Department of Defense, consults closely with governments, policy experts, civil society leaders, international organizations, and others throughout the Western Hemisphere, to refine our combined efforts against illegal drug production, trafficking, and consumption. In this regard, we are working with the interagency to synchronize U.S. and partner country military, intelligence, law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial, and penal efforts

with public health, anti-corruption, economic development, financial regulation, and related activities to address weaknesses that transnational criminal organizations exploit and exacerbate. The United States and partner countries are also cooperating to ensure that counter-drug efforts are integrated with operations against related threats, such as weapons smuggling, money laundering, kidnapping, extortion, and in some places, terrorism and insurgency. The term “citizen security” is now widely used in the Western Hemisphere to signify that governments need to go beyond suppressing crime to provide justice and security to their populations. Defense Department counternarcotics efforts play a supporting role, but by no means the leading one.

All DoD international counternarcotics support is provided at the request of, and in close coordination with, the partner nation and the U.S. Embassy. DoD also plays a coordinating role, providing support to multinational efforts to exchange counternarcotics information and coordinating interagency and multinational interdiction efforts through Joint Interagency Task Force – South.

Colombia is one of the best examples of what can be achieved by sustained U.S. support for a partner country’s efforts resulting in a real return on investment. Once facing a seemingly insurmountable narco-terrorist problem that threatened to overwhelm its legitimate government, the Colombian Government today clearly has the upper hand and is extending effective governance by working to resolve many of the social issues underlying that country’s protracted conflict. Colombia still has a long way to go, but it has turned the corner. Narco-terrorist organizations and other transnational criminal organizations are, however, extremely flexible. As Colombia, the United States, Mexico and other countries have put pressure on criminal organizations over time, the surviving groups have adapted by dispersing to places such as Central America, forming global illicit networks, and diversifying into other crimes. Therefore, our efforts must continue to be flexible to keep pace with this ever-evolving threat.

30. National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime

Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people. Last July, President Obama released the first National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. The Department of Defense is not a law enforcement agency, but it does bring unique enabling capabilities to our nation’s Federal law enforcement agencies.

What role, if any, should the Department of Defense play in combating transnational criminal organizations?

The President’s *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* declares that transnational organized crime “poses a significant threat to national and international security.” The Strategy calls for the U.S. Government to “build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat TOC (transnational organized crime).” This direction – to take a whole-of-government approach to combating a national security threat – includes an important role for the Department

of Defense. I believe that DoD should continue to focus on delivering unique capabilities to support law enforcement agencies that are combating transnational organized crime.

Specifically, I believe that DoD should continue to provide military intelligence support to law enforcement, counter-threat finance support, and military-to-military capability development. When appropriate (e.g. in theaters of conflict), DoD may take the lead in operational activities against specific transnational criminal threats to the United States. As the President's Strategy notes, transnational organized crime "presents sophisticated and multifaceted threats that cannot be addressed through law enforcement action alone." DoD's capabilities and authorities are thus critical supporting tools to broader U.S. Government efforts against transnational organized crime.

The President's Strategy also directs DoD to enhance "support to U.S. law enforcement through the Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support Center," a dedicated DoD-led center that integrates military, intelligence, and law enforcement analytic capabilities to go after key nodes in global criminal networks. This guidance further reflects the added value that the Defense Department brings to whole-of-government efforts against transnational organized crime.

DoD should also consider how it can play a role in breaking the links among criminal organizations, terrorists, and insurgencies. As the President's strategy states, "terrorists and insurgents are increasingly turning to TOC to generate funding and acquiring logistical support to carry out their violent acts." As the Department continues with its counterterrorism efforts around the world, it will be important to account for the links between criminal and terrorist entities.

31. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.

What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?

I strongly support U.S. accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?

I do not believe there are any national security disadvantages to the United States becoming a treaty Party, and there are numerous advantages. As a treaty Party, the United States could best preserve the navigational freedoms enshrined in the Convention and not have to rely on customary international law, which is subject to change based on state practice. In turn, this could allow us to influence the development and interpretation of the Convention, reflective of our status as the world's premier maritime power.

What is your understanding of the principal arguments against ratifying UNCLOS, and what is your response to those arguments?

From what I understand, there are a range of arguments against accession, including that the United States would surrender a portion of its sovereignty. Simply stated, this is a flawed argument. As a treaty Party, we can reinforce our navigational freedoms--key to our global power projection capabilities and access.

32. Cyberspace

What is your understanding of the role of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the development of policy and strategy for military operations in cyberspace and in exercising oversight of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency?

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) advises the Secretary of Defense on the formulation of DoD cyberspace policy and strategy, including development and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives in and through cyberspace. OUSDP, through the Joint Staff, works closely with U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command on cyberspace strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of cyberspace operations. A close partnership with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the National Security Agency ensures that policy formulation and execution are well informed and supported by their cyber capabilities and expertise.

In the cyberspace domain, for each of the mission areas of cyber network defense, cyber network exploitation, and cyber network attack, what is your understanding of the relationship between the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and each of the following: the Chief Information Officer; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSDP) serves as the lead within DoD in the development, coordination, and operational oversight of overarching DoD strategy, policy, and planning related to cyberspace. The Chief Information Officer is the primary official responsible for policy matters and oversight of Information Resources Management, Information Technology, Information Assurance, and network operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics advises the Secretary on cyberspace matters relating to the DoD Acquisition System; research and development; modeling and simulation; systems engineering; advanced technology; developmental test and evaluation; production; and systems integration. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence advises the Secretary on cyberspace intelligence, counterintelligence, security and other intelligence-related matters.

What is your assessment of the maturity and adequacy of policy and doctrine governing defensive, offensive, and intelligence-gathering operations in cyberspace,

both within the Department of Defense and the interagency? What gaps or deficiencies remain, in your view?

The Department of Defense continues to assess organizational relationships, doctrine, and policies necessary for its cyberspace mission. As it continues to develop cyber capabilities, DoD is addressing cyber governance in general by refining doctrine, training, standing rules of engagement, and command and control structures for cyberspace operations. DoD continues to work closely with interagency partners to meet the cross-cutting challenges of cyberspace. DoD also supports the *Cybersecurity Act of 2012* to provide for the development of risk-based standards for the critical infrastructure that the Department depends upon for its national security mission.

What is your assessment of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis other government agencies (such as the Department of Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, and the Justice Department) and the private sector in preparing for, and the conduct of, the defense of government and critical infrastructure networks in cyberspace?

As stated in the *Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace*, DoD is partnering closely with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, as well as the private sector, to enable a whole-of-government approach cybersecurity. DoD works closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to protect U.S. critical infrastructure, the Intelligence Community to understand and counter cyber threats, and the Department of Justice to protect against cyber crime. DoD is working closely with Defense Industrial Base companies and DHS to protect DoD information, spur innovation, and increase the cybersecurity of the Nation as a whole. The protection of critical infrastructure from cyber threats is of particular importance to DoD. Development of risk-based standards and increased information sharing such as those included in the *Cybersecurity Act of 2012* represent important advances in the ability of the Department and the Nation to secure government and critical infrastructure networks in cyberspace.

33. Illicit Arms Trafficking

In July, governments of the world will gather at the United Nations to negotiate a global Arms Trade Treaty intended to set global standards on the international transfer of conventional weapons.

What is your understanding of the problem of illicit arms trafficking and the role of the United States to deal with the problem?

The arms market is increasingly complex and global. Existing regional and national arms export control systems do not provide complete, global coverage. This creates gaps that are being exploited by illicit arms dealers. I believe that the United States should seek to negotiate a robust and effective Arms Trade Treaty, which may close these gaps.

In your view, to what extent, if at all, does the lack of national controls and enforcement on arms flows contribute to the illicit trafficking problem, and could efforts to respond to illicit trafficking be improved if other countries adopted and enforced national regulations on arms import, export, and transit similar to those of the United States?

An Arms Trade Treaty would be a legally binding agreement that will require states to establish high national standards in controlling the export of conventional arms. Such norms should better regulate the global arms market to prevent weapons reaching the hands of terrorists, insurgents and human rights abusers.

Do you think an arms trade treaty, such as is being contemplated in the United Nations, would enhance U.S. national security interests?

U.S. national security interests would be served by a treaty that increases international standards in different regions; includes major arms exporters such as Russia and China; reaffirms the right of self-defense and the legitimacy of arms transfers for security purposes; does not undermine existing nonproliferation and export control regimes; and is agreed through consensus.

What is your view on whether or not the United States should be a party to this effort?

U.S. participation in the negotiations will help ensure the treaty establishes a high standard of international behavior that will ultimately reduce the proliferation of conventional arms. I would need to see the results of negotiation to make any further recommendation.

34. Arms Control

What role do you see for arms control as a means of improving U.S. national security?

Arms control continues to play an important role in advancing U.S. national security by providing predictability and stability in certain strategic relationships, particularly in U.S.-Russian relations. Arms control should never be an end unto itself; neither is it a tool that can be employed without the context of a well-prepared and effective military force.

What are your views on the next bilateral steps to address nuclear-weapons issues between the United States and Russia?

I believe that as New START is implemented and any issues that arise are addressed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, we should continue to work with Russia to lay the groundwork for future bilateral negotiations on reducing both strategic and nonstrategic weapons, including non-deployed weapons.

The Report of the Nuclear Posture Review noted that because of our improved relations, strict numerical parity between the United States and Russia is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War. However, it also indicated that large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term strategic relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced. By joining with the world's other principal nuclear power to move to lower levels of forces in concert, arms control thus provides a means for strengthening strategic stability in our relationship with Russia.

What conditions, if any, do you believe need to be met to reduce further the U.S. strategic nuclear stockpile through arms control?

The ongoing Nuclear Posture Review implementation study will help identify the force levels needed to support deterrence and targeting requirements. Completion of this analysis is necessary to formulate any future arms control objectives involving our nuclear stockpile. In general, I believe that future nuclear reductions should maintain strategic deterrence and stability with regard to Russia and China, strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, and ensure the credibility of our security assurances to our allies and partners. We also must guarantee our operational flexibility and ability to hedge against geopolitical and technical uncertainty.

What is your view of the role of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in U.S. national security, and how should it be strengthened or improved?

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is a valuable foundational element of the broader international non-proliferation regime, and contributes significantly to strategic stability. We should work to strengthen the Treaty by encouraging greater State-party adherence and agreement to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, among other steps.

35. Ballistic Missile Defense

In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range

missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging against future uncertainties.

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review?

Yes, I support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the 2010 Report of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review.

Do you agree that our missile defense must be fiscally sustainable?

Yes. DoD has tailored its budget request to fiscal requirements. We have protected our top missile defense priorities, including defending the homeland, implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and pursuing Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAAs) in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region.

In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles, increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against potential future long-range missiles from Iran that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability.

Do you support the PAA to Missile Defense in Europe and, if confirmed, will you implement it?

Yes, I support the EPAA and, if confirmed, I will support its implementation.

Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we deploy operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat?

Yes. I believe that DoD should continue to subject new ballistic missile defense capabilities to testing under realistic operational conditions against realistic targets. DoD should invest in ballistic missile defense capabilities that are fiscally sustainable over the long term and are mobile and re-locatable.

Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and Evaluation, in order to assess operational capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to deploying such systems?

Yes. U.S. ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic and include robust Operational Test and Evaluation. I support the “fly-before-you-buy” policy outlined in the Report of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review.

The United States and NATO are seeking options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, including the possibility of sharing radar and early warning data. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from Iran, and could send a powerful signal to Iran that could help persuade Iran not to pursue long-range missiles or nuclear weapons?

Yes. Missile defense cooperation with Russia could strengthen common defenses against Iranian missiles and send an important signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working together to counter the proliferation and use of ballistic missiles.

Do you agree that, notwithstanding Russian concerns, the United States is committed to the continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, needed to meet our security needs?

Yes. The United States will not accept constraints on missile defense. We will undertake the necessary qualitative and quantitative improvements to the ballistic missile defense system to meet U.S. security needs.

36. National Security Space Policy

What role, if any, do you believe the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should play in the establishment of a national security space policy?

I believe that the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense should support the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in developing and ensuring implementation of national security space policy. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs to establish and oversee the implementation of overarching DoD space policy developed in accordance with the National Space Policy, National Security Space Strategy, and associated guidance.

37. Special Operations Forces

The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces and enablers that directly support their operations.

Do you believe that we should further increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?

I believe the completion of the directed growth in Special Operations Forces and Combat Support and Combat Service Support personnel directed in the 2006 and 2010 QDRs would posture USSOCOM to conduct the range of anticipated operations effectively to meet future requirements. These forces will continue to require service provided enablers to sustain the level of mobility, ISR, fires, and medical evacuation, in differing mixtures, based on the operational environment.

In your view, how can the size of special operations forces be increased while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?

Experience has shown that SOF manpower growth of 3-5 percent annually can be sustained and will not dilute the force or outpace the required training and support structure. In my view, USSOCOM has done a magnificent job of adjusting its processes to maintain the quality of SOF operators and support personnel during this current era of SOF growth.

In recent years, special operations forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated changes to the activities of the U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) enumerated in section 167 of Title 10 to more specifically track the activities special operations forces are carrying out around the world.

Do you believe any modifications to USSOCOM's Title 10 missions are appropriate? If so, what modifications would you suggest?

The Department uses a range of processes, including the development of the Unified Command Plan, to review the mission sets and responsibilities it assigns to USSOCOM on an on-going basis. The language in Section 167 of Title 10, United States Code, also includes "such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense," which provides the President and the Secretary of Defense the flexibility needed to meet changing circumstances. Hence, at this time I would not advocate significant changes to USSOCOM's Title 10 missions.

What can be done to ensure that indirect special operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

The activities of Special Operations Forces are quite varied, from high-risk strikes and counterterrorist raids to working by, with, and through local partners, whether in the form of

training and advising foreign counterparts, or providing support to civilian authorities abroad. I believe that each of these missions is highly valued within the Special Operations community. However, as the security landscape has changed, the demands for these kinds of missions have begun to exceed the ability of the Special Operations community alone to meet them.

As a remedy to this situation, and consistent with QDR 2010 and the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the Department is building the capacity and capabilities of the general purpose forces to be prepared to take on more of the kinds of missions that used to fall exclusively to SOF. Security force assistance is an example of that. I believe that broadening the spectrum of irregular missions that our general purpose forces are able to take on will alleviate some burdens on the SOF community and ensure that the Total Force is adequately prepared to undertake and support both direct and indirect missions. I believe that increasing the contribution of general purpose forces to these missions will help ensure adequate capabilities overall and proper balance between general purpose forces and Special Operations Forces.

Some have advocated providing the USSOCOM Commander with new authorities that would, among other things, better resource the Theater Special Operations Commands and provide special operations forces with additional flexibility and funding to build the capacity of partner nation security forces.

Do you believe additional special operations-specific authorities are appropriate? If so, what types of authorities would you suggest?

The Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) are essential to all facets of the Geographic Combatant Commander's (GCC) engagement and campaign plans. The Department is currently conducting a full scale review of authorities to guarantee that we are providing the TSOCs the flexibility and agility to best meet GCC objectives.

38. Interagency Collaboration

The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

I believe one of the most important lessons learned has been the necessity of close civil-military collaboration at all levels, at the tactical level with organizations such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Embedded PRTs, as well as unity of effort at the operational and strategic levels. Such unity of effort is critical in missions ranging from direct action to building partner capacity. We can facilitate this type of coordination through organizational structures, but much of this is also a cultural issue – making collaboration and coordination part

of the ethos of our civil and military institutions. Experiences from recent conflicts have facilitated this to a large degree, although institutionalization can and should be continued.

How do you believe these efforts can be improved?

One of the lessons learned has been the need for close collaboration early in the planning phase, before a contingency begins. This lesson can and should carry forward to future contingencies. Recent conflicts have also pointed to the need for sufficient capacity and capability within civilian agencies for these kinds of contingency operations.

If confirmed, what would be your role in encouraging greater interagency collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies?

Several parts of the Department, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands, work with interagency partners, both in Washington and in the field. If confirmed, I would continue to support these activities by participating in interagency fora and providing policy input and oversight, as directed by the Secretary and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

In terms of counterterrorism, Special Operations Forces will continue to have a leading role in our efforts to defeat al-Qa'ida. The Department is prepared to sustain a significant number of deployed SOF around the world, working closely with allies and partners to develop the capabilities and capacities they need to rid their territories of terrorists and prevent their resurgence. The defeat of al-Qaida cannot be achieved without bringing together the expertise and resources of the entire U.S. Government—intelligence, law enforcement, military, and other instruments of national power—in a coordinated and synchronized manner. If confirmed, I would seek strong relationships with DoD's interagency partners; in particular, the National Counter-Terrorism Center, the State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism, and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, to maximize DoD's efforts to counter violent extremism.

Building the capacity of foreign security forces is a key part of any counterinsurgency effort. It is a shared responsibility within the executive branch, particularly the Departments of State and Defense. Close collaboration between the Departments is a key characteristic of the Section 1206 authority, and one of its greatest strengths. The Global Security Contingency Fund epitomizes this shared responsibility, and represents an opportunity for DOS and DoD to plan for contingencies jointly, and to establish a new model for interagency planning of security sector assistance.

To foster operational-level integration, our interaction with other departments and agencies continues to deepen both in Washington and at the Combatant Commands. In the field, Combatant Commands use Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) to support interagency planning and coordination. The interagency is also playing an increasing role in

DoD exercises, making them a more realistic reflection of the environment in which our forces would operate. If confirmed, I would continue to promote such cooperation.

39. Readiness Oversight

Part of the scope and responsibility of the office of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, is to help shape and decide how and where the Department of Defense deploys forces, but without direct oversight into the readiness of those forces. Currently, that readiness oversight function resides with the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Arguably, a shift of the readiness oversight responsibility from personnel into policy could provide a comprehensive and broader insight into the readiness of our forces.

If confirmed, would you be in favor of shifting the readiness oversight from the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy?

Both the offices of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (P&R) and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Policy) play important but distinct roles in monitoring the readiness of the Armed Forces. P&R focuses on the delivery of readiness through the key elements of training, personnel, health affairs, reserve component affairs, and quality of life programs. P&R is also staffed by people with expertise appropriate to assessing programs and activities in these areas. Policy, on the other hand, articulates the requirements for readiness through the development and issuance of guidance on strategy, plans, force structure, and regional and global posture initiatives. These two different but complementary perspectives on readiness provide the Department's leaders with appropriate and separate oversight of readiness that ensures the Military Departments and Services are prepared to support the Combatant Commanders' operational requirements with ready forces.

40. Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.”

What is your view on whether the United States should contribute additional military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

In general, if confirmed, I would support additional contributions of U.S. military personnel to staff officer positions, provided that they are positions that would add significant value to the mission, and that the mission is a strategic priority for the United States.

Support for international peacekeeping remains an important security objective for the U.S. Government, and the United States has a stake in the success of UN peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practicable, the United States should continue to provide military personnel for UN peacekeeping operations, especially for key staff positions that can help shape the direction and success of the mission. If confirmed, I will carefully evaluate any proposals to contribute military or civilian personnel to a UN peacekeeping operation, weighing the potential positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against other military commitments we have around the globe, and the estimated cost of U.S. involvement.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations?

There are several potential advantages to contributing additional military personnel to UN missions: the opportunity to shape these missions from the inside and contribute to the success of the mission; professional development opportunities for military personnel to serve in a joint, combined environment; and the benefit of receiving real-time information and insights on emerging threats and crises from places where there might not otherwise be a U.S. presence. It also enables an increased professional interaction by U.S. military personnel with numerous partner nations' military personnel, with whom we may not normally have the opportunity to serve.

The potential disadvantage of providing additional military personnel is the additional demands these assignments would impose on a U.S. military force that has seen extensive deployments in recent years, and that is still heavily engaged in overseas operations. I do not believe the United States will be in a position to provide significant numbers of military personnel to peacekeeping missions anytime in the near future. However, I believe the selective placement of even modest numbers of U.S. military personnel in addition to the personnel we currently have assigned to UN operations can have a significant, positive effect on UN peacekeeping operations.

41. Minerva Initiative

The Minerva Initiative is a DoD-sponsored, university-based social science research initiative launched by the Secretary of Defense in 2008 focusing on areas of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy. The goal of the Minerva Initiative is to improve DoD's basic understanding of the social, cultural, behavioral, and political forces that shape regions of the world of strategic importance to the United States. OSD Policy and the ASD (Research & Engineering) co-lead this initiative.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Minerva Initiative?

The Minerva Initiative is a basic research program in the defense social sciences initiated by former Secretary of Defense Gates and now supported by Secretary Panetta. The program is

jointly managed by OSD Policy and ASD(Research & Engineering). The Minerva Initiative has sponsored innovative university research on topics ranging from terrorism to the relationship between climate change and political stability to technological innovation in China. The Minerva Initiative also sponsors research faculty chair positions at select Joint Professional Military Education schools and the three Service Academies. After only three years, the program has contributed to developing new intellectual capital in the social sciences, building ties between the Department and the academic social science community, and improving the Department's understanding of key areas of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy.

If confirmed as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, what guidance, if any, would you provide to the Minerva Initiative, including incorporating the results from the research produced thus far and utilizing the expertise affiliated with this initiative?

If confirmed, I would provide guidance to ensure the Minerva Initiative continues to strengthen the ties between the social science research community and the defense community. Many Minerva findings have already been applied to inform policy for today's defense priorities, and Minerva Initiative scholars have briefed valuable, warfighter-relevant insights to senior officials such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, decision makers in the defense policy community, and our Combatant Commands. As a basic research program, however, the Minerva Initiative's most important contributions may be greatest over the longer term.

The DoD community already plays an active role in both shaping Minerva Initiative research priorities and benefiting from scholarly insights. In particular, staff officers in OSD Policy serve not only as reviewers but as advisors and potential customers for Minerva Initiative efforts while connecting those insights to the broader defense community. If confirmed, I would seek to continue this strong oversight to ensure the results of Minerva Initiative research are connected to the key social science-related issues the Department faces.

42. Private Security Contractors

In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security contractors to perform security functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in ensuring the Department's responsibilities in this regard are met. The use of force by contractors or military personnel can, if misapplied, undermine our policy objectives. Contractors for physical security missions have been a necessity in Iraq and Afghanistan and are likely to be so in future contingencies. DoD has established procedures over time to manage these contractors more effectively, in order to prevent unnecessary violence that would be detrimental to our policy objectives. This is an area that requires constant attention and continued supervision to ensure that our policy is appropriate and effective.

What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to reduce the Department's reliance upon contractors to perform security functions in Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I would work to facilitate the transition from private security contractors to the Afghan Public Protection Force. I would also ensure that the Combatant Commander is furnished with clear policy assuring that private security contractors are only being used where appropriate and necessary. Our commanders on the ground must have authority to restrict security contractors' operations as the situation requires.

What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?

If confirmed, I would work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Joint Staff, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and Combatant Commanders to ensure that commanders at all levels understand their responsibilities regarding armed contractors operating in support of them or in their operational area. This includes ensuring commanders are aware of extant legal responsibilities with respect to qualification, training and vetting requirements as well as the limitations on the use of force by these contractors.

I would also work to ensure that Combatant Commanders are furnished with clear policy assuring that private security contractors are only being used where appropriate and necessary. Our commanders on the ground must have authority to restrict security contractors' operations as the situation requires.

Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of all federal agencies?

I support steps to ensure that there is legal accountability for the actions of all contractors performing work for the U.S. Government in an area of combat operations. If confirmed, I will support DoD efforts to work with our interagency partners to build appropriate mechanisms to ensure such accountability.

43. Detainee Treatment Policy

Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes, I do.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes.

If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

Yes.

Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Yes. I believe that DoD and more broadly U.S. leadership should be mindful of multiple considerations when developing standards for detainee treatment, including that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts.

44. Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.