

**Advance Questions for Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert , USN**  
**Nominee for the Position of Chief of Naval Operations**

**Defense Reforms**

**The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.**

**Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?**

Goldwater-Nichols has served us well, but in the past 20 years the security environment has changed significantly and a review is worthy of consideration.

**If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy if I see need for specific improvement.

**Relationships**

**Section 5033 of title 10, United States Code, discusses the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Naval Operations. Section 151 of title 10, United States Code, discusses the composition and functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to submit advice and opinions to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. Other sections of law and traditional practice, also establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chief of Naval Operations to the following offices:**

**Secretary of Defense**

The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. As a Service Chief and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is a military adviser to

the Secretary of Defense, particularly regarding matters of naval warfare, policy, and strategy.

### **Deputy Secretary of Defense**

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on occasion, serves as acting Secretary in the absence of the Secretary. During these periods, the CNO's relationship with the Deputy Secretary will essentially be the same as with the Secretary. The Deputy Secretary is also responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will endeavor to interact regularly with him and provide him with my best possible professional military advice and the same level of support as I would the Secretary.

### **The Under Secretaries of Defense**

Under current DoD Directives, Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DoD components, to include the Services, in the functional areas under their cognizance. If confirmed as CNO, I will respond and reciprocate. If confirmed, I will use this exchange of information as I communicate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense.

### **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

The CNO is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as such, works with and through the Chairman in the execution of duties. Along with the other Service Chiefs, I will be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked with the responsibility for actively reviewing and evaluating military matters and offering professional military advice to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.

### **The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

When functioning as the Acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman's relationship with Combatant Commanders is that of the Chairman. Also, the Vice Chairman has the same rights and obligations as other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I would exchange views with the Vice Chairman on any defense matter considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Vice Chairman also heads or has a key role on many boards that affect readiness and programs and, therefore, the preparedness of naval forces. If confirmed, I will establish a close relationship with the Vice Chairman on these critical issues.

### **The Secretary of the Navy**

The CNO is responsible, under the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support Combatant Commanders in the accomplishment of their missions. In addition, the CNO assists the Secretary of the Navy in the development of plans and recommendations for the operation of the Department of the Navy. The Navy enjoys a productive, collaborative environment

within the Department, and if confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Navy.

### **The Under Secretary of the Navy**

The Under Secretary of the Navy is the principal assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and is first in line of succession. The Under Secretary performs such duties, and exercises such powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I look forward to establishing a close relationship with the Under Secretary and to working with him to achieve the Secretary's goals.

### **The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy**

The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy work with the Under Secretary to achieve the Secretary's goals. Like the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries perform such duties, and exercises such powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretaries to achieve the Secretary's goals.

### **The General Counsel of the Navy**

The General Counsel of the Navy serves as legal advisor to the Department of the Navy and performs such functions as the Secretary of the Navy shall direct and as necessary to provide for the proper application of the law and effective delivery of legal services within the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel to achieve the Secretary's goals.

### **The Judge Advocate General of the Navy**

Under 10 USC § 5148(d), the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy performs duties relating to any and all Department of Navy legal matters assigned to him by SECNAV. The JAG provides and supervises the provision of all legal advice and related services throughout the Department of the Navy, except for the advice and services provided by the General Counsel. It is important that the CNO receive independent legal advice from his senior uniformed judge advocates. If confirmed, I will work closely with the JAG and seek the JAG's legal advice.

### **The Commandant of the Marine Corps**

A unique historical and operational relationship exists between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Many of our capabilities, programs, and personnel issues are inextricably linked. Our forces deploy together, and both must be ready on arrival. If confirmed as CNO, my relationship with the Commandant of the Marine Corps must be exceptionally close and I will be committed to making every facet of the Navy-Marine Corps team stronger.

### **The Chief of the Navy Reserve**

Under 10 USC § 5143, the Chief of the Navy Reserve serves on the staff of the CNO and is the principal adviser on Navy Reserve matters to the CNO and is the commander of the Navy Reserve Force. The Chief of the Navy Reserve has an essential role in advising CNO of Navy Reserve capabilities alignment to Navy's Total Force mission and operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Chief of the Navy Reserve to continue and enhance the vast progress and Total Force synergies we have achieved.

### **The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force**

Our Armed Forces must work together to recognize each other's strengths and to complement each other's capabilities. We must achieve and maintain synergy in warfare, training, and procurement to ensure each Service contributes optimally to Joint and combined operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with my counterparts to enhance Joint interoperability and other aspects of the Joint relationship in order to improve the war fighting capabilities of the United States.

### **The Combatant Commanders**

The CNO's responsibility as a Service Chief is to provide properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to the Combatant Commanders to accomplish their military missions. If confirmed, I will work to foster close working relationships with the Unified and Specified Combatant Commanders.

### **Major Challenges**

#### **In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Chief of Naval Operations?**

The major focus of the next CNO must be to maintain current readiness and provide ready, capable forces; to define and deliver a relevant naval force for the future; and to ensure we continue to attract a motivated, high-quality and diverse force of Sailors and civilians. The CNO's enduring leadership covenant is to take care of those who serve today, including our wounded, ill and injured, and their families. The overarching challenge remains balancing priorities in a fiscally-constrained environment.

#### **If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

If confirmed, I will remain committed to war fighting readiness to ensure we remain agile, capable, and ready forward. I will continue to employ our Fleet Response Plan while seeking to re-establish a sustainable level of operations consistent with our force structure. We must adapt our deployment models to ensure the viability of both current and future readiness, which involves reaching the expected service lives of our ships and aircraft at reasonable cost.

In light of budget realities, our acquisition programs will face increasing pressure; therefore, it is more important than ever to meticulously review requirements throughout the acquisition process. We will stay in lockstep with the acquisition community and Joint partners and be willing to change, adapt, and re-scope to meet evolving threats. I intend to partner with the Commandant of the Marine Corps in establishing the finest naval force attainable within fiscal limits; a Naval Force ready to respond today to today's crises—anytime, anywhere. I also plan to remain open, transparent and collaborative with our fellow Services and OSD in efforts to seek cost savings while ensuring our Navy remains strong, effective and relevant. Internal to Navy, we will continue ongoing efforts to eliminate redundant processes, overhead, and costly infrastructures, as well as identify and adopt business best practices as standards for all.

I intend to be unwavering in our obligation to take care of Sailors and their Families through sustained program oversight and support. They are the Navy's foundation. Attracting and retaining a diverse, high-quality Total Force will require innovative ways to communicate with the youth of our nation. Once aboard, we will provide opportunities for individuals to rise as far as their talents and ambitions allow.

### **Most Serious Problems**

#### **What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the execution of the functions of the Chief of Naval Operations?**

The nation cannot have a strong defense without a strong economy; therefore I view the deficit crisis and corresponding deep cuts in defense as one of the most significant challenges to the entire national security community. Fiscal realities aside, every Chief of Naval Operations faces the following challenges executing his duties: (1) properly balancing current resources allocated to sustain, train, and equip the Navy; (2) obtaining the necessary resources to build and man the future Navy; and (3) ensuring continuity among requirements, resourcing, and acquisition in the existing planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process. The Navy's larger imperatives are to remain whole (avoid decisions that create hollow capabilities) and maintain an international forward presence that offers our national leadership options to protect U.S. global interests.

#### **If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?**

If confirmed, I will work closely with my Navy senior leadership team, my fellow Service Chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Navy, and through him, the Secretary of Defense and Congress to develop balanced, fiscally-responsible approaches to addressing and solving these problems.

## **Duties and Qualifications**

**Section 5033 of title 10, United States Code, describes the duties of Chief of Naval Operations and requires that the person nominated to fill the job have had significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a flag officer.**

**What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?**

I believe the breadth and depth of my experience as a naval officer and Joint warfighter qualifies me for this position. I had the privilege of five commands, including assignments as Commander U.S. SEVENTHFLT, where I served as a Joint Task Force Commander, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, and Coalition Force Maritime Component Commander for two major Pacific war plans. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, I was responsible for the Navy's Global Force Management and support to three Combatant Commanders. In my current position as Vice Chief of Naval Operations, one of my core responsibilities is to serve as Navy's representative for Joint capabilities development. My five tours on the Navy headquarters staff and financial management specialization have provided me deep insight on integration of warfighting capabilities and resources; business operations; planning, programming, budgeting and execution; and cost reduction efforts in a fiscally constrained environment.

**Do you meet the joint requirements for the position or did you require a waiver?**

Yes, I required a waiver. Per 10 USC Section 5033(s)(3), the President may waive the joint requirements. My nomination is based in part on my joint duty assignment as a flag officer while serving as the U.S. Pacific Command Representative, Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau. The Secretary of Defense requested this waiver based on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy and the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

## **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea**

**Officials of the Department of Defense, including previous Chiefs of Naval Operations, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.**

**Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?**

Yes. The United States is the world's foremost maritime power and our security interests are intrinsically global in nature. Our Navy is deployed throughout the world. We have more to gain from legal certainty and public order in the world's oceans than any other

nation. Joining the Convention will reinforce our Cooperative Strategy for 21st Seapower and the Naval Operations Concept 2010 to confront maritime security challenges.

**How would you respond to critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?**

I believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention is in our national security interests. The basic tenets of the Convention are clear and beneficial to the Navy. From the right of unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international navigation and reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, to providing a framework for countering excessive claims of other states and preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones, the Convention provides the stable, predictable, and recognized legal regime we need to conduct our operations today and in the future.

U.S. military forces must be able to operate freely on, over, and above the world's oceans. That freedom is critical to our national security interests, the military in general, and the Navy in particular. The Law of the Sea Convention codifies fundamental benefits important to our operating forces as they train, transit, and fight. Amendments made to the Convention in the 1990s satisfied many of the concerns that opponents have expressed. Also, joining the Convention will not subject the U.S. Navy to the jurisdiction of international courts, nor will it adversely affect the President's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) or United States intelligence activities.

The Convention is the bedrock legal instrument underpinning public order for the world's oceans. By joining the Convention, we can best assert our leadership in oceans law and policy, and in conjunction with our Freedom of Navigation program, we can best protect the navigational rights and freedoms that are of such critical importance to our nation's security and economic prosperity.

**In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime disputes such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?**

The United States is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council and the only Arctic nation not a party to the Law of the Sea Convention. US economic interests in the Arctic are significant, including natural resources, shipping and trade. The United States has an extended continental shelf (ECS) that is likely to be more than one million square kilometers - an area nearly half that of the Louisiana Purchase, with energy and mineral resources that have been estimated to value up to \$1T and include mineral deposits and petroleum resources (oil, gas, gas hydrates)

In the ongoing tensions over rights in the South China Sea, the United States will be in a stronger position of influence by joining the Convention that provides the legal regime for the oceans. UNCLOS membership will put the full weight of US political leadership behind the legal maritime framework it upholds. Application of the legal standards and

framework as codified by UNCLOS is central to resolution of existing maritime disputes. Our friends and allies need our political leadership within UNCLOS to influence resolution of South China Sea disputes in accordance with the legal standards and customary maritime law as defined by UNCLOS.

### **Transformation**

**If confirmed, you would play an important role in the process of transforming the Navy to meet new and emerging threats.**

**What are your goals regarding Navy transformation?**

The Navy is on a good course and speed regarding transformation initiatives and we have a good navigation plan for the future. If confirmed, my goals will remain largely consistent with our current efforts. For example, Navy has taken the lead within DoD in reshaping itself to meet current and future cyber threats and opportunities, but we have more work to do to capitalize on our progress to date and realize the full potential of our growing cyber force. We must continue to mature Navy's recently-formed Information Dominance Corps, which will help develop integrated solutions in unmanned ISR systems, Electronic Warfare, and C5I. We must continue to retain our advantage in the undersea domain in order to achieve joint assured access wherever it is needed. We will also focus on supporting the development of emerging technologies we think hold the greatest promise for future naval and joint warfighting (such as the railgun, Free Energy Laser, and Directed Energy).

Underpinning all these goals is a need to transform our demographics within the Navy to ensure our personnel reflect the society we defend. I intend to pursue diversity goals within established policy guidelines, so that we can recruit, retain, and promote the best talent the nation has to offer, regardless of color, creed, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender.

### **Fleet Readiness**

**Recently, there have been a number of ships that have failed inspections by the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV), including Aegis cruisers and destroyers due to poor material condition. Some have suggested that these INSURV failures result from increased deployment demands supporting current operations. Others have suggested they are caused by deficiencies in the maintenance efforts or deficiencies of leadership in maintaining these ships.**

**What do you believe has caused these increases in INSURV inspection failures, and what would you propose to do about it?**



The Navy has been aggressively tackling causal factors related to increases in INSURV inspections that have resulted in “degraded” or “unsatisfactory” findings. A major contributor to these problems has been our high operational tempo to support ongoing conflicts over the last decade. Frequent deployments, compounded by a decreasing fleet size, have constrained our ability to adhere to pre-planned maintenance schedules. Other causal factors include past decisions regarding “optimum manning” (excessive reductions in ship manning), technical training for Sailors, material assessment training for senior officers, shifts in staffing of intermediate maintenance activities, and planning and execution of surface ship maintenance.

We have initiated a number of activities to improve overall readiness of our surface ships over the long term. The Naval Sea Systems Command has established SEA-21, a directorate dedicated to managing the complete lifecycle support, maintenance and modernization for all non-nuclear surface ships operating in the Fleet. Another critical step forward is the improved research, planning, and execution of surface ship maintenance built upon the proven processes we use in the carrier and submarine communities. We are increasing the crew size of select ship classes, focusing on critical technical ratings, creating waterfront material assistance teams, and increasing the staffing of Regional Maintenance Centers. Technical training has been updated to increase hands-on experience and improve the balance between computer-based and instructor-led classes. We have partnered with the American Bureau of Shipping to improve our assessment of ship material condition and actions required to achieve the expected service life of each hull. These initiatives are resulting in tangible improvement in surface ship readiness, and improvement in functional areas in recent INSURV inspections, as attested to by recent Fleet reports. If confirmed, I intend to continue to promote and support these actions, which are expected to continue to have a positive impact on material readiness of our surface ships over the next several years.

### **Acquisition Management**

**Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition management processes of the Department of the Navy?**

From my perspective, the role of the CNO in the requirements determination and resource allocation process is clear and appropriate. While the current cooperation among the CNO and acquisition officials is good, it should not be personality dependent. Service Chiefs should have a more formal role in acquisition management to ensure continuity among the requirements, resourcing and acquisition processes.

**Do you see a need for any change in the structure or functions of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) or the role played by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations in the JROC?**

I do not. I will continue to support the important work of the JROC. If confirmed, and after I have participated in the process, I will recommend changes as appropriate.

## **Anti-Access/Area Denial**

**Over the past few years, much has been made of the emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the U.S. Navy's freedom of movement and action in certain regions.**

**Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities are a concern and, if so, what do you believe the Navy needs to be doing now and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all strategically important segments of the maritime domain?**

There are an increasing number of foreign capabilities that have the potential to slow or prevent the deployment of friendly forces into the theater, cause our forces to operate from distances further from a crisis than desired, or to disrupt friendly operations in theater by targeting our enabling capabilities. The Navy has and will continue to develop programs that provide capabilities and capacity to address emerging anti-access threats. Accordingly, we are strengthening our partnerships, modernizing our forces, fielding new capabilities and technologies, and developing new operational concepts. One specific initiative that will help preserve access and freedom of action in denied areas is implementation of the Air-Sea Battle Concept. This effort leverages advantages a particular service has in one domain in order to enable or enhance effects in another domain through integrated operations of networked naval and air forces. Air-Sea Battle implementation will ensure continued U.S. advantage against emerging anti-access threats.

## **Recapitalizing the Fleet**

**Despite the fact that Navy leadership has determined that it needs to have a 313-ship fleet to meet the maritime requirements of the National Military Strategy, it is currently operating with 284 battle force ships. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has concluded that the Navy has underestimated the costs for building the 313-ship fleet by approximately 16 percent.**

**Do you agree with the CBO's assessment that there is significant cost risk associated with the Navy's shipbuilding plan?**

The Navy and CBO are in relatively close agreement in our cost estimates for the first 10 years of the 30 year shipbuilding plan because we have a good understanding of the ships requirements and costs. In the second 10 years, our cost estimates begin to diverge because we lose some of the cost fidelity, and inflation factors come in to play. There is a difference between the way the Navy cost estimators account for inflation versus the way CBO accounts for inflation, which impacts the gap between CBO's estimates and the Navy's estimates. In the last 10 years of the 30-year plan, the gap increases are driven by this difference in inflation estimates, and by the assumptions made for the capabilities

and costs of new ships. As the near term is most relevant from an execution perspective, the relatively small differences pose limited risk to the shipbuilding plan.

**What actions do you believe are necessary to execute the Navy's shipbuilding plan within the Navy's budget estimates?**

In the near term, I anticipate the acquisition community will continue its efforts to promote efficiency and competition in the industrial base to gain best value for the Navy and the taxpayer. For the longer term, we will work to control changes in requirements and ensure requirements for new classes of ships are limited to essential or mandated capabilities.

**How would you characterize the risks to mission performance posed by the current shortfall in battle force ships and the growing shortfall in tactical aircraft?**

The Navy is meeting critical COCOM demand for battle force ships and associated tactical aircraft. While not able to meet the cumulative annual global COCOM requirements, Navy is meeting all adjudicated demands through the Joint Global Force Management process, based on prioritized requirements defined by the OSD's Guidance for the Employment of the Force.

**What adjustments to the respective programs are necessary and appropriate to reduce that operational risk?**

Based on our current strategy, I believe the President's budget reflects the best balance of resources across the totality of our requirements.

**What further adjustments would you consider if the Navy's program comes under further pressure due to cost growth?**

Pending the outcome of the current strategic review, it is premature to identify where it might be most appropriate to adjust requirements.

**Alternative Financing Methods for Shipbuilding**

**Navy leaders have testified that alternative financing methods must be found for shipbuilding.**

**What are your views and recommendations on the benefits and feasibility of alternative financing methods, such as incremental funding and advance appropriations?**

The Navy currently has incremental funding authority for our most expensive ship class, nuclear carriers, and Congress has granted two year funding authority for some large amphibious ships. This authority has been helpful in mitigating the impact of the high

levels of funding required by these ships on other ships which need to be procured to achieve required force levels and to more efficiently load the shipbuilding industrial base.

**What is your assessment of the long-term impact of such alternative financing methods on the availability of funds for shipbuilding?**

Alternative financing methods allow the Navy to maintain the shipbuilding industrial base through more efficient management of SCN total obligational authority. Different financing periodicities provide greater flexibility in executing scarce resources and help avoid individual-year funding spikes. Whenever possible, the Navy remains committed to following a full-funding policy, where the entire obligation is provided upon contract award.

**Attack Submarine Force Levels**

**The Navy's most recent statement of requirements for attack submarine force levels was 48 attack submarines. However, the Navy projects that the number of attack submarines will fall as low as 39 boats and remain below the 48-boat requirement for almost two decades. The Navy is now claiming that it will be able to mitigate this shortage using three techniques: (1) building the new *Virginia* class submarines faster by reducing the time between the start of construction to delivery from the current level of 86 months for the last boat to deliver to a level of 60 months; (2) extending the life of some boats currently in the fleet from 3 to 24 months; and (3) increasing the length of deployments**

**What is your assessment of whether the three techniques listed above will yield a number of deployed attack submarines sufficient to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs?**

The Navy has already made progress in shortening the time to build the Virginia class SSN to 66 months for the most recent delivery, USS MISSOURI (SSN 780). The program is on schedule to meet its ultimate goal of a 60-month construction span. This has the effect of adding one submarine to the force, thereby delaying the onset of the SSN force structure trough which will begin in 2024. Projected life extensions of a limited number of SSNs is possible, but will relieve less than 20% of the force structure trough and its duration. Increasing the length of deployments can improve forward deployed presence for short-term periods but does not address the impending force structure trough. Taken together, although helpful, these three techniques will not be sufficient to meet the shortfall relative to combatant commander's requirements under current planning guidance.

**What risks are being incurred by allowing the attack submarine force levels to remain below 48 for so long?**

Under current planning guidance, an attack submarine force level below 48 will increase the risk of gaps in our coverage for indications and warning of potential hostile action, delay or reduce the arrival of submarines critical to the war fight, and potentially allow an adversary to create and maintain a safe haven.

### **Ohio class replacement**

**A major cost risk facing the Navy at the end of this decade is the cost of replacing the *Ohio* class strategic missile submarines. The acquisition process has already resulted in the Navy acquisition system making a number of cost vs. capability decisions to try to reduce those costs risks to the shipbuilding budget.**

**Do you agree with the decisions that have been made about the capability of the *Ohio* class replacement submarines?**

The OHIO Replacement Program Milestone “A” decision reflects cost versus capability trades that were jointly agreed on by the requirements and acquisition stakeholders in the Navy and the Department of Defense. I support these decisions.

**How confident are you that the program will be able to produce an *Ohio* class replacement vessel that meets current cost objectives?**

The OHIO Replacement Program has been thoroughly reviewed. All aspects of the program (warfighting requirements, program execution, design and construction efforts) were aggressively challenged to drive down non-recurring engineering and construction costs. The Navy estimates that the average OHIO Replacement cost for hulls 2-12 will be \$5.6 billion with a goal of reducing this to \$4.9 billion.

I believe these estimates are achievable in the context of the current shipbuilding plan due to the scrutiny on requirements and costs leading up to the Milestone “A” decision.

### **Sea-based ISR**

**There is a documented Joint Urgent Operational Need for sea-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to support missions by special operations forces in areas where land-based ISR is unavailable. The committee understands the Navy recently completed a proof of concept which demonstrated the value of such a capability to current combat operations, but does not intend to field a program-of-record solution until 2019.**

**What is your understanding of the requirement for sea-based ISR capabilities to support special operations forces?**

Navy is planning and developing capabilities that will help satisfy legitimate ISR demands of special operations forces. The intent is to procure ISR systems with multi-

intelligence sensor modules, on station endurance and integrated weapons to support a broad range of missions from the sea.

**Do you believe the responsibility for fielding sea-based ISR capabilities to support special operations forces falls on the Navy or U.S. Special Operations Command?**

Fielding sea-based ISR capabilities is a shared responsibility that begins with coordination over requirements and development of systems that can execute many types of ISR missions for operational commanders. Demands for service-specific ISR already in the field is managed through the Joint Staff Global Force Management Allocation Plan and Request for Forces. The Navy is investing in sea-based ISR support to SOF with programs of record such as the Small Tactical Unmanned Air System (IOC 2013) and the Medium Range Maritime Unmanned Air System (IOC 2019). While program development continues, the Navy is committed to supporting SOF from the sea with other capabilities to include Fire Scout, land-based Scan Eagle support, manned ISR aircraft and deployed combatants. The Navy is pursuing options to accelerate the fielding of an upgraded Fire Scout that will provide enhanced endurance and payload.

**Do you believe the Navy's current timeline for fielding a program-of-record capability for sea-based ISR is appropriate?**

The Navy has embarked upon a transition to a future ISR "Family of Systems." The Family of Systems will allow the Navy to transition from a limited number of multi-intelligence manned platforms to a greater number of systems that are tailorable and scalable to meet Navy, Coalition and Joint warfighter requirements. We are making significant investments of over \$8B across FY12-FY16 to address the Navy's future requirements, including funding for the following Unmanned Airborne Systems: Fire Scout (\$1.1B, IOC 2012), Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (\$3.9B, IOC 2015), Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (\$2.5B, IOC 2018), and Medium Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System (\$1.1B, IOC 2019). These platforms with appropriate sensors and processing will recapitalize the capabilities currently provided by EP-3 and Special Projects Aircraft and are programmed for delivery to the fleet prior to EP-3/SPA end of service life in the 2019-2020 timeframe.

**Special Operations Personnel Management**

**Some have argued that the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) should have greater influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of special operations forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, United States Code, to change the role of the USSOCOM Commander from "monitoring" the readiness of special operations personnel to "coordinating" with the services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect special operations forces.**

### **What is your view of this proposal?**

I do not believe the proposal is necessary. Navy already coordinates with SOCOM-- typically through the component SOF commander to SOCOM--on a wide variety of personnel policy/actions such as individual selection, assignments, promotion precepts, and command selection. It is vital that a Service is vested with final decision authority when it comes to personnel and manpower management policies.

### **Capabilities of Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces**

**The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called for increased counter insurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces. These missions have traditionally been within the purview of special operations forces.**

**What actions, if any, do you believe need to be taken in order to allow special operations and general purpose forces to successfully share these missions in the future?**

The Navy continues to emphasize coordination and integration, where appropriate, of Navy's General Purpose Forces (GPF) and Special Operation Forces (SOF) for Counterterrorism (CT), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions. These missions are shared in many parts of the world, whether using naval platforms for Afloat Forward Staging Bases in remote littoral areas, integrating sea-based ISR and fires support to augment SOF "find, fix, finish" operations, or using Naval Expeditionary Combat Command units to support SFA activities. We will continue to encourage increased coordination between GPF and SOF units in pre-deployment phases. Navy's inherent multi-mission focus continues to give operational commanders options to mix and match capabilities to best meet their mission needs in forward areas.

**Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for special operations forces only?**

Unconventional Warfare and Direct Action missions in Counterterrorism should stay predominantly within the purview of SOF.

### **Science and Technology Program**

**The budget request for defense Science and Technology (S&T) still falls short of the Defense Science Board's recommended goal of dedicating 3% of the total defense budget to S&T. In particular, the Navy S&T program, especially the investment in long-term, innovative work which has been so successful in**

**confronting emerging threats, has declined significantly since the Fiscal Year 2006 request.**

**If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess whether the Navy is investing adequately in S&T programs?**

Three key components exist to an effective S&T program: (1) a strong and focused investment in basic and early applied research to build the scientific foundation for future technologies, (2) an emphasis on key “game changing” initiatives that can provide disruptive technologies to the Navy and Marine Corps warfighter, and (3) an ability to transition S&T programs to the acquisition community and the Fleet. One way we assess the adequacy of our investments is to assess the balance of effort and output in each of these areas. A second metric is our success rate in transitioning viable and affordable S&T initiatives into the acquisition programs that make it to the Fleet.

**How would you assess the value and appropriate investment level for basic research programs?**

Discovery and Invention (D&I) includes basic research (6.1) and early applied research (6.2) in areas with unique requirements essential to the naval mission and in areas that are undefined but hold promise for future application. D&I develops fundamental knowledge, provides the basis for future Navy/Marine Corps systems, sustains our scientist and engineer workforce, and contributes to long term DoN strategic goals. D&I constitutes the largest portion, approximately 40 percent, of the Navy’s two billion dollar S&T investment. We believe this investment is appropriate for our needs.

### **Technical Workforce**

**A significant challenge facing the Navy today is an impending shortage of high quality scientific and engineering talent to work at Navy laboratories and technical centers.**

**In your view, what are the pros and cons of having active-duty Navy personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers within the Navy research and acquisition system?**

The Department of the Navy's technical workforce has been the reason for the Navy's long term technical success in developing and fielding advanced maritime systems. The current level of U.S. Navy talent is high -- producing the world's top-ranked government patent portfolio, according to the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Navy estimates that close to 50% of our S&T professionals will be retirement eligible by 2020. Attracting, recruiting, and retaining qualified scientific and engineering talent is critical to the Navy and the nation's future.



The use of uniformed military officers to fill potential shortfalls in our scientific community helps infuse an understanding of fleet operations and requirements, and strengthens the military-civilian partnership in our acquisition system; however, laboratories and technical centers are best served by a strong, stable cadre of civilian specialists who provide long-term, dedicated support in their highly specialized fields of study.

### **Test and Evaluation Issues**

#### **What do you see as the role of the developmental and operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition processes?**

The developmental and operational test community role in rapid acquisition is the same as that of traditional acquisition. Adequate testing is critical to assess performance of systems in operationally realistic environments. Testing informs decision makers of the capabilities and limitations of systems and how they perform relative to the acquisition program requirements or the operational need. The goal is to do this as early as possible and before systems are fielded. The only significant difference between “normal” acquisition processes and rapid acquisition or urgent needs is the flexibility and timeline for testing requirements and the oversight provided. In general, the test community has flexible policies which can be customized. A good example of this is the Quick Reaction Assessment on the Littoral Combat Ship, which allowed it to deploy earlier in support of Fleet needs.

#### **Are you satisfied with the Navy’s test and evaluation capabilities?**

Yes. Current T&E capabilities are adequately funded to meet acquisition program requirements and Navy Ranges and Labs are considered key to assessing system performance. The Navy has a robust process to evaluate current and future T&E capability needs. Through the Tri-Service T&E Reliance process, we work with the other Services and the OSD Test Resource Management Center (TRMC) to review existing test infrastructure, assess health, and ensure adequate test capabilities and capacity exist without unnecessary duplication.

#### **In which areas, if any, do you feel the Navy should be developing new test and evaluation capabilities?**

We continue to look at emerging technologies and the T&E capability needed to test them. New focus areas may require future capability investments as systems are developed and their T&E needs and challenges are defined. Requirements for new technologies and programs of record will be used to determine shortfalls and build investment plans for Navy T&E Improvement and Modernization funding. We also work with OSD and the other services to develop Joint T&E capabilities, where appropriate.

## **Ballistic Missile Defense**

**The Navy will play an important role in defending the nation against the threat of long range ballistic missile attack and in defending allies, friends, and deployed forces against theater ballistic missile threats.**

**The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383) required the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the requirements for major combatant surface vessels with respect to ballistic missile defense (BMD). The Navy report stated that the Navy has established a requirement for fiscal year 2024 of having a force of 94 multi-mission large surface combatants (including ballistic missile defense capability).**

**The Navy also delivered a copy of its 30-year shipbuilding plan to the Committee. The Navy projects that they will achieve the 94-ship goal for BMD-capable ships in 2020 and 2021, although force levels will decline thereafter. Specifically, the Navy projects that they will have, at most, 92 BMD-capable ships in 2024 before declining to 65 ships in 2034.**

### **Do you view ballistic missile defense as a core Navy mission?**

Navy ballistic missile defense is fully consistent with our Maritime Strategy, enhancing deterrence, supporting sea control and the conditions for power projection, all of which is achieved through forward presence. The Geographic Combatant Commanders recognize the value of this capability and have created a high demand for these assets, as demonstrated through the validation of an increase in the large surface combatant requirement from 88 to 94 in the current planning environment.

### **What options should the Navy be exploring to reduce the shortfall in meeting the stated requirement of having 94 BMD capable ships?**

The Navy has already embarked on an effort to increase the production of BMD capable large surface combatants through the restart of the DDG 51 production line, promoting competition in DDG production to improve cost, setting the conditions for a future DDG multi-year program, and adding an additional DDG in FY14. The Navy has also embarked on a focused effort to control costs in the OHIO Strategic Ballistic Submarine replacement program to minimize impacts on other elements of the shipbuilding plan.

## **Active-Duty End Strength**

**According to the latest data provided to the Committee, the Navy remains on pace to exceed its 2011 authorized end strength and the problem is likely to continue into 2012, given the state of the economy and the fact that the Navy plans to reduce its active-duty end strength by 3000 sailors in 2012. The other Services are facing**

**similar problems as the Air Force is also overstrength and the Army and Marine Corps are planning significant force reductions. To address these issues, the Department of Defense is seeking force management tools that require Congressional authorization.**

**What force management tools does the Navy need to address these issues, and which of these require Congressional authorization?**

Our strength projections show we will finish the fiscal year under our congressionally-authorized end strength. We have taken action to shape the force, such as reducing accessions, conducting a selective early retirement board and holding an enlisted retention board. High retention and low attrition continue to challenge our ability to keep a balanced force in terms of seniority, skill, and experience.

I support the Administration's FY12 Defense Authorization Request that seeks approval for the following Force Management Authorities:

- Reinstatement of Enhanced Selective Early Retirement authority would expand the retirement eligible pool of officers to target to shape the force.
- Extension of Voluntary Separation Pay, to provide Secretaries of the military departments with temporary authority to continue using voluntary separation pay.
- Reinstatement of Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA) to target officers with between 15 and 20 years of service for early retirement.
- Voluntary Retirement Incentive (VRI) to provide a voluntary retirement incentive to service members with 20 and 29 years of active service, who would retire prior to their planned retirement dates without the need to force their retirement through involuntary means.
- Authority to Reduce Years of Service for Mandatory Retirement for certain Officers in the Grade of O-5 from 28 years to 25 years.
- Authority to Reduce Years of Service for Mandatory Retirement for certain Officers in the Grade of O-6 from 30 years to 27 years.

**In addition to Enlisted Retention Boards, what methods does the Navy plan to use to reduce active-duty end strength from 2012 through 2014?**

The objective of our force management policies is to preserve a balanced force based on seniority, skill sets, and seniority; reward our best performers; and position the force to meet future manpower requirements for our projected force structure. We assess our end strength requirements each year as part of the budget submission process. For FY 2012, Perform to Serve, our centralized reenlistment process, will be augmented by a Selective Early Retirement Board and an Enlisted Retention Board to meet our projected end strength. As we have yet to determine our end strength levels for FY 2013 and beyond, it is too early to determine our required end strength target or assess methods we might use should a reduction be necessary. I anticipate we will make those decisions coincident to our FY2013 budget request.

## **Navy Reserve**

**What is your vision for the roles and missions of the Navy Reserve, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you seek to achieve with respect to the Navy Reserve's organization, end strength, and force structure?**

The mission of the Navy Reserve is to provide strategic depth and deliver operational capabilities to our Navy and Marine Corps team and Joint forces, from peace to war. Our vision for the Navy Reserve is to be a provider of choice for essential naval warfighting capabilities and expertise, strategically aligned with mission requirements and valued for its readiness, innovation, and agility to respond to any situation. Our Navy is carrying out this mission and working toward that vision.

In the decade since the September 11, 2001 attacks on our nation, our Navy Reserve has answered the call. Going forward, we face a changing global security and economic environment, and we will ensure our Navy Reserve remains aligned with mission requirements. Because our Navy Reserve is ready, innovative and agile, we can assign capabilities and missions to our Reserve Component with confidence. Even as we reduce our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, I see a continued need and desire to keep our Navy Reserve engaged as a full partner in Navy's Total Force. We will work together to ensure Navy's Total Force, active and reserve, delivers the right capabilities to the Nation at the best value to the taxpayer.

**How do you anticipate the Navy will use new legislative authorities, if enacted, that would permit involuntary call-up of reservists for pre-planned, operational missions?**

As we move forward into a post-Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) environment, the Navy Reserve should be a regular part of our worldwide deployment cycle, as well as performing the Navy's predictable, part-time missions, where appropriate. The new authority would provide the ability to fully use the reserve components (RC) as a rotational, operational force to augment the active component forces in the execution of planned missions in support of the President's national security strategy, as well as for operational missions. For instance, our Navy Reserve Seabees are currently part of the Navy's Total Force mobilized deployment cycle. They mobilize in a one in five cycle, which allows the active duty Seabees to maintain a one in three cycle. This provides a cost-effective model for both components while maintaining sufficient strategic depth in this capability. Post-OCO, without this legislation, our ability to continue to use some of the RC as an operational force, as we currently are and described above, would be severely inhibited.

## **Joint Officer Management**

**What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nichols-required Joint Qualification System?**

When the JQS was implemented on 1 October 2007, it recognized the skills that support U.S. military response to national security threats, interagency coordination, combat operations, and humanitarian crises. It also accounts for the intensity, environment, and duration or frequency of a Joint experience. The JQS provides the opportunity to create and sustain the largest possible pool of fully-qualified and inherently Joint leaders suitable for Joint command and staff responsibilities in both the active and reserve components.

**Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are needed to respond to the unique career-progression needs of Navy officers?**

The JQS effectively addresses the need of the military services to provide qualified active and reserve component personnel in support of Joint missions. We will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of the JQS and will consider changes in law or regulations as required or needed. No changes are proposed at this time

**In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a Joint Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to general and flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Navy line officers?**

We have made solid progress in policy initiatives linking career progression and Joint management policies within Navy line officer career paths. While it is challenging to meet these joint requirements, especially for nuclear-trained aviators commanding our aircraft carriers, we continue to assign high-quality line officers to Joint billets. Our goal is to sustain a cadre of officers who are fully qualified and inherently Joint leaders, suitable for Joint command and staff responsibilities. We are meeting our Joint promotion objectives and filling our Joint assignments and JPME seats with high-caliber officers.

**Do you think that career judge advocates in the Navy should be required to complete joint professional military requirements in connection with operational law requirements?**

I believe there is value for judge advocates to obtain Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). I understand that the JAG Corps intends to formalize JPME guidance that would strongly encourage judge advocates to complete JPME Phase I as part of JAG Corps training requirements. The feedback the Judge Advocate General will receive from this initiative will inform any decision that will be made regarding the desire to formalize judge advocate participation in the joint officer management program and joint qualification system.

## **Selective Early Retirement Authority**

**The Navy has requested that Congress reinstate enhanced authority for selective early retirement.**

**What changes in existing law, if any, regarding selective early retirement, are needed in your view?**

Although Navy prefers to utilize voluntary force shaping methods before resorting to use of involuntary Selective Early Retirement (SER), we have determined that its employment will be necessary in FY12 and beyond as Navy transforms to meet future warfighting requirements. Accordingly, Navy believes that Selective Early Retirement authority should be extended until December 2018 and that enhanced authority should:

- permit consideration of members for early retirement more than once in any five-year period;
- permit consideration for officers in the grade of O-5 who have failed to select for promotion one time (rather than two or more times); and
- permit selective early retirement of officers in the grade of O-6 with greater than two years time in grade.

## **Individual Augmentees**

**The Navy continues to support non-traditional requirements through the use of individual augmentees (IAs). Admiral Roughead, in his written testimony for the Navy Posture Hearing earlier this year, stated that there were, at that time, more than 14,000 sailors deployed in the CENTCOM Area of Operations on the ground, with some significant portion of these sailors serving as IAs.**

**Will the Navy continue to be able to support these non-traditional assignments as it draws down its end strength?**

Properly manning our ships, squadrons and submarines while simultaneously supporting Overseas Combat Operations (OCO) and meeting end strength limits is increasingly challenging. Previous manpower programming provided additional end strength authorizations to support the OCO IA demand. In anticipation of the drawdown of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy has phased out Non-Core and Adaptive Core billets from the baseline budget request, and is no longer authorized OCO-related supplemental end strength. In order to properly man our units, this will require the Navy to limit the number of Sailors and Officers it sends on OCO IA assignments in coming years.

**What are the criteria being applied to determine which active and reserve officers and enlisted personnel are assigned duty as IAs?**

The Navy provides over half of its IA support in core skill areas, such as cargo handling, airlift support, and SeaBees. Navy also provides Sailors for provincial reconstruction, detainee operations, civil affairs, customs inspection, and a variety of other “non-core” missions. The joint sourcing process to meet both “core” and “non-core” requirements is deliberate and is currently focused on reducing IA requirements without unduly increasing the risk to mission success.

**How do these assignments impact Navy readiness?**

Every Sailor on an OCO IA assignment is a Sailor away from his or her primary duty station. This has a direct impact on the manning of our operational units and ultimately could degrade readiness. Sailors on Non-Core OCO IA assignments are not maintaining their primary, or core Navy skill sets, potentially degrading future operational and material readiness. This requires a balance when considering IA assignments for our Sailors so that we do not disadvantage them.

**What benefit, if any, inures to the Navy as a result of these assignments?**

Sailors and Officers who serve on OCO IA assignments gain valuable leadership skills and experience in Joint, Interagency, and non-traditional Navy skills. Many OCO IA assignments also provide coalition experience that further enhance professional skills and adaptability.

**Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve**

**What is your understanding and assessment of the Navy Reserve as an operational reserve, as opposed to its long standing traditional role as a strategic reserve?**

The Navy Reserve is doing a magnificent job in both their operational and strategic roles. These missions are not mutually exclusive. The Navy Reserve can operate anywhere along the spectrum from strategic to operational, and as long as commanders have assured access to their Reserve Component Sailors, we can confidently assign missions to the Navy Reserve where it makes operational and fiscal sense.

**In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the Navy Reserve as a relevant and capable operational reserve?**

Our Navy Reserve is relevant and capable today because we have invested in our people and our equipment, we have assigned them real and meaningful work, and we have honored the support of our families and our employers. In the future, we need to ensure our Sailors continue to have the training and equipment they need to maintain their readiness. Much of the Reserve’s valuable training and operational support is funded with Active Duty for Training (ADT) dollars. We must maintain an appropriate level of ADT funding to ensure our Sailors are a relevant and capable force. Obtaining

Congressional legislation allowing assured access of the Navy Reserve for routine deployments would further enhance the Reserve as a relevant and capable operational force.

**What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve Component forces in meeting combat missions?**

The optimal role for the Reserve Component is as a partner in the Navy Total Force, where we view missions in terms of capabilities first, and then decide where the capability should reside. For some capabilities, the Navy Reserve mirrors the Active Component, in some cases the Navy Reserve complements the Active Component, and in others, the Active Component and the Reserve Component augment each other.

**In your view, should the Department of Defense assign homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions exclusively to the Reserves?**

We look at each mission from a Total Force perspective and decide what capabilities are needed, how often we need them, and what component is best suited to carry them out. As the Department of Defense assigns Navy to homeland defense or domestic civil support missions, Navy will evaluate which component can best deliver those capabilities.

**In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of the all-volunteer Reserve force?**

We view predictability as a key element of a viable and sustainable all-volunteer reserve force. With predictability and a 1 in 5 dwell ratio, we can maintain the support of the three elements that make our Navy Reserve strong: Sailors, families and employers.

**Mobilization and Demobilization of the Reserves**

**In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World War II. Across all of the services, numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical readiness monitoring, errors caused by antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members of the Individual Ready Reserve. In the Reserve components, force management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as “inefficient and rigid” and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.**

**What is your assessment of advances made in improving Navy Reserve**



**mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still exist?**

The Reserve Force has seen improvements in the planning and notification time of Sailors selected to mobilize. Internally, the Reserves have leveraged technology for process improvements via the Ready Mob Pool, Volunteer Portal, IA Portal and a Single Source Deployability metric.

Sailor notification of impending mobilization has greatly improved from an average of 60 days in 2009 to 140 days (orders in hand) as of July 2011. The longer notification time directly translates into needed time for Navy families to plan for impending mobilizations and for our Sailors to individually prepare themselves medically, physically, and administratively. This improvement is seen in the significant lowering of the administrative mobilization processing fall-out rate from 40% to 15% of cancellations. It also allows employers more time to prepare for mobilized employees and eases tension in the workplace.

The Navy Reserve has made a concerted effort to strengthen all phases of the deployment cycle to take the best possible care of Sailors and their families. Pre-deployment Family Readiness Conferences, Command Individual Augmentee Coordinators (a Total Force program), Returning Warrior Workshops, the Psychological Health Outreach Program, and the Navy's Family Readiness programs minimize risk to Navy missions supported by Navy Reserve Sailors. These programs enable service members to focus on the mission by preparing them before, during, and after deployment, and reassuring them that their families are being cared for while they are away.

**What is your understanding and assessment of the sufficiency of current Reserve force management policies?**

Management policies as they relate to mobilization are sufficient. Co-location of Reserve Forces Command with Fleet Forces in Norfolk, VA following the 2005 BRAC has improved integration and facilitated constant and consistent communications. The joint working space of the Individual Augmentee Portal allows for greater notification of requirements. Coupled with the increased volunteer rate, these have improved the ability to provide the Reserve Sailor increased notification of impending mobilization to allow for improved preparation from individual readiness to family preparedness.

**What do you consider to be the most significant enduring changes to the administration of the reserve components aimed at ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?**

Improvements in overall Reserve Force notification time has allowed Reserve Sailors to seek additional resources earlier, which has improved the readiness of the Reserve Force.

**Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities for the mobilization of members of the Reserve component?**

Yes. The Reserve Component has been used as a rotational, operational force during the past ten years. The Department of Defense expects that there will be a continuing military requirement to augment the Active Component to meet the force requirements of the Combatant Commanders as we execute the President's national security strategy. Since September 11, 2001, access to the Reserve Component has been assured via Presidential action that initially invoked, and has annually extended, a declaration of national emergency that enables the use of the partial mobilization authority detailed in 10 U.S.C. 12302.

The Department of Defense has proposed an amendment to section 12304 of title 10, United States Code, which would enable the President to access the RC for all missions to support his national security strategy, not just operational missions, weapons of mass destruction scenarios, and terrorist threats or attacks.

**Is the Navy Reserve currently meeting the dwell time ration goal of 5 years at home for every year deployed?**

Yes. The Navy Reserve has no communities that are required to involuntarily mobilize any Reserve Sailors inside a 1 to 5 dwell ratio. Between new accessions, volunteers and Navy Reserve Sailors completing their dwell period, the Navy Reserve has had the necessary inventory to meet all missions assigned without violating the 1 to 5 dwell period.

**Individual Ready Reserve**

**The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war was problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning is not feasible.**

**What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the Navy?**

The Navy has developed and implemented new objectives for its IRR, as well as changed the face of the current IRR population to provide improved training, manning, accountability and valuable support to gaining commands worldwide. During the past couple of years, we have strived to streamline the IRR by discharging Sailors not able to mobilize and improving access to those members who remain qualified for mobilization and show a continued interest to serve.

**What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Navy force management planning?**

The role of the IRR is and should be a strategic reserve of members who are a valuable resource pool of trained veterans that can be mobilized individually or with an augmented Selected Reserve unit with minimal preparation.

**If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making to the Navy's IRR recall policy?**

The Navy has been working for the past two years to sustain a ready pool of medically, physically, and training-ready IRR Sailors in high demand, low supply skill sets. This right-sizing effort has paid tremendous dividends with the increased demand for IRR support staff at multiple gaining commands worldwide with noticeable results. Also, Navy has recently switched from physical musters of the IRR to completely virtual musters. We have found that the benefits of a physical muster were marginal when compared with the cost and manpower required to administer them.

**What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in place for members in the IRR receiving orders to active duty to request a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in place for appealing a denial of that request?**

Navy has not involuntarily mobilized members from the IRR and currently has no plans to do so. Should we change course with regard to this policy, we have the tools in place to fairly and efficiently recall our IRR sailors. The current delay or exemption process utilized for Selected Reserve Sailors could be expanded to include IRR members.

**Medical and Dental Readiness of Navy Reserve Personnel**

**Medical and dental readiness of reserve component personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the Committee, and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved policy oversight and accountability.**

**If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Navy Reserve?**

In the past two Fiscal Years, Navy has exceeded DOD readiness standards for fully and partially ready Reserve Component work force. We attribute our improved readiness status to process improvements in policy implementation and legislative changes. Examples including (1) improved access to Navy Military Treatment Facilities, satellite clinics, Navy Operational Support Centers and Community healthcare via Reserve Health Readiness Program (RHRP) Point of Service to complete individual medical/dental screening requirements; (2) access to TRICARE Standard six months pre and post deployment has also contributed to a continuum of available clinical services for our RC sailors identified for mobilization; and (3) implementation of TRICARE Reserve Select, an affordable health plan option available to our selected reservists, enabling them to obtain required medical and dental services that have contributed to our high level of overall medical and dental readiness.

If confirmed, ensuring timely and accurate medical and dental readiness of our Reserve Component will remain a priority for me and Navy leadership. Moving forward, we will to continue to focus on improvements in readiness reporting including use of Medical Reserve Readiness System (MRRS) as a single source capturing Medical/Dental Readiness indicators. We will also be assessing opportunities in developing interoperability capabilities that will standardize internal readiness processes.

**How would you improve upon the Navy's ability to produce a healthy and fit Navy Reserve?**

Our Sailors must be healthy, fit and mission capable. A healthy and fit Navy Reserve Force is not negotiable. We will continuously improve our screening process and work to ensure compliance of with current individual medical readiness policies (including obtaining required periodic health assessments). Our focus will continue to be one of health promotion and disease prevention.

#### **Navy Policies Regarding Drug and Alcohol Abuse**

**What is your understanding of the Navy's policy with respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of sailors who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you agree with this policy?**

Navy's policy on drug abuse is "zero tolerance." Navy members determined to be using, possessing, promoting, manufacturing, or distributing drugs and/or drug abuse paraphernalia shall be disciplined as appropriate and processed for Administrative Separation. Members diagnosed as drug dependent shall be offered treatment prior to separation. I support this policy to preserve troop strength and mission readiness.

**What is your understanding of the Navy's policy with respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of sailors who have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?**

Our policies are sufficiently permissive to allow commanders the opportunity to assist service members with treatment and recovery for both illegal drug use and alcohol abuse. Members diagnosed as drug dependent shall be offered treatment prior to separation. Commanding officers have the discretion to retain members determined to have abused alcohol. The separation authority may, under unusual circumstances, forward cases of illegal drug use or abuse of prescription drugs to Commander, Navy Personnel Command for retention. I agree that Navy policies ensure that the deterrence benefit of disciplinary action is balanced with -- but not sacrificed to -- the need to appropriately provide treatment and support.

**What resources does the Navy have currently to respond to sailors who are alcohol or drug dependent and do you believe that the Navy has devoted sufficient resources**

**to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?**

Navy maintains a steadfast commitment to resourcing our Substance Abuse Rehabilitation Programs (SARPs). Our SARPs offer a broad range of services to include alcohol education, outpatient and intensive outpatient treatment, residential treatment, and medically managed care for withdrawal and/or other medical complications. We have expanded our existing continuum to include cutting-edge residential and intensive outpatient programs that address both substance abuse and other co-occurring mental disorders directed at the complex needs of returning Warriors who may suffer from substance abuse disorders and Depression or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as well as implementing a web-based recovery management program available to Service Members 24/7 from anywhere in the world.

**What measures are being taken to improve the Navy's performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?**

Navy has taken an integrated approach across all of our Sailor programs to emphasize positive lifestyle choices including physical and mental fitness, nutrition, healthy personal relationships, and alcohol free entertainment opportunities. Navy also emphasizes the significant negative outcomes associated with drug and alcohol abuse such as suicide, domestic abuse, sexual assault and other damaging personal and professional events.

### **Religious Guidelines**

**The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that “DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization” and recommended that the policy be updated.**

**Has the Navy revised its policy regarding religious accommodation since the issuance of this report?**

No. We have coordinated with the Department of Defense and other Services on a policy that will apply uniformly across all the Services. Once we receive an updated DoD policy, we will work with the Secretary of the Navy to update our standing policy.

**Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the Navy?**

No. I expect that all Navy personnel – both uniformed and civilian – will act professionally and treat their shipmates with dignity and respect. The Navy has a zero tolerance policy for harassment. All commanders and commanding officers routinely

reiterate this policy to their personnel and closely monitor their commands for potential issues such as these.

**If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the Navy?**

I do not believe new strategies are required beyond reinforcement of existing policies, guidelines, and standards that emphasize dignity and respect for all.

**Do Navy policies regarding religious practices in the military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles with religious significance?**

Current Department of the Navy policy is to accommodate the doctrinal or traditional observances of the religious faith practiced by individual members when these doctrines or observances will not have an adverse impact on military readiness, individual or unit readiness, unit cohesion, health, safety, discipline or mission accomplishment. Accommodation of a service member's religious practices cannot be guaranteed at all times and is subject to military necessity. Determination of necessity rests entirely with the commanding officer.

When approved by competent military authority, religious apparel not visible or otherwise apparent may be worn with the uniform, provided it does not interfere with the performance of the member's military duties or interfere with the proper wearing of any authorized article of the uniform. Visible items of religious apparel will be authorized for wear with the uniform, except when the item is not neat and conservative (i.e. discrete, tidy and not dissonant or showy in style, size, design, brightness or color), its wearing will interfere with the performance of the member's military duties, or is specifically prohibited if the item impairs the safe and effective operation of weapons, military equipment or machinery; poses a health or safety hazard to the wearer or others; interfere with the wearing or proper functioning of special or protective clothing or equipment (e.g. helmets, flak jackets, flight suits, camouflage uniforms, gas masks, wet suits, and crash and rescue equipment). Furthermore, visible items of religious apparel shall not be worn while wearing historical or ceremonial uniforms; participating in review formations, parades, honor or color guards and similar ceremonial details and functions.

**In your view, do these policies accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?**

Yes. It is Department of the Navy policy to foster mutual respect for diverse religious expressions (including no religious expression) and to accommodate the doctrinal or traditional observances of the religious faith practiced by individual members when these doctrines or observances will not have an adverse impact on military readiness, individual or unit readiness, unit cohesion, health, safety, discipline or mission accomplishment.

**In your opinion, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other service members with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?**

Yes. Title 10 § 6031 says, "An officer in the Chaplain Corps may conduct public worship according to the manner and forms of the church of which he is a member." Navy policy on public worship as set forth in SECNAVINST 1730.7D supports this Title 10 guarantee, i.e. "a chaplain may conduct divine services 'according to the manner and forms' of his or her Religious Organization." When inviting a chaplain to deliver religious elements such as prayer at a command function outside of public worship, a commander shall not compel the chaplain to pray in a way that is inconsistent with the tenets of his or her faith and the chaplain may choose not to participate without suffering adverse consequence.

When religious elements are incorporated in command functions outside of public worship, such as changes of command, where all members of the command are required to be present, chaplains are instructed to be sensitive to the needs of the total audience.

**Current policy in the Department of Defense gives discretion to military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The DOD has submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly exempt the Armed Services from the requirements of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).**

**Do you believe that the Navy needs to be exempted from the strictures of RFRA? If so, why?**

Our current policy provides our commanders adequate ability to provide religious accommodation and is supported. I am aware of this legislative proposal, but have not had the opportunity to assess the need for a change to our current policy.

### **Support for Wounded, Injured, and Ill Sailors**

**Wounded service members from Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from the Navy for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007 illustrated, all of the Services were not adequately prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded service members. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain.**

**In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior care since 2001 in the Navy?**

We have no higher priority than caring for Wounded, Ill and Injured shipmates. I believe we have made significant improvements in the care for our Wounded Warriors and their families; yet all of us remain concerned about the cumulative effects of stress, worry and anxiety due to a decade-long conflict on our Sailors and their families. I also understand that preserving the psychological health of personnel is one of the greatest challenges we face today. We are learning more about injuries such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury and ensuring our Sailors have access to the best treatment available to support their recovery. Fortunately, we are seeing historically unprecedented survival rates and dramatic innovations in the combat casualty care on the battlefield. However, we, like the other Services, also are seeing more complex battle injuries as our personnel return to heal. We must continue to develop our systems of support and recovery for our Sailors and families.

**What is your assessment of the Navy's response?**

The Navy has made significant progress in developing programs that support the treatment, recovery and reintegration of our wounded Sailors and their families. Our medical facilities are providing world-class care – and I am reminded of this each time I visit our wounded personnel. Our programs of support are in place and maturing as we adapt to the needs our patients. Throughout the Fleet, we have developed an integrated health promotion and prevention program, Operational Stress Control, to help build resiliency at all levels. We have implemented targeted programs such as FOCUS (Families OverComing Under Stress), Returning Warrior Workshops and Psychological Health Outreach Program to ensure both our active and reserve component personnel and their families have access to support programs.

**How does the Navy provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service and transition assistance to help sailors who are disabled find rewarding employment prior to separation?**

We recognize how important it is for our injured Sailors to heal in body, mind and spirit and we honor our commitment to provide the support and resources to aid in their recovery and transition. We have significantly increased our medical case management resources at our treatment facilities to help our wounded, ill and injured personnel not only recover but also assist in the coordination of their care. These efforts extend to helping our Sailors transition their medical care to the Veterans Administration or TRICARE networks/civilian clinician to provide better care and seamless service and support. Our Navy Safe Harbor program has responsibility for coordinating the non-medical care of Wounded, Ill, and Injured Sailors and their families. This program provides exceptional, individually-tailored assistance to our Wounded, Ill, and Injured for the duration of their lives. We have increased our support for community reintegration through the Anchor Program, which pairs members with volunteer reserve component Sailors in their communities, and initiated the Adaptive Athletics Program, designed to



support long-term recovery and rehabilitation through whole-body training and education. Additionally, we signed Memoranda of Agreement with the Departments of Labor and Veterans Administration to ensure greater access to employment services and support programs.

**How effective, in your view, are those programs?**

I am pleased with the progress and effectiveness of all these programs. Assessing their efficacy, adapting to the needs of our personnel and their families and implementing best practices will remain priorities as we move forward. We are engaged and committed to ensuring resources will be in place to meet our commitments to Sailors and their families.

**If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Navy's support for wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?**

We are grateful to the support that Congress has provided in this important area. I remain confident we have good programs in place that will continue to mature and improve. If confirmed, I will continue to build on the progress we have made within the Navy and our collaborative engagements with the VA and other federal and private sectors partners.

**Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program have been established to improve processing of service members.**

**What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and improve the Integrated DES?**

The IDES provides the process and administrative framework necessary to fulfill the requirements of Title 10 U. S. C., Chapter 61. Designed to function within existing laws, IDES leverages military core competencies to determine service member fitness for continued service via the Medical Evaluation Board and Physical Evaluation Board processes. Under IDES protocols, the Veterans Administration leverages their core competencies to render the disability rating percentages needed to establish both Title 10 and Title 38 disability compensation. IDES brings these core competencies together to minimize duplicative burdens on the member and the departments while maximizing support through the seamless availability of post-service benefits for our Wounded, Ill or Injured (WII).

While the IDES process delivers many significant improvements over the *Legacy DES*, it does not provide the desired end-state for disability processing because it takes too long to process servicemembers (avg 400 days). Navy supports ongoing OSD and VA efforts to compress the processing down to a more efficient and acceptable duration that limits undesirable personnel and operational impacts.

**If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?**

A principle focus for change must be on reducing the amount of time consumed by the IDES process without affecting the quality of support to our WII service members. We continue to support WII service members and our mission needs by supporting process design changes in IDES that are under consideration, adequately resourcing capabilities such as PEB liaison officers at MTFs, and better leveraging capabilities that exist within Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA).

**Non-Worldwide Deployable Sailors and Disability Evaluation**

**The Navy has used involuntary administrative separation for unsuitability as a means to remove from active duty Sailors with medical conditions who were found fit for duty by physical evaluation boards. Previous Navy policies authorized denial of re-enlistment of Sailors considered to be non-worldwide deployable, even if that had been found fit for duty, or had not been evaluated in the disability evaluation system.**

**What is current Navy policy regarding the retention of Sailors who are non-worldwide deployable due to physical or medical conditions?**

Sec. 534 of NDAA FY11 restricts the involuntary administrative separation of personnel found fit by a Physical Evaluation Board if later found unsuitable due to the inability to deploy for the same medical condition. We are complying with the new law. SECNAV policy is that those retained on active duty after a finding of "fit" should not be denied reenlistment or other career progression simply because of the finding. These individuals shall receive the same opportunity to compete with other Sailors for reenlistment and promotion.

**Implementation of the Repeal of "Don't Ask Don't Tell" Policy.**

**The President, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have certified to Congress that repeal of the Don't Ask Don't Tell homosexual conduct policy will not harm military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, or recruiting and retention. The statute underlying the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy will be repealed on September 20, 2011, 60 days from the date of this certification.**

**Do you support the repeal of the Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy?**

Yes.

**If confirmed, do you foresee any problems with implementing a repeal of the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy in the Navy?**

No.

**What effect, if any, do you anticipate the repeal will have on readiness and discipline in the Navy?**

I have every confidence that the men and women of the U.S. Navy, with their character, discipline, and decency, will successfully implement this change in the law and continue to fulfill the U.S. Navy's mission with the utmost professionalism. As always, strong leadership remains essential to a successful transition. Navy leaders will continue to set a positive tone, create an inclusive and respectful work environment, and enforce our high standards of conduct as we serve the nation.

**Sexual Assault Prevention and Response**

**What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Navy has in place on ships, overseas, and in CONUS locations to offer victims of sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?**

Sexual assault is a criminal act that has far-reaching consequences for all involved. It violates the Navy ethos, corrodes morale, undermines trust, and will not be tolerated. A DoD SAFe Help line number is available to all and widely posted in command spaces and websites to ensure immediate "hotline" support. Our resources and programs are distributed so that all deployable Navy units have SAPR Victim Advocates (VAs) and SAPR Command Points of Contact (POCs) assigned. This ensures continuity of victim support regardless of whether the unit is shore based or at sea. Deployed units have ready access to medical, investigative and legal support, and the unit VAs have reachback to a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC).

To ensure resource and program availability in a joint environment, joint protocols have been developed and Joint SARCs meet regularly to outline, understand and mitigate differences in SAPR program requirements. The key is to ensure standardized coordination of SAPR responses across all Services.

Individual Augmentees (IAs) receive pre-deployment briefings from IA Support/Deployment Specialists at the Fleet and Family Support Centers that include specific contacts for both sexual assault reporting options.

**What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to prevent sexual assaults?**

While significant progress has been made to date, we are continuing to implement further enhancements to contribute to ongoing efforts to eliminate sexual assault from the Navy:

- We are implementing Bystander Intervention (BI) training to teach Sailors how to safely and effectively intervene to prevent sexual assault and other negative behaviors.

- Sexual Assault Response Coordinators have been provided two full days of training to better equip them in the collection of data and standardized training for prevention.
- Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy have implemented specialized training to more effectively investigate and prosecute sexual assault cases.
- We are conducting a pilot prevention program, developed in collaboration with national experts, which uses multiple prevention modalities based on local demographics and circumstances. Rigorous pre-and post-pilot survey data will show the efficacy of these modalities and determine applicability to other locations.

**What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Navy has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?**

Navy provides robust training for investigators and prosecutors of sexual assaults. All NCIS agents are trained to be “first responders” to sexual assaults and other criminal activity, and attend courses that combine prosecutors and investigators in a shared environment that enhances cross discipline understanding. NCIS agents have recently attended the U.S. Army’s advanced course on sexual assault investigative techniques and several other seminars and courses taught by nationally recognized experts.

Members of Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps attend a course on litigating sexual assault at Naval Justice School. JAGs also attend a course on prosecuting alcohol facilitated sexual assaults, prosecuting complex cases (which includes a section on Victim Witness Assistance Program). Navy has hired two nationally recognized experts on adult and child sexual assault and child physical abuse litigation to provide field-level legal training and case consultation, and provide policy support for the Navy SAPR program.

**Do you consider the Navy’s sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?**

Navy’s policies and execution of confidential reporting (Restricted Reports) are effective. We continue to emphasize to Sailors, SAPR stakeholders and leadership the policy and importance of a restricted reporting option. A 2010 SAPR Quick Poll indicated that nearly 92% of respondents are aware victims can report sexual assault without command notification (Restricted Reporting).

**What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?**

Close-quarters environments such as controlled basic training educational environments and brigs for “incarcerated” Sailors provide a challenge with regards to confidential reporting. Solutions to address these situations are being investigated. California state law has also caused confusion due to state-mandated reporting for all medical personnel.

Our California-based SARCs continue to educate leaders and responders to ensure compliance with policy and victim privacy when considering the “restricted” reporting option.

**What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Navy in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?**

Preventing sexual assaults is the job all Navy leadership. It mandates a synergistic approach by military and civilian leaders. The Department of the Navy established a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office and Director in 2009 to serve as the principal point of accountability for all sexual assault matters, program support, and oversight. From the Secretary of the Navy on down, we are committed to eliminating sexual assault from our ranks. A key to success is the understanding and engagement by unit level leaders.

**If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure senior management level direction and oversight of Navy efforts on sexual assault prevention and response?**

At a minimum, I intend to maintain strong and viable Family support programs by ensuring adequate oversight and sufficient funding. I will remain open to initiatives designed to further evolve existing programs and look for innovative ways to help our Sailors and Families become more resilient and ready to meet the enduring demand for Navy forces.

### **Family Support**

**Sailors and their families in both the active and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.**

**What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for sailors and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?**

Family Readiness is critical to Fleet readiness and Sailor retention. If confirmed, I intend to continue supporting Navy families with a variety of institutionalized programs and resources to meet their needs. Our existing programs cover everything from Exceptional Family Members and Respite care to deployment preparedness, ensuring our Sailors and their families are cared for while deployed.

Navy will continue to pursue opportunities to optimize services, including counseling, family and youth development programs, and deployment readiness to ensure our Sailors

continue to have access to the necessary resources that enable readiness while minimizing stress and impact to their loved ones at home.

**How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and declining O&M budgets?**

Navy will preserve the current Family Readiness budget plan and has realigned funding from supplemental requests and overseas contingency funds to our baseline budget requests. We have consolidated oversight to ensure all Family Readiness programs are adequately sustained and fully resourced as required.

**If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Navy Reserve families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation?**

Navy supports geographically isolated service members and their families through the nearest DOD facility whether a Navy Operational Support Center or other sister service installation. If a support site is not conveniently located nearby, then Navy provides remote support through our network of Fleet and Family Support Centers and Military OneSource.

In support of Individual Augmentee (IA) spouses and family members, FFSCs have developed programs tailored to their specific needs, such as IA Family Handbook, Deployment Readiness Briefs, IA Family Discussion, Family Connection Newsletter and Families of Warriors in Transition Homecoming Program, and active and reserve Command IA Coordinators (CIAC), whose primary responsibility is to serve as the Navy liaison to IA Sailors and families.

**If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to enhance family support?**

At a minimum, I intend to maintain strong and viable Family support programs by ensuring adequate oversight and sufficient funding. I will remain open to initiatives designed to further evolve existing programs and look for innovative ways to help our Sailors and Families become more resilient and ready to meet the enduring demand for Navy forces.

**Suicide Prevention and Mental Health Resources**

**The numbers of suicides in each of the services has increased in recent years. In addition, mental health surveys conducted in theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced multiple deployments.**

**In your view, are Navy suicide prevention and resiliency programs adequate to help prevent suicides both in homeports and on deployment, and to increase the resiliency of sailors and their families?**

Yes. And I am committed to doing everything possible to prevent the tragedy of suicide and provide our Sailors, families, and leaders with the tools, training, and environment to allow them to successfully navigate the stress of Navy life and thrive personally and professionally. Within the past 6 months, Navy has significantly increased staffing and resources devoted to supporting Navy suicide prevention program and institutionalizing resilience building both ashore and within the Fleet. Resilience cannot be built in a day. It will require time to fully take root and grow. As our efforts continue to mature, ongoing assessment will guide further improvement.

**If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that sufficient mental health resources are available to Navy personnel on deployment, and to their families upon return to home station?**

Navy is committed to fostering a culture that promotes resilience and wellness and empowers our leaders to ensure the health and readiness of our Sailors and families. Our Psychological Health program supports the prevention, diagnosis, mitigation, treatment, and rehabilitation of post-traumatic stress disorder, and other mental health conditions, including planning for the seamless transition of such members throughout the recovery and reintegration process.

Through active leadership, we are also working to reduce the stigma associated with seeking help. We have increased the size of our mental health workforce and continue to focus on recruiting and retention of our mental health providers. Our priority is ensuring we have the service and support capabilities for prevention and early intervention available where and when it is needed, including in operational environments. Embedded mental health providers provide coordinated, comprehensive primary and secondary prevention efforts throughout the deployment cycle, focusing on resilience training and stress reduction. In order to understand the behavioral health needs of our Sailors serving in theatre, we deployed a Mobile Care Team to administer the Behavioral Health Needs Assessment Survey which allows real-time surveillance and intervention as needed.

If confirmed, I will continue to ensure we have the proper number of mental health providers in place to address the medical, physical, psychological, and family readiness needs of our Sailors and their families.

### **Morale, Welfare, and Recreation**

**Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive**

**to all eligible users, including active duty and reserve personnel, and their eligible family members.**

**What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Navy MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?**

The major challenges facing MWR are maintaining adequate funding, repairing or replacing aging infrastructure, and dealing with increased demand for certain core services, particularly in the area of child and youth programs. We have and will continue to take aggressive actions to address these challenges. In the area of child and youth programs, for example, Navy has funded dozens of new Child Development Centers that, by the end of FY12, will increase capacity by over 7,000 spaces. When these centers are completed, we will have almost entirely eliminated unmet demand for child care spaces.

I believe we should continue to expand our stable of partners in the private and public sector off base as we build on our past track record of success in ensuring Navy MWR programs measure up to the needs of our Sailors and their families.

### **Women in the Military**

**In the past year, the Navy has opened service on submarines to women, and the issue of the appropriate role of women in the armed forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.**

**What is the status on the implementation of the decision to allow service by women on submarines?**

In 2010, eighteen female officers began their submarine officer pipeline training, which consists of nuclear power school, prototype training and the submarine officer basic course. Two officers deferred their training to complete follow-on graduate studies. The first sixteen officers will complete training and report to their submarines between November 2011 and February 2012. Eight female warfare-qualified Supply Officers have been selected to serve as department heads to provide senior female mentoring. We have applied lessons learned from integration of women in surface combatants and aviation squadrons in the mid-1990s and have incorporated those into our comprehensive women in submarines integration plan.

**What challenges still exist and what proactive measures are submarine force leaders taking to enhance the success of female officers assigned to submarine duty?**

Submarine crews that are slated to be integrated will receive appropriate training on fraternization, berthing/privacy requirements, Navy's Equal Opportunity policy, prevention of sexual harassment, and sexual assault and rape prevention. Executive level training will ensure that commanding officers, executive officers and chiefs of the boat



are prepared to lead an integrated crew. Independent Duty Corpsman assigned to each submarine to be integrated will receive refresher training on medical situations unique to women. A Command Climate Survey will be conducted on each crew prior to certification and again about six months after integration to evaluate and address any unanticipated concerns and challenges that may arise.

**Do you believe additional specialties should be eligible for service by female sailors?**

Navy continues to examine opportunities for additional specialties for female sailors. Navy modified its policy in 2007 to allow the temporary assignment of women to units normally closed if the unit is not expected to conduct a combat mission during the period of temporary duty. Since that time the Navy Special Warfare (NSW) Command has deployed 10 to 15 females to the CENTCOM region with each NSW Squadron for support operations (intelligence, administrative, legal, information technology, and construction ratings). From 2008 through the present, certain NSW operational successes have been directly related to the rapport Navy females have been able to develop with both indigenous women and men. Leveraging unique cultural skills of women, NSW has been able to gain access, develop key relationships, calm tense situations, and locate individuals of interest.

**Do you believe any changes are needed or warranted in current assignment policies regarding women?**

At present, the Navy's assignment policies for women are in the best interest of the naval service, accomplished per current SECDEF guidelines, and are consistent with the principles of fairness and equal opportunity. However, we continue to evaluate opening other opportunities as appropriate. As part of our current review of restrictions on women in the Navy, we have identified a number of medical and chaplain support billets assigned to Marine Corps units that could potentially be opened to women.

**Personnel and Entitlement Costs**

**In addition to health care costs, personnel and related entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget. Secretary Panetta has supported a comprehensive review of military compensation, saying "everything must be on the table," including military retirement.**

**What percentage of the annual Navy budget from 2011 to 2015 is devoted to personnel costs?**

The percentage of the annual Navy budget, from 2011 to 2015, devoted to active and reserve military personnel costs is approximately 23 percent. This is comprised of the Military Personnel, Navy (MP,N); Reserve Personnel, Navy (RPN); Medicare-Eligible, Navy (DHAN); and Medicare-Eligible, Navy Reserve (DAHNR) appropriations.

**Do you believe the time is right to begin discussing reform of military compensation and retirement benefits?**

I support Secretary Panetta's call for a comprehensive review of military compensation, including the retirement benefit. If confirmed, I will support the Navy's continued participation in ongoing efforts to assess the cost, value and effectiveness of all parts of the military compensation system.

**Other than reducing Navy end strength, what actions do you believe can be taken by DOD and Navy leaders to control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?**

Reviews of military compensation are currently ongoing. I will use the results of these reviews to inform my judgments.

**Military Retirement**

**The 10<sup>th</sup> Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE fees for retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible spending accounts for service members. Both Secretary Gates and Secretary Panetta have called for a comprehensive review of the military retirement benefit.**

**While it is often said that the military retirement benefit encourages retention after the 10-year point, do you believe it provides any significant boost to recruitment? Do 17 and 18 year olds care about the military retirement benefit when deciding to enlist?**

The current retirement benefit is better suited to enhance retention than to serve as an enlistment tool. While a generous retirement benefit relative to the private sector is a good recruiting point, the retirement benefit is not at the top of the list of things that attract new recruits to the Navy. During a recent poll of new recruits, military retirement ranked seventh among reasons for joining.

**How might the retirement benefit be modernized to reflect the needs of a new generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost of the government?**

The overwhelming majority of those who enter military service never qualify for the 20 year military retirement, therefore, many service members would benefit from some form of a defined contribution plan that offered vesting short of a full military career. Navy

has not yet studied this option well enough to define how certain contribution plans might impact recruitment and retention.

### **Judge Advocate Issues**

**In December 2010, the Department of Defense Inspector General completed an evaluation of post-trial reviews of courts-martial within the Department of the Navy – triggered in part by the egregious case of *United States v. Foster* -- documenting the persistence of serious post-trial processing problems within the Navy and Marine Corps for at least two decades.**

**If confirmed, what actions will you take to address the post-trial processing issues identified by the Department of Defense Inspector General?**

I am confident that given the improvements in structure, operating procedures, case tracking and oversight that have been undertaken to date, we have a military justice system that works as intended. I will continue to support all efforts to address the issue of post-trial processing.

**The Inspector General concluded that current Navy and Marine Corps case-tracking systems do not provide the visibility needed to monitor case progress and timeliness throughout the post-trial process and recommended the development of a single Navy and Marine Corps military justice case processing and tracking system.**

**What is the current plan for the development of a single Navy and Marine Corps military justice case processing and tracking system?**

Efforts are ongoing within the Department to develop a unified case-tracking system for the Navy and Marine Corps and a joint effort is currently in progress to formally establish a new acquisition program for the Naval Justice Information System (NJIS). In the interim, the Judge Advocate General's Corps has continued to use the Navy Case Management Tracking Information System (CMTIS) to track every case while the new systems are being developed.

**Will this case tracking system be funded by the Navy?**

Yes, Navy will fund the system.

**At the direction of Congress, the Secretary of Defense appointed an independent panel to review the judge advocate requirements of the Department of the Navy. This Panel issued a report in February, 2011, that concluded that "there is a requirement in the U.S. Navy for approximately 950 active-duty judge advocates. The Panel noted that the Navy had 811 judge advocates on active duty at the end of FY 2010, but had programmed**

**further reductions in judge advocate manning over the next five years. The Panel expressed “strong concern over the current and future manning levels for judge advocates in the Navy, believing those manning levels create an unacceptable legal risk to the Department of the Navy.” Testimony at a recent hearing indicated that Navy leadership has now indicated an intent to fund 852 positions over the FYDP.**

**What is your evaluation of the recommendations of the Independent Panel regarding the role and resources available to the Navy JAG Corps?**

I concur that we need to have adequate judge advocate manning to meet operational law and other requirements, including a first-rate military justice system. In the Navy, this issue is currently undergoing the required budget review process for implementation across the future years defense program.

**If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that the Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps is adequately manned to address the increasing complexity and intensity of the legal and policy environment in which commanders are required to operate?**

This issue is currently undergoing the required budget review process for implementation across the future years defense program.

### **Defense Incident-Based Reporting System (DIBRS)**

**DIBRS is an information technology system funded and managed by the Defense Manpower Data Center and required under DOD Directive 7730.47. It is intended to provide more comprehensive data on the incidence and types of crimes committed within the Armed Forces. The Department of the Navy is developing a Department of the Navy Criminal Justice Information System (DONCJIS) to satisfy DIBRS reporting requirements but has been unable to predict when the system will be fully operational.**

**What is the status of the Navy's implementation of DIBRS and DONCJIS?**

The Department of the Navy Criminal Justice Information System (DONCJIS) was initiated but did not meet program requirements. The Department cancelled it in September 2010. Efforts are ongoing within the Department to develop a unified case-tracking system for the Navy and Marine Corps and a joint effort is currently in progress to formally establish a new acquisition program for the Naval Justice Information System (NJIS). As currently envisioned, this system will incorporate not only the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System (DIBRS) required data, but expand to include criminal justice case tracking and management.

**What utility do you see for Navy's senior leaders in having the information available through DIBRS?**

The lack of such a functional database inhibits electronic interface and data sharing among all stakeholders of a criminal case and inhibits accurate data collection. We will continue to use the Navy Case Management Tracking Information System (CMTIS) to track every case while the new systems are being developed.

**U. S. Naval Academy Oversight**

**In November 2009, the Naval Inspector General submitted a report harshly critical of the financial management practices at the U.S. Naval Academy, which reflected a lack of oversight and supervision over the Academy's internal controls, regulatory compliance, and expenditure of appropriated and non-appropriated funds.**

**What measures have been put in place to ensure that the financial management at the Naval Academy complies with the legal and regulatory requirements that apply to other comparable commands?**

The Naval Academy has worked closely with Navy leadership, including the Navy General Counsel and Office of the Judge Advocate General to improve meaningful oversight, improve guidance and foster continual self assessment of the Academy's financial management practices. After a series of reviews and audits, including the 2009 Navy Inspector General report, 59 corrective actions were identified. To date, 49 of the 59 have been completed, including a comprehensive fiscal oversight review of Naval Academy Nonappropriated Fund activities by Commander, Navy Installations Command this month (July 2011). In all, these efforts have resulted in improved and revised financial procedures, directives and instructions, including gift acceptance and expenditure guidance, ensuring the Academy is in compliance with relevant Navy and DoD instructions and policies.

**What is your assessment of the changes that have been made to the Honor System at the Naval Academy following the review conducted last year by the Chief of Navy Reserve and what do you consider to be the most important reforms put into place?**

The changes to the Naval Academy Honor Concept have been very positive for the Brigade of Midshipmen and the Naval Academy as a whole. While several important reforms were adopted, improved educational understanding, process efficiency, consistent accountability and Brigade empowerment have been most notable. Specifically, the focus on refining the adjudication process has driven average adjudication time down to approximately 17 days, providing more immediate feedback to the Midshipmen on honor cases. Coupled with consistent application of the Honor Concept and increased ownership of the Honor Concept by the Brigade of Midshipmen,

the Naval Academy has seen a significant drop in repeat honor offenses and honor offenses by upper classmen.

**What changes, if any, would you recommend in the organization or functioning of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors?**

I wouldn't recommend changes in the organization or functioning of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors. Since the findings of the Navy IG, the Board of Visitors has taken an active and positive role in assisting the Naval Academy and providing oversight.

**Following Congressional direction, the Department of Defense in August 2007, established a policy regarding modification of the active-service obligation for service academy and ROTC scholarship graduates who are offered professional sports contracts. This policy is currently not being applied uniformly by the Departments of the Air Force, Navy, and Army.**

**What is your personal view of the appropriate applicability of this DOD policy in the Navy?**

My view is that Navy personnel are first and foremost here to faithfully serve their country and fulfill their military commitment by completing their Active Duty Service Obligations (ADSO). I do believe however, in rare and exceptional cases, a Servicemember can use their exceptional talents in a mutually beneficial way to the Service and the Member, after completing a shortened ADSO and then continue to actively engage in the military by participating in the Selected Reserves.

The Secretary of the Navy recently updated the early release policy for the Navy and Marine Corps, removing a moratorium imposed in 2007 on applications for early release to participate in professional sports. This change in policy will again allow NROTC and USNA graduates to apply for early release from active duty after two years of service providing the requestor has relevant and proven special or unique talents that would aid in recruiting. This policy change aligns the Department of the Navy's application of the DoD policy with the Departments of the Air Force and Army. While the number of those allowed for an early release is expected to be small, I believe that those rare individuals with extraordinary abilities should be allowed to showcase their talents on a national stage when in the best interests of the service.

**Independent Legal Advice**

**In your past assignments, you have had the opportunity to observe the working relationship between the Navy General Counsel, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and judge advocates advising commanders in the field.**

**What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocate General to provide independent legal advice to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps?**

The ability to provide independent legal advice is vital to the Navy. The law appropriately prohibits any officer or employee of the Department of Defense from interfering with the Judge Advocate General's independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

**What is your view of the responsibility of judge advocates within the services and joint commands to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?**

Commanders and commanding officers are obligated to discuss legal issues with their staff judge advocates. To provide legal solutions that address the legal challenges faced by our military commanders requires independence.

**Environmental Concerns**

**The Navy has been involved in civil litigation over its use of mid-frequency active sonar during training exercises and its impact on the environment.**

**What is the Navy doing to comply with environmental laws so it can continue to effectively train with mid-frequency active sonar?**

The Navy remains committed to accomplishing training goals while still achieving full compliance with all federal environmental laws and regulations. Continued training with active sonar is absolutely essential in protecting the lives of our Sailors and Marines and defending our nation. Increasingly quiet diesel-electric submarines continue to proliferate throughout the world, which requires our Navy to continue to train to counter them. Neutralizing this threat requires the ability to locate, track, and defeat these submarines; active sonar is the primary system to accomplish this task.

The Navy continues to work closely with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to receive annual permits under the Marine Mammal Protection Act and Biological Opinions under the Endangered Species Act. In 2002, the Navy began implementation of a comprehensive Phase I strategy to ensure compliance with applicable federal laws. The process of completing this documentation, including the required analysis and public comment periods, was a multi-year effort and will continue indefinitely. As of July of this year, the Navy has completed environmental planning documentation for 13 of 14 Navy ranges and Operating Areas. This permitting process has ensured that the Navy mitigates its effect on the environment while still meeting national security requirements.

The Navy has already begun work on Phase II at-sea Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) and permits, significantly expanding the sound sources analyzed and including at-

sea testing events that were not part of phase I permits and documentation. Consolidating the 14 Phase I Navy ranges and Operating Areas into 6 study areas will achieve greater consistency, efficiency, and integration of acquisition/military readiness/scientific research information in Navy environmental planning documentation and permits. The Navy continues to work closely with NMFS to ensure these Phase II documents and permits are informed by best available data, providing the most accurate representation of potential impacts to the marine environment. The first of these documents and permits is currently on track to be approved in early 2014.

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes.

**Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?**

Yes.

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Naval Operations?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes.