

**Advance Policy Questions for Ashton B. Carter
Nominee to be Deputy Secretary of Defense**

1. Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

I do not see a need for modification of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions at this time. The Act has served the Department and our nation well, fostering a spirit of jointness that has enhanced the Department's capabilities to respond when called, such as in Operation Enduring Freedom. If confirmed, I will continue to consider this issue and will make proposals for modifications if and when required.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

2. Relationships

What is your understanding of the relationship between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary performs duties as assigned by the Secretary and must be able to perform the Secretary's duties when the Secretary is absent. The Secretary and the Deputy work closely together to develop defense strategy and policy. The Deputy Secretary serves as the Department's Chief Operating Officer (COO) and focuses primarily on the daily activities of the Department, including financial management, acquisition, and personnel policy matters (both civilian and military) and on the implementation of policy and strategy decisions.

The Under Secretaries of Defense

The Deputy Secretary oversees and ensures the coordination of the activities of the Under Secretaries. The Deputy Secretary ensures that the Secretary's direction and guidance is

implemented promptly and properly by the Under Secretaries. The Deputy Secretary elevates to the Secretary issues raised by the Under Secretaries that require the Secretary's personal attention.

The Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense

The DCMO reports directly to the Deputy Secretary, and there must be a close working relationship between the two. The DCMO monitors and reports on the progress of the Department toward achieving management goals, keeps the Deputy Secretary informed, and proposes solutions to significant issues to the Deputy Secretary.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

For Assistant Secretaries who report directly to the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary's relationship with them would be similar to the Deputy Secretary's relationship with the Under Secretaries. For Assistant Secretaries who report directly to Under Secretaries, the Deputy Secretary works with them through the appropriate Under Secretary.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy Secretary has an especially close working relationship with the Vice Chairman on requirements, programming, budgeting, and Departmental management matters.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments to ensure that the Secretary of Defense's policies are implemented fully and effectively in a timely manner.

The Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments

The Deputy Secretary works with the Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments in close coordination with the Deputy Chief Management Officer. The Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments play an important role in ensuring that the Department carries out its strategic plan and attains its management goals.

The Service Acquisition Executives

The Deputy Secretary plays an important role in establishing acquisition policy for the Department, and interacts with the Service Acquisition Executives primarily through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services

The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Service Chiefs, as appropriate, in ensuring the Services have the resources they need to accomplish assigned missions and implement the Secretary's policy effectively and efficiently. The Deputy Secretary normally works with the Service Chiefs, in their role as Service Chiefs, through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Deputy Secretary normally works with the Service Chiefs, in their role as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the Chairman and the Vice Chairman.

The Director of National Intelligence

The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Director of National Intelligence on matters of mutual interest to the Department and the intelligence community, for example, the relationship between the Military Intelligence Program and the National Intelligence Program.

The Inspector General of the Department of Defense

The Inspector General performs a vital function for the Department of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary receives advice from the Inspector General on significant issues. The Deputy Secretary ensures that the Inspector General is able to perform his functions in an independent manner.

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense

The Deputy Secretary relies on the General Counsel for legal advice on all issues that come before him. The Deputy Secretary must be able to rely on the candid advice of the General Counsel.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau

The Deputy Secretary works with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on matters related to the National Guard and in coordinating issues related to the National Guard with the States. The Deputy Secretary may receive advice from the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on any matter related to the National Guard.

The Judge Advocates General of the Services

The Judge Advocates General have important roles in their respective Military Departments, providing legal advice to the senior leaders of the Military Departments, overseeing the military justice system, and leading their respective teams of military and civilian lawyers. The Deputy Secretary works with the Judge Advocates General primarily through the General Counsel of the Department of Defense.

3. Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense

Section 132 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

Assuming that you are confirmed, what duties do you expect the Secretary to prescribe for you?

The primary duty of the Deputy Secretary of Defense is to assist the Secretary as needed. If confirmed, my expectation is that the Secretary will ask me to serve as his alter ego when necessary; to assist him in organizing the decision making process within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); to carry out the statutory duties of Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense; and to carry out other duties as assigned.

What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

My background includes service in a number of previous civilian positions in the Department of Defense, culminating in my current service as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. During this service, I have had the opportunity to serve under four Secretaries of Defense, working most closely with William J. Perry and Robert M. Gates, and to work closely with four Deputy Secretaries of Defense: William J. Perry, John P. White, John J. Hamre, and William J. Lynn III. In addition to my service within DoD, I have served as a member of the Defense Science Board, the Defense Policy Board, and Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's International Security Advisory Board. I have also served as chair of the International and Global Affairs faculty at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and Co-Director of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Harvard and Stanford Universities. If confirmed, I would bring to this position substantial experience with the Department in each of the last three decades; current detailed knowledge of the Department's operations; experience with managing major policy initiatives; experience with managing one of the Department's largest organizations and several large defense agencies; a solid understanding of many of the major technological issues confronting the Department; and experience tackling some of the Department's most persistent management problems.

Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

If confirmed, there would be many actions I would need to take to best perform the duties of Deputy Secretary. First and foremost among these would be to build a strong working relationship with Secretary Panetta as his Deputy. Likewise, I would need to build on my existing relationships with the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of

the Military Departments and their military leadership, and the OSD staff to enlist their knowledge and assistance in helping me carry out the duties of Deputy Secretary. I would work closely with Deputy Secretary Lynn to ensure a smooth transition and seamless hand off of his major initiatives to ensure they are continued within the Department. Of critical importance initially would be to learn in greater detail the significant budget issues pending in the Department where my position as Under Secretary has not required deep involvement.

What changes to section 132, if any, would you recommend?

At this time, I believe the statutory authorities for the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense are appropriate. If confirmed, I would be sure to inform the Congress if I determined that any change in the statute were necessary to effectively perform the duties of this office.

Section 132 was amended by section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, to provide that the Deputy Secretary serves as the Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the Department of Defense. The Deputy Secretary is to be assisted in this capacity by a Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO).

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO of the Department of Defense?

My understanding is that the primary duty of the Chief Management Officer is to provide leadership and to ensure accountability for the business operations of the Department of Defense. These operations involve all of the Department's components and cut across the responsibilities of the Under Secretaries of Defense, so they require leadership and accountability at a high level. The CMO's role is to lead, oversee, and support, rather than supplant, the roles of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and agency heads in managing their business operations.

The CMO also provides leadership to the CMOs of the Military Departments and is responsible for the development of the Strategic Management Plan for the Department of Defense. The Deputy Secretary chairs the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, a responsibility consistent with the CMO role.

What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?

As Under Secretary, I have been deeply involved in the Department's operations over the last two years. As Defense Acquisition Executive and Defense Logistics Executive, I have fulfilled leadership roles similar in nature to the Chief Management Officer role. This experience has provided me with the background and expertise to serve as CMO.

Do you believe that the CMO and DCMO have the resources and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of the Department of Defense?

At this time, I believe that these positions have all of the authority needed to carry out business transformation. I am not currently in a position to determine if the CMO and DCMO have the appropriate resources to carry out these roles, although I have no reason to believe that they do not. If confirmed, I will examine the resources available to the CMO and DCMO to determine if they fully address the need.

What role do you believe the DCMO of the Department of Defense should play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems by the military departments?

As with the CMO, the role of the DCMO is to support and oversee rather than to supplant the responsibilities of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and other agency heads in acquiring specific business systems. The DCMO has specific responsibilities for many of our Major Automated Information System acquisitions as Milestone Decision Authority and broad responsibility for defense business systems as the Vice-Chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee. The DCMO ensures that the acquisition of business systems is consistent with principles of sound business investment, has applied appropriate business process reengineering efforts, and is compliant with the Department's business enterprise architecture.

Do you believe that the DCMO should have clearly defined decisionmaking authorities, or should the DCMO serve exclusively as an advisor to the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO?

I believe that the DCMO should have duties as assigned by the CMO and the Secretary of Defense. These duties may include decision making authority where the CMO or the Secretary determines appropriate.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to the statutory provisions establishing the positions of CMO and DCMO?

At this time, I believe the statutory authorities for the positions of the Chief Management Officer and the Deputy Chief Management Officer are appropriate. If confirmed, I would be sure to inform the Congress if I determined that any change in the statute were necessary to effectively perform the duties of this office.

4. Major Challenges

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Deputy Secretary of Defense?

If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

The main tasks of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be fully prepared to act and speak in the Secretary's stead at all times; to shape an orderly deliberative process for the Secretary, so that he can make decisions and advise the President based on careful consideration of accurate management information and a full range of options; and to manage the budget process and other Department-wide matters, reserving decisions of greatest consequence for the Secretary.

I have had the opportunity to discuss these matters with Secretary Panetta, with other members of the Obama administration, with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs, with Combatant Commanders, and with other leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I have also had the benefit of the advice of many members of Congress, including members of this Committee. Finally, it has been my privilege to know personally a number of former Deputy Secretaries of Defense throughout my career and I have worked, in one way or another, for almost every Secretary of Defense since Caspar Weinberger. Last, as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I have responsibility for a number of the matters that fall under the Deputy, and I look forward, if confirmed, to working with this Committee to acquaint myself with the additional responsibilities that fall under the Deputy.

5. Priorities

What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, with respect to issues which must be addressed by DOD?

The top priority of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, like that of the Secretary, is to ensure the security of the American people.

Key challenges facing the Department at this time include: prevailing in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the fight against al-Qaeda; keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations; preparing to counter future threats and military technologies; preserving the finest fighting force in the world and taking care of service members and their families; and continuing the process of reform which will be crucial in this time of constrained budgets.

6. National Security Budget Reductions

The President has called for \$400 billion in reductions to national security spending over a 10-year period starting in 2013, and has asked the Secretary of Defense to lead a review to provide recommendations on where to make those cuts.

What is your understanding of the current status of that review?

It is my understanding that the review is ongoing and will be completed as part of the FY 2013-2017 program and budget review.

What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in guiding the review and in determining what cuts should be made to the defense budget?

If confirmed, I would expect to play a significant role in the Department's program and budget review, including serving as chairman of the Deputy's Advisory Working Group which provides the Secretary informed views of major budget issues.

The recent agreement on the debt ceiling calls for reductions in defense spending that could range from \$350 billion in the first phase, to as much as \$900 billion, if the joint committee is unable to reach agreement and a sequester is required.

Do you believe that a national security spending reduction of this magnitude can be accomplished without significant adverse impact on our national security?

I believe the Department can build a balanced defense program that also achieves the national security reductions enacted as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011. These reductions are in line with what the Department was anticipating at a time of considerable fiscal challenge. However, making these reductions will require difficult choices by the Department and the Congress. Any further reductions that may result from a failure of the joint committee to reach agreement will undermine our ability to meet our national security objectives. The risk of hollowing out the force and weakening our ability to respond to threats around the globe will go up significantly. It is imperative that the joint committee be successful.

If confirmed, how will you prioritize the objectives of: making needed investments in the future force, addressing pressing requirements for completing the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, re-setting of the force, meeting ongoing operational commitments across the globe, and achieving the level of savings proposed by the President?

The art of budgeting is about setting priorities. Winning today's wars, investing in force modernization, re-setting the force, and meeting our operational commitments are all priorities that must be addressed. In addition, Secretary Panetta has been clear that we must ensure that we are able to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorist and rogue nations and that we always support our service members and their families. In addressing these priorities in the budget, it is important that we build a balanced defense program that meets the demands of today, but also prepares us to meet the inevitable challenges of tomorrow. That balance requires a careful assessment of the contribution each program makes toward those ends. Difficult choices will have to be made and, if confirmed, I look forward to contributing to that effort.

7. Efficiencies Initiative

Last year, then-Secretary Gates announced an efficiencies initiative designed to reform the business operations of the Pentagon and root out duplication, waste, and excess spending. The Secretary identified \$78 billion of defense-wide cuts over the Future Years Defense Program; the military departments identified an additional \$100 billion of reductions, which they were permitted to reinvest in other areas.

What is your view of the process by which the Department of Defense identified the \$178 billion in reductions called for in the efficiencies initiative?

I believe that Secretary Gates acted with great foresight in establishing last year's efficiencies initiative. He clearly foresaw the fiscal and economic challenges our nation is now confronting. As a result, the Department had a strong head start in identifying areas in its budget to target for efficiency. The process used by Secretary Gates, however, was designed to support his goal of largely redirecting, rather than reducing, defense spending. As a result, the processes that were used to identify the \$178 billion in reductions may not be the best model for identifying the savings needed to meet the Department's current budget limitations. That said, the overall intent of Secretary Gates's initiative remains highly relevant, especially the Better Buying Power initiative, which we expect to continue to generate efficiencies in the Department's operations for years to come.

Do you believe that these reductions are achievable and have been appropriately distributed through the Department?

I believe that the level of reductions projected by last year's efficiencies initiative are achievable and have been distributed appropriately throughout the Department. There will inevitably be a few efficiency items that produce lower savings than anticipated, thereby requiring the Services to make adjustments to meet their targets. However, it is my understanding that the Department, on the whole, is making good progress towards achieving the necessary reductions.

What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in ensuring that the expected savings are achieved?

If confirmed, I expect that I would oversee the Department's efforts to ensure that expected savings from the efficiencies initiative are realized.

What is your view of the decision to disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Business Transformation Agency, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration?

I believe the disestablishment of these organizations has been executed with minimal disruption to the Department's operations and with satisfactory distribution of their enduring functions.

Do you believe that the Department can achieve significant additional savings through the elimination of duplication, waste, and excess spending?

Yes. Over the last ten years, the Department has been engaged in two wars and a range of other contingencies and has experienced growth in its base budget at a rate faster than inflation. These circumstances fostered a tendency to defer some difficult decisions because management attention was consumed by the wars and funding was not so tight that these decisions were unavoidable. In the current fiscal environment, we can no longer afford to defer these difficult choices. I believe, however, that meeting the budget limits established in the recent Budget Control Act of 2011 will require us to cut significantly more than just duplication, waste, and excess spending.

What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in identifying such potential savings?

If confirmed, I would expect to play a central leadership role in identifying potential savings in the Department's budget.

8. Management Issues

If confirmed, what key management performance goals would you want to accomplish, and what standards or metrics would you use to judge whether you have accomplished them?

If confirmed, my key management goals will be those that have been identified in the FY 2012 & FY 2013 Strategic Management Plan. These seven key goals are:

- Strengthen and right-size the DoD Total Workforce mix (military, civilian, and contracted support) to accomplish the DoD mission and sustain superior performance in a time of constrained resources.
- Strengthen DoD Financial Management to respond to warfighter needs and sustain public confidence through auditable financial statements.
- Build agile and secure information technology capabilities to enhance combat power and decision-making while optimizing value.
- Increase the buying power of the DoD acquisition system and processes spanning requirements determination, development, procurement, and support to ensure that the force structure is modernized, re-capitalized, and sustained within available resources.
- Increase operational and installation energy efficiency to lower risks to our warfighters, reduce costs, and improve energy security.

- Re-engineer/use end-to-end business support processes to reduce transaction times, drive down costs, and improve service.
- Create agile business operations that plan for, support, and sustain contingency missions.

These goals are aligned with and support the Department's overarching strategy as articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Each goal is supported by sets of key initiatives and performance measures which serve as our management standards and metrics. The Department closely monitors these performance measures to assess whether we are achieving our goals.

GAO recently reported that “the DOD systems environment that supports [its] business functions is overly complex and error prone, and is characterized by (1) little standardization across the department, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the same data stored in multiple systems, and (4) the need for data to be entered manually into multiple systems. According to the department’s systems inventory, this environment is composed of 2,258 business systems and includes 335 financial management, 709 human resource management, 645 logistics, 243 real property and installation, and 281 weapon acquisition management systems.”

Would you agree that the Department will not be able to put its financial house in order until it effectively addresses this problem?

It is extremely important for the Department to rationalize its defense business system environment and ensure that its suite of systems is tightly integrated. However, while we must ensure that the Department's feeder systems, in all of its business areas, properly capture and report financial information, greater integration of our business systems environment alone will not correct the longstanding weaknesses in our business and financial operations. We must also continue to implement an integrated business strategy and pursue process improvement to enable interoperable business solutions and financial auditability.

Section 2222 of Title 10, United States Code, requires that the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide the development of its business systems and processes.

Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful transformation of DOD's business systems?

Yes.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that DOD's enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements of section 2222?

If confirmed, I would continue the ongoing efforts to define, capture and enforce the business processes, data standards and business rules in the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) from an end-to-end perspective and hold the Under Secretaries of Defense and the Military Departments accountable for those functional portions of the BEA for which they are responsible.

What are your views on the importance and role of timely and accurate financial and business information in managing operations and holding managers accountable?

Timely and accurate financial and business information (aka business intelligence) is the operational intelligence we use to inform the management of our business operations. It provides assurance that we are effectively and efficiently using our limited resources, while ensuring good stewardship of the taxpayers' money.

What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial and business information available to DOD managers?

If confirmed, I would take my role as Chief Management Officer/Chief Operating Officer and chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee seriously. In these roles, I will hold those responsible for managing our business operations accountable for meeting the objectives identified in the Department's Strategic Management Plan that are directly linked to improving financial and business information.

The Department has chosen to implement the requirement for an enterprise architecture and transition plan through a "federated" approach in which the Business Transformation Agency has developed the top level architecture while leaving it to the military departments to fill in most of the detail. GAO recently reported that none of the three military departments has yet fully developed a well-defined business enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide and constrain business transformation initiatives.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Secretaries and Chief Management Officers of the business enterprise architecture and transition plans of the military departments meet the requirements of section 2222 and provide a sound roadmap for business transformation initiatives?

If confirmed, I would intend to hold the Secretaries and Chief Management Officers accountable for delivering integrated business solutions defined in the federated business enterprise architecture and affiliated transition plans.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that business system investments are defined and implemented in accordance with the Department's business enterprise architecture?

If confirmed, I would assess the investment review process currently in place to review and certify business system investments and implement improved policies and procedures as necessary. My focus would be to ensure that we review our investments from a holistic, end-to-end perspective.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that supporting architectures for component organizations are further developed and aligned with the corporate architecture to provide a truly federated business enterprise architecture?

If confirmed, I will assess the plans of the Service Secretaries and Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments for aligning their enterprise architectures with the Department's overall business enterprise architecture approach.

9. Audit Readiness

Secretary Panetta has stated: "While we have reasonable controls over much of our budgetary information, it is unacceptable to me that the Department of Defense cannot produce a financial statement that passes all financial audit standards. That will change. I have directed that this requirement be put in place as soon as possible. America deserves nothing less."

What is your understanding of the efforts and progress that have been made in DOD since 1999 toward the goal of being able to produce a clean audit?

While I am not familiar with the details or history of DoD accounting systems, I understand that DoD financial processes were established and ingrained in legacy systems long ago. These processes and systems were designed for budgetary accounting – not for the accounting standards called for in the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act. I also understand that there has been limited progress made towards auditability until recently. Our CFO has established a set of priorities and a roadmap for making progress. It focuses on the budgetary information that we use to manage the Department and ensures we can account for the material we need to support our mission.

Do you believe that these efforts will result in a clean audit opinion by the end of fiscal year 2017, as required by statute, or are additional steps needed?

Yes. 2017 is an ambitious goal but, as Secretary Panetta has indicated, the Department is committed to it. In addition, Secretary Panetta has directed a review of audit efforts to ensure that our focus is on completing the project as soon as possible.

Do you believe that the Department can achieve a clean audit opinion through better accounting and auditing, or is the systematic improvement of the Department's business systems and processes a prerequisite?

From my discussions with Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) / CFO Hale, systematic improvement of the Department's business systems and processes is necessary to achieve a clean audit opinion.

When do you believe the Department can achieve a clean audit?

The Department is working to have auditable financial statements by 2017. Secretary Panetta's review of audit efforts will inform that goal.

The Department's Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) plan is organized into five waves that focus on audit readiness of the Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) (waves 1 and 2), the existence and completeness of assets (wave 3), and a full financial statement audit (waves 4 and 5).

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure the development and implementation of specific detailed plans for achieving a full audit through waves 4 and 5?

I understand that while the longer term goal involves planning for and executing the final two "waves," the Department remains focused on near term milestones. Senior leadership within the military components is committed to, and is accountable for, accomplishing these interim goals. As directed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, the Department has developed a strategy for producing fully auditable financial statements. If confirmed, I would work with our CFO to prepare implementation plans that will lay out exactly how we will do this.

What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the military-department Chief Management Officers (CMOs) in implementing the FIAR plan through their individual financial improvement plans (FIPs)?

The oversight role of the CMOs was established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Since then, the Department has developed more detailed responsibilities for the CMOs regarding their financial improvement role and responsibilities. Specifically, the Military Department CMOs:

- Coordinate and marshal resources from across the Department in support of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) / CFO financial improvement goals, objectives and priorities.
- Carry out budget, finance, accounting and human resource operations in a manner consistent with the comprehensive business transformation plan.
- Eliminate or reduce financial management systems that are inconsistent with the business systems architecture and transition plan.

- Ensure that the functional communities recognize their role in achieving audit readiness, since most financial transactions originate from business events in the functional community's business operations.
- Provide the unifying support needed to ensure that business system modernization efforts are fully linked with Component financial improvement activities.

What steps, if any, do you believe are needed to clarify those roles and responsibilities?

I believe the currently defined roles are sufficiently clear, but, if confirmed, I would continue to monitor and make adjustments as needed.

Do you believe that performance measurement and monitoring mechanisms need to be improved?

The Department has established a robust governance structure to oversee progress towards FIAR goals. If confirmed, I would plan to review our performance measures to see if any improvements are necessary to enable us to meet these goals.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to sustain the commitment of the Department's top leadership to the long-term goal of transforming the Department's financial management?

Secretary Panetta has emphasized the importance of making the Department auditable. Our CFO has developed a plan for achieving audit readiness. If confirmed, I would intend to work closely with them and other leaders in the Department to transform the Department's financial management processes.

Do you think that having the Deputy Secretary of Defense "dual-hatted" as the CMO is consistent with the prioritization and sustained day-to-day focus needed for the success of the Department's financial improvement efforts?

Yes. Overall accountability rests with the Deputy Secretary in his CMO role. However, day-to-day responsibility falls to the CFO, the Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO), and the Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments, as well as line management throughout the DoD business enterprise.

10. Business Transformation

Since 2005, the General Accountability Office (GAO) has designated the Department of Defense's approach to business transformation as "high risk" due to its vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement. However, GAO has recently found that the Department's senior leadership has shown commitment to transforming business system operations and has made progress in establishing management oversight and developing a

strategic plan to guide transformation efforts. Nonetheless, in GAO's view, the Department needs to take additional action to further define management roles and responsibilities and to strengthen strategic planning.

Do you believe that the Department needs to more clearly define roles and responsibilities, as well as relationships among key positions and governance entities, for integrating the Secretary of Defense's efficiency initiative with ongoing reform efforts; overseeing its implementation and otherwise institutionalizing the effort in the long term?

I do not believe additional steps are necessary at this time, but, if confirmed, I would continue to monitor the situation closely and take corrective action where necessary. The tools that Congress has provided the Department over the past six years, including the establishment of a clear business system investment review process in the FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the creation of the Chief Management Officer (CMO) construct in the FY 2008 NDAA, and specific strategic planning requirements in the Government Performance and Results (GPR) Modernization Act of 2010, have created a strong framework for our business transformation efforts.

If so, what steps do you believe the Department should take to achieve this objective?

I do not believe that additional steps are necessary at this time, but, if confirmed, I would continue to closely monitor the situation and take corrective action where necessary.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to further refine strategic goals, performance measures and other elements of the Department's strategic management plan?

The Department's current strategic planning process is quite robust and has continued to improve with regard to planning for defense business operations since the introduction of the Strategic Management Plan (SMP) in the FY 2008 NDAA. In my current role as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I have been involved in the latest planning efforts for the FY 2012 & FY2013 SMP and believe that it faithfully aligns the Department's business goals with the Department's overall strategic goals. It also establishes a set of key initiatives and performance measures that will allow the Department's senior leaders the opportunity to track performance throughout the year and take corrective action where necessary. If confirmed, I would look to incorporate additional improvements and lessons learned from each iteration of this process.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to more clearly define the Department's strategic planning process, including mechanisms to guide and synchronize efforts to develop strategic plans; monitor the implementation of reform initiatives; and report progress, on a periodic basis, towards achieving established goals?

The Department's current strategic planning process is effective. However, if confirmed, I would work to better align the timing of our business operations planning cycle with that of our overall strategic planning and budgeting activities. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process produces the following FY's President's Budget (PB) submission in February. The SMP articulates the Department's business priorities and is due in July. My goal would be to make the SMP timeline a more deliberate process aligning to the PPBE cycle.

Do you believe that the Deputy Chief Management Officer should have control over funds for the components' business systems programs to ensure that the components follow guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Department's business transformation efforts?

I believe that it is important to allow the components to maintain control over their budgeting process, while simultaneously maintaining an enterprise perspective on our business system investments. The Department's current investment review process, established by Congress in the FY 2005 NDAA, effectively allows the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including the Deputy Chief Management Officer, in the role of vice-chair of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee, to ensure that component investments are aligned with the enterprise strategy as laid out in the Business Enterprise Architecture.

11. Acquisition of Business Systems

Most of the Department's business transformation programs are substantially over budget and behind schedule. Last year, at the request of the Armed Services Committee, GAO reviewed DOD's nine largest Enterprise Resource Programs (ERPs), which are intended to replace more than 500 outdated business systems, and reported that six of the nine had experienced schedule delays ranging from 2 to 12 years and incurred cost increases ranging from \$530 million to \$2.4 billion. GAO reported that DOD has failed to follow good management practices for developing schedules and cost estimates for many of these programs.

If confirmed, how would you work with the Deputy Chief Management Officer, the Chief Management Officers of the military departments, and the Under Secretaries of Defense to address these problems?

It is my understanding that the Department concurred with the recommendations in the GAO report and that the Services have taken steps to implement them. If confirmed, I would intend to continue to work directly with the Deputy Chief Management Officer, the Chief Management Officers of the military departments, the Under Secretaries of Defense, and the DoD Chief Information Officer to implement better management practices and internal lessons learned. Each of these officials has an important role to

play in addressing the planning, implementation, and change management challenges that historically have hamstrung the Department's ability to deliver programs such as ERPs in accordance with established cost and schedule baselines.

The Department of Defense must implement a full range of business systems modernization management controls to ensure that its business system investments are the right solutions for addressing its business needs; that these investments are being managed to produce expected capabilities efficiently and cost-effectively; and that, ultimately, its business stakeholders are satisfied.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that both the corporate and component investment management processes are appropriately defined and institutionalized?

If confirmed, I would assess the investment review process the Department is using to review and certify business system investments and implement improved policies and procedures as necessary. The Department is currently implementing a Business Capability Lifecycle approach to acquiring business systems that emphasizes the use of well defined and relatively short increments of capability. Many of the Department's problems with business systems have stemmed from overly ambitious programs with severely underestimated budgets and schedules. The Business Capability Lifecycle approach is intended to constrain requirements and discipline programs to deliver testable and fieldable increments. I believe that adopting these practices will improve the results the Department achieves with its business systems investments.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that business system investments are managed with the kind of acquisition management rigor and discipline that is embodied in relevant guidance and best practices, so that each investment will deliver expected benefits and capabilities on time and within budget?

If confirmed, I would continue to implement the principles and initiatives outlined in the report to Congress, *A New Approach for Delivering Information Technology Capabilities in the Department of Defense*, which was signed by Deputy Secretary Lynn, and which provides an update on the Department's progress toward developing a new acquisition process for information capabilities. The Department has already begun this process through the implementation of the Business Capability Lifecycle, an alternative acquisition approach for defense business systems, pursuant to guidance I issued in my current role as Under Secretary on November 15, 2010. If confirmed, I would ensure that this alternative acquisition approach is followed and that the Department does not revert to the old way of doing business out of habit or inertia.

Do you believe that unique challenges to acquiring services related to information-technology (IT) systems may require an acquisition strategy or approach different from those used for acquiring property or services unrelated to IT systems?

Yes, I believe that there are unique challenges to acquiring services related to IT systems and we must tailor our acquisition strategies to meet these unique circumstances. In fact, the Department has already begun to adapt to the unique challenges of IT acquisition through the implementation of the Business Capability Lifecycle, an alternative acquisition approach for defense business systems.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that requirements management, systems testing, and data quality are improved and to help resolve other problems that have continued to hinder the Department's efforts to implement its automated systems on schedule, within cost and with the intended capabilities?

The issuance of the report to Congress, *A New Approach for Delivering Information Technology Capabilities in the Department of Defense*, and the November 15, 2010 directive requiring the use of the Business Capability Lifecycle are important initial steps, however, more work remains to be done. The Department is in the process of revising its acquisition process governing directives to incorporate this approach, but implementation has already begun on a case-by-case basis. If confirmed, I will actively pursue the implementation of these initiatives.

12. Defense Acquisition Reform

Two years ago, Congress enacted the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), without a dissenting vote in either House. WSARA is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition process.

What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements in the Defense acquisition process?

When I initially took office as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I received a mandate from Secretary Gates to improve the defense acquisition system, including weapon systems acquisition, and particularly acquisition in response to urgent operational needs. Shortly thereafter, the Administration supported, and Congress passed, the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA). I continue to support the improvements in the areas of defense acquisition organization and policy that are addressed in the WSARA. A number of the memos issued under the Department's Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative directly address WSARA mandates, ensuring that the Act's requirements are reflected not only in acquisition policy, but also in our acquisition practice. This is particularly true in the case of the Department's mandate that affordability be treated as a requirement at major acquisition milestones, supporting the Act's requirements that DoD examine trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance, and in the Department's emphasis on promoting competition. If confirmed, I would continue the effort to improve the defense acquisition system

consistent with the direction provided in WSARA. I would also continue to enforce the Better Buying Power guidance, based on WSARA, to target affordability and control cost growth, incentivize productivity and innovation in industry, promote real competition, improve tradecraft in services acquisition, and reduce non-productive processes and bureaucracy.

If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of the acquisition process – requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?

My experience as Under Secretary has deepened my belief that the acquisition process must be closely coordinated with the requirements and budget processes in order for the defense acquisition system to function properly. I believe that in the last two years the Department has improved in this area, but it remains an ongoing challenge. The Department has made the most significant improvement in the area of rapid acquisition through the use of coordinating entities such as the Senior Integration Group (SIG), previously known as the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device SIG (C-SIG), which regularly brings together the leadership of the three processes with theater commanders to coordinate action on fulfilling urgent wartime needs. In July of this year, the Department broadened the responsibilities of the SIG to cover all urgent warfighter requirements.

Prospectively, I believe it is necessary to create a closer alignment of the acquisition, requirements, and budget processes across the Department by expanding the type of cooperation and coordination we have instituted for urgent needs. If confirmed, I would make doing so a priority.

If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition accountability?

The Goldwater-Nichols Act established a chain of authority for the acquisition process that provides for clear accountability in a chain beginning with the Defense Acquisition Executive and extending through the Component Acquisition Executives to the program Executive Officers and Program Managers. I emphasized this chain of responsibility as Under Secretary and, if confirmed, would continue to do so as Deputy Secretary. Additionally, the acquisition process must be operated in close coordination with the requirements process and the budget process, and this requires active participation by DoD's senior leadership to ensure all three processes are properly coordinated and held accountable. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring accountability in all aspects of acquisition during my tenure.

As Under Secretary, I have also worked to reward productivity, and innovation in the defense industry by ensuring that the terms and conditions of our contracts fundamentally align contractors' incentives with the Department's interest so that our industry partners are accountable for performance not just to the Department but to their shareholders.

Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?

Since becoming Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I have expressed my belief that the unacceptable cost growth in far too many individual programs, combined with a habit of mind born from an unrealistic belief that the defense budget would keep growing, had to be reversed in order to avoid an affordability crisis in defense acquisition. With the recent passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Department will need to redouble its efforts to control cost growth in investment and reexamine all areas of the budget for affordability in the context of the caps put in place on discretionary spending. If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary in leading and managing the Department's review of all areas of the budget, including investment.

If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?

If confirmed, I would continue to implement all aspects of WSARA and the Better Buying Power Initiative to reverse unacceptable cost growth in our programs and activities.

Do you believe that the Department has adequately addressed its shortfalls in systems engineering and developmental testing capabilities, or does more remain to be done in these areas?

The Department has recognized and Congress has reinforced, with the WSARA, the need to reinvigorate and grow our capacity and capability in systems engineering and developmental testing and evaluation. I recognize the criticality of good systems engineering and strong developmental testing and evaluation to acquisition program success.

The Department has appointed strong technical leaders as Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Systems Engineering (DASD(SE)) and Developmental Test & Evaluation (DASD(DT&E)), implemented new and updated Department acquisition policy and guidance, grown and educated its technical workforce, and increased program engagement with our Major Defense Acquisition Programs in supporting effective systems engineering and developmental test and evaluation activities.

I believe that the resources and attention applied to these areas have been appropriate and I have supported the revitalization in these areas over the last two years, but I do not believe this work is done. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary and the Congress to ensure, within budget constraints, that we sustain the Department's commitment to grow a skilled acquisition workforce that provides the technical capabilities needed to deliver effective solutions to the warfighter on schedule and under budget.

Do you believe that additional steps are needed to ensure that WSARA principles are implemented on current major programs like the Joint Strike Fighter program?

WSARA principles have been widely implemented in the Department, but more can be done to implement them and extend them to non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The WSARA directly led to refined Department guidance and complementary policy initiatives that are positively affecting the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, as well as the other MDAPs. Subsequent to passage of WSARA, the JSF program was the subject of numerous reviews, culminating in a Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach certification review that was guided by the acquisition reform principles outlined in WSARA. The review incorporated the inputs of the WSARA-formed Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and also included the participation and assessments of the Office of Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA), and the Offices of the Director, Systems Engineering and Developmental Test and Evaluation. These organizational changes were instrumental in the completion of the thorough review and restructuring of the JSF program that resulted in the Nunn-McCurdy certification on June 2, 2010. The WSARA has also contributed to a renewed emphasis on sound systems engineering principles, realistic cost and schedule estimating, a re-energized focus on integrated test and evaluation, and implementation of tighter cost control measures across the MDAPs, to include JSF. Implementation of the Department's Better Buying Power guidance, reflecting WSARA principles, has also resulted in an increased emphasis on affordability and the incorporation of should-cost target goals for JSF and other MDAPs.

13. Role of Service Chiefs in the Acquisition Process

Some have suggested that the Service Chiefs should be given a different or expanded role in the acquisition of major systems. Others have expressed concern that such a change would reverse efforts in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation to reduce the layers between the Under Secretary and the program managers, and ensure that there was a dynamic tension between those who defined requirements (Service Chiefs) and those who filled the requirements (Service Acquisition Executives).

What do you believe is the appropriate role for Service Chiefs in the acquisition of major systems?

Goldwater-Nichols establishes a clear chain of authority for the acquisition process and I believe this chain of authority—program manager, program executive officer, component acquisition executive, defense acquisition executive—is appropriate for acquisition decisions. The acquisition process does not exist in isolation, however, and service chiefs play a major role as a result of their deep involvement in the budget and requirements processes, and because they fund, manage, and train the acquisition workforce of their

respective services. The acquisition process functions properly only when the Service Chiefs, acting through their chain of command, are actively involved.

14. Contracting for Services

Over the last decade, DOD's spending on contract services has more than doubled. As a result, the Department now spends more for the purchase of services than it does for products (including major weapon systems). You testified last year that "the low-hanging fruit really is [in contract services]. There's a lot of money. There has been a very, very high rate of growth over the last decade, in services. They have grown faster than everything else So, there's a lot we can do. I think great savings can be had there, across the Services' spend. It's essential that we look there, because that's half the money."

Do you believe that the cuts made to contract services pursuant to the efficiencies initiative fully addressed the issues of waste and inefficiency in this area, or are further reductions possible?

I believe the reductions the Department has made to date, primarily in the area of service support contracts performing staff augmentation functions, are a good start but are insufficient. Further reductions are possible. One of the major focus areas of the Better Buying Power Initiative the Department has instituted is to improve the Department's tradecraft in services acquisition.

What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to control the Department's spending on contract services?

Under the Better Buying Power initiative, the Department is working to have a cohesive and integrated strategy for services acquisition. The steps already taken include appointment of senior managers for acquisition of services in each Military Department, adoption of a standard taxonomy for services and identifying best practices, and revised contracting policies to increase the use of competition. Additional steps that can be taken include improved benchmarking against commercial experience and employment of stronger incentives for efficient performance. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that the Department focuses on those areas where we know improvements can be made so that we are not spending too much on contracted services.

15. Contractor Performance of Critical Governmental Functions

Over the last decade, the Department has become progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result, contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work

in the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions as DOD employees.

In your view, is DOD still too reliant on contractors to support the basic functions of the Department?

The appropriate balance between organic government performance and reliance on contractors is something that must be assessed function by function. Many functions are appropriate for contractor support; however, some functions, such as program management, are more appropriately performed by government personnel. Some functions are inherently governmental and should not be performed by contractors.

As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I worked to adjust this balance in the acquisition workforce, which had become overly reliant on contractors in a number of areas. As a result, and with the committee's assistance, the Department has significantly strengthened the civilian and military components of the acquisition workforce. At the same time, I communicated to our entire organization that contractors are an important component of the Department's Total Force. If confirmed, I would assess the issue of appropriate use of contractors across the Department to determine whether and where else DoD's reliance on contractors has become excessive.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to reduce the Department's reliance on contractors to perform critical functions?

I understand there are functions that are so critical to the Department's activities that some portion of the function must be performed organically for the Department to have sufficient internal capability to continue to be able to perform and control its operations. Critical functions must be assessed on a case-by-case basis because the level of internal capability required is dependent on the function in question. In my role as Under Secretary, I have sought to ensure that the Department retains sufficient organic capability for critical acquisition and logistics functions. At this time I believe the Department has identified and eliminated most, if not all, over-reliance on contractors for critical functions. Over the next few years, however, I believe the Department needs to be watchful to ensure that this trend is not reversed. As budgets decline and as the organic workforce is reduced, there is a risk that reliance on contractors may increase, particularly in response to new contingencies. As the Department reduces its overseas deployments, it must identify and retain critical capabilities that have been built up over the past decade, at least at the level required to rapidly redeploy those capabilities in response to changing needs. Contingency contracting is an example of the type of expertise that must be institutionalized and retained. If confirmed, I would continue to work to address any shortfalls in the Department's ability to perform critical functions using organic resources.

Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal services contracts is in the best interest of the Department of Defense?

I support the statutory framework that Congress has constructed governing the use of personal services contracts. I believe the Department should adhere to this framework. If confirmed, I would ensure that personal services contracts are not used inappropriately.

U.S. military operations in Iraq have relied on contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S. military operations. According to widely published reports, the number of U.S. contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has roughly equaled the number of U.S. military deployed in those countries.

Do you believe that the Department of Defense has become too dependent on contractor support for military operations?

Contractors are a necessary part of the Total Force. They provide the Department with the ability to obtain a mix of unique skill sets and knowledge that may not be available in our organic force structure and permit us to concentrate our organic resources on those areas that are inherently governmental. Contractors provide a broad range of supplies, services, and critical logistics support in many capability areas, while reducing military footprint and increasing the availability and readiness of resources. Based on our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe we should continue to improve and evolve our strategy regarding the use and management of contractors. At this time, I do not believe the Department is too dependent on contractors for support of operations; however, this is an area that will require continuous scrutiny, particularly as budgets and organic capabilities are reduced. If confirmed, I would ensure that this scrutiny is provided.

What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department should take to mitigate such risk?

Reliance on contractor support can lead to operational problems if contractors fail to perform. Experience has shown that a number of other problems can arise, including a potential for increased waste, fraud, and abuse; problems that arise from contractor interaction with local communities; and issues with the use of force.

In my role as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I have worked to ensure that these risks are mitigated. The study conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs regarding reliance on contracted support in contingency operations and the assessments being conducted by the Military Departments and agencies are key components in this effort. It is also critical to ensure adequate and appropriate planning for contractor support. The Department is integrating contractor support estimates into existing planning systems, and also ensuring that Operational Contract Support requirements are considered in force planning scenario development and joint force assessments. If confirmed, I would continue to monitor these initiatives closely.

Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?

Not yet, but there has been improvement and more is underway. At the start of our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department was not properly organized and staffed to manage contractors in the ongoing contingency operations effectively, but a number of corrective actions have been taken over the last several years. If confirmed, I would continue to oversee ongoing efforts to ensure DoD institutionalizes its contingency contracting capabilities and applies lessons learned from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan to future conflicts.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?

The Department needs to further ensure that training and contingency plans account realistically for the role of contractors on the modern battlefield; that adequate numbers of contracting officers, contracting officer representatives, and other skilled personnel are available to manage contractors; that there is transparency into contractor and subcontractor performance; that waste, fraud, and abuse, and corruption are prevented and vigorously punished; that DoD coordinates with civil agencies effectively; and that other measures identified by the Department are taken. Many of these actions are the same as those recommended by the Commission on Wartime Contracting.

16. Private Security Contractors

Do you believe the Department of Defense and other federal agencies should rely upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?

Without a substantial increase in the force structure committed to contingency operations, the use of contractors for some security functions in contingencies is a necessity. However, these security contractors must be properly regulated and supervised, and their roles must be carefully limited and defined. Contractors cannot engage in combat operations. Their use of force is limited to self-defense, the defense of others against violence, and the protection of critical property. Under these circumstances, I believe that the limited use of security contractors in contingency operations is acceptable. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on their use by other departments and agencies. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department continues its efforts to implement and enforce appropriate limitations on private security contractors.

In your view, has the United States' reliance upon private security contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan?

The use of force by contractors or military personnel could, if misapplied, undermine our policy objectives. Private security providers are a necessity in Iraq and Afghanistan and will likely continue to be so in future contingency operations. The Department of Defense has established policies and procedures to manage contractors effectively to prevent unnecessary violence that would be detrimental to our policy objectives and to address incidents where violence may occur. As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, I recently approved a revised instruction, DODI 3020.50, "Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises," which, as the title notes, expanded our oversight of such contractors from those operating in contingency areas to essentially all overseas operations. This is an area that requires constant attention.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?

If confirmed, I would continue to support the efforts already begun in this regard within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in the Military Services, and in the Combatant Commands. These efforts include development of Department-level policy, coordinating this policy with the Departments of State and Justice and other government agencies, and engaging the international community to provide a common framework for the proper roles and oversight of private security contractors and the enforcement of those policies during overseas operations by the appropriate authorities. The Administration recently published rules that will apply to private security contractors working for all federal agencies operating in overseas operations, consistent with DODI 3020.50.

Additionally, I believe that work remains to be done to ensure that Department of Defense instructions and Combatant Commander guidance and orders remain current, clear, and aligned with, with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives. Collaboration among the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and other governmental agencies must continue to ensure consistent policy is developed across the federal government and with potential coalition partners and host nations to promote a common interagency and international understanding of responsible use and oversight of private security services and binding enforceable standards for private security contractors operating in areas of combat operations.

Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of all federal agencies?

I support steps to ensure that there is accountability for the actions of all contractors performing work for the U.S. Government in an area of combat operations. If confirmed,

I would consult with DoD's interagency partners concerning appropriate mechanisms to ensure such accountability.

What is your view of the appropriate application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security contractors operating in an area of combat operations?

There must be an assurance of accountability for the actions of all contractors deployed to an area of combat operations. In most cases, the best option for handling cases involving contractors will be in the civil legal system. In my understanding that in cases where there is no jurisdiction under an effective civil legal system justice is one tool to consider for ensuring accountability.

What is your view of the recently signed International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers?

I believe that the endorsement of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service providers was an important step for improving the performance of security functions by all private security contractors, not just those under contract to the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. Codes of conduct, however, are aspirational and difficult to enforce. To make the Code effective, there needs to be auditable and measurable standards that exist separately from, and give teeth to, the principles of the Code: standards that are enforceable under contract law. Currently, the Department is sponsoring the development of business and operational standards for private security companies, and those which can be written into all Defense contracts for security functions. These standards are based on the principles described in the International Code of Conduct, along with the Montreux Document, and the regulations recently published in the Federal Register regarding private security functions.

17. Iraq Lessons Learned

What do you believe are the major lessons learned from the Iraq invasion, the effort to stabilize the country following that invasion, and the transition of security responsibility to the Government of Iraq?

One of the most important lessons is that 21st century conflict will occur along the entire spectrum of conflict. DoD cannot be prepared only for combat, but also must be prepared to assist in addressing the social, political, and economic factors that can fuel a conflict. The U.S. military must plan and train with its civilian counterparts and be prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict. Indeed, the need for greater capabilities and capacity in civilian agencies has been a recurring lesson for the entire U.S. government.

What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the Department's adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force structure, or operational concepts based upon these lessons learned?

Lessons learned from Iraq have led to wide-ranging changes in all of the areas listed above. For example, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine has been completely revised, culminating in the publication of Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. Force structure changes include the development of Advise and Assist Brigades. DoD has demonstrated the ability to learn and adapt across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy.

If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in Iraq?

I understand that many of the lessons from Iraq are in the process of being integrated into DoD policy and doctrine, and are contributing to the progress being made in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I would ensure that the integration of lessons learned from Iraq into policy and doctrine are carried through to completion.

18. Lead Agency Transition in Iraq

Responsibility and authority for lead U.S. agency in Iraq is scheduled this year to transition from Department of Defense (DOD) to Department of State (DOS). By October 2011, the Department of State is supposed to achieve an initial operating capability as lead agency and achieve full operating capability by December.

What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the planning and progress on executing this transition from DOD to DOS? In your view, what are the sources of greatest risk, if any, to the current plan and successful implementation of this transition?

DoD, DoS, and other agencies and departments have undertaken unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the transition in Iraq. As USD(AT&L), my office has had some role in the logistics and contracting aspects of the transition plan, and my observation is that DoD has an excellent working relationship with DoS, and the two departments are working together at all levels to achieve a successful transition. As one would expect with a transition of this scope and complexity, challenges exist, and DoD is doing everything it can to help set up DoS for success. The greatest source of risk would be failure to provide the State Department with adequate funding in FY12 in order to implement a successful transition of the U.S. mission from DoD to State.

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to the current plan or actions for implementation of the transition?

If confirmed, I would carefully monitor the transition with other senior Defense leaders and make any necessary recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

19. Stability and Support Operations

The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-conflict situations.

In your view, what is the appropriate allocation of roles and responsibilities, if any, between the Department of Defense and other departments and agencies of the Federal Government in the planning and conduct of stability operations?

Ideally, DoD would provide support to civilian agencies such as the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Justice in the planning and conduct of stability operations. But, when directed, DoD has led stability operations activities to establish civil security and control and to restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, deliver humanitarian assistance, and then has transitioned lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments' security forces, and international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. If confirmed, I would ensure that DoD operates within U.S. Government and international structures for managing civil-military operations, and would seek to enable the deployment and use of civilian capabilities and resources, as directed and as appropriate.

In developing the capabilities necessary for stability operations, what adjustments, if any, should be made to prepare U.S. Armed Forces to conduct stability operations without detracting from its ability to perform combat missions?

Stability operations are a core mission that DoD must be ready to carry out with proficiency equivalent to high-intensity combat operations. Although this represents a cultural shift for DoD, we understand that all of our Military Departments must adequately train, organize, and equip forces to conduct such missions. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary, the Chairman, and leadership of the Military Departments to ensure that DoD is preparing U.S. forces for stability operations.

Do you believe that the U.S. government needs to establish new procedures to manage stability operations? If so, why?

I think we need to strengthen the U.S. Government's collective ability to plan together and be more collaborative in designing stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Department is working with interagency partners to identify areas where we can improve planning efforts.

20. Drawdown in Iraq

Do you support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement of 2008 signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki?

As the President has stated, we intend to fulfill our obligations under the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which requires all U.S. forces to withdraw by the end of the year. I would also note, however, that it is possible that the United States and Iraq could agree on follow-on arrangements that could include continued presence of U.S. forces in Iraq after 2011. I support this plan.

If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you support the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?

On August 2, Iraqi bloc leaders stated that they have agreed to mandate the Iraqi Government start talks with the United States. Talks are focused on training assistance under the Strategic Framework Agreement, given the Iraqi Security Forces' requirement for further development. I agree that we should talk to them about their request.

21. U.S.-Iraq Strategic Relationship

In your view, what will be the nature of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship after December 31st, 2011?

The United States is committed to a long-term partnership with Iraq, as outlined in the November 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, which describes a security relationship that addresses Iraqi needs and advances U.S. interests.

What do you see as the greatest challenges for that relationship over the coming years?

Our greatest challenge is to ensure continued U.S. engagement and support for Iraq in an austere budget environment. The United States is at a critical point in its relationship with Iraq as U.S. forces draw down and the State Department becomes the lead U.S. Agency for the mission. Recent turmoil in the broader Middle East highlights the importance of active U.S. engagement and maintaining strategic partnerships with regional partners based on mutual interests and mutual respect.

22. Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Strategy

Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?

Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set forth, and I believe it is the right strategy. A focused counterinsurgency campaign will allow us to help the Afghans build security forces and government capacity capable of providing the security and basic services necessary to achieve a peaceful, stable Afghanistan that does not again become a safe haven for terrorists.

If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an increase in counter-terrorism action in Afghanistan?

I believe the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. The Administration tracks metrics on progress toward its objectives in Afghanistan throughout the year, and the Department is constantly assessing and adjusting its implementation of the overall strategy. Counter-terrorism is a significant part of the counter-insurgency strategy, and managing the balance of all aspects of the strategy is an ongoing process.

What is your assessment of the progress of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?

Important gains have been made over the past twenty-four months, establishing security and the authority of the Afghan Government in former Taliban strongholds, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar where we focused our surge forces, as well as building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. The momentum has shifted to the Afghan Government supported by Coalition forces, and the transition process has begun with the Afghan Government assuming lead security responsibilities in several areas of the country this summer. This progress is, however, fragile and reversible.

23. Transition of Security Responsibility in Afghanistan and U.S. Troop Reductions

On June 22nd, President Obama announced his decision to draw down 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year and to withdraw the remaining 23,000 “surge” force by next summer, for a total drawdown of 33,000.

Do you support the President’s decision to begin reducing U.S. forces in July 2011? Why or why not?

Yes. I support a responsible conditions-based drawdown as called for by the President. I believe we have made the progress necessary to allow us to begin to bring home U.S. surge forces. As USD(AT&L), I have worked through my co-chairmanship of the Senior

Integration Group (SIG) to ensure that the forces in Afghanistan grow in overall capability even as the U.S. troop presence begins to decrease.

Do you support the President's decision regarding the size and pace of reductions in U.S. forces? Why or why not?

Yes. I believe we have made the progress necessary to allow us to begin to bring home U.S. surge forces.

At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, the participants in the International Security Assistance Force endorsed President Karzai's goal of the Afghanistan National Security Forces having the primary responsibility for providing security throughout Afghanistan by 2014. Last month, transition of lead responsibility for security from ISAF forces to Afghan security forces began in seven areas around Afghanistan.

Do you support the goal of transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan security forces by 2014?

Yes. The transition of security-lead to the ANSF in the first tranche of provinces and municipalities has progressed smoothly and without any significant uptick in violence in those areas. Our transition strategy, as stated at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Conference, is to complete security transition nation-wide by the end of 2014. Transition remains conditions-based. The ISAF Commander and NATO Senior Civilian Representative are working together to refine the transition process to take into account the gradual drawdown of Coalition forces, declining funding, and the need to focus enablers and resources in contested areas as we move forward with transition.

How important is it to the civil-military campaign in Afghanistan that the initial round of transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan security forces begins this summer and be completed by the end of the year?

Successful transition depends upon sufficient development and capable governance to underpin security gains. The timetable is and should be conditions-based.

24. Afghanistan National Security Forces

What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)?

In partnership with U.S. and NATO forces, the ANSF have made enormous progress in size and quality over the past two years and remain ahead of schedule for their growth targets this year. In addition, both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have made significant gains in effectiveness and professionalism. The establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program has also fostered greater

local capability to resist insurgents. However, real challenges remain, for example, in stemming attrition rates.

Do you support the proposed increase in the size of the ANSF to the level of 352,000 personnel by 2012?

Military commanders who are the closest to the issue have conducted detailed analyses of ANSF personnel and capabilities requirements and have concluded that right now, a level of 352,000 personnel appears to be the right force size, although the balance of forces between the Army and Police may change over time. President Obama and NATO have endorsed that growth to 352,000 personnel, and I support those decisions.

What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges?

Some of the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF include poor literacy rates and low education levels in the Afghan population, which constrain the development of more advanced ANSF capabilities such as logistics, aviation, medical, and communications. These capabilities will be necessary for an increasingly self-sufficient ANSF to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has put considerable attention on, and resources toward, the literacy problem. Another key challenge is the development of strong and capable leaders, which takes time and experience to cultivate. If confirmed, I would work with military and civilian leaders and international partners to explore ways to bolster ANSF capacity.

If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have to address challenges relating to the sustainment of the ANSF over the long-term?

We need to challenge our planning assumptions continually to ensure the Afghans are developing a security force that is sustainable, in terms of size, capabilities, and cost. We need to continue to resist providing certain advanced aviation and armor capabilities that do not appear to be necessary for Afghan security and are likely to be unsustainable over the long term. Currently, the United States provides the bulk of funding for the Afghan National Security Forces. We need to continue to urge other countries to increase the amounts they contribute. For example, former Secretary of Defense Gates challenged NATO Allies and partners to contribute a combined one billion euros annually to the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund.

25. Afghan Governance and Development

While improving security for the Afghan people is a key component of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, the success of that strategy also depends on

improving the Government of Afghanistan’s capacity to provide governance, better services and economic development. Significant concerns remain over the performance of the Government of Afghanistan in meeting the needs of the Afghan people and fighting corruption.

What do you see as the role for the Department of Defense in building the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better governance, improve economic development and fight corruption in Afghanistan?

Improving governance and economic development is crucial to our strategy in Afghanistan. Although the Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the lead agencies within the U.S. Government on governance and development initiatives in Afghanistan, DoD contributes to this effort and cooperates closely with DOS and USAID. Coordinating DoD stabilization projects with civilian reconstruction and development efforts ensures that the military and civilian activities work together to support longer-term development objectives, as well as near-term stabilization.

26. U.S. Strategic Relationship with Pakistan

What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to Pakistan?

Our relationship with Pakistan is not always easy, but it is vital to our national security and to our regional interests. The core national security goal remains to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates to ensure that they do not have safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to eliminate their capacity to threaten the United States, our Allies, and interests abroad. Al Qaeda and other extremists continue to use safe havens in Pakistan to plot and prepare attacks against the United States and our Allies and partners, and it is essential to continue working with Pakistan to eliminate these safe havens.

The fact that Pakistan is a nuclear state that faces internal threats from extremist organizations adds to the urgency of these requirements. Furthermore, U.S. economic interests in South Asia require stability in the region. Preventing, if possible, a potential Pakistan-India conflict is another important strategic interest. For these reasons, it is in the United States’ interest for Pakistan to have a strong, civilian-led government and an open society, to live in peace and security with its neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets remain secure, in accordance with international standards. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress as we pursue these strategic interests with Pakistan.

What in your view are the key lessons from the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship?

The key lesson from the raid is that the U.S. must act when U.S. vital national interests are at stake, including unilaterally, if other options present too much risk to mission success. A second lesson is that the Pakistan sanctuary for al Qaeda, Afghan insurgents, and other terrorist groups remains a threat to U.S. vital national interests that must be eliminated. A third lesson is that the U.S. must remain engaged in Pakistan to secure its vital interests, and that Pakistan needs the U.S. as much as the U.S. needs Pakistan.

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-military relations?

Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like our overall relationship, has experienced good and bad periods. If confirmed, I would continue to support the Department of Defense's efforts, in coordination with our interagency partners, to improve our counterterrorism cooperation and develop a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan, aimed at advancing shared national security objectives.

27. U.S. Assistance to Pakistan

Since 2001, the United States has provided significant military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing and training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the United States has provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom.

How effective, in your view, has this assistance been in improving Pakistan's efforts and commitment to counter terrorists in Pakistan?

Security-related assistance, Coalition Support Fund reimbursements, and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan forces have helped enable Pakistan's counterinsurgency campaign. Since 2009, Pakistan has undertaken counterinsurgency operations against extremist organizations in its northwest areas, including in Swat, South Waziristan, Mohmand, and Bajaur, with varying levels of success. If confirmed, I would work with Congress to ensure that the support we provide is yielding the results we seek.

What conditions or factors should the Department take into consideration in determining whether additional U.S. military assistance should be provided to Pakistan in the future?

The current "train-advise-equip" programs with the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important component in pursuing the near-term objective of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries and disrupting the al Qaeda network. It is vital, however,

that Pakistan live up to its responsibilities, including to cooperate more fully in counterterrorism matters, to expand its counterinsurgency campaign, and to cease providing sanctuary to Afghan Taliban and other militant groups perceived to be beneficial to the Pakistani state. Future requests for security-related assistance will be informed by Pakistan's steps in these areas. Additionally, all U.S. security-related assistance will continue to be provided to Pakistan in accordance with the Leahy vetting requirements.

28. Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda

In your view, will the death of Osama Bin Laden have a significant impact on the conflict against Al Qaeda and if so, how?

The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant blow to al Qaeda and brings us closer to that organization's strategic defeat. However, Al Qaeda remains a potent, dangerous, and adaptable foe. Even as the core al Qaeda organization is weakened, decentralized affiliates and adherents pose a continuing threat to the United States.

What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda affiliates to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more broadly? And, which affiliates are of most concern?

Al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents are diverse, dispersed, and decentralized. They are present in the Arabian Peninsula, North and East Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere around the globe, including within the United States. Their intent and ability to attack the United States varies by group, but striking the homeland is a common theme in their propaganda and planning. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has already demonstrated both the intent and the capability to conduct attacks against the United States. Also, despite the death of Bin Laden, core al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region remain a persistent and serious threat.

29. Somalia

Somalia is a collapsed state with a weak government unable to project either power or stability or to provide services to its people in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. Somalia is also a training and operations hub for: al Shabab and other violent extremists; pirates operating in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Peninsula; illicit traffickers of weapons, humans, and drugs; and remnants of the al Qaeda East Africa cell that was responsible for the destruction of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August of 1998.

What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Shabab to the U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S. homeland?

The threat from al Shabab to the U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S. homeland is significant. Al Shabab leaders, who have claimed affiliation with al Qaeda since 2007, are developing ties with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and are showing an increasing desire to stage international terrorist attacks in addition to their acts of violence inside Somalia. Al Shabab employs several hundred foreign fighters and regularly tries to recruit fighters from Somali diaspora communities in the United States and Europe. Al Shabab continues to repress the Somali people – it is not a coincidence that the areas in Somalia where the UN has declared famine conditions to exist are areas under al Shabab’s control.

Further, Somalia’s lack of governance and sparse population could make it appealing as a safe haven for al Qaeda. As al Qaeda undergoes leadership changes and regroupings from counterterrorism operations in Pakistan, we need to ensure that it does not relocate its center of operations to Somalia.

Given your knowledge of the role of the various U.S. Government Departments and Agencies in the Horn of Africa, what changes, if any, would you make to DOD’s current role in the Horn of Africa?

I understand DoD’s primary mission in the Horn of Africa is to build partner-nation capacity in order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests. I believe this mission is appropriate. I am informed U.S. Africa Command is undertaking a review of East Africa to determine how our military efforts in the region work in concert with our interagency partners to achieve our collective regional goals and counter al Qaeda’s linkages to elements of al Shabab. DoD’s ultimate goal should be a fully integrated strategy under which security assistance, capacity building, operational collaboration with regional partners, and counter-terrorism actions are synchronized to provide the regional security and stability that is in the interest of both the United States and our regional partners.

If confirmed, I would work to ensure our strategy is developed as part of a coordinated U.S. national security policy towards the Horn of Africa, and to determine how the DoD can and should best support this policy.

30. Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

A number of senior U.S. officials have indicated that the most significant threat to the U.S. homeland currently emanates from Yemen.

What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen?

I understand the United States is disappointed by President Saleh’s continued refusal to transfer power. U.S. leaders continue to urge him to do so immediately, and to ensure that the legitimate will of the Yemeni people is respected. The U.S. continues to work

with European and Gulf Cooperation Council partners to facilitate a peaceful and orderly transition of power.

The ongoing unrest has weakened an already fragile economy and allowed Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to expand its influence. Despite this, U.S. goals in Yemen remain the same: to help Yemen deny AQAP a safe haven and operational platform and to ensure Yemen is stable, unified, and economically viable.

AQAP has attempted two dramatic attacks on the United States since December 2009, and has expressed intent to try again. AQAP attack planning demonstrates sophisticated and innovative techniques, such as concealed explosive devices and printer cartridge bombs. AQAP is also increasingly attempting to recruit and radicalize would-be terrorists in the West through its extensive media outreach, increasing the threat of lone-wolf terrorists inspired by AQAP.

The Administration has just released a comprehensive National Strategy for Counterterrorism that calls for a collaborative U.S.-Yemeni effort to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that DoD plays a constructive and appropriate role in carrying out this strategy.

Given the ongoing political upheaval and splintering of the military in Yemen, what are your views on the U.S. continuing to provide security assistance – most significantly DOD section 1206 funding – to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?

As with every country, we are regularly evaluating U.S. assistance and counterterrorism cooperation to ensure that the assistance to be provided is appropriate and effective. The Republic of Yemen Government is a critical partner in the war against Al Qaeda, and the Department must be particularly mindful of the continued and growing threat to the United States from AQAP. Given the challenges unfolding in Yemen, the U.S. will need to continually re-evaluate the partnership.

31. China

Much has been made about the economic and military growth in China and what that growth might mean in terms of regional and global security.

From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how is that growth influencing the U.S. security posture in Asia and the Pacific?

In terms of regional security, China's economic growth has increased China's international profile and influence, and has enabled China's leaders to embark upon and sustain a comprehensive transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale of

China's military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raises many questions, both within the United States and the region as a whole, about China's future.

From my perspective, DoD has a special responsibility to monitor China's military and to deter conflict. Through a robust forward presence, prudent capability developments, and sustained action to strengthen alliances and partnerships, DoD can support our national interest in promoting a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.

What do you believe are the objectives of China's military modernization program?

China appears to be building the capability to fight and win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, including possible U.S. military intervention. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery. Beijing's growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through modernization of its nuclear forces, and improving other strategic capabilities such as space and counter-space operations and computer network operations.

How do you believe the United States should respond to China's military modernization program?

The United States has been and should remain the pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region. Our response to China's military modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our Alliances and partnerships.

U.S-China military-to-military dialogue has been strained over the past several years and efforts to establish and maintain mutually beneficial military relations has been hampered by China's propensity for postponing or canceling military engagements in an apparent effort to influence U.S. actions. Since the beginning of 2011, there have been a number of senior-level meetings between U.S. and Chinese military officials, including visits to China by Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, and a visit to U.S. by the People's Liberation Army Chief of Staff, General Chen. By most accounts, gains from these meeting have been modest at best, but they do represent an encouraging step towards perhaps a more mutually beneficial understanding between the militaries of our countries.

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations and what would be your intention, if confirmed, regarding these relations?

I have long supported a continuous dialogue between the armed forces of the United States and China to expand practical cooperation where our national interests converge and to discuss candidly those areas where we have disagreement. Such dialogue can be especially important during periods of friction and turbulence.

I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region, and to press China to partner with the United States and our Asian allies and partners in addressing common security challenges.

What is your view of the relative importance of sustained military-to-military relations with China?

President Obama and President Hu have expressed that a healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military relationship is an essential part of their shared vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. I fully agree with that assertion.

Do you believe that we should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly work if China is willing to reciprocate with transparent and substantive discussions. If confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.

32. North Korea

North Korea represents one of the greatest near term threats to regional security and stability. This seriousness of the threat is seen by North Korea's continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and ballistic missile program, and particularly, over the past year, by North Korea's unprovoked and deadly attacks against South Korea – specifically the attack on the Republic of Korea navy ship Cheonan in March 2010 and the artillery attack on South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

North Korea's large conventional military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including uranium enrichment, present a serious threat to the United States, our allies in the region, and to the international community. The two North Korean attacks against South Korea last year provide a sober reminder that Pyongyang is

willing to utilize its capabilities to undertake provocative actions. If confirmed, I would intend to monitor the security situation on the Korean Peninsula closely; work for the continued transformation of our alliances and partnerships in the region; and maintain the military capabilities necessary to protect our interests, defend our allies, and deter North Korea from acts of aggression and intimidation.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

North Korea's missile and WMD programs pose a direct and serious threat to our regional allies and partners and have the potential to become a direct threat to U.S. territory. The United States must continue to monitor carefully North Korea's WMD and missile development programs and related proliferation activities. If confirmed, I would ensure that DoD continues to work closely with other parts of the U.S. Government to address these and other emerging threats, reduce our vulnerabilities and those of our allies and partners, and work cooperatively with our allies to ensure our contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.

In your view are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?

I understand that DoD, with its interagency partners, has taken several steps to prevent North Korea's proliferation of weapons-related technology, including working to advance international nonproliferation norms and cooperating with partner nations to inspect and interdict vessels and aircraft suspected of carrying illicit cargo. If confirmed, I would continue to work to strengthen international consensus against proliferation, invest in capacity-building programs with partner nations, and increase WMD-related information sharing with international partners.

33. Law of the Sea Convention

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is pending consideration in the United States Senate.

What is your view on whether or not the United States should join the Law of the Sea convention?

I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.

How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention help or hinder the United States' security posture in the Asia-Pacific region?

Being a party to the Law of the Sea Convention would not hinder the U.S. security posture in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, it would enhance our leadership and ability to influence future developments in the law of the sea, strengthen our position in bilateral discussions with the People's Republic of China, and improve our position in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2007, "The legal framework that the Convention establishes is essential to the mission of the Department of Defense, and the Department of Homeland Security concurs that it is also essential for their mission. For that reason, Secretary Gates, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Department Secretaries, all of the Combatant Commanders, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard join me in asking the Senate to give its swift approval for U.S. Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention and ratification of the 1994 Agreement."

34. Department of Defense Counternarcotics

On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1.5 billion to support the Department's CN operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that DOD "does not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities." This is the second such finding relating to DOD CN in the last decade.

What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?

I understand that the Department's counternarcotics activities are intended to perform important roles, including detection and monitoring of drug trafficking bound for the United States, counternarcotics support to law enforcement agencies, drug demand reduction for the Armed Services, and critical support for Combatant Commanders' efforts to confront drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime that support terrorists, insurgents, and other criminal groups. If confirmed, I would assess the Department's progress against these goals.

In your view, should DOD continue to play a role in attempting to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?

Yes. In support of the National Drug Control Strategy, DoD plays an important, statutory role as the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking bound for the U.S. Additionally, as outlined in the President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime released in July 2011, drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime pose a national security threat to the United States. The enemies we face on the battlefield today are increasingly financed through non-traditional means, including through drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. Just as the Department has

long been focused on how traditional, state-funded adversaries are supported, we must use all of the tools at our disposal to attack the sources of revenue that support the asymmetrical threat we face today and are likely to face for the foreseeable future. Transnational organized crime contributes to global instability by undermining legitimate government institutions, fostering corruption, and distorting legitimate economic activity. The Department's efforts to build the counternarcotics capabilities of partner nation security forces serve to prevent and deter broader conflicts that could require a much more costly military intervention in the future.

In your view, should DOD continue to fund the National Guard Counterdrug Program for Youth Intervention and local law enforcement education programs that may be duplicative of the efforts of other agencies, using CN funds?

I am aware of the purposes of this program, and, if confirmed, will assess its level of funding.

35. Engagement Policy

One of the central pillars of our recent national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises, combatant commander (COCOM) exercises, humanitarian demining operations, and other engagement activities have been used to achieve this goal.

Do you believe that these activities contribute positively to U.S. national security?

Yes, the Department of Defense's engagement activities encourage and enable partner nations to provide political support, to give us access to territory and resources, to secure and govern their territory more effectively, and to contribute to regional and global security. Partner support reduces our risk around the world and enables U.S. deterrence and, when necessary, military actions. Further, enabling our foreign partners to provide for their own security and contribute to multilateral security efforts is an investment that pays immediate and long-term dividends by reducing the need for costlier U.S. interventions in response to turmoil in regions critical to U.S. interests. I believe that taken on the whole, these engagement activities are a cost-effective way to strengthen our national security posture by building lasting relationships and alliances with partner nations.

If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military?

Yes, I believe that maintaining cooperative security relationships with foreign militaries will be imperative for DoD in the foreseeable future.

What improvements, if any, would you suggest to the COCOM or interagency process for undertaking these activities?

As with stability operations and security sector assistance, DoD's investment in international engagement is most effective when coordinated with USG civilian counterparts with adequate capacity. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department works closely with other agencies to ensure that the U.S. military plans and trains with our interagency civilian counterparts, that we are jointly prepared to engage with partner nations to prevent conflicts and, if prevention fails, to respond effectively in all phases of conflict.

36. Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”).

In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

Our primary objective in building the capacity of foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries’ internal security, and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn, mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States and promotes interoperability between our forces.

37. Special Operations Forces

The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces and enablers that directly support their operations.

Do you believe that we should further increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?

U.S. Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM’s) current throughput is programmed to meet the growth mandated by the last two QDRs. This planned special operations personnel growth, at the rate of three to five percent per year, includes Navy SEAL, Army Special Forces and Special Operations Aviation, and combat and combat support personnel. Until that programmed growth is complete, I do not believe it is prudent to consider additional growth to the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community.

In your view, how can the size of special operations forces be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?

Special Operations Forces (SOF) cannot be mass produced. As Admiral McRaven has pointed out, Special Operations growth should stay between three to five percent per year in order to ensure quality of the manpower being produced. This is the pace USSOCOM has sustained over the past several years and is on track to sustain over the next several years. However, as the security landscape has changed, the demands for indirect kinds of missions have begun to exceed the ability of the Special Operations community alone to meet. As a partial remedy to this situation, the 2010 QDR recommended expanding general purpose forces' capacities and capabilities to execute some missions that used to fall exclusively to SOF. I support this recommendation.

In recent years, special operations forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) Title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities special operations forces are carrying out around the world.

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?

The Department uses a range of processes, such as the Unified Command Plan, to review the mission sets and responsibilities it assigns to USSOCOM on an ongoing basis. Additionally, the language in Section 167 of Title 10, United States Code, includes "such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense," which provides the President and the Secretary of Defense the flexibility needed to meet changing circumstances. At this time, I would not advocate significant changes to USSOCOM's Title 10 missions, though, if confirmed, I would review these responsibilities.

Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

At this time, I would not advocate significant changes to USSOCOM's Title 10 missions.

What can be done to ensure that indirect special operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

The activities of Special Operations Forces are significantly varied, from strikes and counterterrorist raids to working by, with, and through local partners, whether that be in the form of training and advising foreign counterparts or providing support to civilian authorities abroad. I believe that each of these missions is an essential component of the

Department's national security responsibilities and highly valued within the Special Operations community. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that investments are made in an appropriately balanced way.

38. Russia

What are the areas of engagement with Russia that are most beneficial from a Department of Defense perspective? How would you recommend carrying out such engagement?

I understand that the Department has a robust engagement plan with the Russian Armed Forces through two working groups under the Bilateral Presidential Commission: (1) the Defense Relations Working Group (co-chaired by the Secretary of Defense and the Russian Minister of Defense) and (2) the Military Cooperation Working Group (co-chaired by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Russian Chief of the General Staff). The Defense Relations Working Group focuses on high-level policy issues, such as missile defense cooperation, defense technology cooperation, security issues, and defense reform. The Military Cooperation Working Group focuses on military-to-military cooperation, including counter-terrorism, Afghanistan-Pakistan, crisis response and counter-piracy. Services Chiefs and Combatant Commanders (particularly U.S. European, Pacific, and Northern Commands) also take part in military-to-military engagement activities contained in a mutually agreed upon annual work plan. Combined, these efforts strive to increase transparency and maintain direct and frank lines of communication, and I support their continuation and strengthening.

As Russia and the United States implement the New START Treaty, do you believe that it will be possible to begin a discussion on tactical nuclear weapons, and are there any conditions that you believe should be precedent to such discussions?

As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States intends to pursue further reductions in strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons with Russia, including both deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons. Because of the verification challenges associated with limiting non-strategic and non-deployed weapons, I believe that a discussion of potential cooperation measures would be useful as an early component of discussions on reductions and strengthened security measures.

39. DoD's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

The CTR program was historically focused primarily on eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the states of the former Soviet Union. The emphasis of the program is beginning to shift away from Russia and to new threats, such as biological weapons surveillance mechanisms in Africa and elsewhere.

In your view, what still needs to be done to reduce the proliferation threat from the residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union?

I have been involved in the Nunn-Lugar program from its inception and continue to participate in its management as USD(AT&L). I believe the countries of the former Soviet Union have made significant progress to reduce the threats associated with the extensive Soviet WMD programs, facilities, and stockpiles in their territories. In many cases this was accomplished with the support and assistance of DoD's Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The threat posed by WMD terrorism underscores the need for continued attention to residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD and materials. Where and when host governments are unable to mitigate this threat on their own, CTR and other U.S. programs should work with these nations to reduce these threats through the dismantlement of WMD and associated infrastructure and the consolidation and securing of WMD and related technology.

Are Russia and the former Soviet Union countries now making a significant contribution to efforts to reduce the proliferation threats they inherited?

It is my understanding that, through direct national funding as well as collaboration with U.S. agencies and other international partners, Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) are making significant contributions to reduce proliferation threats they inherited and to address new ones.

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program continues to be DoD's principal vehicle to support these activities. FSU countries are partnering with CTR and other U.S. programs to reduce a variety of Soviet-era WMD threats within their borders and the region. As a specific example, we continue a strong partnership with the Government of Kazakhstan to destroy, secure, and consolidate dangerous pathogens and improve Central Asia's capacity to prevent and respond to a bioterrorism attack.

What do you see as the key remaining objectives of the CTR program in Russia?

I view the key remaining objectives of CTR in Russia to be the prevention of proliferation and WMD terrorism through dismantlement of WMD and associated infrastructure; consolidation and security of WMD and related technology; transition of sustainment responsibilities for U.S.-provided security upgrades to the Russian Ministry of Defense; increased transparency; and support to bilateral defense and military cooperation, with the goal of reducing WMD threats.

Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State Department?

From my current position, I appreciate that DoD's CTR mission is executed with strong White House leadership, essential support from the Department of State, and in close cooperation with the Department of Energy and other interagency partners. Robust collaboration across U.S. agencies and interagency coordination is a hallmark of the program and key to its effectiveness. If confirmed, I would continue efforts to maximize coordination and cooperation with our interagency and international partners.

As the CTR program expands to geographic regions beyond the states of the former Soviet Union, in your view what proliferation and threat reduction goals should the DOD establish?

In my current position with responsibility for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, I have made it a priority to expand the geographic reach of the CTR program beyond the former Soviet Union. WMD threats are global, and DoD has substantial experience in building partner capacity to address WMD threats worldwide. The President has highlighted the threats posed by nuclear and biological terrorism as key proliferation concerns requiring international attention. In line with these priorities, DoD's goals for the program are: (1) reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons threats; (2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile material; (3) detecting, eliminating, and preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons and biological materials; and (4) encouraging development of capabilities to reduce proliferation threats among key partners and regions.

40. Prompt Global Strike

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the United States will continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the effort is early in the technology and testing phase. One test failed and the second test will occur in August.

In your view, is there a role for a conventional prompt global strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national security in the near future?

The Department continues to investigate options for this unique capability. It is envisioned that a conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capability could be useful in certain scenarios involving regional adversaries considering an attack using weapons of mass destruction or against high priority non-state adversaries. It may also serve a unique role in situations where a fleeting, serious threat was located in a region not readily accessible by other means.

What approach to implementation of this capability would you expect to pursue if confirmed?

DoD is developing and testing technologies relevant to both land-based and sea-based CPGS concepts. It would be premature to make any decisions regarding a future acquisition strategy or development concept for this technology until this concept assessment has been completed.

In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike capability?

As with other weapon systems, effective employment of CPGS weapons would depend on the availability of timely and accurate intelligence on the nature, location, and disposition of a potential target. Given the precision and promptness inherent in the CPGS concept, the intelligence requirements for this system would be especially demanding.

41. Nuclear Weapons and Stockpile Stewardship

Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to the Congress the continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

As the stockpile continues to age, and as the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, what do you view as the greatest challenges with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile?

The most recent certification of the stockpile, completed in April 2011, indicates the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. The greatest challenge, as reflected in the comments of the national security laboratory directors, concerns the long-term sustainment and viability of the stockpile and the supporting infrastructure. As the weapons complex and nuclear stockpile continue to age, efforts to sustain them are becoming more costly and technically difficult. Since the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, substantial financial and political commitments have been made to address age-related issues in the nuclear weapons complex. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress and the Department of Energy on this effort to maintain the skills, capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of our nuclear stockpile in a constrained budget environment.

If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing?

If the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program remains adequately funded to maintain critical technical and manufacturing capabilities, I believe it is likely to continue to be effective. My recommendation on what steps to take in the event that the stockpile could not be certified as safe, secure, and reliable would depend upon the causes of the problems in the stockpile, and what technical steps would be needed to address them.

As the current Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, what are the most significant issues facing the Council?

The continued safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear stockpile is the most significant challenge facing the Council, and it is important to meet this challenge in a cost-effective manner. It is essential that the United States continue to invest in critical technical and manufacturing capabilities and infrastructure. If confirmed, I will make this a priority and continue the strong partnership between the Departments of Defense and Energy that is essential to maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

Do you agree that the full funding of the President's plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?

If confirmed, I would continue to work to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and to advocate for the required funding. Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile is a critical national security priority, and the Section 1251 report represents the Administration's current best estimate of required funding. At the same time, like DoD delivery system sustainment and modernization efforts, NNSA nuclear weapons complex modernization must be undertaken in a cost-effective manner. The DoD has already taken steps to reduce the estimated cost of the Ohio-class replacement ballistic missile submarine and new Long-Range Strike Family of Systems.

Can DOD afford the plan set out in the report?

Given the potentially significant future budget reductions we are facing, the DoD is examining all programs for affordability and national security requirements, including our plans for modernization of the nuclear enterprise. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress to ensure that our most critical national security investments, including those in the nuclear enterprise, are balanced with the realities of the current fiscal environment.

Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START Treaty limits for the deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?

I support the Obama Administration's agenda for reducing global nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, as outlined in the 2010 Nuclear

Posture Review. I also support the NPR's conclusion: "The United States will retain the smallest possible nuclear stockpile consistent with our need to deter adversaries, reassure our allies, and hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise." Reductions below the New START Treaty limits must only be considered in the context of the geopolitical environment and the status of our nuclear stockpile and the enterprise modernization effort.

42. Tactical Fighter Programs

Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will face over the next several years is the set of programs to modernize our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology, to include the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the requirements for and timing of these programs?

Based on current and projected threats, I believe it is critical that we transition to a 5th generation capability across the Services while maintaining sufficient legacy inventory capacity to prevail in current and near-term conflicts. Over the next 10 years, the Department's 5th generation capability will grow from a relatively small percentage to approximately one third of the TACAIR force structure. In the 20 years that follow, JSF will become the mainstay of the force. We need JSF to deal with advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles worldwide, especially in the stressing electronic warfare environments of the future. Additionally, the F-22A modernization program will provide improved capability to ensure the U.S. is unmatched in both fighter and ground attack capability as JSF begins operational employment. To ensure we have sufficient capacity of fighter attack aircraft during the transition period, the Department has continued the production of the F/A-18E/F, extended the service life of the Department of Navy's older F/A-18s, and invested in affordable F-15, F-16 and A-10 sustainment and modernization efforts.

What is your view on the affordability of these programs?

I believe affordability is critical to these programs, as well as all of our acquisition programs and services. As Under Secretary, I have instituted a number of strategic initiatives designed to target affordability and control cost growth. Examples include establishing an affordability target at Milestone (MS) A for both production and sustainment costs and the requirement to report on systems engineering trades showing how key design features affect the target cost at MS B. Additionally, I believe the establishment of "Should Cost" targets will provide us with a continuous focus on reducing program cost during planning and execution, especially in preparation for contract negotiations. In looking at the affordability of the current TACAIR modernization programs, I believe we can do better at controlling costs, but I also believe that these programs are affordable if managed properly. The JSF program has a track

record of cost growth that must be reversed. Last year I directed a bottom up technical review of the development and test program to provide us the best assessment of the time and costs required to complete the development phase. We are aggressively managing the early production contracts to ensure the Government achieves best value in procurement. Finally, the estimate for life-cycle program costs is very concerning to me and the Department is taking a very detailed look at all aspects of JSF operations, support, and sustainment to identify best value solutions to control the lifetime operating and support costs for the JSF fleet.

Even if all of the current aircraft modernization programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical, strategic, and tanker fleet will increase. Aging aircraft require ever-increasing maintenance, but even with these increasing maintenance costs, readiness levels continue to decline.

Can both the maintenance of the legacy force and the modernization efforts be affordable at anywhere near the expected budget levels?

Based on expected budget levels, I believe there will have to be some tradeoffs. Balancing the costs of maintaining an aging aircraft fleet with recapitalizing and modernizing that fleet is one of the most difficult problems the Department will deal with over the next few years. The austere fiscal environment we currently face, and the projected future budget levels we anticipate, make the problem challenging. As part of addressing increasing maintenance costs and declining readiness levels, we must improve how we currently do business. I believe we can do that by working with our industry partners to achieve more efficient and cost-effective supply chain and logistics management. We are also taking Service best value processes and mandating establishment across DoD, such as the Navy's predecessor plan to the Department's Superior Supplier Incentive Program (SSIP) and the Air Force's initiatives to improve the management of services contracts. I believe that an affordable JSF is absolutely vital if the Department is going to be able to meet the capability and force structure requirements that the Combatant Commanders, Services, and warfighters need.

Some critics believe that there is still too much service parochial duplication in procuring new systems.

Do you agree with these critics?

In part, I do. I would offer that the Department is improving in this area but can certainly do better. Procuring systems that duplicate or overlap Service requirements is inefficient and does not provide the best value for defense spending.

What steps have you taken as Under Secretary to reduce such duplication?

I have taken a number of steps to reduce duplication. Conducting comprehensive cross-Service warfighting portfolio reviews is part of the Better Buying Power initiative.

Additionally, I meet regularly with the Service Acquisition Executives (SAE), both individually and collectively. These meetings help ensure that the SAEs are kept up to date on policy, guidance decisions, and direction, and they allow me to gain insight into service-specific acquisition issues and direction. Open and direct communication with the SAEs has helped in identifying common capability requirements prior to Materiel Development Decision milestones. As a participant in the Department's budget process, I have worked with the Deputy Secretary, the Services, and others to eliminate duplication.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take in the future?

Last year, Secretary Gates directed the Department to pursue a wide-ranging efficiencies initiative. This effort extends well beyond removing inefficiencies associated with duplication. Working with the senior leadership across the Department's acquisition community, I drafted guidance focused on obtaining greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending. The guidance covered five focus areas: (1) Target affordability and control cost growth; (2) Incentivize productivity and innovation in industry; (3) Promote real competition; (4) Improve tradecraft in services acquisition; and (5) Reduce non-productive processes and bureaucracy. In November of last year, I issued direction designed to achieve specific action in those initiative areas. Since that time I have worked continuously to follow through on the implementation of these initiatives, to adjust them as necessary, and to identify other opportunities. I believe this is a start; however, there are many additional steps that the Department must take in the future to improve the way we do business and deliver better value to the taxpayer and warfighter. Improving how the Department does business is a continuous process. If confirmed, I would intend to focus on these areas and look for ways to expand sound business practices more broadly across the Department.

43. Unmanned Systems

Congress has established a goal that by 2015, one-third of the aircraft in the operational deep strike force aircraft fleet and one-third of operational ground combat vehicles will be unmanned.

Do you support this goal?

I support the goal of fielding unmanned systems with greater capability; however, resources should be focused on warfighter capability needs and systems that are within technological reach. The Department's January 2001 congressional report stated that the 2015 goal would be largely driven by the pace of the technology and that the timelines at the time did not fully support the goal. The Military Departments' acquisition strategies did, however, reflect an aggressive pace for the fielding of these systems, should the technologies prove viable.

Today, unmanned systems are providing tactical and soldier focused capabilities critical to winning the current overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The capabilities needed for these conflicts (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; armed reconnaissance; Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detection/disposal), however, are not the same as the unmanned capabilities envisioned at the time the goal was established. The Department should continue to pursue the needed technology and consider unmanned systems on a case-by-case basis implementing them when it makes sense from a capability, technological, and affordability perspective.

What is your assessment of DOD’s ability to achieve this goal?

Because of technological challenges, an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) providing an “operational deep strike” capability will not be fielded by 2015. However, the Air Force and Army are both operating armed UASs (MQ-9 Reaper, MQ-1B Predator, and MQ-1C Gray Eagle) in current overseas contingency operations. These aircraft are providing critical intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities to combatant commanders. At this time, because of current operations, the Services are focused on higher priority missions than deep strike. The Navy has entered the materiel development phase of an unmanned carrier launched surveillance and strike capability, but with the goal of fielding a UAS with limited strike capability by 2018.

For unmanned ground combat vehicles the Department is more than four years away from a fielded capability that approaches the mobility, perception, and intelligence comparable to a trained squad of soldiers aboard a Stryker or Bradley combat vehicle or an Abrams tank crew. More limited capabilities are feasible, but may not be affordable within projected budgets. The Department is actively working on unmanned requirements to detect, mark, and report IEDs.

What steps do you believe the Department should take to achieve this goal?

The Department should continue robust, focused research and development efforts related to UAS and ground robotics technology. This is vital to realizing increased unmanned capabilities that are properly aligned with evolving warfighter needs, at affordable cost.

44. Shipbuilding Budget

With about half of the Navy’s construction and development dollars being needed to build nuclear submarines, the Navy’s commitment to building new submarines could crowd out funding needed to modernize the surface fleet. With regard to the ballistic missile submarine replacement program—a twelve submarine \$60 billion acquisition program-- Admiral Roughead, has stated that, “[SSBN-X] is a strategic national asset and should not necessarily be funded in the shipbuilding account.”

In your view, will the level of funding in the shipbuilding budget and certain high-cost programs force the Department to make requirement decisions in a constrained budget environment that may not be in the best interest for our national security?

What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take to address this concern and ensure adequate funding for the ballistic missile submarine replacement program?

Do you believe that certain high cost “national assets” should be funded outside the services’ budgets where they do not have to compete with other critical weapon systems modernization needs of the services?

The Department of Defense (DoD) remains committed to sustaining the force structure required to maintain our nation's security, and recapitalization of the nation's sea-based strategic deterrent is critical to this mission. While the Ohio Replacement program presents certain resource challenges for the Department, we are aggressively acting now, during the design phase, to drive down costs while meeting the core military requirements for a survivable nuclear deterrent. These efforts, coupled with many other significant cost-saving initiatives throughout the Department, are critical to meeting our broad national security needs within the Department's budget. The Department considers all funding priorities together and must frequently make judgments that cross budget account lines.

45. Information Assurance

Protection of military networks, information, and communications is critical to Department of Defense operations. The Department has not yet provided Congress with a comprehensive legislative proposal that would enable the Department to implement the President’s guidance on dealing with current and future cyber threats.

What is your assessment of the cyber security posture of the Department's critical information systems?

DoD is developing a solid foundation for securing critical information systems. Due to the advanced persistent threat, DoD's critical information systems, like other critical financial, energy, and transportation information systems, are at risk of having their vulnerabilities exploited by a sophisticated adversary. To address this threat and mitigate these vulnerabilities DoD has implemented and continues to improve a capability for protecting and defending its networks. Among other actions, the recent establishment of U.S. Cyber Command has brought increased operational focus to these tasks.

Prospectively, an enormous amount of work will be required to keep pace with technology and capabilities, and to stay ahead of system vulnerabilities that put our information and communications technology systems at risk. If confirmed, I will

continue the efforts to secure DoD's information and communications technology, address cyber challenges, and ensure DoD can defend against network adversaries.

What Department-wide policies or guidance do you believe are necessary to address information and cyber security challenges for current and future systems?

The Administration is currently working with Congress to develop new cyber legislation, and the Department is an active participant in these ongoing discussions. Additionally, the Department is currently developing policy and guidance in a number of cyber security areas. For example, the Department is developing policy for a strengthened insider threat program and is working with other federal agencies on policy and practices that will strengthen the security of classified information sharing while still providing the information to those who need it when they need it. The Department has also recently published revised policy on the use of DoD Public Key Infrastructure for user authentication, digital signatures, and encryption, and is also currently developing cyber security policy in such areas as supply chain risk management, protection of DoD information held by the defense industrial base, and continuous monitoring of DoD information systems. The Department is also in the process of consolidating its network infrastructure in order to better enable protection of those networks. If confirmed, I will assess this issue further, and if I determine that additional legislative changes are needed, I will work with the Administration to provide those recommendations to Congress.

46. Cyber Security

Deputy Secretary Lynn has been heavily involved in developing the DOD cyber strategy.

If confirmed will you also play a major role in DOD cyber issues?

If confirmed as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I would devote significant attention to cybersecurity and more broadly to continuing to strengthen the Department's ability to operate effectively in cyberspace. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense and others in DoD to build on recent progress and continue to improve the Department's and the nation's cyber security.

47. Test and Evaluation (T&E)

What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between the desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to perform adequate testing?

I believe that cycle time is best reduced by ensuring reasonable requirements are set, by being willing to trade away requirements that prove to be excessive, and by controlling requirements creep so that development time can be constrained. I support rigorous developmental and independent operational test and evaluation to provide accurate and

objective information on the capabilities and limitations of defense systems to both acquisition executives and warfighters and to ensure contractors deliver products that meet requirements. When systems are urgently needed in the field, the imperative for accurate and objective testing is still just as important but should be addressed through efforts to expedite the test and evaluation process, with some acceptance of risk. This has been accomplished successfully for such urgent efforts as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program. In those urgent cases some risk could be taken, but safety and basic performance had to be verified prior to fielding. Testing is needed to validate system performance and I believe it is a necessary part of the acquisition process. That said, there may be opportunities to achieve this goal through more efficient processes than those currently in practice.

Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we should procure weapon systems and equipment that has not been demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective, suitable, and survivable?

Systems should demonstrate their effectiveness, suitability and survivability through operational testing prior to a full rate production decision. In specific cases, based on the nature and seriousness of the deficiencies found in testing, it may be acceptable to continue production while the deficiencies are corrected. In a limited number of urgent circumstances it might also be necessary to field a system prior to operational testing in order to address an urgent gap in a critical capability. But even in such cases, operational evaluation should still be conducted at the earliest opportunity to assess the system's capabilities and limitations and identify any deficiencies that might need to be corrected.

Congress established the position of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to serve as an independent voice on matters relating to operational testing of weapons systems. As established, the Director has a unique and direct relationship with Congress which allows him to preserve his independence.

Do you support the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's ability to speak freely and independently with Congress?

Yes.

48. Funding for Science and Technology Investments

In the past, the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Department's leaders have endorsed the statutory goal of investing 3% of the Department's budget into science and technology programs.

Do you support that investment goal?

As a scientist and in my current position, I fully recognize the critical importance of a robust science and technology (S&T) program that can develop and deliver near term capabilities and maintain long term options for the Department. At this point in the consideration of the Department's future budget situation, however, every part of the budget must be considered "on the table."

How will you assess whether the science and technology investment portfolio is adequate to meet the current and future needs of the Department?

If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Services and others to establish guidelines for investment priorities. Based on these priorities, I would work through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to assess the adequacy of the current program and recommend changes in the future program to address the Department's priorities.

49. Space

In your current position you have been the milestone decision authority for major space acquisition programs.

Do you believe that this authority should be retained by your successor? Why or why not?

For the foreseeable future, I believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) should retain milestone decision authority (MDA) for major space acquisitions. Independent acquisition oversight is a statutory requirement for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and major space programs should be overseen by the USD(AT&L) in his capacity as the Defense Acquisition Executive, consistent with all other MDAPs in other domains, including air, sea, and ground. Most of our national security space programs, including those executed by the Air Force and Navy under Title 10 authorities and those executed by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) under Title 50 authorities, entail very substantial resource commitments and substantial development and acquisition risks. As a result of the hard work of the Service Acquisition Executives, the Director of the NRO, their staffs and the staffs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, we are recovering from more than a decade of very serious space acquisition shortcomings. While that progress continues, we still confront serious challenges in space acquisition, which will become even greater in a constrained resource and budget environment. Therefore, I believe the USD(AT&L) should continue to be the MDA for major space acquisition programs, while working with the Service Acquisition Executives, the DNRO, and the ODNI to consider MDA delegation on a case-by-case basis at appropriate milestone decision points.

50. Ballistic Missile Defense

In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles, starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against long-range missiles that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in Europe and, if confirmed, will you implement it?

I support the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and, if confirmed, I would continue to advance the substantial U.S. efforts already underway to implement all four phases of the EPAA, as I have done as USD(AT&L) and as chair of the Missile Defense Executive Board.

In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging against future uncertainties.

Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you implement them?

Yes, I support the conclusions of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) and, if confirmed, would support continuing U.S. efforts already underway to implement the BMDR, as I have done as USD(AT&L).

Do you agree that our missile defense must be fiscally sustainable?

Yes, I support the U.S. commitment, described in the 2010 BMDR, to deploying capabilities that have been proven through extensive testing and assessment and that are affordable over the long term.

The two most recent flight tests of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has formed a Failure Review Board to determine the root cause of the most recent failure and

will devise a plan to correct it, including two flight tests to confirm the correction. Until the second flight test confirms the correction, probably sometime in late 2012, the Director of MDA has suspended production of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKVs) of the type that failed last year's flight tests, in order to ensure that those EKV's do not contain a flaw that would need to be corrected later.

Do you agree that it is prudent to verify that the flight test failure problem has been corrected before continuing production of the EKV's, and before building more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) or deciding how many additional GBIs may be needed in the future?

Verifying and correcting any problems with the EKV's prior to continuing production is prudent and supports the policy priority to "fly before you buy" in order to improve reliability, confidence, and cost control.

Do you believe that such verification should include a successful intercept flight test?

A non-intercept test will provide a more rigorous evaluation of the kill vehicle flight envelope than could be achieved in an operational scenario flight test. A successful non-intercept flight test will sufficiently reduce risk to restart production of the EKV, in particular for long-lead items and items common to both EKV designs. Certification of the Capability Enhancement II (CE II) EKV will remain dependent on a successful intercept.

Do you support the continued modernization and sustainment of the Ground-based midcourse defense system?

Yes. The United States is currently provided protection against the threat of ICBM attack from states like North Korea and Iran. It is important that we maintain this advantageous position by continuing to improve the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.

The United States and NATO are seeking options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.

Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from nations such as Iran?

Yes, cooperation with Russia could strengthen the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, as well as those of the Russian Federation. Effective ballistic missile defenses devalue Iran's ballistic missile arsenal by reducing its confidence that an attack would be successful.

Do you agree that, irrespective of Russian objections, the United States is committed to the continued development and deployment of United States missile defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems?

Yes.

51. Readiness Funding

After almost a decade of combat operations, each of the military services faces a rising bill for maintenance and repair. The Army has stated that reset funding will be needed for at least two to three years beyond the end of overseas contingency operations. The Marine Corps leadership has acknowledged that a \$10 billion bill awaits at the end of combat operations, but has requested only \$250 million for reset this year. The Navy has identified a one-year backlog of deferred ship and aircraft depot maintenance. The Air Force has requested funding for only 84% of needed aircraft repairs this year.

What level of priority do you place on reset and reconstitution funding for the military services?

I place a very high priority on reset and reconstitution funding for the military services. The current requests reflect the difficult challenge of balancing investments in deployed readiness, which is a top priority to support troops in the field, with investments in non-deployed readiness such as reset and reconstitution. It is imperative that Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for reset and reconstitution continue to be enacted for two to three years after a drawdown of forces to fully reset the forces.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address maintenance backlogs and ensure that the military departments request adequate funding for reset, reconstitution, and other maintenance requirements?

I will work to ensure that the Department properly considers and balances maintenance and reset requirements with fiscal realities and future risk during Program and Budget development.

52. Protection of U.S. Forces Against Internal Threats

On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 people and wounding or injuring 43 others. A Department of Defense review of the attack released in January 2010 concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.

What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at Fort Hood?

I understand that the Fort Hood review released by DoD in August 2010 included seventy-nine recommendations on how to improve personnel policies, force protection, emergency response and mass casualty preparedness, and support to DoD healthcare providers. DoD has completed implementation of half of these recommendations.

If confirmed, I would work to ensure that all the lessons learned and recommendations for improvement continue to be implemented and would work closely with members of Congress to ensure that DoD is prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization among DoD's military and civilian personnel.

If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?

The findings and recommendations of the Fort Hood Review are the foundation of the Department's current strategy. Leadership, clear guidance, and accountability are key. If confirmed, I would review this strategy and how it has been implemented, seek the advice of DoD's civilian and military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure that the Department implements the most effective policies to prevent and mitigate such threats in the future.

53. Religious Guidelines

The Independent Review Related to the Tragedy at Fort Hood observed that "DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization." Recommendation 2.7 of the Final Recommendations urged the Department to update policy to clarify guidelines for religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the Department to task the Defense Science Board to "undertake a multi-disciplinary study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and self-radicalization"

What is your view of these recommendations?

The Fort Hood Follow-on Review prepared an implementation plan in response to both of these recommendations. If confirmed, I would review that report and the progress that has been made to ensure DoD policies, programs, and procedures appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion.

Has the Department of Defense updated its policy to clarify guidelines for religious accommodation? If so, what is the revised policy?

It is my understanding that the Department of Defense is updating its policy to clarify guidelines for religious accommodation. If confirmed, I would review the proposed

update to ensure accommodation of service members whenever possible without compromising accomplishment of mission, unit cohesion, and personnel safety.

What is your understanding of current policies and programs of the Department of Defense regarding religious practices in the military?

The military places a high value on the rights of service members to observe their respective religious faiths and this is reflected in our policies and programs.

In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

I understand each religious ministry professional has committed to functioning in a pluralistic environment and to supporting, both directly and indirectly, the free exercise of religion by all members of the Military Services, their family members, and other persons authorized to be served by the military chaplaincies. If confirmed, I will review the relevant policies, seek the advice of the military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure that the Department appropriately accommodates the free exercise of religion.

In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other service members with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?

Current policy appears to strike the proper balance by allowing chaplains to voluntarily participate, or not participate, in settings which conflict with their faith traditions, while also ensuring chaplains performing in an interfaith setting, such as an official dinner or interfaith memorial service, are mindful of the requirement for inclusiveness. If confirmed, I would monitor these policies and practices.

If confirmed, will you work to ensure that a scientific fact-based approach to understanding radicalization will drive the Department's relevant policies on this topic?

DoD has commissioned a Defense Science Board study on violent radicalization and plans to commission two additional clinical studies to identify any potential indicators of violent behavior in military personnel. The results of these studies will inform DoD's policies and programs on radicalization. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that DoD continues to rely on a scientific, fact-based approach to countering radicalization and protecting our force.

Current policy in the Department gives discretion to military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The Department has submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly exempt the armed services from the requirements of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).

In your view, do DOD policies appropriately accommodate religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith?

An important and delicate balance must be struck between accommodating religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith and maintaining the military's uniform grooming and appearance standards. If confirmed, I will work with the leaders of the military services to achieve an appropriate balance between granting religious accommodations and maintaining the military's uniform grooming and appearance standards.

Do you believe that the Armed Forces should be exempted from RFRA? If so, why?

The Armed Forces have long relied on uniformity of dress and appearance to create a common identity, provide visual reminders of shared experiences, reinforce a sense of tradition, and foster pride. These factors are understood by the military, and historically by the courts, as critical to development of cohesion and esprit de corps, and thus to mission accomplishment. In section 774 of title 10 of the United States Code, Congress established a standard that balances religious imperatives with the military's dress and appearance requirements.

I understand the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) establishes a "very high" standard for the Executive Branch, including the military, to use when denying any request for religious accommodation, which is why the Services have asked for an exemption.

At this time, I do not have an informed view about the specific legislative proposal but if confirmed, I would consider this issue carefully.

54. Muslims in the U. S. Military

Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?

The attack at Fort Hood was a tragedy for all involved. It is possible that the attack could spur retaliation in the form of harassment and violence; it is therefore important that military leaders and supervisors take precautions to prevent such occurrences and maintain good order and discipline in the force. No form of harassment can be tolerated.

If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the U. S. military?

If confirmed, I would continue to advocate for open communications in the workplace, decisive action by our military leaders and supervisors, and command emphasis on the military standard for maintaining good order and discipline. If confirmed, I would also review the effectiveness of these feedback systems and take measures to improve them, as appropriate.

55. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Department has in recent years developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assault, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in combat areas of operation and at home stations are still being reported.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential or restricted reporting, to be effective?

Sexual assault has no place in the Department of Defense. The Department's zero tolerance policy on sexual assault is the right policy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and the Service Chiefs, are continuously and directly engaged in emphasizing the importance of responding to sexual assault. It is my understanding that according to experts, sexual assaults in both civilian and military society are underreported – meaning that the number of sexual assaults estimated by anonymous surveys vastly outnumbers reports to police. In 2005, the Department put in place new policies to prevent sexual assault and increase the number of reports received by DoD authorities. I understand these new policies have had positive results. However, there is still work to do to integrate and continue to improve our efforts across DoD and the Services. If confirmed, I will ensure that DoD continues to be committed to addressing sexual assault in this comprehensive manner.

What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the restricted reporting procedure has been put into operation?

I am not aware of any specific problems in the implementation of the restricted reporting option. It is my understanding that restricted reporting allows victims who wish to remain anonymous to come forward and obtain the support they need following an assault without being identified. I believe that the most important results of this reporting procedure should be that victims are coming forward so they can receive the care and support they need. I understand that the number of victims choosing a restricted report has increased by about seven percent each year since 2007, and in Fiscal Year 2010, restricted reports accounted for about a quarter of all sexual assault reports made to the

Department. Experts believe these are victims who would never have come forward had there not been a confidential reporting option. If confirmed, I would review DoD's program to gain a clear picture of progress and areas for future improvement in sexual assault reporting procedures.

What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including assaults against contractor personnel?

Sexual assault against anyone is unacceptable in any location. I do not have enough information to make a comprehensive assessment at this time, but it is my understanding that if any of our deployed Service members, civilians, or contractors is assaulted, he or she will receive appropriate and responsive support and care.

I understand DoD policy mandates a 24-7 response to sexual assault, regardless of location. In addition, I understand that DoD personnel travelling to combat zones receive pre-deployment training on prevention and response procedures in country. Furthermore, it is my understanding that the Department takes action against individuals who perpetrate sexual assault whenever it has the jurisdiction and sufficient evidence to do so. If confirmed, I would ensure that DoD continues to address sexual assault comprehensively across the Services in all locations. There must be no tolerance in DoD for sexual assault in any location, including any of our personnel or others who serve with our personnel while deployed in a combat zone.

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

DoD is committed to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive, integrated and uniform manner. As stated above, all of the Services have been directed to establish guidelines for a 24-hour, 7 days-a-week sexual assault response capability for all locations, including deployed areas. I also understand that the Services recently invested \$1.8 million to improve prosecutor training and resourcing, and that the three military criminal investigative organizations have committed to adding over 100 specially trained agents, dedicated to sexual assault investigations. While I cannot make a specific assessment at this time, if I am confirmed, I would make it a priority to evaluate the adequacy and efficacy of training and resources allocated to the Services for sexual assault investigation.

What is your view of the willingness and ability of the Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?

DoD's policies emphasize the commander's role in effective response to sexual assault. DoD has taken action to provide training for commanders and to ensure adequate training and resources for prosecutors and investigators. I have been told that DoD policy requires commanders to forward all unrestricted reports to criminal investigators. I also understand that DoD's policies seek to build the victim's confidence, so that the victim

feels able to come forward with an unrestricted report and to assist in the investigation, which is essential to achieving the goal of accountability. If confirmed, I will ensure that accountability, supported by a foundation of victim care, remains an important focus of DoD's sexual assault prevention and response efforts.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults?

I believe that sexual assault has no place in the Armed Forces. Recently, the Department has assigned a General Officer with operational experience as the Director of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program office. If confirmed, I would ensure that sexual assault prevention and response continues to be a priority for the Department, and would work closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chiefs of the Military Services to ensure that DoD maintains senior leadership focus on this issue.

56. Mobilization and Demobilization of National Guard and Reserves

In support of the current ongoing conflicts, the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems have arisen over time in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical response to service-connected injuries or illnesses, antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and inefficient policies regarding members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve force management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as "inefficient and rigid" and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment shortages, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What is your assessment of advances made in improving reserve component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems remain?

I understand that many changes have been made to policies governing the utilization of the Reserve Components, including: (1) providing for a minimum notification period of 180 days prior to mobilization; (2) establishing a dwell ratio goal of no more than one year mobilized for every five years not mobilized; and (3) limiting the involuntary activation of Guard members and Reservists to one year.

These changes have improved effectiveness and morale by providing a predictable cycle of active duty and alert notification well in advance of activation, benefitting families, employers, service members.

A key problem is the lack of an integrated pay and personnel system to support Guard and Reserve personnel as they transition between various duty statuses. This is compounded by the fact that there remains over 30 different duty statuses for Guard and

Reserve personnel. This diversity of duty statuses is cumbersome and results in mobilization and demobilization delays.

What do you consider to be the most significant enduring changes to the enabling of an operational reserve aimed at ensuring reserve component readiness for future mobilization requirements?

I believe the most significant change to the operational reserve is its acceptance and inclusion as a full partner in the Total Force. The use of the Guard and Reserve over the past 10 years has proven their exceptional value to the nation. Their equipping, modernization, and readiness are essentially managed in the same manner as the active component. They are ready, capable, and expect to be used on a predictable and regular basis.

Going forward, the Department must maintain Reserve Component readiness, set expectations with members, families and employers, and seek ways to use the Guard and Reserve to the best advantage of the nation. Budgeting for the operational reserve is critical. There must be a funding stream in the baseline budget that is carried through the future years to ensure the Reserve components remain trained, ready, and available to meet ongoing and emerging operational requirements. I believe the future environment will demand we use all components of the Total Force – Active, Guard, Reserve, DOD Civilians, and contractors in the most efficient and effective manner possible.

Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves or to further enhance their ability to perform various national security missions?

I believe the Department needs to be able to access the Reserve Components on a predictable and regular basis. Current mobilization authorities have served us well but do not account for the continued use of the Guard and Reserve as full partners in the Total Force. I support current proposals before Congress to expand section 12304 of Title 10 to increase authorities to fully use the Reserve Components as a rotational, operational force to augment the active component forces. These proposals will enhance their ability to execute planned missions in support of the President's national security strategy.

57. Medical and Dental Readiness of the Reserves

Medical and dental readiness of reserve component personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the Committee, and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved policy oversight and accountability.

If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the reserves?

In order to fully assess the capability of the Reserve Components, it is critical to measure and report medical and dental readiness in a standardized manner. It is my understanding that over the past several years, small, but steady improvements have been made across the Services, but there is more work to do in confirming the medical and dental readiness of the entire Reserve force.

Medical and dental readiness is tracked through standardized calculations each quarter. Currently, the medical readiness achievement goal is 75 percent and DoD is at 63 percent. The dental readiness achievement goal is 85 percent, and DoD has met that goal.

While some progress has been achieved, the medical and dental readiness of the Reserve Components must remain a priority.

How would you improve upon the Department's ability to maintain a healthy and fit reserve component?

It is my understanding that DoD continues to pursue new and improved opportunities to provide flexible options for the Guard and Reserve to improve their overall readiness. Producing and maintaining a healthy and fit Reserve Component requires more than access to health care – it also requires command emphasis and individual accountability.

Recently, the Army Reserve approved and funded two medical/dental readiness days per soldier starting in FY 2010.

Resiliency is a key aspect of Yellow Ribbon Reintegration events. At pre-, during-, and post-deployment events, Guard and Reserve members and families are given tools to help build resiliency and coping skills. These tools encourage open dialogue with families and encourage members to maintain mental and physical fitness during deployment cycles.

If confirmed, I would advance health and safety promotion and injury/illness prevention policy initiatives to address readiness requirements developed from evidence-based research.

58. Dwell Time

While dwell time is improving as our forces draw down in Iraq, many active duty military members are still not experiencing the dwell time goal of 2 years at home for every year deployed.

In your view, when will the active component dwell time goal be met?

The Active Component of the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, on average, are already meeting or exceeding the Department's dwell time goal of 1:2. I understand that the Army is now averaging better than a 1:1 dwell ratio, with some combat elements meeting

the goal of 1:2. As we execute our drawdown plans for Afghanistan, these dwell times will continue to improve. Recently, the Army has shortened deployments for their Active Component units to nine months. These shorter deployments will reduce the stress on soldiers and their families. It is estimated that Army units will meet dwell time goals within the next two years as the drawdown progress.

When will dwell time objectives be met for the reserve components?

The goal for the Guard and Reserve is one year of active duty for every five years at home (1:5). The goal for the Active forces is 1:2. My understanding is that the Reserve Components being mobilized are currently running closer to the Active goal. Active and Reserve Component dwell and current rotation models are linked and can only improve together.

59. Active-Duty End Strength

Secretary Gates announced this year that the Army would reduce its end strength by 22,000 through FY 2013, including 7,400 in FY 2012. This end strength was part of the temporary increase authorized in 2009 and was intended to enable the Army to cease relying on “stoploss” and to make up for a growing population of non-deployable soldiers. Beginning in FY 2015, depending on conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine Corps plan to reduce their permanent end strength and force structure by 27,000 soldiers and at least 15,000 marines, respectively.

Do you agree with this active-duty end strength reduction plan, especially given the fact that the population of non-deployables is growing?

I am familiar with the Army’s and Marine Corps’ projected personnel reductions, and if confirmed, I would review their respective plans to make these reductions. Based on what we know today, and the assumptions that have been made, I believe that the troop reductions previously announced by Secretary Gates represent a prudent balance between meeting operational mission requirements and ensuring the funds are available for recapitalization. Both are critical to future readiness.

What is your view of how these planned end-strength reductions will affect dwell time ratios?

The Army and Marine Corps personnel strength reductions, starting in FY 2012 for the Army, are based on the assumption of a future draw-down in Afghanistan. These are significant reductions, but if the Afghanistan force draw-down stays on track, the dwell ratio goal of 1:2 for active personnel should be achieved.

What effect would inability to meet dwell time objectives have on your decision to implement the planned end-strength reductions?

If confirmed, I would take into consideration our ability to meet strategic mission objectives and dwell time objectives prior to implementing the planned Army and Marine Corps strength reductions.

In your view, can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its planned reduction in its temporary over-strength without an adverse impact on national security?

The Army is developing force reduction plans that consider ongoing and projected future operational requirements. Given our current commitments around the globe and dwell time ratios, accelerating reductions may not be prudent at this time. The Department is committed to working closely with the Army to ensure they achieve the appropriate personnel strength level and also retain the ability meet national security objectives.

What would be the effect on dwell time of accelerating the Army's force reduction plan?

The effect on dwell time would depend on the Army's deployment requirements coupled with the pace of its troop reductions. I would anticipate the Army might not be able to fully achieve the dwell ratio goal of 1:2 during the draw-down phase.

What are the assumptions regarding "conditions on the ground" that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015 to occur on time?

We must balance our national security requirements and continue to have a ready, flexible, and capable force. The reductions in end strength for the Army and Marine Corps beginning in 2015 should be predicated on the assumption that we have a much smaller presence in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 than we do today. I also would consider our progress towards the established security objectives and I would solicit the advice of DoD's senior military and civilian leaders prior to making any recommendations to the Secretary.

The services have requested congressional authorization of force management tools to avoid exceeding end strength limits and save money.

In your view, what tools do the Department and Services need to get down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require Congressional authorization?

Several authorities used during previous force reductions have either expired or will be expiring soon, to include Enhanced Selective Early Retirement Boards, Reduction in Force, and Voluntary Separation Pay. The Department is seeking to renew or extend these authorities, and in some cases is requesting new legislation, in order to properly size and shape the force. The Department's policy is to make maximum use of voluntary authorities. Further, a balanced approach must be used to ensure to the greatest extent

possible that those service members who leave do not possess skills needed over the short term.

60. Recruiting Standards

Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents unique challenges. The Army has been criticized in past years for relaxing enlistment standards in tough recruiting environments with respect to factors such as age, intelligence, weight and physical fitness standards, citizenship status, tattoos, and past criminal misconduct. On the other hand, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-1, recently testified, less than 25 percent of all 17-24 year olds are eligible to enlist, primarily due to physical and educational requirements.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?

The current enlistment qualification standards are well-defined and have stood the test of time. They are driven by the need to provide the Services with men and women who are prepared to adapt to the rigors of military life and meet performance requirements. To that end, the Services carefully screen applicants, who come from all walks of life. The Department has two key indicators of recruit quality: (1) traditional high school diploma graduates; and (2) above average scores on the enlistment aptitude screen (the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery or ASVAB). The traditional high school diploma is the best single predictor of attrition, while the ASVAB is a robust predictor of training and job performance.

Since it is more costly to recruit such “high quality” recruits, the Department has used a cost-performance tradeoff model, developed under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, to set recruiting and enlistment goals. The recruit quality enlistment goals are 90 percent traditional high school diploma graduates and 60 percent scoring above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), the math and verbal components of the ASVAB.

When recruitment is not difficult, when the supply exceeds demand, as in the current environment, Services tend to recruit above the goals. When recruitment is more challenging, Services adjust and will recruit closer to the goals. During some particularly difficult periods, such as 2005, the Army developed special programs to reduce the attrition risk related to the enlistment of more individuals who did not possess traditional high school diplomas.

In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?

Yes, I believe there are ways to increase the pool of eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality. The Services continually review medical standards, for example, to ensure they are relevant and in the best interest of the military, as well as the individual. For example, the Assessment of Recruit Motivation and Strength (ARMS) Study provided evidence that recruits who are over body fat standards but could pass certain tailored physical tests would have attrition rates similar to weight qualified recruits. Since implementation of the ARMS program, close to 12,000 soldiers have entered the Army with an ARMS waiver across the three components. The Services are also constantly exploring ways to improve other screening tools – especially with respect to our ability to predict attrition. Recent findings suggest the Services may be able to augment their screening procedures by incorporating other measures, such as personality, to identify applicants who are likely to adapt well to the military. If confirmed, I would work with the Services to continually find new and better ways to recruit and screen applicants.

In your view, are there any enlistment requirements or standards that are overly restrictive or which do not directly correlate to successful military service?

I am not aware that the Department's military enlistment standards are overly restrictive. The Services employ fitness, adaptability, and aptitude standards that correlate to the physical, disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to succeed in the Armed Forces.

Do you believe that current policies defining three tiers of high school diploma credentials, aimed at minimizing attrition during the initial enlistment term, should be retained?

My understanding is the Services track the attrition rates of military recruits by a variety of credential types, and traditional high school diploma graduates have lower rates of attrition than any other type of credential holder for the first term (three years) of service. While the 36-month attrition rate for traditional high school diploma graduates is 28 percent, the attrition rates for other types of credential holders ranges from 38-45 percent. That is a meaningful difference, because it costs the Services approximately \$45,000 to replace each individual who fails to successfully complete his/her term of service. Given the track record of the current policy, I believe it should be retained and augmented as needed to improve the accuracy of our ability to predict the attrition risk of individual recruits.

61. Women in the Military

The Navy has opened service on submarines to women, the Marine Corps recently expanded service opportunities for women in intelligence specialties, and the Army is reviewing its assignment policy for female soldiers. The issue of the appropriate role of women in the armed forces remains a matter of interest to Congress and the American public.

Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up for service by women?

As the nature of the combat environment has evolved, the roles of women in the military have expanded, and will continue to do so. It is my understanding that the Department believes it has sufficient flexibility under current law to make appropriate assignment policy for women. The Department will continue to monitor combat needs, and if the Services recommend expanding combat roles for women, the Department will notify Congress accordingly as required by statute (10 U.S.C. § 652 and/or §6035). Any decision regarding opening additional specialties for service by women should be based on our obligation to maintain a high state of mission readiness of our all-Volunteer Force.

Do you believe any changes are needed in the assignment policies regarding women in the armed forces?

The USD(P&R) is conducting a Women in Services Restrictions review of the direct ground combat assignment policy in coordination with the Military Departments and the Joint Staff. This report on review findings will be provided to Congressional Defense Committees by October 2011. If confirmed, I would examine proposed policy changes as a result of this review and work with the Congress to implement them.

62. Rising Costs of Medical Care

In testimony presented to Congress in February, 2009, the Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that “medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.” In April, 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force Base that “health care is eating the Department alive.” The Administration has proposed health care efficiencies to save nearly \$8.0 billion through 2016.

Do you agree with the proposed health care efficiencies?

Yes, I believe the proposed efficiencies are modest, sensible efforts to control the Department’s health care costs while ensuring superior levels of care are maintained.

What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health care?

While the reform proposals included in the FY 2012 President’s Budget are a significant first step, I think it is important, especially in view of the fiscal challenges we face, that we continue to find additional opportunities to control the costs of health care. At the same time, we must preserve our ability to provide the best health care possible to our service members and their families, and especially to our wounded warriors.

What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future Department of Defense plans?

I understand that even with the estimated savings from the health care efficiencies proposed in the FY 2012 budget, the cost of the Military Health System continues to increase as a percentage of the DoD budget and will exceed 10 percent of the budget in just a few years. In this fiscal environment, we must make smart choices that permit us to maintain a balance between personnel benefits and funding for equipment and readiness. If confirmed, I would ensure that DoD provides quality care, and it does so in a way that provides the best value for our service members and their families, as well as the American taxpayer.

If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?

While I am not in a position to recommend actions at this time, if confirmed, I would work closely with the senior military and departmental leadership and the health care community to examine every opportunity to manage cost growth while ensuring that military beneficiaries are provided the highest quality care possible.

63. Personnel and Entitlement Costs

In addition to health care costs, personnel and related entitlement spending continue to grow and comprise an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget. If personnel costs are not curtailed, the Nation may find itself with a military that is both too small and insufficiently equipped. Both former Secretary Gates and Secretary Panetta have called for a comprehensive review of military compensation and the retirement benefit.

How might the retirement benefit, including the provision of health care to retirees, be modernized to reflect the needs of a new generation of recruits, ensure greater equity between those who serve a career and those who don't, while easing the long-term cost to the government?

We must maintain a strong, vibrant military force structure that will serve us well into the future while also looking at prudent ways to control personnel and entitlement spending. If confirmed, I would look forward to reviewing proposals that seek to balance these objectives.

What changes should be made to the military compensation system, including the one-size-fits-all approach to basic pay, separate allowances for housing and subsistence, and the tax treatment of various compensation components, to ensure that the compensation package is fair, economical, and sufficient to field a high quality all-volunteer force?

I believe we need a military compensation system that continues to attract and support the highest quality personnel to sustain the all-volunteer force while also containing costs. I share Secretary Panetta's view that it is appropriate to conduct a comprehensive review of the military's pay and benefits structure to determine where costs can be contained, while ensuring that we are able to attract and support our men and women in uniform and their families in a wide variety of situations.

64. Dependent Care and Flexible Spending Accounts

The 10th QRMC recommended providing dependent care and flexible spending benefits to active-duty service members. Providing these benefits would seem consistent with the initiatives of First Lady Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden on behalf of military families. It would appear that no new legislative authority is needed for the Department to provide these benefits to service members and their families.

If confirmed, would you extend these benefits to the active duty service members and their families?

I support the goals provided for in Dependent Care and Flexible Spending Accounts. I believe that we need to continue to provide a total compensation package to recruit and retain the military service members the Department needs to achieve its worldwide missions while at the same time taking care of military families. If confirmed, I would review how Dependent Care and Flexible Spending Accounts could be integrated into the military's total compensation package while recognizing the difficulties of the current fiscal environment.

65. Systems and Support for Wounded Warriors

Service members who are wounded or injured performing duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of significant numbers of returning wounded service members. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain, including a growing population of soldiers awaiting disability evaluation.

What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Department of Defense and the Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured service members and their families?

The Walter Reed revelations were a sobering moment for both Departments. The progress, focus, and improvements in this area have been substantial since 2007. In the two and a half years that I have been visiting wounded warriors and their families, I have seen advances in the knowledge and understanding of the prevention and treatment of wounds and their effects on individuals and families. But I believe there is more to learn, and more to be done. If confirmed, this would be a continuing priority of mine.

What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?

The high priority the Department has placed on caring for our wounded warriors and their families is one such strength. The sustained focus and assessment of the needs of the wounded, ill and injured service members in areas such as traumatic brain injuries, stress, and amputation allows the Department to continue its progress in caring for these members.

It is also important that the Department take a collaborative approach to caring for our wounded warriors with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Labor, the Office of Personnel Management and other stakeholders to ensure that the needs of service members and their families are met across the federal government.

What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?

The Department should continue to identify opportunities for capturing best practices and implementing improvements by using a proactive assessment and evaluation process that corrects weaknesses in a cost-efficient and timely manner. Additionally, the Department needs to be proactive in identifying post-traumatic stress in our Reserve Components who, following redeployment, return home and are removed from a military environment and chain-of-command.

There are also opportunities to try new programs in the areas of employment, credentialing, licensing and education and training for our wounded that can be explored.

Lastly, a frequent complaint of our service members is that services are simply not delivered in a timely manner. Our application of any program, whether aimed at transition services or care, needs to be timely in order to be effective.

If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded service members and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

The Department needs to regularly evaluate and ensure that current programs and policies are current, helpful and productive. Outcome assessments need to be conducted with adjustments made, as needed, to ensure necessary resources are in place to properly take care of our recovering wounded, ill, and injured service members and their families.

We must also continue to approach this from an interagency perspective. There are many agencies that want to contribute and help. The Department must ensure resources are fielded in a harmonious and productive manner.

In addition, in August 2011, the President directed DoD and the VA to develop reforms to ensure that every service member receives the training, credentials, and education they need to transition to the civilian workforce or to pursue higher education.

This DoD and VA-led task force will be an important part of our ongoing efforts to better assist our service members as they return to civilian life.

Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A DES pilot program and an Integrated DES program have been established to improve processing of service members.

What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the Integrated DES?

The revised and improved Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) developed by DoD and VA is an improvement over the legacy system. It is fairer and faster than the system it replaced. It has also eliminated the gap in pay and benefits that always happened under the old system that was executed by the two Departments. The chief problem with the IDES is that it takes too long.

If confirmed, how will you address any need for change, particularly the Army's growing population of non-deployable soldiers and their need for expedited disability evaluation?

If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary in executing the fielding of the IDES and in concurrently fielding enhancements to IDES. These enhancements would ensure that timeliness is improved and best practices shared. In any area where it is determined that legislative action could help improve this process, I would follow up with the Congress.

66. Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Resources

The numbers of suicides in each of the services has increased in recent years. The Army released a report in June 2010 that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In addition, studies conducted by the Army of Soldiers and Marines in theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced multiple deployments.

In your view, what role should the Department of Defense play in shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of

all service members and their families, including members of the reserve components?

Every suicide among members of the Armed Forces is tragic and the Department has a responsibility to address the factors that contribute to suicidal behavior among our military men and women, whether they are deployed, at a military installation, or in their home communities. All of the Services have established robust suicide prevention programs, and senior leaders across the Department are engaged to address this very important issue. In addition to identifying and reducing risk factors primarily through prevention, we have undertaken multiple initiatives to increase protective factors. The Services have made significant efforts to build resilience among our service members to enhance the key protective factors that enhance performance and increase the overall readiness of the force. I understand that the *Final Report of the Department of Defense Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces* is being used as a vehicle to review all Departmental policies and procedures related to suicide prevention. The Department's Implementation Plan based on these recommendations is undergoing final review and will be delivered to Congress soon. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department stays focused on this very important issue and continues to improve suicide prevention policies and processes.

What is your understanding of the action that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army are taking in response to the June 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 ("The Lost Art of Leadership in Garrison") in particular?

I am fully aware that sustaining a force steadily engaged in combat for over a decade has unexpected challenges. Unfortunately, some of those challenges include a rise in "high risk" behaviors and suicides. The Army's Health Promotion and Risk Reduction Task Force was created to identify program and policy changes needed to respond to issues identified in this and other related reports. I understand that the Task Force is in the process of implementing 417 actionable tasks to rapidly improve Army health promotion, risk reduction and protection policies, programs and processes and is making significant progress. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Department brings these tasks to completion and that the Services share lessons learned to jointly address these risk factors.

If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to service members in theater, and to the service members and their families upon return to home station?

Ensuring that our service members and their families have sufficient access to the behavioral health resources that they need is critical to the wellness of our total force. The Department has been working to determine workforce requirements for behavioral health professionals, and how best to utilize all of the medical, educational, and counseling resources available. I understand that there has been significant progress in this area, but there is still room for improvement. If confirmed, I would monitor how well we are

meeting these goals by assessing current utilization rates and further determining ways in which we can leverage more resources for our service members and their families.

67. Military Quality of Life

In January 2009, the Department published its second Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of key quality of life factors for military families, such as family support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services.

How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment and retention and quality of life improvements and your own top priorities for the armed forces?

I know that quality of life factors, such as the ones mentioned above, contribute significantly to recruiting and retention. Surveys and studies have shown that a service member's satisfaction with various aspects of military life, as well as the family's experience and support for staying in the military, have a strong influence on the member's decision to reenlist. One good example that influences retention is the Department's military child development program. This program provides quality, affordable child care for over 200,000 children every day, permitting service members and their working spouses to be more committed and successful in their respective careers. The degree of success in meeting those needs can have a strong influence on service members' decisions to continue their military careers. If confirmed, I would monitor how effectively DoD programs, in conjunction with community efforts, not only meet the needs of service members and their families but also contribute to the readiness of the Total Force. Taking care of service members and their families is one of the Department's top priorities.

If confirmed, what further enhancements to military quality of life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to achieve them?

DoD is undertaking a number of initiatives to improve the well-being of the Total Force. These initiatives include expanding child care services, modernizing the DoD schools, improving the DoD Tuition Assistance program, new spouse education and career opportunities, and expanding counseling support for geographically-dispersed military members and their families. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with the DoD components, advocacy groups and Congress to close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs and ensure effective communications with families to ensure that they know how to access available support programs and services when they need it.

68. Family Support

Military members and their families in both the active and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for service members and their families?

If confirmed, I would ensure family readiness remains one of the Department's top priorities. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Presidential Study Directive Nine identified access to health care (to include psychological health), military spouse career assistance, child care services, and service member and family education needs as the Department's highest priority family support initiatives. I concur and, if confirmed, will work diligently to ensure these areas remain at the forefront of the Department's efforts to support families.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

I believe that family readiness is correlated with family resilience. It is the Department's responsibility to ensure that families are well prepared to meet the challenges that come with deployment and service. Through focusing on the psychological, social, financial and educational well-being of military families, DoD can continue to build family resilience. A recent DoD survey of active duty spouses shows that families overall are coping well, but certain families are more vulnerable – especially our enlisted families and those who have recently deployed. Since 2006, active duty spouses have reported higher levels of stress in every DoD-wide survey. On the other hand, the number of spouses satisfied with military life has increased since 2006. I understand that programs like Military One Source and the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program have made great strides in improving access to resources for families. However, the Department can do more, and if confirmed I will seek continued improvements in this critical area.

How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and future reductions in end strength?

In order to appropriately address the needs of our families in today's dynamic environment, it is critical for DoD to build community partnerships with federal agencies, state and local governments, businesses, and non-profit organizations, all of which are key stakeholders in meeting the needs of our military families as they continue to serve or transition to civilian life.

Global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and changes to end strength all alter the context of a service member's family life and thus the needs of family readiness. The Department's efforts to ensure family readiness must constantly adapt to these changing conditions.

If confirmed, how would you ensure support to reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

DoD has a duty to ensure that every family has access to quality resources, regardless of location. An appropriate network of support for our geographically dispersed families must be underwritten by a coordinated, community-based network of care, encompassing DoD, the Department of Veterans Affairs, state, local, non-profit and private providers. It is my understanding that DoD's Yellow Ribbon Program has been successful in establishing the required networks, and if confirmed, I would assess the program to ensure that it remains capable of addressing the support requirements of our Guard, and Reserve Service members and their families, wherever they serve. In addition, I understand that the Joint Family Support Assistance Program (JFSAP) has significantly expanded outreach services for military members and their families who are geographically isolated from installation services.

If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?

If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department continues to adapt and evolve our resources and programs to meet the needs of all Service members and their families. For example, we should appreciate the fact that we have a very young force, and the information, the resources, and the support we provide must be delivered in a manner they feel comfortable receiving; otherwise, the information may go unheeded and the resources and support may go unused. This means using technology, social media, and other innovative means. Additionally, there can be a wealth of helpful resources and support resident just outside our gates and residing in our communities. Partnerships with communities and community programs can therefore significantly enhance the Department's efforts to meet the needs of our families. Finally, we must continue to build on the great successes in family support that we have made since the start of combat operations nearly ten years ago.

In your view, are the recent increases in military family support (which have risen to \$8.3 billion in the FY 2012 President's budget) sustainable in future years?

I believe family programs are sustainable in future years. Clearly it will be necessary to review family support programs with respect to efficiencies just as every other program in DoD will be reviewed, however, the focus should not merely be on improved efficiencies. We will need to provide the right programs - the ones that are targeted to the needs of our contemporary service members and their families and that are shown to be effective in meeting those needs.

69. Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs Collaboration

Then-Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans Affairs Shinseki pledged to improve and increase collaboration between the respective departments to support military

service members as they transition to veteran status, in areas of health and mental health care, disability evaluation, and compensation.

If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs achieve the Administration's objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?

I understand significant improvements have been made in DoD-VA collaboration in the last few years. Secretary Panetta has made it clear that he intends to continue the efforts of Secretary Gates and Shinseki and seek to accelerate current timelines. If confirmed, I will ensure that DoD continues to work closely with VA to support service members and their families in all facets of making a seamless transition to veteran status.

70. Goldwater-Nichols for the Interagency

The successful integration of joint capabilities within the Armed Forces under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been held up as a potential model for integration of military and civilian agencies with related missions. A "Goldwater Nichols Act for the Interagency" is considered necessary by some to force changes in organization, training, policies, and procedures in order to achieve unity of effort and enhance cooperation between military and civilian departments. Presidential Executive Order (E.O) 13434 (National Security Professional Development) and DOD's Civilian National Security Professional Development Program reflect the intent to improve performance in this regard.

What is your understanding of the concept of "Goldwater Nichols for the Interagency"? What are your views on the merits of mandating a Goldwater Nichols Act for the Federal government designed to achieve the goals set forth in E.O. 13434? How would you evaluate the progress of DOD and the interagency in achieving the goals of E.O. 13434?

I understand that this concept originates from two facts. The first fact is that virtually every security problem in the modern world requires a joint mix of the skills and authorities that are resident in the military; the diplomatic corps; the development, intelligence, and law enforcement communities; and other federal agencies. The second fact is that the Goldwater-Nichols Act enabled us to combine the efforts of the separate armed forces that constitute today's joint force. I believe this is a sound, indeed vitally important, concept. If confirmed, I would seek to move this concept forward, whether in law or by other mechanisms.

If confirmed, I intend to reiterate the important role each interagency partner plays in supporting our nation's security. We should also continue to adapt the education and training of our national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges.

Developing future national security leaders who understand whole-of-government operations and thinking will remain an important priority.

71. Human Capital Planning

Section 115b of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and annually update a strategic human capital plan that specifically identifies gaps in the Department's civilian workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. The Department of Defense has not yet produced a strategic human capital plan that meets the requirements of these provisions.

Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies gaps in the workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key step toward ensuring that the Department has the skills and capabilities needed to meet future challenges?

Yes. A strategic workforce plan is essential to ensure a capable and mission ready civilian workforce. I understand that the Department has committed to a revised plan which meets Congressional direction, by the end of FY15. Interim updates will be provided. The revised strategic human capital plan will clearly link the missions of the Department to the size, mix and skill sets of military, civilian and contractor employees. If confirmed, I will review this plan for adequacy before it is submitted.

Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements of section 115b regarding the requirement for a strategic human capital plan?

Yes, it would be helpful to the Department to report biennially on the status of the DoD strategic workforce plan. A biennial report will allow time to mature the Department's strategic human capital processes, close identified workforce gaps, and implement strategies for recruitment and retention of the knowledge, skills and abilities required to accomplish the mission.

If confirmed, will you ensure that the Department of Defense fully complies with these requirements?

Yes.

72. All Volunteer Force

The All Volunteer Force came into existence almost 40 years ago and, since its inception, volunteer soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines have helped to win the Cold War, defeat aggression during the Persian Gulf War, keep peace in the former Yugoslavia, combat terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, and defend freedom around the world.

Are you committed to the All Volunteer Force?

Yes, I am committed to preserving the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). The AVF has not only met, but surpassed, the visions and expectations of its founders, and provided this nation with the highest quality, most capable force in its history at a lower cost than a conscripted force. The AVF has proved its viability and resilience through over a decade of prolonged warfighting.

Under what conditions, if any, would you support re-initiation of the draft?

I can think of no likely situation where I would support resumption of the draft. The All-Volunteer Force has surpassed all expectations of its founders. Today's force is unique because each person wearing the uniform today either entered or chose to remain in the military during this period of prolonged conflict. The All-Volunteer Force today is highly educated, of high aptitude, disciplined, physically fit, and representative of America. Today's recruits are the highest quality we have seen in the past 20 years.

What factors do you consider most significant to the success of the All Volunteer Force?

The success of the All-Volunteer Force is built upon three cornerstones: (1) recruiting a quality force; (2) appropriately compensating that force; and (3) providing force management policies that retain the right kinds of people in the right skills.

Do you share the concerns expressed by Admiral Mullen that there is a growing disconnect between the military and U.S. civilian society and, if so, how would you address this problem?

Yes, because we want our military to be representative of the society which it defends. This is an inherent challenge when the Services only take in less than one percent of the youth population each year. The Department's civilian and military leadership, and the nation's leadership as a whole, needs to work to prevent such a disconnect.

73. Detainee Treatment Policy

Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD

Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes.

If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

Yes.

Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Yes, I believe that DoD's leadership should always be mindful of multiple considerations when developing standards for detainee treatment, including that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts.

Do you believe that the Department of Defense has the authorities it needs to detain and try individuals captured in the course of the current conflict, where it is appropriate to do so?

It is my understanding the Department of Defense has the authorities it needs to capture, detain and prosecute by military commission supporters and members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.

It is my understanding over the course of nearly a decade of policy development and litigation, the 2001 AUMF has provided the Executive Branch with the legal basis for using necessary and appropriate force, including detention, against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. The United States has relentlessly and effectively pursued the enemy under this existing authority, and has successfully defended its authority to detain in the Federal courts. The Department of Defense is utilizing its existing authority under the Military Commissions Act of 2009 to prosecute certain of these detainees.

74. Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Yes

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes