

**Advance Policy Questions for Ms. Madelyn R. Creedon**  
**Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for**  
**Global Strategic Affairs**

**Defense Reforms**

**The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.**

**Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?**

No. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation has been very successful in improving operational and warfighting effectiveness.

**If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

I do not see the need to change this legislation.

**Relationships**

**If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:**

**The Secretary of Defense**

At the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, (USD (P)) the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs (ASD/GSA) advises the Secretary of Defense on strategy and policy on issues relating to nuclear weapons, missile defense, countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and the space and cyberspace domains.

**The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

The ASD/GSA provides support to the Deputy Secretary of Defense similar to the support provided to the Secretary of Defense.

**The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

The ASD/GSA provides support to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy similar to the support provided to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense.

### **The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics**

Under guidance of the USD (P), the ASD/GSA works with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) in pursuit of the Secretary's objectives and ensures that policy execution is well-informed and supported appropriately. The ASD/GSA also provides policy input regarding acquisition and programmatic activities that relate to nuclear weapons, missile defense, countering weapons of mass destruction, and the space and cyberspace domains.

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs**

The ASD/GSA works collaboratively and collegially with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to provide policy advice to the USD (P) and the Secretary on cross-cutting global security strategy and policy issues, such as regional missile defense cooperation and NATO developments pertaining to GSA's functional expertise.

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs**

The ASD/GSA works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs to provide policy advice to the USD (P) and the Secretary on cross-cutting global security strategy and policy issues, such as containing North Korean proliferation of WMD.

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense**

The ASD/GSA works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs to provide policy advice to the USD (P) and the Secretary on cross-cutting security strategy and policy issues, such as enhancing the survivability of critical cyberspace infrastructure.

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities**

The ASD/GSA works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict to provide policy advice to the USD (P) and the Secretary on cross-cutting global security strategy and policy issues, such as countering the proliferation of WMD through improved synchronization of contingency plans.

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs**

The ASD/GSA works closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ASD/NCB) to provide policy advice to the USD (P) and the

Secretary on cross-cutting global security strategy and policy issues. The ASD/NCB is responsible for implementing many of the activities for which the ASD/GSA develops policy guidance, such as chemical/biological defense, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and oversight of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Therefore, the relationship between the two offices should be particularly close.

### **The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/GSA works with the Chairman (CJCS) and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide support on matters that affect strategy and policy for nuclear weapons, missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.

### **The Service Secretaries**

At the direction of the USD (P), the ASD/GSA works with the Military Department Secretaries on a broad range of policy issues.

### **The Service Chiefs**

At the direction of the USD (P), the ASD/GSA works with the Service Chiefs on a broad range of policy issues.

### **The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command**

At the direction of the USD (P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the ASD/GSA works with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command on a broad range of issues that affect strategy and policy for nuclear weapons, missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.

### **The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command**

At the direction of the USD (P) and in coordination with the CJCS, the ASD/GSA works with the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command on a broad range of issues that affect defense activities in cyberspace. As the OSD Principal Staff Assistant with responsibility for cyber policy, the relationship with U.S. Cyber Command should be very close to ensure appropriate coordination of this dynamic mission area.

### **The regional combatant commanders**

In coordination with the CJCS, the ASD/GSA works closely with the geographic combatant commanders (GCC) to provide policy oversight of strategy, plans and operations relating to nuclear weapons, missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains in support of the USD(P), the Secretary, and the President of the United States.

### **The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration**

The ASD/GSA works with the Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration to provide policy support to the USD(P) and the Secretary on strategy and policy issues, relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear material security, U.S. nuclear stockpile matters, and related issues.

## **Duties**

**The position for which you have been nominated has been substantially restructured over the last few years.**

**What is your understanding of the duties that you will be assigned if you are confirmed?**

My understanding is that ASD/GSA is primarily responsible for advising and supporting the USD (P) and the Secretary on policy and strategy in the areas of U.S. nuclear weapons and missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.

## **Qualifications**

**What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?**

I have had over 30 years of experience in a variety of executive branch positions and as a member of the staff of the Senate Committee on Armed Services in the areas of responsibility assigned to the ASD/GSA.

**What additional actions do you believe you need to take, if any, to fulfill the responsibilities of this position?**

If confirmed, I will focus on understanding the many specific responsibilities and interactions that are necessary to ensure that I can effectively carry out the duties of the office of ASD/GSA. Many of the overarching policy documents governing nuclear, space, and missile defense policies have been issued. I will develop an understanding of the actions needed to implement these policies. The area of cyber policy will need particular attention and, if confirmed, I will work to develop and grow the relationships and knowledge necessary to provide policy guidance in this challenging issue area.

## **Major Challenges and Problems**

**In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs?**

Implementation of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) and Space Posture Review (SPR), as well as the New START Treaty, the National Space Security Strategy, the DOD Cyber Strategy, and the President's nuclear security agenda and biosecurity strategy will all be significant challenges. Implementing these new policies and strategies under a constrained budget will be even more challenging.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

If I am confirmed as ASD/GSA, I will develop the close working relationships with key partners in DOD, with other relevant executive branch partners, and within the Congress, to understand and address the various programs, issues, and concerns necessary to implement the new policies and strategies.

**What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of your responsibilities?**

At present I am not sure what will be the most serious problems that I would face if confirmed, but I am very concerned about ensuring that the new policies and strategies are implemented in a cost efficient manner.

**If confirmed, what management action and timelines would you establish to address these problems?**

If confirmed, I will work with the ASD/GSA staff and the USD (P) to identify, understand, and prioritize any problems impeding performance of my responsibilities, and to develop timelines to resolve these problems.

## **Priorities**

**If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish for the office to which you have been nominated?**

I understand that Under Secretary Flournoy has emphasized the importance of her team's support to the Secretary to improve interagency development of long-term national security policy options. If confirmed, I will ensure that staff of the ASD/GAS is equipped to support her and the Secretary in achieving these goals.

## **Nuclear Posture Review**

**If confirmed, what role will you play in overseeing and implementing the policies, strategies, and priorities established in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)?**

If confirmed, I understand that I would help to develop and oversee implementation of the agenda set forth in the NPR. This would include helping to frame key issues and decisions for the USD (P) and the Secretary in coordination with my colleagues in USD (AT&L), the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and USSTRATCOM, as well as the NNSA and the National Security Staff.

### **Space Posture Review**

**If confirmed what role will you play in overseeing and implementing the policies, strategies, and priorities established in the Space Posture Review?**

If confirmed, I understand that I would support the USD (P) and the Secretary to continue implementation of President's 2010 National Space Policy and the National Security Space Strategy, which included the Space Posture Review. In that regard, if confirmed I understand that I would help to develop and oversee implementation of DOD policies related to space. This would include overseeing implementation of strategy and plans related to space forces, systems, and activities in close coordination with other DOD officials, as well as serving on the Defense Space Council.

### **Space programs**

**If confirmed what role will you play in establishing architectures for various space systems, such as communications and Overhead Persistent Infra-red (OPIR)?**

If confirmed, I expect to participate actively in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system, as well as other DOD decision-making processes, to ensure space system architectures support our national security objectives effectively. I would expect that this would include support to effective, efficient, and well-coordinated communications, OPIR and other essential national security space applications and programs.

**If confirmed what role will you play in developing a space protection strategy and improving space situational awareness?**

The United States is heavily reliant upon and gains unique benefits from its national security space capabilities. Continually improving space situational awareness underpins our ability to operate safely in the increasingly congested space environment and enables the protection of space assets. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure appropriate and effective strategies are in place to increase our space situational awareness as well as to ensure that critical space capabilities are resilient and redundant to maintain the advantages provided by these capabilities.

### **Space Rules of the Road**

**Over the course of the last several years there has been discussion about establishing international space rules of the road to deal with, mitigate, and reduce generation of space debris.**

**What are your views on establishing space rules of the road?**

Establishing norms for the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space and preservation of the space environment are important issues for all space-faring nations. Rules of the road or other pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space could help avoid collisions and other debris-producing events, reduce radiofrequency interference, and strengthen safety, stability, transparency, and security in the space domain.

### **International Space Cooperation**

**Do you support arms control limitations on space capabilities?**

I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, which states that the United States will pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space, and will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its Allies.

**Would you support the United States signing the so-called European Union Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities?**

I understand that the Department is currently evaluating the European Union's proposed international Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this evaluation.

**Given the concern about the increase in space debris, and the need to improve the ability to forecast and avoid potential conjunctions, in your view is there an opportunity to cooperate with Russia and other nations in the area of space debris analysis and warning?**

The significant increase in space debris presents challenges to all space faring nations. I believe that coordinated international efforts to develop and share information, particularly with respect to space debris, could help increase awareness and prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. I understand that the Department recently signed statements of principles on Space Situational Awareness sharing with Australia, Canada, and France. Additional such statements signed with other nations, and with commercial firms, would continue to enhance spaceflight safety for all parties.

### **Nuclear Weapons Management**

**Since the Air Force unknowingly flew nuclear weapons on a B-52 bomber from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana on August 30, 2007, the Air Force has taken a number of significant steps to increase its attention, discipline, and expertise on nuclear weapons management.**

**If confirmed, what role, if any, will you play in ensuring that nuclear weapons are safe, secure and accounted for, and that the military services have established a high level of attention, discipline, and conduct of operations with respect to nuclear weapons?**

Since the events of August 2007 the Air Force has made significant improvements in its management of the Air Force nuclear enterprise. If confirmed, I will work with the other stakeholders in OSD, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and Combatant Commands, as well as with NNSA, to ensure that the renewed senior-level focus and attention and new management approaches are sustained and institutionalized. It is vitally important that all aspects of our nuclear force and the nuclear weapons enterprise are positioned to ensure their long-term safety, security, accounting, and reliability.

**The various reviews of the Air Force incident also exposed significant gaps in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to the attention and expertise to deal with nuclear weapons issues.**

**If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that there is sufficient attention to management of nuclear weapon matters in the Office of the Secretary of Defense?**

If confirmed, I will work with the USD (P), the ASD-NCB, the Military Departments and other key stakeholders to sustain senior-level attention on the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear deterrent.

**If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that there is sufficient technical expertise in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to nuclear weapons?**

I would note that with the reorganization in the policy office and the creation of the ASD/GSA, a strong focus on nuclear and other relevant expertise was re-established. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the expertise available to the ASD/GSA. Included in this evaluation will be the means to ensure that new technical and policy expertise relating to nuclear policy is “grown” in OSD since the aging nuclear workforce poses a challenge to our deterrent. If confirmed, I will continue OSD’s traditional outreach to institutions such as the NNSA National Security Laboratories, in order to strengthen relationships and enlist on-site support through their experts detailed to OSD.

### **Nuclear Weapons Council**

**The Nuclear Weapons Council is intended to be the joint Department of Defense – Department of Energy management organization for nuclear weapons matters.**



**If confirmed, what responsibilities and interaction do you expect to have relative to the Nuclear Weapons Council?**

The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) is a statutorily established entity with broad responsibility for nuclear weapons. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is a member of the NWC. If confirmed I would expect to support the USD (P) in the work of the NWC.

### **Strategic Nuclear Programs**

**The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) established, among other things, nuclear force structure parameters prior to negotiation of the New START Treaty. The Administration has indicated that it is continuing to study future nuclear force levels, consistent with the NPR.**

**If confirmed, what roles and responsibilities do you expect to have relative to policy development concerning future nuclear force structure and planning?**

If confirmed, I expect to help shape the development of policy for the nuclear force structure and the planning to implement the President's vision of a re-capitalized nuclear enterprise.

### **New START Treaty Implementation**

**The New START Treaty entered into force in February of 2011, and establishes limits on the deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States. The treaty allows the parties up to seven years to comply with the numerical limits of the treaty.**

**If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in overseeing implementation of the New START Treaty?**

If confirmed, I expect to work with the Air Force and the Navy, Strategic Command, the Joint Staff, the NNSA, and others to implement the New START Treaty to meet the central limits of the New START Treaty by 2018 while maintaining a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent.

### **Modernization of the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise**

**A principal issue in the debate of the New START Treaty was ensuring that as we draw down the number of deployed nuclear warheads that we modernize our nuclear warhead production capability as well as their command and control systems and delivery platforms.**

**If confirmed what role do you expect to play in modernizing these three areas?**

If confirmed, I will continue the Department's commitment to a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. This includes sustaining and maintaining the nuclear stockpile, and modernizing the nuclear infrastructure and delivery systems.

**Do you agree that the full funding of the President's plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?**

Yes.

**Prior to completing this modernization effort do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START Treaty limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?**

The most recent Section 1251 report covers funding through 2021, the term of the New START Treaty, but these substantial investments in nuclear infrastructure must continue well beyond this timeframe. As a result, any proposed future reductions in deployed strategic warheads covered by the Treaty, or deployed non-strategic warheads and non-deployed warheads, not covered by the Treaty, must all be considered in a number of contexts, including the rate and progress of the complex modernization, the success of the life extensions, and the sustainment and modernization of the delivery systems, as well as the geopolitical environment. I would note that the NPR states that any future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, maintain strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our security assurances to our Allies and partners. Ensuring that we are well-hedged against geopolitical or technical surprise also remains a key priority. If confirmed, I will support the Department's continuing assessment of the proper force size and the capabilities required for a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.

**Without the construction of the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Facility at Los Alamos and the Uranium Production Facility (UPF) at Y-12 and the other elements associated with the robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, do you believe reductions to the strategic hedge would be prudent?**

Ensuring that we are well-hedged against geopolitical or technical surprise remains a key priority, of the NPR Report, with which I agree. Modernization of the nuclear complex, the success of the life extension programs, and the progress maintaining and modernizing nuclear delivery platforms, as well as the geopolitical environment, will all inform any future proposals to reduce the hedge. The NPR also stated that modernization of the nuclear weapons complex will eventually allow the United States to shift its "hedging strategy" away from retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads to a smaller, more responsive manufacturing infrastructure. If confirmed, I will support the Department's continuing assessment of the proper force size and the capabilities required for a safe secure and reliable nuclear deterrent.

## **Nuclear Policy**

**Do you support the President's vision for a world without nuclear weapons?**

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, included as a goal the cessation of the nuclear arms race and set forth the commitment "to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament." The President's ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide is consistent with the NPT. The President has also said, however, that while working toward that goal the United States will retain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent, as long as nuclear weapons exist. I support both of these goals.

**Do you believe this goal is a viable near and or long term strategic strategy for the United States?**

The conditions that would ultimately permit the United States and others to give up their nuclear weapons without risking greater international instability and insecurity do not exist today. As a result I think the goal is a long-term one.

**In a recent speech at the 2011 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Thomas Donilon, the President's National Security Advisor, stated that the administration is currently "making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions" and that the Department of Defense will "review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile." He continued by stating that in meeting these objectives, the White House will direct DOD to consider "potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures."**

**Do you believe the United States should pursue further reductions? Please explain why or why not.**

I would note that the NPR states that any future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries, maintain strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our security assurances to our Allies and partners. Ensuring that we are well-hedged against geopolitical or technical surprise also remains a key priority. If confirmed, I will support the Department's continuing assessment of the proper force size and capabilities required for a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.

**Do you believe it would be prudent for the United States to pursue unilateral nuclear reductions? Please explain why or why not.**

On balance I do not believe the United States should make unilateral reductions in the strategic nuclear systems covered under the New START Treaty, while the Treaty is in force. Reductions in nuclear systems not covered by the New Treaty should be addressed on a case by case basis and should reflect geopolitical situations as well as the technical requirements associated with maintaining a safe secure and reliable nuclear deterrent.

**Do you believe changes to well-established nuclear targeting requirements could negatively impact our ability to: (1) assure our allies; (2) discourage other countries**

**from seeking strategic equivalence with the United States in nuclear weapons; and  
(3) hedge against future threats and uncertainties?**

While I understand that the Department of Defense continually assesses deterrence requirements, including potential changes in targeting requirements, I am not familiar with the specific targeting policy. If confirmed, I will continue to support a safe, secure and reliable nuclear enterprise that maintains strategic deterrence and stability, strengthens regional deterrence and assures our Allies and partners.

### **Ballistic Missile Defense Review**

**In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans, programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran.**

**Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review?**

Yes.

**If confirmed, what role do you expect to have in implementing these policies, strategies, and priorities?**

If confirmed, I expect to provide oversight and guidance to implement the BMDR, and to participate in the development of related policies, as well as prioritization of resources.

### **Phased Adaptive Approach**

**In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles, starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability to defend against long-range missiles that could reach all of Europe or the United States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense capability.**

**Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe and, if confirmed, what role do you expect to have in implementing this approach?**

Yes, I support the European PAA and, if confirmed, I will continue the substantial U.S. efforts already underway to deploy all four phases of the European PAA. I would expect that a significant part of my role would include working with our Allies and partners to ensure pragmatic and cost-effective cooperation, and providing oversight and guidance to the development and deployment of U.S. missile defense capabilities.

### **“Fly before You Buy” Approach to Missile Defense**

**The two most recent flight tests of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has formed a Failure Review Board to determine the root cause of the most recent failure, and will devise a corrective plan that includes two flight tests to confirm the correction. Until the second flight test confirms the correction, the Director of MDA has suspended production of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKVs) of the type that failed last year’s flight tests, in order to ensure that those EKV’s are not deployed with a flaw that would need to be corrected later.**

**Do you agree that it is essential to verify that the GMD flight test failure problem has been corrected before continuing production of the EKV’s, and before delivering more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) or deciding how many additional GBIs may be needed in the future?**

Yes. I understand that although the exact number of additional GBIs will not be decided until the test failure problems are identified and resolved, it does appear that additional GBIs will be required.

**Do you agree with the Defense Department’s “fly before you buy” policy for missile defense that “before new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that enables an assessment under realistic operational conditions against threat-representative targets” to demonstrate that they will be effective and reliable?**

Yes.

**Do you support the continued modernization and sustainment of the Ground-based midcourse defense system?**

Yes.

### **Homeland Missile Defense Hedging Strategy**

**One of the elements of the BMDR is the policy of hedging our homeland missile defense options in case the threat of future long-range ballistic missiles from countries like North Korea and Iran develops more rapidly or more robustly than expected, or if we**

**encounter technical problems or delays in developing the Standard Missile-3 Block IIB interceptor. The Department of Defense has already decided to pursue a number of hedging options, and is considering others.**

**Do you support the policy that the United States should maintain a hedging strategy for homeland missile defense?**

Yes.

**If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in overseeing our missile defense hedging strategy?**

If confirmed, I expect to monitor the ballistic missile threat and to be responsible for ensuring that we have the policies and strategies in place to address changes in the threat or unexpected delays in development of new technical capabilities.

### **Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia**

**The United States and NATO are exploring options to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.**

**Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from nations such as Iran?**

I think that cooperation with Russia could strengthen the effectiveness of United States and NATO missile defenses, as well as those of the Russian Federation against Iran.

**Do you believe that U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation could send an important signal to Iran that the United States and Russia are unified in their determination to reduce the risks of Iran's nuclear and missile programs?**

Yes, missile defense cooperation with Russia could send an important signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working together to counter the acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles. This in turn could further strengthen the international commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

**Do you agree that irrespective of Russian objections, the United States is committed to the continued development and deployment of United States missile defense capabilities, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such capabilities?**

My understanding is that the United States is committed to this goal and to developing and deploying improved missile defenses against states such as Iran and North Korea.

**If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in efforts to pursue missile defense cooperation with Russia?**

The Administration is pursuing a broad agenda with Russia focused on shared early warning of missile launches, technical cooperation, and even operational cooperation. Cooperation with Russia could offer some important tangible benefits for the United States, our NATO Allies, and Russia. If confirmed, I will support the efforts of the Defense Relations Working Group, established by Defense Secretary Gates and Defense Minister Serduykov, to further practical cooperation in a number of areas, including missile defense.

**Chemical and Biological Defense**

**One of the areas under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs is the Chemical and Biological Defense Program of the Defense Department.**

**What do you believe are the principal challenges in chemical and biological defense, and what would be your priorities for the DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program?**

As part of the Department's overall effort to counter WMD, the Office of the ASD/NCB manages the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. If confirmed, I would be responsible for development of policies to guide the program. I am informed that current priority issues include developing defenses against non-traditional chemical agents, and accelerating the ability to detect and attribute any chemical, nuclear or biological materials used to attack or threaten the United States. These appear to be appropriate priorities. I would note that DOD, through the Cooperative Threat Reduction and other programs, is developing a comprehensive toolkit of biological defense options for the Secretary that includes biosurveillance, vaccines, and other medical countermeasures to protect our forces against multiple threats.

**Do you believe the Chemical and Biological Defense Program should be closely coordinated with related efforts of the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction program focused on reducing biological threats?**

Yes. The Chemical and Biological Defense program and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program are well established components of the U.S. efforts to counter WMD. The two programs have related but distinct goals, but they should be closely coordinated for the best effect. If confirmed, I will ensure that these and other DOD biological defense policies are coordinated appropriately both within the DOD and with other relevant U.S. and international agencies.

**Chemical Demilitarization**

**DOD Directive 5160.05E states the DOD policy that "the Department of Defense shall be in full compliance" with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the**

**Biological Warfare Convention (BWC). In 2006, the Department announced that the United States would not meet even the extended deadline of April 2012 for destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile, as required under the CWC.**

**Do you agree that the Department of Defense and the United States Government should be in full compliance with the terms and obligations of the CWC and the BWC, including the deadline for destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile under the CWC?**

I understand that in 2006, the United States informed the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that it did not expect to meet the 2012 deadline. Since then the United States has continued to follow a policy of transparency about the U.S. chemical weapons destruction program and stressed U.S. efforts to find ways to accelerate it. I understand that the Department is on track to destroy 90 percent of the U.S. stockpile by the CWC deadline, and that the Department of the Army and the office of the USD (AT&L) are focusing significant senior leadership attention on this issue.

**If confirmed, will you work to ensure that the Department takes steps needed to minimize the time to complete destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, without sacrificing safety or security, and that the Department requests the resources necessary to complete destruction as close to April 2012 as practicable?**

Yes.

### **Counter-WMD Efforts**

**One of the issue areas under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs is the Department of Defense effort to counter Weapons of Mass Destruction, meaning nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.**

**What do you believe are the principal challenges in countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, and what are your priorities for Defense Department efforts to counter Weapons of Mass Destruction?**

President Obama made clear in his April 2009 speech in Prague that overcoming the twin dangers of WMD proliferation and WMD terrorism are the greatest threats facing our country and will require a comprehensive approach to reduce and counter these threats. Countering these threats takes commitment not only by the United States but also by the international community. One of the significant challenges is developing a sustained commitment among international partners to both recognize the threat and to take the actions necessary to reduce the dangers.

**If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in the creation of policy for, and oversight of, Defense Department programs to counter Weapons of Mass Destruction?**



If confirmed, I will pursue policies to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers at their source and in transit, while enhancing our ability to detect and respond to emerging threats. Another key priority is to continue refining policy guidance that ensures our forces and coalition partners can fight and win, in an environment contaminated by chemical, biological, and other hazards. I would support the USD (P) in developing these policies and coordinate the efforts within the DOD with the Departments of State, Homeland Security (DHS), and Energy (DOE), and other entities that will be essential to execute this function successfully.

### **Proliferation Security Initiative**

**The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an international effort to identify and interdict weapons of mass destruction and related materials.**

**If confirmed would you recommend that the PSI program continue and if so do you believe that it should be modified in any way?**

I agree with the 2010 National Security Strategy and the NPR Report, which state that the PSI should become a “durable international effort.” If confirmed, I will support the Department’s continued lead role in organizing U.S. support for PSI Operational Experts Group activities, including interdiction exercises.

**The absence of funding specifically identified for the PSI program has made it difficult for the Department and the Congress to provide appropriate oversight.**

**If confirmed would seek to establish a separate budget account for PSI? If not, why not?**

I understand that Congressional oversight of the PSI program has been difficult and that the PSI activities have not always been clear or well understood by Congress. If confirmed I would seek to improve understanding of the PSI and to ensure that Congress has whatever information it needs to conduct appropriate oversight of PSI activities.

### **Cooperative Threat Reduction Program**

**If confirmed what will your role be in implementing and overseeing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program?**

If confirmed, I will provide Departmental policy guidance for activities of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. My understanding is that the ASD/GSA works closely with the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the ASD/NCB to ensure that the execution of the CTR program activities is consistent with policy guidance.

**If confirmed what changes, if any, would you recommend to the CTR program, including changes in legislative authorities, programs, or funding?**

Congress has taken steps to streamline CTR's authorities over the past several years, and I believe this process should continue. Congress has authorized the CTR programs to expand its activities beyond the traditional geographic focus on the States of the Former Soviet Union. In carrying out this expanded authority the DOD CTR program has expanded its biological defense work to address those challenges around the world. If confirmed I will work with CTR's many stakeholders in the Administration and in Congress to ensure that this expansion is conducted in coordination with other relevant entities and that it is carried out in a cost effective manner.

### **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty**

**If confirmed, what role will you play in any efforts to obtain Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?**

If the Senate takes up the CTBT for consideration, and if I am confirmed, I would expect to play a significant role in presenting the views of the DOD to the Senate.

**Would you support and or advocate for the administration to pursue the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?**

The President set forth his agenda for nuclear security during his April 2009 address in Prague, Czech Republic. Non-proliferation was a central goal of this agenda, and U.S. ratification of CTBT would play an important part in that agenda. The NPR reflected the Department's commitment to the goal of ratifying the CTBT. I support the CTBT. If confirmed I look forward to supporting an effort to ratify the CTBT when the Senate decides to take up the CTBT.

### **Russia**

**What areas of opportunity and cooperation do you believe the U.S. could take to improve overall U.S. Russian relationships?**

ASD/International Security Affairs (ISA) leads OSD's involvement in defense relations with Russia. If confirmed, I will work with ASD/ISA in support of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in those areas that fall under the ASD/GSA including: non-proliferation, nuclear security, and missile defense. I believe that the historic cooperation with Russia under the CTR program could help guide such future cooperation.

**Would you support an expansion of the U.S. and Russian military-to-military relationship?**

While I do support such cooperation, my understanding is that the office of the ASD/GSA has minimal involvement in military-to-military relations with Russia, and if confirmed I would look to the ASD/ISA to guide such contacts and to support that office as needed.

**What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, on these issues?**

If confirmed, I expect to work with the ASD/ISA, U.S. European Command, and the Joint Staff as appropriate, on any issue relating to nuclear policy and arms control, missile defense cooperation, combating WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.

**Cyber Security**

**What are the main policy challenges facing the Department of Defense in the area of cyber security, both within the Department and with respect to the Federal Government as a whole?**

My understanding is that the Department's primary policy challenge is to determine how U.S. Government departments and agencies can best collaborate to provide for the cybersecurity of Federal Government systems and U.S. critical information infrastructure. The President's International Strategy for Cyberspace calls for a whole-of-government approach to cybersecurity while ensuring the continued promotion of an open, interoperable, secure and reliable information and communications infrastructure. I am told that the Department is a full partner in these efforts, which include a commitment to protect the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. citizens.

**What should the Defense Department's role be in defending the nation against cyber threats? Should the Department play the lead role in stopping attacks from abroad through cyberspace, just as the Department defends the nation from attack by missiles, aircraft, or ships?**

DOD has cyber-defense capabilities that make it an invaluable player in defending the nation against cyber threats, but it should not be the lead in non-DOD cyber security. My understanding is that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead for U.S. Federal and critical information infrastructure security, a designation with which I agree. The challenge for DOD is to leverage its cybersecurity capabilities to ensure that other agencies, under DHS leadership, are synchronized appropriately for the best defense of U.S. Government networks and critical infrastructure.

**What should be the role of law enforcement and the Department of Homeland Security in directing operations to defend the nation in cyberspace?**

I understand that the DHS is the lead for the cybersecurity of non-DOD U.S. Federal systems, and critical infrastructure, a designation with which I agree. Law enforcement can play a key role in U.S. cyber defense by assisting in development of complete forensic information regarding a cyber-intrusion and should maintain its criminal investigative responsibilities. This is an essential step in formulating a U.S. policy and operational response. I am told that DOD organizations such as the Defense Cyber Crime Center have been working to improve collaboration with various law enforcement agencies within DHS and the Department of Justice to ensure enhanced cybersecurity of Federal and critical information infrastructure systems.

**What organizational and operational construct would allow multiple departments and agencies to mount an effective, unified defense of the Nation's cyber networks and resources?**

My understanding is that the Administration's current organizational construct allows multiple departments and agencies to develop, implement and maintain an effective, unified defense of our Federal and critical information infrastructure networks and the resources that reside or pass through those networks. The Department of Homeland Security leads this effort, developing plans to secure Federal Government (.gov) systems. My understanding is that DOD is responsible for the security of its networks, some classified government networks, and is currently engaged with the defense industrial base, through a pilot program, to look at the appropriate role for DOD to protect defense industrial base information systems. I would note that the legislation recently submitted by the President would, if enacted, address many of these issues, including the ability to share information.

**In your view, is there a need for a strategy and doctrine for deterring foreign adversaries from engaging in attacks on the United States through cyberspace, just as there is a nuclear deterrence strategy and doctrine based on the threat of retaliation?**

Yes. I believe there is a need to develop a deterrence strategy in cyberspace. The President's International Strategy for Cyberspace states, "The United States will ensure that all risks associated with attacking or exploiting our networks vastly outweigh the potential benefits" and reserves the right to defend vital national assets as necessary and appropriate. If confirmed, I would devote considerable attention to developing appropriate policies and guidance to ensure that all DOD components are coordinated closely in this rapidly evolving aspect of our national security posture.

**Should the United States have the ability, and announce the intention, to undertake offensive operations in cyberspace, through the Department of Defense, in retaliation against, or to defeat, foreign aggression in cyberspace? Does such doctrine exist today, in your view?**

The President's recently announced International Strategy for Cyberspace states that the United States will maintain the full-spectrum of options for cyber deterrence, and that the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. The Strategy highlights that nations' inherent right of self-defense applies to cyberspace. If confirmed, I would devote considerable attention to developing appropriate policies and guidance to ensure that all DOD components are coordinated closely in this rapidly evolving aspect of our national security posture.

**When do you expect the Department to have a policy and rules of engagement for offensive operations in cyberspace?**

My understanding is that the Defense Department and Executive Branch have existing policies and rules of engagement for cyberspace, but that further development and clarification may be useful. The Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace provides guidance on DOD's role in cyberspace. If confirmed, I will work with senior leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint Staff to ensure that rules of engagement are consistent with applicable international laws, and drafted to allow us to defend our nation, our Allies, our partners and our interests.

**Defending cyberspace implies the need for conducting surveillance in cyberspace to achieve the ability to warn of threats and to characterize them.**

**Can surveillance in cyberspace be conducted effectively without impinging on the privacy interests of the American people?**

While this is a challenge, the privacy of U.S. persons should be protected. Balancing requirements for surveillance in cyberspace against privacy interests of the American people is a critical element of any policy or strategy for government operations in cyberspace. The balance between national security and privacy is one we have confronted many times before in other security domains. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department's senior leadership is fully invested in decision-making on this essential civil liberties challenge.

**In your view, will it be necessary to publicly disclose more information about the government's plans and methods for conducting surveillance in cyberspace in order to explain how civil liberties and privacy will be protected?**

While the public's understanding of the threat is growing, it is not clear to me at this time whether there is a good understanding of the actions that are taken or could be taken by the U.S. government. If confirmed, I will devote all necessary attention to ensure that policies and procedures are appropriate to support public confidence in DOD's cyberspace activities.

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes.

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

Yes.

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes.