

Advance Policy Questions for Mark W. Lippert
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian & Pacific Security Affairs

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

I do not see a need for modification of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions at this time. The Act has served the Department and our nation well, fostering the spirit of a joint force that has enhanced the Department's capabilities to respond to critical security demands, such as in Operation Enduring Freedom. If confirmed, I will continue to consider this issue, and I will make proposals for modifications if and when required.

Duties

Department of Defense Directive 5111.17 assigns the responsibilities, functions, relationships and authorities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (ASD (APSA)). The directive establishes ASD (APSA) as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on various matters relating to the Asian and Pacific regions, their governments, and defense establishments.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD (APSA)? Will they differ in any way from those described in DOD Directive 5111.17?

The ASD(APSA) is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DoD interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of the Asian and Pacific regions, their governments, and defense establishments and for oversight of security cooperation programs, including Foreign Military Sales, in these regions. The ASD (APSA) is also responsible for developing regional security and defense strategy and policy, as well as for overseeing the implementation and coordination with appropriate DoD officials of such policies and strategies.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

My experience on Capitol Hill, at the National Security Staff, and in the military have provided me with a unique skill set and the relationships that will allow me to be effective at managing a large issue portfolio and staff.

As the Chief of Staff to the National Security Staff, my duties often required me to work at senior levels of the U.S. Government on a number of issues related to the East and -South Asia region. In this capacity, I collaborated closely with key U.S. officials (such as NSS Senior Directors and officials of various agencies) on a range of policy matters, participated in bilateral and multilateral meetings, and coordinated foreign travel conducted by the President. I also performed similar functions with respect to the Obama-Biden Transition Project. During my tenure in these positions, I was responsible for helping to manage complex organizations with large numbers of employees and/or volunteers.

As a staff member of the U.S. Senate, I held three different positions over the course of a decade, each of which required me to engage on East Asia and Pacific Rim issues. As foreign policy advisor to then-Senator Obama, I handled all of the Asia-related work for the Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee, including spearheading early efforts to combat avian flu in Asia. As a Professional Staff Member on the State-Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, I dealt frequently and extensively with East Asia-Pacific issues especially related to U.S. bilateral and multilateral assistance programs and associated legislation. As an aide to Senator Daschle (Democratic Policy Committee), I worked on issues such as the accession of China to the World Trade Organization.

During my time in the military, I deployed in support of Joint Task Force operations in Afghanistan. I helped to manage a number of intelligence professionals spread out over a large forward deployed area, facilitating timely intelligence support for multiple direct action operations. I was selected to lead multiple, post-operation mitigation efforts with senior Afghans and coalition military and political leaders. As a reservist at the Office of Naval Intelligence, I was selected to work on highly-specialized projects concerning a key nation in East Asia.

As for my education, I was awarded an M.A. in International Policy Studies from Stanford University. My coursework included a Stanford University-Beijing University study abroad program which focused on Mandarin language training (as well as continued Chinese language studies upon return to the United States).

Relationships

If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
Commander, U.S. Central Command
Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
Other Combatant Commanders
The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC
Commander, U.S. Forces Korea

If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I expect to develop and maintain a close working relationship with under secretaries and assistant secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and as appropriate, the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea. If confirmed, I would also work closely with and coordinate with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within OSD Policy. Examples of this coordination include working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on the role of NATO in Afghanistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict on counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and security assistance matters; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in Asia; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for a Global Strategic Affairs to implement the Proliferation Security Initiative in the Asian and Pacific regions.

Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next ASD (APSA)?

I think the Administration has rightly acknowledged that Asia is increasingly critical to U.S. prosperity and security interests. This is evident from the Administration's steadfast commitment to defeating al-Qa'ida and countering violent extremism in South and Central Asia and efforts to enhance U.S. relationships across the Asia-Pacific region. At the broadest level, I believe the most significant challenge for the entire Department of Defense is managing a changing global security environment in an era of budget austerity. As Secretary Panetta has noted, the Department faces hard, but manageable, choices in order to maintain a globally engaged force amidst domestic fiscal constraints.

In Afghanistan, I note undeniable progress on the security front – particularly in the core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al-Qa’ida. U.S. forces along with Afghan and coalition partners are degrading the insurgency, building up the Afghan security forces, and continuing to transition key areas of the country to Afghan lead for security. Pakistan continues to remain a critical part of the fight against al-Qa’ida, and despite the many challenges in this relationship, I believe we need to continue to work closely with Pakistan to combat the extremists that threaten U.S. and regional security and stability.

In the Asia-Pacific region, I think the Administration has rightly focused on the need to support key norms and principles that benefit all nations. China’s military buildup continues to pose anti-access/area-denial challenges and shift the cross-Strait balance in the mainland’s favor. It remains important to encourage greater transparency from China about how it will use its growing capabilities.

It is also vital to modernize and enhance U.S. regional security Alliances, including efforts to enhance defense posture in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, I think it will be essential to continue the Administration's strong efforts to address the increase in non-traditional threats beyond violent extremism, such as the proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies, competition for scarce resources, and devastating natural disasters. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to address these issues.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

I believe the Administration has done a good job of putting in place the right strategies and plans to address the challenges facing the next ASD(APSA). These issues, and the plans associated with them, are always evolving. If confirmed, I would work closely with others in the Department, the interagency, Congress, and our international Allies and partners to adapt and shape these strategies for the future. I would analyze current strategies, review the results of the recent strategy reviews, and participate in on-going policy reviews as deemed necessary. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating closely with the Committee on the range of challenges and opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region.

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD (APSA)?

Strategies for dealing with the set of challenges facing the ASD (APSA) are largely in place in DoD and in other departments and agencies within the U.S. government, and are reflected in agreements with our Allies and partners in the region. If confirmed, I see the challenge as principally one of careful, sustained execution of these strategies. However, if confirmed, I will be carefully evaluating current strategies to determine if a reordering of priorities, applicable to ASD (APSA), is in order. Overall, the key priorities are to continue to make progress against al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan; to broaden and deepen existing Alliances, while developing our ties to new Allies and partners; to work on a constructive relationship with China; to enhance the development of action-oriented regional organizations that can tackle

shared challenges; and to ensure that the U.S. military is postured to protect and advance American interests in this critical region

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the priority will remain to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qa'ida and affiliates, and to prevent their return to either country, while increasing the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan Government so they can assume the lead for Afghanistan's security by the end of 2014. If confirmed, I will work first and foremost to ensure the U.S. military stays on track and has the guidance and tools required to succeed in these missions.

With regard to China, it is my understanding that the Department of Defense seeks a healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relationship with China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), in support of President Obama and PRC President Hu's vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive bilateral relationship. Strengthening the military-to-military relationship serves a critical role in shaping China's choices, as does the continued adaptation of U.S. forces, posture, and operational concepts to ensure a stable and secure environment.

U.S. regional security Alliances remain vital, and central to the larger regional strategy. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to continue to broaden and deepen the U.S. defense and security agenda with Allies and partners, expanding areas of cooperation even while reinforcing traditional missions of deterrence and reassurance. Finally, if confirmed, I will work to support the Department's effort to maintain and enhance defense posture and capabilities across the Asia-Pacific region.

Engagement Policy

One of the central pillars of our national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, joint combined exchange training exercises, combatant commander exercises, humanitarian assistance operations, and similar activities are used to achieve this goal.

If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military? If yes, would you advocate for expanding U.S. military-to-military engagement? If not, why not?

If confirmed, I will support continued U.S. military-to-military engagement with nations in Asia. I believe the current and emerging security environment will require robust engagement with the militaries of our Allies and partners around the world, and building productive relationships with many States in which our past military-to-military engagements have been limited or absent entirely.

Do you believe that these activities contribute to U.S. national security?

Yes.

Stability Operations

Experience in Iraq has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability operations in post-conflict situations.

In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DOD and other departments of government in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?

DoD has played and will continue to play an important role supporting other key U.S. departments and agencies in stability and support operations post-conflict.

What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq?

Operations in Iraq demonstrate that long-term success requires a robust capacity for integrated civil-military action and substantially more resources to support the expeditionary capacity of other key departments and agencies. Long-term success will also require close cooperation between DoD and other U.S. Government departments in planning, preparing for and conducting stability and support operations, both in terms of DoD participation in whole-of-government efforts and for interagency participation in the review of military campaign and contingency planning. The U.S. military must plan and train with civilian counterparts, be prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict, and develop better awareness of political, cultural, and economic factors to ensure that our actions will meet our objectives.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”).

In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations in the Asia and Pacific region?

The United States’ primary objective in building the capacity of foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries’ internal security, and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn, mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States and promotes interoperability between our forces.

What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 global train and equip authority?

As I understand it, this authority has two discrete purposes outlined in law: to build a partner’s national military or maritime security forces’ capacity either to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations or (2) conduct or support stability operations where U.S. forces are participating.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for an expansion of the Government's resources devoted to instruments of non-military "soft power" – civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance.

In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis other civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft power?

In my view, the Department's role should generally be to support, not lead, in the exercise of "soft power."

Afghanistan Policy

Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?

Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set forth, and I believe it is the right strategy. A focused counterinsurgency campaign will allow us to help the Afghans build security forces and government capacity capable of providing the security and basic services necessary to achieve a peaceful, stable Afghanistan that does not again become a safe haven for terrorists.

If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an increase in counter-terrorism action in Afghanistan?

I believe the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. The Administration tracks metrics on progress toward its objectives in Afghanistan throughout the year, and constantly assesses and adjusts its implementation of the overall strategy. Counter-terrorism is a significant part of the counterinsurgency strategy, and managing the balance of all aspects of the strategy is an ongoing process.

Do you support the President's decision to withdraw the 33,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan, with 10,000 troops to be withdrawn by the end of this year and the remaining 23,000 troops to return by next summer?

Yes. I support a responsible, conditions-based drawdown as called for by the President. I believe we have made the progress necessary to allow us to begin to bring home U.S. surge forces.

Afghanistan Transition

At the NATO Summit in Lisbon last November, the participants in the International Security Assistance Force endorsed President Karzai's goal of the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) having the primary responsibility for providing security throughout Afghanistan by 2014.

Do you support the goal of transitioning responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces by 2014?

Yes. As I understand it, the transition to Afghan security lead in the first tranche of provinces and municipalities has progressed smoothly and without any significant increase of enemy-initiated attacks in those areas. The Administration's transition strategy, as adopted at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, is to complete security transition nationwide by the end of 2014.

In your view, how important is it to the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan that the transition of primary responsibility to the Afghan security forces for providing security throughout Afghanistan be completed by 2014?

In my view, the current goal of completing transition by the end of 2014—as proposed by President Karzai and confirmed by our Allies and partners at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit—is important to our effort in Afghanistan. A key element of U.S. strategy is building an increasingly capable and professional Afghanistan National Security Force (ANSF) that can protect its citizens. To that end, my understanding is that the Administration is focused on increasing the size, quality and performance of the ANSF to ensure the successful transition of security lead to Afghan control.

With an increasingly capable ANSF, the Afghan Government has been able to begin the process of transitioning areas to Afghan security lead—a process that began in July 2011 and will continue through 2014. As a result, about 25 percent of the Afghan population now lives in areas where the ANSF have lead security responsibility. The Afghan Government will soon announce a second set of areas to begin the transition process, and will likely include locations where approximately 50 percent of Afghans live.

In your view, what are the main challenges to the success of the transition to an Afghan lead for security throughout the country by 2014?

Safe havens for insurgents in Pakistan, and Afghan capacity in the governance and development areas, remain the most challenging aspects of transition. The limited capacity of the Afghan Government to manage development programs and fill government positions at the national and sub-national levels hinders the ability to assume leadership on these lines of operation. Efforts in these areas must underpin the success of the security transition in order to achieve durable stability in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan National Security Forces

According to a recent DoD report, the NATO training mission has met its target end strength of 305,000 ANSF by October of this year. The Afghan Government has approved a new ANSF target end strength of 352,000 by 2012 comprised of 171,600 Afghan National Army (ANA) and 134,000 Afghan National Police (ANP).

What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)?

My assessment is that the ANSF, in partnership with U.S. and NATO forces, have made enormous progress in size and quality over the past two years and remain ahead of schedule for their growth targets this year. In addition, both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have made significant gains in effectiveness and professionalism. The establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program has also fostered greater local capability to resist insurgents. However, real challenges remain, such as stemming attrition rates.

What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges?

Some of the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF include poor literacy rates and low education levels in the Afghan population, which constrain the development of operational enablers, including logistics, aviation, medical, and communications capabilities. These capabilities will be necessary for an increasingly self-sufficient ANSF to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has put considerable attention on, and resources toward, the literacy challenge. Another key challenge is the development of strong and capable leaders, which will take time and experience to cultivate. If confirmed, I would work with military and civilian leaders and international partners to explore ways to bolster ANSF capabilities.

Afghan Governance and Development

While improving security for the Afghan people is critical, the success of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan also depends on improving the Government of Afghanistan's capacity to provide governance, better services, and economic development. Significant concerns remain over the performance of the Government of Afghanistan in meeting the needs of the Afghan people and fighting corruption.

What do you see as the role for the Department of Defense in building the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better governance, improve economic development, and fight corruption in Afghanistan?

The role of DoD should be a supporting one. Improving governance and economic development is crucial to our strategy in Afghanistan. Although the Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the lead agencies within the U.S. Government on governance and development initiatives in Afghanistan, DoD contributes to this effort and cooperates closely with DOS and USAID. Coordinating DoD stabilization projects with civilian reconstruction and development efforts ensures that the military and civilian activities work together to support longer-term development objectives, as well as near-term stabilization. If confirmed, I would emphasize continued close coordination of these interconnected civilian and military efforts.

Reconciliation and Reintegration

Under what conditions, if any, should reconciliation talks with the Taliban leadership be pursued? In your view, should negotiations be pursued with the leadership of the Haqqani network? If so, under what conditions?

The President has clearly outlined U.S. support for an Afghan-led process to pursue a political resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan. I support the Afghan Government's efforts to reconcile with groups who agree to cut ties with al-Qa'ida, cease violence, and accept the Afghan Constitution.

I would defer to the Department of State for further discussion of reconciliation issues.

In your view, what role should Pakistan play in any reconciliation talks?

I believe Pakistan should play a constructive role in the effort to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.

What is your understanding and assessment of the current program for reintegrating insurgent fighters willing to lay down their arms? What additional steps, if any, should be taken to improve the reintegration program?

I understand that, since the Afghan Government established the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program last summer, the Afghans—with international community support—have made steady progress in establishing the support structures to implement the program at the national and sub-national levels. The High Peace Council and working-level Joint Secretariat have conducted extensive outreach activities to spread awareness of this new program. There is a steady entry of reintegration candidates (now more than 2,700) into the program, and I believe the program has inspired informal reintegration as well. The international community should continue its support for program implementers and for the Afghan interagency cooperation necessary to reintegrate these former fighters in a timely way.

U.S. Strategic Relationship with Pakistan

In September, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen testified to the Committee that he believed a “flawed and difficult relationship [with Pakistan] is better than no relationship at all.”

Do you agree with Admiral Mullen regarding maintaining a “flawed” relationship with Pakistan? Why or why not?

Our relationship with Pakistan is not always easy, but it is vital to our national security and to our regional interests. The core national security goal remains to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida and its affiliates to ensure that they do not have safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to eliminate their capacity to threaten the United States, our Allies, and interests

abroad. Over the past several years, the United States has made major progress in reducing al-Qa'ida's ability to conduct transnational attacks. As Secretary Panetta has said, "the United States is within reach of strategically defeating Al-Qa'ida" At the same time, there are serious questions about Pakistan's ability to prevent its territory from being used as a safe haven by the Haqqani network and other militant extremists to attack coalition forces in Afghanistan. Therefore, I believe it is essential to continue working with Pakistan to eliminate these safe havens.

The U.S. military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like our overall relationship, has seen good and bad phases. Pakistan has suffered more than 11,000 military personnel killed or wounded and more than 30,000 civilian casualties in recent years from terrorist actions, most recently in the significant attacks following the Osama bin Laden operation. Therefore, the United States has a shared interest with Pakistan in preventing terrorism. As President Obama has said, "We have killed more terrorists on Pakistani soil than anywhere else, and that could not have been done without their cooperation."

What do you believe are the United States' key strategic interests with regard to Pakistan?

I believe the United States' interests in the region and in Asia more broadly require a stable and constructive relationship with Pakistan. The fact that Pakistan is a nuclear state that faces internal threats from extremist organizations adds to the importance of a continued relationship with Pakistan. Preventing, if possible, a potential Pakistan-India conflict is another important strategic interest. It is in the United States' interest for Pakistan to have a strong, civilian-led government and an open society, to live in peace and security with its neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets remain secure, in accordance with international standards.

If confirmed, I will continue to support the Department of Defense's efforts in coordination with our interagency partners for a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan, aimed at advancing shared national security objectives.

The Haqqani Network

A number of recent deadly attacks on Afghan, U.S., and other coalition forces in Afghanistan have allegedly been linked to the Haqqani network operating from safe havens across Afghanistan's border with Pakistan. The Pakistan intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), appears to provide support to the Haqqani network, which then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen has called a "veritable arm" of the Pakistani ISI.

What is your understanding of the rules of engagement for U.S. troops in Afghanistan who are subjected to cross-border attacks from Haqqani or other insurgent forces on the Pakistan side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border?

My understanding is that U.S. forces in Afghanistan are authorized to act in self-defense when they are under attack. I understand that ISAF and USCENTCOM are working with the Pakistanis to improve cross-border coordination.

Do you agree that it is essential, if U.S.-Pakistan relations are ever to be normalized, that Pakistan eliminate its support for the Haqqani network and denounce the cross-border attacks conducted by the Haqqanis and other insurgents against Afghan and coalition forces in Afghanistan? Why or why not?

The ability of violent extremist groups to find support and safe haven in Pakistan poses a significant threat to U.S. forces, the NATO mission, and the long term stability of Afghanistan. Attacks against U.S. and coalition personnel are unacceptable. It is Pakistan's responsibility to prevent attacks from its territory on others, including Afghanistan and our forces there. If Pakistan does not address these threats, the United States will have to consider a range of options, but it is best when we have Pakistan's cooperation. Pakistan has legitimate concerns that should be understood and addressed by the Afghan Government in any process to bring about a stable and durable political solution in Afghanistan. But Pakistan also has responsibilities of its own, including taking decisive steps to ensure that the Afghan Taliban and affiliated organizations cannot continue to conduct the insurgency from Pakistani territory. Increased action is particularly critical with groups such as the Haqqani network, who continue to maintain close ties to Al-Qa'ida and other violent extremist organizations that pose real threats not only to the United States, but also to the people and Government of Pakistan.

Pakistani military leaders cannot pick and choose among militant groups. However, Pakistan remains a critical country in the fight against terrorists. Therefore, I believe we should continue to work closely with Pakistan to act against the extremists that threaten U.S. and Pakistani security, and pursue a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region. As Secretary Clinton stated in her testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 20, working with our Afghan and Pakistani partners is not always easy, but these relationships are advancing U.S. national security interests, and walking away from them would undermine those interests.

Would you support designating the Haqqani network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended? Why or why not?

I would defer to the Secretary of State regarding designation of the Haqqani network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. It is in the interests of both Pakistan and the United States to eliminate terrorists and safe havens. As Secretary Clinton told the Pakistanis, "There will be dire consequences for Pakistan as well as Afghanistan if this threat from the terrorist networks is not contained, at the very least, because there's no way that any government in Islamabad can control these groups."

U.S. Assistance to Pakistan

The United States has provided significant military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing and training and equipment through the Pakistan

Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the United States has provided significant funds (“Coalition Support Funds”) to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom. More recently, the United States has suspended assistance to Pakistan under the PCF and Coalition Support Funds pending greater cooperation from Pakistan.

In your view, under what conditions, if any, would it be in the U.S. strategic interest to resume the provision of PCF assistance and Coalition Support Fund reimbursements to Pakistan?

In my view, the current “train-advise-equip” programs with the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important component in pursuing the objective of improving Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities and improving cross-border coordination. Going forward, it is vital that Pakistan live up to its responsibilities, including to cooperate fully in counterterrorism matters, to expand its counterinsurgency campaign against all extremists and militant groups that have found safe haven inside Pakistan. I understand that in the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid, the Administration asked Pakistan to take a number of concrete steps to demonstrate its continued commitment to a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship. Future provision of security-related assistance will be informed by Pakistan’s response to these requests. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure that the support the United States provides yields the results we seek.

Detainee Treatment Policy

Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes.

If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

Yes.

Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Yes, I believe that DoD should always maintain principled and legal standards for detainee treatment and comply fully with the law, keeping in mind that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts.

Force Posture in the USPACOM AOR

In connection with his recent trip to the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility, Secretary Panetta stated that “the United States remains committed to a robust forward presence in Asia.” Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region are planned over the next several years, including movement of Marines from Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea. There are also discussions about increasing presence in southern parts of the Asia-Pacific, including countries like Australia and Singapore, and developing more comprehensive engagement strategies with a number of other countries in the region. These initiatives will likely compete with other global commitments for increasingly constrained funding.

If confirmed, how would you propose to make the tradeoffs and tough choices necessary to manage risks that might result from a U.S. commitment to a “robust” forward presence in Asia in light of other global commitments and in the face of a shrinking DOD budget?

In keeping with Secretary Panetta’s recent statements I believe it is essential that the United States maintain an enduring military presence that provides a tangible reassurance that the United States is committed to Asia’s security, economic development, and the prosperity essential to the region’s success. It is also important to ensure that the Department maintains a fiscally responsible approach to a defense posture that maximizes U.S. resources. In many cases, it is most efficient to sustain our global posture by forward stationing a portion of our forces closer to where they will be used. Doing so maximizes the capability of our military, giving us “more for less,” and potentially offsetting the impact of necessary force structure cuts.

If confirmed, I would work with my counterparts across the Department and our Commanders in the field to assess the potential global tradeoffs, risks, and budgetary implications associated with any changes in U.S. forward presence in the Asia-Pacific.

In your opinion, what should be the United States’ national security priorities in the Asia-Pacific?

As outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy, the United States must develop a positive security agenda for the region. DoD’s priorities include protecting U.S. territory, citizens, and

Allies; deterring aggression and maintaining regional stability; maintaining free and open access to the maritime, air, and space domains; deterring and defeating violent extremism; and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated materials.

In your view, what strategic criteria, if any, should guide the posture of U.S. military forces in that region to best address those priorities at acceptable risk?

I agree with DoD's assessment that we should establish a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable posture in the Asia-Pacific region.

What, in your view, does "robust" forward presence mean?

In my view, a "robust" forward presence connotes a powerful, capable, military presence -- one that is sufficient for a wide range of contingencies and activities across the range of military operations.

I believe the Department must keep pace with changes in the Asia-Pacific security environment that pose profound challenges to international security, such as the rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state actors, and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

As such, I believe the Department should maintain an enduring military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that provides a tangible reassurance that the United States is committed to Asia's security. To do so, as the Secretary has consistently said, will require that U.S. posture in the region be geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and, of course, politically sustainable.

My understanding is that the Department is seeking to distribute U.S. forces geographically into Southeast Asia, Oceania, and the Indian Ocean region to address the significant security challenges we face across the entirety of the region. This will allow the United States to perform the types of missions our forces are more likely to face in the future -- combating terrorism, responding to natural disasters, and strengthening regional stability. Consulting closely with U.S. Allies and partners, and tailoring defense posture appropriately will allow the United States to respond more effectively to the wide range of challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st Century.

In East Asia, a robust presence is one that continues to support our long-time alliances while also ensuring our force remains operationally resilient in response to any future challenges. The United States must ensure that our regional Allies and partners are confident in the continued strength of our deterrence against the full range of potential threats.

How, if at all, do the methods of forward basing, rotational forces, and agreements with allies for training and logistics activities throughout the region contribute to "robust" forward presence?

From my understanding, DoD views posture as a combination of three elements: forces, footprint, and agreements. Forces are U.S. military, capabilities, equipment, and units assigned and rotationally deployed overseas. Footprint is the term the Department uses to describe the overseas network of infrastructure, facilities, land, and propositioned equipment. Lastly, “agreements” are the series of treaties and access, transit, support, and status protection agreements and arrangements with Allies and partners that set the terms of U.S. military presence within the territory of a host country, as agreed with the host government. In combination, these elements underwrite the Department’s ability to develop a robust forward presence and project military power in support of our national interests.

Some of these elements are more flexible than others, and this fact dictates the ways in which the Department can adapt its current posture to changes, including changes in the security environment, new diplomatic realities, or mounting budgetary pressure. For posture, I believe the whole is greater than the sum of its parts – not only is posture the fundamental enabler of U.S. defense activities overseas, it is also central to defining and communicating U.S. strategic interests to Allies, partners, rivals, and adversaries.

In your view, is the right mix of these forward presence methods necessary to achieve an affordable theater posture at acceptable levels of risk? If so, how would you propose broadly assessing each method relative to its cost and benefit?

Yes. Finding the right mix of forward stationed and rotational forces is one of the U.S.’s toughest challenges; requiring continuous review and assessment with respect to the evolving strategic environment, national interests, regional threats, opportunities, and our operational requirements to respond to crises. The right mix of presence provides the United States affordable regional posture at an acceptable level of military risk.

I believe the Department must ensure defense posture reflects the unique regional and political security dynamics by harmonizing the right combination of relationships and agreements, forward-stationed forces, rotational presence, prepositioned equipment, and basing infrastructure to enable the Department to prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies. This will naturally include the appropriate mix of assigned and rotationally allocated forces in theater in order to meet operational requirements in the most efficient manner.

How important is a forward basing strategy to the ability of USPACOM to execute its day-to-day mission? Its operational contingency plans?

I believe the United States’ forward-basing strategy is critical to enable USPACOM’s execution of both its day-to-day operations as well as operational contingency plans. U.S. forward presence provides unique capabilities that can be flexibly deployed, employed, and sustained in a timely manner across a wide spectrum of operations and contingencies.

What do you see as the implications, if any, of the planned force posture changes in Korea, Japan, and Guam on the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in general? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam

improve U.S. security in the region? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula improve security?

As the Administration considers posture changes in the Asia-Pacific region, my understanding is that we are seeking to build a presence that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. As this effort evolves, I understand that our goal is to sustain the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia, while enhancing it in Southeast Asia. I believe that all of the initiatives underway support these broad objectives.

What is your understanding of the plans for the possible U.S. military presence in Australia and how, in your view, will such a presence advance U.S. security interests?

It is my understanding that in November 2010, the Department established a working group with our Australian counterparts to develop options to align our respective force postures in ways that would benefit the national security of both countries. In September 2011, at the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) meeting in San Francisco, Secretaries Clinton and Panetta discussed a number of options aimed at positioning the military forces of both nations to respond in a timely and effective way to contingencies, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and to enhance their ability to train and exercise together and with regional partners. As I understand it, these options will demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-Australia alliance and the combined resolve to enhance regional stability and security.

In your view, are the levels of funding, manning and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region appropriate to the management of current and future risk to U.S. strategic interests in the region? Do you foresee a requirement to increase or to decrease those funding levels in the coming years?

If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Department of Defense and our military commanders to assess the appropriate levels of funding, personnel, and military-to-military engagement necessary to meet our strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific region.

China

China is viewed by some in the United States as an emerging adversary that poses a potential threat to security in the region, and by others as a constructive international partner that should be welcomed and integrated into the international economic and political community. Others yet believe we are at a crossroads somewhere between those two scenarios.

How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China?

As President Obama stated in January 2011, the United States seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China. I would describe the relationship as cooperative and competitive. The United States continues to pursue opportunities to engage where there is mutual benefit while discussing frankly areas where we may have differences.

To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of the United States and other major regional and international actors will affect the direction in which China develops?

I believe that U.S. policies and actions can influence the direction of China's development. No country has done more to assist, facilitate, and encourage China's national development and integration into the international system than the United States. However, U.S. policy and actions, or the policies and actions of any country or group of countries for that matter, cannot alone determine China's future which, in many ways, will be based upon the choices that China's leaders make. More fundamentally, the United States can also help to shape the environment in which China makes its strategic choices, and in so doing, encourage China to "do the right thing."

What do you see as the impact of current global economic challenges on stability and security in China specifically, and in the Asia-Pacific region generally?

The full impact of the global economic crisis upon China and stability in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly will continue to play out over time. But those who manage defense and security issues must be attentive to the connections between security and economic issues, and be prepared to work together with colleagues in economic and diplomatic fields, both to guard against negative outcomes and also to seek positive ways forward where they may exist.

China's defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of military growth is to be expected for a country experiencing the kind of economic growth that China has had over about that same period, the types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China's intentions in the region.

What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program?

China appears to be building the capability to fight and win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, and to deter or deny effective intervention in a cross-strait conflict. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery. Beijing's growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear forces, and is improving other strategic capabilities, such as in space and counter-space operations and in computer network operations.

How should the United States respond to this Chinese military growth and modernization?

The United States has been and should remain the pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States' response to China's military modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our Alliances and partnerships.

What do you believe are the Chinese political-military goals in the Asia-Pacific region? Globally?

Broadly, the overriding objectives of China's leaders appear to be to ensure the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, continue China's economic development, maintain the country's domestic political stability, defend China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and secure China's status as a great power. Within this context, preventing any moves by Taipei toward de jure independence is a key part of Beijing's strategy. Within each dimension there lies a mix of important challenges and opportunities for the United States that will continue to deserve priority attention.

What effect is China's military growth having on other countries in the region?

In terms of regional security, China's economic growth has increased China's international profile and influence, and has enabled China's leaders to embark upon and sustain a comprehensive transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale of China's military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raise many questions, both within the United States and in the region as a whole, about China's future.

Other countries in the region are closely watching the growth of China's military, and how its military acts. Although on the one hand China has recently deployed its first hospital ship, conducting good-will missions far from its shores, on the other hand, there have been worrisome incidents in disputed waters in China's neighboring seas that have caused concern in nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have contributed to a greater focus on regional forums, such as the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN), where issues may be addressed multilaterally; such security concerns have also led to stronger and more welcoming relations with the United States as a security partner of choice.

How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship between China and Taiwan, and how can we help prevent miscalculation on either side?

Taiwan has made significant strides to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait. These initiatives should be encouraged. I believe the United States can help to prevent miscalculation on either side by continuing to abide by our longstanding policies, based on the three joint U.S.-China Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, including making available to Taiwan "defense

articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Such a continued commitment by the United States will allow Taiwan to continue its outreach to the PRC without fear of coercion.

How do China’s efforts to establish a strategic presence in the Indian Ocean by securing and maintaining access to various seaports in South and Southeast Asian countries affect its political-military posture and influence in the region?

China looks to South and Southeast Asia as an area of strategic importance, which includes political objectives, access to resources, trade, and investment. With regard to South and Southeast Asian sea-ports, the important question is how China intends to use its presence. The United States retains strong relationships in South and Southeast Asia and should continue to monitor China’s growing presence in the region.

What are your views of China’s deployment of warships to counter piracy in the western Indian Ocean and how does this deployment contribute to China’s ability to project power?

Generally speaking, I see China’s participation in counter-piracy operations as a positive development that contributes to addressing a global security challenge and demonstrates China’s ability to use its military in a positive, constructive, and responsible manner. It is more than likely that from this experience China could begin to develop capabilities that would enhance its ability to sustain a deployed force over an extended period of time.

What is the role of DOD in helping to ensure that China’s nuclear power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region?

The Obama Administration has reiterated that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, along with related technologies and materials, is a key goal for the United States. I believe that DoD should work in the interagency process to ensure that any proliferation concerns relating to China, including its nuclear power industry, are expressed to the Chinese Government in appropriate forums, and should similarly support the development of appropriate interagency responses in the event that China takes steps that do contribute to nuclear proliferation.

Our military-to-military relations with the Chinese military can be characterized as modest at best and the Chinese approach to these relations can be accurately described as “on again, off again.” Clearly, one thing that has hobbled U.S.-China military relations has been China’s history of canceling or postponing military-to-military engagements in response to U.S. arm sales to Taiwan.

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

I have long supported a continuous dialogue between the armed forces of the United States and China to expand practical cooperation where our national interests converge and to discuss

candidly those areas where we have disagreement. Such dialogue can be especially important during periods of friction and turbulence.

I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region, and to press China to partner with the United States and our Asian Allies and partners in addressing common security challenges.

Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly work if China is willing to reciprocate with transparent and substantive discussions and engagements. If confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.

What is your view regarding the longstanding U.S. policy of selling defense articles and services to Taiwan despite objections and criticism from China?

U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that the United States will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Act also states that the President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. That policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30 years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I believe our arms sales have been carried out in a responsible manner.

In your view, to what extent, if at all, should China's possible reaction to such sales be considered by the United States when making decisions about the provision of defense articles and services to Taiwan?

None. The United States should not be held hostage to any potential reaction China may have in response to arms sales to Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act provided that the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air and space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in particular is China's increased aggressiveness in asserting its excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea. In one such incident, Chinese-flagged ships harassed the USNS IMPECCABLE, a U.S. military ship conducting ocean surveillance in the international waters of the South China Sea. That incident underscored the nature of Chinese maritime claims and the Chinese sensitivity associated with U.S. Navy operations in these areas.

What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime dispute in the South China Sea?

As Secretary Gates affirmed at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June of this year, and Secretary Clinton affirmed at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in July of this year, the United States is a Pacific nation that has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.

I agree with the assessments of the Departments of State and Defense that the United States should not take a position on the competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea, and I believe all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with customary international law, without resorting to the threat or use of force. The United States should sustain its presence in the South China Sea and uphold its commitments to its Allies and partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region.

How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation?

The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the South China Sea. Although the United States does not take a position on the territorial and maritime disputes, I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain its presence and assert its freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary international law.

If confirmed, I will work with our military commanders to evaluate the appropriate level of naval activities in the South China Sea to maintain regional peace and stability as well as unimpeded access for lawful commerce and economic development.

What should the United States do to help prevent dangerous encounters in the South China Sea?

To reduce the risk of conflict in the South China Sea, I believe the United States should use its position in several regional organizations, including the East Asia Summit the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, to facilitate initiatives and confidence-building measures that will help claimant States reach agreement on a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Additionally, the United States should encourage all claimants to abide by international "rules of the road," such as the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, to ensure greater operational safety and reduce the risk of dangerous incidents at sea.

Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There are reports that

China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential conflict situation.

What is your understanding of China's efforts to develop and deploy cyber warfare capabilities?

It is my understanding that in 2010, numerous computer systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. Government, were the target of intrusions, some of which appear to have originated within the PRC. These intrusions were focused on exfiltrating information. Although this alone is a serious concern, the accesses and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct computer network attacks. I also understand that developing capabilities for cyber warfare is consistent with authoritative People's Liberation Army military writings. Additionally, China's 2010 Defense White Paper noted China's own concern over foreign cyber warfare efforts and highlighted the importance of cyber-security in China's national defense.

If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack?

The United States, like many other nations, has been the target of innumerable malicious activities via cyberspace from hackers, criminals, and unidentified entities, some of which may well be nation states. I understand that numerous steps have been taken to increase network defense and monitoring capabilities. This work continues actively today. The Department of Defense should continue to evaluate all global threats to its networks and work closely with other government agencies, industry, and the international community in order to meet those threats. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, the lead for cyber policy, on these efforts.

In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community. Since then, China has continued its active pursuit of missile and satellite technology.

What is your view of China's purposes for its pursuit of these capabilities?

In my view, this test was just one element of China's military modernization effort to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. The United States' goal should be to promote the responsible use of space.

What do you see as the long term implications of such developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

Space systems are vital to our national security and our economy. In this regard, the United States should seek ways to protect our interests in space. U.S. space policies and programs should be informed by China's space and counterspace capabilities, which have contributed to

today's challenging space environment. I believe we need to enhance our deterrence and ability to operate in a degraded environment. At the same time, the United States should seek to engage China, a major space-faring nation, to promote the responsible use of space. However, our concern should not be focused on only one country, but on the range of actors that make space increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.

What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space and the international agreements to prevent space weaponization?

I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, including that all nations have a right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, and that all nations should act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.

Space is vital to U.S. national security and that of our Allies and partners. I support our long-standing national policies of affirming the right of all nations to use outer space for peaceful purposes, the right of free passage through space, and the right to protect our forces and our nation from those that would use space for hostile purposes.

Taiwan

Much of the recent discourse regarding Taiwan has involved the state of Taiwan's defensive military capabilities and the U.S. commitment to do what is "necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability" as required by the Taiwan Relations Act. In particular, much of the debate about how best to enhance Taiwan's current defensive capabilities has revolved around fighter aircraft and what air defense capabilities are most prudent and appropriate under the circumstances.

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-Taiwan security relations?

In my view, U.S.-Taiwan security relations are excellent and have never been stronger. The Department of Defense engages Taiwan at every level to ensure that it maintains its ability to deter aggression from the China.

What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

I believe our priority should be to assist Taiwan in the implementation of an innovative defense strategy to deter aggression from China. Taiwan cannot compete militarily with China; it must develop a future defense force that is capable of limiting China's ability to coerce Taiwan.

What is your opinion of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)? Enacted 30 years ago this year, do you see any need to modify the TRA to reflect the current state of affairs in the region? If so, how?

I believe the Department of Defense has a special responsibility to monitor China's military developments and to deter aggression and conflict. The Taiwan Relations Act has served our country and the region well and has helped guarantee peace and stability in Northeast Asia for more than 30 years. Consistent with the Act, DoD assists in maintaining the capacity of the

United States to take appropriate actions, as determined by the President and Congress in accordance with U.S. constitutional processes, in response to threats to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan. DoD works closely with its interagency partners to make available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. This is consistent with long-standing policy that has provided a basis for maintaining security and stability across the Taiwan Strait. I believe that the Taiwan Relations Act is a good law that makes for good policy.

Given the increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait, do you think Taiwan is making appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities? If not, what is the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more in its military?

My view is that Taiwan needs to increase its defense budget to three percent of its GDP. The under-resourcing of Taiwan's defense jeopardizes Taiwan's security and sends the wrong signal to Beijing.

I believe that the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more in its military is to send strong and consistent messages from both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government to Taiwan.

What military capabilities do you believe would be most effective in improving Taiwan's self-defense capability over the next 5 to 10 years?

In my view, Taiwan needs to implement a defense strategy that includes asymmetric solutions that undermine the offensive capabilities of the PLA. This strategy requires systems that are survivable. Survivability is enhanced through the implementation and integration of measures that include mobility, redundancy, integration, camouflage, concealment, quantity, deception, decoys, hardening, and joint operations. This defense strategy would not replace traditional military approaches; however, it would ensure that in a crisis Taiwan's defenses would be more effective.

Do you think the United States should sell new F-16 C/D aircraft to Taiwan?

Given the nature of the multi-dimensional threat that Taiwan faces and the need to prioritize and ensure that Taiwan has a full range of self-defense articles and services (as opposed to simply one platform), I believe that Taiwan needs multiple capabilities and methods that will provide Taiwan the means to defend itself. I believe that retrofitting Taiwan's F-16 A/B is a higher priority than assimilating new F-16 C/D airframes into Taiwan's Air Force. The F-16 A/B retrofit would provide Taiwan with a robust aircraft that is nearly equivalent to the F-16 C/D in its capabilities. There are a number of other weapons systems that provide important capabilities at reasonable cost and should be a higher priority than Taiwan purchases F-16 C/Ds.

North Korea

North Korea still represents one of the greatest near term challenges to security and stability in Asia and deterring conflict on the Korean peninsula remains a top U.S. priority.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and of the diplomatic efforts to date to persuade North Korea to comply with international mandates regarding its missile and nuclear programs?

North Korea's provocative behavior, large conventional military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including uranium enrichment, present a serious threat to the United States, our Allies and partners in the region, and the international community. The opaque nature of the North Korean system, coupled with an uncertain political transition, add to our concerns. The two North Korean attacks against South Korea last year provide a sober reminder that Pyongyang is willing to utilize its capabilities to undertake provocative actions. I believe the U.S. must work with its Allies and other key partners in the region and internationally on diplomatic solutions to the range of pressing concerns we face with North Korea. Under the appropriate conditions, diplomatic engagement with North Korea is important as well. The U.S. commitment to its Allies has helped preserve deterrence against North Korea, but deterrence alone will not bring issues of North Korean compliance to a close. Diplomacy too is essential for a lasting resolution to the nuclear, missile, and proliferation threats we face.

What is your understanding of the threat posed to the United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities, and the export of those capabilities?

North Korea's missile and WMD programs pose a direct and serious threat to our regional Allies and partners and have the potential to become a direct threat to U.S. territory. The United States must continue to monitor carefully North Korea's WMD and missile development programs and related proliferation activities. If confirmed, I would ensure that DoD continues to work closely with other parts of the U.S. Government to address these and other emerging threats, reduce our vulnerabilities and those of our Allies and partners, and work cooperatively with our Allies to ensure our contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.

What concerns you most about North Korea?

North Korea maintains a large, offensively postured conventional military; it continues to develop long-range ballistic missiles; it seeks to develop nuclear weapons; and it engages in proliferation of WMD in contravention of international norms and law. What concerns me most is that this range of threats comes from a single actor who stands on the outside of the international community.

Republic of Korea

The long-standing alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region. This relationship, while strong, is undergoing substantial changes in terms of command and control and force laydown over the next several years.

What is your understanding of the current status of the U. S. security relationship with South Korea?

In my view, the U.S.-ROK Alliance remains one of the cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and is as strong and viable today as it has ever been. This was most recently reaffirmed by the Secretary during his travel and participation in the Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul on October 28, 2011. Our security relationship is based on mutual commitment to common interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, and combined planning, ensuring a comprehensive strategic Alliance.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?

As I understand it, DoD and the ROK continue to work closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and to prepare for the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK by December 2015. If confirmed, I would support this continued realignment and the return of facilities that our forces no longer require. The United States is also working toward developing new command and control relationships with Korea, which will ensure that contingency plans remain appropriate to changing circumstances. Additionally, I believe it is important to ensure the U.S. and Korean publics continue to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived from this Alliance, and that the United States work effectively with the ROK as it plays an increasing role in regional and global security issues commensurate with the ROK's economic status and influence. If confirmed, I would work hard to maintain close contact with my ROK counterpart and to build upon the solid foundation developed to date to improve and transform this important security relationship.

What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this transition takes place by the end of 2015?

I understand that the United States and the ROK have a comprehensive way forward to transition wartime operational control by December 2015. If confirmed, I will work with my ROK counterpart to complete this process under the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework, ensuring the transition is implemented methodically and validating that the combined defense posture remains strong and seamless.

How do we ensure that we continue to protect our vital regional interests, while continuing meaningful progress toward the transfer of command and control to the Republic of Korea and the relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula?

I believe regional interests are best protected through our presence in the region, strong Alliances, and further developing mechanisms that enhance our abilities to engage in the region. A good example in Korea is the Secretary's effort to formalize the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue, a senior-level policy consultative channel, as an umbrella framework that encompasses various defense dialogue mechanisms between the ROK and the United States to ensure high-level political oversight and synchronization of Alliance objectives.

Do you support expanding the number of U.S. personnel assigned to the Korean Peninsula for two- or three- year tours of duty and increasing the number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer assignments?

I understand tour normalization in Korea was designed to further our commitment to support our forward-stationed forces and family members. It was to be implemented on an “as affordable” basis and not according to any specific timeline. However, as Secretary Panetta has said, DoD is taking a hard look at everything that costs a lot of money, as this would. If confirmed, I will continue to assess thoroughly the cost of implementation and our proposed force posture to determine the best way forward.

Do you believe that the security relationship with South Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or should U.S. forces stationed in Korea be available for regional or global deployments?

In accordance with the commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the ROK, U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula serves to deter potential aggressors from taking hostile actions that would threaten the peace and security of the Republic of Korea. In my view, this presence has both deterred further war on the Korean Peninsula and contributed to the stability of the Northeast Asia region. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is transforming to ensure a capable and relevant forward presence for the future security environment. For U.S. forces in Korea, it is my understanding that the principles of Force Management decided at the 42nd Security Consultative Meeting in 2010 provide greater flexibility for regional and global deployments. As ROK military forces have served and will continue to serve with the U.S. military in places off the Peninsula (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the Gulf of Aden), I believe the U.S.-ROK Alliance will continue to serve an important role regionally and globally.

What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?

The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces from north of Seoul and from the Seoul Metropolitan area to locations south of Seoul, primarily U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys and Daegu. The movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han River improves force protection and survivability, placing the majority of personnel and equipment outside of the tactical effective range of NK artillery. In addition, the move to a central location outside of Seoul provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to the political sustainability of our forward presence, and improves military readiness on the Korean Peninsula.

Since the North Korean attacks last year – the sinking of the South Korea Navy ship CHEONAN and the artillery attack on the South Korean island – South Korea has been adamant that it will responded “firmly” to the next such provocation. A main topic during recent U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings was reportedly the Joint Operational Plan for responding to future North Korean provocations.

What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe the U.S. armed forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?

My understanding is that, under the Mutual Defense Treaty, when the political independence or security of South Korea or the United States are threatened by external armed attack, the United States and South Korea will consult together and develop appropriate means to deter the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of North Korean provocations, the two sides should continue to consult closely so that responses are effective.

The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report established a policy and program priority for defending against near-term regional ballistic missile threats, and elaborated on the Phased Adaptive Approach to regional missile defense, including to defend against North Korean ballistic missile threats.

Do you support the missile defense policies and priorities established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region to defend against North Korean regional ballistic missile threats?

Yes, I support the missile defense policy priorities established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including the implementation of phased adaptive approaches to regional missile defense that are tailored to the threats in each region and capabilities best suited for deployment. It is my understanding that the Administration is currently developing a phased adaptive approach to missile defense for the Asia-Pacific region that builds on our current missile defense efforts in the region.

There has been some speculation, mainly in the South Korean press, that recent incidents in South Korea, such as allegations of assault by U.S. soldiers on Korean civilians and environmental issues associated with U.S. bases, may cause the ROK to seek to renegotiate some of the terms of the current Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and the ROK.

What is your opinion regarding whether or not the United States should reopen the SOFA to renegotiate any of the terms?

I believe the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) has served the Alliance well since its inception in 1967. The U.S.-ROK SOFA is a "living document" that is constantly reviewed and kept current and fresh through the work of the Joint Committee, the Special Joint Committee, and some 20 subject matter subcommittees that consult frequently with their counterparts across the ROK Government. Although the SOFA has been updated twice through long, difficult negotiations in 1991 and 2001, the Joint Committee process has approved thousands of implementing arrangements that effectively address the way in which the SOFA is implemented.

This process has served both countries well over the years and continues to be the best path to address SOFA related issues.

Japan

How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship?

The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security in East Asia. Japan is a valued Ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in the region. Our Alliance has held fast through the turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and some contentious trade disputes and now stands poised to become a truly global Alliance. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a complicated realignment process that is part of a larger Alliance Transformation agenda that also includes a review of roles, missions, and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability, and cohesiveness of the Alliance for the next several decades. The updated Common Strategic Objectives announced at the Security Consultative Committee in June 2011 highlight the Alliance's ambitious agenda, which I fully support.

How does Japan's relationship with its regional neighbors, mainly China, North Korea and South Korea influence the U.S.-Japan relationship?

I believe it is important for Japan to continue to cultivate constructive relations with all of its neighbors. By moving forward, Japan and other East Asian nations can increase their security cooperation. Working with other U.S. Allies and partners in the region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and prosperity throughout Asia and globally. Japan is a valued and essential partner in the Six-Party Talks process and in other important regional security architectures.

What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

The security environment in Asia is changing and the United States needs a more capable Alliance with Japan to deal with those challenges, including greater interoperability between our armed forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would work to encourage Japan's increasing contributions to the Alliance, both regionally and globally. I would also encourage trilateral security cooperation with the Republic of Korea and with Australia, as these kinds of activities effectively strengthen the functional capacity of the emerging regional security architecture. Cooperation and the development of complementary and mutually reinforcing capabilities should range from missile defense to increased bi-lateral training opportunities – in Guam, for example.

What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense?

Ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan is a success story for the Alliance and has resulted in Japan's fielding of both sea and land-based missile defense systems. Japan is one of our most important ballistic missile defense partners, and U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense plays an important role in supporting our common strategic objectives on defense. The SM-

3 Block IIA is an important cooperative program that will result in a significant increase in ballistic missile defense capability.

Currently, the 2006 Roadmap Agreement between the United States and Japan links the closure of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station on Okinawa and the movement of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam to the plan to build a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab on Okinawa. The plan to build the FRF has run into difficulty and, as a result, the closure of Futenma and the movement of Marines remain uncertain.

What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?

I believe that the Government of Japan (GOJ), like the U.S. Government, remains committed to the 2006 Realignment Roadmap, and although both governments have acknowledged that the Futenma Replacement Facility will not be constructed by 2014, as originally planned, there appears to be positive movement on the construction of a replacement facility at Camp Schwab.

Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?

I believe the cost-arrangement between the United States and Japan as outlined in the May 2006 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) document known as the Realignment Roadmap is equitable and appropriate. For relocations within Japan, the GOJ is paying the lion's share of the costs to develop new facilities. The GOJ also understood the strong desire of Okinawa residents for the relocation of Marine forces from Japan to Guam to occur rapidly and recognized that this move—which it explicitly sought—would not happen without substantial investment on its part. Spending less than one percent of its gross domestic product on its national defense, yet desiring the continued presence of U.S. forces in close proximity, Japan could also clearly justify financial support for U.S. military construction within a U.S. territory on the grounds that it is making a direct contribution to Japanese security and to overall Alliance burden sharing. This decision was not without controversy in Japan, as it is highly unusual—perhaps even unprecedented—for a host country to pay for U.S. forces to relocate out of that country. It will be important for the Department of Defense to work closely with the GOJ on the project scope, management, and other factors to minimize risks to the efforts.

How, in your view, does building an unpopular new airfield on Okinawa, one that could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of at least \$3.6 billion, serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular?

It is my understanding that the relocation to the Futenma Replacement Facility will enable the closing of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma), which is located in a very densely populated portion of Okinawa. I believe both the U.S. and Japanese Governments recognize that retaining the USMC air assets on Okinawa, while moving them to a relatively isolated part of the island, is essential to the operational readiness of the USMC ground units stationed there. Successive

Japanese and U.S. Government officials have examined this problem, and have concluded that the vicinity of Henoko and Camp Schwab is the best place for this capability.

What do you see as the implications, if any, of the planned force posture changes in Korea, Japan, and Guam on the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in general? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam improve U.S. security in the region? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula improve security?

As this Administration considers posture changes in the Asia-Pacific region, my understanding is that we are seeking to build a presence that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. I understand that our goal is to sustain the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia, while enhancing it in Southeast Asia. I believe that all of the initiatives underway, including changes on the Korean Peninsula as well as Okinawa and Guam, support these broad objectives.

India

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security relations?

In my view, a close and continuing security relationship with India will be important for security in Asia and for effectively managing Indian Ocean security in the twenty-first century. The United States and India have a range of common security interests that include maritime security, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Over the past decade, there has been a rapid transformation in the U.S.-India defense relationship. What was once a nascent relationship between unfamiliar nations has now evolved into a strategic partnership between two of the preeminent security powers in Asia. Today, U.S.-India defense ties are strong and growing. Our defense relationship involves a robust slate of dialogues, military exercises, defense trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments cooperation. Efforts over the past ten years have focused on relationship-building and establishing the foundation for a long-term partnership. The strong ties between our two militaries reflect this. It is also my understanding that the United States remains committed to a broad defense trade relationship that enables transfers of some of our most advanced technologies.

If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

If confirmed, I believe our priorities for this relationship should be focused on increasing maritime security cooperation, expanding the military-to-military relationship, and deepening cooperation on defense trade and production. Additionally, I believe there is potential for cooperating on counter-proliferation, collaborating on humanitarian assistance and disaster response, dealing with piracy, cooperating on counter-terrorism, greater intelligence sharing on common threats, and working towards stability in Afghanistan and the broader Indian Ocean region.

What, in your view, is the effect on DOD interests, if any, of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India?

The civil-nuclear cooperation agreement was a landmark agreement that significantly transformed the U.S.-India bilateral relationship. The agreement has also deepened the level of trust between the United States and India that will have positive effects on DoD interests and will hopefully lead to greater military-to-military cooperation and increased defense trade.

What is your assessment of the relationship between India and China and how does that relationship impact the security and stability of the region?

As Asia's two largest powers, India and China collectively will have a significant impact on Asia's future security landscape. Both countries are in the process of building their respective military capabilities. It is important to engage actively with both of these Asian powers to ensure they both contribute in a positive way towards Asian stability and security. Both countries should adhere to international norms and standards in their resolution of outstanding issues.

What do you believe the United States should do to assist the Indian government in the prevention of and response to terrorist events in India?

As the world's largest democracy, I believe that India is a critical strategic partner of the United States. Both India and the United States share an interest in preventing terrorism. Counterterrorism cooperation with India is led by the Departments of State and Homeland Security, with support from the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will work with both Departments to consider carefully all requests for counterterrorism assistance from India.

What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and Pakistan?

In announcing the return to talks in early February, India and Pakistan's Foreign Secretaries agreed that a number of outstanding issues were on the table, including Kashmir, counter-terrorism, humanitarian issues, and trade. It is good to see both nations make progress on these fronts. In early November, Pakistan's cabinet approved extending Most Favored Nation trade status to India. Subsequently, India and Pakistan's Prime Ministers met on the sidelines of the recent South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in the Maldives, where they heralded a "new chapter" in their relationship. I understand there will be talks soon on nuclear and conventional confidence-building measures, which will be critically important. I am pleased that both nations continue to engage with each other, and I am hopeful that confidence building measures are able to take root to promote a greater level of trust between the two countries.

In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?

India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are linked by history, culture, language, trade, and regional stability cannot be achieved without the cooperation of all three countries. It is critically important that Afghanistan work to build positive relationships with all of its neighbors. In my view, the strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan is a bilateral matter between these two countries. It is my understanding that both countries have made clear that their partnership

is not directed at any other countries. This should not be seen as a threat to Pakistan, nor a statement that Pakistan is no longer part of the solution. I believe it is the Administration's view that India and Afghanistan should be transparent with their neighbors, including Pakistan, on the content of their partnership and the activities they carry out under it. I support this position because it has the best chances for stability of Central and South Asia.

Republic of the Philippines

What is your view of the current state of U. S.-Philippine military-to-military relations?

The Philippines is one of five treaty Allies of the United States and is a committed bilateral and regional partner, especially in combating terrorism. The Alliance with the Philippines remains strong, and the Philippines remains important to the United States and to regional stability in general.

What do you believe the U. S. goals should be in the Republic of the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?

I believe U.S. defense goals should be to deny safe haven, sanctuary, and training areas for terrorist groups; and to partner in cooperative regional maritime security programs. These goals are best achieved through U.S. Government security assistance and security cooperation programs.

What is your assessment of recent U. S. military efforts in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U. S. assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against insurgent groups?

In my view, the U.S. military is working effectively with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to provide assistance that is consistent with Philippine Constitutional restrictions on foreign forces. The Philippine Armed Forces continue to professionalize and reform in a manner consistent with U.S. and Philippine defense goals and objectives. They benefit from various security assistance programs, exercises, and engagement opportunities that develop capacity and capability with their military. These efforts have resulted in successful counterterrorism operations against the Abu Sayaf Group and Jemah Ismailiya in the Southern Philippines. Lastly, it is my understanding that our security engagement programs have also resulted in better regional maritime security cooperation.

Do you anticipate a reduced U. S. military footprint or change in mission for U. S. military forces in the Philippines in the near to mid-term?

In my view, it is important to support the Philippine military in its operations in the South. It is my understanding that the Department is monitoring progress and plans to assess whether there needs to be an adjustment in the overall mission. If confirmed, I will work to coordinate these efforts with other departments and agencies with an eye towards a whole-of-government approach.

What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if confirmed, to ensure that U. S. personnel do not become involved in combat or law enforcement in the Republic of the Philippines?

In my view, the established current policy guidelines are clear: the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement guide bilateral policy with the Republic of Philippines. The Philippine Constitution prevents foreign forces from conducting combat operations in the Philippines. Deployed U.S forces will continue to comply with these limitations set by the Philippine Government.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a key Asian power and is the largest Muslim country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and expand U. S. relations with Indonesia where possible. Last summer, Secretary Gates announced that DOD intended to resume working with elements of the Indonesian Special Forces, known as Kopassus. DOD engagement with Kopassus had been suspended for more than a decade because of past human rights violations by some of its members.

What is your view of the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?

The U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relationship continues to improve after the end of years of restrictions. I believe the 2005 decision to waive congressional restrictions on bilateral military cooperation and the July 2010 decision by Secretary Gates to begin limited engagement with Kopassus have enhanced our ability to support Indonesia's efforts to consolidate its democratic transformation and to support its efforts to reform and professionalize the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI).

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian government is cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism?

If confirmed, I would consult with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict on this question. Based on my current understanding, I believe that the Government of Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with the United States and our Allies in combating global terrorist networks in the region, particularly against Jema'a Islamiya.

Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-military contacts. I believe we want Indonesia and the TNI to consider the United States as a strong and credible partner, particularly where our values and interests coincide in the critical areas of democratization and reform, bilateral and regional security cooperation, and counterterrorism. Our measured and gradual

program of security activities with Kopassus will continue to take into account the implementation of reforms within the TNI. All activities will be in accordance with U.S. law, which, of course, requires individual and unit human rights vetting as a prelude to receiving U.S. military training or assistance.

What is your understanding of the factors that informed the decision to re-engage with Kopassus members?

My understanding is that the significant reforms across the TNI and the Indonesian Defense Ministers' commitment to protect human rights and advance accountability contributed to Secretary Gates' decision for DoD to begin a measured and gradual program of security cooperation activities with Kopassus.

What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

The Government of Indonesia continues to make progress in military reform. Early progress toward defense reform – separation of the police from the military, eliminating formal political roles for the TNI, increasing accountability, and human rights training – has been sustained. Continued progress on the divestiture of TNI businesses would be an unmistakable indication of Indonesia's commitment to reform. The 2002 Defense Law and the 2004 TNI Law codified the roles and responsibilities of the TNI as a mechanism to support, not replace, civilian government. Continued "hard" reforms that the United States should continue to support include full accountability for past human rights abuses, strengthening civilian control, putting the TNI fully "on budget," and continued professionalization of the TNI officer corps.

If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?

If confirmed, I would sustain efforts to encourage professionalism within the military in terms of both respect for human rights and accountability, through bilateral security discussions, joint training, military assistance, and military training programs. U.S. security assistance and security cooperation programs are the most effective channels to encourage professionalism in the Indonesian military.

High Altitude Transition Plan

The Department of Defense, under the High Altitude Transition (HAT) Plan, intends to retire the U-2 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) fleet in the middle of this decade and replace these aircraft with the Global Hawk RQ-4. Under the HAT Plan, the RQ-4s will apparently be a USPACOM-wide asset, flying missions throughout the region, whereas the U-2s have been dedicated to supporting U.S. and Korean forces on the Korean peninsula. The United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) have been considering a ROK purchase of the Global Hawk aircraft through the Foreign

Military Sales (FMS) process. If this FMS case were to proceed, much but not all of the impact of U-2 retirement would be mitigated, but either way the level of airborne ISR available on a day-to-day basis in Korea may well be diminished.

In your assessment, is the possibility that the level of airborne ISR available on a day-to-day basis will be diminished a concern, or are there other means to compensate for the retirement of the U-2?

Allied ISR capabilities on the Korean Peninsula and in the region contribute significantly to our ability to defend the United States and our Allies and partners, promote regional stability, and protect our collective interests. I have not had a chance to review the U-2 retirement issue in detail, but if confirmed, I will be an advocate for a strong and well-equipped U.S. forward presence on the Korean Peninsula.

If the sale does not go through, how would you propose that the United States sustain required levels of airborne ISR support on the Korean peninsula?

I have not had an opportunity to examine this issue in detail. If confirmed, I will research this issue and work closely with my colleagues in the Defense Department and other relevant departments and agencies to ensure that we do not experience a reduction in ISR capabilities that would diminish our ability to execute our required missions.

Counter-Piracy Operations

Since January 2009, the U.S. Navy has been patrolling the waters of the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as part of the international coalition engaged in counter-piracy operations. Prior to the engagement off the coast of Somalia, DOD worked with many of our Asian partners to address the threat of piracy in the Southeast Asia, such as in the Strait of Malacca.

What is your understanding of the current threat of piracy in the Asia-Pacific region?

Piracy in the Asia-Pacific region has declined in recent years, largely due to committed efforts of regional littoral states. Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, for example, took the initiative – with U.S. support to provide increased security to key sea lines, in particular, the Strait of Malacca. Although piracy has declined in the Strait of Malacca, there are instances of piracy in the southern parts of the South China Sea, and we should be mindful that, as long as piracy remains a lucrative business model, it will be attractive not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but around the world.

What role, if any, should DOD play in countering any piracy threat in the Asia-Pacific?

The situation off the coast of Somalia and in the western Indian Ocean demonstrates that the military cannot solve the overall problem of piracy. Military force addresses the symptoms, not causes, of piracy. In the Asia-Pacific region, DoD should provide capacity building and training

support to enhance the ability of regional States to counter piracy when such support aligns with broader U.S. objectives and interests in the region and complements the political commitment of regional countries, as was the case with Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia regarding piracy in the Strait of Malacca.

International Peacekeeping Contributions

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to UN peacekeeping operations.”

What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute more military personnel as both staff officers and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing additional military personnel to U.N. operations?

If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the United Nations?

The United States has a stake in the success of UN peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practicable, the United States should continue to provide military personnel for UN peacekeeping operations, especially for key staff positions that can help shape the direction and success of the mission. However, as with any investment, there are associated costs.

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that DoD evaluates requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions, weighing the potential positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against other military commitments and the proposed cost of U.S. involvement.

Combatting Terrorism

The Administration recently released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda’s core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups “that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia.”

If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to counter terrorism?

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism maintains focus on pressuring al-Qa’ida’s core while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our resilience. If confirmed, I understand that my role in this effort will be to work closely with the nations in this strategically important region to build enduring partnerships and capabilities, degrade the

links between al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents, and eliminate terrorist safehavens. At the same time, I would work closely with colleagues in the U.S. interagency, as well as with our Allies and partners, in order to support the CT strategy's objective of applying a "whole-of-government" approach to defeating al-Qa'ida.

What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated groups in the Asia-Pacific region?

There have been important recent successes in the fight against al-Qa'ida, most notably the successful operation against Osama bin Laden. Despite these important successes, from its base of operations in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, al-Qa'ida continues to pose a persistent and evolving threat to the United States. Despite significant losses to its command structure, al-Qa'ida is adapting, and uses its safehaven to continue attack planning as well as produce propaganda, communicate guidance to affiliates and operational cells in the region and abroad, solicit logistical and financial support, and provide training and indoctrination to new operatives.

Is there a nexus between terrorist groups and criminal networks in the Asia-Pacific?

Transnational criminal activity, including narcotics trafficking and arms smuggling, provides pathways and opportunities for terrorist organizations to move people and resources across the region. Kidnapping for ransom and piracy have the potential to generate millions of dollars, some of which may end up in the hands of terrorists to fund operations, training, and recruitment.

In Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippines and Indonesia, U.S. engagement with partner nations has helped combat violent extremist ideology and activities. The integration of operations by host nation security forces with U.S. capacity building, development, and information support operations has dramatically reduced the ability of violent extremist organizations to operate.

What more can the United States do in Southeast Asia to help combat the threat of terrorism perpetrated by violent extremists?

The new National Strategy for Counterterrorism recognizes the success our partners have had in maintaining pressure on the region's most lethal terrorist organizations, while noting that the region remains potentially fertile ground for local terrorists who share al-Qa'ida's ideology and motivations. Going forward, the United States should continue to assist in building the security capacity of governments in the region that consistently demonstrate their commitment against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents.

Which Southeast Asian countries are most important in the fight against terrorism in that region and what should the United States do to enhance relations with those countries?

Because of the prominent interagency aspects of building partner-nation counter-terrorism (CT) capacity, especially on the law enforcement side, DoD will often serve in a supporting role. As

reflected in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the United States has developed a robust network of bilateral CT relationships with key countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Australia. For the Department of Defense, Indonesia and the Philippines should be the top priorities for counter terrorism capacity-building assistance in Southeast Asia, notably through “Section 1206” programs. Section 1206 (of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006, as amended remains one of the Department’s most effective authorities for building partner capacity to combat terrorism. The Department enjoys good relations with Indonesia and the Philippines and, in close consultation with Congress and the Department of State, should sustain and enhance these relationships through continued policy dialogues, security cooperation, and security assistance programs.

Section 1208 Operations

Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this authority?

I understand that Section 1208 authority is a key tool that Combatant Commanders have repeatedly confirmed as essential to combating terrorism in their areas of responsibility. It enables the special operations forces under their control to leverage willing partners that possess access to areas, people, and information that are denied to our forces, but critical to tactical and strategic success. The authority has allowed DoD to respond quickly to emergent global challenges. Section 1208 requires appropriate civilian oversight, including Secretary of Defense approval and congressional notification.

Department of Defense Counternarcotics Activities

On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1.5 billion to support CN operations, build the capacity of certain foreign governments in Asia and around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.

What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?

Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are multidimensional threats to the United States. In addition to the impact on our nation's public health and economy, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source for terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate government institutions, and contribute to international instability.

I have not had an opportunity to assess the DoD counternarcotics program. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Congress, and counterparts at DoD, the Department of State, and the National Security Staff to ensure that these programs achieve measureable results in the Asia-

Pacific region and that those results are clearly aligned with the goals of the National Security Strategy and the National Drug Control Strategy.

What is your understanding of the illegal narcotics industry in Asia?

South and Southeast Asia have become increasingly more attractive as bases for drug trafficking organizations' production and smuggling operations. Several Asian and Pacific nations have experienced a significant increase in the production, transshipment, trafficking, and consumption of narcotics in recent years. Methamphetamine produced using diverted precursor chemicals, heroin transshipment through Asia, poppy cultivation, and potential narco-terrorist funding remain the primary drug threats to the United States from the Asia-Pacific region.

What role, if any, should DOD play in countering – either directly or by, through, and with our Asian partners – the illegal narcotics industry in Asia?

I believe that the current DoD role is appropriate. DoD serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime trafficking of illicit drugs flowing toward the United States. In addition, DoD plays a critical role in supporting U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies responsible for counterdrug and drug-related activities, primarily through information sharing and building partner nation security capacity. In cooperation with the U.S. interagency and foreign partners, DoD conducts activities to detect, disrupt, and dismantle drug-related transnational threats in Asia and the Pacific.

On an annual basis, DOD spends approximately \$500 million building the capacity of the Afghanistan Government to counter the illegal narcotics trade. Despite this sizable annual investment, Afghanistan remains the “wellspring of the global opium trade, accounting for 93 percent of all opium poppy cultivation” according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). UNODC has also found that about 80 percent of the drugs derived from Afghan opium poppies are smuggled out by transnational organized criminal groups through the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan; the rest flow through Central Asia.

What is your assessment of DOD’s CN program in Afghanistan?

I understand that DoD supports counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan by building Afghan capacity and working with U.S. law enforcement agencies such as DEA, CBP, FBI, and ICE to interdict narcotics trafficking. Although DoD supports Afghan eradication efforts, the Department of State has the lead for that effort. This year the interdiction of opiates and precursor chemicals in Afghanistan has increased. Afghan Counternarcotics Police-vetted units, mentored by DEA, are now capable of conducting drug interdiction operations and have been actively involved in combined operations with DEA and military forces. DoD has also been building the capacity of the Afghan border management efforts to stop drugs from leaving Afghanistan and precursor chemicals from entering the country.

Do you think the DOD CN program in Afghanistan has been successful to date?

Yes. I believe that considerable improvements have been made this year with military and law enforcement coordination.

Law of the Sea

Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea? If so, why?

I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. It is in the enduring interests of the United States to be at the forefront of promoting the rule of law, including in the world's oceans. U.S. accession to the Convention would send an additional, clear signal to the world that we remain committed to advancing the rule of law at sea. Additionally, under the Convention, the United States would have the firmest possible legal foundation for the navigational rights and freedoms needed to project power, reassure Allies and partners, deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain deployed combat forces, and secure sea and air lines of communication that underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.

Would U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention benefit the U.S. military's mission in the Asia-Pacific region? If so, how?

U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would benefit the U.S. military's mission in the Asia-Pacific region by enabling the United States to reinforce and assert the Convention's freedom of navigation and overflight rights, including transit passage in strategic straits. In addition, becoming a Party to the Convention would support combined operations with regional partners and support the Proliferation Security Initiative; establish undisputed title to our extended continental shelf areas; strengthen our position in bilateral discussions with the People's Republic of China; and bolster our leadership in future developments in the law of the sea. Accession would also improve the United States' position and add to our credibility in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues where Law of the Sea matters are discussed.

POW/MIA Accounting Efforts

The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of missing military members. Recovery of remains of U. S. service members from World War II, the Korean War, and the Viet Nam war continues to be a high priority. On October 20, 2011, the Department of Defense announced an agreement with North Korea that will allow U.S. personnel to return to North Korea to resume recovery of remains of U.S. service members missing from the Korean War. Recovery operations in North Korea were suspended in 2005.

What is your understanding of this recent agreement to resume recovery operations in North Korea?

It is my understanding that DASD Robert Newberry, Director of the POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) led an inter-agency team to conduct negotiations with the North Korean military last month, which reached a successful arrangement to resume recovery operations. The operations in North Korea are expected to begin next year and will mark the first operations

since 2005 when the U.S. halted missions because of increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Prior to that time, U.S. specialists from the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command conducted recovery operations in that country for 10 years, recovering remains believed to be more than 225 servicemen since 1996.

It is my understanding that the arrangement calls for U.S. teams to work in two areas in North Korea—Unsan County, about 60 miles north of Pyongyang, and near the Chosin/Jangjin Reservoir—where more than 2,000 soldiers and Marines are believed to be missing.

How might the resumption of recovery efforts in North Korea impact the future of the Six Party talks or the stability on the Korean Peninsula?

Remains recovery operations are a humanitarian issue between the United States and North Korea and are divorced from other political issues. I would have to defer to the Department of State for remarks on the future of the Six-Party Talks. The ROK-U.S. Alliance and the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea remains a cornerstone not only of stability on the Korean Peninsula, but throughout Northeast Asia more broadly.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the PACOM area of responsibility?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, U.S. Pacific Command, the State Department, and all other organizations involved to provide advice and support whenever necessary.

Foreign Language Policy

In 2005, the Department of Defense approved the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap to improve the Department's foreign language capability and regional area expertise. Since then, the Department has been working toward implementing that roadmap.

How many Mandarin and/or Cantonese speakers does the Department of Defense have in intelligence analyst positions?

Is this number sufficient to ensure good intelligence assessments for use by the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

In your view, how should the United States expand the foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel in order to improve the quality of intelligence input to, and policy output by, the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

I have not had an opportunity to examine this issue in detail. If confirmed, I will research this issue and look forward to working with Congress to ensure the Department of Defense builds sufficient foreign language capability and regional area expertise.

Counter Threat Finance

A number of officials in DOD and the intelligence community (IC) have called for investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter-threat finance activities?

Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to support their activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. It is critical to engage all U. S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of money associated with these organizations. It is my understanding that DoD has capability to identify and disrupt our adversaries' finances while working with its interagency counterparts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. DoD is not the U. S. Government lead agency in counter-threat finance, but I believe it plays a supportive role by working with other departments and agencies, and with partner nations, to fight our adversaries' ability to use global financial networks.

In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?

DoD should increase its cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Treasury Department, the intelligence community, and the Department of State to target and degrade adversaries' funding sources where possible. DoD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy provides that DoD should work with other U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies and with partner nations to deny or disrupt, or defeat and degrade adversaries' ability to use global licit and illicit financial networks to affect U.S. interests negatively. Greater cooperation will yield greater ability to target adversaries' vulnerabilities using a whole-of-government approach including interdiction, sanctions, and other law enforcement actions.

Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people.

Do you think expanding counter threat finance activities in the Asia-Pacific region would be beneficial? If so, what role – if any – should DOD play in those activities?

Several dangerous terrorist organizations operate in the Asia-Pacific region. Not only do they seek to target the United States, but they work to destabilize the region. Expanding counter threat finance activities in this part of the world would be a powerful way to target the finances of these organizations, hindering their ability to purchase weapons, pay salaries, and conduct attacks. Conducting counter-threat finance activities is most successful through a whole-of-government approach. I understand that USPACOM and JIATF-West have already undertaken counter-threat finance efforts. If confirmed, I would advocate that DoD continue to work in collaboration with interagency partners and provide analytical capabilities, technology, strategic and operations planning, and personnel to attack the revenue used by these terrorist organizations.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.