

Advance Questions for Derek H. Chollet
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Goldwater-Nichols was landmark legislation that led to dramatic improvements in operational effectiveness, unity of effort, and civilian oversight. There is now a generation of military leaders who are experienced with operating in a coordinated and joint, multi-service environment. I do not see the need to change the provisions of this legislation.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

See my previous answer.

Duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

DoD Directive 5111.07 (11/7/2008) delineates the functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD ISA). Under this Directive, the ASD ISA is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DoD interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia), the Middle East, and Africa; their governments and defense establishments; and for oversight of security cooperation programs.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD ISA?

The responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is to advise and support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on defense policy and strategy for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

Relationships

What do you see as the relationship between the ASD ISA and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense

Under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs advises the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DoD interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Middle East, and Africa.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs advises the Deputy Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DoD interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Middle East, and Africa.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs provides similar support to the Under Secretary as described above.

The other Under Secretaries of Defense, including the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

At the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works closely with the other Under Secretaries of Defense, including the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, to achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy input to each Under Secretary, as appropriate, that relates to the nations and international organizations of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

At the direction of the Under Secretary or Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide support on matters that affect strategy and policy for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, working to ensure that military advice is taken into account in an appropriate manner.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of issues related to international security strategy and policy.

The Combatant Commanders, in particular the commanders of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. European Command

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works closely with the commanders of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command and U.S. European Command to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Secretary and Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations.

The Other Functional and Regional Assistant Secretaries of Defense

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works with the other functional and regional Assistant Secretaries of Defense to provide sound policy advice to the Under Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Defense on cross-cutting international security strategy and policy issues.

The Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works with the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency on implementation of security cooperation activities, such as Foreign Military Sales, with countries in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa to ensure that these activities support national security policy objectives and strategies.

Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for the position of ASD ISA?

I believe that my experiences in government – at the U.S. Department of State, National Security Council Staff, and as staff in the U.S. Senate – as well as my experience dealing with national security issues in numerous research institutions, provides me with the necessary background to handle the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Throughout my career, I have worked closely with the Department of Defense in shaping and implementing U.S. policy in Europe and the Middle East and in managing a wide range of international conflicts and crises. Over the years, I have deeply appreciated the importance of close civil-military coordination to the achievement of U.S. objectives – something that is especially important in meeting the new threats and challenges of the 21st century.

Priorities and Challenges

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD ISA?

If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Department of Defense pursues a strategic and balanced approach as outlined in the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. Top priorities would include strengthening America's alliances with key partners and allies; ensuring the success and effective transition of the NATO mission in Afghanistan; preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon; combating terrorism; strengthening security and stability across the Middle East; maintaining a strong relationship with Israel; pursuing a constructive relationship with Russia while supporting the sovereignty and independence of Russia's neighbors, and working with the states of Africa to meet urgent security challenges and achieve opportunities.

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the ASD ISA?

If confirmed, my office will aim to play an important role within the Department and the interagency process in developing policy for a number of key issues, including among others: countering the continuing threat of violent extremism; transitioning security responsibility in Afghanistan in a way that protects U.S. vital interests; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in Iran; strengthening alliances and partnerships globally to further strengthen U.S. and international security; advancing U.S. interests in the context of dramatic changes that have unfolded and are unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa; and continuing to strengthen the U.S. defense posture globally. A key challenge will be to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Government in resolving these and other issues – and pursuing opportunities – in the context of significant fiscal pressures.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I would address these challenges by undertaking the development and implementation of DoD and interagency strategies, policies, and plans on key issues relating to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. I would continue to work closely with other components of the Department of Defense in support of the Secretary of Defense, as well as our interagency counterparts, U.S. Allies and partners, and where appropriate the private sector and non-governmental organizations. I would seek to ensure that strategies, policies, and plans are updated as needed to reflect new challenges and new opportunities. Under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I would work to support the President and Secretary's guidance to shape a Joint Force for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be flexible, agile, ready, and technologically advanced.

Strategy and Contingency Planning

One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning.

What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

I believe that civilian leadership is critical in the formulation of strategy and planning. Civilian defense leadership is particularly vital in translating broad national security policies and principles into the strategic goals that ultimately drive military planning. The Joint Staff is a critical partner in the development of guidance for contingency planning and provides independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. In addition to the provision of written guidance, an important civilian role is to review contingency plans submitted for approval by the Combatant Commanders.

In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy and contingency planning?

The United States is at a critical time in history – with multiple wars, enduring threats, and imminent challenges. Strong civilian and military partnership on the range of national security issues facing our nation is vital. I believe that the level of civilian oversight is appropriate. But if confirmed, I will examine this issue closely and seek to ensure that civilian leadership has the appropriate level of oversight on the full range of strategy, planning, and use-of-force issues, while respecting the importance of receiving independent military advice from the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commanders.

What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy and contingency planning?

I agree with the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy that the Department of Defense should continue to fortify its capacity for strategic thinking and strategic planning to ensure that it not only deal with the challenges of today but is also well prepared for those of tomorrow.

The DoD strategic guidance released in January is evidence that the Department thinks critically about strategy formulation and its associated resource implications – a trend that, if confirmed, I will continue to work to reinforce. If confirmed, I would strive to provide the best advice possible to the Under Secretary of Defense in the provision of written policy guidance and in the review of contingency plans for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

Strategic Reviews

If confirmed, what role – if any – will you play in the formulation of policy, implementation of policy, and reporting of results for each of the following strategies:

The National Defense Strategy;

The National Military Strategy;
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism;
The Quadrennial Defense Review;
Global Defense Posture Review; and
The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review.

With the exception of the National Military Strategy, for which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible, the Secretary of Defense determines the processes and decision-making bodies for developing and approving the results of each of these strategic reviews. Although a wide range of approaches and mechanisms have been employed for these purposes over the years, each review is based on candid advice from senior military and civilian leaders and informed by relevant data and analyses. If confirmed, I will provide input into these reviews on matters that affect strategy and policy for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve DoD's processes for analysis, policy formulation, and decision making relative to each review above?

Given my experiences at the State Department and on the National Security Council Staff, I have found that the following factors have been associated with successful strategic reviews:

- All relevant stakeholders are represented in formal review and decision-making fora. At DoD, these stakeholders generally include Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, leadership of Components, and the Combatant Commanders.
- Leadership of working groups and review groups is assigned to organizations with the predominant expertise and involvement in the issue areas under examination.
- The deliberations and findings of working groups are transparent and are vetted with stakeholders before being presented to top leadership.
- Senior leadership establishes and maintains "hands-on" oversight of the overall effort from start to finish.

Also critical for the success of any strategic review is the maintenance of a vibrant, ongoing set of analytical efforts that continually assess the ability of current, programmed, and projected forces to accomplish key missions. If confirmed, I would recommend that insights gained from previous reviews, along the lines of those outlined above, be applied to upcoming reviews, including the development of the next National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review.

Department of Defense Strategic Guidance

The new DoD strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” announced by President Obama on January 5, 2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century and the key military missions for which DoD will prepare.

Do you agree with the defense priorities set out in that guidance?

Yes.

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to those defense priorities?

I would not recommend any changes at this time. However, like all strategies and guidance, I believe that it will be important to review and update this guidance in the future.

Transatlantic Relationship and NATO

In your view, how important to U.S. national security interests is the U.S. transatlantic relationship with our European partners?

NATO remains of vital importance, and is a net provider of global security. As President Obama has said, Europe remains the cornerstone of our engagement with the world, and NATO is the most capable Alliance in history.

The transatlantic relationship is of critical importance to U.S. national security, and the transatlantic community has never been more closely aligned in confronting the challenges of a complex, dangerous, and fast-changing world. In Libya, NATO Allies came together with Arab and other partners to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, and to support the Libyan people. In Afghanistan, with nearly 40,000 Allied and partner forces alongside our own, we have built and sustained NATO's largest-ever overseas deployment. As Iran has continued to defy its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions, the United States, Europe, and other partners have put in place the toughest sanctions yet.

What do you see as the main benefits and costs of that relationship?

Keeping NATO strong both politically and militarily is critical to ensuring the Alliance is ready when it is needed. Allies look to the United States for leadership – to craft the compromises necessary to move forward, and to lead the way in keeping NATO strong, relevant and credible. NATO forces are in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, in pirate-infested waters off Somalia, and last year conducted operations in Libya. Future challenges to the United States and our Allies include ballistic missile proliferation, violent extremism, weapons of mass destruction, and

global instability. In today's interconnected world, these challenges will be best addressed with the United States working alongside our Allies.

In your view, what is the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance in meeting U.S. security interests?

The United States has important stakes in a strong, mutually supportive NATO Alliance, and the President has stressed his strong desire to rebuild and adapt transatlantic security relationships to meet 21st century security challenges. NATO is our most reliable source of coalition partners. NATO's new Strategic Concept is an important step in ensuring that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring the common security of its members, including in meeting U.S. security interests, and it will guide the next phase in NATO's evolution.

What are the greatest challenges and opportunities that you foresee for NATO over the next 5 years?

Over the next five years, the top NATO-related challenges include achieving durable progress and a successful transition in Afghanistan, implementing missile defense in Europe, and stemming the deterioration in European military capability. Many of our NATO Allies have been under-investing in defense capabilities, especially when it comes to deployable expeditionary forces. Many have significantly reduced their national defense budgets in response to the global economic crisis, and some are planning further cuts. A key challenge – and a key opportunity – will be for Allies to determine which capabilities must be sustained, and how that can be done in a more cost effective manner.

Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the next 5 years? What criteria should the United States apply in evaluating candidates for future NATO membership?

I agree with the President's statement that NATO's door should remain open so long as new candidates are democratic, peaceful, and willing to contribute to common security. Which countries would be candidates for further engagement and within what timeframe NATO would undertake further enlargement are important questions the Administration would need to address in close consultation with Congress and our Allies. Each NATO aspirant should be judged on its individual merits and progress in implementing political, economic, and military reforms.

Should NATO consider an expanded role for Israel beyond the Mediterranean Dialogue?

Israel is an active and valued partner of NATO through the Alliance's "Mediterranean Dialogue," which includes practical cooperation as well as political dialogue, both bilaterally with NATO and multilaterally including the other six Partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue. The United States supports and encourages this partnership, and encourages other Allies and partners to do so as well. The Mediterranean Dialogue includes an "Individual Cooperation Program," developed between NATO and Israel, which outlines Israeli desires for engagement with NATO.

NATO-Russia Council

What in your view is the potential of the NATO-Russia Council to serve as a forum for promoting cooperation between NATO and Russia on security issues?

The NATO-Russia Council (NRC), and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council before it, have been important drivers of institutionalizing and promoting cooperation between NATO nations and Russia since 1997. While there have been successes in the relationship, the U.S. can build on existing cooperation and intensify efforts to address the common challenges that our nations face in the 21st century.

The NATO-Russia Council is a dynamic forum for discussions on areas where the two countries disagree, and for constructive dialogue to move forward practical cooperation in areas of shared concern. Both elements of NATO's engagement with Russia are important.

At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, leaders endorsed the NRC Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges (Joint Review) that identified five key areas for practical cooperation: Afghanistan, counterterrorism, counter-piracy, countering weapons of mass destruction, and responding to natural and manmade disasters. NATO and Russia have already developed cooperation in these areas, and in particular on Afghanistan, which remains a common cause between Russia and NATO partners. The NATO-Russia Council also cooperates on countering terrorist hijackings of airplanes even as Russian and NATO ships continue to help each other fight piracy in the Indian Ocean.

NATO Mission in Afghanistan

At the NATO Summit at Lisbon in 2010, the countries participating in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force affirmed their support for the goal of having Afghan National Security Forces in the lead and providing security throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

Do you support the Lisbon goal of transitioning the security lead in Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces by 2014?

Yes. I support the strategy that the U.S. is now implementing along with NATO Allies and ISAF partners as originally set forth at Lisbon. I believe a focused counterinsurgency campaign, with a transition plan that includes an enduring U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, is the right strategy. It will allow us to help the Afghans build security forces and government capacity, which can help ensure the security necessary for an Afghanistan that never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists.

While the U.S. and Allied strategy in Afghanistan is sound, I also believe that both the Administration and ISAF should continue to assess and adjust as necessary the implementation of the overall strategy based on conditions on the ground. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting with Congress, and with our Allies and partners in this regard.

In your assessment, is NATO on track to achieve this goal?

Yes. Transition is progressing on a positive track. ISAF and the Afghan Government are currently implementing the first two tranches of transition, and approximately 50 percent of the Afghan population now lives in areas where the Afghans have the lead for security. I understand the third tranche is to be announced in the spring of 2012 and the fifth and final tranche in mid-2013. As transition progresses, Afghan forces have been able to provide effective security in transition areas.

I understand that important challenges remain between now and the end of 2014. Safe havens for insurgents in Pakistan and Afghan capacity in governance and development remain the most challenging aspects of transition. The limited capacity of the Afghan Government to govern effectively and to fill government positions at the national and sub-national levels hinders the ability to assume leadership on these lines of operation. Efforts in these areas must underpin the success of the security transition in the effort to achieve durable stability in Afghanistan.

It appears likely that the Afghan security forces will still need significant assistance and support even after the 2014 transition. In addition to training and equipment, Afghan security forces still lag in certain key enablers, including logistics, airlift, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

What role, if any, do you believe NATO forces should play in Afghanistan after 2014?

More needs to be done to determine NATO's post-2014 role in Afghanistan, but a sustained and well-organized international effort to train, advise, and assist the ANSF will be critical to their success after transition is complete. Going forward, building ANSF "enabler" capacity, improving the functioning of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, and fighting waste and corruption will also be critical.

The United States and other coalition partners must continue to provide the requisite fiscal and personnel support to help make this happen. Securing the international community's support for the ANSF through 2014 and beyond continues to be a major U.S. interagency effort ahead of the NATO Summit in Chicago this May. The Summit is an opportunity to send a unified message that NATO is on track to achieve our Lisbon goals, and advance a cohesive approach to the closing stages of this war.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, DoD has requested and Congress has provided a number of temporary authorities to build the capacity of partner nations or provide security assistance. These include the "Section 1206" global train and equip authority, targeted authorities to build capacity in Yemen and East Africa, and the Global Security Contingency Fund.

In your view, what are the strategic objectives and priorities for DoD's programs for building the capacity of partner nations?

In my view, the main strategic objective of the United States in building the capacity of foreign partners is to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries' internal security, and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn, mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States, and serves to build a base of countries that can effectively participate in multinational coalition-based operations.

Successfully countering violent extremist networks requires developing and sustain a global network of allies and partners that is capable and interoperable. Additionally, once partners become capable and have sufficient capacity, they are able to help bolster regional security in a way that supports U.S. interests. In some cases, participation by these partner nations' forces provide cultural and linguistic advantages that afford them better access and effectiveness than U.S. forces executing the same mission.

Finally, efforts to build partner capacity promote interoperability between forces and enable the U.S. military to establish personal connections and long-term relationships with foreign counterparts. We can never be certain where in the world U.S. forces may be required to operate. Enduring relationships with partner nations are at the core of a multinational coalition's strength, helping secure shared access to facilities and territory, information, and diplomatic support.

What improvements, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to the strategic direction, oversight, and management of DoD's programs for building partner capacity to ensure that these programs are executed consistent with U.S. national security goals and objectives?

If confirmed, I would continue to support DoD capabilities and investments that encourage and enable partners to develop capable security forces and institutionalize the Department's capacity to provide high impact security force assistance. I would provide recommendations to the Secretary that enable him to make informed choices with regard to the location and frequency of DoD activities that build partners' security capacity. It is essential in this era of shifting focus and constrained resources that we carefully prioritize which partners we engage with, how often, and to what end.

What is your assessment of the implementation and effectiveness of DoD's programs for building partner capacity in achieving U.S. national security goals and objectives?

The Department's capacity building programs are useful tools that contribute significantly to the achievement of our national security goals and objectives. These programs are most effective when they are closely aligned with the Department of State's foreign policy objectives while addressing critical needs as identified by our foreign partners.

For example, in Georgia, our coalition support authorities have enabled a relatively small partner nation to serve in Afghanistan, not only deploying there with battalion-sized combat units that operate without caveats, but punching well above their weight class while doing so. The provision of high-mobility vehicles, night vision goggles, communications equipment, and training has enabled Georgian forces to make a significant contribution to coalition operations, in turn lessening the burden on U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan.

In your view, what should be the role of DoD, vis-à-vis the State Department and other civilian departments and agencies, in efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces?

The U.S. will be more successful at deterring and responding to security challenges when allies and partner security forces act in a way that is complementary to U.S. goals and objectives. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, our continuing efforts to counter violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal organizations, and our preparations for future contingencies clearly illustrate the need for capable partners who can apply capabilities complementary to U.S. military objectives. In that vein, I believe that the Department of Defense should sustain and grow the capability to develop partner security forces, especially forces to train, advise, and assist partners during conflict.

Building the capacity of foreign security forces is a shared responsibility within the executive branch, particularly the Departments of State and Defense. Close collaboration between the Departments is a key characteristic of the Section 1206 authority, and one of its greatest strengths. The Global Security Contingency Fund epitomizes this shared responsibility, and represents an opportunity for DOS and DoD to plan for contingencies jointly, and to establish a new business model for interagency planning of security sector assistance.

Russia

What role will you play, if confirmed, in establishing policy with respect to the U.S.-Russia security relationship?

DoD has been a proponent and a beneficiary of the reset with Russia. The OSD-MOD Defense Relations Working Group and the Joint Staff-General Staff Military Cooperation Working Group revived U.S.-Russia defense and military relations from the low-point after the 2008 Russo-Georgia War. As a result, DoD has a robust military-to-military work plan with the Russian MOD and is constantly looking for ways to improve the relationship and contribute to greater security in the Euro-Atlantic space.

If confirmed, I would play an active role in managing the efforts of the U.S.-Russia Defense Relations Working Group, as well as providing oversight and input to the Joint Staff-led Military Cooperation Working Group and the annual U.S.-Russia Military Cooperation Work Plan, which is developed by U.S. European Command in cooperation with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy.

The Defense Relations Working Group, which meets at the Secretary of Defense level and consists of eight sub-working groups, has proved to be an effective venue for advancing the U.S.-Russia security relationship. If confirmed, I would chair the Sub-Working Group on Global and Regional Affairs, which enables frank and open dialogue with our Russian counterparts on issues of key importance, such as the Middle East and North Africa, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, and others. In addition, if confirmed, I would oversee the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs, which leads the planning and coordination for all meetings of the Defense Relations Working Group at all levels.

What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russian security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?

The United States and Russia should be able to cooperate effectively in the many areas where we share common interests; communicate effectively in areas where we have competing interests; and negotiate reasonably in areas where we have overlapping interests.

Among the most important areas where the United States and Russia have common interests is in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. We have had significant cooperation on, for example, Iran. The Russians cancelled a major weapons sale worth several hundred million dollars to Iran in 2010 and supported UNSCR 1929, which imposed international sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear programs. I believe that the United States should continue to seek Russian support to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons. Similarly, Russia is a key player in reversing North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, and shares common interests in this regard. As a third example, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program continues to be one of the most successful cooperative programs in the U.S.-Russia relationship. Finally, the United States and Russia share strong interests in reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, as reflected in the New START Treaty.

Russia also has an interest in stability in Afghanistan. Our efforts in Afghanistan have benefited greatly from improved security relations with Russia. The Northern Distribution Network has been critical to continued operations given the closure of our Pakistan ground lines of communication. Russia allows our military personnel, supplies, and equipment to transit its territory by air and rail and will soon allow for reverse transit from Afghanistan. Russia has also been forward-leaning in identifying possible areas of cooperation on counter-narcotics.

In your view, what steps should DoD take to improve security relations with Russia? For instance, would you support increased military-to-military relations and exchanges with Russia?

The 2012 Military Cooperation Work Plan includes more than 100 events and comprises activities such as cadet exchanges, exercises, senior leader visits, and conferences. Over time,

cooperation on a wide range of issues may help to build a foundation for more concrete and substantive cooperation with Russia.

Would you support other cooperative programs with Russia, including cooperation on missile defense in relation to Iran?

I support U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defenses first and foremost because it could improve the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, thereby improving the protection of the United States, our forces overseas, and our Allies. Missile defense cooperation strengthens capabilities across Europe to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles and would send a strong signal to Iran – in addition those sent by U.S. and international sanctions and diplomacy – that Iran’s development of missiles and pursuit of nuclear capabilities is reducing rather than enhancing Iranian security.

Iraq

President Obama has said that the withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 marked the beginning of a “new chapter” in the U.S.-Iraq relationship.

In your view, what should be the nature of the long-term U.S.-Iraq security relationship?

Developing a long-term security relationship with Iraq, as part of a broader enduring commitment to regional peace and security, is one of the highest priorities. This relationship should include consultation on regional security issues, and the continued development of appropriate Iraqi military capabilities. The Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), as the roadmap for long-term relations, provides the framework for the long-term strategic security relationship.

What in your view are the greatest opportunities for U.S.-Iraq security cooperation going forward, and, if confirmed, how would you recommend that DoD pursue those opportunities?

The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), under Chief of Mission authority, is the cornerstone of the long-term U.S.-Iraq strategic security partnership. It will serve as the main vehicle to expand our security cooperation relationship with the Iraqis. On a daily basis, the OSC-I coordinates security assistance and security cooperation activities, and conducts training to support the development and modernization of the Iraq Security Forces.

The Defense and Security Joint Coordination Committee (DSJCC), established under the Strategic Framework Agreement, is another vehicle to strengthen bilateral relations, including security cooperation. If confirmed, I will assist the Under Secretary for Policy in advancing both of these important vehicles for expanding our security cooperation.

What do you see as the greatest challenges facing DoD with regard to the U.S. security relationship with Iraq and, if confirmed, how would you recommend meeting those challenges?

Ensuring Iraq's integration into the regional security framework will remain an important task. The Department will need to continue strengthening its security cooperation activities, while helping to expand Iraq's military engagement with key regional partners.

If confirmed, I would support the DSJCC and would seek to bolster the U.S.-Iraq defense partnership on a wide array of security matters.

What is your assessment of the role that Iran is playing within Iraq with respect to Iraq's internal security and stability?

The Iranian regime will continue to attempt to influence the future of Iraq. However, we have seen that there are real limits to Tehran's ability to affect the trajectory of Iraq. The Iraqi Security Forces have demonstrated the ability to maintain security and prevent the emergence of wide-scale violence.

What additional steps, if any, should the United States take to counter Iran's influence within Iraq?

The strong, sovereign, self-reliant Iraq we see emerging today has no desire to be dominated by Iran or by anyone else. Iraqi nationalism is real and powerful, and the Iraqis have consistently shown their willingness to resist the Iranians and their surrogates when Tehran has overreached. The Iraqis have made clear that they desire a strong and enduring relationship with the United States under the SFA.

For the Department of Defense, building the capacity of our partners in the region is a vital avenue for countering destabilizing Iranian activities in Iraq. These efforts have helped shore up the ability of our regional partners to defend themselves. The Foreign Military Sales program with Iraq is the fourth largest in the Middle East and the ninth largest in the world. That represents an Iraqi alignment with the U.S., not Iran. In countering Iranian influence within Iraq, it is important for us to continue to build on this strategic relationship.

Iran

The President said: "America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no option off the table to achieve that goal."

Do you agree that we should leave all options on the table with respect to Iran? If so, why? If not, why not?

Yes, I agree with the President that all options should remain on the table to address Iran's illicit activities. It is DoD's responsibility to plan for all contingencies, and through prudent military

planning, refine options to protect U.S. and partner interests from Iranian aggression. However, I continue to believe that diplomacy and economic pressure are the most effective tools for changing Iranian behavior at this time.

In your view, what should be the role of DoD for advancing the President's policy with respect to Iran?

The Department of Defense plays a supporting role in the whole-of-government strategy of engagement and pressure toward Iran, which is led by the Departments of State and Treasury. In addition to DoD's support of interagency efforts, it is the responsibility of the Department of Defense to plan for all contingencies, and to provide the President with a wide range of military options should they become necessary.

What more do you believe the United States and the international community could be doing to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program? Specifically, what actions do you believe that DoD ought to undertake to support diplomatic efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon?

The United States has a dual-track strategy of engagement and pressure. With the broad support of the international community, the United States has steadily increased the pressure on the Iranian regime to meet its international obligations. The next round of P5+1 talks are set for May 23. In support of a the whole-of-government strategy, the Department of Defense builds partnership capacity in the region, maintains a robust force presence to enhance stability and deter regional aggression, and conducts prudent defense planning.

Gulf Security Cooperation

The Administration has been working with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments to enhance regional cooperation and security against ballistic missile threats, particularly from Iran.

What is your view of the potential for missile defense cooperation within the GCC to enhance regional security, and how do you see this potential cooperation fitting into the United States missile defense efforts in the Middle East?

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) interest in missile defense cooperation is increasing in response to the growing ballistic missile challenges to regional security. During the inaugural U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in March, foreign ministers stressed the need to expand individual and bilateral missile defense cooperation to more multi-lateral collaboration. Greater GCC interest and involvement in missile defense, including through acquisition of advance missile defense technologies and participation in multi-lateral training and exercises, will complement U.S. missile defense efforts and enhance the overall regional security architecture.

What role do you see for the sale to the United Arab Emirates of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot missile defense systems in regional security against Iranian missile threats?

The acquisition of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), advanced Patriot missile batteries, and other missile defense technologies bolsters Gulf nations' capabilities to defend against a growing number of regional air and missile threats. Partner nation's procurement of BMD platforms will lead to improved cooperation and help promote interoperability with U.S. BMD assets and enhance overall regional missile defense.

Post-Arab Spring Military-to-Military Engagement

The past 18 months have brought great change to the Middle East and North Africa. These changes may require adjustments to our military-to-military engagement efforts throughout the region.

What is your understanding of U.S. military-to-military engagement in the Middle East and North Africa (e.g. Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries in the region), and what changes – if any – would you advocate for in light of the Arab Spring?

The developments of the so-called Arab Awakening present both strategic opportunities and challenges for U.S. interests in the region, and more specifically for U.S. defense objectives. Events of the Arab Awakening have clearly demonstrated that military-to-military partnerships are critical for protecting enduring U.S. security interests, and also for providing a channel through which U.S. defense officials can discuss the importance of reform. As partner governments in transition continue to implement reform agendas, our military-military relationships remain vital. If confirmed, I will work to continue to use our security partnerships to deliver messages on reform, focus U.S. security assistance and cooperation activities to elevate reform in the security sector, and leverage our military-to-military relationships to mitigate the risks that arise from the uncertain trajectory of regional developments.

Israel

With regard to our relationship with Israel, President Obama has stated: “Our military and intelligence cooperation has never been closer. Our joint exercises and training have never been more robust. Despite a tough budget environment, our security assistance has increased every year. We are investing in new capabilities. We’re providing Israel with more advanced technology – the type of products and systems that only go to our closest friends and allies. And make no mistake: we will do what it takes to preserve Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge – because Israel must always have the ability to defend itself, by itself, against any threat.”

Do you agree with President Obama’s position and views with regard to the U.S. security relationship with Israel?

Yes. The statement that the U.S.-Israel defense relationship is stronger than ever is backed by unprecedented actions that the Administration has taken over the past three years to improve Israel's security and ensure its Qualitative Military Edge to defend itself, by itself, against any enemy, to include previously unmatched levels of Foreign Military Financing, missile defense funding for Israel's multi-tier rocket and missile defense architecture, and a more expansive set of military exercises. This fifth generation fighter technology will also ensure Israel's aerial superiority for decades to come. These are just a few examples of the hundreds of tangible efforts that are underway to improve Israel's security.

Libya

Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector saved countless Libyans from the potential slaughter at the hands of Muammar Qadhafi and his regime and – ultimately – they also ended a more than four-decade long reign of a brutal dictator.

What is your understanding of U.S. policy toward Libya in the post-Qadhafi era?

It is in U.S. interests to build strong ties with the new Libyan government and support the Libyans through their transition to democracy, in coordination with our partners and the United Nations (UN).

Libya is a resource-rich country and can be expected to fund its own reconstruction. However, during this sensitive transition period, the Administration believes it is prudent to support limited activities that are critical to U.S. interests to ensure they take place, such as the collection and destruction of MANPADS.

On security policy, I understand that DoD is committed to working with the Libyan Ministry of Defense to encourage a unified, capable, and apolitical military that can effectively deny access to extremists and maintain effective control over its weaponry—including WMD—that is respectful of human rights, and that will be able to work constructively with its neighbors toward regional stability.

What is your understanding of the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Libya?

Following the end of Operation Unified Protector, I understand that DoD is focused on normalizing the bilateral military-to-military relationship and on mitigating the regional fall-out resulting from the turbulence of last year. Given Libya's substantial national assets, the U.S. is seeking to undertake low-cost, high-impact activities in close coordination with partners and the UN.

Within this context, I understand DoD is prioritizing assistance to focus on building institutional capacity and on improving the Libyans' ability to counter terrorism, counter weapons proliferation, and secure and destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles.

It is my understanding that DoD has offered the Libyan MOD advisory support through the Defense Institute Reform Initiative (DIRI) and Global Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) programs to assist in the process of establishing defense institutions and armed forces. Other projected activities include non-lethal train-and-equip missions, invitations to multilateral military exercises, professional military education at U.S. institutions, and English language training.

What opportunities and challenges does post-Qadhafi Libya present to the United States? If confirmed, what actions would you undertake to take advantage of and to address these opportunities and challenges?

Libya is still very much a country in transition. Its prospects are good, but the path to democracy is difficult. There have been sporadic instances of militia violence, retributive attacks, and power jockeying. The U.S. government is taking these events seriously, but recognizes that they are not systematic or occurring on a scale that represents a serious threat to the stability of the new government.

While the challenges are great, the opportunities are even greater. There is tremendous goodwill towards the United States in Libya right now, and there is a unique opportunity to forge a strong and mutually beneficial relationship with a newly emerging democracy.

The Libyan government understands the need to consolidate control over the militias and, I understand that senior Libyan officials have assured the Department of Defense that they consider the establishment of a national army and police force top priorities. Indeed, progress is already being made in this area.

Ballistic Missile Defense

In February 2010, DOD issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, programs and capabilities.

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review?

Yes, I support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the 2010 Report of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR).

Do you agree that our missile defense must be fiscally sustainable?

Yes. DoD has tailored its budget request to fiscal requirements. The Department has used a clear set of priorities to guide spending decisions in this mission area. It has protected our top missile

defense priorities, including defending the homeland, implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and pursuing Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAAs) in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific.

In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles, increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against potential future long-range missiles from Iran that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability.

Do you support the PAA to Missile Defense in Europe and, if confirmed, will you implement it?

Yes, I support the EPAA and, if confirmed, I will support its implementation.

Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we deploy operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat?

Yes. I believe that DoD should continue to subject new ballistic missile defense capabilities to testing under realistic operational conditions against realistic targets. DoD should invest in BMD capabilities that are fiscally sustainable over the long term, mobile, and relocatable.

Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and Evaluation, in order to assess operational capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to deploying such systems?

Yes. United States ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic and include robust Operational Test and Evaluation. Realistic testing of the system allows us to field new capabilities as they become available and integrate them into the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) architecture. The “fly-before-you-buy” policy outlined in the Report of the BMDR still makes good sense.

The United States and NATO are seeking options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, including the possibility of sharing radar and early warning data. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from Iran, and could send a

powerful signal to Iran that could help persuade Iran not to pursue long-range missiles or nuclear weapons?

Yes. I believe that missile defense cooperation with Russia could strengthen common defenses against Iranian missiles, and send an important signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working together to counter the acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles.

Do you agree that, notwithstanding Russian concerns, the United States is committed to the continued development and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, needed to meet our security needs?

Yes. The United States has pursued missile defense cooperation with Russia with the clear understanding that we would not accept constraints on missile defense, and that we would undertake necessary qualitative and quantitative improvements to meet U.S. security needs.

Al Qaeda

What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda, its affiliates, and adherents in the geographical area of responsibility for ASD ISA to the United States, our allies, and our interests?

In the ISA area of responsibility, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) poses the most direct threat to the United States. AQAP has exploited a year of political unrest in Yemen to expand its area of operations in remote provinces, and continues to threaten domestic stability while actively plotting operations against the U.S.

AQAP has strong connections to al-Shabaab in Somalia, which represents a terrorist threat to U.S. and its regional interests and is an insurgent problem to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Somali regional administrations.

In Iraq, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been significantly weakened. Shia militants continue to observe a cease-fire and are engaged in reconciliation talks with the Government of Iraq. While AQI has attempted to make a comeback, they do not pose a significant threat to Iraq's overall stability.

AQI is also seeking to exploit instability in Syria, further fueling an already volatile situation there. In North and West Africa, al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) uses ungoverned spaces in the Maghreb and Sahel as a safe haven. Originally focused on overthrowing the government of Algeria, AQIM evolved and now has a stated intent to attack Western targets. There are clear indications that AQIM is now involved in trafficking arms from Libya.

What is your understanding of DoD's ongoing effort to combat al Qaeda in the geographical area of responsibility for ASD ISA?

The Department is working closely with multiple regional and interagency partners to disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents. The Department provides training, advice, and assistance to regional security forces in order to build enduring CT partnerships and capabilities and to deny al-Qa'ida safe haven.

Africa-related Security Matters

The new DoD strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” announced by President Obama on January 5, 2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century and the key military missions for which DoD will prepare. The primary emphasis of the strategy relates to the Middle East and Asia. The strategy makes little reference to Africa and its myriad security challenges.

In light of the emphasis on areas outside of the African continent, if confirmed, how would you draw attention to the myriad security challenges confronting African nations?

The new strategic guidance makes clear that from a regional prioritization perspective, the Department will rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. From a mission perspective, however, the guidance also clearly directs a strong focus on counter terrorism and irregular warfare, in particular holding al-Qaeda and affiliates (AQAA) under constant pressure wherever they may be. In light of this focus and growing AQAA presence on the continent, I do not anticipate a lack of attention to African security challenges.

Countering the Lord's Resistance Army

On October 14, 2011, the President announced the deployment of approximately 100 members of the U.S. Armed Forces to the central Africa region to assist the efforts of regional militaries to remove Joseph Kony and his top lieutenants from the battlefield.

What is your understanding of this ongoing operation in central Africa?

The United States continues to pursue a multi-faceted, comprehensive strategy to help the region eliminate the threat posed by the LRA. The pillars of this strategy include increasing protection of civilians; apprehending or removing Joseph Kony and senior commanders from the battlefield; promoting the defection, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; and increasing humanitarian access and providing continued relief to affected communities.

One part of this strategy is the deployment of U.S. military advisors to the LRA-affected region. As part of their “advise and assist” mission, the military advisors are building relationships with military and civilian leaders and working with regional forces to increase overall effectiveness. It is too early to quantify the direct impact of the deployment of U.S. advisors, but my understanding is that DoD is satisfied with the steady progress of the deployment to date

considering the complexity of the operating environment, the number of partners involved, and the remoteness of the operational areas. As per the President's announcement on April 23, the deployment of U.S. forces will continue. DoD will continue to regularly assess and review whether we are making sufficient progress.

If confirmed, what changes – if any – would you advocate to make to this ongoing operation?

I look forward to becoming more familiar with this operation if I am confirmed. Based on my understanding of this operation and its intent, I believe it is on the right track. I understand that several areas for bolstering the operation have been identified and are being addressed, including intelligence and logistics capacity, building the capacity of partner forces, and increasing LRA defections. If confirmed, I will work to reinforce these efforts in the months ahead.

Combating Terrorism

During the summer of 2011, the Obama Administration released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups "that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia."

If confirmed, what would be your role within DoD with respect to combatting terrorism?

If confirmed, I would support the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the formulation of national security and defense policy on matters relating to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, including counterterrorism policy. My role, if confirmed, would be to assist the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in formulating, coordinating, and presenting the views of the Secretary on counterterrorism policy issues. Currently these are mainly focused on the effort to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda, which includes operations and activities against its allies, adherents and affiliates, but we also recognize that there are other terrorist groups that may seek to cause harm to the U.S., its interests and allies.

Under the direction of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, if confirmed, I would work closely in my performance of these duties with the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Department of Defense General Counsel, the Joint Staff, and the other regional and functional Assistant Secretaries in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, particularly the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, who has the Department lead for all special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. I would carefully consider the views of our interagency colleagues and international partners to craft whole of government solutions to counterterrorism problems.

Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.”

What is your view on whether the United States should contribute additional military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

In general, if confirmed, I would support considering additional contributions of U.S. military personnel to staff officer positions, provided that they are positions that would add significant value to the mission, and that the mission is a strategic priority for the United States.

Support for international peacekeeping remains an important security objective for the U.S. Government, and the United States has a stake in the success of UN peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practicable, the United States should continue to provide military personnel for UN peacekeeping operations, especially for key staff positions that can help shape the direction and success of the mission. If confirmed, I will carefully evaluate any proposals to contribute military or civilian personnel to a UN peacekeeping operation, weighing the potential positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against other military commitments we have around the globe, and the estimated cost of U.S. involvement.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations?

There are several potential advantages to contributing additional military personnel to UN missions: the opportunity to shape these missions from the inside and contribute to the success of the mission; professional development opportunities for military personnel to serve in a combined, multi-lateral environment; and the benefit of receiving real-time information and insights on emerging threats and crises from places where there might not otherwise be a U.S. presence. It also enables an increased professional interaction by U.S. military personnel with numerous partner nations’ military personnel, with whom we may not normally have the opportunity to serve.

The potential disadvantage of providing additional military personnel is the additional demands these assignments would impose on a U.S. military force that has seen extensive deployments in recent years, and that is still heavily engaged in overseas operations. I do not believe the United States will be in a position to provide significant numbers of military personnel to peacekeeping missions anytime in the near future. However, I believe the selective placement of even modest numbers of U.S. military personnel in addition to the personnel we currently have assigned to UN operations can have a significant, positive effect on UN peacekeeping operations.

Special Operations Authorities

Some have advocated providing the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command with new authorities that would, among other things, better resource the Theater Special Operations Commands and provide special operations forces with additional flexibility and funding to build the capacity of partner nation security forces.

Do you believe additional special operations-specific authorities are appropriate? If so, what types of authorities would you suggest?

It is my understanding that the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) are essential to all facets of the Geographic Combatant Commander's (GCC) engagement and campaign plans. The Department is currently conducting a full-scale review of authorities to guarantee that it is providing the TSOCs the flexibility and agility to best meet GCC objectives.

U.S. Military Basing in Europe

DoD has announced reductions of approximately 10,000 of the 80,000 U.S. military personnel currently stationed in Europe, including 2 of 4 brigade combat teams (BCTs) in Europe drawing down over the next 2 years.

Do you support the decision to reduce the U.S. force posture in Europe, including the drawdown of 2 of 4 BCTs?

Yes, I support Secretary Panetta's decision to adjust U.S. force posture in Europe, including the inactivation of two brigade combat teams (BCTs). Over the past ten years, forces assigned to the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) were frequently deployed into the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility (AOR), so a steady state of two BCTs in Europe now would be an improvement in availability. The two remaining BCTs will provide the USEUCOM Commander with adequate ground maneuver capability to meet operational and training requirements. To mitigate the impact of inactivating two BCTs, the Department is preparing to initiate the periodic rotation of a maneuver battalion task force into the USEUCOM AOR in order to promote enhanced capacity and interoperability with our European allies and partners.

Do you believe that further reductions in the U.S. force posture in Europe are in order? Why or why not?

Maintaining interoperability with European militaries is critical to our ability to form effective coalitions to address global security challenges. As coalition operations in Afghanistan wind down, our ability to train with European Allies and partners to prepare for future missions is essential. Therefore, we must maintain a strong presence in Europe, emphasizing combined training, exercises and military cooperation, as well as new capabilities, such as missile defense. To this end, we must reorient the remaining U.S. ground forces and plans for a U.S. Army rotational battalion toward broad-spectrum training, continue implementation of the EPAA (the U.S. has already established a radar system in Turkey and will be stationing SM-3 missiles in

Romania and Poland and forward deploying four BMD-capable ships to Spain,) and create an aviation detachment in Poland.

Arms Control

What role will you have, if confirmed, in future arms control negotiations, such as a follow on to the New START Treaty?

Negotiation of arms control agreements, such as a follow on to the New START Treaty, is the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs in supporting any future negotiation. Arms control plays an important role in advancing U.S. national security by providing predictability and stability in certain strategic relationships, particularly in U.S.-Russian relations. Arms control should never be an end unto itself; nor is it a tool that can be employed without the context of a well-prepared and effective military force.

Detainee Treatment Policy

Do you support the provisions of section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 which state that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment?

I believe the prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is clearly in America's best strategic interest and consistent with American values. During the long history of the Cold War, when America's way of life was challenged by a powerful competing ideology, we were ultimately successful, in part, because we held true to the best ideals and principles that sustained America as a shining beacon to millions under totalitarian rule. Power in the 21st century will stem as much from the strength and appeal of our ideas and moral principles as from our military might. If we are to defeat violent extremism, we must hold true to those ideas that make this country great, and continue to inspire the growth of freedom and tolerance around the world.

Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DoD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes.

If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant DoD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes, I will.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DoD Directive 2310.01E, the DoD Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD ISA?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.