Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
REVISITING THE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE
ARMED FORCES

Thursday, November 5, 2015

Washington, D.C.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
1155 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
SUITE 200
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
(202) 289-2260

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON REVISITING THE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES

Thursday, November 5, 2015

U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators McCain [presiding], Inhofe, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, King, and Heinrich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

Chairman McCain: Well, good morning. The committee meets this morning to consider the roles and missions of the U.S. armed forces as part of our review of our Nation's defense organization. Our recent hearings in this series have considered the first order question of geopolitics, strategy, and technology. We have asked, for example, what challenges do we face and how must our military be ready to deter, fight, and win in war, both at present and in the future. Now we seek to ask who should be responsible for what military missions.

We are fortunate to have a distinguished panel of experts to help guide us. Retired General David Deptula, dean of the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies, Mr. Bryan McGrath of the Center for American Seapower at the Hudson Institute, Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, co-director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at the Brookings Institute, and Mr. Robert Martinage, who is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Mr. Martinage, did I pronounce that correctly?

Mr. Martinage: Martinage.

Chairman McCain: Martinage. Please accept my apologies.

Mr. Martinage: That is fine.

Chairman McCain: I am sorry. To find out the last time this question arose in missions was seriously deliberately and clearly defined by senior leaders, you have to go back to March 1948. It was then in the aftermath of a World War and the creation of what would become the Department of Defense. And in an effort to resolve confusion and quell rivalries between the services that the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, brought together the service chiefs for four days in Key West to resolve these questions.

The resulting 14-page document, commonly known as the Key West Agreement, defined the role of each service in achieving the core military missions of the day. Simply put, the Navy was tasked with fighting other navies, the Army with fighting with other armies, and the Air Force with other air forces. President Truman signed the final agreement in April of 1948. This was the last time the Commander-in-Chief formally approved the roles and missions of the armed services.

To be sure, inter-service rivalry did not end at Key West, and efforts have been made over the years to review roles and missions, but many of these efforts have come to naught. The congressionally-mandated 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions even dismissed the questions it was asked

to answer -- who does what.

The result has been far from ideal. To the extent that the roles and missions of the armed services have evolved, they have done so largely in ad hoc and reactive ways, driven more by budgetary pressures than strategic direction. Far too often this has led to duplication of effort, inadequate responses to increasingly important missions, programs of record that continue along despite changes in the strategic environment, and inter-service fights over resources that give papered over in the belief that everyone can do everything with roughly equal shares of the pie.

There are other reasons as well why a review of roles and missions is timely. First, while our military is still composed of distinguished services, as it should be, it fights as one joint force, conducting missions that span all the domains of warfare. The Navy, for example, has a key role to play in attacking targets on land and in the air. Air Force planes armed with anti-ship missiles, have a vital role to play in winning fights at sea. And Army air defense batteries are increasingly important in creating the kinds of anti-access challenges for our roles that they seek to impose on us.

The question of who does what is even more pronounced when budgets are tight. Take the mission of long-range precision strike, which is essential to our ability to

project power against advanced adversaries. Aircraft carriers, long-range bombers, and ground-based missiles and rockets all have roles to play. But what is the proper balance between these capabilities, especially when a carrier now costs $13 billion, one bomber costs half a billion dollars, and individual missiles cost millions of dollars each. What is the most efficient allocation of roles to perform this mission?

Second, the missions themselves are changing significantly. It has been a while since the Army mounted a large-scale airborne assault on to contested ground or since the Marine Corps conducted a contested amphibious landing. At the same time, unconventional missions, such as space, special operations, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are more important than ever. Other missions like coastal defense, close air support, and nuclear deterrence continue to struggle for adequate funding and attention. And then there is a mission like cyber, which did not even exist 20 years ago, but is now absolutely central to our security.

There are serious questions about how to properly prioritize new and untraditional missions. We cannot afford for these vital functions to be orphaned within services that will undercut and underfund them in favor of parochial priorities.

I would like to hear from our witnesses how best to motivate the Services, to give the attention to these new and non-traditional missions that they deserve. Should certain missions be allocated among the services? And in these new domains of warfare, such as space and cyber, should we even consider creating new services, such as the Air Force was created seven decades ago in recognition of the vital role of air power?

I would also be interested in our witnesses' view on the value of competition both between and within the Services. "Service rivalry" has become a derisive term. It is often contrasted with service collaboration, unity of effort, and jointness. Is that justified, or can competition of this kind actually create the necessary incentives for excellence and efficiency? And when the services do compete, as they inevitably will, how are those fights resolved and by whom? Do we get clear, creative courses of action regardless of who wins and loses or homogenized, lowest common denominator options that cost more and deliver less?

Finally, I recognize that civilian and military leaders at the Department of Defense are wrestling with many of these questions now, and that is encouraging. But they, like their predecessors, face the challenge of how to affect enduring change. The defense bureaucracy in the services

have a healthy track record of reverting back to their original forms and functions once they are overseers of the moment move on.

The Key West Agreement was important because the Secretary of Defense himself with the service chiefs and the Commander-in-Chief personally directed the roles and missions assigned to each service. Should we be asking the Commander-in-Chief, either this one of the next one, to do the same today?

I look forward to this testimony of our witnesses.

Senator Reed?

STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND

Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to join you in thanking our witnesses for their willingness to appear today to provide their thoughts on the roles and missions of the military services and providing for the defense of the Nation. It is clear from your past week and your prepared testimony for today's hearing that each of you bring unique and valuable perspectives on this issue. Thank you, gentlemen.

Two of our site experts that have recently come before our committee, Shawn Brimley and Paul Scharre, wrote last year that, "Today's military is the product of history, not of the missions and threats it now faces. American forces are hampered by overlapping roles and missions, arcane organizational structures, Cold War platforms and programs, and recruiting practices detached from modern means. If it were starting fresh, this is not the military the United States would build."

Now, while starting from scratch is obviously not an option, I hope today's witnesses will offer their own thought-provoking proposals for smart reform that would better align the various roles and missions of our military services, reduce redundancy where appropriate, and make our joint forces more effective. The current and projected

budget constraints facing the Federal government require that we week efficiencies while at the same endeavoring to shape our military for the threats we are most likely to face in the future.

While I suspect that all of our witnesses would support larger budgets for all of our Military Services, I hope that your testimony will take into account the very real budget realities facing the Department of Defense, and offer recommendations for prioritizing limited resources to most effectively risk to our national security.

Some may also argue for better readiness and capability of other parts of the government, such as the Departments of State and Homeland Security. These departments also include important elements of national power and security. The domestic discretionary budget is also constraining these elements of our national power.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reforms necessarily focused on the importance of jointness in the aftermath of several high-profile military operations that exposed deficiencies in our operating concepts. While these reforms were critical to enabling today's joint force, they may have also had the unintended consequences of blurring the lines between traditional roles and missions assigned to the Military Services, and allow for duplication in some capability areas as new threats and technologies have

emerged over time.

I would be especially interested in the thoughts of our witnesses on the delineation of responsibilities in mission areas that have arisen since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, most notably related to the use of cyber and unmanned aerial vehicles. I would also say unmanned undersea vehicles.

Congress has recognized the need to continue to address the responsibilities of the military services as new threats and technologies arise by mandating periodic roles and mission reviews. Unfortunately, these reviews, namely the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, have largely been unsuccessful in accomplishing their appropriateness. According to the Government Accountability Office, these reviews fail to "clearly identify the components within the Department that are responsible for providing the core competencies and capabilities needed to address each of the primary missions of the Department of Defense, or plans for addressing any capability gaps or unnecessary duplication." I hope our witnesses today will provide any suggestions they might have for improving the output of these efforts.

It is extremely important to take a look at all of these issues, and I, again, commend the chairman for not only these series of hearings, but for his intention to carry forward with a significant review of our fundamental

defense structure and policies. With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen.

Chairman McCain: I thank you, General. Welcome. Please proceed. By the way, all witnesses' complete statements will be made part of the record. General Deptula?

STATEMENT OF HON. LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID A. DEPTULA, USAF (RET.), DEAN, THE MITCHELL INSTITUTE FOR AEROSPACE STUDIES

General Deptula: Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, and members of the committee, I am honored and humbled that you invited me here today. I assure you I will do my best to keep my comments brief, up front, and appreciate you putting an extended version of my remarks in the record.

I will tell you all right up front that I believe if we want to maintain our position as the world's sole super power, we need to have the strongest Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in the world.

I am the product of a military family. My grandfather was an immigrant and served as an Army infantryman in World War I. My uncle was a marine at the tip of the spear in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. My dad served in World War II and the Pacific as a B-29 maintenance officer. Later, he helped win the Cold War, participating in nuclear weapons development and testing. He is the most dedicated Air Force officer I know, and now almost 95, he is still my inspiration, and I am honored that he is with us today in the audience.

Chairman McCain: He is certainly welcome. Thank you, sir, for your service.

General Deptula: World War II and the Cold War posed

for my uncle, my dad, and many others of the Greatest Generation significant challenges. As a result of their efforts, the United States prevailed against incredible odds. It is now up to us to confront our own set of circumstances.

Today my son carries on a proud tradition by serving in the military. Today's world presents him and his brothers and sisters in arms a stark picture. The United States faces a burgeoning set of threats around the globe, but has fewer resources to meet them. One of the only ways to prevail is to optimize our service roles and missions to evolve their relationship from one of interoperability, which was an objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, to one of interdependency, the next step in the progress of our military, and perhaps the focus of the McCain-Reed Act.

Now, getting to interdependency will require a more clearly delineated assignment of roles and function than exist today. As you gentleman have already noted, while updated in 2010, they do not provide the kind of distinction among the Services that current budgets, technologies, threats, and the strategic environment demands.

So how does the Air Force fit into this environment? The strategic narrative of the Air Force is to provide our Nation global vigilance, global reach, and global power. These tenets emphasize not only the agility of Air Force

capabilities, but also the flexibility and options they provide our civilian leadership. That said, our defense institutions are woefully stuck in the last century. The last serious roles and missions review was held in 1995. It is time for a 21st century review as 21st century threats present daunting challenges. We are not going to buy our way out of these challenges because the money is not there, nor are there any silver bullets. We are going to have to think our way out of these problems.

This respected committee could lead the way on defense reform if the committee considered realigning its structure to mirror modern capabilities versus some model that reflects last century military organization. Sea power is currently afforded its own subcommittee. Land and air power are batched together and named after a previous version of Army doctrine, and no subcommittees are dedicated to cyber or space. An action you might consider to increase focus on 21st century defense is to split the Air/Land Subcommittee into one on aerospace power, one on land power, and add one for cyber operations.

In my written remarks, I offer 14 additional areas that may provide a starting point for serious review. Briefly, here are my top six. One, insert a commission on roles and missions for the 21st century into the next National Defense Authorization Act that will inform a new National Security

Act. Two, cyber. Operation in cyberspace beg for more unification. Stand up a U.S. cyber command as a combatant command as soon as possible.

Three, information. Stand up of a vigilance command inside the Air Force as soon as possible to integrate intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyber, and space operations with a view to a future combatant command to codify information as a defense enterprise. Four, concepts of operation. Shift combatant command predilection to organize by service components to a more functional alignment of an ISR strike maneuver sustainment complex, capitalizing on advances in network capability to empowering information's ascent as a dominant factor in warfare.

Five, process. Change the primary measure of merit in DOD program decisions from individual unit cost to cost per desired effect, and do it across service boundaries, vice inside service stovepipes. Six, personnel. Change military force management from a system that values risk avoidance to one that accepts risk tolerance and rewards innovative thinking instead of punishing it.

Please notice there recommendations are not about hardware. They are focused on ideas, ideas about integrating existing and future capabilities within an agile operational framework guided by human understanding. The appropriate force structure will follow.

Just as combat tomorrow will look different than it did yesterday, so, too, should the military that prosecutes it. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Deptula follows:]

Chairman McCain: Mr. McGrath?

STATEMENT OF BRYAN MCGRATH, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, THE CENTER FOR AMERICAN SEAPOWER, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. McGrath: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee. Thank you for this great civic honor today to be before you and to sit alongside these experienced individuals.

The roles and missions defined at Key West were only part of the story of how national and military strategy were arranged during the Cold War to protect and sustain America's interests. Of equal and perhaps greater importance, in my view, was the strategic prioritization of those roles and missions, to the point where the Department of the Air Force was receiving nearly 50 percent of the defense budget late in the Eisenhower Administration.

I am here today as a sea power advocate, and any reading of my work leads logically to that conclusion. But I am also a land power advocate, and I am also air power advocate. I am an advocate of preponderant American military power capable of deterring, fighting, and winning conflicts thousands of miles from our own shores, and I am concerned that the current force on its apparent trajectory does not maintain this preponderance.

If we continue down the path we are on, one in which less and less is spent on defense as a function of our

economy, as a function of total government spending, and as a function of the capability and capacity necessary, our preponderance will decline, and it will result in a force that looks proportionally much like this one, only capable of doing fewer things in fewer places to a lesser degree. I consider this path dangerous and risky, but unfortunately it is perhaps the likeliest path.

There are two other general paths we could take. We could do what I believe is the most prudent thing to do, and this is to increase defense spending across the board on virtually on all components, capabilities, and capacities of the current force. Unlike the flag and general officers present at Key West, we have some idea of what the table stakes of great power competition are.

Some consider this path to be unaffordable. I do not believe this this is true. We remain a very prosperous country. The fiscal restraints imposed on defense spending are self-imposed and represent choices among competing priorities, but they are choices nevertheless. Choosing to de-weight military strength at the end of the Cold War was wise, but it is increasingly unwise in the emerging great power contention environment. This path would obviously cost more than we spend today, but it would involve relatively little in changing the strategic prioritization of roles and missions.

The second path we could take is one in which we spend relatively similar to what we spend today and inflate it appropriately, but where roles and missions -- certain roles and missions are prioritized in a return to the clarity of President Eisenhower and his assumption of risk through the making of tough strategic choices. Were we to do so, I believe that American sea power would merit greater emphasis, specifically because in its modern instantiation, it merges the sea power of the world's most powerful Navy, with the air power of the world's most lethal and mobile tactical air arm, and the land power of the world's most feared middle-weight land force, the U.S. Marine Corps. I see this force and a robust mix of Special Forces as capable of needing a substantial number assurance, presence, crisis response, and conventional deterrence needs of any appropriate national strategy.

American sea power makes disproportionate contributions to important national security objectives. Sea power enables the homeland defense away game. Sea power bolsters critical security balances. Sea power provides for effective conventional deterrence. Sea power enables diplomacy and development. Sea power provides for modulated military responses and options for escalation and de-escalation as the case may require. And sea power shows the compassion and spirit of the American people on a global

basis on disaster strikes.

Of course, sea power cannot do it all. Campaign-level air and land power would continue to be what they have been for decades, war waging and war winning forces. But they would be overwhelmingly based in the United States, and they would be maintained in a somewhat reduced status.

My written statement contains more detail with regard to the major movements of this future joint force, one that recognizes the virtues of friendly border neighbors, the geography of being thousands of miles from many of our security interests, and the reality of man's overwhelming proclivity to live and work near the sea. I look forward to laying out some of that detail in the questions period.

I want to stress once again that this sea power-centric approach is not my first choice largely because I believe it assumes too much risk, but less risk than staying on the path we are on. I would much rather resource a larger, more powerful version of the current force, one I believe appropriate to the challenges ahead. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McGrath follows:]

Chairman McCain: Thank you. Dr. O'Hanlon? I might mention for the record the excellent new book called The Future of Land Warfare. Congratulations. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, PH.D., CO-DIRECTOR, THE CENTER FOR 21ST CENTURY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dr. O'Hanlon: Thank you, Senator. Very kind of you. I appreciate the honor to be here today as well.

I really just want to make two main points in the spirit of the roles and missions conversation that we are having, and the first is to say that while many are looking to the Army as a preferred bill payer for other parts of the military, I think we have gone about far enough with this way of thinking. So I am not here to advocate for a larger Army, but I am very concerned about some of the ideas now being considered and presented, whether it is the strategic capabilities and management review that we heard about in 2013, whether it is some ideas that are out there now, for example, from former CNO Admiral Gary Roughead to cut the Army to below 300,000 active duty troops.

Some of these ideas I believe would go too far. This would require a longer conversation, of course, about just what size Army is optimal, but I would simply make a historical point before moving on to my specific recommendations on roles on missions. The historical point, we always tend to assume that we have figured out how to avoid big ground wars, and for the last century we have had this tendency. When we have come out of a big conflict or a

big crisis or competition, we have made that assumption, and we have been proven wrong.

And so, I would simply observe, for example, up until World War I, we had a tiny Army, 17th or 18th in the world even as we were becoming the world's number one economic power. And the argument was, well, we got away from all those Old World conflicts. Let us stay over here. We are safe. We do not need to worry about playing that Old World game of interstate war.

And we all know we had to build up for World War I, but you would have thought that might have been the lesson, but after World War I we cut back to being the 19th largest Army in the world in the mid-1930s, and we all know what happened after that. You would have thought World War II would have taught us the lesson, and, of course, we did have to downsize from eight million soldiers. But nonetheless we downsized so much that in five short years, as this committee well knows, Task Force Smith was incapable of responding to North Korean aggression just five years later, just five years after we had had the world's most powerful military machine ever contemplated or invented on the face of the earth.

And then, of course, we had problems in the Cold War period. We tried to fight the Vietnam War with tactics and weapons that I think were inappropriate to that fight. And

then the lesson of Vietnam was no more Vietnams -- excuse me. No more Vietnams. Let us not even have a military that can do that. Let us get the Army out of the counterinsurgency and stabilization business. And lo and behold, that seemed okay for Operation Desert Storm, but by the time we got to the wars of this century, we were not ready. And it took us three or four or five years to really get the right tactics, and leaders, and concepts to be effective.

And now, we risk doing it again. I do not think that the damage so far has been all that great, but I think we are starting to say things and think things that are worrisome. And in addition to the ideas I just mentioned a few minutes ago about proposals for even deeper cuts in the Army, we now have the Quadrennial Defense Review as a matter of official U.S. strategy saying we will no longer size the armed forces for prolonged large-scale stabilization missions. I just think this is ahistorical, unrealistic, and incorrect.

President Obama has every right and reason to try to stay out of big new operations in any specific place, like a Syria or where have you. But nonetheless, the idea that we can simply assume away these kinds of missions forever, which is essentially what the QDR says if you take it literally, I think is a mistake. So I would simply counsel

that we have gone far enough in our thinking about downsizing the Army and putting it into a very specific limited set of missions.

General Petraeus was kind enough to launch my book with me last week, and he repeated the idea that I know he, and Senator Reed, and Senator McCain, and many others on this committee have discussed and heard about before. Our Army needs to remain an Army of pentathletes, people and forces that can do many different things and at scale, not in a boutique way, not in an overly limited way.

One last set of thoughts.

Chairman McCain: Let me -- let me ask, in this scenario, what role and capacity is the Marine Corps?

Dr. O'Hanlon: Well, my thinking is the Marine Corps is essentially right sized. The Marine Corps has a pretty good floor under its force structure. It is known for being very effective on Capitol Hill. It is known for being very effective with the American people. I think the Marine Corps in a sense I am taking as a given in the sense that it may fluctuate a little. But I think the Army is more likely to be the target for big new changes, and that is why I focused my attention there.

Just a couple -- because the committee has asked us to give specific recommendations, and like my fellow panelists I would like to just give a couple and then finish, because

I am not trying to say that every Army program or every military program is just right today. I do think we need a somewhat larger defense budget increase than President Obama is calling for or that the recent budget compromise is calling for. But I think, you know, we need to make some reforms, as you said, Senator, and let me just list a couple.

First of all, the Army has already managed to kill off most of its own weapons programs. It may not need a lot more help from the committee or anyone else, and I say that somewhat facetiously, but it is also somewhat true. In the last 20 years, the Sergeant York, the armored gun system, the crusader, the Comanche, the future combat system, all of these have met their demise. The Army has had some troubles with modernization. It needs to go back to the drawing board. It is trying to do that, I recognize, but the Army is already thinking hard about how to scale back some of its modernization programs. So I will leave that as it is.

On the Air Force, and Navy, and Marine Corps side, I think the F-35 Program is a good program, but I think it is oversized. In an era when we are doing so much more with drones, with space, with existing fourth generation systems like the A-10 and the F-16, I think that we do not need 2,450 F-35s. And I would encourage the other services to look at that number.

I would also suggest that when the United States Navy under a man I respect greatly, former CNO Admiral Greenert, says that nuclear modernization is its top priority, I would suggest the Navy ought to reconsider. We do need safe and reliable nuclear deterrent capabilities, but I do not think the Navy should have nuclear deterrence as its top priority. The world has changed. The details of our nuclear force capabilities to me are not as quite as important as the Navy is perhaps estimating. I want to see a little greater relative focus on conventional forces.

And I think finally on the size of the Navy, I would submit that perhaps we can scale back the size of the carrier fleet by one or two if we are willing to put a little bit more land-based tactical air power in the Persian Gulf. We have a lot of our allies now equally concerned about the rise of Iran. I think the idea of going back to some more permanent land basing for tactical fighter jets may enable us to reduce the strains and demands on the carrier force in the Persian Gulf. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. O'Hanlon follows:]

Chairman McCain: Thank you. Mr. Martinage?

STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. MARTINAGE, SENIOR FELLOW, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Martinage: First off, I would just like to thank the committee for the opportunity to share my views on how we might realign the roles and missions of the armed forces to better addresses emerging operational and strategic challenges, as well as take more advantage of new opportunities.

I would like to focus my remarks on three broad areas for potential change: the possible creation of new services for space, cyber, and special operations, the need for increased service specialization, and the concept of what I call comparative jointness, meaning encouraging healthy intra- and inter-service rivalry to foster innovation.

So, first, creating new services. While few argue that air power merited an independent service in the immediate wake of World War I, the momentum behind the establishment of the Department of Air Force was strong by the end of World War II. Today in comparison to air power, cyber and space forces are arguably somewhere in the later inter-war period. Cyber and space warfare capabilities have been developed, but have yet to be tested in high intensity combat.

So looking specifically at cyberspace, it has clearly

become a vital operational domain for U.S. military forces that is similar, but yet unique, from the air, sea, and space. Unlike the other warfare domains, it encompasses physical elements, such as communications infrastructure, and computer networks, electromagnetic radiation, traveling through air and space, and the virtual world of computer code and data processing. It is distinct culturally as well. We are requiring different types of warriors to fight it.

Given these myriad differences and its growing importance, cyber warfare may warrant an independent branch of the armed services. As a step in this direction, in 2010 DOD's U.S. Cyber Command, which is staffed in large part by the services, but in addition each service maintains its own cyber component that is technically subordinate to Cyber Command, but is also controlled by the respective service chain of command. This approach has a number of drawbacks, including duplication of effort, potential inconsistency across the Joint Force, and lack of continuity as personnel rotate in and out of their cyber positions every three years.

An independent service focused on cyber operations would offer at least six potential benefits: unity of command, better enforcement of common cyber and information technology standards, different recruiting standards,

training programs and retention strategies, dedicated career paths to enable the development of deep technical and operational expertise over time, the formulation of cyber and operational concepts and doctrine independent of the parent service culture, and centralized management of cyber manpower and resources. And, of course, there are some potential downsides, which I also get into in my prepared statement.

With respect to space, while each service has its own space professionals, most of the expertise currently resides within the Air Force. But space operations are fundamentally different from air operations. The laws of aerodynamics govern activities in space, whereas the laws of aerodynamics govern air power. Like space -- like cyber -- excuse me -- space operations require specialized skill sets, training, equipment, operational concepts and doctrine. The culture of the space community is also far different from the very pilot-centric one that dominates the Air Force. Accordingly, it may be worth considering the establishment of an independent service to organize, train, and equip space warfare operators.

In 2010, Congress created the Commission -- I mean, in 2001 created Congress created the Commission to Assess United States National Security Management and Organization, the so-called Rumsfeld Commission, that looked at the

specific issue. And at the time, they decided the disadvantage of creating a separate space service outweighed the advantages. As they put it at the time, there is not yet a critical mass of qualified personnel, budget requirements or missions sufficient to establish a new Department. They did, however, leave open the possibility that a military department of space might be needed at some future date.

I think it is instructive to reflect on what has or, more importantly, what has not happened over the past 14 years since that commission was formed. First, U.S. space systems have increased significantly, most notably from China and, to a lesser degree, from Russia, and it is not at all clear that we are keeping pace with the threat. Second, until recently most of DOD's larger space system acquisitions experienced considerable difficulty. The past decade is littered with failed or canceled programs, ones with staggering costs and scheduled overruns.

Third, while financial and program turbulence exacted a toll on the space industrial base across the board, the U.S. space launch sector has severely atrophied. For over 15 years, for example, the United States has been in the very unfortunate position of having to purchase RD-180 rocket motors designed and built in Russia for use on the Atlas 3 and 5 space launch vehicles owing to the lack of a domestic

supplier.

In short, most of the urgent items identified by the Commission 14 years ago remain partially or completely unaddressed. It certainly appears that the Nation has become more, not less, vulnerable in space. While threats have intensified and proliferated, space-related acquisitions have been slow and disordered, and the U.S. industrial base has grown weaker. While it is impossible to say with certainty, the focus of attention -- the focused attention of a dedicated space service may have prevented some of this downward slide.

Like Cyber Command, there are a number of benefits of potential new space service in the years ahead dealing with recruitment, space career paths, space operational concepts, a dedicated funding stream, and the concentrated and dedicated management of space systems acquisitions. It is a long list.

Switching now to SOCOM. SOCOM is a hybrid organization like the services. It is a force provider to the combatant commands, but like the other combatant commands it is involved in operational planning, force allocation, and, in some cases, execution of military operations. The primary reason to consider elevating SOCOM to a full-fledged service would be to give it far more flexibility in managing the career paths of its highly-skilled operators, both enlisted

and officers.

I would like to switch now to the second major topic, increased service specialization. There are many unintended consequences of the Key West Agreement as reinforced by Goldwater-Nichols. First, the service budget allocations have remained fixed over the past three decades, which has stifled innovation. Second, there is an everyone plays mentality when it comes to contingency planning and, thus, resource allocation. And within the respective Key West stovepipes, the services have over invested in capabilities for conducting operations in medium threat environments with the implicit reasoning that such capabilities can swing to the low end or to the high end. The problem, however, is that such middle of the road capabilities are often inefficient in terms of cost with respect to lower-end contingencies, and inadequate operationally for higher-end ones.

In my prepared remarks, I have a series of examples of how the Marine Corps, the Army, and the Air Force, and Navy might become more specialized to deal with both these low-end and high-end threats, and I am happy to discuss in the questions if you are interested.

The third major area for change is what I call competitive jointness. Intra- and inter-service competition should be more strongly encouraged. The inter-service

crowding into each other battle space, if managed properly, could give the services -- keep the services on their toes, foster innovation, and lead to a more robust future force. A competitive approach to joint operations would allow alternative service concepts to vie for incorporation and to regional contingency plans and, thus, demand a larger share of the budget.

To enable competitive jointness, some of the service monopolies on specific missions protected as "primary functions" in Secretary Forrestal's memorandum in 1948 and that have hardened over time will need to be opened to competition. And many of the collateral functions enumerated for each service, but largely ignored since 1948, will need to be elevated in importance. And, again, I have a lot more detail on those examples of how we might foster more intra- and inter-service competition for -- to foster innovation in my prepared remarks.

So to conclude, the emergence of new capabilities in the evolving threat landscape demand a fundamental re-look at the Key West Agreement and the subsequent evolution of service roles and missions. It may well be time to establish new independent services for space and cyber, as well as to elevate SOCOM to a full-fledged service. Given flat or declining resources for defense and ongoing threat trends, service investments that focus on being a jack of

all trades but master of none are increasingly problematic. Accordingly, increased service specialization in selected areas should be given serious attention.

And finally, intra- and inter-service competition should be more strongly encouraged as a means of fostering innovation. To do so, many of the service mission monopolies that have hardened since 1948 will need to be broken, and many of the so-called collateral missions that have been ignored or under invested in to date will need to be elevated in importance.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Martinage follows:]

Chairman McCain: Well, thank the witnesses. And, you know, just a comment, we with Goldwater-Nichols encouraged jointness as one of the major factors of it, yet we want competition. We want them to be joint, and we want them to be competitive. I am still not sure how we get our arms wrapped around that one.

It seems to me, if I recall my history, and I think it is right, that in World War II we had basically two commands. We had a European command under General Eisenhower, SACEUR, and we had a Pacific Command under Admiral Nimitz, eight million people under arms. And now we have a proliferation of commands.

It seems to me that every time I turn around there is a new crisis, so the answer is create a new command. Problems in Africa, let us have an AFRICOM. Let us have a NORTHCOM and a SOUTHCOM with an arbitrary line between Guatemala and Mexico. And every one of these commands creates large staffs, requires large support, requires contractors. And we have watched the number, especially Dr. O'Hanlon, we have watched the number of brigade combat teams go down while we watch the support contractors staffs go dramatically up.

So here we are before the committee and saying, well, we need a cyber command. I do not disagree. I do not disagree with that, and SOCOM we are all proud of. SOCOM crosses all of those geographic lines. So it seems to me or

I am not convinced that this increase in commands that we have experienced particularly in an almost accelerated process and now calls for another command, which I am not opposed to. It seems to me that at some point, should we not look at the whole structures as they are, particularly since the greatest threats that we face in the opinion of most crosses boundary lines, crosses oceans, and crosses all aspects of geography, whereas our commands were set up for basically different geographical parts of the world.

And so, again, I am not against a cyber command. In fact, I think we would probably agree to it. But should we not look at the other end of the spectrum here? Do we need to just have a proliferation of commands and, by the way, a commensurate increase in admirals and generals? So maybe I could begin with you, Mr. Martinage.

Mr. Martinage: I think you raise a really good point. I think, you know, when you look at cyberspace and special operations commands, I mean, there is already a significant headquarters and overhead associated with those. The question is if you elevate them to a service, give them more independence in terms of their budget authority, give them more control over their resources and managing their personnel, do you -- is that worth the investment.

But I would separate that from the geographic combatant commands, which I agree with you have become too large, and

have become much more like mini State Departments than actual combat, you know, preparing organizations. So, you know, a lot that could be done -- you know, we have these combatant commands, but then when we have a contingency we set up a joint task force, which I think reflects a lot of this.

So anyway, I think -- I agree with you. I think that we could pare back the number of or size of our geographic combatant commands, but I would separate that from the question of do we want to think about elevating SOCOM or creating a space or cyber service, which I think is a different question.

Chairman McCain: Doctor? Dr. O'Hanlon?

Dr. O'Hanlon: Thank you, Senator. I would just make the brief point that I agree with the thrust of your argument. The nice thing is we now sort of have a geographic command for every continent, so there probably is not a whole further to go, and I hope we do not go any further. But on the functional commands --

Chairman McCain: We have two for this --

Dr. O'Hanlon: That is a good point, and one could make the argument, especially you put it very well that Guatemala, Mexico, it is sort of an unnatural division. And obviously Northern Command is thinking about the defense of the homeland fundamentally. Southern Command is thinking

about Latino allies fundamentally, but perhaps that is something that could be juxtaposed.

Cyber, however, strikes me as different enough, and hard enough, and technical enough that I am sympathetic to the idea of according it its own command. I do not know about a separate service. I do not know about separate services for space and special operations, but I think having a cyber command recognizes the technical challenge of the operations associated with that and the importance of cyber to everything we do. So that is probably the one example where I would be willing to go ahead.

Chairman McCain: You would -- might agree that jointness does not foster inter-service competition?

Dr. O'Hanlon: You know, Senator McCain, as a person who is not in the military, I have admired the balance between competition and cooperation. And I generally think it is pretty good today. I take your point that there is a tension, and one could easily see it skewed too far in one direction or other. Historically, I think it has been at times skewed in one direction. I think Strategic Air Command in the 1950s had too much influence, and too big an idea of what it could accomplish with nuclear weapons, so there have been mistakes in the past. But today I think it is a pretty good balance between competition and collaboration.

Chairman McCain: Mr. McGrath?

Mr. McGrath: Very quickly on the cyber point. Cyber is so misunderstood by me, by perhaps people in the room, as to defy anything I think. There are strategic cyber activities that are held, I believe, at the level of the President. There are cyber activities that could be easily carried out at the individual unit ship board level.

Who controls those, who controls the ROE, all of those issues are very complicated, and I would as a former naval officer be loath to not have people on my ship who understood, who were wearing uniforms subject to my command, who understood what the impact of those cyber activities would be, or that we would just subcontract them all to a building somewhere in Maryland to come in from above.

With respect to jointness, I have written quite a bit. I think we are -- jointness works at the level of war fighting. It works much less at the level of strategy and the making of strategy.

Chairman McCain: General?

General Deptula: Yes, sir, very quickly. Great point on the challenge of balancing service perspectives versus joint just very quickly because many people -- I know many here do, but external from this body some do not. And that is the fact that to be joint requires that separateness of the services. It takes 20 to 25 years to master the skills

of learning how to be a commander of a surface action group, or a division, or an air expeditionary force, or a Marine expeditionary force.

The beauty of the joint construct is that the services do not fight. The services organize, train, and equip, and provide these professionals to a joint task force commander who can then organize relative to the contingency that is facing him or her. So they can select from this menu of capabilities that require the separateness of the services, but then to integrate them to meet a particular contingency. So that balance is there.

Now, second point. In the context of --

Chairman McCain: You have got to -- you have got to accelerate a little bit. I am way over time.

General Deptula: Okay, sorry, sir. You are right on re-exploring the validity of the regional combatant commands that were established after World War II, and then we tack them on until we have got every continent. It ought to be part of the review of the 21st Century Roles and Missions Commission.

Cyber command versus service, probably needs to be a command first because, as Bryan mentioned, every one of the services has and is affected by the cyber domain.

Chairman McCain: Thank you, General. Senator Reed?

Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for your excellent testimony. The chairman has raised, I think, a fundamental question here about the way we have put together the military with both overlapping missions and responsibilities. Some argue it is wasteful, redundant. Others argue it spurs the kind of competition and complementarity that is -- makes us successful.

And you can attack this in very different ways to look at it. One is the structural. Do we need these commands? The other is missions. And I would just -- I think it to be useful to the expertise here starting with the general. Are there sort of missions that are now being conducted by several services that are redundant, and on the other side of the ledger, missions that are more effectively carried out because they have several services engaged? And that might help us, I think, sort of begin think through some of these.

So, General, if you have any thoughts.

General Deptula: Yes, sir. Obviously there is a lot of redundancy across all of the services, and this is one of the areas that we have got to revisit. If you take a look at the current 5100.01, there are a listed 28 common military department functions and 24 common military service functions. Obviously we do not have time to go into all of

those here today.

A couple of the ones that stand out and deserve immediate attention is the whole issue of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, the use of remotely piloted aircraft. We have one service that is buying and developing essentially the carbon copy of the same kind of drone that is operated by another service. Why is that?

We have different organizational means of actually employing them. Some believe that the use ought to be up to the Joint Task Force commanders. Others believe that they should be inherent to the organic ownership of particular units. That is an issue that needs to be addressed.

The capability in the context of the mission area of deep attack, long-range strike is one that is maintained by all the services. A roles and missions review would take a good look at that. I mean, why do we have one service that is developing deep attack capability that is already resident in another?

And the other area is close air support. We have got multiple services with multiple systems that can all conduct close air support, yet we tend to focus on, and this is not a surprise to this committee, a particular aircraft and a particular service without looking across the different service stovepipes to take a holistic look at what we have available for close air support.

Senator Reed: Thank you, sir. Mr. McGrath?

Mr. McGrath: Senator Reed, I would like to speak in favor of redundancy and overlap. When the chiefs got together at Key West, it was three months before the Berlin air lift. They had no concept of what was coming. Secretary Forrestal generally considered the product of Key West to be sub-optimal, that there was still far less efficiency gained and swim lanes designated than he wanted.

I think we are entering into a new period of great power dynamics, that overlap and inefficiency I think served us well through the Cold War. It does not mean it was the only thing that could have worked, but it was something that did work. And so, if we look at a roles and missions review right now solely through the lens of efficiency and more efficient allocation of resources, I think we miss the bigger picture is if we are going to do it, it needs to be focused on preparing us to be ready for great power and competition.

Senator Reed: Thank you. Dr. O'Hanlon and then Mr. Martinage.

Dr. O'Hanlon: Senator Reed, thank you. Just a very brief point about the Marines and the Army. And to me, I have seen that they have actually done well in having a healthy competition in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of course, the Marines do not like to be seen, nor should they

been seen, as a second army, but they did have certain sectors, as we all know, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and they sometimes employed somewhat different tactics, and perhaps they were a little bit ahead of much of the Army, not General Petraeus, not General McMaster, but much of the Army on the proper use of counterinsurgency tactics. And I think there was a healthy competition and a back and forth getting ideas from each other.

There was a reputable book done by a former Washington Post reporter that thought that Marines went too far in Helmand Province in Afghanistan and created their own Marinastan in Helmand, and insisted only having their own TacAir support for their own forces. And I think there was some validity to that concern, but General McChrystal, General Petraeus were in positions to overrule that if they needed to.

And so, I think generally speaking, the distinctiveness, the competition was probably okay, and we probably got more benefit from it than harm.

Senator Reed: I would add in reflection, I think the Army learned a great deal from the Marine Corps because it became an expeditionary force essentially, and much more closer to the Marine Corps model than it was going into these operations. So it has been -- that is an example of how competition, if you will, helps everybody in a sense.

But, Mr. Martinage, quickly.

Mr. Martinage: Again, I think it is a balancing act between specialization on one hand and then jointness and overlap on the other. And I just come down, I think, in some cases with Bryan in terms of that overlap is good as long as you have competition in that area.

So, for example, anti-surface warfare, the Air Force has gotten out of that business over time in terms of anti-Navy capabilities. But you are feeling this LRSB, very stealthy, capable aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles. It could be a very effective anti-surface warfare capability for the Nation, possibly surpassing what we could do with carrier strike groups, which could provide an impetus for the Navy to think about how they are going to go after that problem differently. So that is just one example of many.

Senator Reed: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McCain: Senator Inhofe?

Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, first of all, General Deptula, I am very proud of your family and the fact that your daddy is here. I just am very pleased, and also with your career, the things that you have done, the things you have accomplished. And I am not surprised in that you got your training at Vance Air Force Base. So anyway, I appreciate your being here.

And, Dr. O'Hanlon, it was kind of interesting. You brought up a couple of things. First of all, are you aware that in 1994 I was in the House? I was on the House Armed Services Committee. Sitting next to me was John McHugh, and we had testimony -- this is 1994 -- by experts like you experts, except they were not quite to your level. They said in 10 years we would no longer need ground troops. Do you remember that discussion?

And I bring that up because whatever we say now goes back to what General Gates said. You know, whatever we do and decide to do about the future of threats and preparing right now -- we were 100 percent, we were wrong every time. And, of course, that is one of the reasons that I am very happy that we have had a series of hearings over the last three, four weeks that I have really benefitted a lot from.

We have had, of course, Secretary Gates, and then we had one on the 22nd of October with some -- four professors coming from their perspective. General Alexander was here with some of the academic witnesses. And I think -- the one thing that they all had in common was that we are really not spending enough on defense. We are not getting enough resources in defense. We have a different world now than we have had before.

And we are now in a position where we have cut the military. I think you mentioned, Mr. McGrath, the same

thing that I think General Gates, and he said in 1961 we had 51 percent of our resources went to defending America. Now we are down to 15 percent.

Now, I would ask each one of you, do you think that that is a problem. And we have adopted a policy now that if we try to correct the problem that we are having that came with sequestration, that we have a policy now that we cannot increase the spending in defense unless we have an equal amount of increase in social programs. I would like to have, starting with you, General, your opinion of that policy.

General Deptula: Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity to comment on that. First order question that still little discussion has been given to. Everybody has an opinion on what we should do with defense spending relative to social spending. But I suggest that we go back to one of our foundational documents, which can provide some guidance, the Preamble of the Constitution, which we formed this government to "provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare." It does not say provide for the general welfare and promote the common defense.

So if you take a look at what we have done in terms of sequestration, we have hit defense essentially at an excessive rate relative to the percentage of the budget that it makes up. So you are exactly right, we need to provide

the resources to meet the national security strategy. If we want to be the world's sole super power and to be able to engage on all the continents around the world to shape peace and stability, and then fight and maintain multiple contingencies simultaneously, we need to pay for it. We either do that or we change the strategy.

Senator Inhofe: Okay. Do the rest of you kind of agree with that generally? Yes, because we are short of time.

Dr. O'Hanlon: Senator, could I just make one very brief --

Senator Inhofe: Of course.

Dr. O'Hanlon: I would like to see domestic discretionary programs that are relevant to long-term national power supported, too. So I am most concerned about the overall downward pressure on all discretionary programs and the relative lenient treatment for entitlements and for tax considerations. I would rather see a much more integrated budget deal because those domestic programs on infrastructure, science, education I see as relevant to long-term national power.

Senator Inhofe: All right.

Mr. Martinage: Two seconds. I would just like to say, I mean, I think we need a larger defense budget, but investing in more of the same I think is not the solution.

We face a different array of challenges, and doing more of the same is not going to work.

Senator Inhofe: Okay. I am almost out of time here, and I did not want to spend that much time on that because one of the problems that we are having now is one that everybody recognizes, all the other panelists. And it is not exactly in the purview of what this is supposed to be about, but that is in the difficulty we have in making cuts in headquarters.

You know, we have been trying to do this for a long period of time. I have an analogy that I use, all bureaucracies are the same; they all want to grow. In the case of the FAA back in 2000, they had a budget of $9.9 billion. Today it is $16.5 billion, and they have fewer licensed pilots out there. It is just the nature of the bureaucracy.

And I think we are trying right now to address that. I know Secretary Gates and Secretary Hagel attempted to do it, and we in our defense authorization bill have actually -- headquarters budget and personnel by cutting it $435 million in personnel spending. And we are making an effort to do that, and we have not been successful in doing it.

And since my time has expired, I would like to have each one of your for the record give your recommendations on what we can do to keep the -- that level from growing

regardless of what, you know, what the situation is. And you said it very well, General, when you said the size of the Pentagon that won World War II was far smaller than the present enterprise. For the record, all right? Thank you.

General Deptula: Yes, sir. Very briefly, this needs to be one of the objectives, number one, of a roles and missions review. I went back and, I mean, I mentioned earlier we have 28 common military department functions, 24 service common service functions. That does not even touch the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which has exploded as well as the Joint staff.

This is a, what I call, as you were talking, the law of large organizations, and it will take leadership to put a stop to it. But we need to reduce, not continue to grow, and quite frankly you can do things better if you have smaller staff. So set an arbitrary limit and stick to it. You can start with cutting OSD by 25 percent.

Senator Inhofe: Yes, and just the rest can answer for the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman McCain: Senator King?

Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We had a very interesting hearing yesterday in the Budget Committee talking about some of these larger issues. And I think it is important to put into perspective the discussion about defense spending and domestic discretionary spending. They represent just about 25 percent of the total Federal budget. We are fighting over a small piece and not discussing the major piece, which is entitlement spending, interest on the national debt, and tax expenditures which are now a trillion dollars a year equal to the entire discretionary budget.

So there is a lot of areas to discuss. I do not see this as a fight between the National Park Service and the Defense Department. It is a much larger discussion in terms of the context of this -- of this issue.

General Deptula, first I want to say how impressed I have been by your testimony. The person who allowed you to retire should be hunted down and punished. Delighted to have you with us this morning. Give me a big picture in a minute, upside of reorganization. We are here today talking about reorganization. What do we gain? Is it financial? Is it effectiveness? As Chief Justice Burger used to say, why are we here?

General Deptula: Sir, depending on how it goes, it could be all of those. It could be increased capability

with fewer resources. But in order to get that end state, we need to think about different ways and how technology has enabled us to go there. You know, folks like to single out the F-35 and say, well, we can use fourth generation aircraft instead, but what they are doing is they are thinking about the F-35 as a replacement aircraft, older aircraft.

Part of the problem with weapons systems like F-35, F-22, and the next generation bomber is they are not Fs or Bs. They are F-B-E-A-R-C-E-W-A-W-C-S 22s and 35s. They are flying sensor shooters that with the proper context you could put together and match them and connect them with land forces, sea forces. A wingman to an F-35 should be an Aegis cruiser. Those kinds of concepts will allow us to become much, much more effective with fewer overhead in structure trying to use an employ forces the old way.

Senator King: One of the concepts we have been talking about here is that the modernization of these large weapon systems -- the new Ohio class, the F-35, the strike bomber -- we need to be thinking about modularization and modernization as built into the concept because we are building a 35- or 40-year asset, and it is obsolete the day it is built. And we have got to be thinking about how it can be upgradable, it seems to me.

Specific question. Dr. O'Hanlon, you said something

very interesting, and perhaps you could give me this on the record. The relative cost of a carrier versus a land base, do you have anything on that specifically? We know what a carrier costs. It is about $12 billion. What about a base somewhere in the Persian Gulf?

Dr. O'Hanlon: Well, bases typically cost in the range of $2 billion if they have to be very well fortified and protected. So that would be the investment cost, a land base, and that is going to include underground facilities for fuel, weapons, all sorts of redundancies so that you can survive hits. And, of course, there are going to be costs that a land base is going to have incur thereafter that are going to be quite high --

Senator King: But I think that is -- but I think that is an interesting figure because there are areas of the world where we know we are going to have to station a carrier. And maybe it would be most cost-effective to station a station.

Another question, intelligence. We spend about $70 billion on intelligence, $50 on the civilian side, $20 on the military side. Those are rough figures, unclassified. That is a lot of money. Is this an area where we could -- where we could find some efficiencies? I just -- I cannot help but believe that there is overlap having these multiple intelligence agencies essentially all watching what Assad is

doing or what Putin is doing. Any thoughts on that, General?

General Deptula: Yes, sir. You are exactly correct.

Senator King: Could the record show that?

[Laughter.]

General Deptula: Sixteen, 17 intelligence organizations. I used to go to the EXCOMMs on a, you know, monthly basis that the DNI held, and I would sit around the table. I would listen to everybody, and then everyone would go back home to their own organizations and do their own thing again. It is an area that is worthy of further exploration to get to the point how do we integrate and avoid duplication and overlap.

Senator King: Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your testimony.

Chairman McCain: Let the record show that the opinion of the senator from Maine for the first time in the history of this committee was exactly right.

[Laughter.]

Chairman McCain: I am also reminded to correct the record concerning the Pacific in World War II. It was divided between Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur. A West Point graduate was offended by my omission there, and I deeply apologize.

[Laughter.]

Chairman McCain: I am not sure who is next.

Senator Ernst: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us here today. I appreciate your testimony very much.

I would like to kind of redirect back to our air powers for a little bit of discussion there. As many of you know, I and many of my colleagues have really been focused very much on the Air Force effort to divest the A-10. Many of us are strongly opposed to that. Senator Ayotte has been a wonderful leader in this effort, and I have known many warriors on the front lines that have had the benefit of close air support from the A-10. It is very highly regarded amongst members of our armed forces.

So I would just love to get your feelings on whether the A-10 should be divested, and certainly, General, let us start with you.

General Deptula: Well, thanks very much for the opportunity. The first point that I would like to make, and by the way, this gets to the heart of the subject of roles and functions, roles and missions. The close air support is a mission. It is not an airplane. As you have been -- I do not know if you have been involved in close combat, but if you are being shot at by an adversary and all of a sudden that adversary gets terminated and you are no longer shot at, do you really care where the weapon came from that

terminated the adversary? I do not think so.

Senator Ernst: General, do we have a platform if we should get rid of the A-10 right now as suggested by some? Do we have a platform that would perform that mission?

General Deptula: Yes. More than 70 percent of the close air support missions that have occurred in Afghanistan were by aircraft other than the A-10. Now, that is not to say it is not a magnificent platform, which gets to my other point, and that is why we need to look across service boundaries. In the United States Army, as you well know, we have got Apache helicopters. The A-10 performs a close air support mission much better than the Apache helicopter or the helicopters -- attack helicopters in the Marine Corps.

So why do we not open the spectrum before we look at terminating one particular aircraft in one particular service stovepipe and look at the entire mission set, and look at what is the best way to meet our fiscal challenges while at the same time optimizing our military capability?

Senator Ernst: That is a great discussion. How about you, Mr. McGrath?

Mr. McGrath: I realize the world is not this simple, but we could trade, trade air defense artillery from the Army to the Air Force, trade the A-10 from the Air Force to the Army. Many of our allies around the world have air defense artillery in their air force. But I believe the

plane, the A-10, and how it is revered by those who live under its protection, we should be very, very cautious about getting rid of that platform. Perhaps it should just be switched over to the Army.

Senator Ernst: Well, that was going to be my next question actually is I know the Army does not want to absorb the A-10, but that is a thought that is out there as well.

Mr. McGrath: I think they would absorb it if you gave them the money.

Senator Ernst: That is it. That is the key. That is the big issue. Dr. O'Hanlon?

Dr. O'Hanlon: Senator, I, too, think the A-10 is a pretty good platform, and I would like to see a more integrated cost study. We have this figure that has been used by the Pentagon that there is $4 billion in O&M savings if you retire the A-10. I think that is based on very specific assumptions, and, of course, it is not accounting for the fact that you are going to have to buy F-35s in order to replace the A-10s if you retire them.

I would buy fewer F-35s and/or attack helicopters in order to be able to keep the A-10, and then it becomes a different cost calculation. So at a minimum we should see that calculation done with a broader set of assumptions because I think the Pentagon is giving a very specific way to do the calculation, which assumes the F-35 Program and

the Attack Helicopter Programs are all givens and untouchable, and only then calculates the cost addition from the A-10.

Senator Ernst: Okay, thank you. Mr. Martinage?

Mr. Martinage: I tend to agree with my colleagues here on the panel, and I would say I think it is really important to look at it as a mission and, you know, have the AC-130. You have attack helicopters, you have the A-10, you have TacAir, you have bombers that can all perform the mission to varying degrees. I think the A-10 is probably one of the best in the bunch, but I think that we need to look at the cost implications.

And I think this gets to the high/low mix. You know, for the Air Force, they probably need some dedicated low capabilities for doing ISR close air support, strike in low to medium threat environments, and they need a different set of capabilities for high-end A2AD environments. And quite frankly, the F-35 does not fit well into either of those.

Senator Ernst: Okay. And, General, I would like to shift back to you since you brought up the Apache attack helicopter. There is an effort to move the Apaches out of the National Guard. I, of course, believe that the National Guard needs to retain some of the combat capabilities. We need those pilots to retain hours or keep their hours up. What are your thoughts on moving that strictly to the active

duty component?

General Deptula: I think the Guard and the Reserve forces in the United States of America are oftentimes overlooked as a key element of our entire defense architecture. I am not specifically familiar with the details of that argument, and so I would leave that to the experts in the Army, Guard, and Reserve as well as active duty. However, I would be a bit suspicious about shifting a particular capability set all into one of the components or the other.

Senator Ernst: Thank you. I am suspicious as well. My time is up, gentlemen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman McCain: Senator Hirono?

Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the panel. We note that as we focus on what should be the roles and missions of the armed services that I note that I think all of the panelists said that -- indicated that this is not the armed services that we would have if we were creating this body because our military is a product of history.

So, General Deptula, thank you very much for your service. I know you also had a stint in the -- in the Pacific, so mahalo for that. I note in your testimony that the biggest challenge our defense establishment faces is one

of institutional inertia. If there is institutional inertia, how can we have a serious discussion that leads to changes to the military if there is inertia, as you indicated? How would you go about pushing through this inertia and creating an environment where appropriate changes can happen?

General Deptula: Aloha, and thank you for the question, because it is a very, very important one. And the first thing that we need to do, in my opinion, in terms of getting at this institutional inertia is, number one, recognizing it and talking about it, which gets to my first recommendation that I made earlier, and that is we need to have a roles and missions commission for the 21st century to deal directly at these issues because, once again, as Senator Inhofe, and the chairman, and Mr. Reed have mentioned, we are faced with this law of large institutions that tends to dumb everything down to a lowest common denominator, and adds lots of time and effort into any decision, which also reduces the proclivity for risk taking.

And it has gotten to be such a risk averse environment across many, many subject areas in the Department of Defense, it is amazing that we make any progress.

Senator Hirono: Do the other panelists agree that institutional inertia is a huge factor in moving us forward? Yes?

Mr. McGrath: Senator, I think another word for "institutional inertia" is "jointness." Jointness, as I have said earlier, has provided a lot of really good things. Our ability to summon a variety of fires from a variety of services and platforms at the time and place of our choosing is the envy of the world.

But when you enter a process of the making of strategy with one of your first pillars being how the joint force would be used or how the joint force would be -- would contribute, rather than thinking about what is it you are trying to do and which elements of this joint force are most important. Until we get to a point where jointness is not the number one attribute that we look for from our armed services, until we get to that point we will have this sclerosis and this institutional inertia.

Senator Hirono: I think you mentioned that jointness works when we are actually in a war situation, and it does not work so well when we are planning for a 21st century military.

Mr. McGrath: I think it is less successful.

Senator Hirono: Anyone else want to weigh in, especially on the subject of risk averseness in our military, and that was testified to in one of our earlier panels. Dr. Thomas Mahnken said that we are -- the U.S. has grown unused to having to take risks and bear costs.

Dr. O'Hanlon: Senator, I would -- I would personally say that when we get to issues like high-level modernization debates, I think we have a system that works pretty well because we cannot expect the system to make the decisions for us. All we can expect is the system will elevate the important issues to a place where the Armed Services Committee, the Pentagon, the Nation as a whole focuses in on them and the contending arguments.

What I am most concerned about is I think where Senator McCain and Senator Inhofe were speaking earlier, the harder to analyze growth in staff growth and bureaucracy, to me these the parts of the institution and the system that are the most challenging to comprehend and to attack. And so, I am less troubled by the high-level roles and missions debates on some of the weapons and more concerned about the growth of the bureaucracy.

Senator Hirono: Well, I think in connection with that then, as we focus on research and development efforts, and, you know, a large part of that is in the service of combatant commanders. Would you say that the combatant commanders should have much more input into what kind of technologies and resources that they need as opposed to much more of a centralized decision making at the Pentagon level? Anyone?

Mr. Martinage: I would say yes. I mean, I think one

of the big ways to get out of the institutional inertia problem is to encourage inter-service competition for key missions, and exactly what those missions are and the priorities of those missions could very much come from the geographical combatant commanders.

But to have real inter-service competition, you have to be able to affect budget share. If you cannot get out of the one-third, one-third, one-third rule, there is no incentive to take risks to try to something new. So, I mean, I think that is a big part of it.

Senator Hirono: Thank you.

Chairman McCain: Senator Sullivan?

Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. I think these are really important hearings. I want to commend the chairman for undertaking this important look at the future, what we need to do.

Dr. O'Hanlon, I really appreciate your comments on Task Force Smith. You know, one of my favorite books that I have in my office I actually suggested to the Secretary of Defense and his team to read is T.R. Fehrenbach's This Kind of War, which I think for people thinking about readiness is always a good book to read on the lack of readiness that we had in the Korean War. And as Senator Inhofe mentioned, we seem to get it wrong every time if you are looking

historically.

But I do want to amplify for the record on your comments on the Marine Corps. You mentioned effectiveness on Capitol Hill, effectiveness with the American people. You forgot to mention effectiveness on the battlefield, and as you can imagine, those levels of effectiveness are all related.

But I want to talk about the size of the Army, and I know that you have written a lot of -- I really appreciate your Wall Street Journal op-ed recently on that. And with all due respect to Admiral Roughead, I think the idea of an Army of less than 300,000 is strategic lunacy, and hopefully nobody seriously is contemplating that. I certainly am not. I think it should be about double that size.

General Milley, the chief of staff of the Army, gave a recent speech at the AUSA conference a couple of weeks that I thought was an excellent speech that talked about some of the myths of warfare. And one of those myths that he talked about was that armies are easy to regenerate. If you overshoot, cut to 300,000, and then, oh, my gosh, we have got a crisis, that you can, presto, bring back a couple of brigade combat teams and, you know, units that need to be trained.

Can any of you talk about just what that takes in terms of once you cut -- once you get rid of a, you know, BCT --

an airborne BCT, for example, what happens? How long does that take, because obviously he thinks -- he puts that out as a myth that it can take years, decades.

Dr. O'Hanlon: I could start, and I know others will want to weigh in. Thank you, Senator. General Deptula already made the very important point that it takes 20 years to grow a leader of a certain stature.

Senator Sullivan: Right.

Dr. O'Hanlon: And you can try to distribute the existing stock across a slightly larger force structure, and promote people a little faster, and do a few things around the edges. And I would defer to those who have more experience hands on than I have, but I would simply say that the buildup of the last 15 years, once we started growing the force after 9/11, we grew by about 15 percent over about six to eight years. And I think that is about as fast I feel that we can empirically say is consistent with maintaining high standards.

So I think 15 percent growth in overall numbers of people, of brigade combat teams, and so forth over a six- to eight-year period, that is a pretty good set of numbers to keep in mind. Anything faster than that would be unproven, except going back to World War II when we had a much different kind of buildup.

Senator Sullivan: Right.

Dr. O'Hanlon: And I think with all great respect to our World War II veterans, you know, some of the concepts in that particular fight were a little different than today's.

Senator Sullivan: Sir?

Mr. McGrath: Senator, I think General Milley was attacking a straw man in that speech. No thoughtful defense analyst thinks it is easy to grow an army. The question ultimately is, is it easier to grow an army, or easier to grow a navy, or easier to grow an air force in capital intensive services where you have to put investment in year after year in order to maintain a certain size.

It winds up being easier to grow the Army. I think we surged up 80,000 people in the Army in a relatively short term, and a good number of those saw combat. It would be very difficult to imagine a navy growing that fast in that amount of time.

Senator Sullivan: Thank you. Let me switch topics a little bit here. The other thing that General Milley, and I know that our committee has been focused on to try do a fair amount in the NDAA this year on it, is focusing on the tooth-to-tail ratio with regard to if we have to make cuts. And, again, I am focused more back on the Army, but I would appreciate your views on this more generally, that the last units we should be cutting are the units that are the, you know, direct combat units.

And do you think that as we are looking right now on kind of downsizing in the Army or the other branches that we are getting that tooth-to-tail ratio correct, or -- because I certainly think that the last units we should be cutting are the BCTs and the other ground combat units. But are we missing something in terms of getting that ratio correct? Dr. O'Hanlon?

Dr. O'Hanlon: Senator, I will begin. I do not disagree with you, but I also think that one of the great strengths of the American military is that tail. Now, there are parts of it that are less efficient, and I would -- I would agree with the idea of putting 10, 20, 30 percent cuts into some of the headquarters and staff, and then letting the services and other organizations within DOD figure out how to make that happen.

So I support that because I think there is a lot of waste. But the general notion of tail includes intelligence, includes logistics, transportation, cyber. All these things are crucial to how we fight, and I think our tail is actually just as impressive as our tooth in terms of how we stack up against other countries' militaries, which is part of why I am just generally reluctant to get too far into that conversation because it implies that if you really have tough budget caps, you can cut tails safely or relatively safely. I think we just cut

the defense budget enough, and we are going to have to recognize that the tail is important to protect in some cases as well.

Senator Sullivan: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman McCain: Senator Shaheen?

Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. O'Hanlon, I think I heard you say in your testimony that, and I agreed as you went through the history of how we, you know, fought in Vietnam based on a false set of assessments and based on what we learned from previous wars, and dismantling after those wars. But I think what I heard you say is that it took us several years to be ready now for the wars of this century. Do you think we are ready for the fight against ISIS and for the potential threat from Russia, and Iran, and China that we might face?

Dr. O'Hanlon: Senator Shaheen, thanks for the great question. No, I do not think we have a good concept of how to deal with Syria partly because the political mess is so huge. I mean, what kind of solution are we really after at a higher level of political -- I have argued for a confederal model of Syria. Trying to negotiate a new successor government to Assad just is not going to work, and if we begin with that political framework, we are bound to fail militarily as well. So that is more than just a military challenge. I think it is a broader strategic

challenge.

In Asia, I think we are doing better, and I know other panelists who will want to comment on that a swell. But I think the recent moves by the Pacific fleet to operate in the South China Sea, the general concept of the rebalance have been reasonably well thought through. I think we are all still struggling on how to think about Putin, so that is a separate problem, and I am not sure it is fundamentally a DOD problem.

So I think it really depends, but on the --

Senator Shaheen: And explain that when you say you do not think it is fundamentally a DOD problem.

Dr. O'Hanlon: Well, I think that the genesis of this goes into how we have dealt with Russia for 25 years in terms of everything from Nunn-Lugar, to NATO expansion, to many other issues. And now, seeing the arrival of Putin and how he suppressed Russian democracy and otherwise, you know, been a bully in his neighborhood, I am not sure that beginning with the debate about which weapons to give the Ukraine Army, for example, is the essence of the matter. I would rather have a broader debate about the future of European security structures and think about how our strategy follows from that.

So arming the Ukraine military may be part of it, but I think it needs to be in a broader debate that we are not

really having. So, again, I do not fault DOD and its tactics and its units for that particular challenge.

Senator Shaheen: Yes, Mr. Martinage?

Mr. Martinage: I would like to focus in on your comment about sort of Iran, China, and that sort of section of challenges. In my view, the power projection concept that we developed during the Cold War and demonstrated in Desert War and really refined since then is really fundamentally being called into question. Our adversaries get a vote, and they are developing and fielding capabilities to disrupt our preferred approach to power projection.

The big -- the big four in my view are space is no longer a sanctuary against attack; closed-in airbases and ports, which we rely on extensively, are now increasingly vulnerable to attack; service combatants and aircraft carriers are vulnerable to detection at rang and attack at range; and conventional aircraft are increasingly vulnerable to integrated air defenses. And if you look at all that and how we are currently structured and postured in our force, and we have a big and growing problem.

Senator Shaheen: Mr. McGrath, I want to -- in your written testimony, you talk about the rise of the combatant commanders creating the impression that strategy development is no longer in the purview of the services. And this sort

of gets to some of the other issues that you all are raising.

Talk a little bit more about that and why you believe that the services should be involved in strategy because my perception is that they have been very involved, if no in the final decisions around strategy, at least in presenting options for what we should be doing. And, you know, certainly in the war in Iraq, I think General Petraeus with his surge, which I think there were members of Congress who were involved in those discussions. But I think much of the strategy there was based on what we were hearing from the commanders in the field. So explain what you mean there.

Mr. McGrath: I think it is important to make a distinction between sort of campaign level military strategy, which is what the surge was, and the making of long-term military strategy to serve the national security strategy. It is in the latter part where the services, in my view -- I was the lead author and the team leader of the Navy's 2007 maritime strategy. There was a lot of institutional resistance within the building. What is the Navy doing writing strategy? The strategy is the purview of the CoComs.

And in my twisted view of the world, strategy really ought to be the purview of the service chiefs because they are the ones with the long-term view, whereas the combatant

commanders are generally more looking at the threats that are before them, and I think that's what we pay them to do.

So it is that tension between the near term and the long term that I think puts the service chiefs in a better position to do that long-term strategic thinking.

Senator Shaheen: I am out of time, but does anybody disagree with that?

[No response.]

Senator Shaheen: Okay. And I just want to ask Dr. O'Hanlon a final question. You raised issues about the QDR. We heard last week from a panelist who said we should get rid of the QDR. Do you agree with that?

Dr. O'Hanlon: No, Senator. I think overall even though I do not always enjoy reading them -- at this point they have gotten a little dry at times -- the discipline of the process is actually useful. And sometimes when they are dry, it is because we have worked towards a consensus as a Nation, which is not all together a bad thing in all cases either.

So, no, I would support it. I think we have got about enough. General Deptula has mentioned the roles and missions commission idea. Maybe that is a good idea. Maybe that is enough, however. I mean, in other words, we should not pile on additional reviews one after another after another. But I think a QDR every four years is probably a

pretty solid concept.

Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

Chairman McCain: I have found the QDR to be an excellent cure for insomnia myself.

[Laughter.]

Chairman McCain: Senator Cotton?

Senator Cotton: Mr. McGrath, a question about the role of sea power. Over the last 15 years, we have used sea power to project the power onto the land, especially air power. Still doing that to this day in the Middle East. Do you think that is the proper or primary role that should be using sea power for, or should we have sea power focused primarily on control of the seas and lines of communication on the seas?

Mr. McGrath: More of an emphasis on the latter than there is today, but certainly a great emphasis on the former.

Senator Cotton: Okay. Could you say more about that?

Mr. McGrath: Sure. We live thousands of miles from our security interests. Sea power is ultimately probably going to be the most effective way to bring mass quantities of power to bear quickly when situations are likely to still be in the time where they can be controlled, escalated and de-escalated.

It is hard to get the amount of power flown there from

CONUS that we would need in that kind of a role, so we have to be able to project power in the early stages of conflicts. But when it comes time to bring the big hurt, that is really I think an Air Force mission.

Senator Cotton: Would you say the same thing about the Marine Corps and extended land warfare?

Mr. McGrath: I would say the Marine Corps should -- I was just talking to Bob Martinage this morning about this. The Marine Corps really ought not be in the counterinsurgency business and the wide area of security business. They ought to be in the crisis management business, but there is a lot of business in the crisis management business.

Senator Cotton: Anybody care to respond to Mr. McGrath's comments on those two points? Dr. O'Hanlon got his hand up first.

Dr. O'Hanlon: Sorry. I will be brief. Senator Cotton, I think the Marines helped us a lot in the counterinsurgency campaigns of the last 15 years. And so, while it may nice to have them prioritize the missions that focus on expeditionary warfare, I think we need to have them also as a potential counterinsurgency force.

Senator Cotton: General Deptula?

General Deptula: Listen, having 4.3 sovereign square acres of U.S. territory that could be moved around the world

where and when we need it is an absolutely necessary force structure requirement of the United States military. The question becomes how many in the context of force structure. That decision and discussion needs to also be informed by the fact that sea-based air power is about 10 times more resource costly than land-based air power. And I am not talking Air Force versus Navy here because I am including the Marines as part of that land-based calculation. So it is just something that needs to be taken into consideration.

So if you take a look at the initial stages of Operation Inherent Resolve, you were flying F/A-18E/Fs with two 500-pound bombs 1,200 miles to deliver and come home when on B-1 could essentially accomplish the equivalent of 40 F/A-18E/F sorties.

Chairman McCain: I would point out that without the use of Incirlik, we did not have many other options.

Mr. Martinage: I would just say, along with what Bryan said, I think sea control is essential. It is a key enabler for the Joint Force. But ultimately, we want to be able to project from the sea against land targets.

Senator Cotton: Okay.

Mr. Martinage: And the challenge there is I think we need to rethink the future of the Carrier Air Wing. In particular, we need the longer range and more survivability off the carrier deck.

Senator Cotton: General Deptula, I would like to shift to our nuclear forces. Given China and Russia's modernization of their nuclear forces as well as delivery vehicles and space systems, do you think our nuclear forces are properly postured to appropriately deter aggression from those countries?

General Deptula: The overarching general response would be yes, particularly in the context of the viability of our triad. However, we cannot neglect attention to modernizing our nuclear forces. Quite frankly, adversary or potential adversary nuclear forces are the only forces that currently pose an existential threat to the United States, so that needs to be priority one.

Senator Cotton: Anyone else have comments on our nuclear forces? Mr. McGrath?

Mr. McGrath: I want to associate myself with something Dr. O'Hanlon said earlier, which was his concern -- and I do not want to misquote you here -- his concern for the degree to which the Navy's recapitalization of its strategic deterrent could potentially impact its ability to continue to provide the force necessary as the conventional deterrence force. That concerns me greatly.

I think that is the U.S. Navy's primary close to unique contribution to our national defense, and that is day-to-day conventional deterrence around the world. And if that is

impacted, I think that is a dangerous thing.

Senator Cotton: So you worry that they are prioritizing the strategic deterrent over conventional deterrent?

Mr. McGrath: I am certain that they are, yes.

Senator Cotton: No, as am I. That worries you.

Mr. McGrath: Oh, okay. I am sorry. Yes, sir, they are.

Senator Cotton: Okay.

Mr. Martinage: The only thing I would say about that is when we come down on the number of the delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads, the coin of the realm becomes the survivability of that assured deterrent. And nothing is as good as the SSBN, period, stop.

Senator Cotton: My time has expired.

Chairman McCain: Senator Donnelly?

Senator Donnelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of you for being here. General Deptula, in your testimony you wrote in regards to the three legs of the triad, you affirmed the importance of it, in maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent, and I completely agree. And what I am interested in is hearing some of your additional thoughts. In your testimony you wrote, "A dollar spent on duplicative capability comes at the expense of essential capacity or capability elsewhere."

Do you believe we can achieve savings by pursuing common components and systems among the services for nuclear modernization efforts?

General Deptula: Senator, I am not an expert in that particular area, but in general as you posed the question, my answer would be yes.

Senator Donnelly: Okay. I would love to hear the insights of anybody else on the panel. Mr. McGrath, I know you talk about jointness as a -- as a strategy it is not always the greatest thing. How about jointness in common components and similar things?

Mr. McGrath: I think if we were able to create a missile that was nearly identical for the SSBN and for silos, I think that would be a wonderful thing. I do not know how likely that it is. I just want to quickly say that my fear is not -- I am not trying to say that we should not do the SSBN. What I am trying to say is we cannot let building the SSBN keep us from having the level of conventional Navy that we need to do its job.

Dr. O'Hanlon: I will pile on the SSBN issue for just a second, if you do not mind, and this is in the spirit of -- I do not want to associate with this, Senator. But you mentioned the $13 billion aircraft carrier. I am troubled by the $6 billion Ohio Class replacement. I do not why it has to cost $6 billion. I know why it is going to cost more

than the Ohio Class, and there are some inefficiencies, and times have changed.

The Ohio Class, I think, is quite survivable. It is just getting old. And to be honest with you, just conceptually I would be happy with something that looked like the Ohio Class for the future, new Ohio class subs. I realize we cannot really do that because we have lost some shipyard capabilities and so forth. But I am still not quite sure why the SSBN successor has to cost more than twice as much per vessel. And I think some scrutiny on that would be -- would be advisable for all of us.

Mr. Martinage: I do not want to get too far down in the weeds on the -- on the common costs on the nuclear side, but in terms of warhead designs, having some inefficiency and redundancy is probably good so if there is this failure, technical failure, in any one of the different warhead designs, it does not compromise our strategic deterrence. So sometimes you have got to balance, you know, the efficiency.

Senator Donnelly: Let me ask you this. As we look at dollar challenges and budget challenges, and I would love to hear from all of you, each one, one after the other, your best idea for reduction in bureaucratic growth. You know, if you had one main point on that, what would you tell us this is what you have to go after? General, I do not know

if you want to start first, but you are the Lieutenant General in the group, so.

General Deptula: Sure, I will go first. Once again, we have 18 defense agencies. We have 10 DOD field activities. That is the first place I would start looking to cut in terms of increasing and freeing up resources. And then the next place I would look is I would look at the staffs, both OSD and Joint staff. Then I would look at the service headquarters staff.

Senator Donnelly: Mr. McGrath?

Mr. McGrath: Defense agencies.

Dr. O'Hanlon: I agree with the idea of a 10 or 20 percent arbitrary cut. Usually that kind of policymaking strikes me as a punt, and I am frustrated as an analyst when that is all I can recommend, but staffs have grown so much. I think simply imposing some degree of percentage reduction over a period of time --

Senator Donnelly: And having them figure out --

Dr. O'Hanlon: Exactly. And then I also am a supporter of another round of base closures. I recognize a lot of the objections this committee and others have had to the specifics of how we did it in 2005. I share some of those critiques. But I think we are going to have to get to it at some point as well.

Mr. Martinage: I agree with the rest of the panel.

Defense agencies, then OSD and Joint staff, and just looking broadly at contractor support across the Department.

Senator Donnelly: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McCain: Thank you. I am sure our witnesses are aware that in the defense bill, which hopefully -- which just passed the House in the -- has a seven and a half percent across-the-board required cut for four years in staffs. And it has been pointed out that former Secretary Gates mandated a cut in staffs as well, which never really happened. They just shifted people around.

And it is also hard to get a handle on it when you don't how many people are working there. And for 15 years now we have been trying to get an audit of the Pentagon. And it is my desire, and I was just recently out in Silicon Valley to see if they can come up with a way since obviously internally we have been unable to achieve that.

We did even get to the issue sequestration, and the -- not only the damaging that it does to our defense funding, but to the ability of the men and women to plan, to operate, to know, to have some certainty. I do not know how we can have a QDR if we are lurching from one year to another and nobody knows what the level of funding is going to be. And, of that course, that responsibility less in a bipartisan effort in Congress and the President of the United States.

So these are very interesting and difficult times, and almost every day brings a new challenge, the disappearance of an airliner over Egypt just being the latest. So we need your thinking and experience and knowledge very badly. We do not pretend to know all the answers, but we are going to make it our -- reform our highest priority for the coming year.

There are some very important beginnings, such as reform of the retirement system which is fundamental, as you know, and many others. But we have a long way to go, and your testimony has been very helpful to all members, and I thank you very much. Jack?

Senator Reed: Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for bringing together these experts, and let me thank the witnesses for extraordinary insights, and thank you for your service to the Nation in so many other ways. So, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]