

Advance Policy Questions for General James D. Thurman, USA
Nominee for Commander, United Nations Command,
Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command,
and Commander, United States Forces Korea

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the war fighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

No. If confirmed, I will continue to be alert to the need for any modifications.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Not applicable.

Duties and Qualifications

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea and what is your understanding of how these different command responsibilities interrelate?

The Commander, United Nations Command (CDR UNC), serves as commander of an international command and is responsible for maintaining the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. The CDR UNC acts in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions and directives. The CDR UNC also acts in accordance with directives from the United States government that are transmitted by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, keeping the Commander of United States Pacific Command informed. The CDR UNC is responsible for the strategic direction, guidance, operational control of forces, conduct of combat operations, and acceptance and integration of United Nations Command (UNC) member nations' forces during contingencies. This includes enabling access to the seven UNC bases in Japan.

The Commander, Combined Forces Command (CDRCFC), as commander of a bi-national command, supports Armistice Agreement compliance, deters hostile acts of external aggression directed against the Republic of Korea, and, should deterrence fail, defeats an external armed attack. In this position, the CDRCFC is responsible for receiving strategic direction and missions from the United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) Military Committee, which acts as the strategic coordinating interface for ROK and United States national authorities. The missions and functions for the CDRCFC are prescribed in the Terms of Reference for the Military Committee and in the U.S.-ROK "Military Committee Strategic Directive Number 2."

The Commander, United States Forces Korea, as a sub-unified commander of the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), is responsible for all duties and functions associated with Title 10, United States Code, the Unified Command Plan, and CJCSI 5130. This role provides the United States with the means to provide forces to CDR UNC/CFC as required, and to support these forces with the required logistics, administration, and policy initiatives necessary to maintain readiness.

These three commands are, in a sense, mutually supporting of each other's missions. The Combined Forces Command (CFC) and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) can both provide support to the Armistice functions of the UNC. Similarly, both USFK and UNC can provide support to CFC for the latter's deterrence and defense missions. International support to the CFC is coordinated through the UNC. The close consultative partnership with our ROK allies and the member nations of UNC ensure that these commands are leveraged in a complementary fashion in order to support the national interests of both nations.

What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

If confirmed, my first priority as the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander must be to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined joint and combined commands that are prepared to fight and win. My extensive operational combat and joint duty experience positions me well to perform this key task. As a battalion executive officer during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Chief of Plans and Policy for Allied Forces Southern Europe in Kosovo (1999-2000), the Chief of Operations for Coalition Forces Land Component Command during the invasion of Iraq (2002-2003), and the Multi-National Division Commander responsible for all coalition operations in Baghdad, Iraq (2006), I have obtained the operational experience and skills that are needed by a UNC/CFC/USFK Commander who must lead forces that are ready to "fight tonight" on the Korean Peninsula. If confirmed, my operational experience in a combined/coalition environment would be of great benefit in a future role as the Commander of multinational UNC and the bi-national U.S.-ROK CFC. In the case of CFC, the ability to work effectively with a partner nation is particularly important as significant change will occur under the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan. Experience gained from operating and leading in multiple combined/coalition environments prepares me well for applying the lessons learned toward further strengthening of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. Most recently, my assignment as

the Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) has prepared me for leading large and complex organizations – FORSCOM is the Army's largest organization – an experience that will serve me well when dealing with the complexities of UNC, CFC, and USFK. Additionally, by currently having the responsibility of overseeing, manning, training, and equipping 237,000 Active Component soldiers, and training and readiness oversight of 560,000 soldiers in the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, I am well positioned to apply this experience toward maintaining joint and combined commands on the Korean Peninsula that are prepared to fight and win.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

If confirmed, I plan on conducting in-depth discussions and exchange with personnel of the U.S. and Republic of Korea governments, non-governmental organizations, educational and research institutions, and civil society at large in order to enhance the expertise needed to command United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea. I will continue this dialogue and exchange throughout my time in command so that my knowledge and understanding of affairs in the Republic of Korea continues to increase and mature.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea with the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Combatant Commands, the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, Department of Defense Field Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities, organizations, and commands established or designated by law, or by the President or by the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with sections 111, 113, and 192 of Title 10, United States Code. The functions of the heads of these offices are assigned by the Secretary of Defense in accordance with existing law. The CDR UNC reports to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and through the Secretary of Defense to the President, while at the

same time keeping the Commander, United States Pacific Command, informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities. A validated bi-national U.S.-ROK document provides further guidance on CDR CFC's unique relationship with the ROK National Command and Military Authorities and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the authorities contained in Title 10 United States Code, and except as expressly prohibited by law or order of the President or Secretary of Defense, has full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense upon any and all matters concerning which the Secretary of Defense is authorized to act pursuant to law.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy, and the integration and oversight of Department of Defense policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. CDR UNC communicates through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments, including: recruiting; organizing; supplying; equipping to include research and development; training; servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering to include the morale and welfare of personnel; maintaining; construction, outfitting, and repairs of military equipment; and the construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities as well as the acquisition, management, and disposal of real property and natural resources.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of the Services under Title 10, United States Code. Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. The Service Chiefs of Staff also provide military advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Commander, United States Pacific Command

The Commander, United States Forces Korea, as commander of a sub-unified command of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), reports directly to Commander, USPACOM, on matters directly pertaining to United States Forces Korea areas of responsibility. Commander, United Nations Command and Commander, Combined Forces Command, keep the Commander, USPACOM informed of any communications with U.S. national authorities.

Other Combatant Commanders

The Commanders of the Combatant Commands are responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the military missions assigned to them and shall exercise command authority over assigned forces as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions within the chain of command by transmitting to the Commanders of the Combatant Commands the orders of the President or the Secretary of Defense.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

Based on my initial study of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and vital U.S. national interests in Northeast Asia, there are four major and enduring challenges that confront any UNC/CFC/USFK Commander.

First is the requirement to deter war, defend against provocation and attack, and maintain the Armistice. As shown by events in 2010, North Korea continues to commit provocations that have become increasingly escalatory and dangerous. A significant challenge is to understand the regime of Kim Jong-il and attempt to determine its intent. The Alliance must take the necessary actions to deter attack, break the cycle of North Korean provocation, and remain ready to defend if deterrence fails.

Second, the command must continue readiness preparations to fight and win a war with North Korea and at the same time prepare to deal with the complexity of a regime collapse and the attendant consequences.

Third, the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander must sustain the strategic U.S.-ROK Alliance and ensure that the military component of the Alliance continues to be strong as it has been historically and serves the interests of our two countries.

Finally, we must continue to transform the Alliance in the best way to achieve national security objectives on the Korean Peninsula. This should be done within the dynamic changes occurring in the region and the fiscal constraints imposed by the global economic situation.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

If confirmed, to address these enduring challenges I will focus on the readiness of U.S. and ROK forces to be able to “fight tonight.” This includes placing strong emphasis on joint and combined warfighting fundamentals, readiness and sustainment at best value, interoperability of forces, and counter-provocation. Planning and preparing for the complex challenges of war and collapse provides the foundation for deterrence, defense, and maintaining the armistice. If deterrence fails the Alliance will win the war; if regime collapse occurs we will deal with the myriad potential scenarios of regime collapse.

If confirmed, I will work to sustain and strengthen the Alliance, building on the great work both our militaries and our governments have done over the years and focus on sustaining mutual trust and interoperability of forces through a robust joint and combined training program.

Finally, if confirmed, I will work toward transforming the military component of the Alliance in accordance with the interests of the U.S and ROK and our fiscal constraints.

North Korea

North Korea represents one of the greatest near term threats to regional security and stability. The seriousness of the threat is seen by North Korea’s continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and ballistic missile program, and particularly, over the past year, by North Korea’s unprovoked and deadly attacks against South Korea – specifically the attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK) navy ship *Cheonan* in March 2010 and the artillery attack on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

I believe North Korea remains the primary threat to security in Northeast Asia. Over the past few years, the security situation on the peninsula has reached high levels of tension following the attack on the *Cheonan* and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. North Korea has hindered the progress of Six-Party denuclearization talks; adopted a policy of provocative actions in an attempt to secure concessions; continues its nuclear program, which includes pursuit of Highly Enriched Uranium; and continues to proliferate dangerous technologies. Although its conventional force threat continues to decline, it has compensated by investing in asymmetric capabilities, such as ballistic missiles and special operations forces. However, Kim Jong-il carefully weighs the cost and benefit of military action and avoids actions that could escalate to war. Our primary concern is the potential for additional North Korean provocations, which is a tool of choice as part of its coercive diplomatic strategy designed to safeguard the regime, maintain internal control, and extort foreign aid.

North Korea is also in the process of a succession of power from Kim Jong-il to his son, Kim Jong-un, adding another dynamic to deterrence. Although little is known of Kim Jong-un, there is no evidence to suggest his decision-making calculus will differ significantly from his father's or that his strategic priorities will change. However, Kim Jong-un's youth and inexperience increase the likelihood of miscalculation, as does the imperative for him to establish credibility with the military hardliners he needs to support succession. These factors make him less predictable in the near-term.

I believe the U.S.-ROK Alliance is strong and ready to address these and other security challenges on the Korean Peninsula.

What is your understanding of how the attacks on the *Cheonan* and on Yeonpyeong Island changed the ROK and U.S. security posture on the Peninsula?

In response to these two attacks by North Korea, the U.S. and ROK engaged in a series of combined military exercises designed to send Pyongyang the clear message that its irresponsible and belligerent behavior must stop and that both the U.S. and ROK remain committed to enhancing their combined defense capabilities. The first exercise held in this series was a combined maritime and air readiness event called *Invincible Spirit*. This exercise included extensive training in the areas of anti-submarine warfare, battle group air defense, surface warfare training, including live fire exercises, and a robust complement of aircraft that flew a variety of missions.

Invincible Spirit was followed by the *Ulchi Freedom Guardian* exercise. This annual exercise, like all other training events conducted by the Combined Forces Command, was designed to improve the U.S.-ROK Alliance's ability to preserve the Armistice. The exercise was focused on ensuring readiness to prepare for, prevent, and prevail against a full range of provocations that could occur on the Korean

peninsula now and in the future. Following *Ulchi Freedom Guardian*, the U.S. and ROK conducted a combined anti-submarine warfare exercise. Focused on anti-submarine warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures, the exercise was conducted in the waters west of the Korean Peninsula. This anti-submarine warfare exercise was followed by a U.S.-ROK naval and air training event that provided training in the areas of fleet protection, alerts/intercepts and defensive counter air/combat air patrols, air defense, surface warfare readiness, basic seamanship maneuvers, logistics sustainment, and communications.

When viewed in their totality, the set of combined exercises conducted since North Korea's attacks in 2010 have enhanced U.S. and ROK combined defense capabilities and readiness, improved force interoperability, and demonstrated U.S. commitment to regional security.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to South Korea, Japan, and the United States by North Korea's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities?

North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear programs pose a direct threat to security in Northeast Asia. The Kim Regime continues to use these two programs to shape conditions to gain leverage during negotiations, to extract concessions, and ensure regime survival.

With an inventory of more than 800 ballistic missiles, North Korea continues to build short and medium range missiles of increasing range, lethality, and accuracy, while enhancing the survivability of its missile forces. With its continued research and development of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, and possible fielding of an intermediate range missile, North Korea grows closer to threatening the western United States and striking Okinawa, Guam and Alaska. This missile development program presents a threat which cannot be ignored.

North Korea demonstrated the ability to produce a nuclear weapon with its second nuclear test on 9 October 2006 at Punggye. The intelligence community assesses that North Korea has enough material for at least six plutonium-based weapons. Additionally, there are indications that North Korea has pursued a highly enriched uranium program in the past, and it is likely the effort continues today. In November 2010 North Korea displayed a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon to foreign visitors. The facility's purpose, ostensibly, is to produce fuel for a light water reactor currently under construction at the facility. However, this capability could provide an alternative source of highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.

What is your assessment of North Korea's conventional capabilities and readiness?

Despite decades of decline in overall readiness and capabilities, North Korea retains the fourth largest armed force in the world with more than one million active duty

and five million reserve personnel. More than seventy-percent of these forces are arrayed within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone and North Korea has garrisoned up to 250 long-range artillery systems in positions to strike the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area. Although an aging and technologically inferior force, North Korea fields over 1,700 aircraft, 800 naval vessels, and 13,000 artillery systems. The most modern North Korean tanks are no match for the U.S. M1A2 main battle tank or ROK K1 and K2 tanks. The North Korean Air Force has a very limited number of modern aircraft, and its pilots have a fraction of the flight hours of Republic of Korea and U.S. Air Force pilots. The North Korean Navy's surface fleet is likewise aging and suffering from maintenance problems. North Korea's leadership likely understands its military is incapable of seizing the Korean Peninsula by force and that a conventional war would result in an end to the Kim Regime. However, the North will continue to use its military as a key component of a coercive strategy designed to gain concessions through intimidation and provocations.

What, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean Peninsula?

I believe the most important factor in maintaining deterrence on the Korean Peninsula is the maintenance of a strong U.S.-ROK Alliance. The Alliance is grounded in the Mutual Defense Treaty and we are now striving to develop and expand the Alliance based on the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement, Strategic Alliance 2015 plan, and the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation. These Alliance development measures are designed to build more adaptive and flexible force capabilities and promote closer policy and strategic coordination between the U.S. and ROK. Additionally, it is important to think of deterrence in a holistic manner, and to this end I will seek to ensure that we maximize the military elements of national power as a part of a synchronized whole of government approach. By maintaining a strong Alliance, the U.S. and ROK will maximize the deterrence effect of their combined capabilities.

North Korean Nuclear Program

North Korea recently disclosed that it has a functioning uranium enrichment program. Whether this program is intended for nuclear power, as the North Korean government claims, or for nuclear weapons is unknown. Having achieved enrichment capability, however, North Korea could certainly use that capability to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons. North Korea has a history of proliferating missile and nuclear technology. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was established as a means to interdict suspect shipments, including shipments of nuclear or missile items to and from North Korea.

Would you recommend any improvements to the organization or capability of the PSI member nations to improve the ability to interdict prohibited shipments to and from North Korea?

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an interdiction program designed to impede or stop the transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. It is an interdiction partnership among participating states where the development of operational concepts, organization of the program, and the sharing of information is done through meetings of its Operational Experts Group (OEG). Since endorsing the Statement of Interdiction Principles in May 2009, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has increased its PSI participation. This increased participation is evidenced by its hosting of the *Eastern Endeavor 10* maritime WMD interdiction drill off the port city of Busan and its joining of the OEG in November 2010. Although issues of organization and operational concepts of the PSI are an issue for the OEG, I do believe the initiative is an important component of the international community's effort to stop the transfer of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to states and actors of concern. I support enhancement of the initiative.

In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?

Effective counter-proliferation requires an interagency and international cooperative effort with the intelligence effort the most critical. ROK and U.S. naval forces from the U.S. 7th Fleet participated in the October 2010 ROK led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise Eastern Endeavor 10. If confirmed, I will assess whether U.S. or Combined ROK/U.S. forces can more effectively contribute to the PSI. For the employment of other Department of Defense forces and capabilities, I would defer to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense.

In your view, how does the lack of progress in diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program inform or guide U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy in the region?

As I understand the situation, our diplomatic efforts have been extensive and we have made numerous attempts to reach an agreement leading to a verifiable disablement and dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs through the Six-Party Talks. However, responsibility for the lack of agreement rests with North Korea. The Kim regime continues to pursue its nuclear weapons and delivery systems programs and this indicates its potential intent to be able to employ or proliferate nuclear weapons. Therefore, the U.S. must maintain its nuclear deterrence capability and continue extended deterrence for the Republic of Korea until such time as North Korea verifiably dismantles its nuclear program.

Ballistic Missile Defense Priorities

The proximity and size of North Korea's missile inventory and the unpredictability of the North Korean regime place a premium on the missile defense capabilities in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula.

What is your assessment of the highest priority missile defense needs of U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command?

In 2008, the Secretary of Defense signed guidance directing the distribution of a set number of Patriot PAC-3 and GEM missiles for the Korean Peninsula. To date, the designated number of munitions set forth in that document has not been provided to the U.S. Patriot forces stationed in the ROK. The number of missiles designated for the ROK or, preferably, the Air Defense Artillery Brigade's full unit basic load, is the highest priority concerning missile defense on the Korean Peninsula.

What missile defense capabilities do you believe are needed in the near term to meet the operational needs of these commands, and what systems are available to provide such capabilities?

One of the basic tenants of air and missile defense is the employment principle of "layered defense." Layered defense allows different missile defense systems to engage an inbound ballistic missile at different points in its trajectory. Although there is more than one missile defense system in the ROK, they are not mutually supporting nor do they provide layered defense. The U.S. and ROK militaries both have Patriot systems which conduct engagements in the terminal phase of a missiles flight (the current version of the ROK Patriot systems provide a very limited Theater Ballistic Missile [TBM] defense capability). The ROK Navy has acquired three Aegis-like missile defense cruisers (KDX IIIs) but they currently do not have missiles to be used in theater missile defense (TMD) nor do they have the ability to engage TBMs over the Korean Peninsula. The system that would best support the layered defense employment principle is a Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system which can engage inbound TBMs at either the terminal or mid-course phase of flight. A THAAD system could be used to provide layered defense and also improve early warning for the Korean Peninsula as well as enhance Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) early warning in the region.

The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review established a policy of pursuing a Phased Adaptive Approach to regional missile defense, including in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. This approach is intended to provide timely and effective defense of existing and emerging missile threats with a flexible set of missile defense capabilities, tailored to each region.

Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, and do you believe it is an appropriate approach to providing missile defense capabilities for the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula?

I do support the President's guidance on Phased Adaptive Approach as detailed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review report. This approach is designed to enhance regional security and deterrence architectures in a way that is flexible and adaptive, and responsive to the threat. In coordination with Commander USPACOM, US Forces Korea has been working over the past decade to build a robust BMD force posture that contributes to deterrence and assures the Republic of Korea of our commitment to their security and to greater regional peace and stability. I will continue to work with my counterparts as plans for a regional PAA are further developed.

Do you believe it would be in our security interests to seek a cooperative missile defense relationship with South Korea as a means of enhancing security on the Korean Peninsula and the region?

Yes. There are many benefits and synergies to be gained by cooperative missile defense with the ROK. The U.S. is working with the ROK to evaluate its missile defense requirements. Should the ROK decide to pursue additional BMD capabilities, experience with other allies has shown that we can each leverage our BMD capabilities through operational cooperation. We also believe that regional security can be enhanced through cooperative missile defense relationships.

North Korea-POW-MIA Recovery Efforts

From 1996-2005, the United States worked with the North Korean military to recover and repatriate the remains of American service-members who perished on the Korean peninsula. However, in the spring of 2005, the United States unilaterally halted the program.

In your opinion, should the United States work with North Korea to repatriate the remains of American service-members found in North Korea? If so, when, or under what conditions, should the United States resume such cooperation?

It is a core value of the U.S. and our military to not leave a fallen comrade and I believe every attempt should be made to recover those missing as long as it does not conflict with critical security interests and appropriate conditions exist to execute recovery operations. This is an enduring commitment our Nation makes to its Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines.

The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) has responsibility for strategy and policy regarding the recovery of Korean War remains and provides Defense Department oversight on the entire personnel accounting process. The United Nations Command (UNC) assists DPMO and the U.S. Pacific Command Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) in arranging operational and logistics support to remains recovery operations in North Korea. Also, the UNC conducts

repatriation ceremonies after remains are transferred to UNC control at the Joint Security Area (JSA) at the end of each operation.

Once national policy makers determine that conditions permit reengagement with North Korea, DPMO will lead the U.S. team for negotiating the resumption of repatriating Korean War remains. If U.S. and North Korean representatives can reach a mutually agreeable arrangement that provides the necessary process and procedures to conduct operations, it would seem possible to resume this humanitarian effort. The arrangement must address the safety and security of U.S. personnel executing remains recovery in North Korea. When U.S. commanders are satisfied that an acceptable level of risk to U.S. personnel exists, remains recovery operations can resume in North Korea.

If confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to restart cooperation with North Korea on the POW-MIA remains recovery program?

National policy makers will decide when to restart remains recovery operations in North Korea. This is a bilateral U.S.-North Korea policy issue. However, when the decision is made, the United Nations Command will continue to play a key role in supporting remains recovery operations in North Korea.

Republic of Korea (ROK) - U.S. Alliance

Since the end of World War II, the U. S. - ROK alliance has been a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.

What is your understanding of the current U. S. security relationship with the ROK?

It is my understanding the current U.S. security relationship with the ROK is very strong. It is based on mutual respect and trust and grounded in the Mutual Defense Treaty. In June 2009, the U.S. and ROK signed a Joint Vision statement that commits both nations to building an alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world at large. Objectives established in the Joint Vision statement are being supported by the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan that was agreed to by the U.S. and ROK in October 2010. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan will synchronize multiple U.S. and ROK military transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive and flexible force capabilities to deter and defeat aggression and provocations against the ROK. The plan moves the U.S. and ROK toward building an Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world, as called for in the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision statement.

The military component of Alliance development is led by the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation that were agreed to by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of Defense in October 2010. Established to direct the future course of the U.S.-ROK defense relationship, they are based on and serve to advance the June 2009 Joint Vision Statement and the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the guidelines, the U.S. upholds a firm commitment to ROK defense and both nations will implement a set of enabling measures needed for an effective combined defense posture. These enabling measures are: to enhance intelligence and information sharing; strengthen operational planning; further develop capabilities to address the ballistic missile threat from North Korea; institutionalize an extended deterrence policy committee; enhance interoperability; enhance the combined exercise program; and to collaborate on lessons learned. The defense guidelines also recognize the importance of close bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global peace and stability. In support of these stability objectives, the guidelines specify implementation of the following measures: strengthening capabilities to contribute to regional and global peace and stability; supporting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related materials, technologies, and their means of delivery; enhancing bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral defense relationships; strengthening cooperation for international security and peacekeeping efforts; and cooperating closely on other transnational and non-traditional security challenges. The defense guidelines recognize the importance of close policy and strategic consultation between the U.S. and ROK for the enhancement of common interests and further development of the Alliance.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?

Recognizing that a strong U.S.-ROK Alliance is one of the most important factors for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region at large, I will – if confirmed – continue the work of my predecessors directed at sustaining strong ties with personnel of the ROK military, other members of the ROK government, Korean civil society, and the South Korean people at large. I will encourage continued exchange and cooperation activity between Command personnel and the people of local Korean communities – activity that connects and binds Americans and Koreans together. I will also execute the Alliance building initiatives to promote the continuation of a strong U.S.-ROK security relationship.

What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in ROK equipment and training?

It is my understanding that the ROK military is a highly professional and competent force with a modern, mobile network-centric warfare capability that fields an array of advanced weapon systems. These weapon systems include the K1 main battle tank, K9 self-propelled artillery, and the KDX-III guided missile destroyer. The ROK military is led by a professional officer corps that currently exercises daily command of its forces. It has sustained and supplemented operational experience through recent

deployments to places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, Lebanon, as well as participating in a host of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Initiatives to further enhance force capabilities, modernize weapon systems, and improve organizational structures and force management are being implemented as part of the ongoing "307" defense reform program.

ROK military modernization and capability improvements are supported through the maintenance of a robust Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Defense Armaments Cooperation Program with the U.S. These programs promote interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces and thus create a more capable combined force. During Fiscal Year 2010, the ROK was our 11th largest FMS buyer. FMS sales were augmented by a robust military training program, where the ROK sends students to the U.S. for training in a variety of military-related courses.

ROK force capability is also sustained and improved through the conduct of a tough and realistic exercise program. In addition to participating in the combined Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle exercises with the U.S., the ROK military also conducts annually the Taegyeuk, Hoguk, and Hwarang exercises. These exercises help derive requirements for joint force and unit structure development, improve interoperability between the military services, and practice inter-agency coordination. It is these factors in total that lead me to believe that the ROK is a highly professional, competent, and modern military force.

Until last year, the U.S. and ROK were planning the transfer to wartime operational control (OPCON) of ROK forces to the ROK in 2012. Then, in June 2010, the U.S. and ROK agreed to further delay the transfer of OPCON until December 2015. This delay was purportedly agreed to because of the evolving security situation on the Peninsula and in order to more closely synchronize the transfer with other transformation initiatives.

What is your understanding of the ROK's current and projected military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater role in the defense of their homeland including responsibility for command and control of the readiness, operations and war fighting of their own forces in wartime ("OPCON Transfer")?

It is my understanding that the South Korean military is a highly professional and competent force that will be capable of leading Alliance defense of the ROK in wartime. Numbering over 633,000 active duty personnel, it ranks as the world's 6th largest military in terms of personnel and is a modern, mobile network-centric warfare capable force that fields an array of advanced weapon systems. The ROK military is led by a professional officer corps that currently exercises daily command of its forces. It has gained operational experience through recent deployments to places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, Lebanon, as well as participating in a host of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations in East Timor and Morocco and other operations around the world. Initiatives to enhance force capabilities,

modernize weapon systems, and improve organizational structures and force management are being implemented as part of the ongoing “307” defense reform program.

ROK military force capability is supplemented through the conduct of a tough and realistic exercise program. In addition to participating in the combined Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle exercises with the U.S., the ROK military also conducts annually the Taegyeuk, Hoguk, and Hwarang exercises. These exercises derive requirements for joint force and unit structure development, improve interoperability between the military services, and practice inter-agency coordination. Because of these factors, it is my understanding that the ROK will be ready and capable of leading Alliance defense of the ROK in wartime.

Following the decision to delay OPCON transfer to 2015, the U.S. and ROK entered into an agreement referred to as Strategic Alliance 2015 which is described in the U.S. Forces Korea October 2010 Strategic Digest as “an overarching and synchronized Alliance transformation roadmap, containing mutual Alliance end states and milestones, ensuring a smooth transition of the lead for the combined defense of the Republic of Korea.”

What is your understanding of the purpose and scope of the Strategic alliance 2015?

It is my understanding that the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan synchronizes multiple U.S. and ROK transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive and flexible capabilities to deter aggression against the ROK and to defeat aggression should it occur. The plan’s objective is to sustain and enhance the U.S.-ROK Alliance’s combined defense posture and capabilities and to support the Alliance’s future vision and bilateral defense priorities as stated in the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation. Execution of the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan ensures the effective synchronization of major elements of Alliance restructuring while maintaining a strong combined defense posture to deter or respond to the range of North Korean security challenges throughout the transition process. Key elements of the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan include: refining and improving combined defense plans; defining and developing the new organizational structures required for ROK lead of the war effort; implementing more realistic exercises based on the North Korean threat of today and tomorrow; preparing for the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 2015; consolidating U.S. military forces in the ROK onto two enduring hubs under the Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan; and force management. The goal of all initiatives under the Strategic Alliance 2015 construct is to build adaptive force capabilities that deter and defeat future provocations against the ROK and fight and win on the Korean Peninsula should deterrence fail. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan as a whole synchronizes ongoing transformation efforts to ensure they are aligned and mutually supporting and better postures both nations to deter, counter, and defeat North Korean provocations and aggression.

How will it help ensure that the OPCON transfer takes place no later than December 2015, as it is now scheduled?

It is my understanding that established within the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework is a governance structure that guides implementation of the plan to include the transition of wartime operational control according to specified milestones. Implementation issues are identified and addressed through a bottom-up process, where U.S.-ROK governance bodies in order of rising decision making authority include council of colonels, subcommittees headed by 2-star level general officers, a steering committee, the joint committee, and the Strategic Alliance 2015 working group. These bodies continually work issues related to – among other elements of Strategic Alliance 2015 – OPCON transition and ensure that established milestones are adhered to and difficulties addressed as they arise.

Regional Posture

In your opinion, how should the U. S. employ its forces in ROK to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to best respond to regional threats, provide support for out-of-area contingencies, and maintain readiness?

It is my understanding that how U.S. forces stationed in the ROK are employed is currently in a state of evolution as the Command transforms its presence there. Our primary focus must remain the deterrence of aggression against the ROK – a key Alliance and security treaty partner – and to defeat aggression should it occur. However, the Command's transformation initiatives as currently structured will create the opportunity for U.S. forces stationed in the ROK to become available for use in regional exercises, engagement, and global operations. We must maintain a U.S.-ROK Alliance military posture that allows for an immediate capability to deal with military threats and other contingencies on the Korean Peninsula while also seizing upon opportunities to address global challenges such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization, and regional engagement, as called for in the 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision for the Alliance. If confirmed, I will conduct a careful and thorough review of the opportunities for U.S. forces to be employed toward the support of regional engagement and out-of-area operations.

Consolidation of U.S. Forces

The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) is consolidating the combat brigade and supporting elements of the 2nd Infantry Division in and around Camp Humphreys, south of Seoul. New construction of facilities and infrastructure required to support the consolidation is being carried out using funds from both the Host Nation (South Korea) and United States

military construction accounts. The Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) proposes to move most of the U.S. forces currently stationed at Yongsan compound in Seoul to Camp Humphrey as well. The YRP relocation is to be largely funded by the South Korean Government, but the United States will pay for the construction of the housing to support the relocation.

What is your assessment of the current status of the two consolidation plans and the timeline for completion?

The Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) are being executed simultaneously and are scheduled for completion in 2016. The two plans are structured in such a way as to facilitate the orderly movement of service members, civilian employees, and their families to the enduring hubs. The YRP and LPP plans are closely dependent on each other. Land development and infrastructure projects are under construction and must be completed before any unit moves can take place.

The LPP program is on schedule with the majority of projects under design and/or construction. The current plan is to complete construction of the LPP program in the first quarter of calendar year 2016 and complete all unit moves by the end of 2016. YRP negotiations still continue concerning requirements for the U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) Headquarters. Any delays in reaching agreement over this facility could push back completion of the YRP program. However, both the U.S. and ROK expect these negotiations to be concluded shortly. The current plan is to complete YRP construction in early 2016 and complete all moves by the end of 2016 in accordance with the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan.

For the relocation initiative as a whole, as I understand it, the planning and program phase is nearly complete and the design phase is well underway. Site development/construction has been on-going since 2005 and vertical construction of YRP projects will begin within weeks. LPP program construction has been at a steady state since it began in 2004.

What do you anticipate to be the total costs to be incurred by the U.S. Government to carry out the two consolidations?

According to the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) signed by the U.S. and ROK in 2002, most of the facility costs associated with moving U.S. forces from locations north of Seoul to areas south are obtained from host nation burden sharing funds. It should be noted, however, that some of the LPP facility construction was paid for with U.S. Military Construction (MILCON) funds. Under the YRP, the majority of costs associated with relocation will be covered by the ROK, to include the construction of facilities such as barracks, operational facilities, and support facilities. Housing owned by the U.S. at U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan – a facility that is returned to the ROK under YRP excluding a small parcel – will be replaced by the ROK at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys. Housing

currently leased at U.S. Army Garrison Yongsan will be replaced by a privately financed housing project. For both YRP and LPP, additional land required to execute these two agreements was purchased and provided by the ROK.

Over \$2 billion worth of projects are in design and approximately \$1.2 billion worth of construction are currently underway at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys. The United States agreed to provide the majority of required family housing and unaccompanied senior leader quarters for our force at a cost estimated at between \$1-2 billion dollars. With respect to the relocation of 2nd Infantry Division under the LPP, the U.S. intends to fund the requirements using both appropriated funds and host nation provided burden sharing funds. The U.S. share of the total cost to carry out the two ROK-US agreements will be approximately \$2.4 billion.

To what extent to you believe the United States should be responsible for the costs related to environmental clean-up at bases being vacated as a result of the LPP?

The return of U.S. installations in the ROK is governed by the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and its relevant agreements. The environmental clean-up of overseas facilities must be accomplished in accordance with existing Department of Defense instructions. If confirmed, I will ensure that all provisions established in the SOFA and relevant Defense Department instructions are adhered to during the base return process and work with all parties concerned to practice good environmental stewardship at Command facilities.

In your opinion, does the consolidation better support the warfighting mission? If so, how?

I have been briefed that the relocation initiative improves warfighting capabilities in several ways. First, the 2nd Infantry Division and future Korea Command will be collocated at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, improving coordination and planning between staffs of the two organizations. Similarly, relocating 2nd Infantry Division to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys consolidates the Division's subordinate units at a single location, increasing direct face-to-face contact amongst unit personnel while reducing the physical span of control and infrastructure needed to support the Division. The unit is better postured to train and fight together.

I understand that consolidation at two enduring hubs also enhances command and control and coordination. In addition to strengthening relationships between operational staffs of the 2nd Infantry Division and a future Korea Command, 2nd Infantry Division is better positioned to affect initial liaison and coordination during reception, staging, and onward movement of deploying maneuver and sustainment brigades. Early liaison and coordination sets the conditions to more reliable and effective command and control during execution of later phases/stages of conflict. Positioning of the 2nd Infantry Division at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys also improves tactical flexibility by posturing the division in a better tactical location for rapid commitment in support of either of the

forward stationed ROK armies and corps. This position also shortens logistical lines during the initial phases of conflict that better postures the division for successful employment later.

I have been briefed that consolidation will also enhance the execution of noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). By reducing the dispersion of transportation assets, movement times are reduced. By separating U.S. forces from initial wartime threats such as North Korea's long-range artillery and its ground forces threatening Seoul, the vulnerability of these forces is reduced and their survivability enhanced. 2nd Infantry Division located at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys will be better able to integrate follow-on maneuver and sustainment brigades while not under the fire of North Korean long-range artillery. This factor supports the Division's preparation for combat activities. Finally, I understand that force consolidation enhances warfighting capabilities by improving soldier quality of life, realization of stationing efficiencies, optimizes use of land in Korea, and enhances force protection and survivability.

Host Nation Burden-Sharing Programs

Two programs supported by the Republic of Korea, the Combined Defense Improvement Program and the Korea Host Nation Funded Construction Program, provide cash and in-kind projects to satisfy U.S. military facility and infrastructure requirements.

What is your assessment of the current level and quality of the burden-sharing arrangement?

I have been informed that since the year 1991 the ROK has made contributions toward the costs of stationing U.S. military forces on its territory. These contributions are known as cost sharing contributions, where cost sharing is defined as the cash and in-kind contributions allies make to help offset the costs of stationing U.S. forces on their territory. Over the years cost sharing arrangements between the ROK and U.S. have been established and specified in a series of special measures agreements that typically covered periods of time ranging from 1- to 3-years. On 15 January 2009, the ROK and U.S. signed a 5-year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) that specifies cost sharing arrangements during the 2009 through 2013 time period.

ROK SMA contributions are divided into three cost sharing categories: labor, logistics, and ROK Funded Construction (ROKFC). Labor contributions are used solely for the purpose of paying the salaries and benefits of U.S. Forces Korea's (USFK) Korean national employees. Logistics support consists of in-kind support (logistics equipment, supplies, and services) to USFK from the ROK. Finally, ROKFC contributions support USFK's military construction and military construction-like requirements. ROK cost sharing contributions help ensure that the Command maintains its fight tonight readiness and builds the infrastructure needed for a transformed U.S. military force presence in the ROK.

In addition to support provided through the SMA, the ROK makes other contributions toward the costs of stationing U.S. military forces on its territory that are outside the SMA framework. Support of this type includes items such as force protection outside USFK facilities, the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, improvements to infrastructure outside and around USFK facilities, use of ROK training areas, various fee exemptions, and other contributions. Unfortunately, the value of the non-SMA contributions is much more difficult to estimate, but in the past contributions of this type have been estimated to be valued in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars.

The current SMA expires at the end of 2013. Prior to the year 2013, the U.S. and ROK will engage in negotiations over a new SMA to specify cost sharing arrangements for the post-2013 time period. If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment on the level and adequacy of current cost sharing arrangements so that support can be given to U.S. goals and objectives during negotiations for a post-2013 SMA.

What priorities would you establish, if confirmed, for U.S. forces in Korea to make the best use of these programs?

It is my understanding that U.S. Forces Korea currently has a process in place to determine the appropriate distribution of ROK cost sharing contributions across the three cost sharing categories of labor, logistics, and ROK Funded Construction on an annual basis. If confirmed, I will review this process and make any needed changes to ensure that the contributions are being put to best use.

The overwhelming majority of burden-sharing funds over the last four years has been used to carry out construction supporting the consolidation of forces at Camp Humphreys.

Do you believe this funding trend should be continued, or that funding should be spread to critical requirements at other U.S. bases in Korea?

ROK burden sharing (cost sharing) contributions are divided across three cost sharing categories: labor, logistics, and ROK Funded Construction (ROKFC). It is my understanding that USFK has a process in place to determine not only the appropriate distribution of cost sharing contribution across the three categories, but also the appropriate distribution within categories as well. Needs emanating from Land Partnership Plan requirements at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys are supported in the ROKFC account. During the 2009-2011 time period, the value of cost sharing contribution allocated to ROKFC averaged 40% of the total SMA contribution yearly. USFK conducts regular reviews of the ROKFC account to ensure that important and emergent military construction requirements are met. If confirmed, I will review the allocation of ROK cost sharing contribution across the ROKFC category to ensure that needs at Command facilities are being properly addressed.

Training of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea

In the past several years, as U.S. forces in Korea have drawn down and consolidated, home station training of both U.S. Army and Air Force units based on the Peninsula has emerged as a significant concern.

Do you believe there is sufficient availability and access to training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires, and for close air support missions and other Air Force operations?

As I understand it, the ground training requirements for U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK) are currently being met. Expanded digital connectivity is being leveraged to combine live events in the field with virtual or simulation-driven events to maximize training opportunities at the tactical and operational levels. This might include linking events on and off the Korean Peninsula to both replicate the complexity of joint and combined warfare and to optimize use of available resources.

Access to air-to-ground training ranges in the ROK has increased in recent years due to refinements in range scheduling procedures. The command will need to continue unit deployments to other locations for the foreseeable future in order to maintain air crew qualifications with all types of ordnance and for electronic warfare. Additional arrangements must still be made with the ROK government to further improve the level of range access.

In your view, are the ranges in Korea adequate to meet the training requirements of U.S. forces?

I have been briefed that the current inventory for training ranges is sufficient to meet U.S. ground forces training requirements and maintain readiness. The U.S. is working closely with the ROK to improve the quality and availability of training ranges for our air component. Due to the ROK's rapid economic growth, the relatively large scale of its military given the size of the country, environmental concerns, and competition between military and civic infrastructure, our Korean military partners work within the same limitations on range availability that U.S. forces face at home. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our ROK ally to modernize and fully utilize all available training facilities to ensure force readiness requirements are met.

Tour Normalization in South Korea

The Defense Department is pursuing full tour normalization for U.S. military personnel assigned to the Korean Peninsula. Essentially, full tour normalization would lengthen service tours from predominantly 1 year, as is the case today, to 3 year tours for those accompanied by their families and 2 years for those who are unaccompanied. Completion of full tour

normalization would result in about 12,000 U.S. military families in South Korea.

With the events of the past year on the Korean Peninsula and the likelihood that circumstances on the Peninsula will remain unpredictable for the foreseeable future, and considering that the costs of such a policy change have not yet been fully identified, do you believe that it is prudent to proceed with plans for full tour normalization and to significantly increase the number of U.S. families in South Korea? If so, why?

It is my understanding that one of the most important benefits of tour normalization is improved force readiness. Currently, about 85% of USFK service members rotate each year, just as they have completed Korea specific training and the local exercise cycle. This limits the ability to achieve the same level of readiness enjoyed by American forces in the Continental U.S., Europe, and other locations in the Pacific region. Conversely, as the proportion of trained military personnel in place with three year accompanied and two year unaccompanied tours increases, USFK will see benefits such as improved understanding of the region and operational environment, the strengthening of relations with our ROK ally, and enhanced ability to support the transition of Wartime Operational Control to the ROK. Simultaneously, USFK is in the process of relocating the majority of its forces in the ROK south of the capital city Seoul, thereby reducing the immediate threat to family members and simplifying the execution of non-combatant evacuation operations if such operations should ever become necessary. Non-combatant evacuation operation plans are exercised and practiced on a regular basis. Future hubs under the Command's relocation initiative lie outside the effective range of North Korean artillery. If confirmed, I will conduct a review of the tour normalization initiative, taking into account recent recommendations made by members of this committee.

Since full tour normalization was not contemplated as part the either the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) or Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP), what is your understanding of the total costs of full tour normalization and how do you believe it would be funded?

It is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense directed in September 2010 implementation of full tour normalization in Korea as affordable and according to no specific timeline. The Secretary further directed that a plan be provided to him on how to proceed with tour normalization no later than 31 March 2011. It is my further understanding that the Secretary of Defense is currently reviewing options to implement the tour normalization initiative and that his recommended course of action will be forwarded to the President as part of the fiscal year 2013 budget request.

Quality of Life

Through investment in quality of life amenities, to include housing, health care, and recreation, the Department has worked to achieve the goal of making South Korea an "assignment of choice" for U. S. Forces.

What do you consider to be the most essential quality of life programs for Soldiers and their families stationed in Korea and, if confirmed, what would be your goals in this regard?

I believe the most essential quality of life programs for soldiers and their families serving in the Republic of Korea are access to quality living and working conditions and facilities, quality health care, and quality educational opportunities for dependent family members. If confirmed, I will advocate for and take actions to provide our soldiers and family members with the best possible living and working environment, health care services, and educational opportunities for dependent family members.

What is your understanding of the capacity of DOD schools in South Korea to accommodate the increase in families/children associated with tour normalization?

My understanding is that USFK currently has ten schools with the capacity of about 5,500 students. A number of these schools are scheduled to be replaced as part of the Yongsan Relocation Plan, Land Partnership Plan, and the Department of Defense Education Activity School Rebuilding Program. When these programs are completed, USFK will have the capacity to educate about 6,100 students. School capacity will need to increase to about 14,800 students in order to satisfy the projected demand required by full tour normalization.

Medical Care for U. S. Forces in Korea

One of the most important quality of life issues in Korea is ensuring access to high quality medical care for service members of all military branches and their families. Separate medical chains of command responsible for providing health care, and the presence of non-command-sponsored family members who need health services, among other factors, have presented challenges. One possible reform that has been proposed is to offer a TRICARE-like benefit to all family members and DOD employees, regardless of command sponsorship.

If confirmed, how would you assess the need for improvement in the management and delivery of health care services in South Korea?

Quality health care is essential for all service members regardless of where they serve. However, this is even more important for our service members stationed in the

ROK, who are thousands of miles from home. I have been informed of the long history of excellent care provided by U.S. military treatment facilities in the ROK (Army and Air Force) as indicated by the most recent pinnacle surveys by the Joint Commission in 2010 that placed them among the top for patient care, patient safety, and overall performance for military installations. Furthermore, the advances in specialty care to include surgical care, imaging, and therapeutics of our host nation partners in the ROK is among the top in the world, with four of the institutions with whom U.S. Forces Korea conducts business certifying in the Joint Commission International Surveys in the last two years. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor and assess the availability and quality of health care for our service members, Defense Department Civilian employees, and their families serving in the ROK.

What is your view on whether or not the policy regarding medical support to non-command sponsored family members should be reconsidered and revised by the Department of Defense?

It is my understanding that starting under previous USFK commanders and continuing through the present time, extraordinary strides have been made to ensure access and availability of the full range of services, entitlements, and privileges for non-command sponsored family members and dependent family members who reside with their military, Department of Defense civilian, or invited contractor sponsor in the ROK. If confirmed, I will continue those efforts. I will also remain abreast of and weigh in on Defense Department policy adjustments that support adequate staffing and funding of U.S. military treatment facilities so that non-command sponsored personnel can gain access at levels approaching that of command sponsored beneficiaries.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Department of Defense and the Military Services have developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However, numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in deployed areas as well as at home stations are still being reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for the victim. They assert that commands fail to respond appropriately with basic medical services and with an adequate investigation of their charges, followed by a failure to hold assailants accountable.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

First and foremost, one sexual assault in our ranks is too many and significantly affects the morale and readiness of our units and personnel. We are working to

eliminate these crimes from our formations. The current Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) policies and procedures are effective and will continue to improve as we transition to the Sexual Harassment/ Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program, especially for the confidential (Restricted) cases. Over the next 27 months, the SHARP program is expected to be fully functional with trained, full time professionals to educate, respond, and assist in the reduction and elimination of this terrible crime.

What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which confidential reporting procedures have been put into operation?

Confidential (Restricted) reporting is critical to empowering victims of these traumatic crimes. It provides them with confidential reporters such as Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC), Victim Advocate, Chaplain, and/or Medical Provider to privately discuss the details and aid in their recovery. The challenge is when a non-confidential reporter such as a concerned roommate, friend, parent, Equal Opportunity Advisor, or by-stander is informed or aware of the incident and attempts to provide assistance and reports it, then the victim's confidentiality is lost and the case automatically becomes an Unrestricted case. This is when the victims may consider themselves "Re-Victimized" and forced to relive the assault. We must continue to encourage reporting, support victims of sexual assault, and ensure commanders can take appropriate actions as required to maintain good order and discipline.

What is your view of the policies and procedures in place to prevent and respond to sexual assaults, including assaults against contractor personnel?

The Army has sound policies and procedures in place to prevent and respond to sexual assaults. Annually all Soldiers are required to take Awareness and Prevention Training. Every sexual assault victim regardless of duty status is treated with dignity and respect, receives immediate medical care and victim advocate services. If the victim is a contractor then the case is transitioned to the contractor's medical, victim advocate, and investigative staff unless the company does not possess these services then the Army provides the necessary care for the victim.

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Our Criminal Investigation Division (CID), special sexual assault investigators and prosecutors are well trained and do an outstanding job investigating and responding to every allegation of sexual assault.

What is your view of the willingness and ability of the commanders to hold assailants accountable for their acts?

Commanders understand their roles as commanders and judicial officials under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I am confident commanders exercise those authorities and responsibilities. Each case requires investigation, examination of the evidence, appropriate advice from experts, and decisions by the commander. I trust commanders to make their best judgment in each case, and am not aware of any reluctance to make the hard decisions when required.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assaults and to hold assailants accountable for their actions?

I am a strong supporter of the Army's "I. A.M. Strong" campaign which directs all personnel to Intervene, Act, and Motivate each other to prevent sexual assaults. In addition, I will ensure the command has the required number of trained SARC/SHARP, Medical, CID, and Chaplain personnel to provide ample prevention training to units and responsive care to all victims. These actions support the CSA's desire for a cultural change in our Army and lead the attack on sexual assaults in our nation.

Homosexual Conduct Policy

The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010," enacted on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current Department of Defense policy concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days after the Secretary of Defense has received the Department of Defense's comprehensive review on the implementation of such repeal, and the President, Secretary, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the congressional defense committees that they have considered the report and proposed plan of action, that the Department of Defense has prepared the necessary policies and regulations to exercise the discretion provided by such repeal, and that implementation of such policies and regulations is consistent with the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, and military recruiting and retention.

What is your view on repealing the current Department of Defense policy?

This is a policy change that we can make successfully. I believe that the great Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines can and will accommodate such a significant change. The American people have spoken on this subject through their elected officials, and the result is the law that we currently have and the new policy we are deliberately preparing to implement. An important part of this process is to engage our men and women in uniform and their families. The services' chain-teaching programs facilitate thoughtful, constructive dialogue on the subject between leaders and Service Members. Ultimately, I am confident we will continue to have an outstanding military ready and able to serve and meet the needs of the nation.

If confirmed, do you foresee any problems with implementing a repeal of the policy commonly referred to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in the ROK and U.S. Forces Korea, if the President, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs make the required certification to Congress?

If confirmed, I will implement repeal of the policy commonly referred to as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” as directed. I have completed the Department of Defense policy repeal training.

Prevention of Human Trafficking

Following media reports connecting prostitution and human trafficking in Korea to U.S. military forces, Commander, U. S. Forces Korea, in 2004 instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal activities of prostitution and human trafficking. Under this policy, all USFK personnel, military and civilian, as well as contractors and their employees, are expected to comply with prohibitions, including observance of curfews and laws regarding off-limits areas and establishments, aimed at curtailing these practices.

What effects have changes in U.S. policy, as well as new criminal laws implemented by the ROK, had on the incidence of prostitution and human trafficking in Korea?

It is my understanding that USFK has a Zero Tolerance policy regarding the illegal acts of prostitution and human trafficking. The command’s policy is built upon a 4 prong strategy of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement. Awareness is established and increased through improved education such as mandatory prostitution and human trafficking training for all USFK personnel. Identification involves the recognition of indicators that an establishment may be participating in prostitution and human trafficking activities and the procedures to assist victims. Reduction occurs through constant Command presence and efforts to increase alternative activities available for service members to participate in. Finally, the Command pursues aggressive enforcement on illegal establishments and offenders. Additionally, USFK regulation requires all incoming personnel to be briefed on the Command’s policy towards prostitution and human trafficking, establishments and areas that have been placed off-limits, and on individual conduct and values. As a result of this policy and related actions, there has been a steady decrease in the number of reports of prostitution and human trafficking and the awareness of Command personnel on this important issue has increased. I fully support the Command’s current policy of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement, and will continue – and improve upon if necessary – this approach if confirmed.

What further changes, if any, to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and military regulations are needed in your judgment to ensure maximum effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

I know of no changes needed to the Uniform Code of Military Justice and military regulations. If confirmed, I will continue to be alert of the need for any changes.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to further enhance the effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?

If confirmed, I will continue the Command's existing policy of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement, and make efforts to sustain and build upon the success achieved to date.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.