

Advance Questions for Dr. James Miller
Nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

1. Defense Reforms

In answer to advance policy questions at the time of your nomination to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, you stated that you did not see any need for modifications of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms at that time. You stated that the Goldwater-Nichols Act resulted in “dramatic improvements in the effectiveness of the Armed Forces – from strategic decisionmaking to operational command and control. An entire generation of military officers now has a much improved perspective on coordinated, multi-service, joint training and operations.”

Taking into account your experience as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is it still your view that no modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions are needed at this time?

I continue to believe there is no need to modify the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time. The Act was a very significant piece of legislation that, over the course of more than two decades, has led to dramatic improvements in the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. Based on my experience since 2009, my assessment remains unchanged.

If not, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Please see my response above

2. Relationships

What is your understanding of the relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. The USD(P) provides policy support to the Secretary in interagency fora (such as National Security Staff deliberations), engagement with international interlocutors, and in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes inside the Department, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and annual program and budget reviews.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Under Secretary for Policy provides similar support to the Deputy Secretary as described above.

The other Under Secretaries of Defense

The Under Secretary for Policy works closely with the other Under Secretaries of Defense to achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy input, as appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of responsibility. In addition, the Under Secretary for Policy works closely with the Under Secretary of Intelligence and other intelligence officials to ensure that policy formulation and execution are well informed and supported by intelligence.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy exercises authority, direction and control over the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), Asian and Pacific Affairs (APSA), Global Strategic Affairs (GSA), Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), and Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (HD/ASA). This team works together to provide the Secretary with advice and recommendations on the full range of policy issues under consideration in the Department and provides policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary's guidance and decisions are implemented properly.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of issues, including defense strategy and policy development, force planning and other areas in which the Military Departments are critical stakeholders.

The Service Chiefs

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Service Chiefs on a broad range of issues, including defense strategy and policy development, force planning and other areas in which the Military Departments and Services are critical stakeholders.

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the General Counsel on all policy issues that involve a legal dimension. In practice, this means significant and regular coordination on a broad range of issues.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the President and the National Security Council, the Chairman has a unique and critical military role. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman to support the efforts of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, and to ensure that military advice is taken into account in an appropriate manner.

The Commanders of the Regional and Functional Combatant Commands

The USD(P) works closely with the Regional and Functional Combatant Commanders to support the efforts of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of regional and functional strategy and policy, contingency planning and policy oversight of operations.

The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy exercises authority, direction and control over the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Policy organization works closely with DSCA to provide the Secretary with advice and recommendations on the full range of security cooperation issues facing the Department.

3. Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:

Section 134 of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans, and in reviewing such plans. Additionally, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary shall have responsibility for supervising and directing activities of the Department of Defense relating to export controls. Further, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities of the Department of Defense for combating terrorism.

Department of Defense Directive 5111.1 reiterates these duties and specifically notes that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under current regulations and practices?

If confirmed, I will perform the duties set forth in Title 10 and the Department of Defense Directive. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) serves as the principal staff

assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy as well as the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. Specifically, the USD(P) directly supports the Secretary of Defense in the interagency process, dealings with foreign counterparts, developing strategy and planning guidance for the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, providing policy oversight of current operations, and guiding the development and review of contingency plans. He, or she, is the Secretary's principal policy advisor on the use of the U.S. military and its adaptation for future missions.

What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in combating terrorism, in particular as differentiated from those of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict?

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) functions under the authority, direction and control of the USD(P) in combating terrorism. More broadly, the ASD SO/LIC is defined in Title 10 as the principal civilian adviser to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters.

Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

If confirmed, I will discuss with Secretary Panetta how the OSD Policy organization and I can best support him, including whether there are any duties and functions he would prescribe beyond those set forth in Section 134(b) of Title 10, and the Department of Defense Directive for USD(P). At this time, I have not identified any such additional duties and functions.

4. Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

During the past three years, I have been honored to serve as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSDP). In that capacity, I served as the principal staff assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and provided advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy, and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. This work included the full scope of defense policy issues, including both urgent operational challenges (e.g., developing policy for Afghanistan and ways to counter Iran's nuclear program), and setting policy to shape the force of tomorrow (e.g., crafting the Quadrennial Defense Review and Nuclear Posture Review, concluding the New START Treaty, developing new DoD strategic guidance, and setting policy and prioritizing investments in new technologies including cyber capabilities).

Prior to my position as PDUSDP, I spent twenty-five years working on a wide range of defense and national security issues, both in and out of government. I had the honor to work for the late Les Aspin for four years as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee, where I was responsible for both policy and procurement issues. I was privileged to serve for over three years as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Requirements, Plans and Counterproliferation Policy, where my office led defense planning, oversight of war plans, and efforts to improve the military's ability to cope with weapons of mass destruction. During my time outside of government, I have had the opportunity to teach and conduct research on national security issues, to establish and lead a private sector group that provided consulting services to the Department of Defense, and to serve in a leadership position for a then newly-established national security think tank. In addition, I have served on a number of studies and panels including as an advisor to the Defense Science Board, and as an expert to the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. I believe that my substantive expertise and experience would allow me to serve the country well if confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

5. Contingency Planning:

One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is specifically directed to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing such plans.

What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

The role of civilian leadership is not only statutorily mandated, but critical in the formulation of defense strategy and planning. Civilian defense leadership is particularly vital in translating broad national security policies and principles into the strategic ends that ultimately drive military planning.

More specifically, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy supports the development of the President's National Security Strategy, leads the development of the defense strategy, establishes realistic objectives and guidance to form the basis for contingency planning, and reviews DoD plans and programs to ensure they support strategic objectives. In addition to the provision of written guidance, an important civilian leadership role is to review contingency plans submitted for approval by the Combatant Commanders. The USD(P) is also responsible for facilitating interagency coordination on contingency planning efforts, as necessary.

In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning?

I believe that the current level of civilian oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning is appropriate.

What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning?

The Department of Defense should continue to fortify its capacity for strategic thinking and strategic planning to ensure that it not only deals with the challenges of today but is also well prepared for those of tomorrow.

The recently released DoD strategic guidance is evidence that the Department thinks critically about strategy formulation and its associated resource implications – a trend that, if confirmed, I will continue to work to reinforce. If confirmed, I would also continue to strive to provide the best advice possible to the Secretary of Defense in fulfilling his responsibility to provide written policy guidance and to review contingency plans. Finally, I would coordinate closely with the Joint Staff to develop further opportunities to collaborate on planning guidance and reviews.

6. Major Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

If confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I look forward to playing an important role within the Department and the interagency process in developing policy in a number of key areas, including: defeating al Qa'ida and countering the continuing threat of violent extremism; transitioning security responsibility in Afghanistan in a way that protects U.S. vital interests; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the cases of Iran and North Korea; strengthening alliances and partnerships globally to further strengthen U.S. and international security; maintaining stability in Asia and other key regions; advancing U.S. interests in the context of dramatic changes that have unfolded and are unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa; continuing to strengthen the U.S. defense posture globally, as well as in cyberspace and outer space; and most importantly, ensuring that the United States and its vital interests are secure from attack (this requires continued effort in all of the above-noted areas, as well as sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent, missile defenses, and homeland defense capabilities). A key challenge will be to support the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Government in resolving these and other issues– and pursuing opportunities – in the context of significant fiscal pressures.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I would address these challenges by undertaking the development and implementation of both DoD and interagency strategies, policies and plans for key regional and functional issues. I would continue to work closely with other components of the Department of

Defense in support of the Secretary of Defense, as well as our interagency partners, U.S. Allies and partners, and where appropriate the private sector and non-governmental organizations. I would seek to ensure that strategies, policies, and plans are updated as needed to reflect new challenges and new opportunities. I would work to support the President and Secretary's guidance to shape a Joint Force for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be flexible, agile, ready, and technologically advanced. I would work with counterparts in other agencies and across the Department to rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region and place a premium on the Middle East, while remaining the security partner of choice across the globe.

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Department of Defense pursues a strategic and balanced approach consistent with the recently-released Defense strategic guidance. Top priorities would include addressing the challenges listed in my answer to previous question, including defeating al Qaeda, ensuring the success and effective transition of the mission in Afghanistan, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and protecting the U.S. homeland. Continuing to strengthen our Alliances and partnerships, and ensuring that the United States engages through forward presence and is the partner of choice globally, will be a key priority. I would also ensure a strong connection between strategy and resources – making disciplined decisions based on our priorities – and ensure effective working relationships with both military and civilian counterparts through the Department and the with our Federal departments and agencies.

7. Department of Defense Strategic Guidance

The new Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” announced by President Obama on January 5, 2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century and the key military missions for which the DOD will prepare.

As Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, what role did you play in the preparation of the new DOD Strategic Guidance?

The strategic guidance was deeply informed by the Department's most senior civilian and military leadership. As the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I provided advice and assistance to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and worked closely with other civilian and military components including the Joint Staff. More specifically, I participated actively in the conceptualization and writing of the guidance, including the description of the projected security environment, the key military missions for which the Department of Defense must prepare, and prioritization of the key capabilities associated with succeeding at those military missions.

Do you agree with the defense priorities set out in that guidance? What changes, if any, would you recommend to those defense priorities?

I agree with the defense priorities set out in the guidance, and would not recommend any changes at this time. Like all strategies and guidance, I believe that it will be important to review and update this guidance in the future.

8. Afghanistan Strategy

Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?

Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set forth and that we are now implementing, and I believe it is the right strategy. A focused counterinsurgency campaign, with a transition plan that includes an enduring U.S. commitment to Afghanistan, will allow us to help the Afghans build security forces and government capacity that can provide the security necessary for an Afghanistan that does not again become a safe haven for terrorists.

If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?

As I have testified recently to the Senate and House Armed Services Committee, I believe that the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. I also believe that, over time, the Administration should continue to assess and adjust as necessary its implementation of the overall strategy based on conditions on the ground, and am committed to consulting with Congress, and with our Allies and partners in this regard.

Do you support the President's decision to withdraw the 33,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan by the summer of this year?

Yes. I support a responsible, conditions-based drawdown as called for by the President. We have already withdrawn the first 10,000 surge forces, and the remaining 23,000 will be home by the end of September. The key to success in Afghanistan is the ability of Afghan National Security Forces to provide security. Our surge has allowed the Afghans to build up a more capable force, and set conditions for reducing our forces as planned.

Do you believe that timetable should be accelerated?

No. I believe that the planned timetable to withdraw the remaining 23,000 surge troops is appropriate.

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to our strategy in Afghanistan as a result of the drawdown of U.S. forces?

I believe that the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan is sound, and do not recommend any changes at present. I believe that the strategy for Afghanistan (and other strategies and plans) should be regularly assessed, and adjustments made as necessary.

On March 11, 2012, 16 Afghan civilians, including women and children, were killed in a village near Kandahar, allegedly by a U.S. soldier acting alone. A few days later, it was reported that the Taliban suspended preliminary peace talks with the United States and decided not to open a political office in Doha. In addition, President Hamid Karzai called for all NATO forces to withdraw from Afghan villages and remain in major bases.

What is your assessment of the impact of the civilian killings and of the February 22, 2012, incident involving burning of Qurans on the ability of ISAF to carry out its mission?

These incidents created near-term challenges and likely increased risks to U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces in some areas of Afghanistan. However, although tragic and unfortunate, these were isolated incidents, and are not indicative of the state of the campaign. As President Obama stated on March 15, 2012 after speaking with President Karzai, the United States remains committed to completing the process of transition and Afghan National Security Forces taking full responsibility for security across the country by the end of 2014.

What is your assessment of the impact of these incidents on the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and the planned withdrawal of U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan?

My assessment is that these incidents should not affect U.S. strategy or the planned withdrawal of U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan.

9. Afghanistan Transition

Do you support the goal of transitioning lead responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces by 2014?

Yes. Transition is progressing on a positive track. The first two tranches of transition are being implemented, and approximately 50 percent of the Afghan population now lives in areas where the Afghans have the lead for security. We expect the third tranche to be announced in spring 2012, and the fifth and final tranche in mid-2013. We are finding that Afghan forces are able to provide effective security in transition areas.

In your view, what are the main challenges to the success of the transition to an Afghan security lead throughout Afghanistan by 2014?

Safe havens for insurgents in Pakistan and Afghan capacity in the governance and development areas remain the most challenging aspects of transition. The limited capacity of the Afghan Government to govern effectively and to fill government positions at the national and sub-

national levels hinders the ability to assume leadership on these lines of operation. Efforts in these areas must underpin the success of the security transition in the effort to achieve durable stability in Afghanistan.

What measures are being taken, following the murders of U.S. and NATO soldiers last month, to protect NATO and U.S. trainers working with Afghan security forces?

General Allen took some immediate steps after these incidents, including removing U.S. personnel from ministries until their security could be ensured in light of lessons learned from these incidents. The Afghan Government is working to increase their counterintelligence and biometric capability. We are also undertaking additional steps, such as increasing cultural awareness training for trainers and advisors, as part of the security force assistance strategy.

10. Afghanistan National Security Forces

What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)?

ANSF operational effectiveness is improving and the ANSF are demonstrating increasing capability. Currently, 13 of 156 ANA Kandaks or Battalions have the highest possible rating, “Independent with Advisors.” However, the more critical measure is the number of units rated at “Effective with Advisors” and “Effective with Partners,” which are the levels necessary to support transition. Since December 8, 2011, the percentage of ANA units rated as “Effective with Partners” or higher grew from 85 percent to 91 percent. Although the ANSF are currently not ready to operate independently of ISAF in most areas, they are assuming an ever increasing leadership role in operations across Afghanistan, and are on schedule to meet the 2014 goal for transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government.

What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to be able to assume lead security responsibility by 2014?

A first challenge is to continue to build out the full complement of 352,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and to continue to improve the quality, readiness, and performance of these forces. We need to continue ongoing programs to expand ANSF literacy, and continue to provide financial and advisory support to the institutional training centers and existing Afghan training cadres that are currently building leadership and technical capacity of both the Army and the Police. A second challenge is for the ANSF to develop a greater capacity for critical enablers, including logistics support; mobility (e.g., rotary wing); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and operational planning. Third and most broadly, the ANSF must continue building its self-confidence through operational success in taking the lead responsibility for securing transitioned areas and protecting the Afghan people.

If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges?

If confirmed, I would continue current efforts to simplify and accelerate the distribution of ANSF goods and services, support the continued provision of U.S. enabler support as a bridging strategy, and continue the mentoring of Afghan leadership training and education programs.

What do you see as the main challenges to sustaining the ANSF through 2014 and beyond, and if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing these challenges?

A sustained and well-organized international effort to train, advise, and assist the ANSF will be critical to their success both before and after transition in 2014. Building ANSF “enabler” capacity, as noted in my answer to a preceding question, will also be critical. And continued improvement in the functioning of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, including sustained progress in fighting waste and corruption will be essential. The United States and other coalition partners must continue to provide the requisite fiscal and personnel support. Maintaining the international community’s support for the ANSF through 2014 and beyond is essential. We have worked with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to develop a focused international engagement strategy leading up to the NATO Summit in Chicago in May. The Chicago Summit will serve as a key milestone in solidifying the international community’s long-term support and commitment to the ANSF, first established in Lisbon and reaffirmed in Bonn, through 2014 and beyond.

11. U.S. Relationship with Pakistan

What is your assessment of the current U.S.-Pakistan security relationship?

Our relationship with Pakistan is challenging but critical to our national security and our regional interests. Over the past year, the relationship has suffered a number of setbacks and, until recently, our relationship has been nearly frozen. We look forward to working with Pakistan to define and develop a more constructive and durable relationship once Pakistan’s parliamentary review process concludes.

Historically, the U.S. military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like our overall relationship, has seen good and bad phases. However, we still have important shared objectives. A core U.S. national security goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa’ida and its affiliates to ensure that they do not find safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to mitigate the threat to the United States, our Allies, and interests abroad. Pakistan has suffered more than 11,000 military personnel killed or wounded and more than 30,000 civilian casualties in recent years from terrorist actions. The Pakistani military is operating currently against some, but not all, militants that enable the safe havens, and we are committed to working with Pakistan to address this persistent threat. As President Obama has said, “We have killed more terrorists on Pakistani soil

than anywhere else, and that could not have been done without their cooperation.” Pakistan also has a clear stake in Afghan stability and will be an important participant in the process that ultimately brings the conflict to a successful conclusion.

In your view, does the United States have a strategic interest in pursuing increased cooperation with Pakistan on counterterrorism or other security matters?

Yes. I believe U.S. interests in the region and in Asia more broadly require a stable and constructive relationship with Pakistan wherein we can cooperate on matters of shared concern, such as counterterrorism. The fact that Pakistan is a state that possesses nuclear weapons and faces internal threats from extremist organizations adds to the importance of a continued relationship with Pakistan. It is in the U.S. interest for Pakistan to have a strong, civilian-led government and an open society, to live in peace and security with its neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets remain secure.

President Obama recently stated, “We will continue the work of devastating al Qaeda’s leadership and denying them a safe haven.” The conditions that allow the group to maintain its safe haven and regenerate – including its ability to capitalize on relationships with militant affiliates – can only be addressed through a sustained local presence opposed to al-Qa’ida. Therefore, we will defeat al-Qa’ida only through a sustained partnership with Pakistan. Greater Pakistani-U.S. strategic cooperation across a broad range of political, military, and economic pursuits will also be necessary to achieve the defeat of al-Qa’ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan as we work to change the conditions on the ground that give rise to safe havens. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department of Defense’s efforts in coordination with our interagency partners for a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan, aimed at advancing shared national security objectives.

12. The Haqqani Network

The Haqqani network, which has been linked to a number of deadly attacks on Afghan, U.S., and other coalition forces in Afghanistan, operates from safe havens in Pakistan. It has been repeatedly alleged that the Pakistan intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), provides support to the Haqqani network.

What is your understanding of the rules of engagement for U.S. troops in Afghanistan who are subjected to cross-border attacks from Haqqani or other insurgent forces on the Pakistan side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border?

My understanding is that U.S. forces in Afghanistan are authorized to act in self-defense when they are under attack. I also understand that ISAF and USCENTCOM are working with the Pakistanis to improve cross-border coordination and have conducted several tripartite meetings with Afghan and Pakistani security forces in recent months.

Do you agree that it is essential, if U.S.-Pakistan relations are ever to be normalized, that Pakistan eliminate its support for the Haqqani network and denounce the cross-border attacks conducted by the Haqqanis and other insurgents against Afghan and coalition forces in Afghanistan? Why or why not?

The ability of violent extremist groups to find support and safe haven in Pakistan poses a significant threat to U.S. forces, the NATO mission, and the long-term stability of Afghanistan. Attacks against U.S. and coalition personnel are unacceptable. It is Pakistan's responsibility to prevent attacks from its territory on others, including Afghanistan and U.S. forces there. If Pakistan does not address these threats, the United States will have to consider a range of options, but it is best when we have Pakistan's cooperation. Pakistan has legitimate concerns that should be understood and addressed, if possible, by the Afghan Government in any process to bring about a stable and durable political solution in Afghanistan. But Pakistan also has responsibilities of its own, including taking decisive steps to ensure that the Afghan Taliban and affiliated organizations, including the Haqqani network, cannot continue to conduct the insurgency from Pakistani territory.

Increased Pakistani action is particularly critical with respect to groups such as the Haqqani network, which continues to maintain close ties to al-Qa'ida and other violent extremist organizations that pose real threats to the United States, and indeed to the people and Government of Pakistan. In my view, we should continue to work closely with Pakistan to encourage it to act against extremists, including the Haqqani network, and extremist safe havens that threaten U.S. and Pakistani security, and works toward a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region.

13. U.S. Assistance to Pakistan

The United States has provided significant military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing and training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

In your view, should the provision of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan be conditioned on the Government of Pakistan, including the Pakistan military, providing greater cooperation to the United States on counterterrorism efforts?

In my view, our current capacity-building programs with the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important component in improving the Pakistan military's counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities in order for Pakistan's military to fight extremists whose safe havens enable terrorists that threaten the United States. Our assistance has also helped to improve cross-border coordination. Going forward, it is vital that Pakistan live up to its responsibilities, including to cooperate fully in counterterrorism matters, and to expand its counterinsurgency campaign against all extremists and militant groups that have found safe haven inside Pakistan. In the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid, the Administration asked

Pakistan to take a number of concrete steps to demonstrate its continued commitment to a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship. Future provision of security-related assistance will be informed by Pakistan's response to these requests and to the overall restart of our relationship in the wake of the November 26, 2011, cross-border incident that resulted in the deaths of 24 Pakistan Army soldiers. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure that the support the United States provides to Pakistan yields the results we seek.

14. Iraq

President Obama has said that the December 31st, 2011, withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Iraq marked the beginning of a "new chapter" in the U.S.-Iraq relationship.

What in your view are the highest priorities for the U.S.-Iraq security relationship going forward?

Developing a long-term security relationship with Iraq, as part of a broader enduring commitment to regional peace and security, is one of our highest priorities. This relationship should include consultation on regional security issues, and the continued development of appropriate Iraqi military capabilities.

The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) is a foundation for our military-to-military ties with Iraq. OSC-I is under Chief of Mission authority, and administers security assistance programs and conducts security cooperation activities with the Iraq Security Forces.

What do you see as the greatest challenges facing the Department with regard to our security relationship with Iraq and, if confirmed, how would you recommend meeting those challenges?

Ensuring Iraq's integration into the regional security framework will remain an important task. We will continue to work to strengthen our military-to-military ties with Iraq through security cooperation activities, while helping to expand Iraq's military engagement with key regional partners.

If confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I will co-chair the Defense and Security Joint Coordination Committee, established under the Strategic Framework Agreement, and will continue efforts to strengthen bilateral relations. We will seek to bolster the U.S.-Iraq defense partnership on a wide array of security-related matters.

15. Iran

The President said: "America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no option off the table to achieve that goal."

Do you agree that we should leave all options on the table with respect to Iran? If so, why? If not, why not?

Yes, I agree. As the President said, in ensuring that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon, we are using all elements of national power to encourage Iran to make a choice to meet its international obligations and rejoin the community of nations, or face severe and growing consequences if it continues to violate its obligations. This includes a political effort aimed at isolating Iran, a diplomatic effort to sustain our coalition and ensure that the Iranian program is monitored, an economic effort that imposes crippling sanctions, and a military effort to be prepared for any contingency. I believe that sanctions are beginning to have an impact.

Sanctions and political pressures are having an effect on Iran, and Iran is not on the verge of achieving a nuclear weapon. Therefore, *there is time and space to pursue diplomacy, backed by pressure*. At the same time, all options including the use of military force should remain on the table, to increase pressure on Iran and improve the prospects of diplomacy, and to be prepared to take action should diplomacy not succeed.

In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in particular, for advancing the President's policy with respect to Iran?

The role of the Department and the Under Secretary is to provide the Secretary of the Defense and the President sound policy advice and prudent planning, in coordination with military counterparts, to ensure that the President has the best available options to meet U.S. policy objectives regarding Iran.

The Defense Department plays a supporting role to the Department of State and Department of the Treasury in increasing pressure on Iran, and a central role in reassuring our regional partners and preparing for all possible contingencies.

The Defense Department supports State and Treasury's efforts to isolate Iran diplomatically, regionally and globally, and to impede its ability to advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Building upon this, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is working with partners to counter Iran's efforts to destabilize the region, especially following the Arab Spring.

The Department of Defense has invested substantially in and deepened our defense partnerships in the region, building a robust regional security architecture that blunts Iran's ability to threaten and coerce its neighbors.

We have enhanced our significant and enduring U.S. force presence in the region and we have worked to develop a network of air and missile defenses, shared early warning, improved maritime security, closer counterterrorism cooperation, expanded programs to build partner capacity, and increased efforts to harden and protect our partners' critical infrastructure. We

have conveyed clearly our commitment to protecting maritime freedoms that are the basis for global prosperity; this is one of the main reasons our military forces operate in the region.

These efforts have reassured our partners in the region. They demonstrate unmistakably to Tehran that any attempt to dominate the region will be costly and futile.

Taken together, the Department contributes to the Administration's multi-dimensional approach to ensure that the President is in a position where he can employ any option—or the full range of options—as we continue to ratchet up the pressure and price for Iran's intransigence.

16. Syria

The situation in Syria continues to deteriorate on a daily basis and – absent international action – President Bashar al Assad appears intent on staying in Syria and continuing his brutal crackdown on the Syrian people.

What is your assessment of the situation in Syria?

As the Secretary said in his statement to this committee earlier this month, the tragedy in Syria has justifiably evoked the concern and outrage of the United States government, the American people and much of the world. I agree with the President, the Secretary and a broad cross-section of the international community who have stated unequivocally that Bashar al-Asad must halt his campaign of killing and crimes against his own people now, step aside and allow a democratic transition to proceed immediately.

What role, if any, should the United States play in developing international consensus on a path forward in Syria?

The situation in Syria demands an international response. The United States has been leading efforts within the international community to pressure Asad to stop his violence against the Syrian people and to step aside.

The administration's focus is on translating that international consensus into action along four tracks:

1. We are working to increase the diplomatic and political isolation of the Asad regime and encourage other countries to join the United States, the European Union and the Arab League in imposing sanctions on the regime.
2. We are providing emergency humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people, with a total commitment to date of \$12 million.

3. We are working closely with the Friends of the Syrian People group (70 countries and the Syrian National Council) to try to encourage the various opposing groups to unify and lay groundwork for a peaceful, orderly transition to a democratic government that recognizes and respects the rights of all Syrians—including minorities.
4. The Department of Defense is developing options that can be executed, as directed by the President. These options address a range of potential contingencies related to instability in Syria, including the provision of humanitarian assistance.

We are reviewing additional steps that can be taken with our international partners to help protect the Syrian people, end the violence, and ensure regional stability.

17. Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

Prior to the current political crisis in Yemen, the U.S. Government had a robust security assistance program to help the Yemeni security forces take action against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Some observers, while supportive of U.S. security assistance to Yemen, have suggested that the problems being confronted by the Government of Yemen cannot simply be addressed with the provision of additional security assistance.

What is your assessment of the security situation in Yemen?

The United States and Yemen face a common enemy in al-Qa'ida. Recent al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attacks against the Yemeni government demonstrates AQAP's determination to undermine the security situation and disrupt Yemen's ongoing democratic transition. We must continue to work with President Hadi and the national unity government to sustain the pressure against AQAP and deny it a safe-haven and an operational platform.

What criteria would you use in determining whether security assistance and associated training activities in Yemen should resume?

Last year, the Administration temporarily postponed the transfer of lethal security assistance to Yemen in response to the unstable political and security conditions. Since then, the situation in Yemen has improved, and the new Yemeni government has met key benchmarks in their democratic transition process. The new Yemeni leaders held successful presidential elections to replace Ali Abdullah Saleh, and they have demonstrated a commitment to confronting al-Qa'ida. In addition, they are preparing to reform their constitution and reorganize their military. The Department of Defense has been working with the Department of State to re-assess our Yemeni partner units and, thus far, we have not found any evidence that Yemeni units that have received or are slated to receive security assistance have committed human rights violations. The Administration has therefore agreed to resume the transfer of lethal security assistance on a case-by-case basis to support units in the Yemeni Armed Forces that are actively engaged in the fight against al-Qaida. As part of our longstanding commitment to guard against potential human

rights abuses, the Administration will continue to monitor assistance to ensure it serves its intended purpose.

Given the current policy limitations on lethal security assistance to the Yemeni counterterrorism forces, what is your assessment of the U.S. strategy to counter AQAP in Yemen?

Throughout the political instability of the past year, we have maintained a strong working relationship with Yemeni counterterrorism (CT) forces. Although we scaled back some U.S. security assistance, we have still been able to collaborate on a number of operational issues that have degraded AQAP and disrupted its external plotting. In response to the relatively successful political transition in Yemen, the Administration has decided to resume and expand U.S. security assistance with the goal of helping the Yemeni government better combat AQAP and secure its territory.

As AQAP continues to gain territory in Yemen, some observers have argued that the United States should assist the Yemeni government reverse these territorial gains. Others view the territorial gains by AQAP as part of an insurgency and that any effort to confront AQAP should be led and conducted by the Yemenis with limited – if any – assistance from the United States.

What are your views on the proper role of the United States in Yemen?

In my view, the United States should continue to work with the Yemeni government on combating AQAP, which poses a threat to both U.S. and Yemeni security. This includes building Yemeni capacity to counter AQAP and deny safe havens, collecting intelligence on AQAP and the threat it poses, undermining AQAP's message, and, when necessary, conducting combined operations against the group. AQAP has recently made some territorial gains in Yemen, and many in the organization desire to attack the United States and our Allies and interests. Therefore, it is in the interest of the United States to ensure that the group is not able to succeed in any way.

In your view, should U.S. interests be limited to those individuals in AQAP that are seeking to conduct external operations against the United States and our interests or should the United States assist the Yemeni Government to confront this insurgency?

AQAP poses a sustained threat to the U.S. homeland, and our Allies and partners defeating AQAP is the top CT priority for the Arabian Peninsula. We should give top priority to preventing AQAP's external attacks, but we cannot let AQAP seize territory and establish a safe haven within Yemen. I believe that the United States should continue to assist the Yemeni government in confronting the group, and continue to help build Yemeni security capacity so that the Yemeni government can eventually disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP with only limited U.S. involvement.

18. NATO

In your view, how important is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S. transatlantic relationship with our Alliance partners to U.S. national security interests?

NATO remains of vital importance, and has become a net provider of global security. As President Obama has said, “Europe remains the cornerstone of our engagement with the world,” and NATO is “the most capable Alliance in history.”

The transatlantic relationship is of critical importance to U.S. national security, and the transatlantic community has never been more closely aligned in confronting the challenges of a complex, dangerous, and fast-changing world. For example, in Libya, NATO Allies came together with Arab and other partners to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, and to support the Libyan people. In Afghanistan, with nearly 40,000 Allied and partner forces alongside our own, we have built and sustained NATO's largest-ever overseas deployment. As Iran has continued to defy its obligations pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions, the United States, Europe, and other partners have put in place the toughest sanctions yet.

What are the greatest challenges and opportunities that you foresee for NATO over the next five years?

The United States has important stakes in a strong, mutually supportive NATO Alliance, and the President has stressed his strong desire to rebuild and adapt transatlantic security relationships to meet 21st century security challenges. NATO's new Strategic Concept is an important step in ensuring that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring the common security of its members, and it will guide the next phase in NATO's evolution.

Over the next five years, the top NATO-related challenges include achieving durable progress and a successful transition in Afghanistan, implementing missile defense in Europe, and stemming the deterioration in European military capability. Many of our NATO Allies have been underperforming in terms of their own investments in defense capabilities, especially when it comes to deployable expeditionary forces. Many have significantly reduced their national defense budgets in response to the global economic crisis, and some are planning further cuts. A key challenge – and a key opportunity – will be for Allies to determine which capabilities must be sustained, and how that can be done in a more cost effective manner.

Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the next five years?

I agree with the President's statement that NATO enlargement should continue so long as new candidates are democratic, peaceful, and willing to contribute to common security. Which countries would be candidates for further engagement and within what timeframe NATO would undertake further enlargement are important questions the Administration would need to address in close consultation with Congress and our Allies. Each NATO aspirant should be judged on its individual merits and progress in implementing political, economic, and military reforms.

In your view, what should the United States do to ensure that NATO has the resources and capabilities necessary to carry out its missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere?

As Secretary Panetta has made clear, our NATO Allies need to do more for security despite the financial crisis. Europe should not expect the United States to shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden.

In my view, the United States should continue to encourage our European Allies to reinvest the savings in operational costs that will result from transition in Afghanistan in 2014 into the defense capabilities that NATO will need in 2020 and beyond. We should also continue to encourage Europe to pool defense resources and share capabilities in order to get the most from scarce defense resources. In addition, the United States should continue to place emphasis on combined training, exercises, and military cooperation, as well as on new capabilities, such as missile defense.

In my view, the United States should sustain a central role in NATO, and help the Alliance prepare for 21st century challenges. This includes, for example, the allocation of a U.S.-based brigade to the NATO Response Force, and the rotation of U.S.-based units to Europe for training and exercises with NATO counterparts to ensure strong links and interoperability. It should also include continued European Phased Adaptive Approach efforts - the United States has already established a radar system in Turkey, we will be stationing SM-3 defensive interceptor missiles in Romania and Poland, and we will be forward-deploying four BMD-capable ships to Rota, Spain in FY14. As additional examples, I believe that we should continue as the framework nation of the NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters; and in Poland, we should move forward with plans to create an aviation detachment for enhanced training.

In your view, should NATO consider an expanded role for Israel within the organization?

Israel is an active and valued partner of NATO through the Alliance's "Mediterranean Dialogue" program, which includes practical cooperation as well as political dialogue, both bilaterally with NATO and multilaterally including the other six Partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue. The United States supports and encourages this partnership, and encourages other Allies and partners to do so as well. The Mediterranean Dialogue includes an "Individual Cooperation Program," developed between NATO and Israel, which outlines Israeli desires for engagement with NATO.

19. Russia

What is your assessment of the current U.S.-Russian security relationship?

In September 2010, then-Secretary Gates and Russian Minister of Defense Serdyukov advanced the U.S.-Russia defense relationship by establishing the Defense Relations Working Group (DRWG). Through the DRWG and its eight sub-working groups, we engage with the Russian

Ministry of Defense across a wide spectrum of cooperative defense activities – missile defense, defense technology, social welfare, training and education, as well as regional and global security, and defense policy. These efforts have helped us gain important insights into one another's defense establishments. Reciprocity is a key element of our engagement. Our defense relationship and our military-to-military activities are focused in part on helping Russia's efforts to reform its Armed Forces. We are not enhancing the combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces, but we believe strongly that a reformed Russian military is a positive goal worth pursuing.

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) cooperation continues to be a steady component of the U.S.-Russian relationship that has remained largely insulated from the broader peaks and troughs. Although the international agreement that governs our CTR cooperation with Russia (i.e., the CTR "Umbrella Agreement") is due to expire in June 2013, we look forward to an extension of that key agreement and a continuation of our work with Russia.

What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russian security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?

The United States and Russia should be able to cooperate effectively in the many areas for which we share common interests, and communicate effectively in areas where we have competing interests, and negotiate reasonably in areas where we have overlapping interests.

Among the most important areas where the United States and Russia have common interests is in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. We have had significant cooperation on Iran. The Russians cancelled a major weapons sale worth several hundred million dollars to Iran in 2010 and supported UNSCR 1929, which imposed international sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear programs. I believe that the United States should continue to actively seek Russian support for ensuring that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons. Similarly, Russia is a key player in reversing North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, and shares common interests in this regard. As a third key example, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has been and continues to be one of the most successful cooperation programs in the U.S.-Russia relationship. Finally, the United States and Russia share strong interests in reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, as reflected in the New START Treaty, and prior treaties.

Russia also has an interest in stability in Afghanistan. Our efforts in Afghanistan have benefited greatly from improved security relations with Russia. The Northern Distribution Network has been critical to continued operations given the closure of our Pakistan ground lines of communication. Russia allows our military personnel, supplies, and equipment to transit its territory by both air and rail and will soon allow for reverse transit of wheeled armored vehicles from Afghanistan. Russia has also been forward-leaning in identifying possible areas of cooperation on counternarcotics, and we have been engaging Russia to develop these ideas.

The United States and Russia are two of many countries working together off the Horn of Africa to address the threat of piracy. Although Russia does not participate in ongoing multilateral counter-piracy operations, it does share important information and work cooperatively with NATO and EU operations.

In your view what policy steps should DOD take to improve relations with Russia? For instance, would you support increased military to military relations and exchanges with Russia?

DoD has been a proponent and a beneficiary of the reset with Russia. The OSD-MOD Defense Relations Working Group and the Joint Staff-General Staff Military Cooperation Working Group revived U.S.-Russia defense and military relations from the low-point after the Russo-Georgia War.

As a result, DoD has a robust military-to-military work plan and are constantly looking for ways to improve it by ensuring that our cooperation with Russia serves U.S. and Russian interests and contributes to greater security in the Euro-Atlantic space. The 2012 Military Cooperation Work Plan includes more than 100 events and comprises a variety of quality activities such as cadet exchanges, exercises, senior leader visits, and conferences. Over time, cooperation on a wide range of issues may help to build a foundation for more concrete and substantive cooperation with Russia.

A U.S.-Russia agreement to cooperate on missile defense would remove a major irritant from the relationship, would send a strong signal to Iran that development of long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons would be a waste of resources, would add to the effectiveness of our missile defense system, and could help re-cast perceptions U.S.-Russia relations on both sides.

Would you support any joint development or other programs with Russia?

If confirmed, I would be interested in supporting joint programs that would benefit the United States. Through the Defense Technology Cooperation Sub-Working under the Defense Relations Working Group, DoD has been looking for such opportunities. Before undertaking any joint programs, the United States and Russia would need to conclude a Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement, which has been in negotiation for some time.

Would you support joint U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense as a way to send a powerful signal to Iran against Iran's developing long-range missiles or having nuclear weapons?

I support U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defenses first and foremost because it could improve the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, thereby improving the protection of the United States, our forces overseas, and our Allies. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is in the security interests of the United States, NATO, and Russia, first and foremost because it could strengthen capabilities across Europe to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles.

In addition, I believe that U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense. Such cooperation would contribute to the growing strong signals to Iran – including those sent by U.S. and international sanctions and diplomacy – that Iran’s development of missiles and pursuit of nuclear capabilities is reducing rather than enhancing Iranian security.

Do you support efforts mandated by the New START Treaty Resolution of Ratification to seek reductions in the stockpiles of Russian and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons?

Yes. As I stated in my November 2, 2011 testimony, I believe that any future discussions with Russia should include tactical nuclear weapons, as reflected in the certification and reporting done pursuant to the resolution of advice and consent to ratification for the New START Treaty. Discussions regarding reductions in the total number of nuclear weapons, both deployed and non-deployed, are also needed. In any future reductions our aim should be to seek the relocation of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons away from the territory of NATO members.

If so, what steps would you recommend for pursuing such reductions, if confirmed?

The first step for the United States to determine appropriate next steps is to complete the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study. As this work approaches completion, consultation with Congress will be essential to inform Congressional deliberations on budget and policy issues and to sustain bipartisan support for any arms control proposals in the future. Consultation with Allies and partners will be essential to ensure that extended deterrence and assurance remain strong. Finally, the Administration must work with Congress to ensure that key capabilities to support the U.S. nuclear deterrent are funded adequately.

20. China

China’s defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of military growth is to be expected for a country experiencing the kind of economic growth that China has had over about that same period, the types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China’s intentions in the region.

How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China?

The senior-most leaders of our two countries have consistently affirmed the need for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. I would describe the relationship as

simultaneously possessing elements of cooperation and competition. The United States, including the Department of Defense, continues to pursue opportunities to cooperate where there is a mutual benefit, while pursuing frank discussions in areas where we may have differences.

To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of the United States and other major regional and international actors will affect the direction in which China develops?

As Secretary of State Clinton noted in her March 7, 2012 speech at the United States Institute of Peace, the United States is attempting to work with China to foster its rise as an active contributor to global security, stability and prosperity while also sustaining and securing American leadership in a changing world. The United States is trying to do this without entering into unhealthy competition, rivalry, or conflict, and without falling short on our responsibilities to the international community. We need to work with China to build a model in which we strike a stable and mutually acceptable balance between cooperation and competition.

What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program?

China appears to be building the capability to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery, and also to counter intervention by third parties. Its near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, and deterring or denying effective intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery. China's growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear forces, and is improving other strategic capabilities, such as in space, counter-space, and computer network operations.

How should the United States respond to this Chinese military growth and modernization?

I believe the United States should continue to monitor developments in China's military concepts and capabilities, while encouraging Beijing to be more transparent about its military and security affairs. The United States has been and should remain the pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region in order to preserve the conditions that have fostered peace and prosperity. The U.S. response to China's military modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our alliances and partnerships.

What effect is China's military growth having on other countries in the region?

The pace and scale of China's military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raise many questions, both within the United States and in the region as a whole, about China's future. Uncertainty about China's military growth and intentions has led to concerns about regional destabilization, leading other regional countries to intensify their outreach to diverse major power partners. As a result, we have seen the region become more welcoming of the United States as a security partner of choice. In addition, some nations have begun increasing their own military acquisitions, and on the diplomatic front, concerns about the regional military balance have been instrumental to the success of multilateral architecture based on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

As Secretary of Defense Panetta and China's Vice President Xi affirmed in February, a healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship is an essential part of President Obama's and President Hu's shared vision for building a cooperative partnership.

I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region to discuss the peacetime interaction of our respective military forces so as to minimize the risk of accidents, and to press China to partner with the United States and our Asian Allies and partners in addressing common security challenges.

Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly work if China is equally committed to open and regular exchanges. If confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.

By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air and space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in particular is China's increased aggressiveness in asserting its excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea.

What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea?

The United States is a Pacific nation with a national interest in freedom of navigation and overflight, open access to Asia's maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law, including in the South China Sea. In my view, the United States should not take a position on the competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea; all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with international law, without resorting to the threat or use of force.

The United States should continue to call upon all parties to clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms consistent with international law. Accordingly, claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.

How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation?

The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the South China Sea. I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain its presence and assert our freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary international law.

Preservation of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea depend largely upon their continual exercise. Around the world, U.S. military forces conduct operations to challenge excessive maritime claims asserted by coastal States. In the South China Sea, we have expressed our desire for respect for freedom of navigation and overflight for many decades, through operational assertions against excessive maritime claims asserted by several nations. Of note, we challenge excessive maritime claims asserted by any nation, including excessive claims by Allies and partners.

Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential conflict situation.

If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack?

If confirmed, I would work with other parts of DoD and the U.S. Government, including the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Commerce, to facilitate a coordinated approach to cyber threats, not only from China, but from others as well. We must work together as governments not only to defend, but also to develop options to respond to and impose costs on cyber threat actors so as to deter future exploitation and attack. The President stated in his International Strategy for Cyberspace that the United States reserves the right to use all necessary means – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law -- in order to defend our Nation, our Allies, our partners, and our interests against hostile acts on cyberspace. In my view, we should continue to prepare to do so as necessary, while continuing to strengthen international norms of behavior regarding this essential area.

In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising

serious concerns in the international community. Since then, China has continued its active pursuit of missile and satellite technology.

What is your view of China's purposes for its pursuit of these capabilities?

In my view, this test was one aspect of a multidimensional program that China has underway for counter-space activities. Counter-space, and anti-satellite weapons, likewise are one element of a comprehensive military modernization program underway in China that includes an emphasis on developing and fielding disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. The United States' goal should remain to promote the responsible use of space.

What do you see as the long term implications of such developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

Space systems are vital to our national security and our economy. In this regard, the United States should continue to seek ways to protect our interests in space. U.S. space policies and programs should be informed by China's space and counter-space capabilities, which along with activities of other states, have contributed to today's challenging space environment. Our first line of defense should be to deter actions that threaten our space architecture (including through defensive measures as well as credible response options), but should deterrence fail, we must possess alternatives to retain effective operations, albeit in a degraded environment.

The United States should continue to seek to engage China, a major space-faring nation, to promote the responsible use of space. However, our concern should not be focused on only one country, but on the range of actors that add to the increasingly congested, contested, and competitive environment in space.

21. North Korea

Despite the recent death of long-time leader Kim Jong-il, North Korea remains one of the greatest near term challenges to security and stability in Asia and deterring conflict on the Korean Peninsula remains a top priority. In fact, with the uncertainties associated with the ongoing leadership transition, upcoming challenges on the Peninsula may be even greater.

With the precipitous change in leadership in North Korea, what is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

North Korea's provocative behavior, large conventional military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including uranium enrichment, present a serious threat to the United States, its Allies and partners in the region, and the international community. The opaque nature of the North Korean system, coupled with an uncertain political transition, add to our concerns. The

two North Korean attacks on South Korean forces in 2010 provide a sober reminder that Pyongyang is willing to utilize its capabilities to undertake provocative actions. I believe the United States must work with our Allies and other key partners in the region and internationally on diplomatic solutions to the range of pressing concerns we face with North Korea. Under the appropriate conditions, direct diplomatic engagement with North Korea is important as well.

What is your understanding of the threats posed to the United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities?

North Korea's missile and WMD programs pose a direct and serious threat to our regional Allies and partners, and have the potential to become a direct threat to U.S. territory. As we witnessed in 2006 and 2009, North Korea continues to flight-test theater ballistic missiles, demonstrating the capability to target South Korea and Japan. North Korea also continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), which Pyongyang claims to have tested in a space launch configuration but could also reach the United States if developed as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The United States must continue to monitor carefully North Korea's WMD and missile development programs and related proliferation activities. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DoD continues to work closely with other parts of the U.S. Government to address these and other emerging threats, to reduce our vulnerabilities and those of our Allies and partners, and to work cooperatively with our Allies to ensure our contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.

What concerns you most about North Korea and, if confirmed, what would you do to address those concerns?

North Korea maintains a large, offensively postured conventional military, continues to develop long-range ballistic missiles, seeks to develop nuclear weapons, and engages in the proliferation of ballistic missiles contrary to international norms and UN Security Council resolutions. North Korea has also conducted provocative attacks against the Republic of Korea. What concerns me most is that this range of threats comes from a single State standing on the outside of the international community. If confirmed, I will ensure that we sustain and advance our military readiness and coordination with Allies and partners, and explore all avenues for shaping North Korean behavior.

22. Republic of Korea

What is your understanding of the current status of the U. S.-South Korean security relationship?

In my view, the U.S.-ROK Alliance remains one of the cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and is as strong and viable today as it has ever been. This was most recently reaffirmed by the Secretary of Defense to his counterpart at the October 28, 2011 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul. Our security relationship is based on a mutual

commitment to common interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, and combined planning, all of which ensure a comprehensive strategic Alliance.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve this security relationship?

If confirmed, I would support the ongoing realignment of U.S. forces on the Peninsula and the preparation for the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK by December 2015. Also, I believe it is important to ensure that the U.S. and Korean public continue to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived from this Alliance. Conversely, the public should also recognize that the ROK is playing an increasing role in regional and global security issues, commensurate with its economic status and influence, and the scope of the Alliance is extending beyond the Peninsula. In light of the heightened possibility of North Korean provocations, if confirmed, I will ensure that we maintain constant communication and coordination with the ROK senior leadership so that we can effectively deter North Korea, and respond effectively and appropriately to any situation that threatens the security of the Korean Peninsula.

What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this transition takes place as planned?

The United States and the ROK have a comprehensive way forward to transition wartime operational control from the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff by December 2015. If confirmed, I will work with my ROK counterpart, and with others in the U.S. and ROK governments, to complete this process under the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework and ensure that the combined defense posture remains strong and seamless throughout the transition process.

Do you support increasing the tour lengths of U.S. personnel assigned to the Republic of Korea to two- or three- year tours of duty and increasing the number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer assignments?

I agree that a change in personnel policies related to tour lengths could help improve the readiness of U.S. Force Korea (USFK) by reducing the effects of constant turn-over of personnel. At this time, however, DoD has not yet identified an affordable plan for full implementation of tour normalization, and I understand that USFK is holding at the currently authorized 4,645 Command Sponsored Families. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to consider alternative options for the future.

If so, how would you purport to implement such an increase in accompanied tours?

If confirmed, I will ensure that DoD continues to examine how tour length extensions and unit rotations can enhance readiness.

Do you believe that the security relationship with South Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or should U.S. forces stationed in Korea be available for regional or global deployments?

In accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries, the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula serves to deter potential aggressors from taking hostile actions that would threaten the peace and security of ROK. In my view, this presence has not only deterred further war on the Korean Peninsula, but has also contributed to the stability of the Northeast Asian region. It is my understanding that the principles of Force Management, decided at the 2010 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting, provide greater flexibility for regional and global deployments for U.S. forces in Korea, while ensuring that we will continue to meet our commitments to the safety and security of Korea. As ROK military forces continue to serve with the U.S. military in places off the Peninsula (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the Gulf of Aden), I believe the U.S.-ROK Alliance will continue to serve an important role regionally and globally.

What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?

The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces from north of Seoul and from the Seoul Metropolitan area to locations south of Seoul, primarily U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys and Daegu. I assess that the movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han River provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to the political sustainability of our forward presence, and improves force protection and survivability by placing the majority of personnel and equipment outside of the tactical effective range of North Korean artillery. The two plans will reduce the number of U.S. camps and stations from 107 to 48. Thirty-three sites have been returned to the ROK, with 26 remaining to be returned.

Since the North Korean attacks last year – the sinking of the South Korea Navy ship CHEONAN and the artillery attack on the South Korean island – South Korea has been adamant that it will respond “firmly” to the next such provocation. A main topic during recent U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings was reportedly the Joint Operational Plan for responding to future North Korean provocations.

What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe the U.S. armed forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?

My understanding is that, under the Mutual Defense Treaty, when the political independence or security of the ROK or the United States is threatened by external armed attack, the United States and the ROK will consult together and develop appropriate means to deter the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of North Korean provocations, the two sides should continue to consult closely so that responses are effective.

23. Japan

How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship?

The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security in East Asia. Japan is a valued Ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in the region. Our Alliance has held fast through the turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and at times contentious trade disputes, and now stands poised as a truly global Alliance. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a complicated realignment process that is part of a larger Alliance Transformation agenda that also includes a review of roles, missions, and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability, and cohesiveness of the Alliance for the next several decades. In terms of our military-to-military relationship, the shared experience of U.S. and Japanese forces, working should-to-shoulder in response to the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis of last spring, validated our continuing close cooperation and mutual respect.

How does Japan's relationship with its regional neighbors, mainly China, North Korea and South Korea influence the U.S.-Japan relationship?

I believe it is important for Japan to continue to maintain and further develop constructive relations with all of its neighbors. Japan and other East Asian nations can and should increase their security cooperation. Working with other U.S. Allies and partners in the region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and prosperity throughout Asia and globally. Japan is a valued and essential partner in the Six-Party Talks process and in other important regional security architectures. Progress made to bolster trilateral security dialogues in Northeast Asia effectively links Japanese, U.S., and ROK approaches.

What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

Japan is already a close Ally and strong security partner with the United States, and is increasingly contributing to international security activities; however, the changing security environment in Asia will present new challenges. The United States needs to continue to work with Japan to deal with these challenges, including greater interoperability between our armed forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would encourage Japan's development of joint doctrine and organizations that will enhance Japan's ability to undertake complex missions to build security in East Asia. I would also encourage trilateral security cooperation with the United States, Japan and both the ROK and Australia, as these kinds of activities effectively strengthen the functional capacity of the emerging regional security architecture. Regarding international security activity, Japan has actively participated in combined counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, is participating in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and has been a significant donor to ongoing Afghanistan reconstruction. I believe participation in such international security operations are very positive developments, and would encourage future Japanese participation in such missions.

What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense?

Ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan is a success story for the Alliance and has resulted in Japan's fielding of both sea and land-based missile defense systems. Japan is one of our most important ballistic missile defense partners, and U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense plays an important role in supporting our common strategic objectives on defense. The SM3 Block IIA is an important cooperative program that will result in a significant increase in ballistic missile defense capability.

Currently, the 2006 Roadmap Agreement between the United States and Japan links the closure of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station on Okinawa and the movement of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam to the plan to build a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab on Okinawa. In February, the United States and Japan announced their intention to delink the movement of Marines from the plan to build the FRF. It also appears that, while the number of Marines leaving Okinawa will not change, fewer will be relocated to Guam.

What is your understanding of the current plans for U.S. military forces on Okinawa and Guam?

Plans for U.S. military forces on Okinawa and Guam should result in a force posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. A significant number of U.S. Marine Corps forces will move from Okinawa to Guam, which is a strategic hub that supports our ability to operate forces from a forward location. At the same time, we will maintain forces in Okinawa to provide deterrence and rapidly respond to security challenges in areas around Japan.

Although planned posture shifts will result in a rebalancing of our forces, they will not negatively affect our ability to respond to contingencies or meet treaty obligations in Asia. They demonstrate our commitment to Allies and to fulfilling our agreements with Allies and partners.

How does delinking the movement of Marines off Okinawa from the construction of the FRF impact the realignment of Marines in Northeast Asia?

Delinking the movement of U.S. Marines off Okinawa will allow the United States to push forward with the realignment of the Marine Corps in Northeast Asia, which is in our strategic interests as we seek to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific. Specifically, delinkage will allow the United States to establish a force posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.

The United States and Japan remain committed to constructing the FRF as the only viable alternative to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, and are working together in taking the

next step prior to the start of construction: securing the Governor's approval for the landfill permit.

What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?

I believe that the Government of Japan (GOJ), like the U.S. Government, remains committed to the principles of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap, and although both governments have acknowledged that the Futenma Replacement Facility will not be constructed by 2014, as originally planned, there appears to be incremental but positive movement towards the construction of a replacement facility at Camp Schwab. The GOJ submission of the environmental impact statement to the prefectural government of Okinawa in December 2011 was a necessary and politically significant step forward. The U.S. Government is committed to working with the GOJ in taking the next step prior to the start of construction: securing the Governor's approval for the landfill permit.

If confirmed, how would you work with the Commander, Pacific Command, and the military services to update U.S. military force posture in Japan and the Pacific Theater?

If confirmed, I would engage frequently and proactively with the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, and the Military Departments, as well as the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to update U.S. force posture in Japan and the Pacific. I firmly believe that maintaining a strong and comprehensive relationship with my military counterparts is essential to creating a military force posture that makes sense both strategically and operationally.

24. India

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security relations?

Today, U.S.-India defense ties are strong and growing, including a robust slate of dialogues, military exercises, defense trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments cooperation. The strong ties between our two militaries reflect this. Over the past decade, there has been a rapid transformation in the U.S.-India defense relationship. What was once a nascent relationship between unfamiliar nations has evolved into a strategic partnership between two of the preeminent security powers in Asia.

In February I travelled to India to co-chair the annual U.S.-India Defense Policy Group meeting. My trip reaffirmed my view that a close, continuing, and expanding security relationship between the United States and India will be important for security and stability in Asia and for effectively managing Indian Ocean security in the twenty-first century. Having said this, India has a long history of non-alignment and is firmly committed to its policy of strategic autonomy. The continued growth of our partnership should be focused on working closely on common interests in a true partnership.

If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

If confirmed, I believe our priorities for this relationship should focus on increasing maritime security cooperation, expanding the military-to-military relationship, and deepening cooperation on defense trade, including cooperative research and development. There is potential for increased cooperation on counter-proliferation, collaboration on humanitarian assistance and disaster response, countering piracy, cooperation on counter-terrorism, greater intelligence sharing on common threats, and working towards stability in Afghanistan and the broader Indian Ocean region.

What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and Pakistan?

India and Pakistan have a long and complex history characterized by animosity, mistrust, and conflict. Support by elements of Pakistan's military and intelligence services for violent extremist organizations targeting India has the potential to result in military confrontation that could rapidly escalate to a nuclear exchange.

Current efforts at dialogue through a renewed comprehensive dialogue have yielded few concrete results on the core security issues, especially regarding the resolution of territorial disputes; however, the efforts have increased people-to-people exchanges and trade relations between the two nations, and have provided each side greater insight into the other's positions. Although progress is slow, the trajectory is positive and offers the promise of increased confidence-building measures.

In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?

India's actions in South and Central Asia generally align with U.S. goals: increasing economic growth and political stability through strengthened democratic institutions, and developmental assistance to help prevent radicalization. Regional stability ultimately depends on cooperation among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Transparency in the India-Afghanistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relationships is critical to reduce misunderstanding and mistrust between India and Pakistan. The ongoing transition of lead responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan forces, and the strategic partnerships Afghanistan has been negotiating with the United States and other international partners are important steps toward demonstrating long-term commitment of the international community, addressing conditions that create uncertainty, and stabilizing the region.

25. Republic of the Philippines

What is your view of the current state of U. S.-Philippine military-to-military relations, including efforts to increase the number of rotational U.S. forces operating from the Philippines?

The Philippines is one of the United States' five treaty allies in the Pacific and remains a committed security partner facing regional challenges characteristic of current geo-strategic realities. In my view, the Alliance is strong and is the foundation of our security partnership. The U.S. military-to-military engagement with the Philippines is mature and focused, allowing the Philippines security forces (military, coast guard and police) to address security needs more effectively as evidenced by enhanced counter-terrorism performance, expanded maritime security activities, increased multilateral engagement, and effective participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

What do you believe the U. S. goals should be in the Republic of the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?

The primary goal of the United States should be to strengthen the Alliance and assist the Philippines in building and maintaining the capabilities of their security forces. Our Alliances in the Pacific, including with the Philippines, are the bedrock of U.S. security strategy within the region as we face common threats. A Philippines that is capable of mitigating terrorist threats, providing a secure maritime environment that ensures freedom of navigation within its sub-region, and leading multilateral approaches towards regional peace and stability will enable it to fulfill its treaty obligations to the United States, directly benefit U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and contribute to regional security and stability.

What is your assessment of recent U. S. military efforts in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U. S. assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against insurgent groups?

U.S. military efforts and assistance in the Philippines are in support of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to which both sides are committed. The United States, however, does not assist the Philippines in its fight against insurgent groups (e.g., the New People's Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front). The Philippines was the first country in Asia to support the United States after 9-11 in fighting terrorism. In this regard, U.S. military assistance is focused on helping the Philippines fight terrorism by assisting with the development of skill sets that are no different than those needed to help and protect its civilian population. It is the Philippine Government's prerogative to assert its capabilities and resources where needed in conducting its internal security operations.

Do you anticipate a reduced or increased U. S. military footprint or change in mission for U. S. military forces in the Philippines in the near to mid-term?

The United States and the Philippines are discussing arrangements that would allow greater flexibility for U.S. and Philippine security forces to train and work together. This may increase U.S. military engagement with the Philippines in the near to mid-term.

26. Indonesia

What is your view of the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?

In 2010, Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono inaugurated the U.S.-Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership. A key element of this broad partnership is the security component. Our defense relationship with Indonesia – a pivotal country to U.S. national interests – is managed through the Defense Framework Arrangement and facilitated through several forums and mechanisms. Our military-to-military relations with Indonesia are robust and continue to progress and mature, with nearly 200 theater security cooperation activities scheduled for this fiscal year. These security cooperation engagements include a wide range of activities focused on four main areas of emphasis: Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief, Peace Keeping Operations, Maritime Security, and continued Professionalization / Reform of the Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI). Beginning with the normalization of the military-to-military relationship in 2005, engagements have increased in number and evolved from initial small-scale bilateral exchanges into more complex bilateral and multilateral activities.

In addressing the current state of military-to-military relations with the Indonesian Army Special Forces (Kopassus), it is worth noting that this unit has undergone a near-complete transformation over the past decade and is at the forefront of TNI professionalization and adherence to human rights standards. Following a 12-year hiatus in bilateral activities, at the direction of then-Secretary Gates, U.S. Pacific Command established a measured and gradual program of security cooperation activities with Kopassus. These security cooperation activities have consisted of key leader engagements and small-scale subject matter expert exchanges in areas such as military decision making, medical planning, law of war, and safeguarding human rights. I anticipate that these types of activities will continue and gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the demonstrated progress in TNI transparency and reform efforts. Chief among these reform efforts are the fulfillment of commitments made by Indonesian leaders to the Department of Defense in 2010 to continue to safeguard human rights and accountability throughout the Indonesian military through the unequivocal investigation and prosecution of those military personnel accused of human rights abuses and, if convicted, their removal from military service.

Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-military contact within the context of the Comprehensive Partnership, guided by close consultation between the Departments of State and Defense, and within the boundaries of existing legal mechanisms. I believe close military-to-military relations with Indonesia are integral to achieving numerous stated U.S. national interests in the region. I also believe that one of the most effective methods for encouraging reform is through interaction between Indonesian and U.S. service members. Interactions with U.S. service members reinforce professional military practices, including respect for human rights and the

rule of law. Increased interactions facilitate greater understanding and reinforce professional values.

What is your understanding of the factors that informed the decision to re-engage with Kopassus members?

It is my understanding that the decision to begin a measured and gradual re-engagement with Kopassus within the limits of U.S. law was intended to acknowledge the significant progress made by the TNI over the past decade and to encourage continued reform within the TNI. Essential to this decision to move ahead with engagement with Kopassus were the commitments made by the Government of Indonesia to protect human rights and advance TNI accountability.

What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

Indonesian defense reform progressed at a rapid pace after the resignation of President Suharto in 1998, and with the separation of the police from the military, the elimination of formal political roles for the TNI, increased accountability, and the establishment of widespread human rights training initiatives. Although reform efforts appear to have slowed, they have notably not reversed. According to several public opinion polls, the TNI enjoys the respect of the majority of the Indonesian populace. In fact, the TNI often is noted to be the most respected of government institutions. This is a concrete indicator of progress. Continued reforms that the United States should continue to encourage include accountability for past human rights abuses, strengthening civilian control and oversight of the military, and continued professionalism of the TNI officer corps. Fully normalized relations with Kopassus will not happen without demonstrated Indonesian commitment to holding human rights abusers accountable.

If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?

If confirmed, I would support the TNI's continued progress by encouraging senior Indonesian leaders to fulfill their stated commitments, with particular emphasis on accountability, transparency, and respect for human rights. We can advance this agenda through bilateral security discussions, joint training, and military assistance, including military training programs. I view U.S. interaction with TNI counterparts as an effective, indeed essential, method to encourage professionalism and continued reform within the Indonesian military.

27. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.

What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?

I strongly support U.S. accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?

The advantages of U.S. accession are numerous. As a treaty party, the United States can best protect the navigational freedoms enshrined in the Convention and exert the level of influence that reflects our status as the world's foremost maritime power.

I do not believe that there are any serious national security disadvantages to the United States becoming a treaty party.

What is your understanding of the principal arguments against ratifying UNCLOS, and what is your response to those arguments?

From what I understand, the principal argument against accession is that the United States would somehow surrender a portion of its sovereignty. I do not believe this argument is valid. As a treaty party we can reinforce our navigational freedoms--key to our global power projection capabilities.

28. Peacekeeping Operations:

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., stated that the U.S. “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.”

What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute additional military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

In general, I would support additional contributions of U.S. military personnel to staff officer positions, provided that they are positions that would add significant value to the mission, and that the mission is a strategic priority for the United States.

Support for international peacekeeping remains an important security objective for the U.S. Government, and the United States has a stake in the success of UN peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practicable, the United States should continue to provide military personnel for UN peacekeeping operations, especially for key staff positions that can help shape the direction and success of the mission. If confirmed, I will carefully evaluate any proposals to contribute military or civilian personnel to a UN peacekeeping operation, weighing the potential

positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against other military commitments we have around the globe and the proposed cost of U.S. involvement.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations?

There are several potential advantages to contributing additional military personnel to UN missions: the opportunity to shape these missions from the inside and contribute to success of the mission; professional development opportunities for military personnel to serve in a joint, multi-lateral environment; and the benefit of receiving real-time information and insights on emerging threats and crises from places where there might not otherwise be a U.S. presence. It also enables an increased professional interaction by U.S. military personnel with numerous partner nations' military personnel, with whom we may not normally have the opportunity to serve.

The potential disadvantage of providing additional military personnel is the additional demands these assignments would impose on a U.S. military force that has seen extensive deployments in recent years and is still heavily engaged in overseas operations. I do not believe the United States will be in a position to provide significant numbers of military personnel to peacekeeping missions anytime in the near future. However, I believe the selective placement of even modest numbers of U.S. military personnel in addition to the personnel we currently have assigned to UN operations can have a significant, positive impact on UN peacekeeping operations.

If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD request for forces system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral peacekeeping missions, like the U.N.?

Yes, if confirmed I would support exploring ways that DoD could more quickly respond to requests for personnel support, bearing in mind applicable legal requirements and the current operational tempo of U.S. forces.

29. Colombia

Success in suppressing violence in Colombia has been credited to U.S. assistance to support Plan Colombia and to the growth of the Colombian economy, which spread wealth to a larger portion of the population. Over the past two years, there has been a debate about the most effective balance of U.S. assistance to continue to build on this success. Much of the U.S. assistance to Colombia over the past five years would be characterized as hard-side security assistance (such as weapons, aircraft, and necessary training), but some argue hard-side assistance should now be decreased significantly and a more robust development plan should be implemented.

In your view, what is the most appropriate strategy for U.S. engagement (including “soft” support) vis-à-vis Colombia?

U.S. security assistance to Colombia has always been a mix of "hard" and "soft" components. As the conflict has evolved, the ratio of "hard" to "soft" elements has steadily decreased. Between 2000 and 2006, our assistance was mostly focused on building Colombia's military and police capacity, first to defend the country from the offensive actions of irregular armed groups which included guerrillas, paramilitaries and drug traffickers; then, once the situation stabilized to support the government as it went on the offensive to recover terrain dominated by these groups. When most of Colombia was back under government control, our assistance began to focus on supporting what Colombia called Consolidation. Basically this was an effort to bring in the rest of the government to establish permanent presence and services within the newly recovered areas. Currently approximately 2/3 of our assistance to Colombia supports consolidation, with the rest going for hardware and training. As the internal conflict moves towards its conclusion, the ratio of "hard" to "soft" assistance will continue to diminish.

In your view, should DOD reduce its security assistance to Colombia as a result of the success of the last decade?

U.S. military assistance to Colombia has been gradually diminishing since 2006. As Colombia's security capabilities and their economy grow, our assistance becomes less critical. While the U.S. has invested \$8B in Colombia over the last 12 years, this never exceeded 10% of the Colombian defense budget. However, it did enable key capabilities which have put Colombia in a good posture to bring the internal conflict to a successful conclusion. In addition, the U.S.-Colombia relationship has now transformed from a donor-client relationship, to one of increasing strategic partnership. Colombia is reaching out to regional countries in Central America and Mexico, South America, and even West Africa to help these countries combat illicit trafficking, organized crime and terrorism. In some cases, like Mexico, we are coordinating our engagement efforts with Colombia, and in other cases, like West Africa, they are reaching out on their own. The United States and Colombia are developing a mechanism through which to more closely coordinate our regional security cooperation efforts. However, we should maintain the appropriate level of robust and predictable assistance to reinforce success, protect our investment, and reaffirm our commitment to a strong, democratic and prosperous Colombia.

30. Stability Operations

The new DOD Strategic Guidance states that, while U.S. forces will capture the lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, they “will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”

In your view, what are some of the key lessons learned from the stability operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan?

One of the most important lessons learned from these conflicts is the importance of a whole-of-government approach to stability operations. U.S. government military and civilian efforts must be closely synchronized and have unity of effort in order to successfully address not just the military, but also the social, political, and economic factors that can fuel a conflict.

From the DoD perspective, one of the key lessons from these conflicts has been widening the aperture for how we think about conflict environments, to not only include the military dimension of a problem, but also factoring in these other social, political, and economic factors in order to understand how they contribute to insurgency and terrorism. The U.S. military must plan and train with its civilian counterparts and be prepared to operate across a range of environments and types of conflicts. Indeed, the need for greater capabilities and capacity in civilian agencies has been a recurring lesson for the entire U.S. government.

Of paramount importance is our ability to rapidly create effective indigenous security forces. Only indigenous forces can “hold” and “build” on a lasting basis. Establishing effective military, police, paramilitary forces, and local security forces is one of the most critical elements of successful counterinsurgency and stability operations. When building indigenous security forces we need to be careful not to breed dependency. We also need to focus on transitions which entail having the local government and military forces take the lead in projects and operations whenever possible as soon as reasonably possible.

What do you believe is the proper role for the DOD in the planning and conduct of stability operations in future contingencies?

As seen in recent operations, there is a great need for economic development, governance, diplomatic, and law enforcement experts who work for the State Department, USAID, and the Justice Department. DoD must coordinate its plans with interagency partners, especially State, USAID and Justice.

In my view, DoD should operate within whole-of-government structures and in collaboration with international partners to conduct these types of operations. DoD should continue to enable the deployment and use of the appropriate civilian capabilities and resources, and I encourage greater investment in civilian capacity for contingency operations. When no other options are available, and when directed, DoD should be prepared to lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, deliver humanitarian assistance, and then transition lead responsibility to other appropriate entities (e.g., U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations). Close collaboration between DoD and other civilian agencies on contingency planning before contingencies arise can help contribute to success in the event that stability operations are required.

31. Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”), targeted authorities in Yemen and East Africa, and the global security contingency fund.

In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

In my view, the main strategic objective of the United States in building the capacity of foreign partners is to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries’ internal security, and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn, mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States, and serves to build a base of countries that can effectively participate in multinational coalition-based operations.

Successfully countering violent extremist networks requires that we develop and sustain a global network of allies and partners that is capable and interoperable. Additionally, once partners become capable and have sufficient capacity, they are able to help bolster regional security in a way that supports U.S. interests. In some cases, participation by these partner nations’ forces provide cultural and linguistic advantages that afford them better access and effectiveness than U.S. forces executing the same mission. For example, today Colombia provides justice sector and security force assistance to other U.S. partner nations in the Americas and Africa.

Finally, efforts to build partner capacity promote interoperability between forces and enable the U.S. military to establish personal connections and long-term relationships with foreign counterparts. We can never be certain where in the world U.S. forces may be required to operate. Enduring relationships with partner nations are at the core of a multinational coalition's strength, helping secure shared access to facilities and territory, information, and diplomatic support.

What improvements, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to the strategic direction, oversight, and management of the Department’s programs for building partner capacity to ensure that these programs are executed consistent with our national security goals and objectives?

If confirmed, I would continue to support DoD capabilities and investments that encourage and enable partners to develop capable security forces and institutionalize the Department's capacity to provide high impact security force assistance. I would provide recommendations to the Secretary that enable him to make informed choices with regard to the location and frequency of DoD activities that build partners' security capacity. It is essential in this era of shifting focus and constrained resources that we carefully prioritize which partners we engage with, how often, and to what end.

Also if confirmed, I would continue to implement process improvements in the delivery of defense articles and services for urgent and emerging needs.

In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis the State Department and other civilian departments and agencies in efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces?

The U.S. will be more successful at deterring and responding to security challenges when allies and partner security forces act in a way that is complementary to U.S. goals and objectives. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, our continuing efforts to counter violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal organizations, and our preparations for future contingencies clearly illustrate the need for capable partners who can apply capabilities complementary to U.S. military objectives. In that vein, I believe that the Department of Defense should sustain and grow the capability to develop partner security forces, especially forces to train, advise, and assist partners during conflict.

Building the capacity of foreign security forces is a shared responsibility within the executive branch, particularly the Departments of State and Defense. Close collaboration between the Departments is a key characteristic of the Section 1206 authority, and one of its greatest strengths. The Global Security Contingency Fund epitomizes this shared responsibility, and represents an opportunity for DOS and DoD to plan for contingencies jointly, and to establish a new business model for interagency planning of security sector assistance.

32. Combating Terrorism

The Administration recently released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups "that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia."

If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to counter terrorism?

If confirmed, I would be the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy, including counterterrorism policy. In this capacity the USD(P) has historically served as the Secretary's senior representative to Deputies Committee meetings focused on counterterrorism policy (and other policy issues). My role, if confirmed, would be to formulate, coordinate, and present the views of the Secretary on CT policy issues. Currently these are mainly oriented on the war against al Qaeda, which includes operations and activities against its allies and affiliates, but we also recognize that there are other terrorist groups that may seek to cause harm to the US and its allies. I would work closely in performance of these duties with the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Department of Defense General Counsel, the Joint Staff, and the Regional and Functional Assistant Secretaries in the office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, particularly the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. I would

carefully consider the views of our interagency colleagues and international partners to consider whole of government solutions to counterterrorism problems.

What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated groups in each of the Geographic Combatant Commands?

The most significant groups that threaten the United States and our allies are core al-Qa'ida, comprised of the group's senior leaders, and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which is the most capable of the group's allies and affiliates. However, a few key operatives operating from any of al-Qa'ida's other affiliates, or even "lone wolves" inspired by al-Qa'ida, may be able to perpetrate attacks abroad or against the U.S. homeland. Terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and anti-aircraft weapons proliferating from unstable states is a chief concern, as is the growing capability of some groups to construct concealed improvised explosive devices.

In the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility, al-Qa'ida core leadership in South Asia has been significantly degraded. Their most experienced operational planners have been depleted, and they have lost the freedom of movement they once enjoyed. Nonetheless, they remain determined to launch attacks on the homeland and U.S. interests abroad, and have shown recent capability to raise funds and formulate external plots. In Yemen, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) poses probably the most direct threat to the United States. The group has attempted two major attacks in the past three years, first the so-called "underwear bomber" in December 2009, and the airline parcel bombs in October 2010. Both of these plots were devised by the same expert bomb maker, who remains at large in Yemen. AQAP has exploited a year of political unrest in Yemen to expand its area of operations in remote provinces, and continues to threaten domestic stability while actively plotting operations against the US. AQAP has strong connections to al Shabaab in Somalia, which recently announced its affiliation with al-Qa'ida, and uses these connections to share resources and training among the two groups. In Iraq, al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) has shown resurgence in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal, increasing its pace of attacks on the government and fomenting sectarian violence. AQI is also seeking to exploit instability in Syria, further fueling an already volatile situation there.

In the USAFRICOM Area of Responsibility, al-Shabaab represents both a terrorist threat to U.S. and regional interests and an insurgent problem to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as well as Somali regional administrations. On February 9, 2012, al-Qa'ida and al-Shabaab jointly announced their formal merger. al-Shabaab has shown interest in external attacks against the West and has active connections to Somali diaspora communities in Europe and the United States. In North and West Africa, al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) uses ungoverned spaces in the Maghreb and Sahel as a safe haven. Originally focused on overthrowing the government of Algeria, AQIM evolved and now has a stated intent to attack western targets. There are clear indications that AQIM is now involved in trafficking arms from Libya. In addition, the upheavals in Libya and Tunisia have created opportunities for AQIM to establish new safe havens. We should also continue to monitor Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The threat of attack by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates against U.S. interests in the USPACOM AOR remains a serious concern. The possible re-emergence of other terrorist organizations, like Jamaah Islamia and the Abu Sayaa Group, that have been weakened but not defeated by the counter-terror efforts of our allies and partners could quickly affect the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Other decentralized groups and individuals ideologically linked to al-Qa'ida, as well as organizations based primarily outside the USPACOM AOR like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, desire to support their agendas by conducting destabilizing attacks inside the region. Additionally, al-Qa'ida-affiliated groups operate in the USPACOM AOR using facilitation networks that support threats to U.S. interests throughout the world.

The USEUCOM AOR continues to represent an area of high interest for al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, seeking potential targets there and using Europe as a support base. Terrorist organizations exploit the relatively permissive European legal environment to radicalize local populations and to seek material and financial support for jihadist efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Radicalized fighters returning home to Europe from conflict zones pose a real threat given their experience, contacts, and ability to move across the continent. The threat these extremists pose, using Europe as a base or corridor for operations elsewhere in the world, including the United States, cannot be discounted.

In the USSOUTHCOM AOR, particularly in Central America, transnational organized crime has evolved into a volatile and potentially destabilizing threat to both citizens and regional security. These transnational criminal organizations control smuggling routes that traverse the hemisphere, many of which lead into the United States. These routes represent potential access points that could be leveraged by other groups. Although we have not yet seen any attempts by al-Qa'ida to leverage these smuggling routes, we remain watchful for the potential threat of transnational criminal organizations collaborating to move terrorists through the AOR and into the United States. Sunni extremists, although small in number, are actively involved in the radicalization of converts and other Muslims; these efforts can be seen through the influence of public personalities like Jamaica's Shaykh Abdullah al-Faisal, who was convicted in the United Kingdom for inciting terrorism.

Within the confines of U.S. borders, laws, policies, and democratic traditions and practices properly restrict most counterterrorism activities to support to civil authorities. As a result, USNORTHCOM's principal role is to synchronize joint force protection and ensure that military infrastructure across the AOR is properly postured to mitigate and prevent potential terrorist attacks. DoD is and must remain fully aligned within the Federal Government's counterterrorism network and plays a supporting role—assisting with information sharing and remaining prepared to supply military-unique capabilities and to enhance civilian capacity when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Mexico is confronting serious security and public health challenges driven by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) responsible for illicit trafficking of drugs, human beings, money, and weapons. These criminal organizations are increasingly adopting terrorist tactics in their operations.

Are you aware of any nexus between non-state actors and criminal networks?

Terrorist groups and insurgent movements are increasingly turning to criminality - including narcotics and other illicit trafficking - to perpetuate and expand their activities. This is certainly the case in Afghanistan. We also see criminal organizations, such as Mexico-based drug cartels, adopting terrorist tactics in their operations. Criminals and terrorists are also directly working together. We only need to look at the recent Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington by engaging the Los Zetas transnational criminal organization to see this trend. I would also note the recent testimony by Director of National Intelligence Clapper, in which he stated that "Terrorists and insurgents will increasingly turn to crime and criminal networks for funding and logistics. Criminal connections and activities of both Hizballah and al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb illustrate this trend."

On September 22, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton launched the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) with 30 founding members from around the world. The GCTF is a major initiative within the Obama Administration's broader effort to build the international architecture for dealing with terrorism. The primary focus of the GCTF is capacity building in relevant areas and aims to increase the number of countries capable of dealing with the terrorist threats within their borders and regions.

What is your understanding of this initiative?

My understanding is that the GCTF is a multilateral platform that will provide a venue for governments to meet and identify counterterrorism needs, and to mobilize the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs and enhance global cooperation. The GCTF is intended to complement ongoing efforts with the United Nations, as well as other regional and sub-regional bodies. I understand that the September 2011 launch of the GCTF was positively received by all of the members involved.

Given the emphasis on building partner capacity, what is your understanding for the role of the DOD – and in particular special operations forces – in this initiative?

Special Operations Forces will continue to have a leading role in our operations and activities to defeat al-Qa'ida. The Department is prepared to sustain a significant number of deployed SOF around the world, working closely with allies and partners to develop the capabilities and capacities they need to rid their territories of terrorists and prevent their resurgence. We see this as predominantly an advise and assist mission, but the United States should always reserve the right to take direct action in order to defend itself from a terrorist attack.

The defeat of al-Qaida cannot be achieved without bringing together the expertise and resources of the entire U.S. Government—intelligence, law enforcement, military, and other instruments of national power—in a coordinated and synchronized manner. If confirmed, I would seek strong relationships with DoD's interagency partners, in particular, the National Counter-Terrorism Center, the State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism, and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, to maximize DoD's efforts to counter violent extremism. The GCTF, as a State Department-led effort, is one example where DoD including SOF

counterterrorism and security cooperation activities can support and inform interagency partners' efforts in counterterrorism.

33. Department of Defense Counternarcotics Activities

On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1.5 billion to support CN operations, build the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?

Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are a multidimensional threat to the national security of the United States. In addition to the impact on our nation's public health and economy, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source for terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate government institutions, and contribute to international instability.

DoD counternarcotics efforts support global DoD national security objectives by building partner nation capacity and working with U.S. law enforcement agencies such as DEA, CBP, FBI, and ICE to disrupt narcotics trafficking. These cost-effective, small-footprint efforts are consistent with the Department's January 2012 strategic guidance.

I fully recognize the importance of DoD counterdrug activities, including as the statutory lead agency for aerial and maritime detection and monitoring of drugs bound for the United States and in support of law enforcement in Afghanistan and other areas of national security importance such as Mexico and Colombia.

If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that these activities are given their appropriate level of attention and oversight, and to ensure that they are as cost-effective as possible.

What is your understanding of the Department's CN authorities?

The Department's counternarcotics authorities provide critically important tools in confronting the convergence of narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and other forms of transnational organized crime, that pose a growing threat to our national security interests.

In addition to 10 USC 124, which establishes the Department as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug trafficking bound for the United States, longstanding provisions enacted in various National Defense Authorization Acts, allow the Department to enhance the capabilities of State, local, tribal, Federal, and international law enforcement partners. DoD counternarcotics authorities not only support broader U.S. Government efforts to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the United States, but they also support the National Guard's counterdrug activities in 54 States and Territories and the theater campaign

plans of all six Geographic Combatant Commands.

In my experience, counternarcotics authorities are often invaluable in achieving strategic national security objectives. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure these authorities are sustained.

Should the Department continue to play a role in countering illegal narcotics trafficking?

I believe that the answer is yes. Based on my past experience with this issue, DoD contributes militarily unique capabilities that support law enforcement and a whole-of-government approach to address this national security threat. DoD's contributions have been critically important to the progress we have made since the 1980s.

In my view, DoD should continue to play an important role in U.S. counterdrug efforts in support of the National Security Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.

The enemies we face on the battlefield today are increasingly financed through non-traditional means, including through drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. Just as DoD has long been focused on how traditional, State-funded adversaries are supported, we must use all of the tools at our disposal to counter the sources of revenue that support the asymmetrical threat we face today and are likely to face for the foreseeable future.

Drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime contribute to global instability by undermining legitimate government institutions, fostering corruption, and distorting legitimate economic activity. Consistent with the Department's January 2012 strategic guidance, DoD's efforts to build the counternarcotics capacity of partner nation security forces serve to prevent and deter broader conflicts that could require a much more costly military intervention in the future.

Drug trafficking is by far the world's most lucrative illicit activity and therefore is used as a source of revenue by terrorists, insurgents, and other threats to national security. The vast illicit proceeds of drug trafficking can also contribute to instability in affected countries, particularly in smaller, more vulnerable countries along key transit routes as we are seeing today in Central America and West Africa. The national security implications of drug trafficking necessitate our close attention – even when the drugs are not bound directly for the United States.

34. Counter Threat Finance

A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence Community have called for investing additional resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance activities?

Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely heavily on licit and illicit funding sources to support their activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. As Director for National Intelligence Clapper testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in January 2012, “terrorists and insurgents will increasingly turn to crime and criminal networks for funding and logistics.”

It is critical to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of moneys, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, where DoD has the capability to identify and disrupt our adversaries' finances by working with interagency counterparts in Afghanistan and by supporting the U.S. Embassy country team in Iraq.

DoD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter-threat finance, but I believe that DoD can play a critical role working with other departments and agencies, and with partner nations, to fight our adversaries' ability to use global financial networks. I believe that DoD should continue to work with law enforcement agencies to ensure military support is targeted and tailored and are in line with DoD priorities.

In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities (such as Department of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation)?

I believe that DoD could selectively increase its support to U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Treasury Department, the intelligence community, and the Department of State to target and degrade our adversaries' funding sources. DoD brings unique capabilities, such as planning, intelligence analysis and tools, and the integration of intelligence into operations, to this effort.

DoD Counter Threat-Finance (CTF) Policy directs that DoD work with other U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies and with partner nations to deny, disrupt, or defeat and degrade adversaries' ability to use global licit and illicit financial networks to affect U.S. interests negatively.

Working through the interagency, we can increase the U.S. Government's ability to target our adversaries' vulnerabilities through interdiction, sanctions, and other law enforcement actions.

35. National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime

Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people.

Last July, President Obama released the first National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. The Department of Defense is by no means the U.S. Government's law enforcement agency, but it does bring unique enabling capabilities to our nation's Federal law enforcement agencies.

What role, if any, should the Department play in combating transnational criminal organizations?

The President's *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* declares that transnational organized crime "poses a significant threat to national and international security." The Strategy calls for the U.S. government to "build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime." This direction – to take a whole-of-government approach to combating a national security threat – includes an important role for the Department of Defense. I believe that DoD should continue to focus on delivering unique capabilities in support of law enforcement agencies that are the lead agencies for combating transnational organized crime.

Specifically, I believe that DoD should continue to provide military intelligence support to law enforcement, counter-threat finance support, and military-to-military capability development. When appropriate (e.g. in warzones), DoD may take the lead in operational activities against specific transnational criminal threats to the United States. As the President's Strategy notes, "transnational organized crime presents sophisticated and multifaceted threats that cannot be addressed through law enforcement action alone." DoD's capabilities and authorities are thus critical supporting tools to broader U.S. government efforts against transnational organized crime.

The President's Strategy also directs DoD to "enhance support to law enforcement through the Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support Center," a dedicated DoD-led center that integrates military, intelligence, and law enforcement analytic capabilities to go after key nodes in global criminal networks. This guidance further reflects the added value that the Defense department brings to whole-of-government efforts against transnational organized crime.

36. Nuclear Weapons Council

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

In your view, what are the significant issues that the Nuclear Weapons Council should take up in the coming years?

The Nuclear Weapons Council should continue to ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and effective, in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and ensure modernization of the complex supporting the stockpile. One near-term issue before the NWC is

to address the immediate path forward with regard to weapon activities that are to be conducted under NNSA's Future Years Nuclear Security Program.

If confirmed would you commit to active personal participation in Nuclear Weapons Council matters?

I have participated in the NWC while serving as Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, and plan to continue to do so as Under Secretary, if confirmed.

37. Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization

Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84) required a report (the "1251 report") on plans for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and strategic delivery systems. Prior to the Budget Control Act of 2011, the 1251 report that accompanied the New START Treaty set forth a robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles.

Do you support the modernization plan set forth in the 1251 report?

Yes. The Administration's commitment to maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent, and recapitalizing the nuclear complex, was set forth in the Nuclear Posture Review and amplified in detail through the "1251 report." That plan remains sound, however, the Budget Control Act requires DoD and the Department of Energy to make a variety of difficult choices. If confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure that both DoD and the Department of Energy the investments needed to support modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and strategic delivery systems.

Do you agree that modernizing the nuclear triad and replacing critical infrastructure, such as the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) at Los Alamos and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12, should be national security priorities that should be addressed in a timely manner?

Yes. Modernizing the U.S. strategic nuclear enterprise as a whole is a key national security priority. The decision to defer the CMRR was a difficult one, but was made to permit critical warhead life extension programs to move forward in the newly constrained fiscal environment. This tradeoff was approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council after careful review. Moreover, the DoD's independent UPF/CMRR study concluded that if funding limits constrained parallel construction of the two facilities, then phased construction would be a prudent alternative approach, with UPF construction beginning first.

There appear to be differing views on how best to reduce the hedge stockpile of W-78 and W-88 warheads within the Department, which is important to reduce the size of our

overall stockpile. One view advocates a common warhead and another view advocates two warheads that have interchangeable components.

Please tell the committee which view you would advocate for, if confirmed, and why.

Efforts to develop a common warhead would allow DoD to reduce the number of warhead types in the stockpile and to reduce the number of warheads needed to protect the nuclear deterrent should a technical failure be discovered. Warhead commonality would also allow for substantial reductions in life-cycle and production costs. Adaptable or interchangeable components can be configured to provide a degree of commonality, and would preserve more diversity in the stockpile.

Before making a recommendation on this issue, I would like to see the results of analysis currently under way on this issue by the Services and the NNSA Labs.

38. DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program

Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in Russia, e.g., DOD, the State Department and the Department of Energy?

I believe that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program is well-coordinated with activities of other U.S. government agencies in the Russian Federation, and in the other countries where it operates. Coordination is accomplished at staff and management levels in Washington, and through close collaboration in the field. If confirmed, I will ensure that continuation of this approach remains a hallmark of the program.

The CTR program has been expanded to geographic areas outside the former Soviet Union.

What in your view are the key proliferation concerns that CTR should address outside the former Soviet Union? Please explain.

I believe that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program can be an important tool to address specific WMD-related threats and prevent new WMD threats from developing. For example, CTR can help secure or eliminate radiological, chemical or bio-security threats, or threats posed by related delivery systems or infrastructure. CTR can also be used to build security partnerships related to WMD threats. This is especially appropriate in some areas outside the former Soviet states where partner countries are cooperating to improve bio-security standards and surveillance, as well as border security to improve WMD interdiction capacity.

Which countries outside the former Soviet Union should be the focus of this expansion of the CTR program?

The focus of expansion beyond countries of the former Soviet Union should be in areas where the CTR Program can directly and appreciably reduce WMD threats, contribute to more effective military-to-military or political strategic partnerships, strengthen the nonproliferation framework, and bring to bear unique threat reduction capabilities, resources or partnerships that other U.S. Government threat reduction and related programs cannot. Current expansion efforts are underway in Africa and Asia.

CTR has completed or will soon complete the bulk of the scheduled work with Russia.

What in your view is the next step, if any, in the U.S.-Russia CTR program?

The U.S. and Russia can continue to cooperate on nuclear security-related activities through the CTR program. These include transition of sustainment responsibilities for U.S.-provided security upgrades to the Russian Ministry of Defense, cooperation on security for dangerous spent reactor fuel, and support to bilateral defense and military cooperation related to WMD threat reduction.

39. Illicit Arms Trafficking

In July, governments of the world will gather at the United Nations to negotiate a global Arms Trade Treaty which would set global standards on the international transfer of conventional weapons. What is your understanding of the problem of illicit arms trafficking and the role of the United States to deal with the problem?

The arms market is increasingly complex and global. Existing regional and national arms export control systems do not provide complete, global coverage. This creates gaps which are being exploited by illicit arms dealers. I believe that the United States should seek to negotiate a robust and effective Arms Trade Treaty, which may close these gaps.

In your view, to what extent, if at all, does the lack of national controls and enforcement on arms flows contribute to the illicit trafficking problem, and could efforts to respond to illicit trafficking be improved if other countries adopted and enforced national regulations on arms import, export, and transit similar to those of the United States?

An Arms Trade Treaty would be a legally binding agreement which will require states to establish high national standards in controlling the export of conventional arms. Such norms should better regulate the global arms market to prevent weapons reaching the hands of terrorists, insurgents and human rights abusers.

Do you think an arms trade treaty, such as is being contemplated in the United Nations, would enhance U.S. national security interest efforts in the region?

U.S. national security interests would be served by a treaty that increases international standards in different regions; includes major arms exporters such as Russia and China; reaffirms the right of self-defense and the legitimacy of arms transfers for security purposes; does not undermine existing nonproliferation and export control regimes; and is agreed through consensus.

What is your view on whether or not the United States should be a party to this effort?

U.S. participation in the negotiations will help ensure the treaty establishes a high standard of international behavior that will ultimately reduce the proliferation of conventional arms. I would need to see the results of negotiation to make any further recommendation.

40. Arms Control

What role do you see for arms control as a means of improving U.S. national security?

Arms control can continue to play an important role in advancing U.S. national security by providing predictability and stability in certain strategic relationships, particularly in U.S.-Russian relations. Arms control should never be an end unto itself; neither is it a tool that can be employed without the context of a well-prepared and effective military force.

What are your views on the next bilateral steps to address nuclear weapons issues between the United States and Russia?

I believe that as New START is implemented and any issues that arise are addressed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, we should continue to work with Russia to lay the groundwork for future bilateral negotiations on reducing both strategic and nonstrategic weapons, including non-deployed weapons.

The Report of the Nuclear Posture Review noted that because of our improved relations, strict numerical parity between the United States and Russia is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War. However, it also indicated that large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term strategic relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced. By joining with the world's other principal nuclear power to move to lower levels of forces in concert, arms control thus provides a means for strengthening strategic stability in our relationship with Russia.

What conditions, if any, do you believe need to be met to further reduce our strategic nuclear stockpile through arms control?

As I stated in testimony of November 2, 2011, the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study will help identify the force levels needed to support deterrence and targeting requirements. The completion of this analysis is necessary to inform the formulation of

any future arms control objectives involving our nuclear stockpile. In general however, I believe that future nuclear reductions should maintain strategic deterrence and stability with regard to Russia and China, strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, and ensure the credibility of our security assurances to our allies and partners. We also must guarantee our operational flexibility and ability to hedge against geopolitical and technical uncertainty.

In your response to prehearing policy questions for your nomination to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, you answered that “One way to strengthen the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)] regime would be to ensure that any violation automatically triggers sanctions.”

Do you still agree with that statement, or would you modify it?

In my prior response, I said that we should work to strengthen the Treaty by encouraging states to adhere to the NPT and to agree to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. I continue to believe that one way to strengthen the NPT regime would be to ensure that violations automatically trigger sanctions. I also mentioned in my response that other ways to strengthen the Treaty should be examined as well. For example, this could include a requirement for a State that withdraws from the NPT to return all nuclear material and equipment that had been supplied while it was Party to the NPT.

In your response to the pre-hearing policy questions for your nomination to be Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, you stated that you believe the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is “in America’s national security interest, and...that with careful planning and continued investment that the United States can ensure the safety, reliability, surety, security and sustainability of our nuclear deterrent under a CTBT.”

Do you still agree with that statement, or would you modify it?

I do still agree with that statement. The Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program has proven itself to be successful, and continues to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent. At the same time, our ability to detect nuclear tests has improved since the Treaty was first considered. The CTBT remains fully in America's national security interest.

41. Ballistic Missile Defense

In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range

missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging against future uncertainties.

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you implement them?

Yes, I continue to support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the February 2010 Report of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) and, if confirmed, I will continue to do my best to implement them.

Do you agree that our missile defense must be fiscally sustainable?

Yes. DoD has tailored its budget request to requirements of the Budget Control Act. Missile defense is emphasized in the new strategic guidance, and the Department has used a clear set of priorities to guide spending decisions in this mission area. We have protected our top missile defense priorities, including defending the homeland, implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and pursuing Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAAs) with Allies and partners in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific.

In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles, increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against potential future long-range missiles from Iran that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe and, if confirmed, will you implement it?

Yes, I support the EPAA and, if confirmed, I will continue to support the United States' efforts to implement it.

Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we deploy operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat?

Yes. I believe that DoD should continue to subject new ballistic missile defense capabilities to testing under realistic operational conditions, against threat-representative targets. DoD should invest in BMD capabilities that are fiscally sustainable over the long term, and rely on mobile and relocatable assets in order to provide maximum adaptability in a crisis or to reflect changing threats.

Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and Evaluation, in order to assess operational capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to deploying such systems?

Yes. United States ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic and include robust Operational Test and Evaluation. Realistic testing of the system allows us to field new capabilities as they become available and integrate them into the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) architecture. The “fly-before-you-buy” policy outlined in the Report of the BMDR still makes good sense.

The United States and NATO are seeking options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, including the possibility of sharing radar and early warning data. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from Iran, and could send a powerful signal to Iran that could help persuade Iran not to pursue long-range missiles or nuclear weapons?

Yes. I believe that missile defense cooperation with Russia could strengthen common defenses against Iranian missiles, and send an important signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working together to counter the acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles.

Do you agree that, notwithstanding Russian concerns, the United States is committed to the continued development and deployment of United States missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, needed to meet our security needs?

Yes. The United States has pursued missile defense cooperation with Russia with the clear understanding that we would not accept constraints on missile defense, and that we would undertake necessary qualitative and quantitative improvements to meet U.S. security needs

42. Space Management and Organization

What role, if any, do you believe the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should play in the establishment of a national security space policy?

I believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should lead the Department of Defense in supporting the development and revision of national security space policy, and should remain responsible for establishing and overseeing the implementation of overarching DoD space policy developed in accordance with the National Space Policy, National Security Space Strategy, and associated guidance.

Do you support the policy of having an operationally responsive space (ORS) capability as a means to lower the cost and time for the development of national security space payloads?

Yes, operationally responsive space capabilities are a key way to ensure that resilience, survivability, and flexibility are considered in all future space programs.

The launch of the ORS-1 satellite demonstrated that giving combatant commanders such as CENTCOM the ability to control a small operationally responsive satellite can be successful.

Would you support extending this capability to other COCOMS through the development of additional small tactically responsive satellites?

The valuable role that ORS capabilities can play in responding to Combatant Commander needs is one of the lessons-learned from ORS-1 that we are transferring to the Air Force's Space and Missile Center. Incorporating these lessons-learned into the larger space acquisitions enterprise will ensure that responsive space capabilities continue to support COCOM needs.

Space systems, like other military systems, rely on the availability of sufficient frequency spectrum. However, frequency spectrum is becoming scarce, and its sale has been used as a source of revenue for the government.

If confirmed, how will you work with the Services, the Joint Staff and other elements of the Department of Defense to ensure that the Department's frequency spectrum requirements are accounted for in interagency discussions about potential spectrum auctions?

If confirmed, I will work with the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO), the Military Services, and the Joint Staff to ensure that the Department achieves balanced policy solutions that maintain critical spectrum-dependent mission capabilities for our warfighters while addressing the economic value of spectrum to be auctioned for commercial services.

43. Special Operations Forces

The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces and enablers that directly support their operations.

Do you believe that we should further increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?

I believe that completing the QDR 2006 and 2010-directed growth in Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Combat Support and Combat Service Support personnel will posture USSOCOM to

conduct the range of anticipated operations effectively in the future. These forces will continue to require service provided enablers to sustain the level of mobility, ISR, fires, and medical evacuation, in differing mixtures, based on the operational environment.

In your view, how can the size of special operations forces be increased while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?

Experience has shown that SOF manpower growth of 3-5 percent annually can be sustained and has not diluted the force or outpace the required training and support structure. In my view, USSOCOM has done an excellent job of adjusting its processes to maintain the quality of SOF operators and support personnel during this current era of SOF growth.

In recent years, special operations forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated changes to the activities of the U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) enumerated in section 167 of Title 10 to more specifically track the activities special operations forces are carrying out around the world.

Do you believe any modifications to USSOCOM's Title 10 missions are appropriate? If so, what modifications would you suggest?

The Department uses a range of processes, including the development of the Unified Command Plan, to review the mission sets and responsibilities it assigns to USSOCOM on an on-going basis. Additionally, the language in Section 167 of Title 10, United States Code, includes "such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense," which provides the President and the Secretary of Defense the flexibility needed to meet changing circumstances. Hence, at this time I would not advocate significant changes to USSOCOM's Title 10 missions.

What can be done to ensure that indirect special operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

The activities of Special Operations Forces are quite varied, from high-risk strikes and counterterrorist raids to working by, with, and through local partners, whether in the form of training and advising foreign counterparts, or providing support to civilian authorities abroad. I believe that each of these missions is highly valued within the Special Operations community. However, as the security landscape has changed, the demands for these kinds of missions have begun to exceed the ability of the Special Operations community alone to meet them. As a remedy to this situation, and consistent with QDR 2010, the Department is building the capacity and capabilities of the conventional forces to be prepared to take on more of the kinds of missions that used to fall exclusively to SOF; for example, Security Force Assistance. I believe that broadening the spectrum of irregular missions that our conventional forces are able to take

on will alleviate some burdens on the SOF community and ensure that the Total Force is adequately prepared to undertake and support both direct and indirect missions. I believe that increasing the contribution of conventional forces to these missions will help ensure adequate capabilities overall, and proper balance in both conventional and Special Operations Forces.

44. Interagency Collaboration

The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

I believe one of the most important lessons learned has been the necessity of close civil-military collaboration at all levels, at the tactical level with organizations such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs, and Embedded PRTs, as well as unity of effort at the operational and strategic level. Such unity of effort is critical in missions ranging from direct action to building partner capacity. We can facilitate this type of coordination through organizational structures, but much of this is also a cultural issue – making collaboration and coordination part of the ethos of our civil and military institutions. Experiences from recent conflicts have done this to a large degree, although institutionalization can and should be continued.

How do you believe these efforts can be improved?

One of the lessons learned has been the need for close collaboration early on in the planning phase, before a contingency begins. This lesson can and should carry forward to future contingencies. Recent conflicts have also pointed to the need for sufficient capacity and capability within civilian agencies for these kinds of contingency operations.

How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine and adopted as “best practices” for future counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations?

The DoD has a host of mechanisms for capturing lessons learned and incorporating them into doctrine, such as the Army Center for Lessons Learned, as well as regular updates to Service and Joint doctrine. I believe that DoD has been responsive and adaptive over the past several years of conflict, releasing an updated joint Army and Marine Corps Field Manual on Counterinsurgency as well as incorporating tactical and operational lessons learned into deployment training and forces deployed. I believe that such efforts should continue and I believe they will serve the Department well in any future contingency.

45. Private Security Contractors

In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security contractors to perform security functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in ensuring the Department's responsibilities in this regard are met. The use of force by contractors or military personnel can, if misapplied, undermine our policy objectives. Contractors for physical security missions have been a necessity in Iraq and Afghanistan and are likely to be so in future contingencies. DoD has established procedures over time to manage these contractors more effectively, in order to prevent unnecessary violence that would be detrimental to our policy objectives. This is an area that requires constant attention and continued supervision to ensure that our policy is appropriate and effective.

What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to reduce the Department's reliance upon contractors to perform security functions in Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I would work to facilitate the transition from private security contractors to the Afghan Public Protection Force. I would also ensure that the Combatant Commander is furnished with clear policy assuring that private security contractors are only being used where appropriate and necessary. Our commanders on the ground must have authority to restrict security contractors' operations as the situation requires.

What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?

If confirmed, I would work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Joint Staff, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and Combatant Commanders to ensure that commanders at all levels understand their responsibilities regarding armed contractors operating in support of them or in their operational area. This includes ensuring commanders are aware of extant legal responsibilities with respect to qualification, training and vetting requirements as well as the limitations on the use of force by these contractors.

I would also work to ensure that Combatant Commanders are furnished with clear policy assuring that private security contractors are only being used where appropriate and necessary. Our commanders on the ground must have authority to restrict security contractors' operations as the situation requires.

Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of all federal agencies?

I support steps to ensure that there is legal accountability for the actions of all contractors performing work for the U.S. Government in an area of combat operations. If confirmed, I will support DoD efforts to work with our interagency partners to build appropriate mechanisms to ensure such accountability.

46. Detainee Treatment Policy

Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes, I do.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes.

If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

Yes.

Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Yes. I believe that DoD and more broadly U.S. leadership should be mindful of multiple considerations when developing standards for detainee treatment, including that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts.

47. Interrogation Policy

In answer to questions for the record at his nomination hearing last June, Secretary Panetta stated that he fully supported President Obama's decision to establish the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 as the single interrogation standard applicable to all interrogations by U.S. Government personnel. Secretary Panetta also stated that he did not support a set of classified interrogation methods that are not open to public scrutiny.

Do you agree with Secretary Panetta that the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 should serve as the single interrogation standard for all interrogations conducted by U.S. Government personnel?

Yes.

Do you agree with Secretary Panetta in not supporting a set of classified interrogation methods?

Yes.

48. Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted

Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.