

Advance Policy Questions for Vice Admiral William H. McRaven, USN
Nominee for Commander, United States Special Operations Command

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and subsequent reforms related to special operations forces have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Yes. Goldwater-Nichols did not meaningfully affect the Service manpower/personnel, acquisition, readiness reporting, training or other processes. USSOCOM, in its daily interaction with all Services, must often address each issue in four different ways.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

USSOCOM needs greater personnel management authority to shape mid- and senior-grade SOF operators to meet USSOCOM defined requirements. Promotions, selection for command, selection for advanced educational opportunities, foreign language testing policy, and foreign language proficiency bonus payment policy all differ significantly by Service and are all primarily crafted to support Service needs.

Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

Yes.

From the perspective you have gained in your previous assignments, do you believe that the authority and responsibility of the combatant commanders, in general, and the Commander, United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), in particular, are appropriate?

Yes, I believe the combatant commanders generally have appropriate authorities. As the commander of USSOCOM, I would seek to clarify the responsibilities Geographic Combatant Commanders have for supporting their assigned Theater Special Operations Commands.

Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

By experience, training and education I have what is needed to lead this extraordinary force now and into the future. I have commanded at every level within the special operations community, including assignments as Commander Joint Special Operations Command and Deputy Commanding General for Operations at Joint Special Operations Command. My service in top leadership positions at both Service and joint headquarters has prepared me to operate at the senior levels of government, including as Director for Strategic Planning in the Office of Combating Terrorism on the National Security Council Staff. And, as Commander U.S. Special Operations Command-Europe, I gained valuable experience and built useful relationships with our NATO and international special operations partners. I also established the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander of SOCOM to the following offices:

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense is the USSOCOM Commander's next superior command authority in the chain of command, as your introductory paragraph stated. If confirmed, I will look to the Secretary of Defense for operational authority to deploy and employ Special Operations Forces as well as Department-level direction in the prioritization and accomplishment of the USSOCOM mission. The USSOCOM Commander owes the Secretary of Defense the commander's best military advice on all aspects of recruiting, training, equipping, managing and employing Special Operations Forces in support of his, and the President's, national security objectives.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The USSOCOM Commander coordinates activities through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the senior military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is essential in communicating Special Operations Forces capabilities and requirements to the President and Secretary of Defense. Coordination of USSOCOM activities ensures that the Chairman remains fully informed in support of his responsibilities and for coordination of USSOCOM staff and the Joint Staff efforts to meet Presidential and Secretary of Defense directed taskings.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, USD(P), is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy. The USD(P) develops, coordinates and oversees the implementation of a wide variety of Department policy, including matters related to planning, programming, budgeting, and execution of special operations activities, including civil affairs and psychological operations, and of low-intensity conflict activities, including counter-terrorism, support to insurgency, and contingency operations. USD(P) also exercises authority, direction and control over the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, ASD(SO/LIC/IC), who is responsible for overall supervision of Special Operations activities. If confirmed, I will work closely with USD(P) to ensure USSOCOM activities are closely aligned with Department policies.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The USD(I) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with USD(I), particularly to ensure the intelligence requirements of Special Operations Forces in the field are met.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, USD(AT&L), is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the DOD Acquisition System, including procurement; research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E); military construction; and nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs. If confirmed, I will closely coordinate USSOCOM acquisition activities with USD(AT&L) to ensure USSOCOM procurement efforts are closely aligned with Department procurement processes and priorities.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, ASD (SO/LIC/IC), is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on Special Operations matters. The principal duty of the ASD (SO/LIC/IC) is the overall supervision of Special Operations activities within the Department of Defense, including USSOCOM. As I state in subsequent responses, the USSOCOM Commander works closely with ASD (SO/LIC/IC) in the execution of his “service-like” authorities under 10 U.S.C. section 167.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant Secretary, and with United States European Command, United States Central Command, and United States Africa Command, to ensure the effective employment of Special Operations Forces capability in support of national security objectives in the Europe, the Middle East and Africa. I am particularly interested in developing an enduring relationship with the newly established NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NATO SOF HQ), and look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary in developing policies in support of NATO SOF HQ.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs

If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant Secretary, and with United States Pacific Command, to ensure the effective employment of Special Operations Forces capability in support of national security objectives in the Asian and Pacific regions.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Americas' Security Affairs

If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant Secretary in developing USSOCOM's role in Homeland Defense, and in support of civil authorities, to determine the Special Operations support necessary to protect the United States and its citizens during domestic emergencies.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary in support of his efforts to develop policy on countering weapons of mass destruction and cyber security issues, two areas of abiding interest for Special Operations Forces.

The Service Secretaries

The USSOCOM Commander's authority over the Service components, and those forces assigned to him, is clear in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but requires close coordination with the Service Secretaries to ensure that USSOCOM does not intrude upon each Service Secretary's legal responsibilities. Close coordination between the USSOCOM Commander and each of the Service Secretaries is also essential to gaining and maintaining the Services' support of Special Operations Forces with support units from the General Purpose Forces and with service-common materiel.

The Service Chiefs

Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, the USSOCOM Commander cannot ensure the preparedness of his assigned forces to execute his assigned missions. The Joint Chiefs are also a source of experience and judgment that every Combatant Commander may call upon. If confirmed, I will continue a full and frank dialog with the Service Chiefs.

The other combatant commanders

Successive USSOCOM Commanders have fostered an atmosphere of teamwork and trust in their relationships with the Combatant Commanders. These relationships have only strengthened over the last ten years, and certainly since USSOCOM has been responsible for synchronizing counterterrorist operations after 9/11. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the other Combatant Commanders to achieve our common objectives against transnational terrorist threats and violent extremist organizations.

The Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center

USSOCOM is actively engaged in support of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and has been since it was established after 9/11. USSOCOM also relies upon NCTC estimates and reports in the refinement and synchronization of counterterrorist operations, and will continue to assist NCTC to achieve our common objectives against transnational terrorist threats and violent extremist organizations.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

USSOCOM and its subordinate elements are consumers of CIA products and analysis. If confirmed, I will ensure that USSOCOM continues to develop interoperable capabilities so that, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, we may work efficiently in close partnership to accomplish our assigned missions.

Major Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander of SOCOM?

I believe Admiral Olson, in his 2011 Posture Statement, clearly laid out the major challenges that will confront the next Commander of USSOCOM. These seven major challenges are discussed individually below (not necessarily in priority order) and I have laid out what I believe are each of their main drivers.

1. Carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing demand for Special Operations Forces.

The SOF community has seen these challenges take shape over the last several years, and I see these same challenges continuing as Special Operations Forces remain a first choice for many military operations.

First, we must carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing demand for SOF. Since 9/11, SOF manpower has roughly doubled, the budget has roughly tripled, and the overseas deployments have quadrupled. Demand is outpacing supply, but we cannot grow more than 3-5 percent every year or we risk compromising the quality of the force. Simply stated, more SOF cannot be created overnight. Our “new normal” is a persistently engaged, forward-based force to prevent and deter conflict and, when needed, act to disrupt and defeat threats. Long-term engagement is a hedge against crises that require major intervention and engagement positions us to better sense the environment and act decisively when necessary. The “new normal,” however, translates into increased demand for SOF. The pace of the last ten years is indicative of what we expect for the next ten years.

2. Improve and expand our tactical and operational level skills, equipment, and systems.

The strategic challenges facing our nation are numerous and many may not be foreseen. Virtually all will continue to emanate from the incredibly dynamic and increasingly complex global environment. The next USSOCOM Commander will be challenged to ensure our special operators are properly trained and equipped to fulfill the high degree of expectations the nation places on our special operators. They must excel under the most demanding conditions while accomplishing some of the most difficult and sensitive tasks regardless of the environment or the difficulty.

Our special operators are supported by technology, mobility and communications systems that allow SOF to share information, rapidly move, tactically maneuver, and strategically influence the environment – whether via direct strike or indirect means. Our technology edge needs to be maintained to retain the capability to execute our missions.

3. Preserve our proposed budget levels and authorities.

Managing and preserving SOCOM's Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11) funding within the current and future budget discussions is perhaps the major challenge facing the next SOCOM Commander. At the forefront of this challenge is acknowledging that many of the current expenditures are funded by Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. The Department has made a commitment to phase the OCO funding into USSOCOM's baseline requirement, but the command will continue to rely on OCO funding over the next few years as the phased transfer to the base budget occurs. The next SOCOM Commander must acknowledge our Nation's current fiscal condition will focus attention on the Department thus creating the challenge to preserving the baseline for MFP-11. The current and future demand for SOF capabilities and foundational activities will exceed force deployment capacity. SOCOM infrastructure and readiness accounts have not kept pace with SOF growth or demand. Current operations will pressure future development and limit required modernization and recapitalization efforts. While the new baseline budget will be questioned, the new SOCOM commander will be challenged to deliver the required capabilities in a fiscally constrained environment knowing the budget without OCO transition does not fully resource the command.

Part of this major challenge includes monitoring and understanding the stress the Service Budgets are facing and the impacts it will have on their ability to meet established and future SOCOM requirements for forces, capabilities and platforms. Operationally important Service provided capabilities that enable SOF success in the field will be stressed and potentially unfunded. MFP-11 is used to address "SOF-peculiar" requirements; it cannot be used to deliver these basic building blocks or to generate new SOF capabilities to cover for fiscally limited service-provided capabilities.

4. Find better structures and processes to obtain Service-provided capabilities.

With SOF growth constrained to 3-5 percent annually, effectively meeting the growing demand for our force can only be met through the commitment of the Military Services to attach supporting and enabling forces at a commensurate rate. It is a "SOF Truth" that most SOF operations require non-SOF support. This is true for the acquisition process, personnel policies, and the preparation and execution of the full range of SOF operations.

5. Continue to improve our acquisition speed and agility.

"More" is not always the best answer and should not be the first answer. The speed and agility of Special Operations Command acquisition authority is achieved through Title 10 authority, its own budget line from Congress in the appropriation process, and being chartered to purchase non-mainstream military equipment, also known as special operations peculiar

equipment procured using MPF-11. MPF-11 grants SOCOM the authority to purchase equipment, material, services and supplies required for special operations mission support for which there is no conventional service requirement.

6. Better understand the people and conditions in the places we go, whether to assist or fight.

One of the Command's top challenges is to better understand the people and conditions in the places we go, whether to assist or fight. Indeed, understanding the operational context of the environments in which we operate is a hallmark of SOF.

Our complex, dynamic world presents ambiguous problems that challenge our Nation's national security and interests. SOCOM's strategic appreciation of these challenges stresses the importance of deeper knowledge of micro-regional geography, history, languages, religions, cultures and traditions, to enable SOF to conduct its activities with more predictable outcomes.

Developing this deep experience and high level of knowledge requires cultivating an agile intellectual posture within our force and maintaining persistent presence with partners and populations in diverse locations around the globe.

7. As our most solemn duty, look after the health and well-being of this magnificent force from whom we ask so much.

As the Commander, I would consider it my responsibility to ensure we are doing the most we can to support our teams and families in recognition of the vital role they play in our national security – there is no greater responsibility.

If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

1. Carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing demand for Special Operations Forces.

I see the need to maintain the maximum growth rate of 3-5 percent per year. I also see the need to match this growth and the SOF demand with commensurate levels of Military Services' provided capabilities that enable SOF to accomplish its mission. We were designed to rely on the Services to meet most of our combat support and combat service support requirements. I intend to continue SOCOM's efforts with the Services to implement a way to align SOF demand with these Service-provided capabilities.

I will provide my best Special Operations military advice to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense on how to best use SOF to ensure we are optimizing our contribution to national security. Given the competing demands for SOF, we will need to be judicious and rigorous in our approach to support the Geographic Combatant Commanders and to do our part in support of national strategies and global campaign plans. Not all missions are appropriate for SOF, and we must guard against accepting missions at the expense of those operations requiring our unique skills and capabilities.

Lastly, if confirmed, I intend to continue the SOCOM initiatives to adapt how we train, deploy, and reset SOF for the “new normal.” The force is fraying, but we can stop the stress on the force by pursuing innovative ways that provide a predictable deployment pattern that accomplishes our missions while sustaining our force and protecting our people and families.

2. Improve and expand our tactical and operational level skills, equipment, and systems.

Success increasingly depends upon the larger combination of defense, diplomacy, and development activities. Long term success will depend more and more on SOF individuals that are selected and have expertise for the regions that they are going to habitually operate in. Our culture and language programs can be augmented to enhance our sub-regional and micro-regional knowledge, awareness and understanding. Efforts in training and personnel management can create better opportunities for our personnel to build the productive and enduring relationships we desire.

In addition to a focus on the SOF operator, mobility enabling capabilities are a focal point in the existing USSOCOM Strategic Plan; and technology areas seen as vital to intervention capability will also continue as focus areas for USSOCOM research and development.

Finally, we must preserve our SOF buying power by critically assessing what we buy and prioritizing that which is most important while ensuring that the required service-provided capabilities are properly resourced.

3. Preserve our proposed budget levels and authorities.

First, I must ensure there is a clear understanding and support for the necessity of establishing and sustaining the new baseline budget through the transition of OCO funding into USSOCOM’s baseline. OCO to baseline does not grow the force; it only preserves the command’s existing capabilities and current level of effort. The current and future demand for SOF capabilities makes this a top priority. Preserving MFP-11 budget levels is critical in ensuring Special Operations Forces can meet the Nation’s requirements, which is the SOCOM Commander’s primary responsibility. MFP-11 provides for the advanced and unique training recently demonstrated in Pakistan. It enables the timely and flexible fielding of equipment, and the capability to rapidly and effectively project our force. A decrease in the Command’s budget level would severely impact my ability to meet the demand for SOF and significantly increase the risk to our Nation’s security. The importance of this issue is highlighted in the Command’s FY 2012 budget submission where thirty-four percent of the total MFP-11 request is OCO funding. For some higher intensity SOF elements, the OCO percentage is greater than 75 percent. Without this transition, mission failure is a real possibility.

4. Find better structures and processes to obtain Service-provide capabilities.

For acquisition matters, regular Acquisition Summits with the Military Services create enhanced transparency and effectiveness in finding common solutions for Service-wide requirements, which in turn allows SOCOM to better invest in SOF-peculiar modifications and special capabilities. For operational matters, a new SOF Force Generation process

(SOFORGEN) will be fully synchronized with the Military Services, and fully operational by FY13. SOFORGEN will identify Service-provided requirements in advance, allowing the development of habitual relationships for training and operations, thereby ensuring best possible support to the Geographic Combatant Commanders.

5. Continue to improve our acquisition speed and agility.

The speed and agility of Special Operations Command acquisition authority coupled with leveraging general purpose forces and service support mechanisms enables Special Operations to remain decisive on the battlefield. Working closely with the Services we have identified priorities to ensure there is no redundancy. We have taken the initiative to divest ourselves of equipment that is not core to the SOF mission. We have focused ourselves by disposing of obsolete, redundant or marginally beneficial capabilities. Leveraging acquisition ensures that special operations peculiar equipment necessary to confront the enemy is there when needed most and with the speed to ensure it meets the needs of the operator.

6. Better understand the people and conditions in the places we go, whether to assist or fight.

USSOCOM will maintain and support a number of initiatives the Command has recently developed and implemented, which have shown promising potential and early progress toward meeting these challenges. For example, USSOCOM will continue to review and coordinate changes to Service personnel policies to further incentivize language pay for key languages such as Pashto, Dari and Arabic, and increase the number of career SOF individuals in advanced language training. In order to gain the greater levels of nuanced understanding possessed by indigenous populations, USSOCOM will continue to strongly support DOD's Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) and the Army's Intermediate and Advanced Language Programs (IALP) to recruit and access the requisite expertise provided by native speakers. Additionally, our attached female Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) allow us to reach key elements of the population in some environments which was not previously possible.

Furthermore, USSOCOM will continue to expand our base of global expertise, pursue every opportunity to strengthen our overseas presence, and develop meaningful personal relationships with key foreign military leaders. To enhance current battlefield effectiveness, USSOCOM will strive for repetitive deployments by individuals and small teams to the same locations. More broadly, USSOCOM will participate in academic symposia and seminars, and place SOF members in key positions in U.S. Missions abroad, as well as foreign military units and headquarters. In addition, USSOCOM will pursue career incentives that place value on regional and micro-regional expertise and determine a process that allows us to track and assign Foreign Area Officers with prior SOF experience back into SOF units.

7. As our most solemn duty, look after the health and well-being of this magnificent force from whom we ask so much.

SOF warriors face an increased operational tempo which will not abate even after eventual drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan due to the nature of "new normal" strategic environment

that will require increasing SOF presence. To help SOF warriors and their families cope with the psychological hardships that accompany extended separation and the trauma that comes from violent armed conflict, and most critically to our wounded warriors, USSOCOM has created the Care Coalition and is committed to the Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and Reconditioning (THOR3) Program. Both programs work with governmental and non-governmental organizations, to provide top-notch, personalized support and to physically and psychologically wounded SOF warriors and their families at multiple locations throughout CONUS. Through the Care Coalition and the Chaplaincy, USSOCOM will continue to focus on improving the standard of living, happiness, and support of SOF warriors and their families.

What are the most important lessons you have learned during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the special operations community?

1. The SOF Operator is the “platform” for special operations and we must always remain focused on this over what he carries with him to execute the mission. While material is important, the Operator is the primary concern.
2. The world’s strategic environment has evolved toward one that is characterized more by Irregular Warfare activity rather than major nation state warfare. We must confront this “new normal” and posture our forces to be successful in it.
3. Partnerships are keys to success. The complex challenges of the world demand a more global approach to solving problems with those who share our interests. Part of the partnership building is within our own Interagency – building those relationships and trust that will build unity of effort in Whole of Government approaches to addressing problems.
4. Reputation is everything. We must work everyday to be the best that we can be, the most prepared, the best skilled Operators in the world.
5. SOF continues to provide unique options for complex problems. The agility and diverse capabilities of our force, from long-term engagement to rapid lethal operations, make SOF a first choice for many military operations.

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Commander of SOCOM?

As the Commander of Joint Special Operations Command and a member of the USSOCOM and SOF Board of Directors I helped to craft the Command’s current touchstone priorities of : Mission, People, and Equipment. I believe these have served the Command well and will continue to do so in the future. Specifically, if confirmed, I will focus my efforts to enhance our efforts under each area using the following focus areas:

1. Mission
 - Deter, Disrupt, and Defeat Terrorist Threats
 - Plan and conduct Special Operations

- Emphasize persistent, culturally-attuned engagement
- Foster Interagency cooperation

2. People

Develop and Support our People and Families

- Focus on quality
- Care for our people and families
- Train and educate the Joint Warrior/diplomat

3. Equipment

Sustain and Modernize the force

- Equip the operator
- Upgrade SOF mobility
- Obtain persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems

Civilian Oversight of SOCOM

The 1986 Special Operations legislation assigned extraordinary authority to the Commander of SOCOM, to conduct some of the functions of both a military service and a unified combat command.

Which civilian officials in the Department of Defense (DOD) exercise civilian oversight of the "service-like" authorities of the Commander, SOCOM?

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, ASD (SO/LIC/IC), is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on Special Operations matters. The principal duty of the ASD (SO/LIC/IC) is the overall supervision of Special Operations activities within the Department of Defense, including USSOCOM.

USSOCOM also coordinates with the USD(P), Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology), USD(AT&L), and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) on matters within their jurisdiction which touch upon the USSOCOM Commander's "service-like" authorities under 10 U.S.C. section 167. The USSOCOM Commander and his staff works closely with USD(P), USD(AT&L), and the Comptroller, and their staffs, to ensure USSOCOM's programs are aligned with Department of Defense acquisitions policies and are appropriately funded.

In your view, what organizational relationship should exist between the ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM?

The ASD (SO/LIC/IC)'s role, as described above and in subsequent responses to your questions, describes the organizational relationship as it exists – and as it should continue to exist – between ASD (SO/LIC/IC) and the USSOCOM Commander.

What should be the role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in preparation and review of Major Force Program 11 and the SOCOM's Program Objective Memorandum?

ASD (SO/LIC/IC) is directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide overall supervision of the preparation and justification of Special Operations Forces (SOF) programs and budget; review and approve memoranda of agreement governing the USSOCOM program, budget, and execution process; approve the U.S. Special Operations Command recommendations concerning which programs the USSOCOM Commander will execute directly; review the USSOCOM Program Objectives Memoranda (POM) and budget prior to submission to the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation and the DOD Comptroller, respectively; and present and defend the SOF program to the Congress, with the advice and assistance of the USSOCOM Commander. I believe these duties describe the appropriate role for ASD (SO/LIC/IC) in oversight and support of USSOCOM.

What is the appropriate role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in the research and development and procurement functions of the SOCOM?

Working with the USSOCOM Commander and the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive, the ASD (SO/LIC/IC) advises and coordinates with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, USD(AT&L), on acquisition priorities and requirements for special operations-peculiar material and equipment. I do not presently recommend any changes to ASD (SO/LIC/IC)'s role in research and development and procurement functions of USSOCOM.

What is the appropriate role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in the operational planning of missions that involve special operations forces, whether the supported command is SOCOM, a Geographic Combatant Command, or another department or agency of the U.S. Government?

Through his broad policy, coordination and oversight roles as the principle staff assistant and civilian advisor on Special Operations matters, the ASD (SO/LIC/IC) reviews the procedures and provides policy guidance to the USSOCOM Commander on all aspects of Special Operations planning, including contingency planning when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

Combating Terrorism

What is your understanding of the Department's strategy for combating terrorism?

The current Unified Command Plan (UCP), 06 Apr 2011, designates CDRUSSOCOM as responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks, including the integration of DOD strategy, plans, and intelligence priorities for operations against terrorist networks designated by SECDEF (Pg 24, Para 17). The JSCP assigns CDRUSSOCOM the responsibility to prepare the DOD (vice USSOCOM) Global CT Campaign Plan, and to perform as the global synchronizer for planning (JSCP FY 2008, Enclosure G, Appendix A, Para 2).

What are the roles and responsibilities of the Commander of SOCOM within the Department's combating terrorism strategy and how would you fulfill such responsibilities if confirmed?

Practical implementation of global CT synchronization occurs throughout the development of the DOD Global CT Campaign Plan (CAMPLAN 7500) and its revisions, and in the parallel development of the GCCs' subordinate regional CT plans. Specifically, through the Joint Planning Working Groups, comprised and represented by all GCCs and FCCs, led by HQ USSOCOM, regional objectives/intermediate military objectives, tailored 7500 Lines of Operation (LOO), and planning and assessment tasks, are agreed upon. Further, certain cross-AOR threat actor sets are assigned to specific GCCs for Supported or Supporting planning for Flexible Response Options. The regional (GCC) plans will have an IPR A/C, either simultaneously or serially, at the Under Secretary level, allowing policy leader's visibility on GCC planning focus and priorities in each AOR.

Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other federal departments and agencies?

Joint Staff J5 and USD-P leadership is vital to advise planners of changes in Department priorities (e.g. resource availability, threat focus, interagency issues, IPR types and scheduling) when they occur. Further, as the SECDEF's Global CT plan, CAMPLAN 7500's alignment with the key national strategic documents should be validated from the policy perspective. Finally, the Indirect LOO concerning Partner Capacity Building and eroding or discrediting of violent extremist narratives are areas where the Joint Staff and USD-P can provide oversight and collaboration guidance for interagency review and validation events such as Promote Cooperation.

Afghanistan

What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan? What are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current effort to combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan?

GEN Petraeus' population centric campaign strategy is yielding its intended results. Although hard won, we are witnessing a reversal in Taliban Momentum since 2005, hundreds of Taliban are integrating, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) capacity is increasing, security force competencies are improving and the GIROA's span of influence is beginning to impact a larger segment of the rural population. Security and governance are evolving across the country and as a result we are seeing an incremental shift in popular opinion toward the GIROA. As you can readily recognize, a myriad of political, operational and economic challenges remain, but we are employing the appropriate methodology and it is producing success.

Those weaknesses and shortcomings will arise not from the strategy or the efforts of our Soldiers, Marines, Airmen and civilians on the ground, but from diminished resourcing, lack of

long-term commitment and any decrease in international assistance. These are the obstacles we must avoid to ensure success.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of special operations forces in Afghanistan, and the proper relationship between direct action and counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations there?

Counterterrorism (CT) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) are inextricably linked in Afghanistan. There must be a balanced and measured approach to their application. CT efforts including Direct Action shape the environment and create conditions necessary for the causes of instability to be address, enabling governance capacity development, Afghan security force

General Petraeus and others have emphasized the importance of the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police programs to the strategy in Afghanistan.

What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan populations and what has been the response from the Taliban?

VSO has focused on Security, governance and development simultaneously. It is a bottom-up approach linking governance to the village level. In the span of approximately one year, VSO has expanded GIROA influence in key rural areas from 1,000 Sq KM to 23,500 Sq KM today, roughly the size of the East Tennessee Valley or Lake Erie. Growth has been exponential since April 2010 and across Afghanistan we are witnessing increasing numbers of local communities requesting to participate in this GIROA program. Five sites have already transitioned to Afghan Government control, which is one measure of the GIROA's evolving capacity. The ALP program, the armed neighborhood watch association with VSO establishment by President Karzi has grown into the thousands and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior projects numbers nearing 10,000 by the summer of 2012. VSO has also enabled a massive expansion in small scale infrastructure development in these key rural areas. Approximately 2,000 development projects have demonstrated GIROA legitimacy in areas that have remained disenfranchised and ignored since 2001. These security and developmental successes combined with an aggressive GIROA governance mentoring effort are definitively changing popular attitude. It is empowering local communities, providing hope to historically disenfranchised segments of the population and as a result it is eroding support for the Taliban, denying them safe-haven and ultimately creating the conditions for long-term stability.

As a result, the Taliban have mounted an aggressive intimidation, assassination and disruption effort against GIROA officials and supportive populations. Despite these efforts however, we are witnessing ALP capturing insurgents, District Leaders requesting permissions to participate in VSO and ALP. In the South and West and North this trend continues and increasing numbers of low-level and midlevel Taliban leaders are seeking reintegration.

Do you believe the availability of U.S. special operations teams is a limiting factor in expanding these programs to a point where they can have a strategic impact in Afghanistan?

Yes, the expansion of this effort depends largely now on the growth of SOF teams and enablers. Our combined teams are producing strategic changes presently and additional SOF force structure will demonstrably expand this effect across the country.

How do indirect approaches like Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Programs compliment direct action counterterrorism missions within the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?

Village Stability Operations are the foundation of GEN Patreaus' population centric campaign strategy in key rural areas across Afghanistan. Counterterrorism efforts compliment these rural efforts by shaping and managing the security environment where these indirect approaches are pursued. One is no less or more important than the other; they are separate and distinct efforts that must, and are working in tandem to achieve immediate and enduring stability.

President Karzai has criticized "night raids" carried out by U.S. and coalition Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and alleged that they frequently result in civilian casualties.

What steps have U.S. Special Operations Forces taken to avoid civilian casualties and other collateral damage resulting from counterterrorism missions?

This is a very sensitive issue for our SOF operating in Afghanistan. They have applied multiple approaches to minimize the potentialities for civilian casualties.

1. All of our forces receive formal instruction in theater tactical directives pertaining to CIVCAS
2. Every operation is conducted with our Afghan counterparts and they are always in the lead during entry of compounds and call-outs
3. Escalation of force measures are strictly followed
4. Full integration of Afghan Security Force leadership in the planning, execution, and post-operation phases has occurred to ensure full transparency and enable their leadership to balance risk, cultural considerations, and operational requirements.
5. Our Afghan partners, as well as our own commands strive to keep district and provincial political leadership apprised of all operations.
6. Employment of CAS and Indirect Forces is a more closely managed effort at every level of command today.

CIVCAS is the exception today, not a commonality in SOF operations. These multiple efforts have a combined effect of reducing opportunities for CIVCAS and mitigating it when in the off chance it does occur.

Pakistan

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has often been described as tumultuous and the effects on this relationship of the operation that killed Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011, remain to be seen. Concerns from senior Pakistani officials related to the presence of U.S. Special Operations Forces in the country could negatively impact training and advising activities designed to counter al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Haqqani Network.

What is your assessment of the military-to-military relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan?

Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan remains positive overall, particularly at the unit level. However, periodic events within the region, oftentimes beyond the U.S.'s or DoD's control, create temporary strains at the senior level. As with most mil-to-mil of this nature, relationships, personalities play a key role and must be maintained and nurtured over the long term. U.S. SOF has a long history of mil-to-mil relations with Pakistan. The creation and stand-up of the Office of Defense Representative – Pakistan (ODRP) and Special Operations Command Central (Forward) – Pakistan (SOC(FWD)-PAK) has enhanced and continues to foster our mil-to-mil relations with Pakistan. Since 2008, ODRP and SOC (FWD) – PAK have cultivated the mil-to-mil relationship on a daily basis with much success. Over the years, many enduring personal relationships have been established and benefit both Pakistan and the U.S. I can only speak for I.S. SOF, but I expect it also holds true for ODRP that I expect these relationships and new ones to continue to grow and strengthen the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S.

In your assessment, how important is the U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military relationship to the success of our counterterrorism strategy?

Our National and Military strategy is based on the direct and indirect approach. Our military-to-military relationships with Pakistan, along with other partner nations, are part of that indirect approach and are critical to the success of our counterterrorism strategy. The U.S. cannot win the war on terrorism alone. Wherever possible, we must garner support of partner nations so they can combat terrorism within their nations' borders. The Pakistanis are a key partner in the war on terror. Our mil-to-mil relationship has assisted the Pakistanis with their successes in countering insurgent networks within their borders. Maintaining a strong mil-to-mil relationship is vital for Pakistan to enjoy continued success. From training and equipping to infrastructure enhancements, all are key components in developing and fostering out mil-to-mil relationship with Pakistan. Maintaining a properly balanced U.S. military presence of SOF personnel and Office of Defense Representatives – Pakistan personnel enable us to cultivate and enhance our relationship.

Iraq

From your perspective as Commander, Joint Special Operations Command, what are the main “lessons learned” from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn?

Both operations have provided us with many lessons learned which we have incorporated into our current operations. Some of these lessons include: the need for a unified U.S. government approach, active and integrated interagency coordination, the necessity for culturally attuned forces and the need to maximize combined operations. U.S. military and government efforts need to be synergized to provide a focused effort while reducing the likelihood of duplication and opposed efforts. Inter-agency integration is essential in our fight against violent extremism. Some of our greatest accomplishments would not have come to fruition without this coordinated effort. Our forces are now more culturally sensitive than ever before, greater language skills and incorporating female military personnel into our post operations activities have allowed our forces greater access and integration with the Iraqi and Afghan civilian populace. Lastly, we have maximized our combined operation efforts by working with and through the host nation forces. Every operation is coordinated with the Government of Iraq and Afghanistan and the Iraqi and Afghan Partnering Units. These combined operations are not only doing a tremendous job in accomplishing the mission but, also help enable and empower the Iraqi and Afghan special operations forces for future success.

As conventional forces continue to draw down in Iraq, special operations forces remain heavily engaged with their Iraqi counterparts. However, special operations forces rely on their conventional counterparts for many support and enabling functions including airlift, medical evacuation, resupply, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

If confirmed, how would you ensure special operations forces are adequately supported in Iraq as the drawdown progresses?

As we reduce our presence in Iraq, it will be essential that we make sure that our SOF continues to receive support. U.S. SOF will continue to provide assistance and support to Iraqi Special Forces until relieved. U.S. Forces – Iraq (USF-I) is developing and refining their support plans as situations dictate. USF-I has instructed its forces to conduct detailed coordination and contingency plans to mitigate any degradation to U.S. SOF support. It will be crucial for U.S. SOF to maintain access to the key enablers you have already mentioned and more until the end of Operation NEW DAWN. USSOCOM is postured to respond positively and provide U.S. SOF in support of USCENTCOM missions. I will continue to ensure SOF operating in austere locations are provided the required support through detailed coordination and planning. Contingency plans to provide emergency assistance to U.S. SOF outside of the remaining U.S. bases will require alternate means of support which will take time to coordinate and execute.

Yemen

The U.S. Government has a robust security assistance program with Yemen to help enable Yemeni security forces to deal with the threat posed by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Much of the training and advising activities under these assistance programs has been carried out by U.S. Special Operations Forces.

In light of the political situation in Yemen, what is your assessment of the most effective way the United States can advance its counter terrorism objectives there?

Yemen is unique in the Arab world, with socio-economic indicators similar to the poorest African nations, and governance limitations that invite easy comparisons with some of the world's most vulnerable states. Current political turmoil and an uncertain Yemen Government are enormous challenges that face the Republic of Yemen and by extension, the U.S. Counter Terrorism policy. No other nation enjoys the level of influence with the Yemen Government than that of the U.S. Counter Terrorism initiatives with the Yemen Government contribute directly to a more stable security environment.

FY 2011 International Military Education and Training funds will continue to be used to train and educate Ministry of Defense personnel, thereby increasing Yemen's versatility and utility as a coalition member. These funds will continue to provide equipment and training essential for Yemeni Counter-Terrorism Forces to combat terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Increased funding levels for military assistance, particularly those that relate to training and equipping Yemeni counter-terrorism forces will be essential for the Yemeni Government to neutralize the threat from AQAP within their borders. SOCOM and SOF will complement these activities with a carefully calibrated engagement in tribal areas of the country where violent extremists enjoy safe haven. Towards this end, we have established a close, working relationship with Yemen Counter Terrorism Forces.

Terrorism Threats in Africa

Over the course of the last few years, Al Qaeda-inspired and affiliated groups in Somalia and the Trans-Sahara have continued to gain strength, leading many to express concern about their intent and ability to strike the interests of the U.S. and partner nations.

What is your understanding of U.S. policy with regard to countering the threats posed by these groups?

As with all our counter-terrorist actions across the globe, we work in concert with the Geographical Combatant Commands and SOF is integrated as just one piece of the overall "Whole of Government" endeavor within the Africa. AFRICOM has laid out a comprehensive approach to building security capacity with partner nations across the continent. SOF will play a significant role in AFRICOM's four defense-oriented goals for their partner nations: having a capable military force, having professional security institutions, having the capability to defeat transnational threats, and increase Partner Nation support to international peacekeeping efforts. In assisting AFRICOM with these goals, basing, overflight and arming rights are just a few of the challenges confronting us. We need streamlined policy and procedures supporting rapid capacity building and information/intelligence sharing, in order to facilitate new and nurture existing partner relationships. We also understand this will all take place in a resource constrained environment. The difficult decisions facing Congress as you wrestle with the fiscal

realities facing this nation will most definitely have an impact on our counter terrorist activities in Africa and across the globe.

Do you believe the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets and other resources allocated to countering terrorism threats in Africa are adequate to understand and respond to the threats posed by these groups?

A significant portion of the U.S. CT effort is focused on the CENTCOM AOR and they have received the lion's share of ISR assets. ISR is a high demand, yet finite resource, and in some areas, to include Africa, we have executed an economy of effort in tackling terrorist groups. As our nation's activities in the PAK/AFG AOR change, additional ISR assets may be available to address AFRICOM's needs. DOD, with the outstanding support of the Congress, continues to build more capacity, spotlighting other significant limiting factors within Africa such as communications, basing and overflight rights/agreements, information sharing with partner nations, and highly diverse language requirements across the continent. Given the tenuous nature of African governments and the difficulties associated with adding basing/footprint on the continent, we specifically envision the need for substantial sea-based ISR to support Africa CT operations. We will be in lockstep with AFRICOM as they tackle each of these challenges. SOF will be an integral part of AFRICOM's engagement program and will help lead their response to terrorist networks working on the continent.

Western Hemisphere Transnational Criminal Organizations

General Fraser, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, recently testified that "The northern triangle of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras is the deadliest zone in the world outside of active war zones."

What is your assessment of the threat from transnational criminal organizations operating in the Western Hemisphere?

TCOs are a threat to our National Security. They enable insurgencies and terrorism, and undermine state security and stability. An obvious outcome can be seen in the violence in Mexico and Central America. They have evolved into regional threats as seen with Mexican cartel members operating as far south as Peru. These threats must be addressed through multi-national, multi-agency collaborative efforts.

What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, for U.S. Special Operations Forces in countering these threats?

U.S. Special Operations Forces should continue to support USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM's requirements to build the capacity of selected partner nation forces through training under Counter-Narcoterrorism and Joint Combined Exchange Training authorities. Where appropriate, U.S. SOF should be applied to advise and assist partner nation forces in planning operations against TCOs.

For more than a decade, Colombian security forces have worked in partnership with U.S. Special Operations Forces to counter threats similar to those described by General Fraser. This partnership has helped to enable the Colombians to significantly degrade the terrorist organization known as the FARC.

What do you believe are the primary lessons learned from U.S. Special Operations Forces training and advising activities in Colombia?

SOF is mostly effectively applied when we have persistent presence, we train the right unit at the right level, and we exercise the appropriate authorities through Regional command and control structures.

Are there lessons learned that may apply to U.S. support to Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras in their efforts to counter the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations?

SOF has the capability to train partner nation (PN) forces in a myriad of specialties that are ideal in combating transnational criminal organizations. Many of the security cooperation strategies used successfully in Colombia should be applied in other Western Hemisphere countries.

Philippines

What is your view of the effectiveness of the special operation forces assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against terrorist groups?

Although the focus of the 10 year old mission in the Philippines tends to be on the actions of the military unit against the most prominent terrorist groups, I want to emphasize that this has truly been, and continues to be, a multi-faceted approach. We have engaged with each branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police (PNP) using every available authority to help build capacity, while at the same time working to improve the image and public trust of both the AFP and PNP. Individual examples of these efforts range from Title 22 funded (using Navy and Air Force SOF) training to improve AFP aviation Night Vision Goggles and maritime capabilities, to 1206 funded procurement of precision munitions, to DoD funded Military Information operations efforts and CMSE funded Civil Affairs projects. Additionally, diplomatic efforts, Congressional interest and senior military engagement have solidified the willingness of the Philippine government to maintain the pressure on the key terrorist groups. As a direct result of these combined efforts, the capacity and legitimacy of the Philippine Security Forces has been greatly improved. An assessment of the OEF-P mission is currently being conducted by CDRUSPACOM.

If confirmed, what measures or guidelines will you employ to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in combat in the Republic of the Philippines?

Ultimately, it is CDR, U.S. PACOM who assesses the situation and coordinates with the Ambassador on the execution of OEF-P to include the size of the US Force and its employment.

In addition to the restrictions dictated by the Philippine Constitution, the current Secretary of Defense and CDR, U.S. PACOM orders are very specific and clear on how U.S. Forces may work by with and through the AFP. Obviously the right to self-defense would allow any U.S. military element to protect itself if unexpectedly attacked by the enemy. As a direct result of the current rules of engagement, there have been only three combat-related deaths; all due to IEDs.

Piracy

Despite a significant and concerted international effort, which includes various U.S. agencies and the U.S. military, piracy in the northwestern Indian Ocean and the approaches to vital sea lanes through the Gulf of Aden continues largely unabated. Similar threats exist in other key areas including the Straits of Malacca.

How do you assess the threat posed by piracy?

Piracy operations directly threaten U.S. personnel and interests in these regions. Kidnap for ransom by pirates has recently led to the death of U.S. civilians. Piracy's biggest impact however, is economic. The seizing of cargo ships and ransom demands have harmful economic impacts to companies and countries. Anti-piracy efforts for ship protections and the deployment of military assets for prevention operations continue to require significant expenditures of funds and further strains limited military assets supporting these operations.

The second and third order effects of piracy may lead to future destabilization in the affected areas. The resultant vast sums of money in these impoverished areas lead to the establishment of safe havens for pirates and their support groups. These funds also further subvert the efforts of AMISOM and the TFG in Somalia to stabilize Mogadishu against VEO groups.

What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of U.S. Special Operations Forces in counter piracy efforts?

NATO conglomerate, Navy capabilities, as well as Naval assets from coastal adjacent countries should lead the effort to deter/prevent piracy. This include patrolling pirate populated waters and identifying, boarding and where appropriate, engaging with and confiscating suspect vessels and collecting data on suspect pirates.

Special Operations involvement is currently limited in the counter piracy efforts. SOF support with unique capabilities when required. These capabilities involve Maritime Direct action, Information Ops and Building Partner Capacity for maritime operations.

SOF provides unique capabilities for execution of specialized missions worldwide. These capabilities can be incorporated into counter-piracy operations but due to the high demand, low density nature of SOF, they should not be the lead. Conventional maritime forces have capabilities better designed to deal with the full range of counter-piracy operations on the water. US SOF should only be employed in extreme scenarios where the situation exceeds ability of conventional forces to respond adequately.

Overall, with SOF current force structure and high demand worldwide for its capabilities, current U.S. policy does not warrant a high enough priority for the allocation of SOF assets against this mission since other forces have more relevant capabilities to deal with the full scope of counter-piracy operations.

Intelligence Support for Indirect Activities

Some observers contend that the national intelligence agencies focus their assistance to the Defense Department in Afghanistan and Iraq on special operators engaged in direct action operations. As a consequence, it is alleged, general purpose forces and special operations forces engaged in indirect activities, including foreign internal defense and population protection, receive less intelligence support.

Do you believe this is true?

No.

If so and if confirmed, how would you ensure special operations forces engaged in indirect activities receive adequate intelligence support?

CONPLAN 7500 makes clear the primacy of indirect activities in combating VEOs, and the successful prosecution of that approach is predicated on the level of support given to those efforts, specifically intelligence support. USSOCOM enables the indirect approach with an intelligence network focused on supporting Irregular Warfare, specifically on the tenets: Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Civil-Military Operations (CMO).

At USSOCOM Intelligence support to IW is accomplished by the fusing of all source intelligence with cutting edge pattern analysis, imagery, and socio-cultural analysis (SCA) tools and analytic techniques. These efforts are coordinated by the USSOCOM Joint Intelligence Center (JICSOC) and the Global Mission Support Center (GMSC), which provide network connectivity, 24/7 reachback support to deployed forces and SOTFs, and coordination venues for ISR support.

Although the support to the indirect approach is directed by USSOCOM, the requirements themselves are byproducts of the constant interaction between the supported Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) and USSOCOM. This interaction ensures the coordination of USSOCOM intelligence support with that of the regional Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC). At USSOCOM we realize that the majority of the GCCs are combating terrorism and VEOs in non-kinetic operations so providing tailored intelligence support to those missions is vital to successfully supporting the national security strategy.

The Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Organization, and Defense Intelligence Agency have all

adapted very well to these indirect approach intelligence requirements. To be sure, there are always capacity challenges as we continue to conduct military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and still meet other global challenges, but on balance I am very appreciative of the support provided by the national intelligence agencies.

Section 1208 Operations

Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of this authority?

Section 1208 authority remains a key tool for USSOF to operate by-with- and-through an array of willing partners in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and other locations. These foreign regular and irregular forces leverage their natural access to locations, populations and information that are denied to USSOF, but critical to our success. Their work is challenging and often carries significant personal risk. The training, equipping, and operational support provided to these partners by our forces under 1208 authority are absolutely essential to overall mission accomplishment. We are appreciative of Congress' continued support for this authority.

Recent Interaction with Congress: DASD-SOCT (Garry Reid) accompanied by USSOCOM reps provided a briefing on 27 Apr to HASC/SASC staffers that covered the FY10 annual report. The briefing was well-received, with no significant issues. There was some additional discussion on expanding the authority to go beyond combating terrorism.

Future of the Authority: Rep Mac Thornberry (R-TX), Chairman of the Emerging Terrorism and Capabilities subcommittee of the HASC, has marked the House version of the FY12 NDAA with an increase in 1208 authority from \$45M to \$50M, and directed DoD to provide a report / briefing on the future of the authority to address CT, UW, and IW requirements.

Expenditure trends (current authority is \$45M): a) FY10: \$31M spent of estimated \$38M requirement; b) FY11 (to date): \$9M obligated of estimated \$34M

Counter Threat Finance

A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence Community have called for applying more resources to identify, monitor, and halt the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and the illegal narcotics trade. Comparable efforts have been undertaken by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization against the flow of money and components supporting the construction and employment of improvised explosive devices.

What is your assessment of the value of counter threat finance activities?

Finding, stopping, and via our Law Enforcement partners, freezing or seizing terrorist and narcoterrorist resources is immensely valuable in defeating current threat operations, disrupting future threat operations and ultimately in dismantling the enemy's carefully crafted facilitation networks. Money is the oil that keeps these illicit networks in operation, whether moving guns, jihadists, drugs, or illegal merchandise or persons. Sustained Counter Threat Finance activities are a critical part of any effective Counter Terrorism effort or campaign. CTF done well is preventive and thus highly cost effective.

What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of SOCOM in supporting counter threat finance activities?

The enemy's sustainment networks are global in nature, and to defeat them, our approach must be global as well. We are not effective against these threats when we constrain ourselves in archaic thinking that limits our field of action, whether geographically, functionally, or otherwise. Hence, SOCOM was recently designated the DOD Lead for Counter Threat Finance and that role should be maintained, possibly even expanded, to ensure DOD can operate effectively alongside and in support of our interagency partners.

SOCOM Acquisition Authorities

SOCOM is unique within the DOD as the only unified command with acquisition authorities and funding. Further, the Commander of SOCOM is the only uniformed commander with a subordinate senior acquisition executive.

If confirmed, how would you ensure SOCOM requirements are adequately vetted and balanced against available resources before moving forward with an acquisition program?

USSOCOM has a robust requirements and programming process that is vetted through a Board of Directors consisting of leadership from each of the Component Commands. This disciplined process allows USSOCOM to align available resources with requirements and to prioritize these requirements within our budget and future year programs.

What role can SOCOM's development and acquisition activities play in broader Service and Department of Defense efforts?

USSOCOM is a microcosm of the entire Defense Department, and our challenges are very similar to investment requirements among the Services. USSOCOM also has mature processes to conduct rapid evaluations of technology, systems, and concepts of operations, the results of which benefit SOF and are transferrable to the rest of the Department. Special Operations Forces Acquirers specialize in the integration of emerging off-the-shelf technologies. This integration allows USSOCOM to take the best from each Service as well as industry and modify or

customize the equipment to meet special operations needs and rapidly field it to the force. Our success can then be shared with the Services to improve their capabilities. Some of the SOF technologies that have made their way to the Services include the MH-47 Chinook helicopter common avionics architecture system (CAAS) cockpit, an extended service life wing for the C-130, the MK48 lightweight machine gun, software defined tactical radios, and an improved sniper sight.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that Special Operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall Department of Defense research, development and acquisition programs?

Although USSOCOM generates and validates all SOF requirements, these requirements are provided to the Joint Staff for inclusion in the Joint Requirements Knowledge Management System. In addition, USSOCOM has initiated acquisition summits with OSD, drawing together USSOCOM, USD(AT&L), and the Service Acquisition Executives where we discuss acquisition issues of common interest. For example, the SAEs agreed to synchronize technical and programmatic plans among all investment portfolios as well as explore initiatives to develop common architectures and standards across different future SOF and Service platforms. Additionally, OSD(AT&L) agreed to develop a plan to address the standardization for certification and other Service test requirements between Services and USSOCOM to gain efficiencies and promote common process reciprocity. Continuing that dialogue/exchange will remain one of my priorities.

If confirmed, how would you ensure sufficient resources are dedicated to the development of special operations-unique platforms, when required?

Ensuring SOF not only has the resources to conduct today's operations but preparing ourselves for the future environment is one of my top priorities. The Board of Directors process allows the Command to take a strategic view of future requirements and achieve a balance. Since 9/11, the MFP-11 Budget has kept pace with operations, and the investment funding has allowed USSOCOM to support these increased demands and acquire equipment as required.

If confirmed, what metrics will you use to determine the effectiveness of SOCOM technology development investments and whether SOCOM is investing sufficient resources in these efforts?

We have created a series of technology roadmaps that assist us in identifying promising solutions to our problems. These roadmaps are schedule oriented, containing both the technology development timelines and the formal acquisition program schedules. As such, they have quantifiable metrics (cost, schedule, performance, and technology readiness) embedded in them.

SOCOM has undertaken a series of acquisition programs to fulfill its undersea mobility requirements. Both the Advanced Seal Delivery System and the Joint Multi-Mission Submersible programs were terminated and SOCOM recently initiated a new undersea mobility acquisition strategy.

What lessons has SOCOM drawn from previous undersea mobility acquisition efforts and, if confirmed, how would you ensure they are incorporated into current undersea acquisition efforts?

From our previous efforts, USSOCOM learned that satisfying a wide range of undersea requirements with a “one size fits all” solution was challenging. As a result, we are pursuing a series of dry combat submersibles along with modifications to the dry-deck shelters. This diversified approach will allow us to meet our operational requirements by deployment from either a surface ship or via a dry deck shelter on a submarine.

Acquisition Workforce

If confirmed, how will you ensure that SOCOM has an acquisition workforce with the skills, qualifications, and experience needed to develop and manage its acquisition and research and development programs?

The USSOCOM Acquisition Executive manages the SOF Acquisition workforce similar to the Service Acquisition Executives. SOF Acquirers are specialists in Science & Technology, acquisition, contracting, and logistics. They are operationally oriented, professionally trained and certified, and experts in the SOF-unique processes needed to meet the equipping needs of SOF. We are working with USD(AT&L) to expand our organic acquisition workforce, as well as create a unique identifier for SOF acquisition positions.

Transformation of the Special Operations Forces

Much attention has been focused on the transformation of our conventional armed forces to make them more capable of conducting counterinsurgency and combating terrorism missions.

Do you believe our special operations forces (SOF) need to be transformed as well?

No, not in reference to the development of COIN or combating terrorism capabilities.

If so, what is your vision for such a transformation, and how would the transformation of conventional forces complement a SOF transformation, and vice versa?

USSOCOM and its components have featured counterinsurgency capabilities for many years. We have worked closely with the Services to prepare the total Joint Force, including conventional forces, to execute COIN and counterterrorism missions.

The partnership between conventional forces and SOF is as strong as it has ever been. The extensive combat employment of both forces in shared battle spaces has increased the need to closely coordinate our operations. This has resulted in a sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) between SOF and conventional forces that has helped to increase conventional force capabilities to execute COIN and combating terrorism operations.

The transformation of SOF needs to build on the hard combat skills we have honed over the last 10 years by adding to our ability to understand the operational environment and better discern the likely effects of kinetic and non-kinetic actions we take in complex and increasingly urbanized environments. One of the ways we will help in this transformation is to increase our language and cultural capabilities of our forces. This includes recruiting of both females and U.S. born citizens who speak certain specific languages and are knowledgeable about the socio-cultural aspects of these regions.

Special Operations Personnel Management

Some have argued that the Commander of SOCOM should have greater influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of special operations forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, United States Code, to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from “monitoring” the readiness of special operations personnel to “coordinating” with the services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect special operations forces.

What is your view of this proposal?

Ensuring we have the right people to perform SOF missions is paramount to our operational success. Service personnel policies significantly impact SOF retention--especially as they relate to compensation, development, and promotions. Changing Section 167 to reflect the word “coordinating” rather than “monitoring” will give USSOCOM more influence than it currently possesses. The recently implemented DODI 5100.01 requires the Services to coordinate their personnel policies and plans with USSOCOM. The “coordination” policy will provide USSOCOM more visibility into personnel policy changes and initiatives. USSOCOM is in the initial phases of working with the Services to put this policy into action. We’re optimistic that the inputs provided by USSOCOM during the coordination process will provide the influence needed to develop and retain the most capable SOF personnel.

Size of Special Operations Forces

The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces and enablers that directly support their operations.

Do you believe that we should further increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?

The growth we received during the previous two QDRs has served us well. We are still realizing these increases, with more than 12,000 programmed personnel still to arrive in the next four years. The current Commander has recommended that manpower growth not exceed 3-5 percent annually and I agree with ADM Olson that growing too fast will dilute capability and outpace the

support structure we have in place. A gradual increase in capacity ensures that second and third order effects can be accounted without sacrificing the quality of the SOF Operator.

In your view, how can the size of special operations forces be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?

We are acutely aware of the risks of focusing on quantity rather than quality. In order to sustain our current growth rates at an acceptable level, we have stepped up our recruiting efforts and have enhanced our training pipelines to increase the throughput of our operators with no loss in quality.

Readiness and Operational Tempo

The current Commander of SOCOM has described a “fraying” of the special operations force due to high operational tempo.

What is the current dwell time ratio for SOCOM personnel?

The calculation of dwell time varies depending on the context. Within the Global Force Management process, USSOCOM is required to provide real time dwell calculations when responding to force requests.

These responses are generated based on actual deployment data and current force structure. USSOCOM has multiple unit types (e.g.: Special Forces ODAs, SEAL Platoons, aircraft platforms and crews, Marine Special Operations Teams, etc); too many to list in this response. However, overall, the deployment to dwell ratio for USSOCOM capabilities ranges between 1:0.8 and 1:2. The most requested tactical level units lie at the lower end of this scale while the higher level headquarters at the upper end. With the exception of Special Forces ODAs, the current dwell of forces closely relates to that projected in the Operational Availability 2010 assessment. This assessment accounted for force structure growth not yet realized. However, force demand has continued to outpace some programmed growth. For example, between August 2009 and August 2010, USSOCOM added 36 ODAs to the inventory while ODA requirements increased by 37.5.

In your view, how will shifting resources from Iraq to Afghanistan affect personnel tempo and dwell time ratios?

While some Special Operations resources will shift from Iraq to Afghanistan, it most likely will not be a one for one offset. Some Special Operations Forces will shift to support other operations as well. The demand for SOF worldwide is at such a high level that OPTEMPO will still have to be very carefully managed.

What can be done to increase dwell time for SOCOM personnel?

USSOCOM will continue to support the requirements of Geographic Combatant Commanders at the highest level we can sustain without “breaking” the force. In most cases, SOF are doing what they expected and wanted, and they feel good about their impressive contributions. That said, we will set and enforce maximum deployment rates for each element of the force.

Much of the answer to the OPTEMPO challenge is in providing: 1) greater predictability, and 2) more opportunities to train closer to home when not deployed overseas.

Today, due to the significant demand for Special Operations Forces, many units conduct a combat rotation then, during their dwell period, will deploy for a shorter duration in order to support foundational (Phase-0 type) operations before again deploying for a combat rotation.

In your view, how has sustained high operational tempo impacted the readiness of special operations personnel?

High OPTEMPO has had a number of impacts on SOF readiness:

1. CENTCOM Focus: Over the years one of the major hallmarks of SOF personnel has been regional expertise and language proficiencies for the key nations and/or non-state groups of the region. Since 9/11 the vast majority of SOF operations have taken place in CENTCOM AOR. As a result language proficiency and cultural awareness for other Geographic Combatant Commands has suffered.
2. The compressed time between deployments has had a major impact on the readiness of SOF forces. Opportunities to attend some schools and advanced training normally required for SOF personnel has been reduced or eliminated. Examples include reduced time for classroom language training/proficiency for all SOF; advanced SERE School; lack of fixed wing aircraft available for live ordnance drops needed to train Joint Tactical Air Controllers; lack of vertical lift capability to train SOF ground forces and aircrew proficiency; lack of fixed wing refueling aircraft for helicopter in-flight refueling and ships available to conduct deck landing qualifications. Insufficient availability of non-SOF ranges to support SOF training is a significant issue.
3. Equipment: The lack of CONUS equipment also impacts SOF personnel readiness. SOF aircraft are deployed at the maximum sustainable rate. The lack of CONUS-based rotary/tilt wing lift presents a serious readiness challenge for aircrew qualifications / proficiency and training for SOF ground forces. Many of these assets are either forward deployed or in depot level maintenance. These equipment issues, coupled with compressed inter-deployment timelines, have had a significant impact on overall SOF readiness.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to reduce the negative impacts associated with high operational tempo of special operations personnel?

First and foremost, we must instill the force sourcing discipline previously discussed to improve dwell time, reduce the high operational tempo, and therefore, reduce some of the negative impact resulting from the current operational tempo.

Additionally, USSOCOM must coordinate with the Combatant Commands and Services to ensure that we have developed the best possible force sourcing recommendation for Combatant Command requirements. In some cases, Conventional Forces or a combination of Conventional and Special Operations forces may provide a better solution than a solely Special Operations force.

A number of actions have already been taken to reduce some of these negative impacts on SOF. These include realigning Army Special Forces Groups to specific Geographic Combatant Commands in order for those personnel to regain cultural and language proficiencies; increasing language proficiency pays and training opportunities for all SOF personnel; contracting fixed wing aircraft as a short term “fix” for training Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTAC); and maximizing CONUS-based vertical lift assets for training SOF ground forces.

In the future it is imperative we continue our close relationships with the Services in order to gain or maintain current access to various ranges and to utilize more military fixed wing aircraft for JTAC training. Other initiatives should include continued development and utilization of simulators as a substitute for a portion of live ordnance training requirements; creation of a SOF special pay based on the current aviation flight pay model; and continue or enhance current retention incentives for SOF personnel.

In your opinion, how has the high operational tempo affected the resiliency of SOCOM personnel, including rates of suicide, over the past several years?

Trend analysis shows that SOF personnel, compared to the conventional force and the population in general, are more resilient and capable of successfully handling the stress of high operational tempo. The SOF community has become extremely responsive the creeping “fraying” of the force as operational tempo has increased over the past several years. Successful preventative programs include Command Leadership, an in-depth assessment and selection process, prevention, treatment, and education.

This responsiveness, based on proactive command leadership directives, significantly increased overall force resilience. These directives support the enhancement and availability of psychological support throughout the SOF community. The success of this program is based on a number of basic concepts:

1. A SOF peculiar application of “Assessment and Selection” of potential candidates has been critical to this process. Command leadership, combined with the use of embedded psychologists, assess all personnel and closely monitors those individuals with potential or actual issues.
2. This process enhances the “Prevention” aspect of the directive through training, education, and monitoring.

3. The key to this program is “access to care” within the Military Health System (MHS) when required. This has decreased the negative stigma associated with seeking professional psychological help.

Recruiting and Retention

How successful have the services been in recruiting and retaining the special operations personnel that are needed?

In today’s operating environment, the demand is much greater for SOF operators with varying languages, more cultural attunement, and regional expertise. Service recruitment efforts face many challenges as selection from the pool of eligible U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents are limited due to medical, educational, or conduct reasons. However, Service recruiting commands, in coordination with SOF Component commands continue to be overall successful in recruiting SOF operators.

Continued support for programs like Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI), which has great potential to alleviate some critical strategic language and cultural gaps is needed. Looking forward, the Services’ recruitment must increase for those candidates who will bring ethnic, business, academic, technical and experimental diversity to SOF.

What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in the SOCOM community?

The recent Pressure on our Force focus groups identified that one of the primary reasons personnel consider leaving the force is the lack of predictability for deployments to both named operations and to GCC theater security cooperation program missions—specifically, late shifts in deployment schedules and the insertion of new requirements.

What steps need to be taken, in your view, to meet the recruiting and retention goals of each of the services’ special operations forces?

The Services need increased flexibility to incentivize those qualified individuals who choose the path to become special operators. We need your help in supporting programs that are beneficial to SOF and in maintaining recruiting budgets for the Services.

What monetary or non-monetary incentives do you believe would be most effective in this regard?

USSOCOM currently has a set of retention incentives programs focused on maintaining our most senior and most experienced SOF personnel: Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB), Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP), Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) and Critical Skills Accession Bonus (CSAB). These programs have been effective in retaining their target demographic.

OSD directed a compensation study to verify the effectiveness of our current incentives programs. The OSD study is also looking at trends inside other demographics beyond our senior

SOF personnel. This will give us the information we need to change or modify our existing programs. Trends are starting to show losses in our junior and mid-career SOF personnel. Adapting our retention incentives to counter losses within our junior ranks will ensure they stay SOF until they become our senior SOF personnel.

Prior to the initiation of the OSD study, SOCOM established a compensation working group composed of members of the SOCOM HQs and the SOF Components. This working group was charged with gaining the approval of the Services to extend the current incentives and look at modifying our compensation plan based on being in a state of persistent engagement. The working group proposed a new compensation plan called SOF Career Pay or SCP (pronounced “skip”).

There are two primary intents incorporated into SCP: Predictability and Relative Parity. By institutionalizing the retention benefit, we eliminate the need for periodic revalidation and approval as with current incentive programs. However, periodic re-evaluation of the program is integrated into the proposal. SCP will provide service members with a predictable and dependable retention plan which incentivizes them throughout their entire SOF career. One of the thought processes behind SCP is to ensure newly trained and mid-career SOF personnel remain in military service to become our experienced senior SOF personnel. Currently, our retention incentives’ package focuses solely on senior SOF personnel. The Services will reap the long term benefit of the time and resources invested into our SOF personnel. The second primary intent of SCP is relative parity across the Services by granting similar compensation to those possessing similar skills, experience and mission sets.

Diversity in SOCOM

How do you define diversity in SOCOM?

SOCOM’s definition of diversity includes the traditional categories of minority representation and more. The ability to speak foreign languages, know the eccentricity of the region, blend into foreign environments, and understand the local cultures of our operating regions are invaluable skills which lends diversity to SOCOM. Diversity in application is our female Cultural Support Teams which allow us access to key populations in some environments which were not previously possible.

Do you believe that achieving greater diversity in SOCOM is a priority?

Yes, diversity is an operational necessity for SOF. SOF engagement continues to grow into populations with varied societal values. SOF success is impacted by our ability to assess and adapt on multiple fronts. As such, SOF members must possess a broad range of skills and backgrounds.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that continued progress toward diversity goals is achieved without violating reverse discrimination principles of law?

If confirmed, I will work with Senior DOD leadership and the Services to identify future operational requirements and support funding for them. The ability to recruit the right people, with the right skills, means establishing the right target goals.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

What is your assessment of current sexual assault prevention and response policies and procedures in SOCOM?

The military services have primary responsibility to ensure sexual assault response personnel (Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, Victim Advocates, medical and mental health providers, and criminal investigation personnel) are well trained to support victims, investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault. If resources are not readily available where the alleged incident occurred, victims are transported to a facility where there is appropriate victim advocate support, medical and psychological care (regardless of service) and investigative/legal support.

The Joint Staff remains a key partner with the Services and OSD in the campaign against sexual assault. Additionally, the Joint Staff works closely with the Combatant Commands during the development of operational plans and personnel policy guidance to ensure the prevention and response to incidents of sexual assault is addressed.

Prevention of sexual assault is a leadership responsibility. Commanders at all levels must remain committed to eliminating sexual assault within our forces by sustaining robust prevention and response policies; by providing thorough and effective training to all assigned Service members, by identifying and eliminating barriers to reporting; and by ensuring care is available and accessible.

Do you consider current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

Yes. For a multitude of reasons, sexual assault has historically been an under-reported crime. Restricted reporting has been effective. Although the use of restricted, or confidential, reporting doesn't allow a commander to investigate alleged assaults, it does allow a sexual assault victim to confidentially receive medical treatment and counseling without triggering the official investigation process.

Unrestricted reporting supports a sexual assault victim who desires medical treatment and counseling—but also provides for official investigation of his or her allegations within existing administrative reporting channels (such as their chain of command, law enforcement or through the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC)).

As our military members' confidence in the reporting and investigative policies and procedures improve, I believe and certainly hope that more victims will choose unrestricted reporting. This will ultimately increase offender accountability.

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources SOCOM has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

The services are responsible for training sexual assault response personnel to ensure they are well trained to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault. For example, in March of this year, the Army opened phase three of its Intervene Act Motivate (I.A.M.) Strong program. The four-phase program emphasizes that leaders must understand their responsibilities to ensure victims of sexual assault receive sensitive care and support and are not re-victimized as a result of reporting the incident. It also provides tangible guidelines to help Army leaders remain alert to, and respond proactively to, incidents of sexual assault. Improved training for investigators is also a priority and this includes investigative resources in deployed areas. As you may imagine, the combat environment and deployed operations are very dynamic and investigative resources are often strained by other mission requirements. Remoteness of locations, availability of transportation, or the level of ongoing operations may complicate access to resources. I believe the DOD training network in place now prepares investigators to handle sexual assault cases in a caring, responsive, and professional manner. Our ability to respond and support victims is critical.

Women in Combat

The expanding role of women and the implementation of women-in-combat policies in the armed forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.

Prior to 1994, the Department of Defense (DOD) Ground Combat Exclusion Policy prohibited assignment of female service members to units expected to engage in direct ground combat. The FY94 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) repealed the U.S. Code that supported that policy (10 USC 6015), and required the armed services to issue policy /orders governing the same. The Secretary of Defense issued a “Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Policy” on 13 January 1994 that took effect on 1 October 1994. In part, that policy states:

a. Rule. Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground, as defined below.

b. Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel.”

Additionally, the FY11 NDAA required DOD and the Services to review all laws, policies and regulations restricting service of female members of the Armed Forces. DOD is expected to provide its report to Congress by October 2011.

What is the current SOCOM policy regarding the role of women in SOCOM operations?

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) follows the Department of Defense policy. Recently, USSOCOM sought and was granted approval from OSD(P) to attach

females to select Special Operations Forces in order to perform activities that are inappropriate for males to accomplish, i.e. assisting in the searching of and engaging with women and children. This approval is in full compliance with established DOD policy.

What is your view about changing the policy to allow female military personnel to be assigned to SOCOM units?

Many female military personnel are already assigned to SOF units in a variety of roles. In order to explore opportunities to expand the participation of females in operational activities, USSOCOM fully supports the DOD's efforts to review all laws, policies and regulations restricting service of female members of the Armed Forces as directed by the FY11 NDAA.

Language and Cultural Awareness Capabilities

Deployed special operations personnel are heavily concentrated in the Central Command theater of operations, including many who have been deployed outside of their regional area of expertise.

Are you concerned that the language and cultural skills among special operations forces are being degraded because of repeated deployments outside their regional area of expertise?

Rotational deployments of units not regionally aligned to the CENTCOM area of responsibility have indeed taken a toll on the language, regional expertise, and culture capabilities of those units for their aligned regions. OPTEMPO limits our ability to retain and retrain for primary areas of responsibility while still preparing for the next CENTCOM deployment. This is being addressed to a degree by our force structure growth, however, that growth places increased stress on our training resources.

OPTEMPO continues to reduce our ability to send mid and senior grade operators to advanced regional education and professional development programs such as Foreign Professional Military Education and the Regional Centers program. We leverage these programs to improve specific regional acuity and cultural understanding.

Over the last year we have improved as a command with getting operators to Regional Centers, however during the previous 2 years we pulled primarily from the senior grade USSOCOM HQ Staff officers due to operational units executing rotational deployments. Therefore, the return on this investment was limited by our decreased ability to send mid-grade operators, with longevity in SOF, to build core capability and long term regionally focused relationships.

If so and if confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to ensure these unique skills are adequately maintained?

USSOCOM set new, higher language capability requirements for its components in 2009. Since then, the SOF Service components significantly ramped up and improved training processes.

The HQ, USSOCOM also worked recruiting, language proficiency pay, and other policy issues to help facilitate higher capabilities within SOF organizations. Following through on these initiatives and ensuring the resources necessary for their continuation will remain priorities for the Command. The SOF Service components are actively engaged in implementing their programs and USSOCOM will continue to engage the Department and Services to this end. Policy issues we continue to pursue include native/heritage recruiting, valuing language and regional capabilities in selections and promotions, language testing and incentives, maintaining DOD funded Defense Language Institute detachments at some of our components, adding SOF specific school billets and funding from the Services for foreign education, and encouraging the Services to award Intermediate Level Education and Senior Level Education equivalency for FPME programs.

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command

Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC), is a subordinate component command to SOCOM established in 2005.

What is your assessment of the progress made in standing up and growing MARSOC, and what do you consider to be the principal issues that you would have to address to improve its operations?

MARSOC was ordered established in NOV of 2005 and actually activated on 24 FEB 2006. Since that time, MARSOC has made great strides developing and deploying relevant forces in support of SOCOM and the GCC's. Support from both SOCOM and the Marine Corps have been good. Even though MARSOC represents only 5 percent on SOCOM's total force, they have been aggressively employed as they continue their force build. In fact, MARSOC has conducted over 150 deployment to 18 countries since activation, and has 2 full Marine Special Operations Companies continually present in Western Afghanistan, as well as having just recently completed its second Special Operations Task Force HQ's deployment there. Over the last 5 years, they have also completed their Critical Skills Operator training pipeline, screening applicants with a rigorous Assessment and Selection process and then training those selected Marines in SOF operations through an 8 month Individual Training Course. MARSOC has similarly built a training pipeline for all its inherent Combat Support personnel in order to ensure all their deployed Marines and Sailors can conduct well integrated operations once deployed. Finally, I want to mention the superb working relationship between the Marine Corps and USSOCOM. Over the next several years MARSOC will grow by an additional 1001 active duty Marine billets, occupy state of the art training and living facilities currently under construction and continue receiving next generation SOF-peculiar and Service common equipment. The Military Construction (MILCON) program produced significant mission support capability through delivery of facilities at Marine Corps Bases Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton, with plans to deliver additional facilities to accommodate capacity shortfalls. The interrelated relationship between the Marine Corps and USSOCOM not only solidified the Marine Corps role as an equal partner in the SOF community, but also expanded the SOF capacity and capability that our Nation needs at this critical juncture in the War on Terror. So, I would assess MARSOC's progress over the past 5 years as tremendous.

As to the principle issue remaining, I believe that MARSOC's greatest challenge is the management of its continued growth as it moves toward Full Mission Capability. We currently project that MARSOC will be fully manned with Critical Skills Operators in FY 14. The 1001 additional CS and CSS Marines previously mentioned will be assigned to MARSOC from FY 13-16. This uniformed growth, with an accompanying growth in civilian structure, will allow MARSOC to fully deploy and employ their robust capability of 1 Marine Special Operations Regiment (consisting of 3 Bn's, each with 4 Companies, with each Company containing 4 Teams), 1 Marine Special Operations Support Group (made up of all the Combat Support and Combat Service Support necessary to support MARSOC operations) and 1 Marine Special Operations School (conducting Assessment and Selection, the Individual Training Course, and follow-on Advanced Courses).

What unique attributes, if any, does MARSOC contribute to the capabilities of U.S. Special Operations Forces?

MARSOC brings several unique attributes to SOCOM:

1. First, they are Marines, and they bring a Marine perspective to all their efforts. This perspective, though not easy to quantify, is very valuable and the results speak for themselves. They certainly are very agile and can rapidly reorganize and adapt in order to address new or emerging requirements.
2. Second, MARSOC has been leading the effort to completely integrate Intelligence and Operations at the lowest possible level. To that end, they have task organized their 14-man Marine Special Operation Teams with additional Intel Marines and all the equipment necessary to collect and fuse locally collected intelligence. Their all source intel analysis allows the team to conduct organic, bottom-up targeting/engagement. The local battlespace dominance and distributed operations we see MARSOC conducting in Afghanistan today are proof of the value of this concept and the 1001 Marines being added to MARSOC's structure include a large number of Intel Marines to further bolster this capability.
3. Third, MARSOC brings a unique Command and Control mindset and capability to SOCOM. As Marines, coming from a MAGTF background, they are experienced and comfortable with ground elements, aviation elements and logistics elements combined within a single command and adept at tying all those efforts together into a cohesive effort. MARSOC has twice deployed Special Operations Task Force HQ's to Afghanistan, provided Command, control, Coordination and Support to Special Operation Forces spread of 100,000 square miles. At the lower levels, Marine Special Operations Companies routinely operate and direct the operations of SEALs, Special Forces and even foreign SOF elements in conjunction with their own inherent teams.

Recently, the Marine Corps approved a primary military occupational specialty forenlisted Marines trained as special operators allowing these personnel to remain in MARSOC for their professional careers.

Do you believe officers should have a similar opportunity as enlisted Marines to serve the duration of their military career in MARSOC rather than rotating through the command as they do currently?

Officers who attend ITC are assigned to MARSOC for a 4 year tour instead of the traditional 3 years. They also receive designation with an additional MOS (0370) to ensure their MARSOC service and training are highlighted in their record. With the 0370 designation, these officers can then be tracked and their records reviewed for the potential of follow on assignments back to MARSOC. However, the number of officers assigned to the operating forces at MARSOC is very small. My initial impression is that retaining certain officers within MARSOC for their entire career would impose some manpower management difficulties on the Service, but the topic is worthy of discussion between myself and the Commandant, particularly as we move closer toward the completion of MARSOC manning in FY16.

Special Operations Missions

In recent years, special operations forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to SOCOM's Title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities special operations forces are carrying out around the world.

What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?

USSOCOM and SOF senior leaders are in the process of reviewing the current list of SOF core activities, as listed in DOD Directive 5100.01, to ensure it captures the "new normal." The outcome of this review could become the basis for a future update to the Directive and other key documents.

Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

USSOCOM and SOF senior leaders are in the process of reviewing the current list of SOF core activities, as listed in DOD Directive 5100.01, to ensure it captures the "new normal." The outcome of this review could become the basis for a future update to the Directive and other key documents.

What can be done to ensure that indirect SOF missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

Indirect SOF missions are part of what the Department now calls foundational activities. The foundational activities which SOF perform have not necessarily lacked emphasis, but rather took

a back seat during the last decade as SOF surged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, today we have plenty of resulting pent up demand. Moreover, we expect a future increase in the requirement for SOF to conduct foundational activities, as an evolved defense strategy premised on conflict prevention takes root. Accordingly, I do not see a lack of emphasis as being a future issue for SOF foundational activities. However, appropriate funding and authority are key. First, I believe Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton's current proposal before Congress to create a Global Security Contingency Fund that would provide assistance for security forces, rule of law, and stabilization is indispensable to the future success of SOF foundational activities. (Both Departments would contribute resources to the GSCF and have a say in its allocation, creating a real incentive for integrated planning and prioritization.) Accordingly, I recommend Congress pass it as proposed in the current legislative session. Second, we appreciate Congress' ongoing support for Section 1206, which we view as one of our most critical tools for building the capacity of partners to conduct counterterrorism operations and fight alongside us in stability operations. Third, increasing the resources at the Department of State for this work is essential. The Foreign Military Financing program provides a structure for long-term partner capacity development essential to future missions, but it is not sufficiently resourced to meet important needs.

May 1, 2011, Operation in Abbottabad

The successful operation on May 1st, 2011, which resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden, was a signal victory in the armed conflict against al Qaeda and affiliated organizations.

What do you view as the most important factors that contributed to the success of this operation?

The operation was successful due to excellent interagency cooperation, Operational Security, and the tenacity and flexibility of the operators involved to adjust to any contingency that they encountered.

What steps need to be taken, in your judgment, to ensure that the capabilities of U.S. Special Operations forces to undertake similar missions in the future are maintained and improved?

U.S. SOCOM must maintain the ability to rapidly take full advantage of cutting edge technology that will allow our SOF operators to gain the edge on an increasingly sophisticated adversary. But developing new technology from scratch is too time consuming and expensive so SOF must continue to be innovative in utilizing and modifying COTS technology to support our missions. In addition, the key factor in any operation is the operator. Maintaining high standards, challenging training environments, and encouraging ingenuity develops unique and valuable operators. Finally, continuing to break down barriers between the various Agencies and Departments allows for increased cooperation and synchronization, allowing the U.S. Government to successfully accomplish the mission.

Military Intelligence Operations

In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the intelligence community?

SOF intelligence operations follow all existing policies and regulations guiding DOD and interagency activities. One key difference is the speed of special operations activities. SOF has refined the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze (F3EA) intelligence cycle to support the cycle rate of SOF activities. The F3EA process is now being migrated to conventional forces. SOF have also placed a premium on sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and the collection and registration of biometrics data from the battlefield. SOCOM elements have developed a series of joint interagency task force nodes, both in deployed areas and in CONUS, that bring together expertise from all our interagency partners. Their specific expertise in SSE, combined with the methodology of the F3EA process, drives special operations on a much faster operational cycle than conventional operations. SOF maximizes interagency contributions through reachback, deconfliction and coordination of activities between agencies, which allow our forces to get inside the enemy's decision cycle.

If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are coordinated adequately with other activities carried out by those in the intelligence community?

SOCOM will continue to follow all applicable intelligence community directives, report required sensitive activities to the USD(I), maintain the robust intelligence oversight processes in place involving our Inspector General, Staff Judge Advocate, and our Command Oversight Review Board. I will maintain and build upon the relationships developed over time with the numerous federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies represented in our Interagency Task Force in Tampa. Additionally, SOCOM will continue to employ and leverage our liaison officers, which we call Special Operations Support Team members, to coordinate with agencies in the NCR. Interagency collaboration is a significant contributing factor in many of our biggest successes.

Special Operations Personnel in Embassies

SOCOM deploys personnel to work with country teams in a number of priority countries where the United States is not engaged in direct action operations, but rather trying to stop the spread of violent extremism. Their mission is to support the priorities of the Ambassador and the geographic combatant commander's theater campaign plan against terrorist networks. At times, Ambassadors have complained that they have not been adequately informed of activities by special operations forces in their country.

If confirmed, what do you intend to do to make sure the goals of special operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned closely with those of the Ambassadors they are working with?

USSOCOM has two persistent, strategic avenues to engage with and inform the Embassy leadership of SOF capabilities and operations, the Ambassador Orientation Visit (AOV) Program and the Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) Program.

The AOV provides future Ambassadors the opportunity to visit SOCOM headquarters, receive briefings on USSOCOM unique capabilities and responsibilities, as well as regionally targeted introductions considerate of their newly assigned posts. During the program the ambassadors have a one hour one-on-one discussion period with their respective TSOC Commander and a one hour session with the SOCOM commander. To date SOCOM has hosted more than 75 ambassador designees. Feed back on the program has been positive and the future ambassadors have indicated that the experience is worthwhile and will help them in the future.

Please describe the value of these special operations personnel to their respective Geographic Combatant Commands and the country teams they are supporting.

Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs) are USSOCOM sourced, U.S. SOF qualified officers, and placed under Chief of Mission authority as part of the Country Team, via the NSDD-38. There are currently eight serving SOLOs in various countries with two more going out summer 2011, for a total of ten SOLOs working with the U.S. Embassy country teams. These countries were selected based on their proven or potential ability and desire to work USSOCOM as partners across the spectrum of Special Operations missions and goals. The SOLOs serve as the USSOCOM Commander's representative to the country team and host nation Special Operations Forces. A prime objective of the SOLO program is improving coordination between the U.S. country team, the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) and the host nation. Although the program is still relatively new, all indications are positive. The countries that have SOLO's enjoy a more efficient, direct coordination, and information sharing on SOF specific issues.

Military Information Support Operations

The Department of Defense recently announced that it was discontinuing use of the term “psychological operations” in favor of the term “military information support operations.”

Do you support this change? Why or why not?

Yes. Today, for some, the term PSYOP unfortunately conjures up images of propaganda, lies or deception -- and these inaccurate perceptions limit the willingness to employ MISO personnel in some areas where they could be extremely effective.

To date, there is some evidence that the name change has allowed for some increases in acceptance, cooperation and coordination throughout the U.S. government and our partner nations.

What operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe such a change will have?

Replacing the term Psychological Operations with Military Information Support Operations throughout military doctrine, manuals, and other documents is one of semantics. There were no directed changes in doctrine or operational employment of the force.

Do you believe the Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and other assets to conduct the range of military information support missions being asked of them?

MISO forces and assets, like the rest of the military, are stretched thin with the ongoing operational requirement to the deployed combat forces. This low density force is one of the most deployed in the military which demonstrates the need to increase forces and assets. Under Admiral Olson, USSOCOM conducted several reviews to address these issues. One of the first responses to increasing the MISO capability is the reorganization of SOCOM MISO forces. This reorganization will reduce redundancy in commands and allow for the repurposing of numerous positions from staff to operational capability.

Al Qaeda and affiliated violent extremist groups work hard to appeal to both local and foreign populations. The composition and size of these groups in comparison to the U.S. Government permits them to make policy decisions quickly.

Do you believe the Department of Defense is organized to respond quickly and effectively to the messaging and influence efforts of al Qaeda and other affiliated terrorist groups?

The Department of Defense is well positioned and organized from the strategic level to the tactical to quickly respond to al Qaeda and its affiliates when a quick response is what is required. But unlike kinetic warfare, effectiveness in the war of ideas does not necessarily lie in outpacing the tempo of our enemies. A steady drumbeat which clearly articulates U.S. policy over time, anchored in the bedrock truth, best serves our national interests. The Department of Defense takes its lead from the Commander-in-Chief and the Department of State, in reinforcing the message from our nation. In doing so, we are extremely effective in face-to-face engagements, through a broad array of engagements with our partner and host nations, and allies, on a daily basis. As a representative example, we reinforce our ability to engage with printed products, such as the Geographic Combatant Command's Regional Magazines and the Geographic Combatant Command's foreign engagement websites. These mediums allow us a broad range of options.

In addressing AQ, we collectively identify and exploit their miscues and errors, and forcing them into a reactive role to gain the initiative. The DOD in that way, determines the appropriate level of response and quickly coordinates that response with other agencies, and the State Department. Our military Commanders have a solid understanding of the impact messaging can have in the strategic environment and exercise authorities with coordinated guidance allowing them broad flexibility to respond in the most appropriate manner.

While shocking video and extremist propaganda constantly reminds us that al Qaeda and their affiliated terrorist groups exercise streamlined and individual messaging --- with unencumbered

release processes and no mandate for truth--- it would appear to give them the ability to address emerging issues, as they see them, at a time and place of their choosing. But recent events suggest that the mainstream is rejecting their propaganda.

What do you believe is the appropriate role for Military Information Support Teams in these activities?

The MIST is the MISO equivalent to the Special Forces operational detachment. The element that executes MISO at the operational and tactical level—but should not be equated to tactical loudspeaker elements that operates in support of combat maneuver forces

The Military Information Support Teams develops messages to counter hostile information and propaganda, that are culturally relevant and acceptable to the host national population. Such messaging is closely coordinated with the embassy due to the Team's relationship in support of the embassy staff. The MISTs also can maintain awareness of the information environment by identifying current trends in local and regional media reporting, identifying hostile messaging, and measuring local populace reaction.

Civil Affairs Operations

Civil affairs activities carried out by U.S. Special Operations Forces in partnership with host nation personnel play an important role in developing infrastructure, supporting good governance and civil societies, and providing humanitarian assistance, including medical and veterinary services to needy populations.

In your view, does SOCOM have sufficient personnel and resources to conduct the range of civil affairs missions required for today's operations?

Civil Affairs activities are most effective when coordinated with other U.S. government efforts, most notably those carried out by USAID.

If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs activities by special operations personnel are integrated into larger U.S. government efforts?

Military Information Support Operations can have an amplifying effect on Civil Affairs activities by actively promoting the efforts of the U.S. military and host nation and by communicating truthful messages to counter the spread of violent extremist ideology among vulnerable populations.

If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations are adequately coordinated to achieve a maximum impact?

I'll start by saying this is a mutually supporting effort where, as you've stated, MISO can and does support, reinforce, and amplify CA efforts on the ground. On the other hand, CA can and does amplify MISO efforts to affect behavior through their on the ground activities. In a nutshell,

it's about "words and deeds" – you can't have one without the other, and depending upon the situation one will support or be supported by the other.

Today, we affect this coordination and synchronization through our strategic plans and guidance, where both MISO and CA staff members participate with our strategic planners to ensure, depending upon the situation, activities of both are nested and mutually supporting. This is also true at the TSOCs and GCCs.

On the ground, this coordination and synchronization is affected through the deployment and organization of cross-functional SOF teams that often include elements of MISO and CA who work together, plan together, and often operate together, in coordination with the US Embassy and Country team and JSOTF and / or TSOC CDR's objectives.

While there's room for improvement, we believe we're on the right track. We continue to reinforce our efforts for CA and MISO to work more closely and better achieve our population-centric and indirect approach. Starting with a synchronized campaign in coordination with, and often in support of, our USG civilian interagency partners, CA and MISO have and will continue to improve operations to counter violent extremism as part of USG strategic objectives globally.

Training Capability

What capabilities do you consider most important for effective training of special operations personnel?

Professional military education remains an essential element to the development, sustainment, and advancement of SOF. Additionally, language skills and cultural knowledge continue to be key to establishing effective relations with the foreign forces, organizations, and individuals with which SOF will interact.

Maintaining core Special Operations skills are also critical. They provide the base for what makes SOF special.

What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance training for special operations personnel?

SOF's competition for Service installation's Ground Tactical Ranges and Training Areas with the General Purpose Forces is one of our greatest challenges. Given SOF's OPTEMPO and unforecasted mission requirements SOF needs priority at Service installations over GPFs allowing immediate and unfettered access to ranges and training areas. In the current environment, training time is short and precious.

From a Presentation of Force Perspective, Pre-mission and Pre-deployment training with relevant Service-provided capabilities (e.g. mobility, fires, engineers, etc) is also critical to ensure that joint SOF packages are effective and fully-enabled. The continued emphasis on language and cultural awareness training is important. Special operations forces have seen remarkable

improvements to three key areas since 9/11 — shooting, moving, and communicating. Now the command must concentrate on “understanding.”

What are the most significant challenges in achieving effective training of special operations personnel?

USSOCOM must move from a primarily threat-focused approach to a populace-centric approach. To achieve U.S. strategic objectives, the instruments of national power, including the military, and more specifically SOF, must posture for and then execute an approach based on populace-centric engagement. In this approach, the U.S. out competes rivals in the open market of relevant populations as opposed to countering rivals in a more conventional manner based on threat-centric engagement. While emphasizing the need for the indirect approach, we must not weaken our ability to execute direct action when necessary. To be successful, we must optimize our role with the defense-diplomacy-development construct and design our training programs to maximize our combat capability and make our staffs more effective.

Another challenge is ensuring there is enough time to train in the deployment cycle to maintain proficiency in our core SOF capabilities. Since most SOF missions require non-SOF support, time must be added to work closely with the Service Providers prior to deployment.

What, if any, training benefits accrue to U.S. special operations forces from training foreign military personnel?

SOF providing training in regional synchronization, intelligence sharing, planning and coordination for counterterrorism related operations has provided huge benefits. SOF also participates in Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises throughout the world. These exchanges enhance SOF skills and fulfill training requirements. They also build person-to-person and unit-to-unit relationships.

The bottom line is we must continue to develop relationships with our foreign counterparts for persistent engagement, cultural awareness and to maintain SOF instructor and language skills.

To what extent, in your view, is it appropriate for the United States to rely upon contractors for training foreign military personnel? What do you see as the primary risks and advantages in such contractor training?

Training of foreign forces, as a general rule, must be conducted as a part of the Department of State Title 22 funded Security Assistance or Security Cooperation programs. SOF support to these programs usually does not include the use of contracted personnel. The use of contractors in many cases may make sense from a cost perspective, as well as relieving military assets from these tasks. The risk to SOF in using contracted personnel is the possible disclosure of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) which SOF has developed, and has resulted in our successes on the battlefield. SOF reviews contracts for training to foreign forces to ensure TTPs are protected from disclosure. The problem is trying to monitor contracted training that is being done by other countries for foreign forces. Frequently, former U.S. military personnel accept employment with

foreign companies to conduct SOF training. It is very difficult to monitor the disclosure in this case.

Contractors are not a SOF substitute. They should only be used in a support role such as logistics and administration. The risk is they are not military and therefore cannot represent the U.S. Government. The advantages are they free up SOF from routine logistical and admin support functions and allow them to concentrate on operational mission accomplishments.

Capabilities of Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for increased counter insurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces.

What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of responsibilities assigned to general purpose and special operations forces, particularly with respect to security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?

Special Operations Forces have routinely been the force of choice for Security Force Assistance (SFA) activities. However, SOF cannot indefinitely sustain current levels of overseas presence. The resulting pressure on the force and our families is too great and the pressure is creating a dramatic effect on our readiness. All capabilities, including SOF, require foundational activities to make them sustainable. Any comprehensive plan to develop a capability must address these activities base. The GPF maintains the subject matter expertise to deliver most of these foundational activities. The GPF's primary challenge is the lack of core competence in advising specific skills. The GPFs challenge in the future will be to effectively institutionalize what they have learned, developing the right capabilities, and establishing effective and responsive policies, processes, and procedures to meet the National Security goals with respect to building foundational activities necessary for conflict prevention. Once it is institutionalized across the Department, we feel the development of foundational activities can be accomplished through the appropriate employment of GPF, SOF or SOF/GPF mix.

GPF are best suited for delivering GPF capabilities to foreign military forces in environments where overt U.S. Presence is acceptable to the host-country government and where large-scale U.S. presence is considered necessary and acceptable by the host-country government or in areas where a limited overt presence is acceptable to the host nation government. SOF is more appropriate for politically sensitive environments where an overt U.S. presence is unacceptable to a host country government. These are not hard and fast rules but should serve as general guidelines for the Department.

Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to become more like special operations forces in mission areas that are critical to countering violent extremists?

A key element to countering violent extremists is removing the factors that inspire hatred and discontent, both in their organizations and more importantly, among the populations they recruit.

In order to do this effectively, any force, whether SOF or GPF, needs to have an understanding of the culture, and be able to build relationships with the population that promote mutual respect. A key element in the training of SOF personnel is the development of regional and cultural orientation, language capability, and an ability to interact effectively in other cultures.

In Afghanistan for example, there are many GPF units currently conducting activities that are traditionally Special Operations and that are important for building Afghan capacity to counter VEOs and raising their standard of living to a point where most incentives to join VEOs no longer exist. NTM-A/CSTC-A has GPF conducting Foreign Internal Defense by training Afghan National Army and Police forces. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are conducting capacity building, medical, and engineering support missions that fall under the heading of Civil Affairs, as well as Information Operations to help the Afghan government communicate more effectively with its own population. PRTs and other GPF units also conduct Humanitarian Assistance activities.

GPF needs to be more SOF like as it pertains to the Knowledge, Skills and Attributes (KSA) that make special operations forces effective, such as language, culture, regional expertise, cross-cultural ability, diplomacy, and adaptability. These KSAs will enable the GPFs to effectively execute the missions and activities that support SOF, ICW SOF or independently to create an environment unfavorable to violent extremist organizations (i.e.: enhanced capabilities to conduct or support missions in FID, COIN, STABOPS, SFA, UW, and IO as outlined in the 2010 QDR). I would also mention that the Services have made great strides in this direction in the last two or three years.

Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for special operations forces only?

Missions involving the Title 10 SOF Core Activities of Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, and Unconventional Warfare are highly specialized and from a military standpoint SOF should have primacy due to the extensive specialized mental and physical training required and the high degree of risk that the personnel conducting these missions accept.

However, other agencies in the U.S. Government also specialize in some of these missions, particularly Counterterrorism and Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. SOF needs to partner closely with them in the conduct of these operations. Additionally, SOF is best suited for politically sensitive environments, where an overt U.S. presence is unacceptable to the host country government, and to denied environments.

Special Operations Enabling Capabilities

The Commander of SOCOM has described the “non-availability” of force enablers as SOCOM’s “most vexing issue in the operational environment.” The 2010 QDR sought to balance previously mandated growth in special operations forces with additional enabling capabilities.

What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling capabilities facing special operations forces?

The greatest shortage is in those enabling capabilities not organic to USSOCOM's force structure.

USSOCOM's organic enabling capabilities are those that provide our forces the ability to self-sustain for short durations while maintaining the agility that allows us to deploy forces quickly in support of the Combatant Commanders. Support of Special Operations Forces, by doctrine, and except under special circumstances, becomes the responsibility of each Service's theater logistic command and control structure; Services and/or executive agents should be prepared to support Special Operations not later than 15 days after Special Operations Forces are employed.

Shortages of enabling capabilities for SOF are often similar to the shortage of enablers that plague the rest of the deployed force. Special Operations Forces struggle to obtain enough intelligence, EOD, ISR, communications personnel, medical, and security personnel support.

Do you believe additional enabling capabilities, beyond those mandated by the QDR, are required to support special operations forces?

The QDR mandated an increase in the number of organic combat and combat service support assets available to both the Army and Navy special operations units. These capabilities include logisticians, communications assets, forensic analysts, information support specialists, and intelligence experts. We are slowly realizing this programmed growth, and it will make a difference in how our units are supported. The QDR only addresses growth within USSOCOM. USSOCOM will always rely on the Services for some level of support as addressed in the previous question. Our higher 'tooth to tail' ratio when compared to conventional forces will make us dependent on the services for most operations in excess of 15 days.

Do you believe additional enabling capabilities should be grown within SOCOM or provided in support of special operations forces by the services?

Both, but the preponderance of those support capabilities should remain in the conventional force and be provided to SOF through the habitual association of Service combat support and combat service support capabilities with the SOF units they primarily support.

Currently the responsibility of the conventional force to provide sustainment support to SOF is not clearly defined or specified. This limits SOF's ability to sustain operations.

USSOCOM is currently working with its Components, the Services and the JS to develop the Special Operation Force Generation process to improve how it requests these critical capabilities. We will work to better define our requirements and make them farther in advance, to allow the Services to plan for the employment of habitually associated units in support of SOF. A reduction of our emergent requests and an increase in habitually associated Service provided capabilities will go a long way to resolve this problem.

Render Safe Proficiency

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a growing and especially concerning threat to our nation. Select special operations units are assigned the task of interdicting and rendering-safe weapons of mass destruction should they ever fall into the wrong hands.

If confirmed, how would you ensure render-safe capabilities are adequately maintained by special operations units who may currently be heavily engaged in offensive kill/capture missions against high value targets in Afghanistan and elsewhere?

Currently, our capabilities are adequately maintained by special operations units. I will continue to use the current training and exercise programs in place. Special operations units participate in the Joint Operational Readiness and Training (JORTS) Cycle that incorporates world-wide deployments, individual training, collective training, and joint exercises (and evaluations) year round.

Do you believe additional render-safe capabilities are needed within SOCOM?

Yes, but allow me to qualify that answer. As I stated before - our capabilities, training and exercises are on track. We are abreast of the latest's threats. However we cannot rest. We must stay in front of the evolving threat through our research and development (R&D) programs. I am grateful for what we have, but as with any program, we are limited by funding. Increased funding for our R&D programs could potentially enhance our current capabilities within SOCOM.

Supported Combatant Command

Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by the President or Secretary of Defense, SOCOM may operate as a supported combatant command.

In your view, under what circumstances should SOCOM conduct operations as a supported combatant command?

In your view, what resource, organization, and force structure changes, if any, are required in order for SOCOM to more effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command responsibilities?

The plan of using SOCOM as a supported commander for CT ops was developed soon after 9-11. Part of the reasoning was based on the assumption that SOCOM forces would most likely be prominent players in any terrorist-related incident, and also the fact that SOCOM is not limited to any specific area of ops. Additional rationale was that the SOCOM Headquarters staff would be best suited to quickly plan any effort that spanned several AORs and / or involved precision timing based on a potential need for near-simultaneous execution against multiple targets. However, during the last ten years, several real-world scenarios and numerous CT-focused global exercises have not supported the earlier belief that CDRUSSOCOM is the best choice for

being the Supported Commander for CT-related ops. In every case, both real-world and exercise, the final decision was to designate the GCC as the Supported CDRs. Their staffs, each of which includes a TSOC of more than 100 personnel, proved they were able to competently coordinate cross-GCC efforts and there was no need for an added layer of C2 between them and the SECDEF. Also, the Joint Staff has concluded they are capable of executing the planning for any CT-related mission and may only require some SOF augmentation rather than a SOCOM-led effort. I cannot think of any other situation where CDRUSSOCOM would be the best choice for acting as the Supported CDR.

Interagency Collaboration

The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.

What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?

We have learned a great deal over the last decade about the strength of collaboration. The organizational innovation of forming small task forces of subject matter experts from across the military, government, and partner nations allowed SOF in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere to synchronize efforts with an efficient agility. These task forces all follow three simple principles: the practice of flattened, agile communications, extensive senior leader involvement across the U.S. government and allies, and the leveraging of information dominance provided by these subject matter experts and their systems. These principles are our most important lessons learned.

How do you believe these efforts can be improved?

As we approach future phases of operations in New Dawn and OEF, these forward interagency task forces will likely relocate and refocus on other regions and priorities. We must preserve the ability for the greater interagency network to support these task forces by asking them to loan their best and brightest to the effort. We must remember that any complex task is best approached by flattening hierarchies. It gets everybody feeling like they're in the inner circle, so that they develop a sense of ownership.

How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine and adopted as “best practices” for future contingency operations?

We're on the right track with doctrinal publications such as Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.” Capturing the best practices of these horizontal interagency teams in future editions is critical.

Treatment of Detainees

Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

In your view, is the prohibition in the best interest of the United States? Why or why not?

Yes. It is essential that we follow both international and domestic laws regarding treatment of detainees. We do this not only to maintain international respect but also to set the example and to live our values. The way we behave shows how we view individual's lives. It is who we are.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes, I fully support those standards.

Section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and inhuman treatment.

Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that our special operations forces comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

USSOCOM ensures that these regulations are followed through unit and individual training, and incorporated into all operational plans, pursuant to law and Department of Defense instructions. I would emphasize their importance, direct continued compliance, and hold those who fail to follow the standards accountable for their actions. Prompt investigation into allegations of abuse and swift action are keys to ensuring strict compliance.

What steps, if any, would you take to ensure that those foreign forces *trained* by our special operations forces understand the necessity of complying with the Geneva Conventions when detaining and interrogating individuals?

When conducting the training, I would ensure that our Special Operations Forces personnel continue to explain in clear terms why it is important to follow international laws, treaties, and conventions, and the consequences of failure to abide by them. Additionally, I will make sure that we continue to use these training opportunities not just to show them what we do and how we do it, but to also explain why it works. The best thing we can do is set the example and set down our expectations that they should emulate what we do not because we tell them to but because it is the right thing to do. Finally, we make it known that further military assistance and training is predicated on their adherence to the law of war and human rights laws, as required by the Leahy Amendment.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander of SOCOM?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.