

**HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND AND U.S. AF-
RICA COMMAND IN REVIEW OF THE DE-
FENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FIS-
CAL YEAR 2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM**

THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, Webb, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Brown, Ayotte, Graham, and Cornyn.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; and Gerald J. Leeling, counsel.

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; and Michael J. Sistik, research assistant.

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Hannah I. Lloyd, and Brian F. Sebold.

Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Jeremy Bratt, assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Taylor Andreae, assistant to Senator Graham; and Dave Hanke, assistant to Senator Cornyn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. We want to welcome our witnesses this morning, General Duncan McNabb, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and General Carter Ham, Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), to testify on the programs and budget needed to meet the current and future requirements within their respective commands.

Gentlemen, please extend on behalf of this committee our gratitude to the men and women of your commands and their families for the many sacrifices that they've made on behalf of our Nation. Thanks to both of you for your long careers of leadership and service. I guess the best way we can thank the troops and their families is to make sure there's no gap in the receipt of their paychecks. I know every member of this committee is thinking about how to avoid that gap.

General Ham, congratulations on your recent swearing in as Commander of AFRICOM. Your first month on the job has been extraordinarily busy. However, as Admiral Stavridis told this committee, AFRICOM has demonstrated, just a few years after reaching full operational capability, that it is capable of conducting and coordinating a major multinational effort to prevent a tyrant from massacring his own people, people who simply wanted to exercise their fundamental human and democratic rights. You and your staff at AFRICOM are to be commended for your performance in this effort.

Over the past few weeks, international military action in Libya has established an arms embargo and a no-fly zone, stopped Qadhafi's advancing army, and has seamlessly passed the command of the military effort from a U.S.-led joint task force to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Moving forward, the question is whether the coalition or a coalition member or members should supply the opposition with arms. I believe it is important that any such decision be made with the support or at least the acceptance of our coalition partners because of the military and political importance of maintaining broad international support for the mission.

President Obama has been cautious in weighing the considerations and conditions for the use of military force and I am confident that he will continue to do so in considering the many questions surrounding supplying weapons to the opposition forces.

We look forward, General, to hearing your views on this issue and other Libya-related issues.

From a transnational terrorism perspective, there are many other areas of concern to this committee, including Somalia and northwest Africa. Today large regions of Somalia are "ungoverned spaces," where the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization operates freely and with impunity. To make matters worse, Al-Shabaab numbers are growing as it recruits young men from the Somali diasporas in Europe and North America.

To counter this growing threat, a small African Union force, known by its acronym of "AMISOM," stands between Al-Shabaab and the Somali Transitional Federal Government. So, General Ham, this committee looks forward to what you can tell us about that as well.

In the region that includes Niger, Mali, and Mauritania, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, is growing stronger through the extraction of ransoms, taxing illicit trafficking, and general banditry. Over the past year this group has stated in no uncertain terms that it intends to strike western targets in the region and possibly in Europe. That is a cause of great concern, not only to the United States, but to our allies in Europe. We must also make sure that AQIM does not take advantage of the fog of war in Libya to its advantage. If these al Qaeda franchises grow unchecked in the Horn of Africa or across northwest Africa, it may lead to further attacks against U.S. interests overseas or in the homeland.

While Libya is in the headlines today, there remain many other challenges in General Ham's area of responsibility, including the evolving political situation on the Ivory Coast, the post-protest recovery in Tunisia, the growth in illicit trafficking across the continent, and the ongoing elections in Nigeria. While confronting some of these issues falls squarely in the lap of a combatant command, many do not, which means that your command is being directed to assist in both traditional and nontraditional ways, and often where the jurisdictional lines within the Federal Government are blurred.

General McNabb, we know that things have been busy for you as well ever since you assumed your job at TRANSCOM. TRANSCOM has played a critical role in supporting our war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less well known, but no less important, has been TRANSCOM's role in supporting the Japanese earthquake and tsunami relief efforts, as well as previous relief efforts around the world. We applaud those efforts. We also know that TRANSCOM forces have been involved in supporting forces engaged in operations in Libya.

A number of ongoing critical issues confront TRANSCOM. One is modernizing the forces. One acquisition program supporting TRANSCOM has received a lot of visibility and has been resolved, and that's the strategic tanker modernization program.

TRANSCOM has received Congressional additions to the budget to buy C-17 aircraft in excess of what DOD and TRANSCOM said were needed to support wartime requirements. Now, as the Air Force is taking delivery of those extra C-17s, the Air Force is seeking authorization to retire C-5A aircraft because it believes that they do not need the extra aircraft and cannot afford to operate them.

TRANSCOM is also facing other, less well known modernization challenges. The Ready Reserve Force, the RRF, a group of cargo ships held in readiness by the Maritime Administration, is aging and will need to be modernized with newer ships over the next 10 years. While perhaps not as glamorous as airlift operations, sealift support is critical to our capabilities. We have relied on sealift to deliver more than 90 percent of the cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan, similar to previous contingencies.

This committee has sought to ensure that our combatant commanders have what they need to succeed in all of these missions, conflicts, and challenges. This committee will continue to support the needs of our warfighters in these conflicts.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank our distinguished witnesses for their many years of dedicated service to our Nation. This is an important moment to discuss the issues within both of our witnesses' commands.

In the AFRICOM area of responsibility, Libya is obviously the top priority, even though General Ham is no longer the operational commander of the military effort there. I remain a strong supporter of the President's decision to take military action in Libya. It averted what was an imminent slaughter in Benghazi and has given us a chance to achieve the goal of U.S. policy, as stated by the President, to force Qadhafi to leave power. That goal is right and necessary.

I'm very grateful that we have capable friends, especially our Arab partners and NATO allies, who are making critical contributions to this mission. But for the United States to have withdrawn our unique air-to-ground capabilities at this time is only increasing the odds that this conflict will last longer, that more civilians will be lost unnecessarily, and that what began as a peaceful protest could turn into a long and bloody stalemate.

Qadhafi's forces are regaining the momentum and they're clearly adapting to NATO's capabilities and tactics, which is only making it harder for our coalition to identify and attack regime forces that are threatening Libyan civilians. We cannot say that we intervened to prevent an atrocity in Benghazi only to accept one in Misurata or some other city.

As the leader of Libya's opposition forces, General Abdul Fatah Younis, said, as reported in this morning's New York Times: "NATO blesses us every now and then with a bombardment here and there and is letting people in Misurata die every day." That's not success, and that's why the United States needs to remain engaged militarily, especially with our unique close air support capabilities, such as the AC-130 and the 1-10.

Let's be honest with ourselves and the American people. Our objective in Libya is regime change, whether the administration wants to call it that or not. That's not to say that we should commit ground troops to remove Qadhafi from power. I don't support that. But it is to say that our military mission should work toward the goal of our policy, which is to compel Qadhafi to leave power. This is not the case at present.

Rather than playing a supporting role within NATO, America should be leading. Our military should be actively engaged in degrading Qadhafi's forces in the field, which could significantly increase the pressure on his regime. There continues to be hope that his regime will crack and that he will leave. I hope it does. But hope is not a strategy.

With so much focus on Libya, we mustn't lose sight of other important developments in Africa. The situation in Somalia remains an increasing source of threat to the United States and our friends, especially as Al-Shabaab now appears to have aligned with al Qaeda. However, it's not clear that we have a strategy to foster stability in Somalia while marginalizing and defeating al Qaeda and

its allies in East Africa. To the contrary, their influence in the region has experienced, to quote General Ham, a “dramatic increase.”

Similarly with the growing threat of piracy, I would welcome an explanation of what more we and our partners need to do to disrupt and defeat pirates operating in and out of Somalia and East Africa.

Finally, on a more positive note, the peaceful revolution in Tunisia started the entire Arab spring and we must help their transition to democracy succeed. The Tunisian military has played a vital role throughout this process and I’d like to hear from our commander what more we can do to support the Tunisian military in protecting their borders, policing their coastal waters, and performing their other essential duties during this historic opportunity for the country.

What happens in Tunisia will have a major impact across North Africa and the Middle East, especially in Egypt, which is the heart of the Arab world and the major test case of whether the hopeful opening of the Arab spring will endure and thrive.

There are issues, pressing issues, within the U.S. Transportation Command, especially the security and effectiveness of our supply routes into Afghanistan. Our southern supply line has been and remains plagued by uncertainty, instability, and growing threat, and the strategic consequences of our dependence on it have been problematic. So last year we added two additional routes, through the Baltics and Central Asia, helping to facilitate a faster flow of cargo with less cost and risk. I’d like to hear from the commander about his efforts to support the northern distribution network and how we might expand it further.

At the same time, informed by the results of a critical airlift study from last year, Congress mandated a 316-aircraft floor for large-size cargo planes. From testimony presented earlier this year, the committee has learned that the Air Force has hit the Congressionally- mandated floor for cargo planes. The Air Force now wants appropriate relief from the restriction in last year’s defense bill, meaning that as new C-17 Globemaster aircraft are delivered the Air Force wants to start retiring C-5A Galaxy aircraft, which are too old to reengine cost- effectively.

The administration’s proposal to this effect seems reasonable, especially considering that Congressional appropriators earmarked \$13.2 billion for 44 C-17s that the Air Force did not request and does not need, but which they now have a surplus of thanks to Congressional earmarks. For this reason, I am leaning toward supporting the retirement of some of our oldest, least capable C-5As. However, I’d like to hear the commander’s views on the administration’s proposal to repeal the statutory requirement imposed by Congress for the Air Force to maintain a large-size cargo aircraft inventory of 316 aircraft.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

General McNabb.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. McNABB, USAF,
COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**

General McNABB. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of this committee: It is my distinct privilege to be here with you today representing more than 145,000 of the world's finest logistics professionals. Throughout 2010 and continuing today, the U.S. Transportation Command team of active duty, Guard, Reserve, civilians, merchant mariners, and commercial partners accomplished incredible feats in the face of historic challenges. I have three outstanding components who execute our global mission every day: the Air Mobility Command, led by General Ray Johns; the Military Sealift Command, led by Rear Admiral "Buzz" Busby; and the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, led by Major General Kevin Leonard.

When a regional combatant commander like General Ham is given a mission that requires U.S. TRANSCOM support, we rapidly plan solutions and then as the TRANSCOM commander all I do is unleash them. It is amazing to see that, no matter the challenges our components face in execution, it is their amazing men and women who figure it out and then get her done.

We have a saying at U.S. Transportation Command: We view our success through the eyes of the warfighter. Our mission is to always support the six regional combatant commands and their joint task force commanders. Working with the Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint Staff, the services, the combatant command staffs, our log nation and transnation teams have provided unparalleled logistics superiority to the combatant commanders.

From the services and the joint forces command getting the forces ready to go, the TRANSCOM team delivering the force, and the theater commanders receiving the force, this is the best overall performance I have seen of the end-to-end logistics chain in my almost 37 years of service.

Sitting next to me is one of our finest warfighters and my good friend, General Carter Ham. I was proud to support him as he commanded military operations over the skies of Libya in Operation Odyssey Dawn and I look forward to continuing to support him as he takes AFRICOM to new and even higher levels. It is he and the other combatant commanders that I am always supporting, and we view our success through their eyes.

I feel blessed to be the custodian of one of our Nation's greatest asymmetric advantages, our strategic ability to move. Since taking command of the U.S. Transportation Command in the fall of 2008, I have been amazed to see some of the unique capabilities that are inherent in the command. First and foremost is the power of the total force team. Nobody matches up our Active-Duty Force with our Guard and Reserve partners like the U.S. Transportation Command.

When we called for volunteers to help relieve some of the suffering in Haiti last January, the men and women of the Guard and Reserve stepped up in huge fashion. This included a contingency response group from the Kentucky Guard that was just coming up to speed. During the surge of forces into Afghanistan, we relied heavily on activated C-5 and C-17 crews, maintainers, and aerial porters and they were crucial to meeting President Obama's dead-

line to complete the plus-up by 31 August last year. Most recently, we saw their patriotism in action in responding rapidly to the air refueling requirements in support of the Libyan operation.

I'm also in awe of the power of the U.S. flag fleet in the air, on the sea, and over land. The U.S.-flag maritime fleet and their outstanding merchant mariners stepped up during our historic surge last year into Afghanistan and out of Iraq, and we didn't have to activate one ship for either operation. Our commercial team delivered. They continue to be key to supplying our forces in Afghanistan, whether coming up through Pakistan or over the northern distribution network that Senator McCain talked about.

In the air, our commercial partners have continued to meet the demands of the surge in Afghanistan and most recently responded brilliantly to bringing Americans home from Japan following the recent earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear incident.

We know the combatant commanders around the world depend on us to deliver the forces and their sustainment day in and day out. From resupply of the South Pole to air-dropping food, water, and ammo to a forward operating base in Afghanistan, to delivering fuel to our fighters and bombers enforcing the Libyan no-fly zone, U.S. TRANSCOM delivers. If we do this right, our warfighting commanders do not worry about their logistics lifeline.

This is what the Secretary of Defense intended when he made U.S. Transportation Command the distribution process owner, or DPO, in 2003. He gave the DPO influence over the entire supply chain, from factory to foxhole, and we constantly look for more effective solutions for the warfighter, while also being good stewards of the taxpayers' dollar.

Since its inception, the DPO has realized over \$5.3 billion in savings and we're still counting. Last year alone, that savings was \$1.7 billion.

A big part of the savings is taking advantage of lower-cost surface transportation whenever possible. When we match surface to air and commercial to military modes of transportation, we are leveraging our enterprise to maximum advantage for both the warfighter and the taxpayer.

We recently saved over \$110 million a month moving lifesaving mine-resistant all-terrain vehicles to our forces in Afghanistan using a combination of commercial surface and military air. We also did it faster than air alone by maximizing every air sortie into Afghanistan. We continue to look for every opportunity to use multimodal operations throughout our global enterprise.

My final callout is to the power of the inter-agency and joint team. President Obama in ordering the plus-up of forces in Afghanistan and drawdown in Iraq set a very tight time line for execution. We knew we would need some help increasing capacity on our existing supply lines and help in establishing new supply routes—again, Senator McCain, what you were alluding to. We took our recommendations to the inter-agency and the whole of government came through, with excellent results.

The National Security Council, ambassadors around the world, the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Maritime Administration, the combatant commands, and the log nation and trans-nation teams came together to make logistics

magic. This was at a time when we were asked to expand quickly and redirect flow due to the earthquake in the Caribbean that devastated Haiti, a volcanic eruption that shut down European air space for 3 weeks, a coup in the country where we have our major passenger transload operation, the Deep Horizon oil spill in the Gulf, and the worst floods in Pakistan's history during the last month of the plus-up. And we still closed the force on the President's deadline of August 31st.

Our operations continue today at recordbreaking pace, as, chairman, you alluded to. We continue to support our forces in Afghanistan and the drawdown in Iraq. We pivoted the transportation enterprise rapidly to support General Ham in the implementation of the no-fly zone over Libya, and we moved out urgently to help with disaster relief in Japan and provide immediate responses to the nuclear incident with special equipment and nuclear specialists, and we stand ready to do more.

I could not be more proud of the men and women of the United States Transportation Command. I've flown with our air crews and loaded and moved containers with our stevedores. I've walked through the pilot holding areas with our aerial porters in Afghanistan and explored the cargo holds of our Ready Reserve Fleet with our merchant mariners. Daily I'm amazed and humbled by what our people accomplish.

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and all members of this committee, thank you for your continued superb support of U.S. Transportation Command and our men and women in uniform. It is my distinct honor and privilege to appear before you today to represent the 145,000-plus men and women who are the U.S. Transportation Command and to tell you their story.

I ask that my written statement be submitted for the record and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General McNabb follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General. It will be made part of the record in full.

General Ham.

STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee: Thanks for this opportunity to discuss with you today the accomplishments of the men and women of United States Africa Command. I am honored to be here seated beside General McNabb, a highly distinguished airmen and joint force leader, and it is no exaggeration to say that Operation Odyssey Dawn would not have occurred as it did without Transportation Command's great support.

This is indeed a historic time for U.S. Africa Command. We completed a complex, short-notice, operational mission in Libya and have now transferred control of that mission to NATO. The situation in Libya and the conduct of Operation Odyssey Dawn highlights some important matters about Africa. First, this event illustrates the dynamics of the African political-military environment, one that has seen the growing threat of transnational extremists in Somalia, election crises, coups, the Southern Sudan referendum,

the scourge of the Lord's Resistance Army, to name just a few of the challenges to security on the continent.

In order for Africa Command to reduce threats to our citizens and our interests both abroad and at home, we need to contribute to operations, programs, and activities that help African states provide for their own security in a manner consistent with the rule of law and international norms. We must continue our efforts to enhance regional stability through partnerships with African states and sustained, reliable support to African regional organizations.

Africa Command's programs are designed to help prevent conflict while simultaneously ensuring that the command is prepared to respond decisively to any crisis when the President so directs, as demonstrated in our conduct of Operation Odyssey Dawn.

Second, building the coalition to address the situation in Libya was greatly facilitated through the benefits of longstanding relationships and interoperability, in this case through NATO. This is the kind of regional approach to security that U.S. Africa Command seeks to foster on the continent. U.S. Africa Command's priority efforts remain building the security capacity of our African partners. We incorporate regional cooperation and pursuit of interoperability in all our programs, activities, and exercises so our African partners are postured to readily form coalitions to address African security challenges as they arise.

Everything that U.S. Africa Command has accomplished is the result of the professionalism and dedication of the uniformed and civilian women and men of the command and our teammates from across the U.S. Government. Their dedicated efforts are a testament to the American spirit and determination and reflect our commitment to contributing to the wellbeing and security of the people of Africa.

Our guiding principles within the command are: first, that a safe, secure, and stable Africa is clearly in the best interests of the United States; and second, that we seek to help Africans find solutions to African challenges.

I am cognizant that this command is only able to accomplish its missions with the enduring support of this committee. I thank you for that and invite you to come visit us at our headquarters or, better yet, come see us at work in Africa.

Mr. Chairman, with that I welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Ham follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General, very much.

Let's try a 7-minute first round.

General Ham, let me start with some questions about Libya. You were the operational commander at the time our mission was initiated in Libya. My first question would be whether or not you supported the limited military mission in Libya?

General HAM. I did.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you continue to do so?

General HAM. I do.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in your judgment was it important to obtain United Nations Security Council and Arab League support for the mission before the military operations were initiated?

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, I believe that was important. I think absent that support the negative reaction regionally would

have been fairly dramatic and made it difficult for Africa Command to continue its enduring mission on the continent.

Chairman LEVIN. Would it also have been more difficult to put together the coalition?

General HAM. I believe that would be the case, yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in your judgment should the military mission be expanded to include regime change?

General HAM. While it's clearly our U.S. policy that the current leader has to leave, adding that as a military task greatly complicates the matter. So I would advise that that's a difficult task to achieve militarily and would add to a greater complexity and make the duration and extent of U.S. military involvement much more uncertain than it is today.

Chairman LEVIN. And because of that, would you recommend against it?

General HAM. I would at this point, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, did you support the policy to hand off this mission promptly to NATO?

General HAM. I did, chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Could you tell us why?

General HAM. A couple of reasons, chairman. First of all, there's great capability within NATO. Though we didn't know when we started that NATO would be the organization to whom we would hand off the mission, it was our hope that that would be the case. But we were prepared to hand off to some other coalition should that be necessary. And there is great capability in those other nations.

But more so, most of the forces, U.S. military forces who were engaged in this operation, are either recently returned from or preparing to deploy for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere. They are in the so-called dwell period. And while we can certainly surge to meet operational needs, as we did for operations in Libya, there is a longer term effect if greater numbers of U.S. forces had been committed for a longer period of time in Libya, and it would have had downstream operational effects in other missions.

Chairman LEVIN. The surge you're referring to was in Afghanistan, I believe; is that correct?

General HAM. Sir, I'm sorry. I wasn't clear. No, the ability to surge assets for an unforeseen operation, which was the operation in Libya.

Chairman LEVIN. I see. I understand.

Now, does NATO have the adequate capacity to carry out this mission?

General HAM. Sir, I believe they do.

Chairman LEVIN. Are the AC-130s and the A-10s available to the NATO commander upon his request?

General HAM. Sir, the AC-130 as a very precise and specialized capability remain available. They were not available when I began, just because of the transit time to get those aircraft into theater. They are available. The A-10s similarly were not available when I began, when U.S. AFRICOM began the operation, became available, and with good effect, and they are available, but NATO must request the A-10 availability.

Chairman LEVIN. The rebel commanders have expressed concern about NATO's willingness to strike Qadhafi's—the regime targets. In your view, is NATO willing to carry out this mission?

General HAM. Chairman, in my experience NATO is. In the conduct of several important NATO allies during the period for which U.S. AFRICOM was responsible for the mission, we saw several nations very active, very effective in the conduct of strike operations, and it is my assessment that that continues today.

Chairman LEVIN. Should the United States provide arms to the rebels?

General HAM. Not without a better understanding of exactly who the opposition force is. My recommendation would be we should know more about who they are before we make any determination to arm them.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General McNabb, you made—you've been quoted in the press as stating that TRANSCOM is the most, from a cyber perspective, the most attacked command in the Department, that cyber attacks apparently are very large in number, hopefully not in effectiveness and hopefully never will be, but nonetheless numerically significant. What are the critical needs of TRANSCOM for cyber security?

General MCNABB. Yes. Chairman, we are indeed the most attacked of the combatant commanders, and it primarily has to do with our enterprise. We ride on a protected but not secure, much more like the rest of the whole of government, vice a lot of the other combatant commanders that primarily stay on the high side or the SIPRNET. We do that, obviously, because of the nature of our mission and our working with the commercial partners. So we have kind of special challenges along that line.

The kinds of things that we have found as they have attacked us, we end up having over 33,000 hacking attacks last year. I would say that we have over 100 structured attacks. What we do is we watch that, we work very closely with Strategic Command and the new Cyber Command, General Alexander, and we go through that and say, okay, how do we get at this. One, how do we protect it, but also can we watch it and make sure that we mitigate any damage that would go.

Right now, they will find the weakest link that we will have. In some cases that's a cleared defense contractor that has an ability to get into our databases, and they will come through there.

So again, much like the whole of government, we've got to figure out how to make sure that the whole network with all of its parts are protected. For instance, I sent out a message to all of our cleared defense contractors that help us with all of our systems and told them, we need you to take special look at how you're doing business, your security programs, and make sure that you have taken appropriate measures to protect the network.

The same thing with our components. We obviously do air, land, and sea. The services have taken this on very seriously, but each service does it a little differently. We've got to make sure that we bring that all together so there's not a weak link in the seams between how we do this, especially as we do multimodal operations. Those are the things that we're working right now with General Kehler at STRATCOM and General Alexander at Cyber Command,

and again we keep teaming with everybody to say we're ready to be test cases. Again, I think it has applicability to the whole of government.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Hearing your testimony, General Ham, is almost an Orwellian experience for me. The fact is that if we had imposed a no-fly zone 3, 4 weeks ago, Qadhafi would not be in power today. The fact is that the situation on the ground is basically a stalemate.

Would you say that the situation on the ground is a stalemate or an emerging stalemate?

General HAM. Senator, I would agree with that at present on the ground.

Senator MCCAIN. So the goal—our policy objective of the removal of Qadhafi is further from being achieved than it was 3 or 4 weeks ago?

General HAM. Senator, I don't know that I would agree with that, because that again was not a military mission. The military mission of protecting I think was not wholly achieved, but achieved in large part.

Senator MCCAIN. The citizens of Misurata would be very interested in hearing your comment.

General HAM. Senator, Misurata, as I mentioned—

Senator MCCAIN. Oh, it's only Benghazi that we need to worry about? We don't need to worry about Misurata.

General, you are trying to defend an indefensible position. Is a stalemate in the United States' national security interest?

General HAM. Senator, only if it allows the international community to seek a political or diplomatic solution through at least a cessation in attacks.

Senator MCCAIN. Qadhafi remaining, Qadhafi remaining in power is in the United States—which is the result of a stalemate—is in the U.S. national security interest?

General HAM. Sir, it is clear that the United States' position—

Senator MCCAIN. Is it or not? I'd like an answer to the question.

General HAM. Sir, I don't know that—

Senator MCCAIN. Is it in the United States' national security interest to see Qadhafi remain in power, which is the result of a stalemate? That's a pretty straightforward question, General.

General HAM. Sir, it is clear that the United States has said it is in the United States' interest for Mr. Qadhafi to no longer be in power.

Senator MCCAIN. So right now we are facing the prospect of a stalemate, which then means Qadhafi remains in power, which means that we will then have a very, very serious situation with Mr. Qadhafi in the future if he remains in power, particularly given his past record.

So in other words, you believe we are doing exactly the right thing, which we pursued a course which you strongly support that leaves us in a stalemate situation; is that correct, General?

General HAM. Senator, the military mission which U.S. Africa Command was assigned did not—

Senator MCCAIN. General, I didn't ask you about the task you were assigned. When you were nominated for your position, you were asked if you will state your personal opinion when asked by the members of this committee. I'd like to know if you think a stalemate is an acceptable outcome of the conflict in Libya?

General HAM. Senator, it is not the preferred. My personal opinion, that it is not the preferred solution.

Senator MCCAIN. Not the preferred solution, I see.

Well—and I guess, is a stalemate more or less likely now than when you were in command, when you were commanding Operation Odyssey Dawn?

General HAM. I think it is—it is now more likely.

Senator MCCAIN. General McNabb, on the issue of the supplies into Afghanistan, would you give us a little brief outline as to what the threats you face and how serious they are or how tenuous the situation might be?

General McNABB. Yes, sir. When you talk about resupplying Afghanistan, as you mentioned in opening, we bring about I would say, about 30 percent of our stuff comes in through the port of Karachi and up through the Pakistan LOC. About 35 percent we're bringing over the northern distribution network, and you asked how that was going and we continue to expand that to good effect. We've moved 38,000 containers coming over the NDN. But we are restricted from bringing military type equipment through the NDN, so anything that we bring by surface must come through the Pakistan LOC, and that includes foreign military sales stuff for the ANA, Afghan National Army.

35 percent we bring in by air. That used to be about 20 percent, but we are doing a lot more of the multimodal, where we take it by surface as far forward—

Senator MCCAIN. It's a lot more expensive, too.

General McNABB. Sir, it is much less expensive, because you're taking advantage of the surface for the majority of the trip and you're only using the air for the last part. That allows you to really be efficient on your air, at the same time taking full advantage of the much lower cost of taking it by surface. That has paid very big dividends and that's allowed us to bring a lot more in for that last portion into Afghanistan.

We take everything high value, everything sensitive, everything lethal, we bring in by air. So a couple of the things that we have really pushed hard is the discipline to make sure that if it's stuff that you're going to take through the surface, make sure it's not things that if you don't—if it's a container of food, we can replace it with another container of food. If it's very valuable equipment to you, let's make sure we get that on the air.

We continue to work to make the Pakistan LOC work with better velocity. There's a Task Force Guardian that General Petraeus and General Mattis set up to work the pilferage issue on that and I will say that has had a very good effect. Then, as you mentioned, we're working very closely with the neighbors in the north to see if we can open up some additional routes.

What's been good about the routes is it is a network; competition has driven costs down, so actually costs have come down coming in from the north.

Senator McCAIN. Does the Air Force need additional C-17s?

General McNABB. Sir, not beyond the 222 that you have set. My take right now is, as you had mentioned, is as we get those additional airplanes—we have 209 of those delivered now. We get about one a month now. There obviously is some C-17s that are being used in foreign military sales, so that line—that's good for the alliance because we've got more C-17s with our allies and friends.

So right now the MCRS-2016 said we need 32.7 million ton-miles per day, a measurement that we use. Right now the Air Force has come forward with a plan, as you mentioned, as those additional C-17s are delivered, is to retire some of our oldest C-5As. I think that's a prudent thing to do for what you had mentioned. It frees up the crews and maintainers, the facilities, to be able to retire the C-5As. Our plan would be to flow the newer C-17s into places like Charleston and McCord, take some of our older C-17s, replace the C-5s, so we've modernized our strategic mobility fleet, and the plan that the Air Force has meets that 32.7, and so I am good with that.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to both of you. General Ham, let me come back to a question that the chairman touched on and I want to try to draw you out a little more on it. Senator McCain mentioned it too, which is, certainly the impression or the opinion that the rebel forces, the opposition to Qadhafi on the ground, has, as expressed by General Younis, who I guess is the head of their military, that the support they've been receiving has diminished since the transfer of operations went from your command to NATO.

If you were sitting at a table with General Younis now, how would you answer that? What would you say?

General HAM. Senator, I would say that that's not the case. What has changed dramatically has been the tactics applied by the regime forces. Where they have shifted from their traditional use of conventional armored equipment, which was easily identifiable as regime forces and therefore easily targeted, they now operate largely in civilian vehicles, and when those vehicles are intermixed with the opposition forces it's increasingly difficult to discern which is which.

Second, we have seen an increased tactic by the regime forces to put their military vehicles adjacent to civilian aspects, mosques, schools, hospitals, civilian areas, which would result in significant civilian casualties through the strike of those assets.

So I would say—and then a third factor, Senator, would be, frankly, just the weather. We went through a period of a few days, significantly impeded the ability to collect and to strike.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So you're an experienced commander. Isn't there a way around this response that Qadhafi forces have developed to the attacks that the African Command oversaw?

General HAM. Senator, there are some things that would help. One of the challenges is the opposition forces are not a regular military, not disciplined, and we have seen a tendency for them to

get intermixed with the regime forces, rather than maintaining some degree of separation, which again would allow for more effective targeting of their regime's forces.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I want to come back to that in a minute. But there's been a lot of conversation here—we had it last week with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen—about the A-10s and the AC-130s. Would the A-10s and-or the AC-130s be able to operate more effectively either in the bad weather or in response to the kind of subterfuge that Qadhafi's forces are involved in now?

General HAM. Sir, we have tried that and, while U.S. Africa Command had command, had some limited effect, but frankly limited. The AC-130s are affected by weather, to be sure. They're also affected by a significant number of surface-to-air missiles and systems that remain effective and operational, the tactical mobile systems that the regime has, which do in fact pose a significant threat to the AC-130s.

The weather—for the A-10s, the weather has been probably the most significant factor in being able to identify and strike targets.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Which command has control of the A-10s and the AC-130s, yours or European Command?

General HAM. Sir, European Command has operational control, and those can then be placed under NATO operational control if NATO requests that and the Secretary of Defense approves.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Are those planes remaining somewhere close by the Libyan—

General HAM. Yes, sir, they are.

Senator LIEBERMAN. What's required for the NATO commander to ask that the A-10s and AC-130s come back?

General HAM. Sir, the process is that the Canadian officer who is the task force commander would make a request through his NATO chain that would go ultimately to Admiral Stavridis as Supreme Allied Commander. He would then make a request to the Secretary of Defense. But that process would take a very short period of time.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. Let me come to the rebels or the anti-Qadhafi forces. We all acknowledge that this is not a military force, not an organized military force. But if you take the discussion that you had with Senator McCain, we've got the—this has been a difficult inconsistency here for us. We've got the political goal of getting Qadhafi out of power, but it's not a military goal.

So we're using diplomatic, economic pressure on him. On the other hand, it seems obvious to me that the boots on the ground are the Libyan boots. The stronger they are, the more that puts pressure on Qadhafi, in addition to the diplomatic and political pressure, to get out.

But at this point, if we keep saying, as you did—and it's the answer that the administration basically gives—we don't know enough about the rebels to give them the arms and training, I'm afraid if we wait much longer there's not going to be a reason to help them because Qadhafi will have effectively won the battle.

That's why I want to ask you again, don't you think that either we or NATO or somebody in the region has to work quickly? These rebels have a will, they have a passion for their cause, but they're not trained and they're not in my opinion fully equipped as they

should be to take on Qadhafi's forces. Shouldn't we be making sure that somebody's giving them some training particularly, a military organization, and additional weapons as determined they need?

General HAM. Senator, I have some indication that some Arab nations are in fact starting to do that at present. The points you make are great points and I know that that debate is occurring within the U.S. Government. There is a tactical urgency which I understand. But as the commander who also inherits the long-term security aspects for Libya as part of our area of responsibility, I think the long-term effects also have to be considered.

Senator LIEBERMAN. How do you mean? What do you mean by that?

General HAM. Sir, again I think not knowing who the opposition forces are, are they trustworthy? We have seen certainly media reporting of extremist organizations at least espousing support for the opposition, and we would need I think necessarily to be careful about providing lethal means to a group unless we are assured that those U.S.-provided weapons would not fall into the hands of extremist organizations.

Senator LIEBERMAN. But don't you—a final question. Don't you also, as the head of the African Command with the responsibility for Libya, conclude that Qadhafi's remaining in power is a very bad result for Libya and for the region?

General HAM. Senator, I wholeheartedly agree with that.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, to me that's a much worse result than the possibility, which I understand is only a possibility from everything I hear about the opposition, that there may be some extremists involved. Everything we know says that the leadership of the Transitional National Council and the military are not extremists, not Islamists by any means.

My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Generals, for appearing. As you know, there's been plenty of discussion from my colleagues about Libya, so I'm not going to beat a dead horse. But I will also echo the concern about the escalation of violence in Northern Africa and across the Middle East, and the state of Libyan affairs demonstrates the value that AFRICOM has to promote a secure and stable Africa. So I thank you for your efforts, and I recognize that there are a lot of challenges.

I'd like to discuss the piracy issues coming out of Somalia and how it frames the broader question of how to deal with the growing terrorism and failed states throughout that continent. The fact that piracy enjoys a safe haven is not a big surprise. Somalia has a per capita GDP of \$600. As a result, stealing a \$5 million ship carries a pretty big incentive.

How would you recommend we begin fixing the problem?

General HAM. Senator, I would absolutely agree with you that in the mid-term the extremist threat emanating from East Africa, notably Somalia, is our greatest concern. Piracy has some play in that. I'm not exactly sure yet what it is. But I have to believe that

at least Shabaab and others are drawing at least some economic support from the piracy activities.

I think also the murder of four Americans aboard the motor vessel *Quest* changes this dynamic. This is—some would argue that this had heretofore been exclusively an economic activity. I think the murder of four Americans, at least in my mind, very significantly changes that position.

I am headed to Tampa tomorrow to speak with U.S. Central Command, who has responsibility for the maritime aspects of countering piracy, to see what we can do more effectively together between the two combatant commands to counter this growing threat.

Senator BROWN. It seems to me that—let me ask the question: Are there rules of engagement when it comes to dealing with the pirates and when you can engage them? Are there rules that you're dealing with or the ships themselves are dealing with?

General HAM. Sir, there are. The rules for the application of military force apply. That's probably something we should talk about in a closed session.

Senator BROWN. I'd enjoy that.

Have you noted any—what's your assessment of Al-Qaeda's involvement in the piracy issue off Somalia? And if none, do you think it's a matter of time before they do get involved?

General HAM. Sir, we have not seen the direct links. We have seen direct links between al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al-Shabaab. So I believe it is indeed just a matter of time before al Qaeda is associated in some way with piracy activities in Somalia.

Senator BROWN. General McNabb, current law requires the Air Force to maintain 316 strategic airlifters to meet the global mobility demands. The surge of 30,000 troops into Afghanistan, humanitarian relief, massive drawdowns in Iraq are just some examples. In your testimony you said our National defense strategy requires a viable fleet of about 300 strategic airlift aircraft, and you went from a 316 requirement down to 300. What changed from last year in your estimation?

General McNABB. Sir, a couple of things. When we did the 316, at that time we had programmed 205 C-17s and 111 C-5s. After that time, we now have 222 C-17s coming to us, so that has increased. When we did the 316, at that time we had not done the mobility capability requirements study of 2016, that looked at all the things that had changed, all the lessons learned, and how we're using the airplanes.

Senator BROWN. You adapted to the situations as they came about.

General McNABB. Right. It ended up that the 32.7 million ton-miles per day, what we do is we say that's what the requirement is; Air Force, you figure out what you need on the mix of airplanes.

Senator BROWN. Okay. What is the Air Mobility Command's plan to sustain and recapitalize the C-5 fleet? Because, as you know, it is—I do agree that some C-5s should be retired. It's the oldest—some of the oldest C-5s were flown over 40 years ago. What's your plan to sustain and recapitalize?

General McNABB. Sir, right now obviously we're continuing with the reengining and reliability program on the C-5Bs, the ones that

were built in the 80s. We will end up having—and what that does is not only does it upgrade the engines, but a lot of the reliability enhancements. We have four of those now. We call them the C-5Ms.

When we have all of them, we'll have 52 of those. Right now the—

Senator BROWN. Can I just interrupt? When you say the C-5M, is that the avionics modernization program?

General McNABB. No, sir. The avionics modernization program is for all the C-5s. You have to have that done. Then we plan to also reengine those newer C-5s.

Senator BROWN. Then how many would you like to actually retire?

General McNABB. Sir, they'd like to go down to 27. I think it ends up—they want to go down to 27 C-5As.

Senator BROWN. How many C-5—

General McNABB. It ends up being about 32 C-5As that they'd like to retire, 30 to 32.

Senator BROWN. How many will undergo the reliability enhancement and reengining program?

General McNABB. A total of 52.

Senator BROWN. How many years will the lives of the C-5Bs be extended as a result of the engine and avionics upgrades?

General McNABB. Sir, we're figuring 30 to 40 years.

Senator BROWN. Does that meet the requirements that you—

General McNABB. Sir, it will. The other portion that has been a real plus here is the new tanker. As we bring the new tanker, because it's multipurpose, it will actually free up additional strategic airlift that we are using to do transload operations, C-17s and C-5s, because now we'll be able to use that tanker, the new tanker, to be able to do that because of its other capability to move passengers, aeromedical, and cargo.

Senator BROWN. Great.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm all set. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Brown.

I think Senator Reed is next.

Senator REED. Thank you very much—

Chairman LEVIN. I'm sorry. I apologize. Senator Begich is next. I didn't have a card in front of me. Excuse me.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Ham, let me—I just want to pursue one clarification here. I don't think we—none of us—and I think I heard this from Secretary Gates. Having Qadhafi out of there is a good thing. If we can get rid of him, great. But we've kind of been in a stalemate for 40 years since he's been there; isn't that fair to say? I mean, he's been there for 40 years, and now we're in a different kind of level of stalemate. Isn't that a fair statement?

General HAM. Yes, sir, it is. But I don't think we had previously seen his very clearly stated intent to kill his own citizens.

Senator BEGICH. Well, maybe not publicly. Is that a fair statement, too?

General HAM. It is, Senator.

Senator BEGICH. I think there has been activities that a lot of citizens from Libya would tell you otherwise.

General HAM. I think that's accurate, Senator.

Senator BEGICH. So I mean, our struggle there—we could probably point to multiple countries all around the world that we have concerns with their leadership, but this one we're engaged in right now to a certain level. Is that a fair statement?

General HAM. Yes, sir.

Senator BEGICH. Let me—I want to get to an issue that I started last week with Secretary Gates and I want to just make sure I get, clearly understand, not to debate the policy because I have some concerns, but I'm going to put that aside. It's the money issue that I'm now starting to get concerned about.

As you know, we've spent, at least reported, \$550 million to date so far. I'm getting different reports on what the burn rate is now and how, kind of where we're at. Can you give me a sense of what you see and what your anticipated costs are to manage the affairs from your end of it? I know there's State Department, there's CIA, there's all these other players that are burning money at the same time here.

Can you tell me what you estimate your costs are going to be?

General HAM. Sir, the best estimate that I have seen from the services and from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller Office is about that \$550 million initially, and then about \$40 million per month in continuing costs. It's not a cost—the command does not oversee and budget those operations. The services fund each of their service components. So in this case, largely Air Force and Navy as the primary contributors to this bear the burden. But that's the best estimate I have seen, is about \$40 million in sustained costs per month.

Senator BEGICH. Here's my struggle, because I heard that from the Comptroller also about a week ago or so. You know, I read a report yesterday that the Air Force is burning about \$4 million a day. So doing the math, on a 30-day cycle that's more than 40. So I guess, when do we get to that \$40 million level?

I understand there is other elements that deal with the budgetary, but at the end of the day you're going to have to figure out resource allocation for the command that you're involved in. And if you're burning at a certain rate, which I don't know what it is today, and maybe you have an idea of what your costs are per day right now—when do we get to this supposed level of \$40 million a month, which seems pretty cheap from the perspective of 550 in 10 days that we burned up?

General HAM. Senator, if you'll allow me to take that for the record so I can make sure I give you an accurate assessment.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Senator BEGICH. I'd appreciate that. My biggest concern is, for example, and another question I have for you, on the ISR platforms in aircraft that were required in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Let me ask you this from just an equipment utilization: Have we utilized or have we shifted any of their missions or activities to this now that we're doing in Libya? In other words, some of those platforms that were maybe programmed or planned or utilized as backup for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq?

General HAM. Sir, we probably should have a detailed discussion in a closed session. But in general, I can say that there were some assets that were in fact diverted from the Central Command area of responsibility to support operations in Libya. There were state-side assets which were either in training commands that are generating future capabilities, that were pulled from that mission and sortied to support operations in Libya. So there is and has been an effect. We probably should discuss the details in closed session.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you, General.

Let me ask you in regards—now that NATO has taken the lead and is starting to move in that direction, what have been—I know we have AWACS and refueling and some other activities. What percentage of our assets are now being used compared to when we first started to where we are now? In other words, what are we—in the global picture of now NATO taking the lead, where are we? Are we 10 percent, 40 percent, 80 percent of the assets that they're utilizing or partnered with them? Does that question make sense?

General HAM. It does, sir. If I could divide it into two different categories. In the strike assets, those aircraft which were actually attacking targets on the ground, the U.S. now contributes a very small percentage of that. It is principally those U.S.-unique capabilities, surface-to-air, suppression of enemy air defense systems, which are unique to the U.S. The AC-130s, which others have mentioned, which is a unique U.S. capability, are in that category.

So a very, very small percentage, I would guess maybe less than 15 percent of the strike assets.

Senator BEGICH. And that's as of right now?

General HAM. Yes, sir.

Senator BEGICH. Okay.

General HAM. In the other category, in the support category, which are tankers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, again a number of those are unique U.S. military capabilities. We are probably about, I would ballpark, 60 to 70 percent of that capability is U.S., again because many of those systems are unique U.S. Tankers are a special case. Many other nations have tankers, but they don't have tankers in the quantity that the United States has, and so we are, again while not a unique U.S. military capability, the quantity to sustain operations requires the U.S. to contribute some to that effort.

Senator BEGICH. Let me ask you the question in regards to—as you know, we've frozen I think it's about \$32 billion, give or take, in regards to the Qadhafi family in assets. Has that—have you seen any—I'm just assuming here, within the efforts of conflict he needs money to do what he needs to do. Have you seen any impact of that amount of money that we have frozen, the \$32 billion that he could have access to? Has that had any—have you seen anything that indicates any impact to his operations?

Senator BEGICH. Sir, not a direct tactical effect. But I think we are starting to see that now. I think one of the reasons that the regime forces are not pushing forward is that their sustainment capability has been significantly attacked by U.S. and now by NATO, and he can't replace that. He doesn't have the money to replace those systems, and I think that is starting to have, if not a tactical, at least an operational impact.

Senator BEGICH. Very good.

My time is up. Thank you both for being here.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Begich.

Senator SESSIONS.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, General Ham, I remember that—I think I’ve got it correct—Patton quote that: “A good plan, violently executed today, is better than a perfect plan tomorrow.” I believe that Senator McCain and Senator John Kerry were close to correct. I tended to be supportive of their view early on that a no-fly zone would make a difference.

Now, you’ve talked about the advantages of international support, and there are advantages from that. I don’t deny it. But we now have gone—we’ve waited about 3 weeks before we got all these international agreements and so forth somehow agreed to, and during that 3 weeks Qadhafi rallied, consolidated his power, and put the rebel forces, the contras, on defeat, on the defensive. And it’s not a good situation today and I’m worried about that.

Let’s talk first about the U.N. We apparently spent a good bit of effort getting a resolution out of the U.N. China and Russia abstained. Had either one of those vetoed the resolution, could we have gotten the resolution out of the Security Council?

General HAM. Senator, I’m afraid that’s pretty far beyond my area of expertise.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I would say that it’s pretty clear that it takes a unanimous vote out of the Security Council to get a resolution. So first of all, by going to the UN we put the policy of the United States in the hands of a unanimous vote there.

Then with regard to NATO, it operates on a consensus theory, does it not?

General HAM. It does, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. And consensus means unanimous vote.

General HAM. 28 nations, yes, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. And one nation can object and stop a military operation that’s part of a NATO operation, can it not?

General HAM. That’s correct, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. I just see in the Washington Times today the rebels are blaming the lack of air strikes, the air strike lull, on Turkey. Is that correct?

General HAM. Sir, I also saw that report. But it is my military assessment that that is not the case.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, are you involved in the negotiations that lead up to the deployment of forces in the Libyan campaign?

General HAM. Sir, I was, but I am not now.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, they say Turkey is blocking NATO attacks. Said one of the rebels: “We believe the reason why NATO attacks have come down in the last 4 or 5 days is Turkey is vetoing a lot of them.”

Are you able to say with certainty that NATO is not—Turkey has not vetoed any air strikes?

General HAM. Sir, I have no evidence of that.

Senator SESSIONS. But you’re not saying that that’s true—not true?

General HAM. Sir, I am not privy to internal NATO discussions.

Senator SESSIONS. On the question of arming the rebels, Mr. Erdogan, the prime minister at Turkey, rejected the idea of arming the rebels, saying it could be conducive to terrorism. Isn't it a fact that if Turkey and Mr. Erdogan objects to arming the rebels, even if we were to decide it's a good idea, we wouldn't be able to do that under the nature of the operation we're now in?

General HAM. Senator, again that's beyond my—I'm not sure that that would necessarily be the case, but others would have to address that more definitively.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, as I remember in the Kosovo campaign the United States Air Force—what happened was NATO met and deployed the United States Air Force. 90 percent of the sorties were flown by the United States and it took a virtually unanimous vote, and they voted on various targets inside Serbia, which ones we could hit and which ones we couldn't.

Doesn't that make it more difficult to act decisively in a military campaign when you've got to get 28 nations to agree on the targets that your aircraft may take or the kind of attack that might be executed?

General HAM. Sir, it would. But I spoke with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the current NATO task force commander, and they are—individual targets are not being subjected to individual target approval by the alliance.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, certainly the activities of the U.S. military are under the control of NATO. I don't think that is in dispute.

Now, the question of regime change. We're operating under the essential rules of engagement that the United Nations passed, are we not?

General HAM. No, sir. The forces are currently operating under NATO rules of engagement and previously under—before transition to NATO, under U.S. rules of engagement.

Senator SESSIONS. It's not the—the United Nations clearly has stated that the objective is not regime change, isn't that right? They set forth a limited number of objectives and it did not include regime change.

General HAM. I believe that is correct.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I mean, you're the commander—

General HAM. In my recollection of 1973, I think that is correct.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, what about the NATO? That's not one of the goals of NATO either, is it?

General HAM. No, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. It's explicitly not the goal. That's been discussed and explicitly decided it's not the goal of NATO to have a regime change in Libya. And does that not impact how you conduct a military operation?

General HAM. Sir, again I'm not privy to the internal NATO discussions, but I do know that, while the U.S. military mission did not include regime change, that did not in any way impede the conduct of our military operations.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, it alters them, does it not? I mean, if regime change was one of the missions you were given, you'd be approaching this conflict a lot differently, would you not?

General HAM. We would, sir. We've devoted an increasing amount of intelligence collection and strike activity to an individual personality, and we've had, as you know, some difficulty in that previously.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, my times is up. I would just conclude by saying that, yes, it's good to have international bodies support us, but in this instance I think we've all learned a valuable lesson. Weeks go by. From the time Senator McCain and Senator Kerry said use a no-fly zone, 3 weeks plus I think went by. And in the interim, bad things happened, that leave us now in a stalemate which might not have been the case had we been able to act sooner. And we ended up with an amorphous policy that's put us in a stalemate and it's just not a very comfortable position for this Senator to be in.

Now, I hope we're successful. I believe it would be good for the world if Qadhafi is gone. But we've got to have more clarity and more decisiveness in our plans.

I would make one more complaint, that this administration apparently found time to consult with the UN at length, with NATO at length, but a totally unacceptable

amount of time spent with the United States Congress to explain why they felt it necessary to commit the United States military to this action.

I think we're going to—we should let this thing calm down a little bit. At some point we need to talk more in detail about Congressional role under particularly these military actions that are actions of choice and not defending the direct interests of the United States.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. General Ham, when you began to take air operations it appeared to me and others that the Qadhafi regime was on the verge of taking Benghazi, effectively ending the revolution and consolidating their position in a way which would likely be irreversible. But at this juncture the Qadhafi regime's going from the verge of victory now to a situation where their hold is weakening. Is that a fair estimate in your view of what took place?

General HAM. Senator, I would agree with that general characterization. The important part is that I think at this point the regime has a significantly degraded ability to continue to attack civilians. But if I may, with the notable exception of Misurata, and that is a particular challenge and one that I will frankly bear responsibility for as long as I live for that particular situation.

Senator REED. Yes, sir. The Misurata situation is such that that is within their operational control except for the city itself, and they have been able to introduce forces in there and essentially street-fighting. It's difficult to strike from the air?

General HAM. Senator, that is correct. The opposition forces have held an area in the northeastern portion of the city in the port, and frankly the port has been operating to get some relief. But the regime forces are and remain active in the city against civilians.

Senator REED. Let me ask you from a military standpoint, does the fact that this is an international alliance that has been sanctioned by UN resolution, supported by NATO and the Arab League, increase the effectiveness of these forces and the military capabilities available?

General HAM. Senator, I believe that it does.

Senator REED. Thank you.

One area that I think many of my colleagues are interested in, and so am I, is the specific operational objectives of NATO. It was very clear initially that they were going to suppress any Qadhafi air activity, which they've done. They have the authority to intercept and to disrupt any activities designed to attack the Libyan people. But could you give us an idea more specifically. Is it their goal, for example, to degrade completely the command and control system of the Qadhafi forces? Is it their plan to try to disrupt and destroy all of the ammunition depots, etcetera? All that being factors that would help the overall mission of protecting the Libyan people.

General HAM. Senator, I believe that to be the case. It was clearly the case when the U.S. controlled the operations that those were objectives. As we transitioned those missions to NATO, I believe they share those same priorities.

Senator REED. And from your perspective, which is again you're no longer the direct commander, but you have significant insights, those objectives, those plans and the tactical operations are continuing as they were under your leadership?

General HAM. Sir, I believe they are.

Senator REED. Let me switch to General McNabb, who's the loneliest guy here in Washington today, sir. We have opened up a northern route into Afghanistan to supply. Have you seen that in any way decrease the cost or increase, from another perspective, the leverage we have in moving material through Pakistan?

General McNABB. Yes, sir, I do. I think primarily if you have options you bring competition in. I will say that the Pakistan LOC got better after we established the northern distribution network. I think that's absolutely true.

We are working with the northern distribution network, the countries involved, because all of the countries have agreed that we can move commercial type cargo through them. Most of the countries have said we can move non-lethal military equipment, but not all. We're working to try to get all the countries to say that we can do that, because right now the only way to move by surface military equipment, again non-lethal, is up the Pak LOC.

The other portion that we're working very closely with them is to have a two-way flow. Right now we're allowed to flow stuff in, but we're not allowed to bring stuff out. Obviously, that helps us with retrograde. It helps us with swapping out units, those kinds of things.

Then the other one that we are working very closely with the whole inter-agency team and both CENTCOM and with EUCOM, Admiral Stavridis and again General Mattis, I would say we're looking for intermodal locations in the north that we could use to be able to jump stuff out, especially military equipment, and then be able to prepare it for surface transportation, then bring it home

from there. Those are the things that we're really pushing hard on, because I think that will set us well. We'll have two ways, whether north or south.

Again, we use this to make sure that as we look at the Pakistan LOC, working on better security, better velocity, because every time you slow this down—during the floods in July, we saw almost a doubling of the pilferage rate. We're still below 1 percent, but we did see it go up. As I tell folks, when you talk this number of containers and you say it's less than 1 percent, if it's your container you don't really care that the rest of it made it through. So we really try to make sure that we're constantly looking at that to make it better.

Senator REED. Let's just for a moment get a quick assessment on the repositioning of forces and material out of Iraq. Presumably on schedule?

General McNABB. Yes, sir. That has gone very, very well. Really, I can't say enough about General Odierno and now General Austin and his team and how they do that, working with the Army Material Command. That's commanded by General Ann Dunwoody. They basically make sure that it gets down to the ports in either Kuwait or Jordan. We have wash racks there where they prepare it, agricultural inspections, so that we can bring it back to the States.

They've done a superb job of sorting out what they would send to Afghanistan, what they will bring home for reset, and what they will work with the Iraqis to leave in country. My take is that's really worked well and we'll just continue on that.

Senator REED. Just a final quick question in that regard. I know it's difficult to quantify. The flexibility and the additional sort of capacity or head space you will have at the end of this year, once we've come out of Iraq? An estimate of that? Is that marginal or significant? I.e., you won't be doing as much flying up in there. You won't have to commit resources, etcetera. Can you elaborate very quickly?

General McNABB. Yes, sir. The big thing here is we have not had to activate one military vessel to handle this. So it's all been done by our commercial partners. We worked very closely with them early on. In fact, General Dunwoody came out and kind of gave them a forecast. They stepped up superbly to both bringing the stuff out of Iraq and the stuff into Afghanistan. I mentioned in my remarks that we didn't have to activate one ship.

We have a commercial first if we can use commercial. It's the cheapest way to do it. It keeps our U.S.-flag fleet strong. It's good for jobs. All of those things are positive and that's what we do.

They have done superbly. What I would say—probably our bigger worry is, okay, so what happens to the U.S.-flag fleet as we come down perhaps on some of the requirements that we're depending on them now? We are working very closely with them to make sure that we maintain the robustness. They do depend absolutely on cargo preference. They absolutely do depend on our maritime security program, MSP. Those two programs are really valuable so that we keep a very, very strong U.S. flag fleet, which is in the interest of the taxpayer and in the interest of the warfighter.

Senator REED. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Cornyn.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General McNabb, General Ham, thank you for your service to our country.

General Ham, as a combatant commander and as a general proposition, do you think that it is important before the United States intervenes militarily that there be a clear mission, that the mission be authorized by Congress, and that that mission have the support of the American people?

General HAM. Senator, absolutely we have to have a clear mission. I would have to leave it to others about the second part of your question, but certainly it is preferable always to have the support of the Congress and certainly the support of the people as represented by the Congress.

Senator CORNYN. General, I thank you for your answer. It wasn't supposed to be a trick question. It strikes me that we have learned from sad experience what happens when the United States gets involved or stays involved in a military conflict where public support and support from Congress wanes in terms of its impact on our success of accomplishing the mission.

Let me move on, though, to the question of intelligence. It strikes me as unusual and maybe something that Congress needs to look at further that our intelligence capabilities are so limited that we don't even know the composition of the opposition force in Libya—I'm just using that as one example—before we intervene militarily, and that because we are in doubt about the composition of that opposition force that we are constrained from equipping them or providing them with access to the resources they may need in order to accomplish our goal and their goal at the same time.

Is this unusual in your experience or is this common?

General HAM. I think I would describe it as unique, at least in my experience, not having a clear understanding of who the opposition forces were. Senator, it is also important to remember that our mission was not to support the opposition, but rather to protect civilians. Now, certainly in the protection of civilians there was some obvious benefit to the opposition forces when we would do that. But it was a distinction in my mind of the purpose of the mission.

Senator CORNYN. Well, to protect the civilians in Libya, there's been a lot of discussion about whether we should arm the opposition forces or the rebels. I'm entirely sympathetic to your concerns and those expressed by others that we don't want to arm them if we don't know who they are and what they might become.

But it strikes me as very strange and certainly a deficiency in our intelligence capability if we've intervened in a military action, even for humanitarian purposes, and we don't know who the opposition is, so we are thus constrained from going further and giving them the resources they need in order to win and expel Qadhafi from power.

But let me ask you another question. What sort of signal does it send to our other adversaries in the region, notably Iran and others, for us to intervene militarily and fail to accomplish a regime change in Libya, whether it be by military or political means? Does

it strike you as a sign of weakness or lack of American resolve or inadequacy of planning that we would actually go this far and yet not accomplish or seem ambivalent about accomplishing regime change?

General HAM. Sir, I would say again, I'd come back to the first part, which was the execution of the military mission to protect civilians, establish a no-fly zone, embargo, which I think was successful and I think a message to others around the world is the speed with which that was accomplished was pretty significant.

I don't think the—I don't think people should misunderstand a policy decision that says it is the policy for there to be regime change, but to seek that through means other than military. I don't think folks should misunderstand the lack of seriousness which that means. We certainly could use military force, but again we have some history in trying to apply military force to regime change where we have been less than successful.

Senator CORNYN. Yes, General. It's not your responsibility or your fault, but I go back to my initial questions with regard to clarity of mission, support from Congress, and support from the American people. Any ambiguity it seems to me in any of those things would seem to me to give you less than the kind of support you need in order to accomplish that mission, whatever it may be.

Let me move on to ask about—there's been questions, I think Senator Lieberman, Senator McCain, about the A-10s and the AC-130s, which you said are unique American capabilities. I think you and Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen all said that these are available; although they're unique American capabilities, they're available to NATO if they request them.

To your knowledge, have they been requested?

General HAM. Yes, sir, they have, and they have been provided.

Senator CORNYN. They have been? They're currently being deployed in the fight?

General HAM. Sir, I don't—the AC-130s I believe are currently available. I believe the A-10s are currently available on request.

Senator CORNYN. So the AC-130s are in the fight now?

General HAM. I think they are. My last understanding was that they are available to the commander should he want them.

Senator CORNYN. Then finally, let me ask, General. I think there's an impression, a mistaken impression, that by the U.S. initiating this fight and then handing it off to Libya, it's somehow handing it off to a third party that does not necessarily—that is not the United States. But the truth is that NATO could not function as a fighting force without the U.S. support, could it?

General HAM. Senator, the Supreme Allied Commander is a U.S. officer. Much of the military capability that enables the current operation is provided by the United States.

Senator CORNYN. One of the perennial problems in NATO is that our allies do not resource either funding or in terms of personnel their military requirements like the United States. The United States spends more on our National security than I think the top—the next 22 nations in a row. In other words, the United States is the biggest, most powerful nation as part of that coalition; wouldn't you agree?

General HAM. Sir, I would. The contributions of other nations have been significant and very important, but certainly the United States has provided to this point the preponderance of military force.

Senator CORNYN. And that includes, as Senator Begich asked, the obligation as part of that NATO coalition to fund operations at whatever level is required by our agreements with NATO?

General HAM. Sir, my understanding is that NATO contributions are currently funded by the individual states. I'm not a NATO expert, but I'm not sure that NATO common funding is being applied.

Senator CORNYN. I certainly understand and appreciate that.

You've been very good about answering my questions. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.

Senator Hagan.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Once again, General McNabb and General Ham, thank you for your testimony, your service to our country, and being here today.

I wanted to talk about NATO and Libya. As you know, the Libyan rebel forces allege that NATO inaction and bureaucratic delays are placing the lives of civilians at risk, complicating the rebel efforts to fight Qadhafi's forces, and allowing Qadhafi's forces to advance against the rebels' strongholds. It seems that the pace of the—that the pace of the NATO military operations in Libya is complicated, obviously, by the importance of protecting the civilians and avoiding any sort of collateral damage.

Meanwhile, Qadhafi's forces are reportedly using civilians as human shields and hiding armor in populated areas, decreasing NATO's ability to hit targets. I've read recently where Qadhafi's forces are keeping their heavy equipment, such as their armored vehicles, hidden in more highly populated areas and are actually using more trucks and light vehicles.

In terms of the use of air power, what is the proper balance between destroying Qadhafi's air force, neutralizing his air defenses, degrading the ability of his ground forces to wage war, and avoiding collateral damage?

General HAM. Senator, your characterization is one in which I would generally agree on the manner in which the regime forces are operating. So with the application of air power, even as precise as we are, in the circumstance as you described becomes increasingly problematic. Air power can do other things. Certainly when regime forces move is when they are most vulnerable, and we have collection systems that are able to see them move, and then NATO is able to apply and has applied effective air power against moving forces, particularly their heavy equipment.

The Air Force is also very effective in degrading the regime's ability to sustain its operations, denying the movement of supplies, fuel, ammunition, and the like. It is my military assessment that the attacks on those kinds of targets are what have presently not allowed regime forces to continue their attacks against civilians.

Senator HAGAN. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of NATO assuming command and control of all phases of the missions in Libya?

General HAM. Senator, I believe actually it's been quite good. NATO assumed command first of the arms embargo, which is largely a maritime effort. That I think has gone quite well. There have been numerous instances where NATO vessels under NATO command have stopped, queried, inspected, and denied movement of shipments along the coast of Libya. It has been very successful.

Clearly, NATO's assumption of the no-fly zone remains effective. We have not seen regime aircraft operate in Libyan air space.

Then the toughest mission is the protect civilians mission, and it is my military judgment that NATO has done that effectively, but in an increasingly complex and difficult scenario in which to attack regime forces.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Let me ask about arming, the question having to do with arming the Libyan rebels. Without allied intervention, Qadhafi would have to continue—from what I understand, he would have continued to slaughter his people. And the opposition in Libya wants Qadhafi out. They also, I understand, want democracy and freedom and economic opportunities and an end to the corruption that's been going on.

So I want to know more about the nature of the opposition. Some people have suggested arming them and I'm skeptical about that approach because I think we need to have a lot more information to know about whom exactly it is that we're talking about, the discussion going on about rebels, whether to arm them. And once you put those weapons out there, there's no getting them back. I understand in the early days of unrest the opposition forces broke open the Libyan military arsenals and obtained a large number of weapons.

Do you believe there are members of al Qaeda in this opposition and how concerned are you with the potential regional proliferation of weapons that the opposition has already acquired?

General HAM. Senator, to the second part of your question first, I'm very concerned about the proliferation of weapons, notably shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, which we assess there were perhaps as many as 20,000 in Libya as the operation began. Many of those we know are now not accounted for, and that's going to be a concern for some period of time.

The first part of your question, the presence of Al- Qaeda or other violent extremist organizations with the opposition to me is very much the important unanswered question that we must have to have better understanding of the opposition. We have seen intent expressed by al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, by the Libyan Islamic Fighter Group, and others to partner with the opposition, if you will, in an anti-Qadhafi regime mode. I think we need to know more about what that means before we were to make a U.S. decision to arm, though I think others are working in that direction.

I would also note that the U.S. special envoy's presence and engagement with the opposition forces is an important step in trying to get a better understanding of exactly who the opposition is.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Let me move to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As you know, this area, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, needs an

integrated and professional army to protect its citizens. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of AFRICOM's training and equipment, equipping of the armed forces of this area, and what lessons would you derive from this train and equip effort, and how does this fit under the context of the whole of government approach?

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Senator. We have trained one battalion and, frankly, with good but some mixed results. Clearly there's a capability within the country. They have a willingness to participate in the training and become more operationally effective, subordinate to civilian control, respective of the rule of law—all those attributes that we like.

There have been some technical challenges in the provision of weapons and communication, certainly some leader development challenges. But I think for a first effort it was okay. We're doing an assessment now to say what can we do in the future to make our training and our sustainment more important. I would argue that it is indeed the sustainment—it's insufficient to just train one time and then let them go, but rather an enduring effort, and I think that's one of the reasons that Africa Command was established, was to have that kind of enduring effort, and we look to do that.

Senator HAGAN. Do you know what the retention is of the battalion that they have trained?

General HAM. I'll have to check. My indications are from a personnel standpoint it's pretty good, but there are concerns about the retention and maintenance of useable equipment.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan.

Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General McNabb, we're going to just keep you in a holding pattern for a while. We'll call you if we need you. I appreciate your service.

General Ham, I think you have one of the most fascinating commands in the whole military, and I want to compliment President Bush for creating Africa Command and President Obama for continuing to stand it up. It's really a region ripe with opportunity and heartbreaking all at the same time.

Secretary Gates I've been told has instructed the Department of Defense to look for a stateside home for Africa Command, to move you out of Stuttgart, and that the leading contender, the most preferred site, was Charleston Air Force Base. Are you familiar with that decision?

General HAM. Senator, I'm not familiar with the decision. I have direction to assess and make a recommendation as to—

Senator GRAHAM. Would you like to live in Charleston?

General HAM. Sir, I have visited Charleston and enjoyed that visit very much.

Senator GRAHAM. Good. We would like to have you. I just want to let you know that that was the preferred site in terms of the assessment and that the community is willing to provide infrastructure to the Department of Defense to move your headquarters to Charleston, so you won't have to do military construction contracts.

All politics is local, so I really do want to talk to you about that potential move.

The other issue is that there's \$7.6 billion being appropriated through the foreign operations account for Africa assistance. From a commander's point of view, how important are those funds, \$4.78 billion for health-related issues in Africa? Could you tell this committee the importance of those funds to your mission?

General HAM. Senator, I believe that what that enables us to do is, as the military component of a U.S. whole of government approach, it allows us to more effectively achieve the U.S. Government's desired end states in Africa consistent with the goals which the President has described, to include health care.

Our military component of that is largely focused on building capable, credible, military and security institutions responsive to the rule of law, responsive to civil authority, so that increasingly Africans can provide for their own security nationally and regionally.

Senator GRAHAM. America needs to know, we have a very small military footprint in Africa relatively speaking; is that true?

General HAM. Sir, it is very small, just one—other than the defense attaches in the embassies, it is essentially one location at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti.

Senator GRAHAM. So I would just urge the committee to look at the fact that our foreign operations account probably is our most effective tool in achieving stability in Africa and helping the African continent develop in a positive way. So I just want to let that account be known as important from the military's point of view.

Now, let's go to Libya. What's the likelihood in your view—I know you're not the current commander—of the rebels being able, even with the air support provided by NATO today, to fight their way to Tripoli and replace the Qadhafi regime by military force?

General HAM. Senator, I would assess that as a low likelihood.

Senator GRAHAM. I think that's a very honest answer. I would assess it as almost impossible.

Now, the AC-130s and the A-10s, are they in the fight or not?

General HAM. Senator, it is—my current understanding is that the AC-130s are provided as a U.S.-unique capability which are indeed available at present to the NATO commander should he need to employ them. The A-10s are part of the on-call package which the commander would have to request—

Senator GRAHAM. Is there an equivalent capability within the NATO countries to replace the AC-130 and the A-10? Can you replace those capabilities?

General HAM. Sir, the AC-130 is clearly a unique U.S. capability. No one else has a capability like that. The A-10 has great capabilities, some of which can be replicated or provided by other strike aircraft, but not as a total package like the A-10.

Senator GRAHAM. I'm going to stand up for Senator Ayotte's husband, who's an A-10 pilot, and she'll be the first to tell you that it's almost impossible to replicate the A-10's impact on the battlefield.

Well, if we can't fight our way there, if the rebels can't fight their way there with air cover being provided, how does this end?

General HAM. Sir, I think it does not end militarily. I think militarily, the present condition with the regime forces and the opposition forces essentially opposed, but neither moving—

Senator GRAHAM. Could I suggest a scenario where the military part of it may actually help it end quicker? The inner circle of Qadhafi cracking is probably the most likely scenario, where people tell him, his inner circle: You need to go. Do you agree that's the most likely way this ends for regime change?

General HAM. Sir, I think that's a likely outcome.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Would it be helpful in that regard in terms of putting pressure on the inner circle to make that decision, to take the aerial fight to Tripoli and start looking for targets where the inner circle operate out of and to put pressure on them militarily? Is that within our capability to do if we chose to do that?

General HAM. Senator, it is and we have been from the very start attacking targets of regime command and control in Tripoli.

Senator GRAHAM. Is that still going on today?

General HAM. Sir, I believe it is. I know of no prohibition to that. And specifically to the 32nd Brigade, which is, if you will, the regime's inner protective force, was a very specific target for us in U.S. AFRICOM and I know that it continues to be so for NATO.

Senator GRAHAM. Well, that's curious because he's still on TV. Is there any effort to knock him off radio or TV?

General HAM. Sir, there is. Again, another one of the unique U.S. military capabilities—

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me that if he were unable to spread his propaganda and fear through radio and television he would be less effective in holding power?

General HAM. Sir, I would agree with that.

Senator GRAHAM. Why hasn't he been knocked off radio or TV as of now?

General HAM. Principally, sir, because of a concern for civilian casualties in the broadcast systems that he uses.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Finally, when it comes to putting pressure on this regime, I know we have a variety of strategies, but the idea that the Tripoli targets are being robustly pursued I think would be news to me, because I don't hear any reporting on the ground of targets in Tripoli being pursued in an aggressive manner. Am I wrong there?

General HAM. Sir, again I don't have the day to day tracking of the battle, but again I'm not aware of any prohibition to attacking command and control facilities or others in Tripoli.

Senator GRAHAM. Last question: Is there a prohibition of going after Qadhafi the individual?

General HAM. In the U.S. mission, I expended no effort in tracking him personally or devoting assets to attack him. But there was also no prohibition if he happened to be at a command and control site or some other site.

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree with me that if he were neutralized or taken out of the fight through kinetic activity it would end this whole conflict rather quickly?

General HAM. Sir, his removal by any means would end this relatively quickly.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.

Senator MANCHIN.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you two both. Mr. McNabb—General McNabb, to you: The 167th Air Guard Wing in Martinsburg has handled multiple missions with the C-5 assets, including logistics support to Libya and Afghanistan. The Air Guard gives us the best military value in terms of personnel efficiencies and professionalism. On that base and all that's been invested in that base, I know they're looking at maybe either upgrading or improving those assets. Do you know if that is part of the rotation that you have planned?

General McNABB. Sir, they're going through which bases they'll do. First they have to have permission for us to be allowed to retire the C-5As. We've been allowed to retire some of them, and so the two bases that have been chosen—there's one at Stewart and the other one is Wright-Paterson. They're two C-5A bases, one Reserve, one Guard. They're looking to say, okay, if we're allowed to retire some more where will they do? I know they've been in discussions in Martinsburg, but I know that you have been very happy with the C-5s and you've done a great job of taking care of them.

Senator MANCHIN. I thought logistically where they are located right now proved very effective for our operations.

General McNABB. Yes, sir. So we're still going to have some C-5As under the plan that they have right now, and I think that—so they'll look and say, where's the best place to have those C-5As. Obviously, Martinsburg is one of those.

Senator MANCHIN. Do you know if Martinsburg has an opportunity for the C-5Ms?

General McNABB. Sir, right now it does not. Right now the C-5Ms are going to be at Travis, at Dover, and at Westover.

Senator MANCHIN. How about the 130s at Yeager, the Air Force base that we have flying the C-130s?

General McNABB. Sir, I believe that stays the same. I don't know what the Air Force is planning on that, but I haven't heard of any changes.

Senator MANCHIN. General Ham, thank you again for all your service. I know there was talk about Charleston, South Carolina, I believe as your AFRICOM base, or they would like to entertain that. Why wouldn't the command be in Africa?

General HAM. Sir, we will look at some locations in Africa. But there are some pretty significant hurdles in terms of transportation in and around the continent. There are not great air links. And frankly, cost to establish a wholly new base would be pretty expensive.

Senator MANCHIN. Do we have any other of our operations in other parts of the world where we operate out of the United States?

General HAM. Yes, sir. Central Command is headquartered at McDill Air Force Base in Florida and Southern Command, headquartered in Miami.

Senator MANCHIN. Again, General Ham, Secretary Gates had told me last week, I believe—and I told him I was giving him my overview of basically what happened in the First Gulf War, when

Saddam attacked Kuwait and when we went in and was very successful in that mission, and the Kuwaitis and the Saudis paid. I guess they paid the bill. We as Americans felt good we were able to help—we were asked to help and the American people weren't burdened with the cost.

I understand now as of April the 4th \$608 million has been spent in Libya. It was 550. There's been an additional 58 million since then. With that being said, if we've been asked to come in by the people, the neighbors of Libya, why won't they pay? Why do we have to as the American people burden this financial obligation?

General HAM. Sir, again, out of my area of expertise. But I know there are efforts to seek to defray those costs. But I'm not cognizant of the status of those efforts.

Senator MANCHIN. Secretary Gates said that he did not expect to get any money at all from the other ones because they don't see it's of imminent interest or an imminent threat. And I'm thinking, if you have a bad neighbor, a thug in the neighborhood, you want to get rid of that thug. But if they don't think, and they're living there, why should we interject ourselves? Because I applaud basically getting the agreement from NATO and the other, Arab League, before we did go in, because we tried going alone and we see where that's ended up and we've been in the longest war in the history of the United States.

But with that, I just can't believe that we would continue to interject ourselves in all these challenging areas when the people there really don't care, and they certainly have the resources to pay their own way to clean up their neighborhood.

General HAM. Sir, I can't disagree with you, but in this particular circumstance I think the urgency to conduct military operations to prevent the slaughter of civilians had to—in my view appropriately superseded the concerns about cost. But I think now that we did intercept at least that effort in the east for the regime to attack its civilians, it seems wholly appropriate that we would seek efforts that defray costs.

Senator MANCHIN. General McNabb, on the alternative fuels, I know you have used very effectively, I understand, the coal-to-liquids. If we were able to produce the fuel, would you be willing to purchase it?

General McNABB. Sir, obviously the price goes into that, but—

Senator MANCHIN. The price right now I understand is much more competitive than the imported oil that we're using right now to refine the fuel you need.

General McNABB. Sir, we are absolutely trying to make sure we have all the options. That's why we've made sure all of our airplanes can do that, because we know that—

Senator MANCHIN. You have used successfully the coal to liquids and it worked very well?

General McNABB. Yes, sir.

Senator MANCHIN. So you'd be happy with the fuel as far as performance?

General McNABB. Yes, sir, no problems with that.

Senator MANCHIN. Also, General Ham, I just can't believe that we had to have a northern route because our ally Pakistan was

shaking us down for 30 percent of all the products being moved through there. Don't you find that to be extremely offensive?

General HAM. Sir, it's a tough way to do business.

Senator MANCHIN. I'm done.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Manchin.

Senator Ayotte.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General McNabb and General Ham, for your distinguished service, and please express my gratitude to all that serve below you for the sacrifices that they're making.

I wanted to follow up on a question that Senator Hagan asked. In response you said, General Ham, about the Libyan rebels, and you said that there was an intent of al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb to attempt to partner with the Libyan rebels. Can you tell me more about what we know about that, and how did they attempt to partner, so that we can assess that aspect of what we do know about the rebels?

General HAM. Senator, we should probably have a discussion, a more detailed discussion, in a classified setting. But it is clear to me that there is at least that stated intent. It has been very difficult to ascertain whether that intent to support the opposition with AQIM personnel has actually materialized anything on the ground, and we're watching that for indications of that very clearly.

But in my view, just the stated intent is one that ought be concerning to us, certainly is to me as the commander responsible for that region in the long term.

Senator AYOTTE. I would agree with you, General Ham. As a follow-up, the stated intent is—to what extent do we believe—and if you think this is more appropriate for a classified briefing, please let me know. But to what extent do we think that al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb would be in a position to also provide weapons to the rebels?

General HAM. My sense would be that they probably could do so, but not on a large scale. I think it would be probably fighters. But again, we're talking about an organization where small numbers of people can make a pretty significant difference and pose a pretty significant threat. So it is an area I think we've got to approach with a great deal of precision and caution.

Senator AYOTTE. I would agree, and I appreciate that you're doing that, because obviously if we're making decisions about how we're going to treat the rebels in Libya we've got to know who we're dealing with, and we certainly don't want to encourage them to partner with Al- Qaeda or other groups that want to do us harm.

I wanted to follow up also in regard to terrorist activity in Africa. Do you believe that the activity and recruitment of Al-Shabaab and other groups that are affiliated with al Qaeda, is that growing or diminishing in Africa?

General HAM. Senator, I believe, unfortunately, I believe it to be growing.

Senator AYOTTE. If that activity is growing, what are the factors that you think are driving that, that growth, and do you have any thoughts about how we could help you better address to make sure that we nip this in the bud before it again becomes the site of attacks against our own country and our allies?

General HAM. Senator, the factors that encourage particularly young people to be attracted to the violent extremist organization way of life I think are as common in East Africa as they are in other parts of the world. It's lack of good governance, it's lack of education, it's lack of stability, security, economic opportunity, that makes many young people susceptible to this violent extremist message. I think the challenge is how do you get to those underlying causes, which do in fact require a whole of government approach, not simply a military approach.

Of particular concern to me with Al-Shabaab has been at least an expressed interest to recruit Somali Americans, U.S. passport-holders, to that effort, which I think poses probably the single greatest threat to us.

Senator AYOTTE. With regard to if we were—with the activities that we have in Africa, if we were to detain a member of Al-Shabaab or al Qaeda—obviously, they're partnering there in Africa—where would we detain them for purposes of intelligence-gathering?

General HAM. Senator, that's probably a question we ought to answer in closed session, and I would need some lawyerly help on answering that one.

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I appreciate that. Just others have testified before this committee, including Secretary Gates, that hypothetically if we were to catch, to capture a member of al Qaeda or a significant member of the leadership in an area that we're not in a current armed conflict, for example an Afghanistan type scenario, that it's unclear that, with the administration not putting additional detainees in Guantanamo, that it is unclear what we would do with those types of individuals.

So I would just raise that, but obviously would love to hear from you more in an appropriate setting.

Finally, just I want to ask you a question about the coordination between the Department of Defense and Department of State. As I understand, in Africa the way that you align jurisdiction in Africa is different and so, General Ham, you're actually dealing with two different agencies of the Department of State, because DOD and DOS don't have the same alignment.

Could you describe that for us?

General HAM. Yes, ma'am, that is true. Sub-Saharan Africa is managed at State Department by the African Bureau and North Africa by Mideast-North Africa. So it does cause us to have interaction with two entities of State. But frankly, that's not been an impediment.

One of the reasons it's not is the inter-agency construct of the Africa Command headquarters. In fact, seated behind me is the deputy to the commander for civil-military affairs, who is a long career foreign service officer, Ambassador Tony Holmes, who helps the command understand how we most effectively interact not only with the two bureaus in State, but with the whole of the United States Government.

Senator AYOTTE. General, as a follow-up—and, ambassador, I appreciate your being here—wouldn't it make more sense, though, if we coordinated the boundaries, because then you would be dealing with the same area? I very much appreciate that, with the activi-

ties, the war for example that we are prosecuting in Afghanistan, there's a significant and important relationship between State activities and Defense activities, and that coordination in a counterinsurgency strategy is critical.

Given what you just told me about recruitment and the issues that drive young people to, unfortunately, join terrorist organizations, I would think that that alignment would be important, and wanted to get your thoughts on if you were to realign and have the same jurisdiction whether we would gain a better ability to communicate.

General HAM. Senator, I think this is a subject of some long debate. There are pros and cons both ways. To have the State Department and the Department of Defense looking at the same countries, in our case the 52 or 53 nations of Africa depending on how Egypt would fall out, there is some goodness in that. But what you lose in that, in such an alignment, is the view outside of the area of responsibility and how activities on the continent of Africa might affect, for example, southern Europe or into the Mideast.

I think in that regard Egypt is a good example. It is in—though it's obviously on the continent of Africa, it is in Central Command's area of responsibility, but there is—for matters of African security, we have that discussion with Egypt.

Similarly, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, obvious concerns there. It's in Central Command's area of responsibility, but we have sufficient ties and dialogue to maintain effective operations.

So I think it's worthy of discussion, but I'm not so sure that necessarily equal alignment is the best way ahead.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much, General Ham. I appreciate what you've said about that. The only issue I think that we need to also make sure that we're focused on is, the more you have—if you have to deal with two areas at Department of State, as long as there's good coordination and you don't feel like in one area you're getting good information, in one you're not—that coordination seems key when you don't have aligned boundaries.

So I appreciate your comments on it and thank both of you for your service.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte, for raising that issue, that alignment issue. We are hoping that the GAO is going to get back to us on that issue, and that would be great if you could get deeply involved in that. But we are expecting, apparently, a report on that, my staff tells me, on that very issue. So we'll make sure that that gets to you, so you can get back into that.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, chairman. I look forward to delving into that and looking at that closely.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General McNabb, welcome. General Ham.

Let me begin by following on with what my good friend Senator Graham mentioned about the relocation of Africa Command. I'd like to ask you if you've had the opportunity to visit Norfolk?

General HAM. Senator, I have, but not since arriving at Africa Command. But clearly that is one of the stateside locations that we'll look at.

Senator WEBB. I hope you'll come down and take a look. As you know, JFCOM has been greatly reduced and we've got a facility that you can just turn the lights on and move right in. We hope you'll take a look.

I hope that we can be much more careful in the rhetoric that we're using when we're discussing the situation in Libya. I think the terms of reference we need to be much more precise about when we're having this discussion. Let me begin by pointing out that the goal which this administration has set out is regime change by other than military means, as you have mentioned. But I think there's been a little bit of perhaps maybe public confusion in some of the exchanges that have taken place here.

I think in that respect it's important to remind people that the United States still recognizes the Qadhafi government. This came up in an exchange when I asked Under Secretary Burns in the Foreign Relations Committee a couple of weeks ago. We have never severed our relationships with the Qadhafi government. I had my staff call over to the State Department during this hearing to make sure that is still the case.

So we're in sort of an anomalous situation in which we are conducting military operations with the goal of deposing a government or at least the leader of a government which we still recognize. That would lead me to assume that what we are doing in terms of our military operations are indeed limited and the goal is perhaps the implosion of the government in terms of Mr. Qadhafi. So I think we ought to be real careful about another end state; we're talking about another end state for this individual.

I've had concerns about the way that this decision was made by the President. This was a unilateral decision to use military force when it came to the way that the United States Government is structured. We were not under attack. We were not under an imminent threat of attack. We were not responding to localized attack on our people, as we did in 1986 when I was in the Pentagon. I fully support what we did in 1986 after the Qadhafi regime had supported the killing of some of our soldiers in Berlin. We were not rescuing Americans, as we have in many periods of our history, including Grenada or in the piracy situation.

If I could offer, you had an exchange earlier about rules of engagement in the piracy situation. I think my view would be shoot the pirates, blow up the boats. That's a pretty good rule of engagement. I would support that.

But in this situation we weren't responding to an attack on a treaty ally. We had a very unclear picture as to who we were supporting. In fact, Secretary Gates and I had an exchange last week when I asked him if this was a civil war, and he said clearly in his view it was not a civil war because the opposition is so disparate that there's no one entity that we could work with if we were supporting forces against this present government.

And this all—this has relevance, I think, particularly to your command, more than any of the other commands, because there's so much volatility in the continent that you are responsible for.

What specifically is your understanding of the authority under which the President made this decision?

General HAM. Sir, it is my understanding that the President made this decision and issued authority to conduct military operations to protect lives and did so, it is my understanding, with notification to the Congress. But, sir, I'd have to defer again to the general counsel and others to give you a more definitive answer than that.

Senator WEBB. So it was probably—I mean, I've read the letter of notification. It's a generalized statement of the powers of the Commander in Chief. But as it applies here, this is a humanitarian situation that doesn't involve any of the situations that I just mentioned, correct?

General HAM. Sir, there was no imminent threat to Americans, that's correct.

Senator WEBB. So it would be conceivable that, with this very broad interpretation of presidential power, it could be used in pretty much any manner in which this President decided to use it with respect to other humanitarian situations in Africa, like Ivory Coast?

General HAM. Sir, I would have to defer to the policy folks and the general counsel.

Senator WEBB. Well, I'd just like to reiterate my concern that if we don't use the War Powers Act here we need to use something like the War Powers Act for the Congress to really examine the future of what we're going to be doing in Libya and other situations. I think it's a proper way for us to exercise the powers that we have here in the Congress.

I would assume that planners are considering the prospect that there might be an international force on the ground in Libya in the future? Let's say not boots on the ground in combat, but if Qadhafi leaves is that in the cards?

General HAM. Sir, I think that is certainly one potential outcome of this, an international force of some composition intervening between the regime and the opposition forces.

Senator WEBB. Would it be a consideration for the United States military to be on the ground in that situation?

General HAM. Sir, I suspect there might be some consideration of that. My personal view at this point would be that that's probably not the ideal circumstance, again for the regional reactions that having American boots on the ground would entail.

Senator WEBB. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I read in Defense News this morning the discussion that has been around this table on where the headquarters should be. I was, as you know, General Ham, I was very much involved in dividing out the continent of Africa into one command. It had been parts of three commands and I was involved in that change.

At the time my preference was to have it in Africa, to have the headquarters there. The place that I at that time felt would be more because of the location of the various AFRICOMs or unions

would be in Ethiopia. But we also understand—it's interesting. When you talk, as I do, individually to the presidents of the various countries, they agree that it would be better. But the problem is, and we all know it, with this whole idea of the colonialism and all that, they felt nobody wanted the presence in Africa because it would make it look like kind of a takeover thing. So I understand all of that.

But I'd be very much opposed—and I just want to get on record—that if there is a serious look at changing the headquarters—obviously, we've got Tinker Air Force Base and all that. But it should stay, in my opinion, in Stuttgart, for this reason: We have our other COMs, like the Pacific Com is in theater. It's in the Pacific. In these areas, if you put it where it's a different time zone you've got a problem. I know your predecessors were—they have to come down, and we want them to have relation, be present in the continent as much as possible. It would be very difficult if you were coming from the United States in my opinion.

Stuttgart works well. It's got two commands there, and I would hope that we leave it there until the day comes that we'd be able to move it to, with the acceptance of Africa, to some African nation. I just think it would be very awkward. It's really kind of awkward right now, and I've talked to your two predecessors, in terms of getting equipment down there and responding and all that. Even the distance between Stuttgart and places on the continent are inconvenient.

So I guess I just—if it gets into any kind of a serious talk about changing that, I want in on the discussion, okay?

General HAM. Yes, sir, absolutely.

Senator INHOFE. The other thing, General McNabb, I'm going to bring up something that probably nobody up here is even familiar with, but you are. It has to do with the FAA bill and it has to do with one of our favorite subjects, and that is the Subpart S. The Subpart S has always been - -that's the non-scheduled carriers—has always been separate from the crew rest and some of the problems, some of the, not problems, but some of the things that people comply with with scheduled airlines.

But we have problems in many cases with bringing things in, let's say, from Stuttgart into, or from someplace going into theater and then coming back out, which we do. We take equipment in, we take personnel in and out. If you use that 15 hours, you can't do it. I've got several examples here that we've actually looked at and mapped out. One would be from Belgium to Bagram to Amsterdam. That's a regular route that is run. They take tents and equipment in there. Another one, from Germany to Kandahar to Hong Kong, a regular route. Another one, from Shannon to—well, one from Ramstein to Qatar and return.

Well, the problem is, because of the securities, you can't leave these aircraft in there overnight, so they can't have a crew rest, an RON, that others could have, because it's in a war zone. So I'd like to get you kind of on record recognizing that as a problem and any comments that you have to make if you agree with me on this problem. In other words, we want that Sub S to remain as it has been in the past. I say I do, anyway. What's your thoughts?

General McNABB. Well, Administrator Babbitt did come and talk to me and said: Hey, what are your concerns as I look at the U.S.-flag carriers, the civil Reserve air fleet? I do depend absolutely on the scheduled and the non-scheduled carriers. I do, and I mentioned to him then, that I do not think one size fits all. Domestic flights where you have numbers of sorties is a little different than the international long-range, and so you have to deal with it differently.

Safety is paramount, there is no question, and you can do a lot of things to enhance safety. They're looking at crew rest facilities on the airplane so that you can get some rest en route. Operational risk management programs, to make sure that we're looking at that.

But from my standpoint, what I want to do is make sure that I keep velocity up and we're taking full advantage of modern airplanes. I really pushed the civil Reserve air fleet, saying I really want to get to the more modern airplanes, which are inherently more safe. As we get these international airplanes, the amount of money that's spent, there's a lot of safety that's built into them, and of course I think—so that's a little bit different—

Senator INHOFE. But as far as maintaining the exemption for Sub S, would you agree with my statement on that?

General McNABB. Yes, sir.

Senator INHOFE. All right, that's good.

General Ham, I'm very interested in a lot of things that are going on there. As you know, one of the differences between you and me is when a decision is made as a policy decision by this country, whether you personally agree with it or not, you're a soldier, you carry it out. I'm not. So I disagreed with our attitude toward the government in Cote d'Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo and his wife Simone. I know what they've been accused of in the past, but I also know that what happened in that election—and I have documented on the floor of the Senate—certainly brings it into question as to whether or not that was legitimate.

The French then, behind Alassane Ouattara, actually participated in, not just in Abijan, as they did with their gunships, and we have no idea how many hundreds of people were killed 3 nights ago there. And that was something where specifically the French said to the United Nations: We authorize you; we're going to use our troops as necessary to go in there and try to get the Gbagbo administration out.

Now, that's a real hotbed right now. It's going to have huge repercussions in the future. But I hope that when things like that start coming up that you'd be in a position in terms of what our response will be to talk to those of some of us who are pretty familiar with what is going on in Africa.

Now, that same thing would go, as you and I have talked in the past, with the Lord's Resistance Army, for example. That's something where we now have Uganda, Central African Republic, the Congo, and Rwanda all in agreement they need to get this guy, and we now have a policy of the United States, because I passed the bill, that we need to do away with Joseph Kony and the LRA.

Do you have any comments to make about that and where that is on your priority list?

General HAM. Sir, it is a high priority, and I think it factors into the lack of security in East Africa as a whole. I think so long as the Lord's Resistance Army is able to operate in the horrific manner in which they do, they will continue to contribute to instability in the region. We take very seriously our military responsibility in a supporting role in executing the strategy, and in fact I am this afternoon headed to the State Department to have discussions on this and many other topics.

I think the challenge for us in AFRICOM is, while we may not have access to the full array of forces that we would like to have to support this endeavor, we should do what we can now, and I think that would be my approach in the near term, to enable the Ugandans particularly, but others as well, to put as much pressure as possible on the Lord's Resistance Army.

Senator INHOFE. Well, I know my time's expired, Mr. Chairman, but I want to make sure I get into the record how serious this is. This Joseph Kony for over 20 years, almost 30 years now, he's been going into the villages and stealing these little kids. It's called the kids or the children's army. They have to go back after they're trained—I'm talking about 12 and 13 and 14-year-olds. They have to go back to their village and murder their parents and all that. They have gone through and they've mutilated these kids for all these years.

We now have a position of the United States in this thing. I do say this, that we have some really good presidents over there, like Museveni in Uganda, who's just as interested as we are, Kabila in Congo is just as interested as we are, and certainly in Rwanda they're concerned. So I would like to stay on top of that. Anything that is new in the way of a development, I would personally like to be advised of that.

Then, for the record if you could put in your thoughts on IMET and train and equip. I'd like to have that because when we start developing our authorization bill I want to get everyone on record. And I'd say the same thing for you, General McNabb, as to the significance of those programs.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Blumenthal.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to join in thanking both of you, General McNabb and General Ham, for your service to the country, and hope that you will convey that thanks to all the brave and distinguished men and women who serve with you.

I want to focus on a number of areas quickly, first on, General Ham, on the Joint STARS aircraft. I wonder if you could tell us a little about the role and importance of the Joint STARS mission in Libya and other areas?

General HAM. Senator, Joint STARS has been an integral and important component of the suite of collection assets which the U.S. and others have applied to operations in Libya. Joint STARS' particular capability in detecting moving forces has been particularly useful and noteworthy. Especially early on in the campaign,

where the regime forces were moving, Joint STARS was able to identify those and greatly aided the vectoring in of aircraft to interdict some of those efforts.

So it has been and remains a valuable component. It's got long on-station time and a great capability.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So it's been extremely useful in surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, many of the areas where American aircraft have been so instrumental in the Libyan operation so far?

General HAM. Yes, sir, American and others.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And if you had more of them would that be of use to you?

General HAM. Sir, I had sufficient for this particular operation, which was, of course, limited in scope. But certainly in a larger scale operation and the ability to deal with multiple simultaneous contingencies, then that would be the case.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Do you know whether those aircraft are still available to NATO? Are they still in use in helping to target? Because I understand that one of the challenges in Libya is identifying non-civilian targets.

General HAM. Sir, it is my understanding that Joint STARS is still flying and operating. It is difficult again when both opposition and regime forces are operating in the same area with the same type of equipment. That's a tough target set for JSTARS and others to operate against.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. But JSTARS has been useful and instrumental in that effort?

General HAM. It has been, yes, sir.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McNabb, I wonder if you could tell us about the planning and perhaps the logistics of withdrawals that are intended for Iraq and potentially for Afghanistan? I recognize they are two very different situations. But is there planning for those purposes and what is its status?

General McNABB. Yes, sir. It's all going very well. In Iraq we already came down from 130,000 to 50,000, and of course the last 50,000 coming out by December of this year. That whole system has gone very well. We basically bring it down, General Austin and his folks in Iraq determine which equipment they'll phase out and bring down. They use two ports, in Jordan the Gulf of Aqaba, and then they also use Kuwait for the majority. It has to do with wash racks. They'll wash it up, make sure that it's all set. Then we use our U.S.-flag commercial fleet to then move them back to the States or in some cases to Afghanistan.

Some of the higher priority things like MATVs and MRAPs that they have said, okay, we're going to move these from Iraq to Afghanistan, we will fly directly from Kuwait and take them across.

So I'm very comfortable how well-oiled that is. The Army Material Command, General Dunwoody, that whole team has done superbly along with the folks in Iraq and the services on getting the stuff back and then getting it to the depots and fixing it up.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Fair to say it's all on schedule?

General McNABB. Sir, that one's going great.

Afghanistan, we are working to make sure that we can get a flow out of Afghanistan. Right now the northern distribution network,

we only have permission for one-way flow. A number of countries have no problem with that, but a couple of countries are still—still have said, we are okay with taking stuff into Afghanistan, but we're not okay at this time with bringing stuff out of Afghanistan. Plus we can't bring military equipment out.

So we are looking. There in Afghanistan, one of the big things is to find some intermodal ports where we can jump out of Afghanistan to an airfield, that then we can put it on surface, clean it up and put it on the surface and bring it home that way, which again you get the good part of getting it out quickly, but then we get the value of moving it by surface, so the much cheaper cost.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Regarding Afghanistan, I was interested in your testimony with respect to new air drop or air transportation vehicles, particularly under development at the NADIC Center, again especially the unmanned helicopter. I know the KMAX and other vehicles are in experimental stages. I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit on your testimony in that regard?

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. We went from 2 million pounds of air drop in 2005 to 60 million pounds of air drop last year, and we're headed towards 100 million this year. As I mentioned, using multimodal ops that's freed up military airplanes like C-17s to be able to do more of that, C-130s as well.

We keep working with the folks on the ground in figuring out low-altitude, low-cost, where we use disposable chutes where they don't have to worry about getting the stuff back. We've done precision air drop, which if the weather or the threat demands we still want to make sure we can get the stuff in to them.

Of course, what this does is it frees up either helicopter hours so they can go do operational missions or it gets convoys off the road, which saves our lives of our valuable folks.

What we're working on now is looking at high-speed CDS, which is what the special ops forces do. The commander of AFSOC said—I said: What would you do if you were me? He said: The one thing I would do is try to get to high-speed CDS; that works very well for us. This would be coming in at 250 knots and 2 to 300 feet, very precise. But we have to design chutes that can handle that, that opening shock.

The C-17 and 130J aircraft as we've been modernizing, their tails are already stressed to handle that, so it's simply to make sure that we can design the chutes that we can do that. Again, that will vastly improve safety as we go in and the precision that we need for those forward operating bases—of course, they appreciate the closer we can put it to where they want it, so they don't have to go chase to get it.

So it's a very exciting time. As you mentioned, UAVs. We're also looking at airships, and there are some real positives there that it just may be time to be able to be taking advantage of that.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, I want to commend you for that very exciting work. You've used the term. I think it is exciting, very challenging as well, and absolutely critically important, perhaps underappreciated by the American people, the job that you're doing in getting supplies to those forward positions that are very, very difficult, particularly in Afghanistan, to supply and keep supplied. So I want to thank you for that work.

My time has expired. I have other questions, so with your permission I may follow up with those questions to you in another form.

But I also, just in closing, want to thank you for your focus on aiding our warriors when they are wounded and a very, very important part of your testimony dealing with the increased rate of survival and the great work that you're doing in that regard. So I thank you very, very much, and thank you, General Ham, as well. Thank you.

General McNABB. Sir, it's absolutely a labor of love.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Generals McNabb and Ham, thank you so much for being here. I'm sorry to drop in at the eleventh hour. I know you thought you were all ready to go and then I walked in. So I apologize for missing your testimony.

General McNabb, you mentioned that the recapitalization of the tanker fleet remains your top acquisition priority, and I think we were all pleased, regardless of where we were on the decision, that the decision has finally been made and we can move forward.

We've been following this very closely in New Hampshire, where we have our Air National Guard based at Pease, and has been working with the 157th Air Refueling Wing, and they've been flying in support of Air Mobility Command operations around the globe. Much of that has been done with the old KC-135 tankers from the Eisenhower era, and I can speak to how loud those used to be because they used to fly over my house.

So I know that the acquisition of the new tankers is very important. While I understand that the Air Force is going to be the main decisionmaker on where they're based and that you probably don't want to comment on that process, we're also following that very closely because we would love to have them based at Pease.

But could you talk about what kinds of criteria you think are important as the basing decisions are being made? You talked about looking for ways to optimize air processes and saving money as you're thinking about these missions. So what kinds of strategic basing decisions are you looking at as you're thinking about the missions of the future?

General McNABB. Yes, ma'am. As you said, that's really an organize, train, and equip mission of the services. So the Air Force has a very robust criteria where they will go in and they will look at all the bases, especially given the tanker decision, the 135s, and we know that the first 179 is just the start of the recapitalization of the whole 135 fleet as it ages out.

So they have the criteria, and it is things like facilities, it is like air space, it is how close are you to the tracks. Obviously, Pease is close to the Northeast tanker task force. We use that a lot, and you helped out for the Libya operation, as you I think probably know. Very valuable how well that has worked. I will say that as both the Air Mobility Command commander and then as the TRANSCOM commander I absolutely depended on that.

But it is a process again under the Secretary of the Air Force. They go very clearly on say, here's the criteria, here's how much everything's worth. They do the visits to all the places, and then they will say: Okay, well, here's three more. Then they will finally get it down to a preferred location and say, we'll do the environmental studies. But it's very open and I know their plan is to make sure they do that right in consultation with all of you, in a very open process.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you. We appreciate that and appreciate your kind words for the missions that have been done from there to support the Libyan effort.

General Ham, I missed much of the discussion earlier in the committee about al Qaeda's influence in Northern Africa and concerns about that. I certainly share the concerns that have been expressed today. In a hearing yesterday before the Foreign Relations Committee, we heard testimony about the finding of shoulder-fired rockets in Libya by the rebels. We heard this testimony from Human Rights Watch, and the fact that those shoulder-fired rockets then disappeared not too long after they were found in a warehouse.

You mentioned, as I understand, here the possibility that there could be as many as 20,000 of those rockets that exist in Libya. I wonder if you could talk about what the threat is to the operation in Libya and what we're doing in cooperation with our allies to try and recover those shoulder-fired rockets?

General HAM. Senator, it is a very real problem. We do estimate that there were as many as 20,000 of these types of weapons in Libya before the conflict began. It's very, very difficult now to ascertain how many of them are still accounted for and how many of them may have been taken to other places. It does pose both a regional and an international concern, I believe.

The threat to current operations is relatively easily mitigated by the aircraft operating at an altitude generally above the effective range of those shoulder-fired air defense systems. But the threat longer term that if these systems were to be controlled by violent extremist organizations and the threat that that would pose is really to me the greater concern than the immediate tactical effect.

Senator SHAHEEN. So can you speak to what kinds of cooperative efforts we're doing with our allies in the region to try and recover those?

General HAM. Yes, ma'am. It starts, of course, with intelligence and trying to track through a variety of means where those systems may have been taken and how they're stored and under whose control. But it gets to the larger issue and the larger, longer range mission of U.S. Africa Command and the U.S. interest there of helping African states establish good governance, good security apparatus, that would have the ability to detect the movement of such weapons into their countries and then be able to take actions themselves to bring those under control.

That's really what we want to get to long-term. In the near term, it will be intelligence-driven and then in collaboration with the regional partners to try to take action to get those out of extremist hands.

Senator SHAHEEN. As you talk about trying to help the African states on issues like this, one of the most horrible challenges that I think continues to threaten Africa is violence against women in those regions, especially when it's used as a tool of war, as it was in the DRC. I just wondered whether you're looking at any ways in which you can help as you're supporting African nations and helping transform their militaries, if you're thinking about any kind of training or awareness of the challenges of violence against women, particularly sexual violence against women, and how you're dealing with that, if you are.

General HAM. Yes, ma'am, it is a very real threat. The command has previously highlighted that as an important issue and it has incorporated such training when it partnered—when it helped develop military forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It's a program I think that bears our further and continuing interest. Again, it gets into the notion of what are the characteristics of a military force that is responsive to civilian control, respectful of the citizens that it serves, and sex-based violence, while there is some tradition of that and history of that, is something that's got to be expunged from the ranks of the militaries of those nations. And we'll continue to do what we can in modeling by our own behavior, but specifically targeting instruction and leader development in that regard.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much, General Ham. I really appreciate hearing that. Yesterday the head of the Office of UN Women, former Chilean President Michelle Bachelete, was here and she talked about the challenges that they have and the importance of engaging men in African nations in this fight, so that they understand how they're affected by these actions. So I very much appreciate that. If we in the Senate can help in any way in this effort, I'm certainly ready to do that.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

Just a couple more questions on Libya. General Ham, if the military mission were expanded, as some are proposing, to include regime change, what would be required to achieve that military mission?

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, at the outset it would require a very significant increase in the intelligence collection to be able to track that particular individual and his movements. It would be a considerable increase in the current effort against a very difficult target set, and then have available military forces to be able to act on very, very short notice to that intelligence.

So I think it would be a pretty significant increase from the current level of effort.

Chairman LEVIN. Would that probably require boots on the ground, then?

General HAM. Chairman, that would probably in some cases make it—be part of the intelligence collection, again because this is a very practiced individual in terms of concealing movements. So the human intelligence component would probably necessitate some presence, maybe not military, but to contribute to that intelligence picture.

Chairman LEVIN. And what about in terms of the removal if the intelligence were obtained? Might that require boots on the ground?

General HAM. Sir, that could be an option, and certainly it would be the most precise and the less likely to have civilian casualties or additional collateral damage, but very, very difficult to execute.

Chairman LEVIN. And if that mission were amended, expanded, to include that goal, does that have an effect or might it have an effect on the coalition and on the resolution?

General HAM. Sir, I believe it would. It is not addressed in the current Security Council resolution and I think if it were to be included I think we would find it more difficult to find willing partners.

Chairman LEVIN. Could it have an effect on the NATO agreement?

General HAM. I believe it could, chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. What about the support of the Arab League?

General HAM. I believe it would have a negative effect.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, if the no-fly zone had been put in place earlier, in your judgment would we be at a different place today? Would the situation be different in Libya from what it is today?

General HAM. Chairman, it's difficult to assess. I think had the no-fly zone been imposed unilaterally by the United States or perhaps with a small subset of other willing partners, it probably could have had some effect, would have had some effect on the regime's aircraft conducting some attacks which they did in Benghazi, probably could have had some effect there. But I don't think the no-fly zone in and of itself would have had any deterrent effect on the regime's ground forces moving toward Benghazi.

Chairman LEVIN. We're all set. We thank you both.

General McNabb, you've had I think about as good a partner as you could possibly have today.

We thank you both and thank the men and women with whom you work. And we'll stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee adjourned.]