

Advance Policy Questions for General Raymond T. Odierno, USA

Nominee for Chief of Staff of the Army

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

- a. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?**

No.

- b. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

None. In my view, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been very effective in making the Armed Services an integrated joint force.

Duties and Qualifications

Section 3033 of title 10, United States Code, establishes the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

- a. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?**

The Chief of Staff of the Army is the senior military advisor to the Secretary of the Army. In addition to his role as an advisor, the Chief of Staff is responsible for the effective and efficient functioning of Army organizations and commands in executing their statutory missions. The Chief of Staff shall also perform the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under section 151 of title 10.

- b. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you?**

If confirmed, I would expect Secretary McHugh to assign me the following duties:

- (a) Serve as the senior military leader of the Army and all its components;

- (b) Assist the Secretary with his external affairs functions, including presenting and justifying Army policies, plans, programs, and budgets to the Secretary of Defense, Executive Branch, and Congress;
- (c) Assist the Secretary with his compliance functions, to include directing The Inspector General to perform inspections and investigations as required;
- (d) Preside over the Army Staff and ensure the effective and efficient functioning of the headquarters, to include integrating Reserve Component matters into all aspects of Army business;
- (e) Serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the President. To the extent such action does not impair my independence in my performance as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would keep the Secretary of the Army informed of military advice that the Joint Chiefs of Staff render on matters affecting the Army. I would inform the Secretary of the Army of significant military operations affecting his duties and responsibilities, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense;
- (f) Represent Army capabilities, programs, policy, and requirements in Joint forces;
- (g) Supervise the execution of Army policies, plans, programs, and activities and assess the performance of Army commands in the execution of their assigned statutory missions and functions; and
- (h) Task and supervise the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, the Army Staff and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Army, elements of the Army Secretariat to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

I have over 35 years of experience in the Army with joint and combined operations. I have commanded at every level from platoon to theater level. I had the distinct privilege to command at the division, corps, and theater level in the Iraq combat theater. I have participated in OPERATION DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, supported the operations in Bosnia as the V Corps Chief of Staff, and deployed to Albania in support of the war in Kosovo. In Iraq, I've had the opportunity to apply the full range of Army, joint and combined force capabilities against a broad range of complex environments as well as to establish strong civil military relationships to achieve unity of effort. My considerable service in joint as well as Army positions has given me a unique perspective of the Army, its processes and capabilities. The combination of all these things as well as my experience in working with the great young Soldiers that we have in the Army today will enable me to lead the Army to

meet our current and future missions and requirements.

c. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Army?

If confirmed, my tenure as Chief of Staff will be marked by continuous self-assessment of my ability to perform my duties. As I believe necessary, I will enact measures which will improve my ability to lead the Army. It is essential in this complex environment that we continue to learn and adapt to ensure that our skills remain current so we remain viable to meet our future challenges.

d. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?

If confirmed as Chief of Staff of the Army, I would ensure the Vice Chief of Staff is responsible for providing me advice and assistance in the execution of my duties, specifically with regard to manpower and personnel; logistics; operations and plans; requirements and programs; intelligence; command, control and communications; and readiness.

Relationships

If confirmed, what would be your working relationship with:

a. The Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense, as the head of the Department of Defense and the principal assistant to the President in all Department of Defense matters, provides guidance and direction to the Military Departments. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's guidance and direction. If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will serve as a military adviser to the Secretary of Defense as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army properly implements the policies established by his office. In coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense in articulating the views of the Army.

b. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The Secretary of Defense also delegates to the Deputy Secretary of Defense full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and exercise the powers of the Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary is authorized to act pursuant to law. If confirmed, I will be

responsible to the Secretary of Defense, and to his deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with the Secretary's guidance and direction. Also, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Deputy Secretary in articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

c. The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to time, to issue guidance—and in the case of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction—to the military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with the Under Secretaries to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the Office of the Secretary of Defense's guidance and direction.

d. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman plans the strategic direction and contingency operations of the armed forces; advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets that the combatant command commanders identify; develops doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports on assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces; provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as the law or the President or Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will provide my individual military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, it would be my duty as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to assist him in his performance of these responsibilities. If confirmed, and as appropriate, I will also provide advice in addition to or in disagreement with that of the Chairman. I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the Chairman, and I will communicate directly and openly with him on any policy matters impacting the Army and the Armed Forces as a whole.

e. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. If confirmed, it would be my duty as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that the Vice Chairman receives my frank views and opinions to assist him in performing his responsibilities.

f. The Chiefs of the Other Services.

If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be my duty to engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and opinions with my fellow Service Chiefs. I look forward to developing strong working relationships with these colleagues, if I am confirmed.

g. The Combatant Commanders.

Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for their commands' preparedness to execute missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the unified and specified combatant commands or to the United States element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, to perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and the authority of combatant commanders under Title 10, United States Code, section 164(c), the Service Secretaries are responsible for administering and supporting the forces that they assign to a combatant command. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant commanders in performing these administrative and support responsibilities. I will establish close, professional relationships with the combatant commanders and I will communicate directly and openly with them on matters involving the Department of the Army and Army forces and personnel assigned to or supporting the combatant commands.

h. The Army Component Commanders of the Combatant Commands

The Army component commanders of the combatant commands exercise command and control under the authority and direction of the combatant commanders to whom they are assigned and in accordance with the policies and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense. The combatant commanders normally delegate operational control of Army forces to the Army component commander. The Secretary of the Army generally delegates administrative control of Army forces assigned to the combatant commander to the Army component commander of that combatant command. The Army component commander is responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within the combatant command. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant

commanders and Army component commanders in performing these responsibilities.

i. The Secretary of the Army.

If confirmed, I will establish a close, direct, and supportive relationship with the Secretary of the Army. Within the Department of the Army, one of my primary responsibilities as Chief of Staff would be to serve as the Secretary's principal military adviser. My responsibilities would also involve communicating the Army Staff's plans to the Secretary and supervising the implementation of the Secretary's decisions through the Army Staff, commands, and agencies. My actions would be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary. In my capacity as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would also be responsible for appropriately informing the Secretary about conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and about significant military operations, to the extent this would not impair my independence in performing my duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely and in concert with the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the Army, taking into account national interests.

j. The Under Secretary of the Army.

The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's principal civilian assistant. The Under Secretary of the Army performs such duties and exercises such powers as prescribed by the Secretary of the Army. The Under Secretary's responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary and to the Under Secretary for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary to ensure that the policies that the Office of the Secretary of the Army establishes are implemented properly. I will communicate openly and directly with the Under Secretary in articulating the views of the Army Staff, commands, and agencies.

k. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army serves as the principal advisor and assistant to the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with Vice Chief of Staff, Army.

l. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.

The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional responsibilities that, from time to time, require them to issue guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with the Assistant Secretaries in order to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we address the

Army's day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements.

m. The General Counsel of the Army.

The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army. The duties of the General Counsel include coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the Army on any legal question or procedure, other than military justice matters, which are assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the General Counsel to assist in the performance of these important duties.

n. The Inspector General of the Army.

The Inspector General is responsible for inspections and certain investigations within the Department of the Army, such as inquiring into and reporting to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff regarding discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army with continuing assessment of command, operational, logistical, and administrative effectiveness; and serving as the focal point for the Department of the Army regarding Department of Defense Inspector General inspections and noncriminal investigations, as well as the Department of Defense inspection policy. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Inspector General of the Army to ensure effective accomplishment of these important duties.

o. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.

The Judge Advocate General is the military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and all officers and agencies of the Department of the Army. The Judge Advocate General provides legal advice directly to the Chief of Staff and to the Army Staff in matters concerning military justice; environmental law; labor and civilian personnel law; contract, fiscal, and tax law; international law; and the worldwide operational deployment of Army forces. The Chief of Staff does not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the personal authority to remove him. This enables The Judge Advocate General to provide independent legal advice. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the The Judge Advocate General as my legal advisor and I will assist him in the performance of his important duties as the legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army.

p. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

The National Guard Bureau is a joint activity of the Department Defense. The Chief National Guard Bureau is appointed by the President, he serves as a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters concerning non-federalized National Guard forces. He is also the principal

advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on matters relating to the National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, National Guard Bureau to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau, as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army.

q. The Director of the Army National Guard

The Director, Army National Guard is responsible for assisting the Chief, National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau, as they relate to the Army National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Director, Army National Guard to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau. This will be essential as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and improve the Army National Guard's operational capabilities.

r. The Chief of the Army Reserve.

The Chief, Army Reserve is responsible for justifying and executing the Army Reserve's personnel, operation and maintenance, and construction budgets. As such, the Chief, Army Reserve is the director and functional manager of appropriations made for the Army Reserve in those areas. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, Army Reserve as we deal together with the Army's day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements in order to sustain and improve the Army Reserve's operational capabilities.

Vision for the Future

a. What is your vision for the Army of today and the future?

My vision is of an all volunteer Army today and in the future that provides depth and versatility to the Joint Force, is efficient in its employment and provides flexibility for national security decision makers in defense of the nation's interests at home and abroad.

b. What roles do you believe the Army should play in contingency, humanitarian, and stability operations?

I believe our Army must maintain the right capabilities and amount of capability (depth) to provide our national leaders with trained and ready forces that can perform missions across the spectrum of conflict. We are capable of executing contingency, humanitarian or stability operations as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense under the control of the appropriate combatant commander.

We are also capable of assisting our international partners in building their own operational capacity. Through theater engagement and Security Force Assistance, we have the capability to increase the capacity of partner nations to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic order, protect its citizens during natural disasters, and avoid conflicts, which would otherwise require U.S. military support.

- c. Do you see any unnecessary redundancy between Army and Marine Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army combat battalions, regiments/brigades, and divisions and the equivalent Marine Corps formations?**

No, we each have unique but complementary capabilities that provide the National Command Authority flexibility. We have proven over the last ten years, specifically, the flexibility and the adaptability of the Army and the Marine Corps to complement each other in a variety of operations and environments.

Major Challenges and Priorities

- a. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Chief of Staff of the Army?**

In a potentially resource constrained environment, we must:

- 1) Continue to provide trained and ready forces to meet current wartime requirements and other world-wide contingencies;
- 2) Continue to reset the Army to meet future challenges;
- 3) Continue to adapt and develop a more effective and efficient force to meet our nation's future challenges;
- 4) Right-size the Army and sustain the All Volunteer Army by ensuring programs are in place to care for and develop our Soldiers and their families.

- b. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Congress to address these challenges. We will continue to refine and update our training programs to ensure all our Soldiers are fully prepared to deploy to combat. We will continue to review our reset, force modernization and acquisition programs in order to more efficiently meet the needs and requirements of today and the future. I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and Combatant Commanders to identify the capabilities needed to provide depth and versatility to the Joint Force in order to provide more effective and flexible forces for employment. I will continue to

adjust our leader development programs in order to develop thinking, adaptable decision makers necessary to operate in an increasingly complex and unpredictable environment. I will review our Soldier and family programs to ensure we are meeting their needs.

c. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?

At this point, I am not aware of any problems that would impede the performance of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

d. If confirmed, what management actions and time-lines would you establish to address these problems?

I will ensure that management systems are in place. I will continue to monitor and to assess those processes, and I will specifically reinforce and review our management processes to ensure stewardship of the precious resources we are given to accomplish our mission.

I am committed to the wise stewardship of our limited and valuable resources. Having just completed the disestablishment of USJFCOM, I understand the tough choices that must be made to operate within fiscal constraints, while minimizing risk to operational capability. If confirmed, I will carry this experience and ethos into this position.

e. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?

I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army to lay out the priorities of the Army. Within the framework of the Secretary of the Army's vision, here are my priorities:

- Develop and articulate a vision of the Army that addresses the needs of the nation
- Keep faith with our all-volunteer force
- Focus on leader development to ensure our future leaders remain resilient
- Explore, outline, and implement tangible methods to become more efficient and effective
- Reinvigorate the Profession of Arms

U.S. Forces in Iraq

If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you recommend to the President the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?

Based on the information I have available to me now, my personal opinion is that I would recommend that the US continue to support the Government of Iraq as it assumes responsibility for security. Our assessments indicate that Iraq is well on its way to being capable of providing for its own security, but they must have the opportunity to ensure their systems are fully capable of meeting their needs. If asked by the Government of Iraq, I would recommend a continued presence focused on training and filling any gaps in external security as required, combined with a variety of continued engagements, exercises, and other mutual security arrangements. Our commitment to Iraq is a signal of our commitment to the region, which is closely linked to our national interests.

The Army has recently announced the extension in Iraq of elements of the 25th Infantry Division beyond the normal 12-month deployed limit.

- a. What is your understanding and assessment of this extension and its potential impact on Army, unit, and family morale, well-being, and future rotation cycles?**

As we withdraw from Iraq, there remain some critical requirements and issues that necessitate continuity and experience. I understand that this 30 day extension of the of 25th ID Headquarters specifically, was fully reviewed by USF-I, CENTCOM and the former Secretary of Defense and steps were taken to minimize any negative impacts on the Soldiers and the Families.

Although extensions are always difficult, I expect that this extension may have only a minimal effect due to its relatively short duration and the nature of redeployment. To mitigate the impact when approving the extension, the Secretary of Defense also directed that the maximum number of Soldiers, with consideration of special family issues, redeploy prior to the Holiday Period.

- b. If confirmed, how would you monitor the redeployment of these troops to ensure that the requirements of the U.S.-Iraq security agreement are met and that delay of their return home is avoided?**

This extension was approved by the Secretary of Defense at the request of USF-I and CENTCOM. The Army continually monitors the deployment and redeployment of Soldiers rotating or taking leave. If confirmed, we will do everything we can to facilitate the redeployment and ensure that we maintain accountability of all Soldiers to ensure their safety and well being while accomplishing the mission. We will monitor the redeployment of these Soldiers as we do all others and provide whatever support is needed to PACOM as they redeploy to Hawaii.

- c. Is it your understanding that those soldiers who are extended will be compensated for their additional deployed time in the same manner as those who have been extended in the past?**

Yes, the Army will provide compensation for those Soldiers whose deployments are extended in a similar manner to those who have been extended in the past.

- d. What is your understanding of how the Army will address the needs of those families who have incurred non-refundable expenses based upon original redeployment plans?**

If mission conditions dictate extending Soldiers beyond scheduled redeployment dates and Families have incurred non-refundable expenses, the Army has a claims process they can use to address the situation. Additionally, the Army does provide monthly compensation for Soldiers who are involuntarily extended.

To mitigate the impact when approving the extension, the Secretary of Defense also directed that the maximum number of Soldiers, with consideration of special family issues, redeploy prior to the Holiday Period.

DOD Efficiency Initiatives and Budget Top Line Reductions

The Army's share of the DOD efficiency initiatives in the near-term is about \$29.5 billion that the Army will keep for reinvestment in its own programs. The Army's plan to achieve these savings is based on reorganizations and consolidations of management activities, deferral of military construction costs, and cancellation of some major weapons programs. DOD has also reduced its planned top line by \$78.0 billion over FY2012 to FY2016 and will achieve this goal, in part, with end strength reductions in the Army.

- a. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD efficiency initiatives and the additional \$78.0 billion cut to the top line?**

The Army must do its part in our national effort to reduce the federal budget deficit and improve our economic posture. The Army exceeded Secretary Gates' efficiencies guidance target of \$28.3B by achieving over \$29.5B in efficiencies and applied these savings to enhance capabilities and improve quality of life for our Soldiers and Families.

- b. In your view what are the major risks for the Army associated with these reductions and, if confirmed, how would you propose to manage those risks?**

The projected reductions in the Army's permanent active-duty end strength that are part of the DoD's \$78 billion top line decrease are based on an assumption that America's ground combat commitment in Afghanistan would be reduced by the end

of 2014, in accordance with the President's strategy. As we reduce end strength, we must continue to assess the impacts to our current and future requirements. This also applies to our civilian workforce. If I am confirmed, I will continue to review the status of efficiencies with particular focus on areas we assess as medium to high risk of implementing. The Army reviews status of efficiencies with particular focus on areas we assess as low to high risk of implementing. Reviews are conducted monthly to ensure that we are able to evaluate plan development, milestone achievement, and resource execution.

- c. Harvesting savings through process improvements and efficiencies has a mixed record of success in DOD. In your view, how likely is it that the planned savings will be achieved?**

I do know that the Army is working to ensure successful implementation or continuation of all efficiency and related initiatives. As I understand it, comprehensive Capability Portfolio Reviews and the Task Forces commissioned by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on such key topics as the Generating Force, utilization of the Reserve Components, and improved installation management are aggressively pursuing these efficiencies. If confirmed, I will be in a better position to determine if the Army's objective will be achieved. I feel strongly, however, that we have to make sure that we achieve real savings through realistic and obtainable methods and goals.

Modularity

Modularity refers to the Army's fundamental reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based structure. Although somewhat smaller in size, modular combat brigades are supposed to be just as, or more, capable than the divisional brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix of equipment—such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment. To date, the Army has established over 90 percent of its planned modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully equip this force as required by its design have slipped to 2019.

- a. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modularity transformation strategy?**

I know the Army is almost complete with transformation and is currently assessing the effort. I personally believe that modular transformation has increased the Army's ability to meet combatant commander requirements and national security strategy objectives by providing tailored formations and leaders who are accustomed to building teams based on changing requirements. It has enabled us to sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But after almost six years since the beginning of the modularity transition, we must incorporate and capitalize on lessons learned.

- b. If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you propose relative to the Army's modular transformation strategy?**

If confirmed, I will continue to review Army plans and strategies, including the modular transformation strategy, force structure and modernization to ensure the Army continues to provide the joint force with the best mix of capabilities to prevail in today's wars, and engage to build partner capacity, support civil authorities, and deter and defeat potential adversaries.

- c. What is your understanding and assessment of the employment and performance of modular combat brigades and supporting units in Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom?**

As the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq and United States Forces-Iraq commander, I was extremely pleased with the employment and performance of the modular brigades. Soldiers from across the combat, combat support and combat service support formations were able to adapt, change and react to the ever changing operational environment. We also learned some key lessons that must be reviewed. If confirmed, we will review and incorporate these lessons into the modular force.

- d. What changes, if any, would you propose to the modular design, the mix of combat and supporting brigades, or modular unit employment to improve performance or reduce risk?**

We are currently working with current and former commanders to examine our organizations to see if they are the best we can provide. We are continuously looking at alternate force designs and force mixes to see how we can improve, in both effectiveness and efficiency, our force structure. If confirmed, I will ensure that we look at span of control and training and readiness oversight paradigms in order to provide the most effective and efficient force to the combatant commanders.

With respect to the Army's modular combat brigade force structure design, General Dempsey's June 2011 pamphlet titled "CSA's Thoughts on the Army's Future," directs the Army to assess the feasibility of adding a third maneuver battalion to each heavy and infantry brigade where there are only two maneuver battalions now.

- e. What is your understanding and assessment of the need to add a third maneuver battalion to the modular heavy and infantry brigades?**

The Army is currently conducting analysis on this potential organizational change through a deliberate and holistic process. I am personally in favor of a third maneuver battalion based on my experience in combat, stability and humanitarian missions, but I will wait to see the results of the ongoing analysis in order to make a more informed decision.

- f. If confirmed, how would you propose to implement a decision to add a third maneuver battalion to the heavy and infantry combat brigades? What force structure or capabilities would you propose to reduce in order to increase maneuver forces within the combat brigades?**

If confirmed, I will review the analysis of the modular brigade designs and the associated force mix, including the number and type of brigades. I will discuss this with commanders in order to make an informed decision on the future force structure and design of our combat brigades.

Active-Duty End Strength

The Army has increased its active-duty end strength over the last several years to meet current, and what was believed to be future, demands of operational requirements. Authorized active-duty Army end strength is now 569,400. The Secretary of Defense has announced Army active-duty end strength reductions beginning this year through 2014 of 22,000 soldiers followed by another 27,000 beginning in 2015. The fiscal year 2012 budget starts this reduction by requesting 7,400 fewer soldiers.

- a. In your view, what is the appropriate Army active-duty end strength needed to meet today's demand for deployed forces, increase non-deployed readiness, build strategic depth, and relieve stress on soldiers and their families?**

I know the Army is continuously assessing the factors that affect end strength including assigned missions, operational demands, unit readiness, Soldier and Family well-being, Reserve Component capability and capacity, and fiscal constraints in order to determine required active-duty end strength. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army to determine the appropriate Army active duty end strength based on our National Military Strategy and contributions to the Joint Force.

- b. In your view, what is the appropriate Army active-duty end strength needed to meet the likely future demand for deployed forces, maintain non-deployed readiness, ensure ground force strategic depth, and avoid increasing stress on soldiers and their families?**

I am not yet prepared to provide you with an answer on future Army end strength. If confirmed, this will be a priority focus of mine.

Plans for the reduction of Army end strength assumes that the cuts will be made gradually over several years.

- c. What, in your view, are the critical requirements for the management of this end strength reduction to ensure that should strategic circumstances change the cuts**

can be stopped and, if necessary, reversed?

End strength reductions should not be automatic. They are conditions based and will require periodic assessment. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and the Army Leadership to develop a plan that will allow us to accomplish current and projected missions, balance the well-being of Soldiers and Families, and keep us prepared to meet unforeseen operational demands by retaining the best leaders and sustaining the optimal force structure.

The gradual reduction of end strength may provide a hedge against an unforeseen contingency requiring sufficient and available Army forces, however, savings from the reduction of forces could be realized sooner and with greater long term advantages with faster implementation.

d. What, in your view, are the most important advantages and disadvantages of faster end strength reductions?

I believe the Army's deliberate and responsible draw-down plans should proceed at a pace necessary to ensure mission success, the well-being of Soldiers and Families, compliance with directed resource constraints and flexibility for unforeseen demands.

The advantage of drawing down faster would be the flexibility to invest in other required areas. The disadvantages lie in the reduced flexibility for meeting unforeseen demands and the ability to maintain the skills and quality of the remaining force.

We want to be able to make sure that we have the force necessary to meet the needs of the National Command Authority.

End strength reductions totaling 49,000 soldiers are likely to require force structure reductions.

e. If confirmed, how would you propose to reduce Army force structure, if at all, to avoid the problems associated with a force that is over-structured and under-manned?

I would continue to implement the Total Army Analysis process to ensure Army force structure contains required capability and capacity to meet current and future operational requirements. I am dedicated to ensuring that we have a quality force that is trained and equipped to meet the needs of our future security challenges.

f. How will these planned end strength reductions impact the Army's plans for overseas basing of its units?

In my present position, I have not had a chance to examine the potential impact of

end strength reductions on overseas basing. If confirmed, I will address this as part of the Army's continuing force structure assessment.

The Army has had two other major post-conflict end strength reductions in the last 40 years: after Vietnam and after Operation Desert Storm.

- g. What, in your view, are the critical elements of the planning and management of a major force reduction to ensure that the Army as a whole is not crippled, impacting ongoing operations or general readiness?**

Today's environment is very different than the one following Desert Storm. There are significant uncertainties in many regions. We are facing a significantly greater number of regional and transnational threats and hot spots that could pose a concern for our national security; a sharp and distinct contrast to the early 90s. Therefore, end strength reductions must be conditions based, well thought out and executed deliberately and responsibly. The Army's plan should ensure accomplishment of its assigned missions, operational readiness for future demands and resource constraints while ensuring the sustainment of the All Volunteer Force.

- h. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the planning and management of an end strength reduction minimizes the negative impact on the readiness of the Army and soldier families?**

Whatever decisions are made, we must ensure that we have a decisive, quality Army that is trained, ready and optimally equipped while sustaining a healthy environment for our Soldiers and families which allows them to thrive and grow.

- i. Does the Army have the legislative authority it needs to properly shape the force as part of the personnel drawdown?**

I am not aware of any specific issues, but if confirmed I will assess this area to ensure the Army has the appropriate authorities necessary. Should I determine the need for changes, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Congress to identify any needed authorities.

Strategic Risk

- a. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create increased levels of strategic risk for the United States based on the lack of available trained and ready forces for other contingencies?**

It is well known that the extended pace and scope of combat and other contingency operations over the last ten years have created a demand on our forces that exceeded the previously programmed available mission forces. As the Army looks to drawdown in both theaters and adjust the Boots on Ground to dwell ratios, units will

have more time to reset, train and prepare for full spectrum operations. This in turn will allow for greater flexibility to meet our national security challenges.

- b. If so, how would you characterize the increase in strategic risk in terms of the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?**

The Army would be challenged to generate responsive combat power for an additional unforeseen contingency. A concerted effort to reduce risk created by unsustainably high deploy-to-dwell ratios is required to ensure we maintain a high state of readiness and restore strategic depth in our force given these demands. The Army's plan to reduce this risk to the force is contingent upon achieving sustainable deploy-to-dwell ratios over the long-term, maintaining assured access to the Reserve Component, adequately providing for Soldiers, Civilians, and Families, and receiving reliable, timely, and consistent funding to reset depleted equipment sets.

- c. What is the impact of the decision to decrease Army forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security obligations in other parts of the world?**

As we continue to reduce our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, it allows us the ability to reset and train forces to make them available to meet other world-wide contingencies and thereby reduce the risk. But this will take some time.

- d. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will reductions to Army end strength increase or aggravate this risk?**

Any potential reductions beyond the 27,000 will be thoroughly assessed through our Total Army Analysis modeling efforts to understand the risks involved given anticipated mission requirements. We must be prudent in our approach to budget cuts and ensure we adequately man, train, and equip without hollowing out the force. With tightening budgetary constraints, our intent is to arrive at the right mix of capabilities to meet current demands as well as future challenges and ensure we continue to provide national leaders options in a crisis. We will achieve this by ensuring our forces have the greatest possible versatility while maintaining core capabilities. Any of these reductions must be tied to consideration of the actual drawdown of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- e. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?**

As we look to the future, it is my view that we have to develop an Army that provides depth and versatility to the Joint Force, is more efficient in its employment and provides greater flexibility for our national security decision makers. Our efforts must be tied to the National Military Strategy and our anticipated strategic and

operational environment.

"Institutionalizing" Support for Irregular Warfare

A major objective of the Department over recent years has been increasing emphasis on lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability type operations. All of which are areas that place a high premium and demands on Army capabilities. In order to ensure that a rebalance achieves this objective, and perhaps more importantly is then sustainable, Secretary Gates has stressed the need for the Department to "institutionalize and finance" the support necessary for the irregular warfare capabilities that have been developed over the last few years and will be needed in the future.

a. What, in your view, does it mean to "institutionalize" capabilities and support for irregular warfare capabilities in the Army?

Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare means developing the appropriate doctrine, organizations, materiel solutions, leader developments, personnel assignments and facilities (DOTMLPF) into the Army. Thus far, we have institutionalized Irregular Warfare into the Army through our Leader Development, individual and collective Training and Doctrine development.

b. What is your understanding and assessment of Army efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?

The Army is in the process of creating specified proponents responsible for the institutional management for key tasks associated with Irregular Warfare.

1. The US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at Carlisle Barracks charged with maintaining our doctrine on stability operations and coordinating with other government agencies to facilitate interagency cooperation required to ensure a whole of government approach to the conduct of stability operations.
2. The Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell at Fort Leavenworth charged with coordinating all IW activities within TRADOC, but in particular with maintaining and training doctrine on counterinsurgency.
3. The US Army Information Operations Proponent at Fort Leavenworth charged with maintaining doctrine on Inform and Influence Activities and conducting a course to train officers specifically on information operations.
4. We are creating a proponent for Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities at Fort Leavenworth to write doctrine for Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities and manage the entire DOTMLPF process for Cyber/EM.

5. The Security Force Assistance Proponent provides input on working by, with and through host nation security forces to increase our partners' capability and capacity. This proponent is located at Ft Leavenworth, KS.

From a doctrine standpoint we have made significant strides in creating a mindset that treats all of the above mentioned activities as central to how the Army conducts operations. Specifically, within doctrine we have done the following:

1. The Army's senior operations manual, FM 3-0, has elevated stability tasks to be co-equal with combat tasks, in line with DoDD 3000.05. FM 3-0 also designates inform and influence activities and cyber/electromagnetic activities as key tasks within the mission command warfighting function.
2. We published a separate FM on Stability Operations that goes into great detail on the tasks of stability operations and how they fit within a broader construct of the whole of government approach. Further we are in the process of writing an additional manual on stability tasks that goes into more detail on the specifics at the tactical level of tasks directly related to stability operations.
3. We published FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, that laid out a new and innovative approach to the conduct of counterinsurgency campaigns.
4. We published an FM on Information Operations tactics, techniques and procedures, that is currently being updated to account for lessons learned in our current conflicts.
5. We published an FM on Security Force Assistance that lays out guidelines and specific tasks for conducting security force assistance operations to build partnership capacity. This manual too is being updated based on the latest lessons learned from active operations.
6. We are writing doctrine on the conduct of Cyber/Electromagnetic Activities.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned has collected, collated and distributed numerous Handbooks and Newsletters on Irregular Warfare related topics, to include:

1. The Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines handbook sharing best practices and lessons learned from Special Operations Forces that are assisting Philippine Military and Police forces conducting Counterinsurgency.
2. The Army Security Force Assistance handbook that shares best practices and lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa, Trans Sahel, and the Philippines.

The information collected by the Center for Army Lessons Learned helps to inform what should

be incorporated into new Doctrine and Tactics manuals.

From an organizational standpoint we have also made significant changes in our organizational structure to account for all of the general tasks mentioned above.

1. All of our division, corps and theater army headquarters have been given additional staff structure specifically to address inform and influence activities, increased civil affairs capability, increased engineer staff to support infrastructure development and restoration of essential services.
2. We have created the 1st Information Operations Brigade to assist units in the conduct of inform and influence activities, the Army Asymmetric Warfare Group to support rapid adaptation to the activities of hybrid threats, and US Army Cyber Command to execute cyber/electromagnetic activities for the Army.
3. We created a specialized training brigade to prepare individuals and units to conduct security force assistance missions.
4. We are active participants in the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization.

Training the Army starts with the time that Soldiers enter the Army, all the way through their Professional Military Education (PME). We've incorporated Irregular Warfare into basic training scenarios for use during initial military training by both Soldiers and officers, and have counterinsurgency training and education for students attending the War College. Irregular Warfare is part of our preparation for units deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq:

1. Scenarios at our collective training centers include Stability Operations, Security Force Assistance, Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism.
2. All Brigade Combat Teams attend a 5 day Counterinsurgency seminar at Ft Leavenworth taught by the Army's Counterinsurgency Center.

c. In your view, what are the obstacles, if any, to institutionalizing this kind of support, and what will be necessary to overcome them?

The biggest obstacles will be downsizing the right formations for our mission and requirements. As pressures for cuts in defense spending and force structures increase, we will have to assess which of these capabilities we retain and at what level. Finding the right mix will be a challenge. We can maintain our doctrine and lessons learned databases fairly easily, but retaining all of the necessary force structure will be more challenging.

While force structure and program changes may be necessary, they are unlikely to prove sufficient to achieve full institutionalization. The greater challenge may be found in

changing Army culture, attitudes, management, and career path requirements and choices, for example through adjustments to organization, training, doctrine, and personnel policies.

- d. In your view, what are the most important changes, if any, that might be necessary to complement programmatic changes in support of the further institutionalization of capabilities for irregular warfare in the Army?**

The most important thing we need to do is to ensure that we educate our leadership through professional military education about the conduct of irregular warfare, to include COIN, stability operations, inform and influence activities, cyber/EM activities, and security force assistance. We must also maintain our doctrine and lessons learned that we've gained from almost a decade of active operations. We need to keep this knowledge base updated, based on only on our own operations, but also those of our coalition partners. Through education and maintaining a sound knowledge base, we'll be able to respond effectively to a wide range of tasks in the future. Much as the Army did between the two world wars, we must have a highly professional education system that educates future leaders on the hard earned lessons of this past decade so we don't repeat the mistakes of post-Vietnam of thinking these kinds of operations are behind us.

We have to retain the flexibility, adaptability, and agility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended distances and in missions requiring the establishment of security over wide areas regardless of what kind of threats populate the battlefield.

Institutionalizing support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability capabilities in the force does not mean ignoring the requirement for the Army to be trained, equipped, and ready for major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of operations.

- e. If confirmed, how would you propose to prioritize and allocate the Army's efforts and resources to ensure that the force is prepared for major combat while at the same time it increases and institutionalizes support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability operations?**

The future battlefield will be populated with hybrid threats-- combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups. We must train and educate our leaders and units to understand and prevail against hybrid threats. We are training and educating our Soldiers to understand that they must be capable of both combined arms maneuver and wide area security in this hybrid threat environment. In training, we must replicate the threats and conditions they are likely to face in their next mission. For ten years, that has meant irregular threats and conditions common in the wide area security role that supports counterinsurgency operations.

- f. Do you anticipate that the Army will continue to train and equip general**

purpose force brigades for the “advise and assist brigade (AAB)” mission after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to an end?

I was involved in developing the initial requirements for the advise and assist brigades when I was the Multi-National Force-Iraq commander. The flexibility of the modular brigades allowed us to organize, train and equip for Security Force Assistance activities. I anticipate that there will be an ongoing requirement for Security Force Assistance activities of the type carried out by these brigades into the future. If confirmed, I will continue to assess requirements and work with Congress to ensure we have the resources and flexibility required to accomplish these missions.

g. If so, what mission essential task list or other training guidance changes do you plan to institutionalize this mission set in training for the general purpose force brigades?

If confirmed, I will work with our Joint partners to identify the mission essential tasks for Security Force Assistance and incorporate them into the Unified Joint Task List and Army Unified Task List.

h. Do you foresee that general purpose force brigades or other formations will be regionally aligned to carry out an AAB-type mission? If so, what changes to unit training and equipping based on the requirements of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model will be necessary to support regional alignment?

As we look to the future, I believe some brigades may be regionally aligned. This will depend on combatant command requirements. The number and type of brigades will depend upon what we have available after meeting the operational requirements in the CENTCOM AOR. If confirmed I will work with Secretary McHugh to determine the best allocation to support operational requirements. The ARFORGEN model and our modular design are well-suited to the kind of adaptations that will be required to meet security force assistance requirements in the future.

Lessons Learned

a. What do you believe are the major lessons that the Army has and should have learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and New Dawn (OND) regarding its title 10, U.S. Code, responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping the force?

1. We must ensure that our future leaders understand their environment. A combination of socio-economic, political, cultural and military factors will affect operations at all levels. We must develop leaders who are adaptable and flexible in solving complex problems.

2. We have learned that Soldiers require more than a year to fully recover from extended deployments and to prepare for another deployment. We must do better at identifying and incorporating lessons learned at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. We have learned that the ability to adapt rapidly is the key to success in current and future operational environments.
 3. We must have a fully integrated Reserve Component to meet our operational needs.
 4. ARFORGEN works, but must constantly be reviewed and adjusted to the operational environment.
- b. If confirmed, which of these lessons, if any, would you address as a matter of urgent priority?**

They are equally important and all must be addressed in order to ensure our Army remains as effective and efficient in the future.

Equipment Availability

Both deploying and non-deploying active and reserve component Army units are training without all their required equipment. Deploying units do not receive some of their equipment until late in their pre-deployment training cycle or as they arrive in theater.

- a. In your view, has deployment of additional brigades to Afghanistan increased the strain on maintenance systems and further reduced equipment availability for training?**

With our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have a significant requirement and responsibility to ensure the most modern and capable equipment is available to our forces in combat. This has at times limited equipment availability for training. ARFORGEN has helped us to manage the movement of equipment for training. It is our responsibility to ensure units are properly trained upon deployment. As force generation requirements reduce this will mitigate some of the risk.

- b. What do you expect will be the impact, if any, of our drawdown from Iraq and Afghanistan in this regard?**

The drawdown from Iraq has already improved availability of equipment for units to conduct pre-deployment training. The future drawdown in Afghanistan will also help if we sustain the resources to do reset.

What is your understanding and assessment of the availability of modern equipment to fully support the pre-deployment training and operations of deploying units?

With our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have a significant requirement and responsibility to ensure the most modern and capable equipment is available to our forces in combat. This has at times limited equipment availability for training. ARFORGEN has helped us to manage the movement of equipment for training. It is our responsibility to ensure units are properly trained upon deployment. As force generation requirements reduce this will mitigate some of the risk.

c. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls, if any, for training and operations?

I understand that the Army is short Unmanned Aerial Systems and some non-Line of Sight communications equipment. I am told that light infantry equipment shortfalls in Afghanistan are being addressed through existing processes. As we continue to reset equipment returning from Iraq we will see a steady improvement in on-hand equipment for units training for and deploying in support of operational missions.

d. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and operate?

If confirmed, I will continue to support the Army Force Generation Model of phased equipping through which the Army intensively manages our equipment on-hand to ensure next deploying units, from all components, have sufficient equipment for training and deployment. If confirmed, I will continue our capability portfolio reviews to evaluate our priorities against mission requirements and adjust our resource allocations to ensure the Army continues to strike the critical balance between having enough modern equipment to fully support pre-deployment training and operations in theater.

Equipment Repair/Reset

Congress provided the Army with approximately \$15 to \$17 billion annually to help with the reset of non-deployed forces and accelerate the repair and replacement of equipment. However, the amount of reset funding requested for DOD in FY2012 decreased to \$11.9 billion from the FY2011 request of \$21.4 billion.

a. In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only prepare Army forces for operations in Afghanistan but to also improve the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies?

The level of funding appears sufficient. In my experience, the Congress has been very supportive of the Army's Reset requests, providing the Army with what we require to Reset our redeploying forces. It is true that in FY10 and FY11, the Army was appropriated approximately \$10B for Reset, and in FY 12, the request is less than half that. However, with the drawdown in one theater and more efficient management of materiel moving in and out of Afghanistan, our annual Reset

requirements have decreased. The Army will continue requiring Reset funding 2 to 3 years beyond end of operation in both theaters to move all materiel through repair programs.

Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset?

It is my understanding that our repair depots are currently fully engaged and have the ability to meet a surge in our repair requirements as necessary.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?

The Army has the needed capacity through certain measures, such as adding additional shifts, contract augmentation or rebalancing workload that could be used to increase production at our facilities. This will of course also increase cost. At this time, I do not know if such measures are necessary. If confirmed, I will look into this matter further.

b. What impact is this level of funding likely to have, if any, on the ability of Army National Guard units to respond to Homeland Defense and support to civil authorities' missions?

I am told that the decrease in the Army's Reset funding requirements for FY12 should have no impact on the Army National Guard ability to respond to Homeland Defense missions and provide support to civil authorities. I also understand that reserve component Reset requirements are fully funded.

Deployment and Rotation Cycles

Over the last year, the active Army's ratio of time spent deployed to time at home station has improved from 1:1 to 1:1.6 – that is for each year deployed a soldier spends about one and a half years at home station. The previously stated active Army objective was 1:2 whereby soldiers could expect to be home for 2 years for each year deployed. The Reserve Component objective is 1:5 where soldiers can expect to be home for 5 years for each year deployed. In General Dempsey's June 2011 pamphlet titled "CSA's Thoughts on the Army's Future," he sets a new dwell time goal of 27 months at home for every 9 months deployed as soon as possible.

a. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's near- and intermediate-term plans for deployment length (or Boots on the Ground) and dwell time?

The Army utilizes a rotational Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) readiness model that effectively and efficiently generates trained and ready forces for

Combatant Commanders at sustainable levels. ARFORGEN also provides ready forces for unforeseen contingencies. Starting in Fiscal Year 2012, the Army's intermediate goal for Boots on the Ground (BOG) is one year deployed to two years dwell at home station for the active component and one year deployed to four years dwell at home station for Reserve Component Soldiers. The Army's long-term goals are one year deployed with three years at home station for the active component and one year deployed with five years at home station for Reserve Component Soldiers. The Army is moving to a 9 month BOG, which I support. It should begin to reduce some of the strain on our Soldiers and families. If confirmed, we will constantly monitor the implementation of the 9 month BOG and its impact on dwell.

- b. What impact do you expect the proposed troop reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan to have on the dwell time of Army soldiers? Is it possible that the reduction of demand for Army forces in Iraq alone will allow the Army to achieve the 1:2 dwell time goal by the end 2011, or the 1:3 dwell time goal (whether in terms of months or years) by 2014?**

Utilizing Operation New Dawn (Iraq) drawdown planning assumptions, projections show Corps, Divisions, and Brigade Combat Teams will continue to improve BOG/Dwell and move closer to achieving our goals.

- c. What is your understanding and assessment of the potential impact of the decision to decrease Army end strength on the rotation schedule and meeting the near-term dwell goal of 1:2 for active duty forces?**

The Army will plan to reduce its end-strength and restructure its force mix consistent with reductions in overseas contingency operations commitments and in conjunction with the needs of the Department and the Combatant Commanders. Our intent is to arrive at the right mix of capabilities to meet current demands as well as future challenges, within budgetary constraints. Based on the current strategic guidance and projected future requirements, the Army should be able to maintain its progress to reach its Boots on Ground to dwell ratio goal and have sufficient troops to respond to unforeseen events. But if our overseas contingency operations commitments differ from those planned it will impact BOG/Dwell and availability of forces.

- d. How, in your view, will the proposed reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan impact the demand on Army Reserve and National Guard troops? In your view, how might a reduction in demand, if any, for Army Reserve and Guard troops impact their availability to respond to contingencies for Homeland Defense and support to civil authorities?**

The return of these Army National Guard forces to state control should provide the Governors and Adjutants General with increased forces to conduct Homeland Defense, disaster response, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. These forces will be better trained and more experienced due to their Iraq and Afghanistan combat

deployments. Although the National Guard has been able to meet all disaster relief requirements, the return of forces will allow more flexibility to accomplish local missions.

Capabilities of Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for increased counter insurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces (GPF).

- a. What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of responsibilities assigned to GPF and SOF, particularly with respect to security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?**

The report of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review struck an appropriate balance between the capabilities and capacity of our special operations and multipurpose forces. Today's demand for security force assistance and building partner military capabilities exceeds the capacity of our special operations forces requiring the integration of our multi-purpose forces with our special operations forces to accomplish the mission. Additionally, some of the security force assistance missions, such as those related to building national institutions like military academies and logistics systems, are typically more appropriate for our multipurpose forces and our generating force institutions.

- b. Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to become more like SOF in mission areas that are critical to countering violent extremists?**

Over the last ten years our multipurpose ground forces have developed many of the capabilities once only inherent in our special operations forces. Just as our multipurpose forces have improved their capabilities, so too have our special operations forces. Both forces are national capabilities that must be sustained and continuously enhanced. They increase our flexibility and agility. The needs of our Combatant Commanders will continue to inform the degree of overlap or specialization required between our special operations and multipurpose forces.

- c. What actions, if any, do you believe need to be taken in order to allow SOF and GPF to successfully share these missions in the future?**

In all of the geographic Commands, close collaboration and planning between SOF and GPF will ensure optimum use of all available forces. Additionally, we have a process within DOD whereby combatant commanders identify their future needs and request the allocation of forces to accomplish specific tasks. Through this process – the Global Force Management Process – we integrate the demands and allocation of special operations and multipurpose forces to fill combatant commander needs. We

should integrate combatant commander needs for both special operations and multipurpose forces, including their supporting forces, into this common process.

d. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for SOF only?

Generally speaking mission areas that require minimal footprint or recognized presence, operations independent of larger ground forces in the immediate area, or operations that place a premium on regional cultural awareness and negotiation skills appear best suited for our special operations forces. While our special operations and multipurpose forces share much of the same skills, equipment, and tactics, our special operations forces are generally more mature, at a higher skill level in these common skills, and also equipped and trained in unique capabilities. Where that difference is needed for mission success; that is where we should employ our special operations forces.

Special Operations Enabling Capabilities

The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has described the “non-availability” of force enablers as the “most vexing issue in the operational environment” for SOF. A recent report required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84) indicated that adequately enabling SOF in the future will require improvements to “the process by which SOF gains access to enabler support, and by synchronizing efforts with the Services.” The report also stated that “Currently, SOF units divert scarce organic resources to satisfy enabler requirements and accomplish the assigned mission. In future operating environments, the effects of enabler shortfalls will be further exacerbated unless USSOCOM and the Services can better forecast the need for support, codify support through formal agreements, and eventually get SOF units and their GPF counterparts training together throughout the deployment cycle.”

a. If confirmed, how would you work with the Commander of USSOCOM to address the enabling requirements of Army SOF throughout the deployment cycle?

Special operations forces (SOF) and general purpose forces have made great strides in providing integrated sourcing solutions to increase the overall combat effectiveness of the force. It is the early identification of the right mix of forces-that will allow units to properly integrate. It is my understanding that United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is refining its force generation methodology to build appropriate enabling support into existing USASOC formations and integrating requirements into the Army force generation process. Through this effort, SOF and critical enabling support will be better integrated on a more sustained and predictable basis. If I am confirmed, I will work with USSOCOM and USASOC to ensure the effective and efficient accomplishment of our enabling requirements.

Vice Admiral William McRaven, Commander of Joint Special Operations Command, has stated that USSOCOM needs greater personnel management authority to shape mid- and senior-grade SOF operators to meet USSOCOM-defined requirements. In his view, promotions, selection for command, selection for advanced educational opportunities, foreign language testing policy, and foreign language proficiency bonus payment policy all differ significantly by military service and are all primarily crafted to support service needs.

b. Do you agree that Army special operations personnel should be managed by U.S. Special Operations Command? Please explain.

No. The Army must consider both operational needs and career management in order to ensure the best possible force for the future and not limit flexibility in managing its force. Throughout its operations, Special Operations Forces (SOF) have demonstrated a unique ability to operate in a joint and multinational environment. There are also Service-specific career milestones and development opportunities that vary based upon the individual Soldier. Given these unique needs, the Army should retain management of all members of its force. However, we must work closely with Special Operations Command to identify those skills and opportunities needed so we can incorporate appropriate leader development programs to meet their needs.

Army Readiness

a. How would you characterize Army readiness in its deployed and non-deployed units?

Simply stated, I believe that Army readiness is out of balance between deployed and non-deployed units. Deployed and deploying Army units are given every priority for manning, equipping and training in order to achieve the combatant commander's mission requirements. Due to excessive demand, non-deployed Army units are used to provide the additive resources to ensure that deployed and deploying Army units can meet mission requirements. Routinely, non-deployed commanders are providing personnel and equipment to support deployed and deploying units. The effect of these actions on the force and on specific operational plans (OPLANS), in specific terms, is amply covered in the Chairman's Comprehensive Joint Assessment.

b. Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is acceptable?

No. However, the Army and DoD senior leadership recognize that the Army operates in a fiscally constrained environment. The readiness of Army units, while of utmost concern to the Senior Leadership, must be balanced with other national security and domestic priorities. In light of those competing priorities, the Army has developed a force generation model that synchronizes available Soldiers and resources with units during periods of predictable availability.

- c. How do you see operations in Iraq and Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called upon to respond to an attack or another contingency?**

Clearly, the current demand for Army forces coupled with the cumulative effect of nearly 10 years of conflict impacts the Army's ability and reduces our flexibility to provide forces to respond to an attack or other incident or disaster inside the United States. The Army has "surged" to meet additional contingencies in the past and will do so again in the future – but those "surge" operations impact the readiness of Army units for months and even years after completion. I concur with the specific and well documented effects and examples covered in the Chairman's Comprehensive Joint Assessment.

Deployments and Stress on the Army

Many soldiers are on their fourth and some their fifth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Beginning in August 2008 Department of Defense policy has been to limit deployments for Active Component soldiers and mobilization of Reserve Component soldiers to not longer than 12 months.

- a. What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial active duty obligated service has been completed?**

The Army monitors retention very closely, as I do as a Commander given the high operational demand and multiple deployments that Soldiers are experiencing. Statistics reveal that multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq are not adversely impacting retention.

Since Fiscal Year 2005, retention rates of initial term and mid-career enlisted Soldiers in deploying units has remained above Army goals while retention rates among officers continue to exceed historic rates and outpace the preceding decade. Continuous improvements to Army benefits, such as world class healthcare advances for wounded Soldiers, enhancements in family support programs, and additional monetary bonuses have encouraged large numbers of our Soldiers to continue their commitments beyond their obligated service periods. The Army is focused now on retaining the highest quality Soldiers and officers as we move forward into a period of tightly constrained resources decreased operational demands, and reductions in authorized end strength.

- b. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline.**

The indicators of stress on the force that the Army tracks continuously include: Reenlistments, Chapter separations, Divorce, Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, Enlisted Desertion, AWOL offenses, Drug and Alcohol Enrollments, Drug use Courts-Martial and suicides.

I understand that Army discipline and misconduct rates, including desertion, absence without leave and courts-martial, have remained steady or declined in the past year while other indicators of stress on the force, such as substance abuse and domestic violence have increased. However, the significant increase in the number of Soldier suicides is of the greatest concern. Soldiers and their Families continue to make significant personal sacrifices in support of our nation. If confirmed, I am committed to providing Soldiers and Families with a quality of life commensurate with their service and to continuing Army efforts to develop multi-disciplinary solutions directed at mitigating risk behaviors and enhancing Soldier and Family fitness and resilience.

- c. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?**

I am very concerned about the long term health of the force if we are unable to achieve the appropriate deployment to dwell ratio for our Soldiers. Adequate dwell time should help the visible and invisible wounds of this protracted conflict. If confirmed, I will closely monitor indicators of stress on the force and work to ensure that the Army has plans and programs to confront these issues appropriately.

Former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, stated that the Army was “out of balance.”

- d. What is your understanding and assessment of the concept and efforts to achieve "balance" for the Army?**

I understand balance to be the Army's ability to sustain the Army's Soldiers, Families and Civilians, prepare forces for success in the current conflict, reset returning units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments and contingencies, and transform to meet future demands. With the help of Congress we have made progress over the past three years to restore balance. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress on this issue.

- e. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to achieve and sustain Army "balance"?**

If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Army leadership to adopt measures and strategies to achieve and sustain balance. Building and maintaining resilience among our forces will be one of my highest priorities.

“Toxic” Leadership in the Army (G1, ASA M&RA)

A recent press report outlined the results of an Army survey of leadership and morale that found 80 percent of Army officers and non-commissioned officers had observed and 20 percent had worked for a “toxic” leader in the last year. According to the press report, the survey, conducted by the Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, concluded that toxic leadership “may create a self-perpetuating cycle with harmful and long-lasting effects on morale, productivity and retention of quality personnel.” They also note that “there is no indication that the toxic leadership issue will correct itself.”

- a. What is your understanding and assessment of “toxic” leadership in the Army and its impact or potential impact, if any, on morale, productivity, and retention of quality personnel?**

Throughout my career my top priority has been to create an environment where individual Soldiers and leaders feel empowered and a central part of the organization to which they are assigned. Leadership built on trust, values and standards is essential to our success. Our Army leaders must be disciplined, positive, tolerant, supremely competent, and exemplars of our system of values. Anything less negatively impacts morale, unit effectiveness, and individual Soldiers’ willingness to continue service.

If confirmed, we will review and assess how we continue to prepare our leaders for command and will develop practices that will allow us to identify “toxic” leader environments and take action to correct.

- b. If confirmed, what actions would you propose to take, if any, to deal with the risk to the Army posed by “toxic” leadership?**

Leadership education is a critical component in ensuring a positive command climate. The Army’s professional military education curricula and pre-command specific training address this important aspect of leadership. If confirmed, I will work with my staff to ensure that the Army continues looking at itself to determine if it is placing appropriate emphasis at all levels of military education on the interpersonal dynamics of positive command climate.

- c. What are your views on the benefits and risks of incorporating input from both subordinates and peers, also known as “360-degree” evaluations, into the officer and non-commissioned officer evaluation and promotion selection systems?**

Constructive criticism from peers and subordinates can be an invaluable tool to help leaders see themselves from different perspectives. It is my understanding that the Army is currently evaluating options for revision of its Performance Evaluation

System and that a tool utilizing the Army's Multi-source assessment and feedback/360 degree will be incorporated beginning on 1 October of this year. There will also be a requirement to discuss the 360 degree assessment feedback as part of periodic performance counseling. The Army is also considering inclusion of a 360 degree assessment into the Brigade Command Selection process. I look favorably on changes to our performance evaluation system that enhance the development of leaders without risking fair and equitable treatment of all our Soldiers.

Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve

- a. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's reserve components as an operational reserve, as opposed to its long standing traditional role as a strategic reserve?**

The demand for US ground forces over this past decade has required continuous use of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces in order to meet the Army's operational requirements. The Reserve Component is no longer solely a strategic reserve. Current and projected demand for Army forces will require continued access to the Reserve Component. Mobilization and operational use of the RC will continue for the foreseeable future.

- b. In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as a relevant and capable operational reserve?**

In my opinion, the Army must ensure continued access to the Reserves as an essential part of the Total Force. If confirmed, I will work to ensure they have the necessary training and equipment to accomplish all missions. Maintaining an appropriate level of resourcing for the Operational Reserve and mobilizing these forces on a predictable and recurring basis will be important to our success.

- c. What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve Component forces in meeting combat missions?**

Reserve Component forces play a critical role in enabling the Joint Force Commanders to meet assigned missions. Today's force is structured to balance maneuver capability in the Active Component with a majority of the enablers in the Reserve Component. This balance should provide capabilities to meet operational requirements in sustained operations.

In addition, the Reserve Components are well suited for those operational missions that are recurring and predictable, such as enduring Overseas Contingency Operations, Support of Treaty Obligations, Homeland Defense and Theater Security Cooperation requirements.

- d. In your view, should the Department of Defense assign homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions exclusively to the Reserve?**

Reserve Component forces are uniquely positioned to be the first responder to these missions, however, the Army's Total Force must be able to execute homeland defense or other global domestic support missions.

Through experience we've found that the Army works best as a Total Force, sharing requirements and responsibilities across the formation and between components. Although Reserve Component forces are uniquely positioned to be the first military responder to these missions, the Army's Total Force must be able to execute homeland defense as well as other global and domestic support missions.

- e. In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of the all-volunteer Reserve force?**

Once the Army can restore its balance and stress on the force has been significantly reduced, a predictable cycle that ensures full recovery and training will support the viability and sustainability of the all-volunteer Reserve Force. The Army's long term goal of one year deployed to five years at home station for Reserve Component units is optimal in supporting both the unit's ability to effectively generate readiness, and to ensure Soldier and Family well-being and employability.

Advocates for the National Guard and Reserve assert that funding levels do not meet the requirements of the reserve components for operational missions.

- f. Do you agree that the Army's reserve components are inadequately resourced, particularly in view of the commitment to maintaining an operational reserve?**

Nine years of mobilization and employment for current contingencies has produced the most experienced, ready Reserve Component forces in history and yielded unprecedented readiness levels. The Army must continue to adequately resource the Reserve Command for training and operational requirements. Failure to resource an operational Reserve may result in unit and enabler shortfalls to the total Army.

National Guard Issues

What is your understanding and assessment of changes in the global and domestic roles and missions of the Army National Guard and the National Guard Bureau in the last decade?

The Army National Guard is and will remain a critical component of the Army. It provides depth to the Army and links us to the local U.S. population. During the last ten years, the Army National Guard has transformed from a strategic reserve to an operational force, a trend which should continue with predictable operational use of

the Reserve Components. The Army National Guard, with direction and oversight provided by the National Guard Bureau, has proven to be integral to the Army's Total Force.

a. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's commitment to fully fund Defense Department requirements for Army National Guard equipment?

The Army is committed to fully equipping the Army National Guard to Department of Defense requirements, and I understand significant progress in achieving both modernization and interoperability has been made as the Army National Guard has transformed to an operational force. If confirmed, I will maintain emphasis on the importance of the Army National Guard and its readiness as a part of the Army Total Force.

b. In your view, do Army processes for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution sufficiently address these requirements for National Guard equipment?

If confirmed, I will examine the funding of the Army National Guard to ensure it receives the appropriate level of resources as a part of the Army's Total Force.

c. If confirmed, how would you ensure that these equipment needs of the Army National Guard are fully considered and resourced through the Army budget process? In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief, National Guard Bureau to ensure that Army National Guard requirements and needs are considered, and appropriately synchronized with Army priorities and resourcing strategy.

d. What is your understanding and assessment of the effect, if any, of increasing the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to General (O-10)?

The increase in grade reflects the importance of the National Guard to our Total Force and the significant responsibilities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. I have had the opportunity to work closely with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on several issues as Commander of Multi-National Force – Iraq and U.S. Joint Forces Command.

e. In your opinion, should the Chief of the National Guard Bureau be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

I am aware of this topic, but have not had any discussions regarding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau becoming a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will consider this important question further before forming my opinion.

- f. What is your understanding and assessment of the role and authority of the Director of the Army National Guard, and, in your view, how does this compare with the role and authority of the Chief of the Army Reserve?**

The Director of the Army National Guard leads the Army National Guard Directorate of the National Guard Bureau, and assists the Chief, National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Army. The Director, Army National Guard serves as a member of the Army Staff and as a reserve component chief in similar fashion to the Chief, Army Reserve.

- g. In your view, should the Director of the Army National Guard be “dual hatted” as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army?**

I have not had the opportunity to fully consider this issue before, but if confirmed, will be better able to understand the duties and responsibilities of Director, Army National Guard as they relate to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff.

Given my understanding of the National Guard Bureau, however, the Chief, National Guard Bureau is the principal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army on National Guard matters, while the Director, Army National Guard assists the Chief of National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the Bureau as they relate to the Army.

If confirmed, I will continue to study the duties and responsibilities of Director, Army National Guard as they relate to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff and make recommendations as appropriate.

- h. In your view, should there be a requirement that the position of Commander, U.S. Northern Command or Commander, U.S. Army North, the Army component commander, be filled only by a National Guard officer? Please explain.**

No. We want to sustain flexibility to ensure we have the most experienced and capable leaders. In my opinion we should not be restricted to reserve component or active duty component when selecting a commander to fill either of these positions. Recognizing the roles of NORTHCOM and ARNORTH, however, it is logical to conclude that Army National Guard leaders should be considered for senior command and staff positions.

GPS Receivers and Equipment

- a. As a major user of GPS receivers, what is your understanding and assessment of the Army’s participation, if any, in testing GPS receivers and equipment that use GPS signals with respect to potential interference or disruptions associated with commercial broadband services?**

The Army is a major acquirer of GPS systems both stand alone or embedded in other weapon systems that require position location information. I understand that the Army has tested these systems to verify their requirements, including their GPS functionality. The Army has been a partner with the Air Force, developers of the GPS constellation, since the inception of the program, and has participated extensively in development and operational testing throughout the life of the program.

b. Has all Army equipment utilizing GPS signals been tested?

The Army has tested all GPS equipment it provides to the field either through independent development tests, operational tests, in partnership with other services and in participation in the prime contractor test efforts. The Army will continue to conduct testing in this manner to address continuing equipment developments, the introduction of new GPS features, and evolutionary changes to the GPS system.

c. Is there specific equipment, if any, that has not been tested for which interference or disruption is not known?

I am not aware of any. The GPS program continues to evolve, as it must, to address changes in technology and to address any disruptions or attempts by adversaries to deny us the use of GPS. The Army will participate in the testing of new GPS equipment and waveform (signaling) changes to verify systems performance. New GPS security, space segment and waveform changes meant to improve GPS performance will be tested as those program enhancements mature and proceed through their development cycles.

d. In your view has the time allotted for testing been adequate?

Yes, based on my current understanding, the time allotted to testing has been adequate.

e. What are the preliminary results, if any, from testing?

All equipment testing is meant to verify performance of the systems against the requirements levied upon them prior to providing them to the field. Testing has been successful and any issues resulting from tests are addressed and any fixes are verified and incorporated via software or hardware changes as necessary.

Women in Combat

a. What is your view of the appropriate combat role for female soldiers on the modern battlefield?

Because of the distributive nature of the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan, women's exposure to combat conditions has changed significantly. We must

conduct constant reviews and assess how women can continue to improve our capabilities and flexibility and maximize their contributions to the Army.

Female Soldiers have been and continue to be an integral part of our Army team, contributing to its success and overall readiness, as they perform exceptionally well in specialties and positions open to them and remain critical to the success of ongoing missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- b. In your view, should the current Army policy prohibiting the assignment of women to ground combat units be revised or clarified in any way to reflect changing roles for female soldiers and the changing nature of warfare?**

I believe we must constantly assess the role of women, especially considering the changing nature of war and our experiences over the last ten years. A review of current policies and regulations is ongoing in concert with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), as directed in the Women in the Service Restriction (WISR) under Section 535, FY11 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). If any changes are determined to be appropriate, required notice would be provided to Congress prior to implementing any changes to current policy.

- c. Do you believe that it is appropriate for female soldiers to serve in positions in which they may be exposed to combat?**

Women in the Army continue to make tremendous contributions as well as demonstrate their selfless-service and sacrifices in roles and responsibilities critical to the safety and security of our Nation and to the readiness of the Army. The contemporary operating environment finds our female Soldiers serving in positions that have exposed them to combat and they have proven that they are up to any task, regardless of their occupational specialty, when freedom is threatened and when their country calls.

Suicides

The Committee continues to be concerned about the continuing increase in soldier suicides, especially the increase in Reserve Component suicides. In June, 2010, the Army released a report on Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention that analyzed the causes of suicides in the Army and in Chapter III (“The Lost Art of Leadership in Garrison”) reported disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, high risk behaviors, and inadequate responses by Army leaders.

- a. In your view, what is the cause of this apparent increase in the number of suicides of Reserve Component members?**

I am concerned about suicide as an issue for the Total Army, including both the

Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC). The Army is focusing attention on the differences between our AC and RC suicides because there may be unique variables at play for RC Soldiers not serving on active duty, including: economic and civilian job-related stress; military service factors; and access to medical and behavioral health care. The economic recession has added additional stress to those RC Soldiers who find it increasingly difficult to find or sustain employment whether as a result of a military deployment or merely the prospect of one. Within their military units, RC Soldiers are often only involved with their chain of command during battle assemblies and have fewer opportunities to form “buddy teams” of peers. In terms of access to medical and behavioral health care, RC Soldiers generally do not have the same access to base and family support services, such as Army Substance Abuse Program, Family Life Chaplains and other services that active duty Soldiers utilize.

b. What is your assessment of the Army’s response to the continuing increase in suicide rates?

Leaders across the Army have taken aggressive steps to improve the health of the force, decrease high risk behavior and stem the increasing rate of suicides in our formations. This is a very complex issue and it is going to take fully engaged leadership to modify programs and policies, fully understand the causes for this increase, identify the indicators and implement appropriate intervention measures. After nearly a decade of war, we are working to keep pace with the expanding needs of our strained Army, and continuously identify and address the gaps that exist in our policies, programs and services. The Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention Report 2010, along with the DoD Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces and other strategic reports, serve as the foundation for our systemic effort to improve.

c. What is the Army doing to address the disciplinary and other issues raised in the report on Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention?

The Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention (HP/RR/SP) report was a focused 15 month effort by a multidisciplinary team (leader/medical/personnel/law enforcement) to better understand the increasing rate of suicides in the force. This candid report informed and educated Army leaders on the importance of identifying and reducing high risk behavior related to suicide and accidental death, and promoting help-seeking behavior. Important issues raised in the Report include: gaps in the current policies, processes and programs necessary to mitigate high risk behavior; an erosion of adherence to existing Army policies and standards; an increase in indicators of high risk behavior including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts and an increased operational tempo.

To address gaps in the current policies, processes and programs necessary to mitigate high risk behavior, the Army has taken actions such as establishing policies

that limit the duration of prescriptions for controlled substances to six months, which addresses the issue of abuse of pharmaceutical drugs.

To address the erosion of adherence to existing Army policies and standards, the Army has established policies emphasizing the Army's current policies and systems for assessment, detection and intervention of high risk behavior. This has already increased our compliance and utilization rates across numerous proven policies and processes.

To address the complex stressors associated with an increased operational tempo, the Army has increased the number of Chaplains, behavioral health providers, substance abuse counselors and Military Family Life Consultants. These care providers work with Soldiers and their families during high-stress periods, both prior to deployment/mobilization and during reintegration upon return from deployment.

d. What is your assessment of the status of the Army's Resiliency program in ensuring the readiness and well being of the Total Force?

The Army's Resiliency Program, Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF), initiated in 2008, has been fully deployed beginning in FY 2009. This is a long term strategy that better prepares the Army community-- including all Soldiers, Family members, and Department of the Army Civilian workforce-- to not only survive, but also thrive at a cognitive and behavioral level in the face of protracted warfare and the everyday challenges of Army life that are common in the 21st Century. It has made developing psychological strength as much a part of Army culture as becoming physically fit and technically proficient.

The program, based on 30-plus years of scientific study and results, uses individual assessments, virtual training, classroom training, and embedded resilience experts to provide the critical skills our Soldiers, Family members and Army Civilians need. There is now solid scientific evidence that a well implemented resilience program increases good coping, adaptability, and decrease catastrophic thinking among Soldiers, especially young Soldiers. A robust program evaluation is continuing to ensure we continue to provide the best education and training for our force.

The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is currently performing a 5-year, \$50M study on suicides in the Army (referred to as the Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers) (STARRS). According to NIMH, preliminary data reveal several potential predictors for suicide as well as a three-fold increase in suicide rates among women who have deployed.

e. In light of this information, and based on your own experience as commander, what actions will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the Army's suicide prevention program?

It is important to recognize that the problem of the increasing suicide rate is complex. The findings from Army STARRS are being used to inform the Force, raise awareness and promote help-seeking behavior. The Army STARRS team will continue to work with Army leadership to analyze and integrate context into the research that is being conducted. This is an enduring problem that requires enduring solutions. If confirmed, I will sustain the extensive leader focus on this issue and its challenges.

Support for Wounded Soldiers

Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from the Army for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Fort Stewart in 2003 and Walter Reed in 2007 revealed, the Army was not prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded soldiers.

a. In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior care since 2001?

The quality of military medical care has and continues to be superb. I have seen first-hand how innovations such as the Combat Application tourniquet and Combat Gauze have saved hundreds of lives on the battlefield, allowing severely wounded Soldiers to avoid bleeding to death before additional medical care is able to get to them. At the outset of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Army's infrastructure in garrison was lacking in the area of housing and managing outpatient care for returning wounded, ill, and injured soldiers. Additionally, we identified shortcomings in Traumatic Brain Injury, Post Traumatic Stress, Behavioral Health, and Pain Management. Since 2001, we have invested significant research and resources to learn how to better care for these injuries and as a result have developed formal programs to improve warrior care. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to ensure we continue to assess and enable procedures, processes and care for our Soldiers.

b. What is your assessment of the Army's response?

With the support of Congress, the Army has improved in the housing of wounded and injured Soldiers, developed well resourced Wounded Warrior Transition Units and more effectively centralized our Army programs under the Warrior Transition Command. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to assess and monitor procedures, processes and care of our Soldiers.

c. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service?

In 2004, the Army created the Wounded Warrior program to provide follow on assistance to wounded personnel who separated from service. Under the program, the Army maintains contact with Soldiers to provide a continuum of care and support.

d. How effective, in your view, are those programs?

With more than 190 Advocates stationed around the country in Department of Veteran Affairs medical facilities, at Warrior Transition Units, and everywhere severely injured Army Veterans reside, the Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) Program has continued to progress in support of our Wounded Warriors. These advocates enhance the Veteran Affairs Federal Recovery Care Coordinators to ensure seamless support for our most seriously wounded. As part of the Warrior Transition Command, AW2 is now positioned to ease the transition from Soldier to veteran as part of a continuum of care and support that stretches from the battlefield to where they reside today. We still have some work to ensure seamless medical care as we transition our Wounded Warriors to the VA. We will continue to assess and make adjustments.

e. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

If confirmed, I will continuously assess the efficiency and appropriateness of the Army's support for wounded personnel. I would implement strategies and seek resources as needed to ensure that the Army meets the needs of wounded Soldiers.

Studies following the revelations at Walter Reed point to the need to reform the Army's disability evaluation system.

f. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's disability evaluation system?

The disability evaluation system (DES) is better than it was four years ago; legislative changes and the new Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) has made the system less adversarial; provided greater consistency between Military and VA ratings; reduced the time it takes to start receiving VA benefits after separation. However, the DES remains complex, disjointed, and hard to understand. We must do better to achieve a sustainable system that is understood and better serves our Wounded Warriors. I also believe the rehabilitation and disability evaluation systems deserve a broader national and inter-agency discussion which focuses on the holistic care of our Wounded Warriors as they transition from the Army to the VA.

- g. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you direct to address needed changes in this system, including the Army's growing population of non-deployable injured, ill, or wounded soldiers?**

If confirmed, I will work with the other services, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs to bring real reform to the process and get the Services out of the Disability Evaluation business.

Army Warrior Care and Transition Program (OTSG, G1)

In February, the *PittsburghTribune-Review* published a series of articles that alleged that the Army's 38 Warrior Transition Units had become "a dumping ground for criminals, malingerers and dope addicts" creating an imbalance of soldiers who need complex medical case management and soldiers that commanders do not want to take on combat deployment.

- a. Does the Army have adequate guidelines to ensure that only those soldiers with qualifying medical needs are assigned to Warrior Transition Units?**

I am concerned that Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) maintain the focus on complex medical care management and support those Soldiers with a genuine need. If confirmed, I will continuously assess guidelines to ensure that only Soldiers with qualifying needs are assigned to the WTUs.

- b. In your view, are the Warrior Training Units serving the purpose for which they were created?**

Over the past 4 years, the Warrior Care and Transition Program has significantly improved the quality of care and support Soldiers and families have received.

- c. If confirmed, do you plan to make any changes to the criteria for assignment to a Warrior Training Unit?**

While I do not have plans to change the criteria for assignment to Warrior Training Units at this time, this is an issue I will thoroughly assess if confirmed. Also, I will continually assess the effectiveness of the Warrior Care and Transition Program to ensure it provides the level of care and support our wounded warriors deserve.

Staffing of Warrior Transition Units has been a major issue, especially at installations experiencing surges of redeploying troops.

- d. In your view, are the Warrior Transition Units staffed with sufficient numbers of qualified personnel?**

While not fully informed concerning existing staffing levels in Warrior Transition

units I know that the Army Staff led by the Director of Force Management, in coordination with key leaders from the US Army Medical Command and the Warrior Transition Command, reviews the structure and staffing of the Warrior Transition Units on a quarterly basis. I will, if confirmed, learn more about this area and ensure that the Warrior Transition Units are appropriately resourced to support the Soldiers under their care.

Implementation of the Repeal of "Don't Ask Don't Tell" Policy.

- a. What is your assessment of the Army's readiness and capability to implement the repeal of the "Don't Ask Don't Tell" (DADT) policy?**

Per the Chief of Staff, Army memorandum for Director, Joint Staff, subject: Assessment of Preparedness for Implementation of the Repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, dated 6 JUL 11: Based on both objective and subjective criteria, it is the CSA's judgment that the Army is prepared for implementation of the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell consistent with the standards of military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and the recruiting and retention of the Armed Forces. I concur in this assessment. Policies have been reviewed and training conducted to prepare for repeal within 60 days after certification.

- b. What in your view are the major challenges, if any, that could confront the Army in implementing the repeal of DADT? If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose taking to deal with these challenges?**

The most important challenge has been educating our Soldiers who are in combat situations with a minimum of disruption and risk and we have already successfully trained over 92% of the Soldiers currently in Theater with expected completion by mid-August. Although we have done some training with currently deployed units, we have made it our priority to train units prior to deploying and upon redeployment, and have allowed deployed units the maximum time to complete training. We will follow up with deployed units to ensure that all Soldiers receive the required training upon their return from deployment.

- c. What measures has the Army taken to focus training on combat units and other deployed units and ensure that repeal of the current policy does not adversely affect combat operations?**

The Army is using a Chain Teach methodology, where each commander is responsible for educating his/her subordinates and they in turn train their Soldiers. Commanders and leaders are carefully managing deployed units' training to minimize impact on the mission. The Army continues to make every effort to train units prior to deployment.

- d. **If confirmed, what conditions or circumstances would you expect to be achieved, if any, before recommending that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs certify that DADT can be repealed without adversely affecting the Army?**

If confirmed, I would base my recommendation on the input I receive from commanders and leaders, various assessments on chain teaching and propensity to serve consistent with the requirements established by the Congress and Department of Defense leadership. The Army is completing training according to Army guidance.

Army Role in the Joint Force

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the role of the Army as a part of the joint force.

- a. **We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I generally concur with General Dempsey that the Army best contributes to improved joint military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities and culture by providing forces for prompt and sustained combat operations on land and making permanent the advantages gained by the joint forces.

I would add, however, that I will continue to look closely at what capabilities the Joint Force and Nation require of its Army. We have learned to fight well as a Joint Force over the past decade and to leverage our sister service strengths and unique capabilities. If confirmed, one of my charters will be to ensure the Army continues to look outwardly at its role as a member of the Joint Force.

Acquisition Issues

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the poor performance and challenges of major defense acquisition programs and the Army's efforts with its capability portfolio review process.

- a. **We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I generally concur with General Dempsey's answers to the acquisition issues raised

in the advanced policy questions. The Army must have carefully refined contract requirements, a sound program strategy, and stable funding to be successful in fielding major weapons systems and any other large acquisition programs. We also need to take a hard look at our Acquisition process overall in an effort to shorten the delivery time, reduce costs, and improve our record of delivering the capability we require. Building a degree of flexibility to react to emerging requirements during production may be one area to consider but I would need to study this issue further before I make any specific recommendations for change.

I believe the Army is a learning organization and it continues to look for ways to improve itself in the acquisition arena, through both internally directed reviews like the Decker-Wagner study commissioned by the Secretary of the Army and external reviews like the Comptroller General's assessment referenced in the acquisition questions. As General Dempsey pointed out, we are already making progress with future programs and I am confident in our ability to continue to improve in our future acquisitions.

If I am confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the results of these assessments and I pledge to work diligently with the Secretary of the Army and the Army leadership, along with OSD and Congress, to ensure a unified effort toward acquisition effectiveness and efficiency that meets the capability needs of our force.

If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the Army should take to address these problems?

The Department of the Army has already begun taking steps to address these concerns. There is a renewed emphasis on collaboration between the requirements and acquisition communities in the development of new programs. Last year, Secretary McHugh commissioned a thorough review of the Army's acquisition process led by The Hon. Gil Decker and Gen (Ret.) Lou Wagner that provides a blueprint for improvements to the acquisition process. I understand the Army is now studying these recommendations and developing a plan to implement those that help our process. As a whole, the Department must continue to build on these efforts to avoid unnecessary cost and delay in our programs.

Army Modernization

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army modernization efforts over the last decade and the findings of a recent modernization study done for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the Army Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or**

areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

I concur with General Dempsey's assessments of the Army's modernization efforts over the last decade. We have had success when it comes to equipping our Soldiers, but we have also learned some valuable lessons including the importance of carefully and rigorously reviewing programs before we initiate them. If I am confirmed, I pledge that I will study the Army's acquisition process, and the results of the recent reviews of the process, and work closely with Secretary McHugh to identify areas where we can improve our modernization efforts and the acquisition process. I will definitely look hard at our capability as an Army to meet all potential threats and to operate in the variety of environments we are sure to find ourselves.

I recognize that all of my decisions and recommendations with respect to vision, structure, force mix, and modernization will be made against a backdrop fiscal constraint. However, I also agree with General Dempsey in that every decision and recommendation for trade-offs must be made only after considering and consciously acknowledging an acceptable level of risk.

a. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program for the Army?

I recognize that a stable modernization strategy and program is an important component to both a balanced Army and to exercise good stewardship of resources entrusted to the Services. If confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary McHugh on how to achieve this.

b. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's current modernization investment strategy?

While it is true that several of our major modernization efforts over the past decade have been unsuccessful, I would submit that the American Soldier today is the best equipped and enabled Soldier this country has ever fielded. Successes such as the Stryker vehicle, world class body armor, Soldier night vision equipment, Soldier weapons, Precision fire systems such as Excalibur and HIMARS, and vehicles such as the Family of Medium Trucks all suggest to me that the Army has had some tremendous success in modernization.

I believe the Army has learned and continues to learn some important and valuable lessons in its processes and mindset to more carefully and rigorously review programs both before we initiate them and while they are in progress. We will have to do better as we move forward. This will be an area I will assess more deeply if I am confirmed as Chief of Staff and will periodically give this Committee my frank assessments.

c. Do you believe that this strategy is affordable and sustainable?

If confirmed, I plan to closely examine this strategy to ensure it is affordable and sustainable.

Army Weapon System Programs

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on several specific major Army research, development, and acquisition programs.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

If confirmed, I will ensure to monitor the progress and validity of each of these programs with respect to our current and future capability requirements.

1. Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). In the development of the Ground Combat vehicle - the replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle - the Army is fully committed to the "Big Four" imperatives: Soldier protection; Soldier capacity (squad plus crew); the capability to operate across the Full Spectrum of operations; and Timing (seven years to the first production vehicle from contract award). The Ground Combat Vehicle will be the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to operate in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment. Modular armor will allow commanders the option to add or remove armor based on the current threat environment. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be designed with the capacity for Space, Weight, and Power growth to incorporate future technologies as they mature. The Army is using an incremental strategy for the Ground Combat Vehicle with the first increment being an Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army is currently reviewing proposals from vendors for Technology Development contracts.
2. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T). I believe that the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical is one of the Army's most important programs. It provides the broadband backbone communications for the tactical Army. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 1 (formerly Joint Network Node) began fielding in 2004 to provide a satellite based Internet Protocol network down to battalion level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2 begins fielding in Fiscal Year 12 to provide an initial On the Move capability, extending down to company level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3 will provide improved capabilities, including higher throughput, three to four times more bandwidth efficiency, and an aerial transmission layer, to all 126 brigades/division headquarters with an on-the-move requirement.

3. EIBCT Network Integration Kit (NIK). The E-IBCT investment provides the infrastructure that will allow the Army to grow the tactical network capability, and an opportunity for both large and small companies to support the Army's tactical network strategy. The NIK is a necessary bridge solution that allows the Army to continue evaluation and development of incorporated network technologies.
4. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) including the Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radios. Joint Tactical Radio System is the Services' future deployable, mobile communications family of radios. They provide Army forces dynamic, scalable, on-the-move network architecture, connecting the Soldier to the network. FY12 procurement funding supports fielding of Joint Tactical Radio System capability to 8 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to meet Fiscal Years 13/14 network requirements. The Ground Mobile Radio is the primary vehicular radio capability using the Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform to meet tactical networking requirements. The Man Pack and Rifleman Radio are the primary Joint Tactical Radio System capability for battalion and below tactical operations. The man pack supports the Soldier Radio Waveform and interoperates with legacy waveforms (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications). Rifleman Radio primarily serves the dismounted formation and utilizes the Soldier Radio Waveform to provide voice and individual location information from the dismounted soldier to the leader. The combination of the three radios helps the Army to push the network to the individual Soldier.
5. Stryker combat vehicle, including the Double-V Hull initiative, procurement of more flat-bottom vehicles, and the Stryker mobile gun variant. The current Stryker vehicle has exceeded its Space, Weight and Power and Cooling (SWaP-C) limits due to add-on appliqué (armor and devices) required for ongoing combat operations. In the near term, it is imperative to increase crew protection with the Double-V-Hull (DVH) Stryker. In the midterm, Stryker modernization will improve protection and mobility by recouping SWaP-C, enabling future growth and allowing integration of the emerging network for all Stryker variants. Fleet-wide modernization for all variants upgrades protection, counter-IED, drive train, suspension, electrical power generation and management, and digital communications and network integration.
Double-V Hull: Stryker Double-V Hull (DVH) is on track for June 2011 fielding. The initial DVH test results are positive, indicating the vehicle will be ready for fielding as scheduled. Non-Double V Hull and NBCRV: The Army will procure 168 Stryker NBCRVs in FY12 and 13 for a total quantity of 284 (an ARFORGEN rotation quantity). These vehicles are in normal Hull configuration. The Stryker NBCRV provides a unique capability to the Joint Force including a critical mission of Homeland Defense, for which DVH protection is a lesser consideration. Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS): The Army has procured and fielded 142 of 335 MGS. In August 2009, the Army decided to not pursue additional MGS procurement at this time with forthcoming fleet-wide modernization.

6. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is a joint program with the USMC, Navy and the Army; the Australian Army is also currently a partner in the Technology Development phase. I believe that the JLTV is a vital program to fill the force protection and payload gaps not currently satisfied by HMMWV. It will also fill the mobility, transportability and communication architecture gaps not satisfied by the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles being used in Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) roles. The Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy plans for the JLTV to replace about a third of the LTV fleet, which is roughly 46,000 vehicles. The Army is currently examining the attributes of the JLTV program to ensure it meets our needs for the future Army light tactical fleet, especially in terms of protection.
7. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS). I agree the Army has an enduring requirement for an armed aerial scout as was reaffirmed after the termination of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program. This requirement will be validated by the ongoing Armed Aerial Scout Analysis of Alternatives whose findings are scheduled for release in 3rd quarter FY11.
8. M1 Abrams tank modernization. In my view, the Abrams modernization is necessary and will initially enable integration of the emerging network and provide ability to fire the next generation of 120mm ammunition. Future modernization will provide capability improvements in lethality, protection, mission command, mobility, and reliability intended to maintain the Fleet's combat overmatch and restore Space, Weight and Power margins to keep the Tank relevant through 2050. The Abrams modernization program is funded in the FY12 Budget Request. If confirmed, I will be able to offer an assessment as the program matures.
9. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) will be replaced by the Ground Combat Vehicle beginning in 2018. Bradley Non-Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Cavalry, Engineer and Fire Support variants) modernization will address recoupment of Space, Weight and Power to provide platform growth and enable improvements in protection, mobility and ability to integrate the emerging network.
10. Logistics Modernization Program (LMP). Logistics Modernization Program (LMP). I understand that LMP is the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system used by the Army Materiel Command for national-level (wholesale) logistics, including the operation of our depots and arsenals. LMP has 25,000 users and completed its final deployment in Oct 2010, making it the first fully-deployed Army ERP.
11. Based on commercial-off-the-shelf SAP software technology, LMP provides the Army with an integrated end-to-end supply chain solution at the National level that improves overall synchronization of information. I concur with the Army's vision to

achieve a seamless, end-to-end modernized business enterprise and to develop and implement an enterprise logistics architecture. To support that vision, LMP integrates with other Army ERPs, including the General Funds Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), and Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army), to provide a seamless enterprise-wide logistics environment spanning the factory to the foxhole in accordance with the Army's overall ERP Strategy.

12. Paladin Integrated Management Vehicle program. I understand that the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program is an effort to address an existing capability gap in the self-propelled artillery portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the termination of prior howitzer modernization efforts [Crusader and Non-Line of Sight-Cannon (NLOS-C)]. The PIM program provides upgrades that allow the Army to meet existing and future needs, and leverages the commonality with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis and automotive components. PIM should provide growth potential in Space, Weight and Power and capacity for network expansion to accommodate future howitzer related needs, to include the addition of such Force Protection packages as add-on armor.
13. M4 Carbine Upgrades/Individual Carbine Competition. The Army continues to make improvements and upgrades based on operational lessons learned through the M4 Product Improvement Program. The Army's effort is designed to integrate full automatic firing, an ambidextrous selector switch and a more durable "heavy" barrel. Simultaneously, the Army has initiated a full and open competition to confirm the best possible Individual Carbine solution. Results of the competition are expected in FY13.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the future of the Army's large MRAP and MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle fleets.

- a. **We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I generally concur with General Dempsey that the Army should try to provide MRAP levels of protection to deploying forces worldwide commensurate with the mission assigned.

Quadrennial Defense Review

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), its guidance with

regard to the sizing of military forces for the future, and the military departments' orientation on six key mission areas.

- a. **We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I agree with General Dempsey's assessment that the Army's size and structure have proven adequate to meet the demands of our defense strategy, although the toll on our Soldiers and families has been high. When trying to predict future size or structure changes, we need to maintain some flexibility.

It is difficult to predict what our future commitments will be and we need to account for our wounded warriors and nondeployables which will continue to increase over the next several years as we continue to engage in Afghanistan. Like General Dempsey, if I am confirmed, I pledge to work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and our combatant commanders to match endstrength, structure, and tempo in our Army Force Generation rotational model to meet demands as they change.

- a. **If confirmed, what size or structure changes would you pursue, if any, to improve or enhance the Army's capability to meet these requirements?**

The nature of the strategic environment requires the Army to continuously assess its capabilities and force requirements. It's taken 10 years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can reasonably describe as balanced. We are accustomed to change, and we will undoubtedly need to continue to change. As we do we must seek to maintain a balance of capabilities that are available to meet the nation's needs at a sustainable tempo.

I concur with each of General Dempsey's assessments of the improved capabilities required in the six key mission areas discussed in the attached reference. I also agree with his assessment that the Army is currently capable of supporting these mission requirements, but there are areas where we need to restore our proficiency and improve our training. If confirmed, I will study the QDR further and better evaluate areas where additional emphasis may be needed.

- b. **The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for improved capabilities in the following six key mission areas. For each, what is your assessment of the Army's current ability to provide capabilities to support these mission requirements?**

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve the Army's

capabilities to support:

Defense of the United States.

The Army is fully capable of fulfilling its responsibility to defend the homeland through detection, deterrence, prevention, and if necessary, the defeat of external threats or aggression from both state and non-state actors. A specific program recently undertaken to enhance this ability include the fielding of the enhanced Stryker Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. This provides us with a much improved technical assessment and decontamination capability.

Support of civil authorities at home.

The Army is well postured to provide support to civil authorities. We are organized and trained to provide responsive and flexible support to mitigate domestic disasters, CBRNE consequence management, support to civilian law enforcement agencies, counter WMD operations and to counter narcotics trafficking activities. We continue to address the challenges associated with this mission set including unity of command, integration with civilian authorities, and the integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces.

Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations.

We are highly proficient in counter insurgency, stability and counter-terrorism operations. This has been the focus for the Army for much of the last 10 years and we have institutionalized lessons learned across the operating and generating force.

Build the security capacity of partner states (including your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces in the security force assistance role).

General Purpose Forces have a clear role in building sustainable capability and capacity of partner nation security forces and their supporting institutions. Peace time engagement is our best opportunity to shape the future operating environment. General Purpose Forces are well suited to support these activities through Security Force Assistance.

Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments.

The Army's ability to deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments as part of the joint force is adequate to meet the demands of the current security environment. That said, there are some tasks and skills to which we have not trained due to the demands of our on-going conflicts. We must restore our proficiency in those tasks. We work with our sister Services to assess our

capabilities to conduct entry operations as part of the joint force and watch closely the improved anti-access/area denial capabilities being developed by potential adversaries.

Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction.

The Army provides highly trained and ready forces with capabilities to support Combatant Commander requirements to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Current capabilities include operating effectively within a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment, specialized teams to locate and neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and an operational headquarters with expertise in eliminating WMD.

Operate effectively in cyberspace.

We are on the right glide path to support US Cyber Command and our geographic combatant commanders to operate effectively in cyberspace. On 1 October 2010, the Army stood up a new three star command (U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd Army), to direct the operations and defense of all Army networks, and when directed, provide full-spectrum cyberspace operations. The Army is bringing the forces of network operations, defense, exploitation, and attack under one operational level command to integrate and synchronize global operations for the first time.

Missile Defense

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on air defense missile programs and a recent proposal to transfer a number of Army air and missile development programs to the Missile Defense Agency.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I agree with General Dempsey's responses involving the Army's missile defense program and his understanding of the Army's relationship with the Missile Defense Agency. In addition to protection of our deployed forces, I would add defense of our Nation's national security interests as one of the priorities of this program.

Yes. The Army has confirmed on many occasions that Air and Missile Defense is a core competency. Defense of our Nations' National Security interest and

protection of our deployed forces is the priority. The Army provides this protection in coordination with our sister services and coalition partners.

I concur with General Dempsey in that the Army needs to continue to monitor the threat and prioritize required future capabilities to ensure we provide effective affordable solutions in a timely manner to our forces.

Space

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army support to Strategic Command in getting space based communications to the warfighter and the apparent lag in the acquisition of ground and other terminals to work with new satellite systems.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

Similar to General Dempsey, I am not currently in a position to provide an informed assessment of what needs the Army could address from space or what my vision for future Army space forces would be. I certainly appreciate, however, the importance of the Army's role in space and of ensuring that the Army does not fall behind or fail to be a complimentary contributor to the Joint Force in this domain. The Army depends on capabilities from space-based systems such as global positioning satellites, communication satellites, weather satellites, and intelligence collection platforms for the effective execution of full spectrum operations. I experienced some of the challenges the Army has with respect to the lag in acquiring required space technology in theater, but I would need to examine this issue more closely, if I am confirmed, before I can determine the real cause of any lag or recommend future action.

Low-Density/High-Demand Forces

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on low-density/high-demand forces.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I concur with General Dempsey that the Army needs to use the Total Army

Analysis (TAA) to identify the capabilities necessary, within resource constraints, to achieve the full spectrum of missions expected of the Army. This process allows us to identify requirements while still managing acceptable risk for all forces, in both active and reserve components. I am not aware of any necessary functional changes that should be made between the components at this time, but if I am confirmed, I will continue to evaluate this matter. I also intend to continue to reinforce the great interaction seen between the Active and Reserve Components of the Army that we have seen in the past ten years.

Mobilization and Demobilization of National Guard and Reserves

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the challenges associated with the mobilization of Army National Guard and Reserve forces.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I have seen firsthand throughout my career how critical our Reserve Component Soldiers are to the Total Force. With increased deployments in the last decade, the Army has learned a lot about mobilizing and demobilizing these forces, and it will continue to learn from our experiences and to improve our processes. I understand the Army is currently reviewing all of its mobilization policies to ensure that the systems in place are effective and responsive to meet the Army's needs and the needs of our Reserve Component Soldiers and their families. If confirmed, I will continue to support these efforts.

I share General Dempsey's understandings and assessments of Reserve force management policies and changes to how the Army uses the Army Force Generation Model to build unit readiness for mobilization requirements. If I am confirmed, I will continue to assess the validity and effectiveness of this model over time and to work with Secretary McHugh to identify areas where changes may be needed. At present though, I am not aware of any required changes.

Individual Ready Reserve

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on accessing the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or**

areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

I concur with General Dempsey that the IRR has proven to be an invaluable asset to all Army components in support of contingency operations around the world and it is a critical source of highly-skilled Soldiers. I continue to be amazed at the incredible talent resident across our Total Force. I am not aware of any changes that need to be made to the mobilization or recall policies of our IRR. If I am confirmed, I will learn more about these policies before making any final assessment.

In response to the recent studies showing higher rates of suicide among the IRR, I concur with General Dempsey's response and acknowledge the gravity of this particular issue. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Army's effort to pursue all avenues available to assure the well being of our Total Force.

Personnel and Entitlement Costs

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the challenges of personnel and entitlement cost growth.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I agree with General Dempsey that in order to take control of the Army's personnel costs and entitlement spending, we need to strike a balance between preserving the all-volunteer force, accomplishing operational missions, and retraining an Army that is affordable to the nation. I am not familiar with a requirement to reprogram money to cover current personnel costs.

I also understand that the Military Personnel Army (MPA) appropriation was passed by Congress in April 2011; and both the MPA OCO and Active component base force requirements are adequate to meet current personnel costs.

Medical and Dental Readiness of Army National Guard and Army Reserve Personnel

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on medical and dental readiness of reserve component personnel.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or**

areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.

I concur with General Dempsey and believe the Army should develop and resource mechanisms to routinely identify screen and assess Reserve Component medical readiness. I also believe that the health and fitness of the Reserve Component is a very important issue. In addition to the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program already discussed by General Dempsey, the Army is also moving forward with a Soldier Medical Readiness Campaign Plan that seeks to improve health and fitness, increase Soldier resilience, and reduce injury rates. If confirmed, I would work with the Army's active and Reserve Component leadership to continue these important initiatives and to develop policies for more effectively identifying ready and medically non-ready Soldiers across the force.

Army Science and Technology (S&T)

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army the value and management science and technology programs.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

As General Dempsey stated, the Army's science and technology investment strategy is shaped to foster invention, innovation, and demonstration of technologies for the current and future Warfighter. I believe that a strong Army science and technology program has already provided many advanced capabilities demonstrated in the past 10 years of war.

Technological innovations have resulted in the rapid development and deployment of lightweight and adaptable armor solutions, jammers, unmanned air vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, surveillance systems, communications devices and day/night vision systems. All of these technology enabled capabilities have significantly improved our Warfighter capabilities in recent operations. If I am confirmed, then like General Dempsey, I would use metrics that demonstrate improved Warfighter capabilities; improve acquisition programs; and align technology development to Warfighter requirements, to judge the value and investment level in Army science and technology programs. I do not currently envision any specific new S&T areas for the Army to pursue, but I would welcome the opportunity to study this matter further.

Army Laboratories and Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDEC)

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army's commitment to and investment in its laboratories and research, development, and engineering centers.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

As General Dempsey stated, Army laboratories are science and technology performing organizations that play a major role in supporting current operations with best capabilities available and providing critical new capabilities for Soldiers particularly in key strategic science and technology areas.

I concur with General Dempsey that the Army laboratories and Research and Development Centers need to maintain the resources required to continue initiatives and advancements that support the Warfighter. If confirmed, I will learn more about their operations and support efforts to improve best practices and workforce quality necessary for mission accomplishments.

Army Test and Evaluation (T&E) Efforts

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army's failure to meet test and evaluation range investment certification requirements from the DOD Test Resource Management Center.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I have reviewed General Dempsey's answer and concur with his response, that testing is a crucial capability for maintaining the Army's combat edge and modernizing the force. I fully recognize the value of testing to ensure new technologies and equipment address the capabilities our Warfighters need. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Army T&E community and the Office of the Secretary of Defense T&E leadership to ensure the Army's T&E infrastructure is adequately resourced to address testing requirements and maintain robust test capabilities.

Army Information Technology (IT) Programs

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army information technology management, consolidation, and efficiencies

initiatives.

- a. **We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I concur with General Dempsey's response and believe the Army needs to implement and enforce technical standards, make acquisition of commercial off the shelf (COTS) or near-COTS technology easier, and field new technology to operational forces more quickly. This is in line with the congressional mandate you gave us in section 804 of the 2010 NDAA.

The center for network integration at Fort Bliss, TX- the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) will serve as the Network's primary test unit with a two-fold intent, to remove the integration burden from the operational units and to provide an operational venue to evaluate new technologies and network capabilities prior to fielding to operational units. The new capabilities they develop should ultimately provide the impetus for future acquisition and equipping decisions.

Human Terrain Systems

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army's plans to institutionalize its Human Terrain System program.

- a. **We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I concur with General Dempsey and I understand the Army has institutionalized the Human Terrain System as an enduring capability assigned to Training and Doctrine Command and funded capability starting in the fiscal year 2011. I also believe there is merit to developing a joint capability. In September of 2010, General Dempsey directed a Training and Doctrine Command capability based assessment of all Socio-cultural capabilities throughout the combatant commands and Services. The intent is to identify other on-going socio-cultural initiatives, to determine potential synergies and best practices in order to develop and evolve an enduring joint capability. The results of this assessment have been compiled and if confirmed I will make this part of my review.

Operational Energy

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army's operational energy program and its lack of quantitative metrics against which to measure progress.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I concur with General Dempsey's response that the most important issue with operational energy is the amount of fuel used to meet our operational needs. Most of our fuel is used in generation of electricity. The Army has implemented, and accelerated deployment, of generators that use less fuel as well as microgrid systems that tie generators together to operate more efficiently. We are developing more efficient motors for helicopters and vehicles to reduce our operational energy footprint and, ultimately, wars are won or lost by dismounted soldiers, so the Army is addressing excessive soldier loads, driven in large part by energy and power constraints. If confirmed I will continue efforts currently underway to increase our energy efficient capabilities in theater and emphasize energy awareness through the military chain of command, and across the Army, to foster a more energy-aware culture.

- a. What is your understanding of the Army's progress with respect to testing and deploying operational energy technologies?**

As General Dempsey stated, the Army is taking advantage of every avenue, to include industry, to help us develop technologies that can reduce our operational energy footprint. Renewable energy systems and insulated tentage are some of the systems being piloted and tested. We are also evaluating technologies that will help lighten soldier loads and reduce the amount of batteries and fuel we must procure and deliver to theater. We will continue to pursue more efficient devices, emphasize energy conservation, and employ energy management capabilities that are essential to retain energy as an operational advantage.

- b. What is your understanding of how the Army is taking advantage of its labs and research, engineering and development centers to further its operational energy and security goals?**

I concur with General Dempsey's response that the Army has integrated the national laboratories with Department of Energy and Army laboratories to develop solutions to a range of operational energy, power and security needs. Some of the initiatives include research to reduce the size and weight of components, broadening alternative energy sources, leveraging various emergent energy efficient technologies. These new technologies will increase energy efficiency and improve power supplies for

contingency bases, forward operating bases and equipment carried by individual soldiers. If confirmed I will work to ensure that the research conducted at Army facilities continues to focus on meeting the operational energy needs of the current and future Army and to support DoD's high priority program to increase energy efficiencies.

Investment in Infrastructure

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on decades of under-investment in installation infrastructure that have led to increasing maintenance backlogs and substandard living and working conditions.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I concur with General Dempsey's statement that since Fiscal Year 07, with Base Realignment and Closure, Transformation, and Grow the Army initiatives, the Army has made significant Military Construction investments in its infrastructure. Additionally, a variety of public-private partnership initiatives have complemented direct Army investments. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation, Energy and Environment, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, and the Commanding General at Installation Management Command to assess our infrastructure investments.

- a. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?**

The proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the Army to fully sustain current facilities, dispose of our excess facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities and build-out our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to support the mission. The Army is utilizing programs in which it leverages private financing to upgrade infrastructure and ensure more sustainable, efficient, and reliable mission support. If confirmed, I will evaluate the proper balance of funding, to include evaluating privatization opportunities and whether the Army should increase operation and maintenance (O&M) funding for restoration and modernization (R&M) and Proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the Army to fully sustain the current facilities, dispose of our excess facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities and build-out our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to support the mission.

Army Policies Regarding Drug and Alcohol Abuse

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army drug and alcohol abuse policies and programs.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I concur with General Dempsey that Army policy directs commanders to initiate administrative separation for all Soldiers involved in trafficking, distribution, possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs. While the policy requires initiation of separation, commanders have the authority to retain or separate a Soldier. I concur with this policy as it has proven effective in allowing commanders necessary discretion in treating each Soldier and incident on its merits while balancing the needs of the Army.

- a. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?**

I agree with General Dempsey. Army policy requires the separation authority consider a Soldier drug offender's potential for rehabilitation and further military service allowing effective management of the Army's personnel and discipline needs. To effectively enforce this policy, Soldiers who commit drug and alcohol offenses are required to be evaluated by a certified substance abuse counselor through the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). The ASAP counselor's recommendation is considered by the Commander when determining a Soldier's potential for rehabilitation and retention. I concur with this policy.

- b. Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?**

I have served at numerous command levels since 2001. In my experience, sufficient resources are devoted to the Army's rehabilitation policies and objectives. If confirmed, I will assess and closely monitor the level of resourcing for this important area.

- c. What measures are being taken to improve the Army's performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?**

The Army is very adept at analyzing itself to determine a better way ahead. The Army's policy is a comprehensive approach bringing together the skills and experience of commanders, law enforcement and the medical community for drug and alcohol abuse incidents. The Army continues working on improving systems for

detecting drug and alcohol abuse as well as on improving intervention systems so that we can help our Soldiers who selflessly sacrifice for our Nation. One method through which the Army builds resiliency in the force is through the continually expanding Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. By encouraging a more resilient force and through awareness of available confidential programs, the Army's goal is to promote help seeking behavior by Soldiers.

Medical Personnel Recruiting and Retention

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both the Army's active and reserve components.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

General Dempsey APQs: The Army continues to face significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both active and reserve components.

- a. What is your understanding of the most significant personnel challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the Army?**

I concur with General Dempsey, there continues to be a national shortage of medical professionals that challenges the Army's efforts to recruit and retain healthcare professionals. We are concerned that escalating need in the civilian sector will impact the demand for these critically short professionals. To take care of our Soldiers, the Army must continue evaluating initiatives and programs to attract and retain the most skilled and talented healthcare providers.

- b. If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new requirements for 2011 and beyond?**

Like General Dempsey stated, I also believe it is important to review medical support requirements on a regular, recurring basis. If confirmed, this review will allow me to assess whether the Army is meeting its medical support requirements and, if not, determine where improvements can be implemented to better serve our Soldiers.

- c. If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives, if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill ongoing medical support requirements?**

I do not believe additional legislative authorities are needed to ensure the Army fulfills medical support requirements. Like General Dempsey, the policy initiatives currently underway and the changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 at this time, allow the Army to serve the needs of its Soldiers. If confirmed, this will be an area I closely monitor. If any additional authorities are identified as necessary to maintain this goal, I will work closely with the Administration and Congress to address the needs.

Foreign Language Proficiency

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on foreign language policy, doctrine, and building capabilities for both military and civilian personnel.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

General Dempsey APQs: A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by the Department of Defense in March, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities to include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military and civilian personnel.

What is your assessment of the progress the Army has made in increasing its foreign language capabilities in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

I concur with General Dempsey that the Army has increased in foreign language capabilities in support of OIF/OEF. The Army revolutionized its recruiting processes to enlist native and heritage speakers into vital interpreter/translator positions. Overall, these initiatives have provided enhanced capabilities for counterinsurgency operations and building partner capacity overseas.

Like General Dempsey I also believe a high priority for the Department of Defense should be the continued support of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, which provides Culturally Based Language Training to all Services and Department of Defense Components.

Protection of U.S. Forces Against Internal Threats

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on a DOD review of the attack at Fort Hood concluding that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization of military

personnel.

I concur with General Dempsey that the lessons learned are invaluable to the Army as we strive to improve the Army Protection Program for individuals and units against emerging threats. If confirmed, and as General Dempsey also stated, I will ensure that we continue to integrate and synchronize the many Army Protection Programs that protect our Soldiers, Family members and Department of the Army Civilians by ensuring that Commanders and leaders have the information and tools needed to address the ever changing threat environment.

Religious Guidelines

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on a DOD review of the attack at Fort Hood observation that "DoD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization" and recommended that the policy be updated.

I concur with General Dempsey that there are established policies for religious accommodation in *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia* and because the Army is a diverse, professional force, committed to treating all Soldiers with dignity and respect, that our policies must be clear and provide appropriate guidance to both Soldiers and Commanders. Like General Dempsey, I also believe that current Army policies provide commanders with adequate flexibility to balance accommodation for religious beliefs and maintain good order and discipline. To this end, if confirmed, I will assess the current policy and determine if further changes are necessary.

Family Support

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army Family Action Plan and its success in identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I concur with General Dempsey's statement that the most pressing family readiness issues include sustaining the Army Family Covenant and improving communication and awareness of the extensive range of available support programs and services the Army has to improve Soldier and Family quality of life. The Army Family Action Plan, Survey of Army Families, and other studies revealed that Soldiers and Families

may not be aware of the myriad of available support services.

To address this concern, the Army is transforming Army Community Service (ACS) to help connect Soldiers and Families to the right service at the right time. The Army has begun piloting ACS transformation and anticipates completion by October 2011. I also will endeavor to ensure that Army Family programs reach out to all Soldiers and their Families, regardless of component, geographic location or deployment status. I will work to ensure that Family Program platforms and delivery systems keep pace with a mobile Army and utilize technological advances and social networking so services are available to the Soldiers and Families who need them.

I am highly interested in the results of the ACS pilot and if confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our support services and ensure our programs efficiently meet the needs of the Soldiers and Families who use them.

Mental Health Advisory Teams

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) studies in Iraq and Afghanistan and their value in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in combat theaters.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I concur with General Dempsey that the MHAT studies have played a key role in proactively identifying how changes in the operational environment impact the ability to provide behavioral health care. Both MHAT VI OEF and VII OEF recommended several critical measure that we have put into effect, namely the number of behavioral health personnel in theater to number of Soldiers. One of the most valuable findings from the MHATs has been to document that soldiers suffering multiple deployments and / or short dwell times report higher mental health problems. Overall, the willingness to take a systematic look at the behavioral health care system and the behavioral health status of Soldiers through programs such as the MHATs has ensured that the Army is being responsive to the needs of deployed Soldiers. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to develop and synchronize the expeditionary components of health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention programs and services.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of

issues on policies and procedures to improve the prevention of, and response to, incidents of sexual assault, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault and addressing the challenges that remain.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

Like General Dempsey, I am very concerned about reports of sexual assault in our Army, whether deployed or otherwise. We cannot tolerate this behavior wherever it occurs. The Army is committed to providing victims in all units with appropriate medical care, resources and support while ensuring that our prevention and response programs are fully available and prepared. The Army's SHARP program is a formidable effort at dealing with this issue. There is no doubt that this is a challenging problem that will require leadership and constant vigilance at all levels. and if confirmed, I will continue to look closely at the Army's sexual assault program, to ensure there is trust and faith in the Army's programs and system, and that there is continuous oversight and leadership involvement.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

The committee's advanced policy questions for General Dempsey raised a series of issues on Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs critical to the enhancement of military life for members and their families.

- a. We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the views expressed by General Dempsey.**

I concur with General Dempsey that the Army has taken steps to ensure we care for and retain Families through a broad range of meaningful initiatives, to include many Family and MWR programs and services. The criticality of these programs is immeasurable and I feel we cannot afford to lose such a key enabler of our Force.

The challenge will be in our resource constrained environment to sustain a consistent level of funding for these programs. If confirmed, I will consult with commanders, soldiers and families to ensure that these programs are adequate and meet their needs.

Detainee Treatment Standards

- a. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?**

Yes. The U.S. military will continue to follow the principles of humane treatment outlined in Common Article 3. These basic rules of the law of armed conflict will continue to guide our conduct toward detainees, no matter how they were captured or how the conflict is characterized.

- b. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?**

Yes. Both of these documents provide effective, practical guidance and direction to the field on critically important issues relative to detainee treatment, detainee operations training, and the interrogation of detainees.

- c. Do you believe it is consistent with effective military operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?**

Yes. Common Article 3 has long provided the minimum standards of conduct for the U.S. military. Our forces have adhered to the humane treatment protections outlined in this article and they have been a part of U.S. policy on the law of war for many years.

- d. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?**

First, the Army is committed to adherence to the Law of War and the humane treatment of detainees. The value of adherence to the rule of law in our operations cannot be underestimated – it ensures the trust and respect of the American people, enhances our international credibility, and establishes our professional credentials. Our professional and ethical conduct on the battlefield also earns the respect of the civilian populace we are sworn to protect on this asymmetric battlefield.

I intend to emphasize the importance of conducting disciplined military operations, characterized by adhering to the laws of war, treating detainees humanely, and showing compassion and restraint on the modern battlefield.

I would also seek to sustain and improve our existing systems for helping our Soldiers to understand and adhere to the proper standards for detainee treatment, detention

operations, and interrogations.

Finally, when allegations of wrongdoing by Soldiers surface, the Army will continue to fully investigate and hold Soldiers accountable, as appropriate and consistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, if misconduct is substantiated.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

- a. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes

- b. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?**

Yes

- c. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Chief of Staff of the Army?**

Yes

- d. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

Yes

- e. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes