

Advance Policy Questions for Mr. Michael A. Sheehan
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the special operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act or special operations reform provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

No. The Act and current special operations authorities have served the Department and our nation well and have enhanced the Department's capabilities to respond when called, such as in Operation Enduring Freedom. If confirmed, I will make proposals for modifications if and when required.

Duties

Section 138(b) (4) of Title 10, United States Code, describes the duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)).

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD (SO/LIC)?

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, the ASD (SO/LIC) is the principal special operations and low-intensity conflict official within the senior management of the Department of Defense. The ASD (SO/LIC) has as his principal duty overall supervision (to include oversight of policy and resources) of special operations and low-intensity conflict activities. In addition, the ASD (SO/LIC) oversees DoD's counternarcotics policies and resources, humanitarian assistance policies, strategies for building partner capacity, and stability operations policies in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's priorities and guidance.

What Department of Defense (DOD) activities are currently encompassed by the Department's definition of special operations and low-intensity conflict?

Special operations and low intensity conflict activities, as defined in 10 USC Section 167, include direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other activities as may be specified by the President or Secretary of Defense.

If confirmed, what changes, if any, in the duties and functions of ASD (SO/LIC) do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

I do not currently expect any changes to the duties and functions assigned.

In your view, are the duties set forth in section 138(b)(4) of Title 10, United States Code, up to date, or should changes be considered?

I do not believe any changes are needed at this time.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASD (SO/LIC)?

No.

Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

I believe that my background in operational units, working counternarcotics strategy on the NSC staff, as Coordinator for Counter Terrorism (Ambassador-at-Large), as Assistant-Secretary General for the UN's Department of Peacekeeping, as Deputy Commissioner of Counter Terrorism for the New York Police Department, and as an analyst of the best methods for combating terrorism at NYU and West Point provide me with the necessary foundation for this position.

In addition, I served as an active-duty Army Special Forces officer in a counterterrorism unit (as a detachment commander of an assault team) and as a counterinsurgency advisor in El Salvador.

Relationships

In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following:

The Secretary of Defense

If confirmed, I will perform my duties to provide overall supervision of special operations activities and advise to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy regarding special operations activities and low intensity conflict.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

If confirmed, I will provide advice and support to the Deputy Secretary on special operations, stability operations, counternarcotics, and low intensity conflict capabilities development and employment, among other matters.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

If confirmed, I will work very closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy my advice on matters pertaining to special operations, stability operations, counternarcotics, and low intensity conflict capabilities, among other matters.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Special operations and intelligence are mutually supporting, so, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Americas' Security Affairs

If confirmed, I expect work closely with the regional Assistant Secretaries of Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, providing advice regarding special operations and stability operations that are on-going or in the planning stage. We would also work together on policies to build partner capacity, counternarcotics, and combat global threats. I would also anticipate working very closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs on our counterproliferation and cyber policy efforts.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Successful policy and resource oversight of special operations requires close coordination and collaboration with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman's staff. If confirmed, I plan to maintain a close working relationship with the Chairman, the Chiefs, and the Chairman's staff.

The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs

If confirmed, I will work with the Military Department Secretaries and Service Chiefs to ensure that the requirements to organize, train, and equip personnel and units that enable or feed special operations forces are met and that maintaining the capability to perform stability operations is a priority. I would also work with them to ensure adequate resourcing of Service-common requirements and infrastructure for Special Operations Forces.

Commander, United States Special Operations Command

The Commander, USSOCOM and the ASD (SO/LIC) must be partners in defining and meeting the needs of our Special Operations Forces. If confirmed, I am committed to maximizing that partnership and providing USSOCOM with a senior civilian advisor in accordance with the ASD (SO/LIC)'s statutory requirement to oversee the policy and resources for special operations activities.

The commanders of the service special operations commands

If confirmed, I will work closely with the service special operations commands to ensure they have the policies and resources needed to develop and provide the capabilities needed by the Commander, USSOCOM and the regional combatant commanders.

The regional combatant commanders

The regional Combatant Commands are at the forefront of the global fight against terrorists and violent extremists. They are responsible for maintaining a forward posture to deter and dissuade adversaries and assure and build the capabilities of our allies. If confirmed, I will work closely with the regional Combatant Commands in all of these areas.

The Director of National Intelligence

As mentioned above, special operations and intelligence are mutually supporting, so, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of National Intelligence and his subordinates.

The Director of Central Intelligence

Again, special operations and intelligence are mutually supporting, so, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of Central Intelligence and his subordinates.

The Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State

The Department of State is a key partner in the fight against global terrorists and violent extremists. As the former Coordinator (Ambassador-at-Large) for Counter

Terrorism at the Department of State, I would hope to find opportunities to further integrate and coordinate our efforts with the Coordinator.

The National Security Council

All aspects of the ASD (SO/LIC)'s responsibilities require interagency engagement, coordination, and cooperation. The ASD (SO/LIC) represents DoD in the interagency on relevant matters including counterterrorism, counternarcotics, stability operations, partner capacity building, and other relevant SO/LIC issues.

The Director, National Counter Terrorism Center

Special Operations Forces (SOF) activities are central to counterterrorism; the NCTC helps ensure coordination of all US Government counterterrorism activities. If confirmed, I will maintain ASD SO/LIC's role as the primary Office of the Secretary of Defense's interface on SOF and counter terrorism (CT) matters.

Major Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the ASD (SO/LIC)?

In addition to ensuring adequate resources to provide the special operations and stability operations capabilities needed by the nation, the ASD (SO/LIC) must also provide policies and resources to keep the pressure on al-Qa'ida and its affiliates worldwide as we draw down force structure in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is vital that the US Government remain focused on denying al-Qa'ida and its affiliates the "sanctuary of impunity" globally.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

As a veteran of the interagency process, if confirmed, I plan to keep the issue front and center -- and to ensure that programs key to effective counter terrorism operations are properly supported -- both politically and with resources.

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD (SO/LIC)?

If confirmed, I would continue to prioritize the defeat of al-Qa'ida and like-minded extremists, dismantling their ability to attack us at home or our interests abroad.

I would also focus on sustaining the warfighting capability of SOF warriors. In the past ten years, they have developed enormous capability both to fight terrorists and to build partner capacity which must be sustained for the long haul; terrorism will not go away

any time soon and the need for effective allies and partners is critical to our national security.

Former ASD (SO/LIC) Michael Vickers was quoted as saying “I spend about 95 percent of my time on operations” leaving the rest of his time for “service secretary-like” activities including policy, personnel, organizational, and development and acquisition decisions impacting special operations forces.

Would you anticipate a similar division of time as ASD (SO/LIC)?

Mike Vickers did a great job as the ASD (SO/LIC). If confirmed, I will certainly evaluate his approach as I take this job, but would expect to spend more time on Military Department Secretary-like activities as we face a period of declining DoD budgets.

Civilian Oversight of the United States Special Operations Command –

The legislation creating the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) assigned extraordinary authority to the Commander to conduct some of the functions of both a military service and a unified combatant command.

Which civilian officials in the DOD exercise civilian oversight of the "service-like" authorities of the Commander, USSOCOM?

Per 10 USC §138 and DoD Directive 5111.10 (in accordance with USD(P) priorities and guidance), the ASD (SO/LIC) is the principal civilian oversight for all special operations activities. Other DoD civilian officials also exercise oversight in some capacity:

- USD(I) coordinates on intelligence issues
- USD (AT&L) coordinates on acquisition issues
- USD (P&R) coordinates on personnel policies such as SOF-unique incentive packages
- USD (Comptroller) coordinates on SOF budget and year-of-execution program issues
- Military Department Secretaries coordinate on SOF manpower issues
- Director, CAPE, coordinates on SOF Program development and issues

In your view, what organizational relationship should exist between the ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM?

ASD (SO/LIC) provides civilian oversight of all special operations matters as required by 10 USC §138. As such, the ASD (SO/LIC) provides oversight of special operations policy and resources matters and advice to implement Secretary of Defense and USD (P) priorities. The ASD (SO/LIC) is a voting member of USSOCOM’s Board of Directors for program guidance and decisions. The relationship with the Commander, USSOCOM should be collaborative and cooperative to develop the best possible forces and employ them effectively.

What should be the role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in preparation and review of Major Force Program 11 and the USSOCOM's Program Objective Memorandum?

The ASD (SO/LIC) provides policy oversight for the preparation and justification of the special operations forces' program and budget. The ASD (SO/LIC) co-chairs the USSOCOM Board of Directors—the USSOCOM resource decision forum. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, USSOCOM, to ensure that USSOCOM funding sustains a ready, capable force, prepared to meet this new era's challenges.

What is the appropriate role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in the research and development and procurement functions of the USSOCOM?

The appropriate role of ASD (SO/LIC) is to provide policy oversight in resolving special operations acquisition issues. As the lead OSD official for SOF acquisition matters, the ASD (SO/LIC) represents SOF acquisition interests within DoD and before the Congress. The responsibilities and relationships between the ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM are defined and described in a Memorandum of Agreement between the ASD and Commander, USSOCOM. The ASD directs and provides policy oversight to technology development programs that address priority mission areas to meet other Departmental, interagency, and international capability needs (e.g., the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office).

What is the appropriate role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in the operational planning of missions that involve special operations forces, whether the supported command is USSOCOM, a Geographic Combatant Command, or another department or agency of the U.S. Government?

The ASD (SO/LIC) serves as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense for all aspects of employment, deployment, and oversight of special operations and counterterrorism capabilities. The ASD (SO/LIC) provides policy oversight of USSOCOM's mission planning and Geographic Combatant Commanders' employment of SOF to ensure compliance with law and DoD priorities. The ASD (SO/LIC) coordinates deployment authorities and plans involving SOF within DoD and with interagency partners as required.

Special Operations Command Acquisition Authorities –

USSOCOM is unique within the DOD as the only unified command with acquisition authorities and funding. Further, the Commander of USSOCOM is the only uniformed commander with a subordinate senior acquisition executive.

If confirmed, how would you ensure USSOCOM requirements are adequately vetted and balanced against available resources before moving forward with an acquisition program?

The ASD (SO/LIC) is closely involved in all facets of the USSOCOM Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system, providing oversight of these matters. Additionally, through the annual Program Budget Review process, the ASD (SO/LIC) is able to ensure that USSOCOM's priorities and resource allocation are in alignment with the Department's strategic and policy imperatives.

What role can USSOCOM's development and acquisition activities play in broader Service and DOD efforts?

USSOCOM can continue to serve as an incubator for developing new equipment and capabilities that initially are for special operations-specific needs but often transition to the rest of the Services. Some of the SOF technologies that have made their way to the Services include the MH-47 Chinook helicopter common avionics architecture system (CAAS) cockpit, an extended service life wing for the C-130, the MK48 lightweight machine gun, software-defined tactical radios, and an improved sniper sight. Particularly noteworthy is USSOCOM's ability to conduct rapid evaluations of technology, systems, and concepts of operations, and the ability to integrate emerging off-the-shelf technologies.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that special operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall DOD research, development and acquisition programs?

If confirmed, I would continue to support USSOCOM's important initiatives in this area, particularly the regularly-convened USSOCOM-led "Acquisition Summits" with OSD, drawing together USSOCOM, USD(AT&L), and the Service Acquisition Executives where all elements discuss acquisition issues of common interest. As USSOCOM requirements are provided to the Joint Staff for inclusion in the Joint Requirements Knowledge Management System, I am comfortable that USSOCOM's efforts are synchronized with the DoD process.

If confirmed, how would you ensure sufficient resources are dedicated to the development of special operations-unique platforms, when required?

As noted above, ASD (SO/LIC) is closely involved and integrated with USSOCOM's planning, resourcing, and execution. Additionally, the ASD (SO/LIC) attends the USSOCOM Board of Directors meetings, which allows him to ensure that he is aware of matters of concern and import to USSOCOM and its subordinate commands. Naturally, advocating for steady and predictable resourcing of USSOCOM is the principal means I would use, if confirmed, to oversee the investment strategy in these capabilities. If confirmed, I will also provide advice and support to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as she sits on critical resource decision-making bodies.

If confirmed, what metrics will you use to determine the effectiveness of USSOCOM technology development investments and whether USSOCOM is investing sufficient resources in these efforts?

USSOCOM has created a series of technology roadmaps that are effective in identifying promising solutions to meet requirements. These roadmaps have quantifiable metrics (e.g., cost, schedule, performance, and technology readiness) embedded in them and allow the ASD (SO/LIC) to monitor progress and identify obstacles that may require Department-level involvement.

If confirmed, how will you ensure that USSOCOM has an acquisition workforce with the skills, qualifications, and experience needed to develop and manage its acquisition and research and development programs?

If confirmed, I would support Admiral McRaven's efforts to manage the SOF acquisition workforce, which is similar to the process used by the Service Acquisition Executives. USSOCOM's acquisition workforce experts are professionally trained and certified, and have substantial experience in the SOF-unique processes needed to meet the equipping needs of SOF. I would also support USSOCOM's efforts with USD(AT&L) to expand its organic acquisition workforce, as well as to create a unique identifier for SOF acquisition positions.

Special Operations Personnel Management –

Some have argued that the Commander of USSOCOM should have greater influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of special operations forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, United States Code, to change the role of the USSOCOM Commander from “monitoring” the readiness of special operations personnel to “coordinating” with the services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect special operations forces.

What is your view of this proposal?

Changing Section 167 of Title 10, United States Code, to reflect the word “coordinating” rather than “monitoring” would give USSOCOM more influence over Service personnel policies that affect SOF retention. However, I believe that additional coordination and study should be done within the Department to fully understand the impact of this proposal.

Size of Special Operations Forces –

The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces and enablers that directly support their operations.

Do you believe that we should further increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?

I believe that completing the directed growth in SOF and Combat Support and Combat Service Support personnel directed in the 2006 and 2010 QDRs would posture USSOCOM to conduct the range of anticipated operations effectively to meet future requirements.

In your view, how can the size of special operations forces be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?

Experience has shown that SOF manpower growth of 3-5 percent annually can be sustained and will not dilute the force or outpace the required training and support structure. In my view, USSOCOM has done a magnificent job of adjusting its processes to maintain the quality of SOF operators and support personnel during this current era of SOF growth.

Special Operations Missions –

In recent years, special operations forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to USSOCOM's Title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities special operations forces are carrying out around the world.

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by USSOCOM, and why?

As a result of the 2010 QDR, the Department is building the capacity and capabilities of the general-purpose forces (GPF) to conduct security force assistance to develop the capacity and capabilities of foreign security forces in permissive or semi-permissive environments. The GPF capability to train, equip and advise large numbers of foreign security forces could allow SOF to focus on more complex missions. However, I believe that SOF must maintain a very robust capability to train, equip, and advise foreign security forces as part of ensuring SOF capability to conduct operations in politically-sensitive environments, ensuring access for other SOF activities, and ensuring the ability to train, equip and advise either special operations forces or irregular forces.

Are there any additional missions that you believe USSOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

I do not currently foresee any additional missions that USSOCOM should assume. I believe however, that SOF-led approaches to counterinsurgency are worth exploring. Counterinsurgency operations conducted by the United States will, more often than not, be conducted indirectly. SOF specializes in the indirect approach. I believe that employing unconventional warfare against non-state actors holds considerable promise as an expanded USSOCOM mission area.

Language and Cultural Awareness Capabilities –

Deployed special operations personnel remain heavily concentrated in the Central Command theater of operations, including many who have been deployed outside of their regional area of expertise.

Are you concerned that the language and cultural skills among special operations forces have been degraded because of repeated deployments outside their regional area of expertise?

Rotational deployments of SOF units not regionally aligned to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility have indeed taken a toll on the language, regional expertise, and culture capabilities of those units for their aligned regions. Current operations tempo (OPTEMPO) limits the ability to train SOF for their primary areas of responsibility while still preparing for the next USCENTCOM deployment. This is being addressed to a degree by USSOCOM force structure growth and requires continued monitoring.

If so and if confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to ensure these unique skills are adequately maintained?

I support recent USSOCOM initiatives to implement higher requirements for language capability as well as to improve the training processes for its components. If confirmed, I would seek to continue to pursue several key policy issues in close coordination with USSOCOM, including: native/heritage recruiting, valuing language and regional capabilities in selections and promotions, language testing and incentives, maintaining DoD-funded Defense Language Institute detachments at some of our components, adding SOF-specific school billets and funding from the Services for foreign education, and encouraging the Services to award Intermediate Level Education and Senior Level Education equivalency for Foreign Professional Military Education programs.

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command –

Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC), is a subordinate component command to USSOCOM established in 2005.

What is your assessment of the progress made in standing up and growing MARSOC, and what do you consider to be the principal issues that need to be addressed to improve its operations?

I believe that the establishment of MARSOC has been a resounding success, largely due to the commitment of the Marine Corps and Navy. My initial assessment is that the planned Combat Service and Combat Service Support growth must be fully implemented to support most effectively MARSOC's full spectrum of capabilities.

What unique attributes, if any, does MARSOC contribute to the capabilities of U.S. Special Operations Forces?

Incorporating the wonderful heritage, spirit, expeditionary mindset, and “can do” attitude of the U.S. Marine Corps into USSOCOM has been an extremely positive thing, in my view. MARSOC has led the effort to integrate intelligence and operations completely at the lowest possible level, and MARSOC’s distinctive command and control procedures have created dynamism in the SOF community.

The Marine Corps have approved a primary military occupational specialty for enlisted Marines trained as special operators allowing these personnel to remain in MARSOC for their professional careers.

Do you believe officers should have a similar opportunity as enlisted Marines to serve the duration of their military career in MARSOC rather than rotating through the command as they do currently?

As a former Army Special Forces officer, I recall the process that the Army went through to establish Special Forces as a separate officer career field. One lesson from that experience was that such transitions occur during the maturation of an organization, and that it is probably too early to decide definitively how MARSOC-qualified officers should be managed long-term. I am confident that the Marine Corps will regularly review this topic and conduct the necessary study and analysis to determine if it is appropriate to make a change.

Military Information Support Operations –

The DOD recently announced that it was discontinuing use of the term “Psychological Operations” in favor of the term “Military Information Support Operations.”

Do you support this change? Why or why not?

Yes. Today, for some, the terms “Psychological Operations” or “PSYOP” unfortunately conjure up images of propaganda, lies or deception. These inaccurate perceptions limit the willingness to employ Military Information Support Operations (MISO) personnel in some areas where they could be extremely effective.

To date, there are some indications that the name change has allowed for some increases in acceptance, cooperation and coordination regarding MISO activities throughout the U.S. government and with our partner nations.

What operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe such a change will have?

Changing the term “Psychological Operations” to “Military Information Support Operations” throughout military doctrine, manuals, and other documents is one of semantics. There were no directed changes in doctrine or operational employment of the force.

Do you believe the Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and other assets to conduct the range of Military Information Support Operations being asked of them?

MISO forces and assets, like the rest of the military, are stretched thin with the ongoing operational requirements to support deployed combat forces. MISO forces are low-density forces and are among the most deployed forces in the U.S. military. Under Admiral Olson, USSOCOM conducted several reviews to address this issue. I know Admiral McRaven is committed to following through on this with the objective of enhancing the Department of Defense’s MISO capabilities. One of the first efforts toward increasing the MISO capability is the reorganization of USSOCOM MISO forces. This reorganization will reduce redundancy in commands and allow for the repurposing of numerous positions from staff to operational capability.

Al Qaeda and affiliated violent extremist groups work hard to appeal to both local and foreign populations. The composition and size of these groups in comparison to the U.S. Government permits them to make policy decisions quickly.

Do you believe the DOD is organized to respond quickly and effectively to the messaging and influence efforts of al Qaeda and other affiliated terrorist groups?

The Department of Defense is well positioned and organized from the strategic level to the tactical level to respond quickly to al-Qa’ida and its affiliates when a quick response is required. But unlike kinetic warfare, effectiveness in the war of ideas does not necessarily lie in outpacing the tempo of our enemies. A steady drumbeat that clearly articulates U.S. policy over time, anchored in the bedrock truth, best serves our national interests. The Department of Defense takes its lead from the President, and relies heavily on the Department of State, in re-enforcing the Nation’s message. In doing so, DoD has been extremely effective in face-to-face encounters, through a broad array of engagements with our allied, partner, and host nations on a daily basis. As a representative example, DoD reinforces its engagements with printed products, such as Geographic Combatant Commands’ Regional Magazines and the foreign engagement websites. These mediums provide DoD a broad range of options.

In addressing al-Qa’ida, DoD seeks collectively to identify and exploit their miscues and errors, and force them into a reactive role. In that way, DoD determines the appropriate level of response and quickly coordinates that response with other agencies.

What do you believe is the appropriate role for Military Information Support Teams in these activities?

The Military Information Support Team or “MIST”, is the MISO equivalent of the Special Forces operational detachment. This is the element that executes MISO at the operational and tactical level. MISTs develop messages to counter hostile information and propaganda, in a manner that is culturally relevant and acceptable to the host national population. Such messaging is closely coordinated with the U.S. Embassy. MISTs also can maintain awareness of the information environment by identifying current trends in local and regional media reporting, detecting hostile messaging, and measuring local populace reaction.

Military Intelligence Operations –

In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the Intelligence Community?

In my view, Special Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence operations are complementary and mutually supporting to those carried out by the Intelligence Community (IC). These operations comply with the policies and regulations guiding DoD and interagency activities. One key distinction between SOF intelligence operations and those conducted by the IC is the pace of these activities. SOF have refined the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze (F3EA) intelligence cycle to support the rapid cycle rate of special operations activities. The F3EA process is now being migrated to conventional forces. SOF have also placed a premium on sensitive site exploitation and the collection and registration of biometrics data from the battlefield.

USSOCOM elements have also developed a series of joint interagency task force nodes, both in deployed areas and in the United States, that bring together expertise from all our interagency partners. SOF maximizes interagency contributions through reachback, de-confliction, and coordination of activities between agencies. This improves our forces’ chances to get inside the enemy’s decision cycle.

If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are coordinated adequately with other activities carried out by those in the intelligence community?

I believe that interagency collaboration is the most important contributing factor to many of SOF’s achievements. As Admiral McRaven has stated, USSOCOM will continue to follow all applicable intelligence community directives, report required sensitive activities to the USD(I), and maintain the robust intelligence oversight processes they have established with their Inspector General, Staff Judge Advocate, and the Command Oversight Review Board.

If confirmed, I will oversee, maintain, and build upon the important relationships USSOCOM – as a key member of DoD’s intelligence community – has developed with the Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Additionally, I am aware that USSOCOM continues to employ SOF liaison officers, called Special Operations Support Team members, effectively to coordinate with agencies in the national capital region.

Civil Affairs Operations

Civil Affairs activities carried out by U.S. Special Operations Forces in partnership with host nation personnel play an important role in developing infrastructure, supporting good governance and civil societies, and providing humanitarian assistance, including medical and veterinary services to needy populations.

In your view, does USSOCOM have sufficient personnel and resources to conduct the range of Civil Affairs missions required for today's operations?

I understand that USSOCOM and the Army have determined that current and already programmed Civil Affairs (CA) force structure provides sufficient capacity within the USCENTCOM AOR and other Combatant Command generated Theater Security Cooperation requirements. Any capability shortfalls within the CA force are being addressed in detail by the respective Military Departments and USSOCOM, and solution sets are being provided through the CA Capabilities Based Assessment. Implementation of those solutions, by the Military Departments, will eliminate much of the existing capability gaps. Ensuring the Department has the correct force capacity to meet current requirements will be one of my priorities, and if confirmed, I would resist the temptation to create a new capability or increase capacity when it may suffice simply to enhance capabilities within current force structure, through additional, enhanced, or new training; structure and manning updates; and progressive equipping coupled with continued evolution of the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the current CA force.

Civil Affairs activities are most effective when coordinated with other U.S. government efforts, most notably those carried out by U.S. Agency for International Development.

If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs activities by special operations personnel are integrated into larger U.S. government efforts?

I understand that USSOCOM employs two significant tools to ensure effective interagency coordination: the USSOCOM Interagency Task Force (IATF), and an Interagency Partnership Program. The IATF identifies discrete problems and opportunities to foster interagency collaboration by leveraging unique interagency authorities, resources, and capabilities in support of the mission to expose, disrupt, dismantle, and defeat threats. This capability is available to the CA force as a reach-back mechanism for interagency coordination.

The Interagency Partnership program established and maintains a network of USSOCOM personnel in the national capital region to facilitate the synchronization of planning for global operations against terrorist networks and addressing other emerging national security concerns in coordination with appropriate U.S. Government agencies, the Joint Staff, the OSD, Combatant Commands, combat support agencies, the Military Departments, and others. Two CA officers are currently in the USAID Military Affairs

office. These mechanisms seek to ensure that SOF CA remains integrated into key U.S. Government efforts.

Military Information Support Operations can have an amplifying effect on Civil Affairs activities by actively promoting the efforts of the U.S. military and host nation and by communicating truthful messages to counter the spread of violent extremist ideology among vulnerable populations.

If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations are adequately coordinated to achieve a maximum impact?

If confirmed, I would support USSOCOM in its role as joint proponent for both CA and MISO. This will enable unity of effort and the coordinated execution of CA and MISO. CA and MISO force representation at the operational and strategic levels will also remain critical in achieving a coordinated impact. At the tactical and operational levels, (e.g., country teams at the U.S. Embassies where CA and MISO are working), this is accomplished as a matter of course. CA and MISO personnel receive similar training and understand that their specialties are mutually supporting.

Special Operations Enabling Capabilities –

The previous Commander of USSOCOM described the “non-availability” of force enablers as USSOCOM’s “most vexing issue in the operational environment.” The 2010 QDR sought to balance previously mandated growth in special operations forces with additional enabling capabilities.

What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling capabilities facing special operations forces?

Shortages of enabling capabilities for SOF are often similar to the shortage of high-demand enablers that challenge the rest of the deployed forces (e.g., intelligence, explosive ordnance disposal, communications, medical, security).

USSOCOM’s organic enabling capabilities are those that provide SOF the ability to self-sustain for short durations while maintaining the agility to deploy forces quickly in support of the Combatant Commanders. Longer term support of special operations forces, by doctrine, and except under special circumstances, becomes the responsibility of each Service’s theater logistic command and control structure.

Do you believe additional enabling capabilities, beyond those mandated by the QDR, are required to support special operations forces?

The QDR mandated an increase in the number of organic combat and combat service support assets available to both the Army and Navy special operations units. These capabilities include logisticians, communications assets, forensic analysts, information support specialists, and intelligence experts. DoD is slowly realizing this programmed

growth, and it will make a difference in how SOF units are supported. The QDR only addresses growth within USSOCOM, however, USSOCOM will always rely on the Services for some level of support as addressed in the previous question.

Do you believe additional enabling capabilities should be grown within USSOCOM or provided in support of special operations forces by the services?

I believe both should occur, but the preponderance of those support capabilities should remain in the conventional force and be provided to SOF through the habitual association of Service Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities with the SOF units they primarily support. Currently the responsibility of the conventional force to provide sustainment support to SOF is not clearly defined or specified. At times, this limits SOF's ability to sustain operations. USSOCOM is currently working with its Components, the Services and the Joint Staff to develop the Special Operations Force Generation process to improve how it requests these critical capabilities. If confirmed, I will work with USSOCOM to define enabler requirements more clearly, and to identify them farther in advance to allow the Services to plan for the employment of habitually associated units in support of SOF. A reduction of SOF emergent requests and an increase in habitually associated Service-provided capabilities will go a long way toward resolving this problem.

Render Safe Proficiency – SO&CT

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a growing and especially concerning threat to our nation. Select special operations units are assigned the task of interdicting and rendering-safe weapons of mass destruction should they ever fall into the wrong hands.

If confirmed, how would you ensure render-safe capabilities are adequately maintained by special operations units who may currently be heavily engaged in offensive kill/capture missions against high value targets in Afghanistan and elsewhere?

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights the danger of nuclear terrorism as being the single greatest threat to global security. I understand that, even amidst a sustained focus on offensive operations to capture/kill high-value targets in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the Department ensures that its render-safe capabilities are adequately maintained. If confirmed, I will work closely with USSOCOM on this important issue. I will carefully monitor and assess the impact of our operational tempo on DoD's render-safe capabilities and ensure that these capabilities are maintained.

Do you believe additional render-safe capabilities are needed within USSOCOM?

Not at this time, though I have not yet had the opportunity to examine these capabilities in detail. I believe USSOCOM has the capabilities now to accomplish its render-safe mission.

As long as states continue to proliferate weapons of mass destruction, and both state and non-state actors continue their attempts to acquire these devices with the intent to target the United States and/or U.S. interests, we must remain vigilant and effective in our efforts. It is important to stay ahead of the threat, which requires expanded research and development efforts to ensure that our skilled operators are properly trained and equipped to defeat these threats.

Supported Combatant Command –

Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by the President or Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM may operate as a supported combatant command.

In your view, under what circumstances should USSOCOM conduct operations as a supported combatant command?

USSOCOM should be, in accordance with the Unified Command Plan, the supported commander for planning and synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks. Mission execution in most instances remains under the command of Geographic Combatant Commanders, or, more precisely, in accordance with 10 USC 167 unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.

Only in rare instances, involving highly sensitive targets or significant political considerations, does Commander, USSOCOM execute a mission.

In your view, what resource, organization, and force structure changes, if any, are required in order for USSOCOM to more effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command responsibilities?

It seems to me that, after 10 years of active combat, USSOCOM is probably structured correctly to conduct both supporting and supported Combatant Command responsibilities. I understand USSOCOM and the office of the ASD (SO/LIC) are currently studying the Theater Special Operations Commands to determine what changes, if any, should be considered in the future. I will look at this issue carefully if confirmed.

Training Capability –

What capabilities do you consider most important for effective training of special operations personnel?

Special operations forces cannot be created rapidly since they require a high degree of training, experience, and job skill sets that are often unique. The human component of USSOCOM is where its strength lies and to develop our special operations personnel we

must be willing to invest the necessary time and resources in advanced, realistic training. We must be able to leverage real-world exercises like the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs to expose our SOF to real-world experiences. It is critical that they develop language and cultural skills that allow them to operate in diverse foreign environments where our national interests are greatest. Special operations personnel must develop a mastery of their skills. DoD/SOCOM must maintain or increase resources and time spent on training ranges and developing interoperability with the Services and our Allies who serve as significant enabling components to SOF.

What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance training for special operations personnel?

Professional military education remains an important part of developing the critical language and cultural skills required of SOF personnel. DoD must be willing to prioritize additional resources and incentives to encourage the development of language and cultural skills in our service members and more importantly within our special operations personnel. DoD should take advantage of, and increase where possible, immersion training opportunities, exchanges, and advanced education opportunities. At the same time, DoD/SOCOM must not allow our SOF to lose their core combat capabilities; the balance between warrior and ambassador should be respected and SOCOM needs to prioritize the continued development of the core combat skills that make our SOF unique and experienced.

Admiral McRaven has additionally highlighted that pre-mission and pre-deployment training with relevant Service-provided capabilities (e.g. mobility, fires, engineers, etc) is critical to ensure that joint SOF packages are effective.

What are the most significant challenges in achieving effective training of special operations personnel?

USSOCOM has highlighted that it needs to move from a primarily threat-focused approach to a population-focused approach. This means conducting indirect warfare and moving beyond core SOF skills. It already takes significant time to develop the basic skill sets for special operations personnel. Developing additional language, cultural, diplomatic, and other non-combat SOF skills will be a challenge. SOF are deployed at an extremely high rate leading an effective effort to combat terrorism throughout the world. Deploying persistently and for long durations results in great experiences for special operations personnel, but in many cases a focused mission may result in the atrophy of other skill sets. For example, aircrews may conduct repetitive air-land missions on a long deployment, but may not conduct a specific airdrop mission due to deployment constraints. SOCOM must ensure there is enough time to train in the deployment cycles to maintain proficiency in core SOF capabilities. Additionally, since most SOF missions require non-SOF support, time must be added to work closely with Service counterparts supporting SOF.

What, if any, training benefits accrue to U.S. special operations forces from training foreign military personnel?

Training foreign military personnel has a substantial benefit for SOF, especially when they are foreign military units tied directly to current and future operations. The training of these units can increase interoperability, and allow the foreign units to take a larger lead in their own defense operations while our special operations trainers maintain their instructor skills. The training of the foreign military personnel greatly benefits SOF as they gain an increased situational awareness of future operating environments and allies while honing language and cultural skill sets that are critical to successful operations. JCETs and other regionally synchronized training efforts help pave the way for critical counterterrorism operations or even humanitarian efforts or other SOF mission sets. These activities help expose SOF to new tactics, techniques, and procedures while also encouraging the development of communication and intelligence-sharing mechanisms that enable CT operations. Training foreign military units helps build trusting relationships and fosters familiarization that in return enables our SOF to work in foreign countries with greater success and confidence.

To what extent, in your view, is it appropriate for the U.S. to rely upon contractors for training foreign military personnel? What do you see as the primary risks and advantages in such contractor training?

SOF cannot be replaced by contractors, but there may be times when utilizing contractors makes more sense and should be the course of action. In some situations, it may be prudent to contract out a specific mission because we may not possess that skill within our own SOF. For example, there may not be a SOF aviator trained on a certain aircraft, or there may not be a Green Beret with a specific language skill required for a training event. In these cases, a contract solution might be the best option to ensure an important mission is still conducted.

On the other hand, there are risks of utilizing contractors. DoD is obligated to maintain strong oversight over contractors. Contractors are also not permitted to represent the U.S. government. They are not a replacement for SOF and if not properly utilized may undermine efforts to train foreign units. Contractors can help provide augmented logistics, administrative support, and technical/computer expertise which in turn frees up special operations personnel for more SOF-unique training opportunities and operational missions.

On March 1, 2011, Admiral Eric Olson, the former Commander of United States Special Operations Command, provided written testimony to this committee that stated: “The shortage of readily available, local ranges currently hampers special operations forces' ability to meet deployment training timelines and causes our operators to `travel to train,' further increasing their already excessive time away from home.”

What efforts do you plan to undertake in coordination with the military services to ensure that Special Operations Forces have timely, consistent and predictable access to training ranges and facilities?

If confirmed, I would coordinate with USSOCOM and take a closer look at how the GPF and SOF share training ranges and facilities. Where possible I would look to prioritize limited training resources for SOF training and those Service enablers supporting SOF. For example, if confirmed, I would prioritize future military construction efforts to expand training capabilities for SOF. I would also look to enter into additional memorandums of agreement for expanded GPF-SOF training opportunities on ranges and associated facilities to prepare our SOF for combat deployments.

Capabilities of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces –

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for increased counter insurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces.

What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of responsibilities assigned to general purpose and special operations forces, particularly with respect to security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?

Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to become more like special operations forces in mission areas that are critical to countering violent extremists?

Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for special operations forces only?

I fully support the strategy of building the defense capacity and capabilities of our partners as articulated in the 2010 QDR. I believe that the mix of capabilities between general purpose and special operations forces as called for in the QDR is correct. Each of the Services has gained valuable experience in this area over the past ten years, especially as a result of operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Services are increasingly growing their organic capability and capacity to conduct security force assistance (SFA) operations in permissive and non-sensitive environments or where a large U.S. footprint is acceptable. Likewise, SOF have gained valuable experience in building the military capability and capacities of our partners not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also with our coalition partners as they prepare to deploy in support of both combat and stability operations. The Service SFA capability and capacity, however, should be for Service core competencies and not for missions best suited for SOF. SOF are still the force of choice for those security force assistance missions in non-permissive and politically sensitive areas and where the host nation demands a small footprint. In addition, SOF are the correct choice to train our partner nation SOF and improve their capabilities for counter terrorism operations.

SOF have worked closely with the Service general purpose forces to prepare them to execute COIN and combating terrorism missions appropriate to their capabilities. The partnership between general purpose and special operations forces is strong. The extensive combat employment of both forces in shared battle spaces has increased the need to coordinate our operations closely. This has resulted in a sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures between SOF and general purpose forces that has helped to increase the Services' capabilities to execute COIN and combating terrorism operations. The Services can continue to complement SOF's capabilities by providing those combat enablers that are not organic to SOF units or that are not available in adequate quantities. These combat enablers, including intelligence and combat service support, are vital to the success of SOF, especially in today's complex operating environment.

Combatting Terrorism –

What is your understanding of the Department's strategy for combatting terrorism?

The President's National Strategy for Counterterrorism maintains the focus on pressuring al-Qa'ida's core while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our resilience. The United States is specifically at war with al-Qa'ida and associated forces, not the tactic of terrorism or the larger group of violent extremists in the world. Overarching goals are to protect the American people, Homeland, and interests; disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida; prevent terrorists from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction; eliminate safehavens; build enduring counterterrorism partnerships; degrade links between al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents; counter al-Qa'ida's ideology; and deprive terrorists of their financial support and other enablers.

The U.S. Government is engaged in a multi-departmental, multinational effort. Some of the activities that DoD directly undertakes to support this strategy include training, advising, and assisting partner security forces; supporting intelligence collection on al-Qa'ida; conducting information operations against al-Qa'ida; and, when appropriate, capturing or killing al-Qa'ida operatives. However, I understand DoD is also committed to enabling its intelligence and law enforcement partners, both in the United States and overseas, in their efforts to counter this threat.

If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to combatting terrorism?

The ASD (SO/LIC) is the Department of Defense lead for all special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. If confirmed, I would also advise the Secretary of Defense on sensitive counter-terrorism and information operations; Sections 1206, 1208, and related counterterrorism authorities; and the development of special operations force capabilities necessary for countering the terrorist threat.

Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other federal departments and agencies?

In general, I think DoD is doing a good job of coordinating its counter-terrorism efforts. At the operational level, the U.S. military, intelligence community, and law enforcement agencies regularly collaborate on operations. The various departments and agencies constantly share intelligence, with little of the “stove-piping” that we saw before 9/11. At the strategic level, the multiple counter-terrorism bodies chaired by the National Security Staff provide ample opportunity for senior leaders to discuss key terrorism issues. There will always be some natural bureaucratic tensions, but I think the U.S. Government is well postured for continued strong counter-terrorism collaboration. I will look at this closely if confirmed.

As you look around the globe at this moment, what do you see to be the most significant counterterrorism threats to the U.S., our allies, and partners?

The most significant groups that threaten the United States and our allies are al-Qa’ida in Pakistan and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula. However, a few key operatives operating from any of al-Qa’ida’s affiliates, or even “lone wolves” inspired by al-Qa’ida, can wreak havoc anywhere in the world. I am very concerned with preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction or loose anti-aircraft weapons proliferating from unstable states. I understand that the U.S. Government is continually working to identify new terrorist methods of concealing improvised explosives.

On September 22, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton launched the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) with 30 founding members from around the world. The GCTF is a major initiative within the Obama Administration’s broader effort to build the international architecture for dealing with terrorism. The primary focus of the GCTF is capacity building in relevant areas and aims to increase the number of countries capable of dealing with the terrorist threats within their borders and regions.

What is your understanding of this initiative?

The GCTF is a multilateral platform that will provide a venue for countries to meet and identify counter-terrorism needs, and mobilize the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs and enhance global cooperation. The GCTF is intended to complement ongoing efforts with the United Nations, as well as other regional and sub-regional bodies. I understand that the September launch of the GCTF was positively received by all of the countries involved.

Given the emphasis on building partner capacity, what is your understanding for the role of the DOD – and in particular special operations forces – in this initiative?

The defeat of al-Qaida cannot be achieved without bringing together the expertise and resources of the entire U.S. Government—intelligence, law enforcement, military, and other instruments of national power—in a coordinated and synchronized manner. If

confirmed, I would seek strong relationships with DoD's interagency partners, in particular, the National Counter Terrorism Center, the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, to maximize DoD's efforts to counter violent extremism. The GCTF, as a State Department-led effort, is one example where SOF's counterterrorism and security cooperation activities can support and inform interagency partners' efforts in counterterrorism.

Section 1208 Operations –

Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of this authority?

I understand that Section 1208 authority is a key tool that Combatant Commanders have repeatedly confirmed as essential to combating terrorism in their areas of responsibility. It enables the Special Operations Forces under their control to leverage willing partners who possess access to areas, people, and information that are denied to U.S. forces, but which are critical to our tactical and strategic success. The authority has allowed DoD to respond quickly to emergent global challenges. Use of Section 1208 requires appropriate civilian oversight, including the Secretary of Defense's approval and congressional notification.

Afghanistan –

What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan? What are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current effort to combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan?

In my view, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan partners have made important security gains, reversing violence trends in much of the country, and beginning to transition Afghan security to lead in seven areas. Continued military pressure through partnered operations has allowed joint ISAF-Afghan forces to maintain and expand the security gains, especially in the former Taliban strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been integral to this success, demonstrating substantial growth in quantity, quality, and operational effectiveness.

The United States is employing the right methodology, and security continues to improve. However, the insurgency's safe havens in Pakistan and the limited capacity of the Afghan government remain the biggest threats to consolidating security gains to enable an

enduring, stable Afghanistan. The insurgency remains resilient, benefiting from safe havens, with a notable operational capacity as reflected in isolated, high-profile attacks and elevated violence levels in eastern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this partnered campaign has provided increased security and stability for the Afghan population, and the US continues to build upon this success.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of special operations forces in Afghanistan, and the proper relationship between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations there?

In my view, counter-terrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) are inextricably linked in Afghanistan. There must be a balanced and measured approach to their application. CT efforts, including direct action, shape the environment and create conditions necessary for the causes of instability to be addressed. This enables the further capacity development of Afghan governance and Afghan security forces.

Night raids conducted by U.S Special Operations Forces and Afghan commandos have resulted in removing thousands of insurgents from the battlefield, often without any shots being fired. Nonetheless, night raids remain controversial in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Government and community leaders have repeatedly called for restricting or eliminating their use.

In your view, what should be the role of night raids in our strategy in Afghanistan?

In my view, night operations are an essential and highly effective element of a strategy against al-Qa'ida and the Afghan insurgency, and they should continue to play an important role in maintaining pressure on militant groups. Night operations allow the United States, with its Afghan and international partners, to fight the insurgency with precision and focus while minimizing risk to civilians.

I understand that Afghanistan's highly trained special operations forces are steadily growing, and that Afghans currently play a key role in coordinating and partnering in the vast majority of these operations. Of course, night operations must continue to be conducted with due respect for cultural sensitivities and great care for the prevention of civilian casualties. Ultimately, the goal must be to ensure that Afghan and international forces have the capabilities and authorities necessary to achieve the transition goals agreed at the Lisbon Summit last November, while also being mindful of the goal to increase Afghan ownership throughout the transition process.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of night raids, particularly in removing from the battlefield mid- and senior-level insurgent commanders?

The amount of pressure these operations have placed on the insurgency has been immense. Night operations have been particularly effective at using rapid exploitation of intelligence to target command and control structures, organizational capabilities, support networks, and infrastructure of insurgent and militant groups.

I understand that the United States conducts the vast majority of night operations jointly with Afghan Security Forces, and we share a common goal – transition to Afghan security lead by 2014 and full transition as soon as the ANSF has the necessary capacity. Because of the high level of skill and professionalism of the joint U.S.-Afghan forces, no shots are fired during approximately 90% of night operations, and less than one percent of these operations result in civilian casualties.

What steps, if any, would you recommend to address Afghan concerns regarding the use of night raids?

I understand that the United States has already taken numerous steps to minimize the potential for civilian casualties and give Afghan security forces leadership on night operations. All of our forces receive formal instruction in theater tactical directives pertaining to civilian casualties. Afghan Security Force leadership has been integrated into the planning, execution, and post-operation phases to ensure full transparency and enable its leadership to balance risk, cultural considerations, and operational requirements. Every U.S. operation is conducted with Afghan counterparts, and the Afghans are always in the lead during entry of compounds and call-outs. Measures for escalation of force are strictly followed. I understand that our Afghan partners, as well as U.S. commanders, strive to keep district and provincial political leadership informed of all operations.

Secretary Panetta and others have emphasized the importance of the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police programs to the strategy in Afghanistan.

What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan populations and what has been the response from the Taliban?

Village Stability Operations (VSO) are a critical component of the COIN/CT balance in the ISAF campaign plan. VSO is a bottom-up approach linking governance to the village level. VSO uses Afghan and ISAF special operations forces embedded in the community full-time to help improve security, governance, and development in more remote areas of Afghanistan where the ANSF and ISAF have a limited presence. I understand that, since its inception, VSO has expanded Afghan government influence in key rural areas from 1,000 square kilometers to 23,500 square kilometers today. VSO has also enabled a massive expansion in small-scale infrastructure development in these key rural areas. Across Afghanistan, increasing numbers of local communities are requesting to participate in this program.

The Afghan Local Police (ALP), the armed local security program associated with VSO and established by President Karzai, has expanded to more than 8,000 members. Due to the increase in ALP effectiveness, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior has authorized an ALP end strength of 30,000. ALP are empowering local communities and have proven to be a significant threat to the Taliban, denying them safe-haven, and ultimately creating the conditions for long-term stability.

As a result, the Taliban have mounted an aggressive intimidation, assassination, and disruption effort against Afghan government officials, ALP members, and supportive populations. These attacks have largely failed to intimidate ALP forces and local communities, which continue to defend their villages effectively against insurgent attacks.

Do you believe the availability of U.S. Special Operations Forces is a limiting factor in expanding these programs to a point where they can have a strategic impact in Afghanistan?

Yes, I believe that the expansion of this effort will need to rely on the application of theater special operations forces and enablers. To assist in the responsible growth of these programs, ISAF has integrated specially trained conventional forces into the SOF-led VSO program, mainly to augment security requirements. These combined teams are producing strategic changes, and additional special operations force structure will demonstrably expand this effect across the country. The approved expansion to 30,000 ALP patrolmen will likely strain the capacity of the coalition special operations forces in Afghanistan and may require additional conventional forces to partner with SOF in order to support projected ALP growth adequately.

How do indirect approaches like the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Programs complement direct action counterterrorism missions within the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?

The U.S. National and Military strategies are based on direct and indirect approaches. Indirect SOF missions are part of what the Department now calls foundational activities. Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police are part of that indirect approach and are critical to the success of General Allen's population-centric campaign strategy in key rural areas across Afghanistan. Counter-terrorism efforts complement these rural efforts by shaping and managing the security environment where these indirect approaches are pursued. One is no less or more important than the other; they are distinct yet complementary efforts that work in tandem to achieve near-term and enduring stability.

On an annual basis, DOD spends approximately \$500 million building the capacity of the Afghanistan Government to counter the illegal narcotics trade. Despite this sizeable annual investment, according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan remains the "wellspring of the global opium trade, accounting for 93 percent of all opium poppy cultivation." UNODC has also found that about 80 percent of the drugs derived from Afghan opium poppies are smuggled out by transnational organized criminal groups through the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan; the rest flows through Central Asia.

What is your assessment of DOD's counternarcotics program in Afghanistan?

I understand that DoD supports counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan by building Afghan capacity and working with U.S. law enforcement agencies such as DEA, CBP, FBI, and ICE to interdict narcotics trafficking. Although DoD supports Afghan eradication efforts, the Department of State has the lead for that effort. This year the interdiction of opiates and precursor chemicals in Afghanistan has increased. Afghan Counternarcotics Police vetted units, mentored by DEA, are now capable of conducting drug interdiction operations and have been actively involved in combined operations with DEA and military forces. DoD has also been building the capacity of the Afghan border management efforts to stop drugs from leaving Afghanistan and precursor chemicals from entering the country.

How would you improve DOD's counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan?

I believe that there have been considerable improvements this year in military and law enforcement coordination. Military commanders in Afghanistan are now requesting support from DEA and Afghanistan's Counternarcotics Police. Although there has been improvement there are probably other improvements that could be made; if confirmed, I will look into this.

Pakistan –

The relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan has often been described as tumultuous. Reports indicate Pakistan has expelled U.S. special operations personnel who were deployed there to train the Frontier Corps and other Pakistani security forces to fight al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other associated groups.

How important in your assessment is the U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military relationship to the success of our overall counterterrorism strategy?

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is clear in stating that the U.S. will only achieve the strategic defeat of al-Qa'ida through a sustained partnership with Pakistan. In my view, the military-to-military relationship is an important part of this partnership as it facilitates the indirect approach of working through and with our Pakistan Military (PAKMIL) partners to achieve mutually beneficial counter-terrorism goals. U.S. military assistance to Pakistan has helped the PAKMIL achieve success in its counterinsurgency efforts. Despite recent setbacks in this relationship, it is important that we continue to engage our PAKMIL counterparts to reestablish and rebuild the relationship and continue achieving these successes.

Do you believe the current difficulties, including the reductions in U.S. trainers, are temporary or lasting?

The recent ouster of Special Operations Command (Forward)–Pakistan trainers was a significant setback in the overall military-to-military relationship in Pakistan. However, I do not believe that this event is indicative of the relationships that U.S. and Pakistan

military leaders have established at the unit levels. I understand these relationships are strong, and I believe we should be making every attempt to ensure that our tactical and operational level leaders are able to maintain these ties however possible. In terms of disagreements at the more senior levels, I believe that these can be mended, but it will require persistent, patient engagement. It may require reducing expectations of the military-to-military relationship in the short term, but I do believe that over time the two countries can return to more robust levels of military cooperation.

Iraq –

What are the main “lessons learned” from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn as they pertain to special operations forces?

I believe that the U.S. has learned many lessons through current operations. Some of these lessons include: the need to maximize combined operations with partner forces, the necessity of culturally attuned forces, the need for a unified U.S. Government approach, and the need for active and integrated interagency coordination.

What is your assessment of the security situation in Iraq?

Although Iraq today is closer to being a stable and secure country, I remain mindful of the challenges. The Iraqis are taking critical steps to resolve ongoing political issues, but internal divisions remain. These issues must be addressed to avoid potential conflicts.

The push for influence by Iran, and the activities of Iranian-backed militias that have attacked U.S. forces and the Iraqi people, are other issues that Iraq will still need to face. Unlike Iran, the United States is working to build a safer and stronger Iraq, and it is that shared interest that gives me confidence that the United States can build an enduring partnership with the Iraqi government. I am also mindful of al-Qa’ida’s role in Iraq.

Regardless of DoD’s post-2011 role, its civilian mission should be focused on helping Iraqis address their issues through a robust and representative Iraqi political process, which is the best safeguard against a return to violence.

What is your assessment of the capability of the Iraqi security forces? Do you assess that they are capable of conducting independent operations throughout the country?

Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S. forces to maintain internal stability. U.S. commanders in the field believe that the Iraqi Security Forces are competent at conducting counter-insurgency operations, but that the Iraqis will have gaps in their ability to defend against external threats and in areas such as integrated air defense, intelligence sharing, and logistics.

Do you believe an enduring military-to-military relationship with Iraq is important to the long-term stability of Iraq?

Yes. The United States wants a normal, productive relationship and close strategic partnership with a sovereign Iraqi government going forward – similar to the partnerships we have with other countries in the region and around the world.

What do you believe to be the threat of al Qaeda to security and stability in Iraq?

Iraq's security and political situation is improving after years of instability that enabled groups such as al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) to spread chaos and sectarian conflict. AQI continues to be the main focus of counter-terrorism efforts in Iraq, as it poses a threat not only to stability but to remaining U.S. military forces and civilians. Iraqi-led counter-terrorism operations have dismantled AQI's previous senior leadership, but new AQI leaders have assumed control and the group continues to conduct high-profile attacks. DoD will continue to watch for AQI attempts to reinvigorate its efforts and draw on a still-significant network of associates that spans the region and includes associates in the United States.

Yemen –

Prior to the current political crisis in Yemen, the U.S. Government had a robust security assistance program to help the Yemeni security forces take action against al Qaida. Some observers, while supportive of U.S. security assistance to Yemen, have suggested that the problems being confronted by the Government of Yemen cannot simply be addressed with the provision of additional security assistance.

What is your assessment of the security situation in Yemen?

The security situation remains tense. Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the instability in Yemen, and operates with greater impunity in the most unstable areas while attempting to seize and control territory in the south.

The Yemeni government has recently made some gains against AQAP in the south, driving most of the group out of Zinjibar and removing several key leaders from the battlefield. However, the larger political instability in Yemen will not be resolved until President Saleh agrees to a political transition plan, which he has thus far been unwilling to do.

What criteria would you use in determining whether security assistance activities in Yemen should resume?

I understand the U.S. is currently providing some modest, non-lethal assistance to Yemeni forces, but DoD is also assessing how the United States could resume more robust security assistance. This will require greater political stability, which will probably require President Saleh to leave power. The U.S. will also need to see an improved security situation that allows U.S. personnel to work safely with Yemeni forces. It will be important to ensure any partner units have not committed human rights

abuses or been involved in suppressing the political opposition over these past months. Finally, it will be necessary to assess Yemeni willingness to employ partner units against AQAP and focus support on those units that are most receptive to U.S. assistance and most likely to be used against our common adversary.

Given the current limitations on lethal security assistance to the Yemeni counterterrorism forces, what is your assessment of the U.S. strategy to counter al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?

Although resuming capacity building is critical to long-term efforts against AQAP, the U.S. strategy goes beyond capacity building. I believe a number of important gains against AQAP have been made over the past year. DoD continues to collaborate extensively with Yemeni forces on operational matters. The United States is closely monitoring AQAP and regularly improving understanding of its external attack plots. Efforts to counter AQAP's narrative have also helped delegitimize the group and discourage its efforts to recruit new operatives. The U.S. Government's work on countering threat financing has made it more difficult for AQAP to receive funds and to support other parts of al-Qa'ida. Finally, the past year has seen several key leaders removed from the battlefield, including Anwar al-Aulaqi.

Somalia –

In your view, what should be the U.S. policy towards Somalia and what do you believe to be the appropriate role of the DOD in support of that policy?

U.S. policies toward Somalia should support the Somali Transitional Federal Government's and the African Union Mission to Somalia's abilities to deliver security and basic services and lay the foundation for a stable, functioning government. That is what the United States wants to see for the people of Somalia.

However, Somalia's decades-long lack of governance and sparse population make it appealing as a safe haven for al-Qa'ida. As al-Qa'ida undergoes leadership changes and responds to counter-terrorism operations in Pakistan, the need to ensure that it does not relocate its center of operations to Somalia is critical.

I understand that DoD's primary mission in the Horn of Africa is to build partner-nation capacity in order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests. I believe this mission is appropriate. I am informed that U.S. Africa Command is undertaking a review of East Africa to determine how military efforts in the region work in concert with DoD's interagency partners to achieve collective regional goals and counter al-Qa'ida's linkages to elements of al-Shabaab. DoD's ultimate goal should be a fully integrated strategy under which security assistance, capacity building, operational collaboration with regional partners, and counter-terrorism actions which are synchronized to provide the regional security and stability that are in the interest of both the United States and our regional partners.

If confirmed, I would work to ensure our strategy is developed as part of a coordinated U.S. national security policy towards the Horn of Africa, and to determine how the DoD can and should best support this policy.

Terrorism Threats in Africa –

Over the course of the last decade, al Qaeda-inspired and affiliated groups in Africa have gained strength, leading some to express concern about their intent and ability to strike the interests of the U.S. and partner nations.

What is your understanding of U.S. policy with regard to countering the threats posed by these groups?

In East Africa the U.S. strategy is focused on dismantling al-Qa'ida elements while building the capacity of countries and local administrations to serve as countervailing forces to the supporters of al-Qa'ida and the purveyors of instability that enable the transnational terrorist threat to persist.

Al-Qa'ida elements in East Africa continue to be a primary focus of the United States in light of clear indications of their ongoing intent to conduct attacks against U.S. facilities and interests abroad. Al-Qa'ida's presence within al-Shabaab is increasingly leading that group to pose a regional threat with growing trans-regional ties to other al-Qa'ida affiliates.

U.S.' efforts against al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are closely integrated with the broader U.S. regional strategy, especially since the long-term eradication of AQIM will not be addressed by traditional counter-terrorism tools alone. As appropriate, the United States will use its counter-terrorism tools, weighing the costs and benefits of its approach in the context of regional dynamics and perceptions and the actions, will, and capabilities of its partners in the region—local governments and European allies. I understand that the U.S. will seek to bolster efforts for regional cooperation against AQIM, especially among Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger as an essential element of our strategy. The U.S. should also continue to work with our interagency and international partners on mitigating threats from emergent groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Do you believe DOD's assets and other resources allocated to countering terrorist threats in Africa are adequate to understand and respond to the threats posed by these groups?

A significant portion of the U.S. counter-terrorism effort is focused on the Middle East and Afghanistan/Pakistan regions and USCENTCOM has received the majority of DoD's operational and intelligence assets. To address terrorist threats in Africa, I understand we have executed an economy of effort. As our nation's activities in the USCENTCOM

region change, additional assets may be available to address USAFRICOM's needs. Our special operations forces will undoubtedly be an integral part of future engagements in Africa and will support partner nations in their response to terrorist networks working on the continent.

Colombia –

For more than a decade, Colombian security forces have worked in partnership with U.S. Special Operations Forces to counter security threats. This partnership has helped to enable the Colombians to significantly degrade the terrorist organization known as the FARC.

What do you believe are the primary lessons learned from U.S. Special Operations Forces training and advising activities in Colombia?

In Colombia, the U.S. military learned the value of playing a supporting role, seeking to complement Colombian strategies, rather than develop competing ones. DoD's experience in Colombia also prepared us to adapt to the changing environment; to recognize and embrace opportunities when they presented themselves. DoD has learned that our partnerships must constantly evolve from the point where they start, to confront and counter threats that are also adapting and changing.

Are there lessons learned that may apply to U.S. support to Mexico and Central America in their efforts to counter the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations?

Yes. Many of the U.S. government's lessons learned from our experiences in Colombia are currently reflected in our efforts in Mexico. Transnational criminal activities, including narcotics trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and arms smuggling, provide pathways and opportunities for criminal and terrorist organizations to move people and resources across the region. Moreover, effectively addressing these transnational criminal threats in Colombia and Mexico is critical to addressing security throughout the region, including in Central America and along our Southwest Border.

Republic of the Philippines –

What is your view of the effectiveness of U.S. assistance being provided through the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines to the military of the Republic of the Philippines in its fight against terrorist groups?

Though a great deal of our focus in the Philippines has been on countering terrorist groups, U.S. assistance to the Philippines has always been, and continues to be, a multi-faceted approach. The Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) engages each branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine

National Police (PNP) using appropriate authorities to help build capacity and improve the image and professionalism of all elements of the AFP and PNP. Examples of successes range from DOS-funded training to improve AFP aviation and maritime capabilities to DoD-funded procurement of precision munitions under Section 1206. DoD has also conducted Military Information Support Operations (MISO) activities and Civil Affairs projects, and has supported DOS-led diplomatic efforts. As a direct result of these combined efforts, the capability of the Philippine Security Forces has been vastly improved. The Philippine government has become more effective in maintaining the pressure on the key terrorist groups.

Stability and Peacekeeping Operations

The office of ASD (SO/LIC) is responsible for policy and activities concerning stability operations, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.

If confirmed, what role would you play in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future stability operations? What are the major challenges in this area and how would you address them?

Stability operations are a core mission that DoD must be ready to carry out with proficiency equivalent to high-intensity combat operations. Although this represents a cultural shift for DoD, they understand that all the Military Departments must adequately train, organize, and equip forces to conduct such missions. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary, the Chairman, and leadership of the Military Departments to ensure that DoD is preparing U.S. forces for stability operations.

From 2000 – 2003, you served as the Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations (U.N.). What lessons did you learn from your experience at the U.N. that might apply to your work as the ASD (SO/LIC)?

My time at the U.N. was invaluable. Much like assuming a leadership position at DoD, working as an A/SYG at the U.N. meant learning how to navigate an enormous organization with a culture and a bureaucracy all its own, the pressures of competing priorities and multiple stakeholders, and managing a large staff and complex operations with finite resources. It was a challenging experience, and, if confirmed, I look forward to applying it to my new post in SO/LIC.

Experience in Iraq has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability operations in post-conflict situations.

In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DOD and other departments of government in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?

Ideally, DoD would provide support to other departments and agencies such as the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of

Justice in the planning and conduct of stability operations. But, when directed, DoD has led stability operations activities to establish civil security and control and to restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance, and then has transitioned lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments' security forces, and international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. If confirmed, I would ensure that DoD operates within U.S. Government and international structures for managing civil-military operations, and would seek to enable the deployment and use of civilian capabilities and resources, as directed and as appropriate.

What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq?

I think we need to strengthen the U.S. Government's collective ability to plan and train together and be more collaborative in designing stabilization and reconstruction activities. I am aware that the Department is working with interagency partners to identify areas where they can improve planning efforts.

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., stated that the U.S. "is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations."

What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute additional military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

In general, I would support additional contributions of personnel to staff officer positions, provided that they are positions that would add significant value to the mission, and that the mission is a strategic priority for the United States.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations?

There are several potential advantages to contributing additional military personnel to UN missions: the opportunity to shape these missions from the inside; professional development opportunities for Service-members to serve in a joint, multi-lateral environment; and the benefit of receiving real-time information and insights on emerging threats and crises from places where there might not otherwise be a U.S. presence. It also enables an increased professional interaction by U.S. Service members with numerous partner nations' service members, with whom we may not normally have the opportunity to serve.

The potential disadvantage of providing additional military personnel is the additional demands these assignments would impose on a U.S. military force that has seen extensive

deployments in recent years and is still heavily engaged in overseas operations. I do not believe the United States will be in a position to provide significant numbers of military personnel to peacekeeping missions anytime in the foreseeable future. However, I believe the selective placement of even modest numbers of U.S. military personnel in addition to the fewer than 30 currently assigned to UN operations can have a significant, positive, impact on UN peacekeeping operation.

If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the U.N.?

If confirmed, I would support exploring ways that DoD could more quickly respond to requests for personnel support, bearing in mind applicable legal requirements and the current operational tempo of U.S. forces.

The DOD has provided logistics, communications, and headquarters staff to a variety of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions over the past decade.

In your view, beyond providing key personnel and observers, what support, if any, should the DOD provide to multilateral peacekeeping missions?

The Department already provides support to multilateral peacekeeping missions beyond personnel and observers. For example, the Combatant Commands implement roughly half of all Global Peace Operations Initiative activities, and many troop contributor countries also benefit from inclusion in the regional Combatant Commands' regional peacekeeping exercises. The Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute is involved in a number of efforts to improve international peacekeeping. Additional support might also be possible, but DoD will need to balance increase support for peacekeeping with other operational requirements.

In 2005, the U.S. along with our partners in the G-8 launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to train peacekeepers. This program is run by the Department of State. DOD has provided varying degrees of support since the program's inception.

What are your views on the GPOI program?

I fully support the GPOI program. GPOI is not only a successful capacity-building program, but it is also a great example of a DoD-State Department partnership.

GPOI's efforts are especially needed now as the demands on UN peacekeeping are great and missions continue to increase in scope and complexity.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of the DOD in this program and, more generally, in the training of peacekeepers?

In general, peacekeeping training should be done by the military to the extent possible

As previously mentioned, the Combatant Commands already implement roughly half of all GPOI activities, and include peacekeeping contributor countries in their regional peacekeeping exercises.

The State Partnership Program has also taken a role in peacekeeping training, partnering with contingents readying to deploy to UN peacekeeping missions.

Interagency Collaboration

The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

Our nation has learned many hard lessons about the importance of whole-of-government approaches in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations over the past several years. One of the most important lessons of our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq is that success in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and post-conflict stability operations depends upon the integrated efforts of both civilian and military organizations in all phases of an operation, from planning through execution. Sustainable outcomes require civilian development and governance experts who can help build local civilian capacity. I understand that DoD supports the lead by other departments and agencies such as State, Justice, and USAID in areas such as fostering political reconciliation, building accountable institutions of government, restoring public infrastructure, and reviving economic activity, so that DoD can focus on providing a safe and secure environment and assist in building accountable armed forces. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to ensure that interagency collaboration is as robust and effective as possible.

How do you believe these efforts can be improved?

I believe interagency collaboration can be improved by continuing to ensure that the U.S. military plans and trains with our civilian counterparts, and is prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict, including post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. In addition, improving the interagency planning process would ensure that optimal use is made of all national instruments of statecraft, while also enhancing the ability to conduct comprehensive assessments, analyses, planning, and execution of whole-of-government operations. I understand a 3D (Development, Diplomacy, and Defense) planning group is underway as one method of reviewing and improving interagency planning and coordination efforts. Robust civilian capabilities are critical to realizing any improvements in interagency efforts and implementation of best practices for future operations.

Should these informal and ad hoc arrangements be made more formal (i.e. through legislation, DOD Directives or Instructions, etc...) or is their ad hoc nature the reason for their success?

I note that DoD policy states that “integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of stability operations.” The same policy states that the Department shall support, collaborate with, and assist other U.S. Government departments and agencies to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations. Although I have not studied this issue in detail, I believe we should build on the working relationships developed as a result of experience in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to improve interagency cooperation, interoperability, and unity of effort. If confirmed, I will be open to the advice of others on this issue.

Treatment of Detainees –

Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

In your view, is the prohibition in the best interest of the U.S.? Why or why not?

Yes, this prohibition helps to ensure that individuals in the custody of U.S. forces are treated humanely consistent with the applicable U.S. laws and the laws governing armed conflicts. To treat individuals in our custody otherwise could increase the chances that U.S. service members will be treated inhumanely should they be captured by enemy forces.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes.

Section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and inhuman treatment.

Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that our special operations forces comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all U.S. special operations forces continue to receive the necessary education and training in the standards established in the Army Field Manual, relevant DoD Directives, and other applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations.

What steps, if any, would you take to ensure that those foreign forces *trained* by our special operations forces understand the necessity of complying with the Geneva Conventions when detaining and interrogating individuals?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that our special operations forces continue to stress in our training operations with foreign forces the importance of complying with the Geneva Conventions when detaining and interrogating individuals.

Special Operations Personnel in Embassies –

USSOCOM deploys personnel to work with country teams in a number of priority countries where the U.S. is not engaged in direct action operations, but rather trying to counter the spread of violent extremism. Their mission is to support the priorities of the Ambassador and the combatant commander's theater campaign plan against terrorist networks. At times, Ambassadors have expressed concern that they have not been adequately informed of activities by special operations forces in their country.

Are you aware of these concerns?

Yes. However, no significant concerns have been raised in recent years that I am aware of.

If confirmed, what do you intend to do to make sure the goals of special operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned closely with those of the Ambassadors they are working with?

Please describe the value of these special operations personnel to their respective Geographic Combatant Commands and the country teams they are supporting.

The partnership among our Geographic Combatant Commanders, Ambassadors overseas, Embassy country teams, and forward deployed special operations forces has been strong throughout the past 10 years, even in view of the few isolated incidents where coordination could have been better. If confirmed, a priority of mine will be to continue working with Admiral McRaven, the Geographic Combatant Commanders, and State Department colleagues to strengthen these trusted partnerships further.

DOD Counternarcotics Activities

The DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing toward the U.S. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1.5 billion to support the Department's CN operations, including to build the capacity of Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, and certain foreign governments, and provide intelligence support on CN-related matters and a variety of other unique enabling capabilities.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of the DOD in U.S. counterdrug efforts?

In my view, DoD should continue to play an important role in U.S. counterdrug efforts in support of the National Security Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. In addition to being the statutory lead agency for the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking bound for the United States, DoD provides critical counterdrug support to supporting State, local, Federal, and foreign law enforcement partners. The enemies America faces on the battlefield today are increasingly financed through non-traditional means, including through drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. Just as DoD has long been focused on how traditional, State-funded adversaries are supported, the U.S. must use all of the tools at its disposal to attack the sources of revenue that support the asymmetrical threat the U.S. faces today and is likely to face for the foreseeable future. Transnational organized crime contributes to global instability by undermining legitimate government institutions, fostering corruption, and distorting legitimate economic activity. DoD's efforts to build the counternarcotics capacity of partner nation security forces serve to prevent and deter broader conflicts that could require a much more costly military intervention in the future.

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?

I have not yet had the opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the CN program. Based on my past experience, however, I fully recognize the importance of DoD counterdrug activities, including as the statutory lead agency for aerial and maritime detection and monitoring of drugs bound for the United States, DoD's activities in support of the warfighter in Afghanistan, and other areas of national security interest such as Mexico and Colombia. I also believe that DoD CN authorities are extremely useful tools that fit well into the current construct of the ASD for SO/LIC. If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that these activities are given their appropriate level of attention and oversight, and to ensure that they are as cost-effective as possible.

What is your assessment of the ongoing efforts of the U.S. to reduce the amount of illegal narcotics entering into the U.S.?

As outlined in the National Drug Control Strategy, the counterdrug efforts of the United States and partner nations have achieved major and sustained progress against cocaine use and distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere. These efforts have had an impact on both the demand and supply side of the cocaine threat as evidenced by declining border seizures, increased street price, falling cocaine retail purity, and sharply decreased domestic cocaine consumption. The Department of Defense support, such as the establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force – South and support to Plan Colombia, has played a critical role in this whole-of-government effort by bringing unique military capabilities and expertise to enhance the capability of our law enforcement partners.

In your view, what should be the role of the U.S. in countering the flow of narcotics to nations other than the U.S.?

Confronting the threat of drugs bound for the United States should continue to be a high priority, but we cannot afford to turn a blind eye to drug trafficking that is not directly bound for the United States. Drug trafficking is by far the world's most lucrative illicit activity and therefore is used as a source of revenue by terrorists, insurgents, and other threats to national security. The vast illicit proceeds of drug trafficking can also contribute to instability in affected countries, particularly in smaller, more vulnerable countries along key transit routes as we are seeing today in Central America and West Africa. The national security implications of drug trafficking necessitate our close attention – even when the drugs are not bound directly for the United States.

Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. One of the priority action areas designating in the strategy is “enhancing Department of Defense support to U.S. law enforcement.”

What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat transnational criminal organizations?

The President's strategy declares that transnational organized crime is a threat to national and international security. It calls on the U.S. Government to build, balance, and integrate the tools of national power to combat transnational organized crime and related threats to national security. The strategy calls for integrated, whole-of-government approaches to transnational organized crime. Importantly, the President's strategy addresses drug trafficking and transnational organized crime as increasingly intertwined threats. The fact that transnational organized crime poses a national security threat beyond that of illegal narcotics and requires integrated interagency responses means that DoD must ensure that it is organized, resourced, and appropriately authorized to provide vital support to law enforcement and foreign partners against transnational organized crime. DoD is not in the lead against transnational organized crime, but it provides

unique and critically important support in efforts to combat the manifestations of transnational organized crime that threaten national security.

What kind of additional support, if any, would you envision DOD providing to U.S. law enforcement – either in the U.S. or in support of U.S. law enforcement operations abroad?

It is important that DoD's unique supporting capabilities – from military intelligence support to counter-threat finance support – be available to support U.S. law enforcement at home and abroad. If confirmed, I will examine whether additional forms of such support are needed.

The DOD and the Intelligence Community have determined that some terrorist organizations are beginning to rely more heavily on producing and trafficking narcotics to fund their operations.

In your view, what role, if any, should DOD have in broader U.S. Government efforts to combat the nexus between narcotics and terrorism? Should DOD be the lead agency?

DoD should continue to provide a range of support to law enforcement, the broader interagency, and foreign partner nations as part of integrated efforts to combat the narcotics-terrorism nexus. Support includes military intelligence support to law enforcement, counter threat finance support, military-to-military capability development, and operational activities against threats to the United States.

DoD should not assume the role of lead agency in combating the drug-terror nexus. In some cases, DoD might be the operational lead in actions to degrade a specific threat related to the narcotics-terrorism nexus, but, in general, the Department should focus on remaining ready to deploy our unique capabilities as part of coordinated U.S. government approaches against this nexus. It is also important to note that the nexus is broader than just drugs and terrorism - it often manifests as a crime-terror-insurgent nexus, in which a range of illicit activities undertaken by networks of criminals merge with, or are exploited by, violent, politically-motivated groups.

Counter Threat Finance

A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence Community have called for investing additional resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance activities?

Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to support their activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. In my view, it is critical to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of

money associated with these organizations. It is my understanding that DoD has a capability, working with its interagency counterparts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, to identify and disrupt our adversaries' finances. Although DoD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter-threat finance, it plays a supportive role by working with other departments and agencies, and with partner nations, to fight our adversaries' ability to use global financial networks.

What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of USSOCOM in supporting counter threat finance activities?

I believe USSOCOM plays a critical role in the field of counter-threat finance, and should continue to pursue activities, as appropriate, with interagency partners in identifying and disrupting threat-finance networks. This involves synchronizing DoD counter-threat finance activities and integrating them into broader counter-network planning and operations.

In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities (such as Department of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation)?

I believe that DoD should increase its cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Department of the Treasury, the intelligence community, and Department of State to target and degrade our adversaries' funding sources where necessary and possible. DoD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy provides that DoD should work with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and with partner nations to deny and disrupt, or defeat and degrade, adversaries' ability to use global licit and illicit financial networks to affect U.S. interests negatively. Greater cooperation would yield an enhanced ability to target our adversaries' vulnerabilities using a whole-of-government approach, including interdiction, sanctions, and other law enforcement actions.

Countering Violent Extremism –

Over the past few years, the DOD has funded a growing number of Military Information Support Operations and influence programs under the rubric of strategic communications programs. While the Department does not have any separate documentation outlining these activities, the Government Accountability Office reports that DOD "spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year" to support these operations, including initiatives funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, the geographic combatant commands, and USSOCOM.

What are your views on DOD's strategic communications, Military Information Support Operations and other influence programs, and their integration into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?

Operating in an information environment is a critical component of military operations. DoD's information and influence activities support military objectives established by Combatant Commanders, which in turn support the National Military Strategy. U.S. military objectives, by design, support U.S. foreign policy objectives. Recent changes to how DoD oversees, organizes, and employs Information Operations have resulted in significant improvements in the management and accountability of these activities. DoD recognizes the challenges of evaluating the effectiveness of these operations in the short-term and has placed an emphasis on better evaluating these activities.

In 2005, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that "We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the battlefield of the media." Many observers have criticized the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment violence.

As ASD (SO/LIC), how would you seek to further DOD's strategic appreciation of the ideological basis of al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other non-state actors?

DoD's global presence means our forces often come face-to-face with radical ideologies and the violence propagated by Islamist extremists. Therefore, DoD personnel are in an ideal position to contribute to U.S. government efforts to counter the extremist messages. DoD seeks to reduce support for al-Qa'ida, its affiliates, and adherents by engaging foreign local populations, countering adversarial propaganda, and developing relationships with key leaders and credible local interlocutors across the globe.

In your view, how do we counter radical ideologies that foment violence?

In my view, the efforts of the U.S. government to counter radical ideologies that foment violence must be persistent and long-term, and should be developed in a way that will shape and support collaborative regional security initiatives. DoD participates in, and often provides support to, several interagency efforts to counter violent extremism. DoD works closely with State, CIA, NCTC, and others, to deconflict operations and realize efficiencies.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided the DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations.

In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

DoD's primary objective in building the capacity of foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for

their countries' internal security, and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn, mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States and promotes interoperability between U.S. and partner forces.

In light of demands for defense budget cuts, how would you assess the trade-offs between providing funding for U.S. military forces and providing assistance to build the capacity of partner nations' security forces?

The energy and resources devoted to building partner capacity contribute directly to country, regional, and global security and better enable our partners to provide for their own security needs. Even modest military and security capabilities may prevent or help manage conflict so that the United States and its Allies and partners are not called to intervene in a much larger conflagration at great cost to the United States and U.S. forces. Cooperation through security capacity-building efforts ensures a relationship and interoperability with ready partners able to participate competently in coalition or collaborative operations. Building partner capacity in like-minded partners will mean less demand on U.S. forces to lead military operations, enabling the United States instead to work with and through our partners to meet common security challenges.

What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 train and equip authority? What is your assessment of the implementation of the global train and equip program?

This authority has two discrete purposes outlined in law: to build a partner's national military or maritime security forces' capacity either to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations or (2) conduct or support stability operations where US forces are participating.

I have not been involved in the implementation of Section 1206, but I understand the Department has begun an in-depth assessment of the effectiveness of Section 1206 programs. If confirmed, I will ensure the authority is used in keeping with the intent of the authority and that it produces the intended security outcomes. I will also look forward to sharing the results of the on-going assessment effort with the Congress, and specifically this Committee. As I understand it, Section 1206 to date has enthusiastic support from Embassies and Combatant Commanders, and reflects close collaboration between the Department of State and the Pentagon.

What is the relationship of the train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics assistance, foreign military financing, and other Title 22 authorities? What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?

It is critical that duplication of effort among these activities be avoided. If confirmed, I will do everything I can to de-conflict among them.

The Global Train and Equip (“Section 1206”) authority fills two specific legal requirements: to build capacity for counter-terrorism operations and stability operations where U.S. forces are a participant. Counternarcotics authorities are focused on providing DoD the ability to support U.S. or other government efforts to counter the flow of narcotics globally. If confirmed, both Section 1206 and counternarcotics authorities will be under my purview, and I will monitor their implementation to ensure they continue to be used appropriately, and in keeping with their intent.

Foreign Military Financing serves broad foreign policy objectives such as improving bilateral relations, encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest, increasing access and influence, and building capacity particularly where host-nation and U.S. interests align. As I understand it, the close collaboration between DoD and the State Department on the development, selection, and approval of Section 1206 program ensures we make the best use of available authorities.

Counter-Piracy Operations

Since January 2009, the U.S. Navy has been patrolling the waters of the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as part of the international coalition engaged in counter-piracy operations. The Office of ASD (SO/LIC) leads the Department’s policy and coordination efforts relating to counter piracy operations.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Department’s ongoing counter piracy and counter piracy support operations?

I understand that U.S. naval forces participate in Combined Task Force 151, a multinational counter-piracy task force established in January 2009, and in NATO’s operation OCEAN SHIELD. On average, there are three to four U.S. Navy ships supporting both of these task forces on a daily basis. Since 2008, DoD has provided surface combatants (including helicopters and boarding teams), replenishment ships, P-3C maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, communications support, and command staff in support of counter-piracy operations.

Somali pirate operations have become more lucrative over the last three years, demonstrating success as a business model. Despite the expansion of the piracy enterprise, there is still an overwhelming lack of judicial capacity in the region.

The U.S. Government has focused on encouraging the use of Best Management Practices (BMPs) and Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) in its outreach to industry, which DoD strongly supports. To date, ships that employ BMPs and armed security have a 100 percent success rate in countering pirate attacks, strategically diminishing the pirates’ success rate.

What do you believe to be the appropriate role of DOD in countering the threat posed by piracy?

I believe that DoD should continue to support the National Security Council's "Action Plan" for countering piracy off the Horn of Africa by interrupting and terminating acts of piracy. Furthermore, DoD should continue to remain engaged with the international "Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia" on numerous initiatives related to military operations, industry outreach, public diplomacy, legal issues, and supporting the Departments of State and Treasury in their efforts to make piracy less lucrative.

Countering piracy in the region must be a shared responsibility with the maritime shipping industry – the first line of defense against pirates. The single most effective way to deter piracy is to ensure vessels follow BMPs and employ armed security personnel.

The root causes of Somali piracy lie in the poverty and instability of Somalia. I believe that the solution to piracy does not lie in committing additional naval forces. Rather, addressing the problem depends on progress in restoring Somalia from a failed State to a functioning one.

Some have argued for kinetic operations against the network of pirates that operate in Somalia. Others argue that the threat of piracy is primarily a law enforcement issue and should be dealt with by civilian agencies.

What is your assessment of these two views and what do you believe to be the most effective approach?

I have also heard about both proposals. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about these proposals, and would weigh the implications before deciding what I believe would be the most effective approach.

Crush the Cell

In 2008, you published a book called "*Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism without Terrorizing Ourselves.*"

In your book, you state that U.S. counterterror policy should focus on "strategic terrorism" which you define as "the capability to sustain multiple conventional attacks over time, or develop and deploy a single catastrophic attack with a weapon of mass destruction."

In your view, what terrorist organizations are strategic terrorists?

I would define al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents as a strategic terrorist organization.

Do you believe the National Counterterrorism Strategy is appropriately focused on only those organizations that pose a "strategic terrorist" threat to the U.S. and our interests?

I believe the National Strategy for Counterterrorism is appropriately focused on the preeminent security threat to the United States – namely al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents. The Strategy also rightly ensures we remain committed to working vigorously and effectively to counter the efforts and activities of other foreign and domestic terrorists, even as we are careful to avoid conflating them with al-Qa’ida into a single enemy.

Your book is critical of Congress for creating the National Counterterrorism Center, Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence following 9/11. You state, “I’m convinced we could have fought this war with no budget increase, just a shifting of funds to counterterrorism and a new focus on the problem.”

Do you still hold these views today? Why or why not?

I was not in favor of creating new Federal bureaucracies after 9-11. However, at this point, I would not reverse course.

In terms of budget, I have long believed that the Federal government should find off-sets for new, higher-priority missions whenever possible.

Your book includes a discussion of the effectiveness of U.S. military and intelligence personnel partnering with host nation personnel to conduct counterterrorism operations. You state, “By working closely with foreign units, we may be able to reduce human rights violations associated with these operations. But if we want to get things done, sometimes we *must* work in conjunction with tough organizations with spotty human rights records.”

Do you still hold these views today? Why or why not?

When I was in the Federal government, we were restricted from working with some key agencies in the Middle East and other parts of the world. I believe this was short-sighted, as working with them exposes them to operational tactics that are both more effective and based on protecting civilians. It is still true that many foreign police and intelligence agencies do not uphold the highest standards of human rights, but I believe we should engage both to improve their record and be effective in fighting terrorists -- the two goals can and should be compatible. Of course, such engagement is currently restricted by law in many circumstances, and I would take care to oversee compliance with applicable law in contemplating any such engagement.

Your book expresses concern about the risk averse nature of senior commanders, bureaucratic decision making, and separation of intelligence and operational functions as they relate to U.S. counterterrorism operations. To help solve these issues, you recommend that a single organization, either DOD or CIA, be assigned responsibility for “special operations” to combat terrorism. This recommendation echoes one made by the 9/11

Commission that lead responsibility for all clandestine and covert paramilitary operations be assigned to DOD.

Do you still hold these views today? Why or why not?

I wrote this five years ago, and much has changed. If confirmed, I will have the opportunity to evaluate our current decision-making process closely. I am open-minded and not sure I still hold those views.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes, if confirmed, I will appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress when called upon to do so.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD (SO/LIC)?

Yes, if confirmed, I will provide this Committee or members of this Committee accurate and appropriate information to the best of my ability when called upon to do so.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the necessary information to this Committee and other appropriate Committees and their staff when asked to do so.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the Committee the necessary documents when appropriate and will consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing documents.