

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION  
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR  
2011**

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**THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010**

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

**U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN  
COMMAND**

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:09 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Chambliss, Thune, LeMieux, Burr, and Collins.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Christine G. Lang, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.

Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Michael Harney, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Matthew R. Rimkunas, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr; and Chip Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN**

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

The committee meets today for two hearings. The first hearing will be to receive testimony from the combatant commanders of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Then, at the conclusion of that hearing, we'll take a very brief break and start a second hearing, with four senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials and a witness from the Government Accountability Office, to consider the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft program.

Before we start this hearing, I just want to remind DOD that formal statements of witnesses before the committee are due 48 hours before the hearing. Now, we make this requirement very clear in our formal communications with the Department, and it's important that that rule be met. We understand that there are circumstances beyond the control of individual witnesses, that are the cause frequently, so we're not using this hearing to target or single out this panel, or any member of this panel. We've had this problem in a number of recent hearings, and I would just simply ask our witnesses and representatives of DOD to take this message back to the Department.

We welcome General Gene Renuart, the Commander of NORTHCOM, and also of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); and General Doug Fraser, the Commander of SOUTHCOM.

General Renuart is nearing the completion of his tour of duty as commander, and he's planning to retire later this year. We understand that this could be his last appearance before this committee. We give him, therefore, a special welcome and a special thank you for his long service.

General Fraser is appearing before us for the first time as the SOUTHCOM commander. We thank you, General, for your many years of dedicated service to the Nation.

We, again, want to just offer you our best wishes, General Renuart, as you conclude your long and outstanding career.

We also would ask both of you to convey our gratitude to the men and women who serve in your commands, and to their families for their commitment and their sacrifice in carrying out the missions of the commands, and the commands in which they now serve and have previously served.

NORTHCOM was created following the terrorist attacks of September 11. It is charged with two primary missions: defense of the United States and providing defense support to civil authorities in circumstances where the U.S. military is needed to respond to natural or manmade disasters.

The commander of NORTHCOM is also dual-hatted as the commander of NORAD, our binational command with Canada that provides aerospace warning and control, and maritime warning for North America. As indicated in our letter of invitation, we hope that General Renuart will describe the synergies between these two interrelated commands. In addition to Canada, Mexico is also in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR); and given the continuing high level of drug-related violence in Mexico and the attendant risks to our southern border region, we hope that General Renuart will update us on his view of the current situation, relative to Mexico.

Finally, General Renuart is the combatant commander responsible for the operation of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system that has interceptors deployed in Alaska and California to defend our Nation from long-range missile attack. That system has been of considerable interest to this committee, and we look forward to discussing it today.

Turning to SOUTHCOM's AOR, General Fraser and Lieutenant General Keene, his deputy commander, and commander of the Joint Task Force (JTF) in Haiti, have spent much of the last 2 months responding to the devastating human tragedies in Haiti, and, more recently, to a lesser extent, in Chile. The scope and scale of these tragedies remains difficult to imagine, but the stories that have emerged have captured all of our hearts, have called our people to action, and have put the Haitian and the Chilean people in our thoughts and our prayers. We applaud the work of tens of thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who responded quickly and provided much-needed emergency relief to the people of Haiti.

Beyond Haiti and Chile, General Fraser, the other challenges that we face in our hemisphere remain complex and interwoven. The drug trade in South and Central America continues to boom, and the illicit southward flow of guns and money continues to foster violence, corruption, and political instability. The region is not without its bad political actors, as well. President Chavez continues to work to undermine U.S. interests in the region, to do everything possible to maintain his own power and align himself more closely with countries of concern, like Iran. President Chavez's activities, coupled with the money, corruption, guns, and violence in the drug trade, are cause for great concern.

The SOUTHCOM AOR does, however, have a good news story, as well. The Colombian Government continues to consolidate the gains of Plan Colombia by expanding security in government services to the farthest reaches of Colombia. Later this year, the Colombians will head to the polls to elect a new president, following a Constitutional Court decision that prevented President Uribe from running for a third term.

So, gentlemen, again, we thank you. We look forward to your testimony.

Senator McCain.

#### **STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN**

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in welcoming our witnesses today.

I know that executing two wars in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR has robbed other combatant commands of the sustained attention of Congress and the American people. However, I want to make it clear that the success of your commands' daily operations, and the fact that we don't hear about you every day in the news, is a credit to you. It means that Americans are safe along our northern and southern approaches. So, I thank you both for your long years of service and for the service of all the courageous soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines under your command.

General Renuart, as was mentioned, this is your last appearance before the committee. We thank you for your years of dedicated service to this Nation.

There's no doubt that NORTHCOM and NORAD play a vital role in the defense of our Homeland. Whether it's dispatching jets to respond to unidentified intrusions into our airspace or providing support to civil authorities in the aftermath of a chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attack, the resources and capabilities that NORTHCOM brings to the table are invaluable. Since its creation, NORTHCOM has experienced growing pains common to a new combatant command.

I'm interested, General, in hearing what steps you're taking to better operate in today's security environment, particularly those outlined in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). I also look forward to hearing how the command is improving coordination and reliable communication interoperability between local, State, and Federal authorities so that we avoid the confusion of September 11th.

Not only as ranking member of this committee, and a member of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, but as representing the State of Arizona, I'm also particularly concerned about how NORTHCOM coordinates with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Government of Mexico to confront the growing scourge of violence along our southern border and the growing threat of the drug cartels to the very existence of the Government of Mexico.

The increasingly capable and lethal drug cartels threaten not only our border States, like Arizona, but the entire country. I believe there's no more important mission than protection of the homeland, and I look forward to your testimony.

General Fraser, it's been a trial by fire for you. The Senate confirmed you less than a year ago, and your AOR has experienced two of the worst earthquakes on record in the region, little more than a month apart. So, I want to congratulate you and your team for the exceptional work you have all done supporting the international relief effort in Haiti and providing needed communications and cargo airlift support to the Chilean Government as it rebuilds in the aftermath of its 8.8-magnitude earthquake last month.

We have a number of interests in the Caribbean and Central and South America, but none so important than helping a neighbor in need. I'm proud of SOUTHCOM's efforts, and proud of the men and women serving on the USNS *Comfort*, whom I am sure take for granted how critical they are to the lives of not only our wounded warriors, but to the innocent victims of natural calamity around world.

So, I look forward to hearing about how SOUTHCOM is coping with the unexpected costs associated with these efforts, a status report on our military-to-military relations in the region. I've long believed that consistent engagement is the key to enhancing security. By improving partner capacity, we can help the region decrease gang violence, drug trafficking, and human trafficking, all of which threatens both regional and global stability.

I look forward to your testimony.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses today. I know that executing two wars in the Central Command area of responsibility (AOR) has robbed other combatant commands of the sustained attention of Congress and the American people. However, I want to make clear that the success of your commands' daily operations and the fact that we don't hear about you every day in the news is a credit to you, because it means that Americans are safe from the air, the sea, and from our northern and southern approaches. So, I thank you both for your long years of service and for the service of all the courageous soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines under your command.

General Renuart, there is no doubt that Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and NORAD play a vital role in the defense of our homeland. Whether it is dispatching jets to respond to unidentified intrusions into U.S. airspace, or providing support to civil authorities in the aftermath of a catastrophic chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological attack, the resources and capabilities that NORTHCOM brings to the table are invaluable. Since its creation, NORTHCOM has experienced the growing pains common to any new combatant command. I am interested in hearing what steps the command is taking to better operate in today's security environment, particularly those outlined in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review.

I also look forward to hearing how the command is improving coordination and ensuring reliable communication interoperability between local, State, and Federal authorities so that we prevent similar mistakes of September 11. Not only as ranking member of this committee and as member of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, but as the Senator from Arizona, I am also particularly concerned about how NORTHCOM coordinates with the Department of Homeland Security and the Government of Mexico to confront the growing scourge of violence along our southern border.

The increasingly capable and lethal drug cartels operating to our south threaten not only Border States, like Arizona, but the entire country. There is no more important mission than the protection of the homeland and I look forward to your testimony.

General Fraser, it's been trial by fire for you. The Senate confirmed you less than a year ago and your AOR has experienced two of the worse earthquakes on record in the region—little more than a month apart. So, I want to congratulate you and your team for the exceptional work you all have done supporting the international relief effort in Haiti and providing needed communications and cargo airlift support to the Chilean Government as it rebuilds in the aftermath of its 8.8 magnitude earthquake last month.

We have a number of interests in the Caribbean, and Central and South America, but none so important than helping a neighbor in need. I am proud of SOUTHCOM's efforts, proud of the men and women serving on the USNS *Comfort*, whom I am sure take for granted how critical they are to the lives of not only our wounded warriors but to the innocent victims of natural calamity around the world.

I look forward to hearing about how SOUTHCOM is coping with the unexpected costs associated with these efforts as well as get a status report on our ongoing engagements in the region. I've long believed that continuing engagement in the region is the key to enhancing security. By improving partner capacity, we can help the region decrease gang violence, drug-trafficking, and human trafficking all of which threatens both regional and global stability. I look forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much Senator McCain.  
Let me start with General Renuart.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND, AND COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND**

General RENUART. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee—

You'd think I'd have learned that by now.

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee, good morning. As you are so kind to mention, this may be my last

appearance before the committee, and I want to thank all of the members of the committee for the sustained support that you've provided to not only our commands, but, of course, the men and women serving in our military today.

It is good to be back with you today and represent the men and women of both of our commands, and to talk about some of the developments that we've had over the last year, and to mention some areas where I think we can continue to grow and improve.

Of course, we have to thank the men and women who serve, each day, who wear the uniform, the cloth of our Nation, as they defend our homeland, both here and abroad. It's also important that we recognize the contributions of our senior enlisted leaders. I'm pleased to have with me today my command's senior enlisted leader, Chief Master Sergeant Allen Usry, seated here behind me. Chief Usry is the first National Guard senior enlisted leader selected for NORTHCOM. I would say that was a competitive selection across Active, Reserve, and Guard, senior noncommissioned officers, and we're pleased to have Chief Usry as part of the team.

I'm also very pleased to sit next to my good friend Doug Fraser. As you both mentioned, during the past months our commands have partnered substantially across a broad variety of areas. First, to fight the narcoterrorism in our region, the movement of drugs, to support law enforcement to ensure that illicit trade and trafficking is reduced in our region. But, we've also partnered together to support SOUTHCOM in their efforts to provide the military support to humanitarian relief efforts in the wake of the devastating earthquake in Haiti. We're pleased to be part of Doug's team.

As Commander of both NORAD and NORTHCOM, I really have two principal missions. Chairman Levin, you mentioned those, so I won't repeat them. But, it's important to ensure that, across a broad spectrum of missions—from air sovereignty, to maritime homeland defense, to ballistic missile defense, to support the law enforcement along our borders, and to support Federal agencies, both in natural and manmade disasters, as well as large-scale events, like the Vancouver Olympics—our two commands have created a synergy between each other that is now inseparable. From warning to consequence management, that spectrum of activity is really the symbol of what these two commands have grown to be. I'm pleased to talk about those both today.

It's important also to note that we're members of a combined national response in many of these areas. We don't do it alone. DOD should not be the lead in many of these areas, but is an integral and important partner. We've worked very hard with our teammates in both Federal and State agencies. We've spent a great deal of time on the ground talking to adjutants general in the States, to the Governors, and to their senior emergency managers to ensure that we create an integrated team for success.

It's also important to note that we have excellent relations with our international partners. Both the chairman and Senator McCain mentioned Mexico; certainly Mexico is in a difficult struggle, continuing to work hard on countering the drug-trafficking organizations in their country. We work very closely with our Mexican military and their interagency partners to ensure that the lessons we've learned in other places around the world are shared so that

we can create strong capacity within the Mexican military and within their governmental agencies to allow them to succeed. They face significant challenges. We'll continue to work with them aggressively. I look forward to discussing that with you here today.

As for our Canadian teammates, they stand shoulder by shoulder with us on the battlefields of Afghanistan, but also here in this hemisphere. We work very closely with them in air sovereignty. They partner with us in the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South to counter drug-trafficking. We've worked very closely to provide support to them in special events in their country. I mention the Vancouver Olympics one more time.

Finally, I want to thank the committee for the support you've provided for the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). WHINSEC is an important element to both of our commands. It allows us to establish relationships with senior military and civilian leaders from other countries, and it has allowed us, then, to bridge into some of these tough topics that we'll talk about maybe a little later in the hearing. So, we both feel that WHINSEC is critical to our ability to interoperate in our region.

Thanks for your support also to keep the personal security, the individuals attending these schools, confidential. It allows them to speak openly, to understand and maintain that academic freedom that we value in our institutions.

Our commands train hard to ensure our operational readiness and our mission effectiveness are always the best they can be. Protecting our families, our Nation, and our communities is the most important mission we have, and we take that very seriously.

Mr. Chairman, as I complete my service to the Nation, I want to tell you that this past 3 years in these two commands has been an extraordinary experience, much more complex than I would have imagined, and it created challenges that we are meeting and successfully achieving every day.

I have to close by saying thank you to my family. For 39 plus years, my wife has quietly endured the moves, the changes, the challenges, from Operation Desert Storm to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to here today in the homeland. So, I want to go on the record to say thank you to her for her support, and our two sons, who are both serving in their own way.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions here today. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Renuart follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to report on the posture, challenges, and future direction of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Every day, the Commands' soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, National Guardsmen, reservists, and civilians defend the United States and Canada from external threats and aggression-protecting our citizens, national power, and freedom of action. Due to their efforts, North America enjoys continued security and freedom.

HOMELAND DEFENSE IS OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY

NORAD and NORTHCOM are inextricably linked Commands that have complementary missions and work closely together to protect our homelands. Incor-

porating an integrated headquarters staff, our Commands have forged an indispensable partnership operating within a common security environment, and together are dedicated to defending the United States and Canada. The synergies that exist between these two Commands enable us to conduct our missions with a sense of urgency in the face of very real threats.

NORTHCOM is responsible for homeland defense, sustaining continuous situational awareness and readiness to protect the United States against a range of symmetric and asymmetric threats in all domains. NORTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) includes air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Saint Pierre and Miquelon (French Territory off the northeast coast of Canada), The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and three British Overseas Territories: Bermuda, Turks and Caicos Islands, and British Virgin Islands, as well as the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles, the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. NORTHCOM is also responsible for leading the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts for theater security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and Caribbean nations within the NORTHCOM AOR.

Day to day, we are focused on deterring, preventing, and defeating attacks against the United States. We also stand ready to support primary agencies, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, in responding quickly to natural and man-made disasters. To accomplish our civil support mission, we stay close to our Federal partners to anticipate and plan for how and when the DOD can assist in preventing and minimizing loss of life, suffering, and property damage. We continually assess threats to our security, improve our homeland defense and civil support plans and capabilities, and strengthen relationships with our mission partners. We work diligently to ensure our Nation's military is ready and immediately accessible to support our fellow citizens when called upon.

NORAD is the binational U.S. and Canadian command charged with the missions of aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America. Aerospace warning includes the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America—by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles—through mutual support arrangements with other commands. Aerospace control includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defense of the airspace of the United States and Canada. The renewal of the NORAD Agreement in May 2006 added the maritime warning mission, which entails a shared awareness and understanding of the activities conducted in U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime areas, and internal waterways.

#### INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

To perform our missions, we rely on the sharing of intelligence among Federal, State, and local agencies. NORTHCOM's Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC-North) coordinates the acquisition, analysis, and fusion of intelligence, counterintelligence, and appropriate DOD-related law enforcement information for the NORTHCOM AOR, and shares that information with organizations at the national, State, and local levels. JIOC-North maintains a dual focus on monitoring both non-state and nation-state threats to North America.

In countering transnational terrorism, we continue to rely on our established connections within the intelligence and Federal law enforcement communities, seeking as much legally appropriate information as possible. NORTHCOM maintains liaison officers with the National Counterterrorism Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Beginning in 2009, DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis placed a liaison officer with JIOC-North. In the wake of the Fort Hood shootings in November 2009, we established a daily terrorism and force protection information sharing group to improve the manner in which potential threats are identified, assessed, and acted upon. We perform our intelligence activities with a focus on safeguarding the civil rights and civil liberties of U.S. citizens and adhering to appropriate statutes and DOD regulations.

#### HOMELAND DEFENSE OPERATIONS—PROTECTING WHAT AMERICANS VALUE MOST

NORTHCOM may be known best for leading the DOD response to disasters in our AOR; however, we remain vigilant in our number one responsibility, homeland defense, as we monitor an average of 12–20 potentially dangerous events each day. Through our operational missile defense program and our maritime and air defense activities, NORTHCOM maintains a high state of readiness to respond as necessary against manmade threats.

### *Ballistic Missile Defense*

NORTHCOM is responsible for ballistic missile defense operations within our AOR and other areas as directed to protect the homeland, allies, friends, and other national interests from potentially hostile acts. Our ability to carry out this mission continues to mature. The Ballistic Missile Defense System has been in nearly continuous operations since 2006 against potential threats to the defended area. Although it is a Missile Defense Agency (MDA) asset, the Sea-Based X-Band radar capability has also been included in our operational baseline during heightened threat periods since 2008.

Our missile defense crews are trained and our procedures are continuously validated and exercised, so that we can meet the high standards required to defend the Nation. Furthermore, NORTHCOM is active in the ground and flight testing programs to ensure the tests are more operationally realistic. Our immediate challenge is balancing a real-time defensive capability with requirements of MDA's Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation activities.

NORTHCOM is working closely with the other Combatant Commands to develop a Global Force Management Plan to address the Phased Adaptive Approach and improved capabilities to defend the homeland. This effort will assess operational planning, force structure, and budgetary implications to better meet global ballistic missile defense requirements. We are working with MDA to ensure that the Phased Adaptive Approach includes upgraded sensor systems with real-time discrimination capability; improved deployable and fixed-site interceptors; enhanced command and control systems that provide a common operating picture across the strategic, operational and tactical levels; and an additional Fire Control node at Fort Greely, AK. MDA's Concurrent Test, Training, and Operations and Simultaneous Test and Operations, with the additional Fort Greely equipment, will bridge the gap between operational capability and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation activities.

### *Operation Noble Eagle*

Operation Noble Eagle began immediately after the September 11 attacks and continues today to protect and defend the United States and Canada with airspace surveillance, ready alert forces, and the U.S. National Capital Region (NCR) Integrated Air Defense System. Air National Guardsmen and Air Force reservists have flown more than 80 percent of the more than 55,000 Operation Noble Eagle missions.

The security and defense of the NCR against terrorist air threats is one of our highest priorities. NORAD works closely with DHS, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to ensure the skies over the NCR are protected. We are prepared to provide a rapid, reliable response as incidents unfold. As part of the NCR Integrated Air Defense System, NORAD and the USCG provide air patrol and alert aircraft to counter fast- and slow-moving air threats that may penetrate the NCR Air Defense Identification Zone.

NORAD also provides tailored air defense for National Special Security Events (NSSE) in the United States and similar events in Canada.

We are implementing a "risk assessment" model as recommended in the GAO-09-184 report "Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace." This risk assessment will enhance NORAD's ability to determine and apply appropriate requested levels and types of units, personnel, and aircraft.

### *Northern Sovereignty Operations*

During 2009, NORAD launched fighter aircraft on 14 occasions in response to TU-95 Bear and TU-160 Blackjack aircraft not on international flight plans that penetrated North America's Air Defense Identification Zone. Because these flights did not violate U.S. or Canadian airspace, they were not considered threats to national sovereignty. The response was a means of identifying unknown aircraft operating in relative proximity to U.S. and Canadian sovereign airspace. In 2009, for the first time, a NORAD representative was included at the annual U.S.-Russia Prevention of Incidents over the High Seas staff talks. We anticipate continued NORAD and Russian Long Range Aviation dialog in 2010 to reduce the ambiguity of Russian military flights near our borders and promote safe flight operations within international airspace. NORAD operations in Alaska will remain a key avenue for positive interaction with Russian military counterparts during the reset of relationships between our Nations; continued support for military-to-military engagement opportunities is essential to maintain this professional dialog.

### *Maritime Domain Awareness*

Maritime Domain Awareness is the comprehensive understanding of the global maritime domain as it relates to the security, safety, economy, and environment of the homeland.

In the fall of 2008, a Russian Surface Action Group, led by a KIROV class cruiser, transited the NORTHCOM AOR en route to participate in a naval exercise with Venezuela and a port visit in Cuba. Additionally, in the summer of 2009, we were involved with monitoring the activity of a Russian support ship and a pair of nuclear-powered Russian submarines patrolling covertly off our Eastern seaboard. Although these vessels were not considered a threat to our homeland, their presence off the coast of the United States cannot be ignored and requires naval assets to be in a readiness posture to respond in any way necessary to defend the homeland, if required.

NORTHCOM has aggressively pursued interagency and partner-nation cooperation for Maritime Domain Awareness. NORTHCOM has partnered with Mexico to better integrate regional efforts by initiating the development of an automated identification system architecture, which will contribute to increased information exchange and Maritime Domain Awareness. This will have a positive impact on our combined capability to combat illicit traffic.

NORTHCOM is the Operational Manager for two Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations, which transitioned to Programs of Record in 2009. These complementary programs—Maritime Automated Super Track Enhanced Reporting and Comprehensive Maritime Awareness—automatically fuse maritime-related intelligence to allow joint and interagency analysts to provide decisionmakers, planners, and operators the capability to rapidly evaluate and respond to potential maritime threats. These programs are fully operational and are employed in the NORAD and NORTHCOM Command Center, as well as the Navy's maritime operations centers.

As the Arctic emerges as an area of increased activity, NORTHCOM has taken steps to evaluate DOD's ability to maintain Maritime Domain Awareness in the region. To establish this foundation, NORTHCOM has commissioned a surveillance study with the intent of identifying current capabilities to determine where gaps exist. The study will be completed in the fall of 2010.

### *NORAD Maritime Warning*

The NORAD maritime warning mission continues to evolve as NORAD planners work in close coordination with Canadian and interagency partners. Collaboration on several planning documents with these many organizations established and reaffirmed formal and informal relationships required for binational and bilateral maritime operations.

The past year's accomplishments and ongoing efforts have resulted in enhanced bi-national information sharing and comprehensive understanding of the maritime domain among our mission partners. We worked aggressively to address gaps and seams documented in an internal Information Sharing Architecture study that identified barriers to achieving full mission capability status. The study further identified critical steps and processes necessary to close these gaps within the NORAD maritime warning mission. We have also moved forward in the development of a shared binational common operating picture of the maritime domain. We continue to be challenged in a constrained environment to match the Canadian manpower commitment to this important mission area.

### *Maritime Homeland Defense*

Commander, NORTHCOM (CDRNORTHCOM) is the operational commander responsible for Maritime Homeland Defense within the AOR. Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command is under the operational control of CDRNORTHCOM for Maritime Homeland Defense. Maritime threats, particularly asymmetric maritime threats in close proximity to the homeland, require defensive capabilities ready to respond on extremely short notice. NORTHCOM is developing a short-notice maritime response concept of operations that will provide an anti-ship defeat capability for short-range emergent threats leveraging U.S. interagency and partner-nation capabilities.

NORTHCOM faces a wide spectrum of maritime vulnerabilities that warrant a comprehensive analytic study of "Short-Notice Maritime Response" to identify Maritime Homeland Defense capability gaps from a whole-of-government perspective. The nation's ability to respond to a maritime threat in the NORTHCOM AOR requires the full integration of DOD maritime operations with those of interagency partners and, where appropriate, international partners, anchored on the principle of unity of effort. To respond to a maritime threat within the NORTHCOM AOR, the Nation depends on synchronized security efforts at the operational level along the approaches to and within the United States. The capability to intercept vessels

of interest beyond their ability to impact population centers, critical infrastructure, and key resources, and the ability to respond quickly to maritime indications and warning are essential to protecting the United States from external threats and aggression. In sum, a whole-of-government approach is required to leverage NORTHCOM maritime partner capabilities and resources.

#### *Mine Countermeasure Contingency Operations*

The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan outlines roles and responsibilities that enable the U.S. Government to respond quickly and decisively to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain. In accordance with the MOTR Plan, NORTHCOM is responsible for Mine Countermeasure (MCM) operations in U.S. waters. In 2009, in order to consolidate logistics and maintenance infrastructure, the Navy completed the homeport shift of all surface MCM forces (minesweeping vessels) to San Diego, CA, and all Aviation MCM forces (mine sweeping helicopter squadrons) to Norfolk, VA. In May 2009, an experiment conducted in the port of Corpus Christi, TX confirmed that surveys and port folders completed prior to a mining incident can significantly reduce the time required to mitigate the mining threat and restore port operations.

#### *Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection (AT/FP)*

NORTHCOM protects DOD assets in our AOR by executing a comprehensive all-hazards approach to the AT/FP mission that provides DOD personnel (active duty, reservists, civilians, and family members), assets, facilities, installations and infrastructure protection from the full spectrum of threats in order to ensure mission accomplishment. NORTHCOM has established theater policy, standards, and training, and verifies program execution and compliance through an exercise program and AT Program Reviews. We also integrate operational protection efforts with DHS to create a synchronized defense strategy for the AOR.

NORTHCOM supports new processes and technologies that sustain the force protection mission. During the past year, we participated in a pilot program, with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, to identify a suspicious activity reporting and sharing capability for the DOD. The unclassified FBI eGuardian system is anticipated to be the DOD suspicious activity reporting system when designated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The eGuardian system will share potential terrorist threats, terrorist events, and suspicious activity information with State, Local, Tribal, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, State Fusion Centers, and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The eGuardian system will provide a continuous law enforcement force protection threat information sharing environment to identify emerging threats to DOD.

#### *Critical Infrastructure Protection / Critical Resource Protection*

The Secretary of the DHS is responsible for coordinating the national effort to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) in the United States. The DHS Secretary serves as the Principal Federal Official to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of CI/KR protection efforts among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and private sector. NORTHCOM continues outreach with DHS and infrastructure sector partners to ensure effective critical infrastructure information sharing for the execution of its missions.

As assigned by the Secretary of Defense, combatant commands act to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation of DOD-owned critical assets within their AOR. For non-DOD owned critical assets, combatant commands act to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation only at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, with the exception of responding to a time-critical event that requires specific actions by military forces to prevent significant damage to mission-critical infrastructure.

NORTHCOM retains DOD Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) focus in three areas: (1) AOR or those DOD assets that are owned, leased, or managed by DOD; (2) Area of Influence to include the Defense Industrial Base; and (3) Area of Interest that is non-DOD assets that are critical to sustaining U.S. military operations.

#### CIVIL SUPPORT—HELPING THOSE IN NEED

When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, NORTHCOM supports the primary agency, typically DHS, in responding to natural and manmade disasters by conducting operations to save lives, reduce suffering, and protect the infrastructure of our Homeland. The Department of State may request DOD support in response to requests from other countries within and outside the NORTHCOM AOR. DOD is prepared to support primary agencies with military-unique capabilities such

as fixed- and rotary-wing airlift, search and rescue teams, mobile medical facilities, communications infrastructure, and catastrophic planning expertise.

A key component of NORTHCOM's support is Incident Awareness and Assessment to provide critical imagery for local responders. Military aircraft over disaster sites provide Full Motion Video and still imagery to give responders on the ground their first look at affected areas. At the request of the primary agency, NORTHCOM is prepared to provide a variety of aircraft and satellites to gather photos and video that allow Federal, State, and local response assets to quickly respond to situations. We conduct these Incident Awareness and Assessment activities while simultaneously safeguarding the civil liberties of American citizens and adhering to appropriate statutes and DOD regulations.

*Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management.*

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents pose a great and foreseeable challenge to the security of the American people. A terrorist attack on U.S. soil or an accidental CBRNE incident could create catastrophic results that would likely exceed the response capabilities of civil authorities. As a result, DOD established a requirement for CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) to be trained and ready to respond to requests from civil authorities to save lives, help mitigate pain and suffering, and reduce property damage.

A CCMRF is a brigade-sized task force that operates under the authority of Title 10 of the United States Code. CCMRFs are self-sustaining and may be tailored to any CBRNE event. A CCMRF is composed of Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy units with unique CBRNE training and equipment, as well as general purpose units trained to operate in a CBRNE environment. CCMRF capabilities include event assessment, robust command and control, comprehensive decontamination of personnel and equipment, hazardous material handling and disposal, medical support, air and land transportation, aerial evacuation, mortuary affairs, and general logistical support for extended operations. The CCMRF augments the consequence management efforts of State and local first responders, National Guard forces, and Federal agencies by providing complementary and unique capabilities when the effects of a CBRNE event exceed their capabilities.

In November 2009, NORTHCOM and Army North (ARNORTH), NORTHCOM's Army Component Command, conducted the Vibrant Response 10.1 Field Training Exercise (VR 10.1 FTX), the first full-scale, full-deployment exercise for a CCMRF, confirming the CCMRF's capability to deploy to and support a catastrophic CBRNE Consequence Management event from a standing alert status. VR 10.1 FTX involved a simulated Improvised Nuclear Device detonation at Muscatatuck Center for Complex Operations near Camp Atterbury, IN. This challenging scenario is one of the 15 National Planning Scenarios established as a common interagency baseline, and the exercise set the stage for CCMRF 10.1 to fulfill its assignment through the remainder of fiscal year 2010.

Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), a NORTHCOM subordinate command, plans and integrates DOD support to the designated primary agency for domestic CBRNE consequence management operations. When approved by the Secretary of Defense and directed by CDRNORTHCOM, JTF-CS deploys to the incident site and executes timely and effective command and control of designated DOD forces, providing support to civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support. Some typical JTF-CS tasks include incident site support, casualty medical assistance and treatment, displaced populace support, mortuary affairs support, logistics support, and air operations.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, section 1082, as amended by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, section 1034, directed DOD to establish an advisory panel to carry out an assessment of the capabilities of DOD to provide support to U.S. civil authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident. This advisory panel was sworn in on 15 September 2009 and will submit their report with recommendations to Congress within 12 months. NORTHCOM hosted the Advisory Panel's second meeting at our Headquarters on 23 November 2009 in closed session for classified command mission briefings and discussions. The Command will continue to engage with the Advisory Panel throughout its efforts and we look forward to assisting them in additional research and insight into the Department's CBRNE consequence management mission sets.

*Response to Haiti Earthquake*

NORTHCOM is supporting U.S. Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) response and support for Haiti Earthquake relief efforts. NORTHCOM and our components

contributed more than 170 people. Air operations experts from Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH), assisted SOUTHCOM by transforming the 601st Air Mobility Division's Regional Air Movement Control Center into the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center to control the smooth flow of aircraft into Port-au-Prince Airport. AFNORTH's Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, Air Force Reserve officers assigned to respond to natural and man-made disasters in the United States, were onsite at facilities set up in the Southeast Region to support Haitian earthquake relief efforts. ARNORTH's Defense Coordinating Officer/Element worked closely with Federal, State, tribal, and local officials to determine which DOD capabilities can assist in mitigating the effects of the Haiti disaster.

#### *Cyber Operations*

NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to rely on data systems, the Internet, and networked commercial and military infrastructure to accomplish our missions. Cyber threats to these infrastructures include nation-state actors, terrorists, and criminal organizations, and are increasing in sophistication and occurrence. These cyber threats pose potentially grave damage to the ability of NORAD and NORTHCOM to conduct aerospace, maritime, and homeland defense, as well as DSCA missions. Our dependence on critical information systems leaves us vulnerable to potentially pervasive and sustained cyber attacks from global actors.

The Commands partner with U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the Military Services, DOD agencies, DHS, and other Federal agencies to share cyber threat and related information, reduce cyberspace vulnerabilities, and defend against information infrastructure attacks. Efforts such as the U.S. Government's plans to increase information sharing with the private sector, and its migration to trusted Internet connections for the government and military networks, will help promote situational awareness and reduce vulnerabilities.

In 2009, NORTHCOM, along with DHS, STRATCOM, and other mission partners, developed a plan tailored to provide rapid assistance to DHS and other Federal agencies for cyber-related events. This DOD cyber support would fall under our DSCA mission area and be provided in a similar fashion as hurricane relief, wildfire support, and responses to other national disasters. NORTHCOM is also conducting an analysis of providing a cyber response under our homeland defense responsibilities.

#### *H1N1 Operations*

NORTHCOM is executing Phase 1 of our Pandemic Influenza response plan. As part of our response, we identified five Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) Headquarters. The RJTFs, along with NORTHCOM subordinate commands, continue to prepare to assist the primary agency. To date, NORTHCOM has not received any requests from the primary agency for DOD capabilities.

In addition, NORTHCOM is the DOD lead for globally synchronizing military efforts to minimize contamination and prevent further spread of pandemic influenza. The DOD Global Synchronization Plan for Pandemic Influenza provides guidance to all the Geographic Combatant Commands, Functional Combatant Commands, Services, and DOD Agencies to assist in development of regional plans addressing operations in a pandemic influenza environment. Our efforts are focused on ensuring our military remains combat ready while taking care of interagency actions to keep military families safe at home.

#### *Support to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics*

The 2010 Winter Olympics began on 12 February 2010 in Vancouver, British Columbia. The Canadian Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness was charged with overall security for the Games and delegated the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) as the lead agency for this task. At the same time, the Minister formally requested Canadian Department of National Defence assistance for the RCMP. As a result of this request, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk, tasked CDRNORAD with the aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for this event.

#### *Inland Search and Rescue (SAR) Coordinator*

In addition to defending our freedom, our lives, and our territory, SAR is a priority mission for NORTHCOM. On 4 November 2009, the Secretary of Defense designated CDRNORTHCOM as the U.S. Inland SAR Coordinator, which made NORTHCOM responsible for civil SAR involving the inland portion of the 48 contiguous States. NORTHCOM stands ready to coordinate the full spectrum of SAR, from normal SAR, such as searching for a lost hiker, to responding to catastrophic incidents, such as a large-scale earthquake, through our Rescue Coordination Center (RCC). The RCC is our key node for inland SAR and is under the purview of

NORTHCOM's Service Component Command, AFNORTH. In addition, our Joint Personnel Recovery Center at Tyndall AFB, FL, allows us to have experts in place for routine SAR missions and to have those same experts at AFNORTH lead the way for a catastrophic incident SAR mission. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request for recapitalization of the Air Force's current rotary-wing SAR capability supports the continued viability of our SAR mission. Full funding of this fiscal year 2011 request keeps us on a path to continue providing SAR support to American citizens in those critical early hours of a crisis when aerial life support is a no-fail mission.

#### SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

##### *Joint Task Force-North Operations*

Joint Task Force-North (JTF-North), a NORTHCOM subordinate command, provides military support to Federal law enforcement agencies to assist in the identification and interdiction of transnational threats within and along the approaches to the United States. During fiscal year 2009, JTF-North coordinated 61 missions in support of Federal law enforcement agencies. In accordance with DOD policy for supporting law enforcement counterdrug efforts, JTF-North employed joint air, ground, and maritime sensors along the Nation's Southern and Northern borders and coasts; conducted detection and monitoring of suspected trafficking threats; provided for information and intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies; supported Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) request for enhanced tactical infrastructure along the Southwest border; assisted with building planning capability within CBP; and provided Federal law enforcement with other support such as transportation, tunnel detection capabilities, and basic military skills training.

At the request of DHS Assistant Secretary Alan Bersin, JTF-North provided support to the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, a multi-agency operation, in the State of Arizona. JTF-North facilitated intelligence and operational planning, and provided sensor capabilities during execution of this intelligence-driven operation.

Through JTF-North's missions and activities, NORTHCOM continues to sustain important relationships with Federal law enforcement agencies in securing our Nation's borders against drug traffickers and their associated activities. Robust collaboration exists today between JTF-North and operational-level leaders in CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the FBI.

##### *Counternarcotics (CN) Programs*

NORTHCOM's CN Program is an integral part of the defense and security of our Nation. We continue to build NORTHCOM's capabilities and establish coordinated efforts supporting our partner agencies and partner nations to address the illicit narcotics trafficking threat to the homeland.

NORTHCOM's CN efforts support Law Enforcement Agencies through information collection, analysis, fusion, and sharing, as well as theater security cooperation and partnership programs. These efforts are closely coordinated among the NORTHCOM staff and subordinate commands.

In addition to our southwest border, there are ongoing efforts with our Canadian partners along our 5,000 mile long northern border. This U.S.-Canadian cooperation has uncovered and is addressing widespread illicit narcotics trafficking in our shared land, air, and sea domains that does not currently exhibit the level of violence as on our border with Mexico, but nevertheless remains a serious transnational threat to the United States. Illicit trafficking also poses a threat to The Bahamas, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, which are now in the NORTHCOM AOR. Accordingly, we are exploring how to better coordinate CN efforts with SOUTHCOM in this region.

NORTHCOM has also made tremendous strides in supporting national CN efforts by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the Interdiction Committee (TIC) as part of their coordination with DOD. TIC membership consists of 17 agencies and commands led by a chairman appointed by the ONDCP Director. TIC provides advice to ONDCP on activities and threats posed by all illicit drug trafficking that threatens the United States and its interests in the Western Hemisphere. NORTHCOM is now represented quarterly as a TIC participant with JTF-North.

##### *Counter-Tunnel Initiative*

NORTHCOM is working with DHS, other combatant commands, and coalition partners to explore, map, and characterize illicit subterranean structures. Among these enhanced capabilities are seismic-acoustic and linear fiber-optic sensors, robotics, and other technologies. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research

and Development Center, is the technical lead for this initiative and continues to work in support of multiple combatant commands to solve this difficult problem. Within the past year, DOD support has resulted in the preemptive interdiction of two unfinished tunnels on the Southwest border. The Southwest border is a perfect test-bed for this capability. Results of this initiative benefit all combatant commands and help our interagency partners in their border security mission.

#### THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES—OUR PARTNERS

National Guard and Reserve Forces are critical to NORTHCOM's ability to carry out our assigned homeland defense and civil support missions. As such, NORTHCOM advocates for National Guard and Reserve capabilities in support of the Command's mission. In each of our annual Integrated Priority List and Program Objective Memorandum submissions to the DOD, we advocate for and support resolution of National Guard and Reserve capability concerns. We further advocate for changes to DOD policies that allow for more collaborative planning to ensure proper resourcing for National Guard and Reserve units' equipment, personnel and training for civil support operations. We also advocate for and support key issues such as equipment modernization in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.

We recognize the National Guard as a fundamental partner in the Total Force and essential to the security and defense of our Nation. The Air National Guard provides the bulk of NORAD's operational force for Air Sovereignty Alert missions, and is developing additional capabilities in support of domestic requirements. The Army National Guard provides all of the manning at our Ground-Based Interceptor sites in support of missile defense requirements. Additionally, the Army National Guard provides the bulk of personnel for ground-based air defense capabilities protecting the National Capital Region.

The National Guard has made a significant investment in personnel assigned to NORTHCOM. In fact, NORTHCOM has the largest concentration of Title 10 National Guard officers in a joint organization outside of the National Guard Bureau. There are over 50 full-time National Guard authorizations in NORTHCOM HQ; however, only 39 of those positions are filled. In addition, Guard general officers serve in nominative positions as my NORTHCOM Deputy Commander, Director of Operations, and one Deputy Director of Plans and Policy. Our ongoing partnerships with the National Guard have increased our ability to coordinate and integrate joint and interagency operations. While we still have work to do, I am pleased to report our collaboration with the National Guard has never been better, and the experience gained by Guard members serving throughout NORTHCOM ensures we have a strong foundation for enhancing this relationship as these servicemembers progress through their careers.

#### PLANS—THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR SUCCESS

NORTHCOM's homeland defense and civil support plans are vital to our Nation's ability to deter, detect and defeat threats to our security, and assist civil authorities when called upon by the President or Secretary of Defense. Our plans are modified as threats, observations, and lessons learned from exercises and real-world operations dictate.

On 2 November 2009, the Secretary of Defense established a Civil Support Plan category of DOD plans that may be shared with State, local, tribal, and other Federal authorities that play a mission-critical role in the development, review or execution of the plans. This Civil Support plan category of DOD plans contains seven NORTHCOM plans.

The NORTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan provides the framework for all of our planning efforts and is the primary means by which we synchronize day-to-day operations for homeland defense, civil support, and theater security cooperation activities. The operations and activities outlined in the campaign plan place strong emphasis on anticipating threats, improving our homeland defense and civil support capabilities, and strengthening relationships with our mission partners, at home and in the North American region. We continually assess the campaign plan to evaluate our progress toward achieving the long-term goals and objectives outlined in national and DOD strategies.

#### THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION

Our top theater security cooperation priority is to build the capacity of allies and partners to help create an environment in North America that is inhospitable to terrorism. NORTHCOM's long-range vision focuses on establishing a comprehensive defense architecture where the United States works with its international partners to deter, prevent, and if necessary, defeat mutual threats. To achieve this, we plan,

execute, and assess theater security cooperation programs, events, and activities with The Bahamas, Canada, and Mexico to support national and Command goals and objectives. This requires us to direct theater security cooperation activities toward improving partner-nation defense capacities, using a capacities-based planning approach, to promote regional cooperation and enhanced interoperability.

The focus for our efforts is on building partner capacities with The Bahamas and Mexico and on enhancing coordination and interoperability with Canada. Our goal is to strengthen homeland defense through mutually beneficial partnerships in the AOR that counter terrorism, trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and illicit narcotics and other transnational and irregular threats and their consequences, while contributing to national security objectives.

We have worked over the past year with the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Geological Survey, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Environmental Protection Agency to strengthen those relationships to further North American security and prosperity. Recent, ongoing, and planned initiatives include building relationships and capabilities and creating enduring partnerships that result in enhanced safety and security along our common borders and within the region. Activities have focused on developing and improving procedures to prepare for and respond to potentially catastrophic events such as pandemic influenza outbreak, mass exposure to dangerous chemicals and/or materials, and natural and/or manmade disasters.

#### *Canada*

The relationship among NORAD, NORTHCOM and Canada Command is a tremendous example of the strong and mutually beneficial military-to-military ties between our Nations. I reported last year that we had signed the Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan, which is the framework for forces from one nation providing support to forces of the other nation for timely, effective, and efficient support to their respective civil authorities. We used the Civil Assistance Plan in our deliberate planning process, as the U.S. Government responded to requests from the Government of Canada for NORTHCOM support to Canada Command when they supported Royal Canadian Mounted Police security efforts for the 2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver.

NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to develop our relationships with Canada Command. This past year, we concluded a comprehensive Tri Command Study that examined future roles, missions and relationships to increase North American defense and security while enhancing the valued relationship between Canada and the United States. The Tri Command Study identified several initiatives to further integrate and synchronize our operations and created a Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation among NORAD, NORTHCOM, and Canada Command that highlights fundamental relationships and underscores individual command responsibilities for mutual support and cooperation.

#### *Mexico*

NORTHCOM leads Theater Security Cooperation and Building Partnership activities with Mexico to promote specific U.S. security interests and support the development of Mexican military capabilities for self-defense and coordinated operations. Our military-to-military relationship with Mexico is growing stronger, with full respect for Mexican sovereignty and a shared responsibility for countering the transnational illicit trafficking activity affecting our Nations.

As one essential element of the U.S. whole-of-government approach, NORTHCOM's most significant contribution is in strengthening the operational capacity of the Mexican Army, Air Force, and Navy. Our engagement goes beyond providing hardware and the associated training; it also focuses on developing the ability to analyze and share the information that will allow the Mexican military to conduct operations against the drug trafficking organizations to systematically dismantle them. We are committed to a long-term military partnership with Mexico that is beneficial to both nations.

NORTHCOM works in partnership with the Mexican military to support its efforts to increase capacities and execute its current strategy to counter Mexico's security threats. The level of communication, interchange, cooperation, and training exchanges between U.S. and Mexican armed forces has increased dramatically over the last 2 years and represents a historic opportunity for long-term strategic improvement of the U.S.-Mexico security partnership.

Through our Theater Security Cooperation Plan and activities, NORTHCOM plays a significant role in supporting the Mexican military and improving the security situation in Mexico through the execution of the following programs:

- The Mérida Initiative: \$415.5 million appropriated in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 Foreign Military Financing funds to purchase aircraft (up to eight Bell 412 helicopters, up to five Sikorsky UH-60M helicopters and up to four CASA aircraft) to improve the Mexican military's ability to deploy rapid-reaction forces quickly in support of police operations against drug cartels, and to conduct maritime surveillance in an effort to deny the use of the eastern Pacific and western Caribbean to transnational criminal organizations, including drug traffickers and potential terrorists. In addition, funding will procure ion scanners to help detect illicit drugs. NORTHCOM's actions are in coordination with efforts to build up the capabilities of Mexico's civilian law enforcement entities by the U.S. Department of State and other agencies.
- Section 1206 assistance: \$14.0 million for equipment such as Night Vision Goggles, Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boats, personal protective equipment, digital media forensics, tactical communications equipment, and specialized training.
- Section 1004 counterdrug support: \$18.0 million for pilot training, specialized skills training, and intelligence training.
- Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid: \$3.0 million in fiscal years 2008–2010 for hazardous materials response, flood early warning and emergency management training.
- Facilitated training support in the areas of Night Vision Goggle maintenance, Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Hazardous Material team training, and Aviation Training. Additionally, our Service components are actively engaged with their Mexican counterparts in subject matter exchanges and sharing lessons learned from our experiences in the areas of civil-military relations and urban operations.

I have engaged with senior officers in the Mexican armed forces over the past few months who have expressed an interest in more detailed discussion and training in the areas of military justice and operational law (and inherent human rights issues) and administrative law. As a result, we are developing Subject Matter Expert Exchange and Mobile Training Team events (in conjunction with the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies) in order to enhance respect for the rule of law and human rights within the Mexican armed forces. For example, NORTHCOM attorneys and attorneys from the Mexican armed forces have already participated in conferences designed to develop curricula for the professional development of military attorneys. Additionally, senior attorneys from the Mexican armed forces have visited various U.S. military entities to get a first-hand view of how the U.S. military is organized and trained for the administration of military justice and for conducting operations in compliance with domestic and international law.

NORTHCOM continues to support the Department of State's "Beyond Mérida Initiative." NORTHCOM has partnered with the Mexican military in support of disrupting the capacity of organized crime to operate and institutionalizing capacity to sustain the rule of law, thus helping to build strong and resilient communities on both sides of the border.

We will continue to work proactively with our mission partners and with the Mexican military to achieve the joint goals of the United States and the Government of Mexico. It is important to recognize that while we are currently working with Mexico to develop and strengthen its military's capability to defeat the drug trafficking organizations, our long-term goal is to establish an enduring relationship—built upon trust and confidence—so that we can cooperate in the future on other mutual security issues.

#### *The Bahamas*

On 17 December 2008, Theater Security Cooperation responsibility for The Bahamas was transferred from SOUTHCOM to NORTHCOM. This Unified Command Plan transfer enhances our homeland defense mission through our partnership with the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF), and strengthens our civil support missions with Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This past year, my staff coordinated closely with SOUTHCOM and RBDF staffs to ensure smooth planning and execution of this shift in mission and responsibilities. We have developed a comprehensive Bahamas engagement plan as part of our Theater Campaign Plan that will enhance the U.S.-Bahamian relationship and integrate The Bahamas as a participant in the President's Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.

#### *Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation*

NORTHCOM representatives participated in the WHINSEC Board of Visitors in June and December 2009. We worked closely with the WHINSEC staff to ensure

their curriculum is fully compliant with U.S. Code and supportive of human rights. I have tasked WHINSEC to provide human rights training to the Mexican armed forces in the upcoming months; however, I continue to believe that open disclosure of the names of all WHINSEC graduates intrudes upon students' privacy and, more importantly, would assist drug trafficking organizations or terrorist groups to target the best and the brightest graduates from Latin America.

#### INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS

For mission success, our communications activities are focused on ensuring DOD interoperability with our DHS, State, and local partners to rapidly and effectively share information to ensure a prompt, coordinated response in the aftermath of a disaster.

In partnership with the Defense Information Systems Agency, each year we sponsor the VITAL CONNECTION Communications Exercise (VCCE), which provides a realistic, controlled environment for DOD and its partners to train and collaborate on communications systems and capabilities that facilitate effective and efficient interoperability.

In 2009, there were four venues where DOD, State, and local first responders developed and refined their techniques and procedures to improve interoperability in the event of a natural disaster or national emergency.

NORTHCOM continues to partner with FEMA and the National Guard in the employment of Deployable Cellular-Based Suites, which include cellular towers, satellite communications connectivity, Land Mobile Radio interfaces, and ancillary devices to improve interoperability and service to emergency responders. NORTHCOM procured four additional Incident Awareness and Assessment/Full Motion Video communications suites through the Combatant Commander Initiative Program that are positioned within AFNORTH Headquarters and Air Combat Command Communication Squadrons to provide enhanced Incident Awareness and Assessment/Full Motion Video capabilities to incident commanders. These suites provide additional capability to enhance situational awareness during disasters and emergency events for both incident on-scene commanders and our national leadership.

#### EXERCISES, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION

NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to derive exceptional training value from our participation in the National Exercise Program (NEP). In 2009, we participated in each of the Tier I and Tier II NEP exercises, including the National Level Exercise in July that represented the capstone event for the first-ever New Administration Transition Training program.

Our own two major exercises, Ardent Sentry 09 (AS 09) in June 2009 and Vigilant Shield 10 (VS 10) in November 2009, represented extraordinary training opportunities with scores of Federal, State, local, tribal, non-government organizations, private sector, and multi-national partners.

In AS 09, we ran agro-terror and other asymmetric exercise incidents in Iowa and three surrounding States, a Deployable Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense scenario off the coast of Oregon, and a nuclear weapon accident/incident vignette in Wyoming, all while simulating loss of the use of our primary operations facility and having to move to an alternate location.

In VS 10, we linked to the main Canadian exercises supporting preparation for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics (including how we would provide civil support if requested), and simultaneously conducted an earthquake exercise in up-State New York. Each of these major exercises was linked to a Vigilant Guard exercise, the series we conduct in support of State National Guard Headquarters and Joint Task Forces.

In 2010, we will again participate in the National Level Exercise, and Ardent Sentry 10 will further exercise our civil support mission. We will also practice our homeland defense missions in Vigilant Shield 11, linked to STRATCOM's exercise Global Thunder 11. We are also continuing a series of Pandemic Influenza exercises in preparation for future DOD-wide and U.S. Government-wide Pandemic Influenza exercises.

All in all, we annually conduct or participate in approximately 50 exercises of varying type, length, and complexity, to maintain our readiness across diverse NORAD and NORTHCOM mission sets detailed in over 10 Concept Plans. We engage our training partners at every level of Federal, State, tribal, and local government to employ the most comprehensive and realistic scenarios.

The newest complement of our civil support series of training courses is our DSCA Senior Executive Seminar. Hosted in our Headquarters, this 2-day seminar provides a great opportunity for me to meet with State Governors and The Adjutants General

(TAGs) (ranging from one to five at a time), for them to receive capabilities briefs from various staff Directorates regarding DSCA operations, and orient themselves to NORTHCOM's missions.

#### PARTNERSHIPS

Working with our mission partners is essential to ensuring the American people receive assistance during times of need, whether at the international, interagency, or State and local level. Our Nation's Governors take very seriously their role as Commanders in Chief of their State and we respect that authority. Our job is to support our Nation's Governors in responding to emergency situations and threats in their States.

##### *States and Territories*

In an effort to understand each State's risks and capabilities and in order to anticipate the best response for DOD requested assets, I participated in the initial meeting of the congressionally-directed Council of Governors and have also separately engaged with Governors, Lieutenant Governors, various State Directors of Emergency Management and the TAGs. Since taking command, I have met with a total of 27 State Governors and/or Lieutenant Governors. I have also met individually with 37 different States' TAGs and have addressed all 54 TAGs at various National Guard senior leader conferences. The most recent conference was the 2010 National Guard Bureau/NORTHCOM Hurricane Planning Workshop, 18–22 January 2010, in Tampa, FL, where several hundred representatives from 30 States and for the first time senior officials from DHS and FEMA addressed hurricane emergency response preparedness. Next year, we plan to expand the scope of the planning conference to include all hazards. These engagements strengthen the relationships between the State and DOD, improve mutual understanding of the critical balance each State must maintain between its requirements and resources to ensure support of the State's civil authorities during a major disaster, crisis, or NSSE; enhance sharing of information and lessons learned from previous responses to disasters and events; and support the State's understanding of NORAD and NORTHCOM and our missions.

NORAD and NORTHCOM provide a training and exercise program that actively engages the States and Territories. The Vigilant Guard Joint Regional Exercise Program is sponsored by NORTHCOM and executed in conjunction with the NGB. Four Vigilant Guard (VG) exercises are conducted each year, and when feasible, two are linked to NORAD and NORTHCOM-sponsored exercises (VG Iowa with Ardent Sentry 09 and VG New York with Vigilant Shield 10). All VG exercises include some degree of local/county government participation.

##### *Interagency Community*

NORAD and NORTHCOM have strong relationships with many non-DOD Federal Agencies and Departments. Agency representatives and NORTHCOM liaison officers provide an established reach-back capability to their parent organizations. These relationships provide the essential interagency context during operations planning and execution, while also providing the DOD's perspective to external agencies.

##### *Private Sector*

Our Private Sector Engagement Team has worked closely with DHS, particularly FEMA, to support a comprehensive outreach program to non-profit and nongovernmental organizations (NGO), businesses, academia, faith-based organizations, and public-private partnerships throughout the country. The tremendous capabilities, resources, and willingness of the private sector and NGOs community are essential to successful disaster response. Achieving unity of effort is our goal.

#### CHALLENGES

We are aggressively tackling impediments to our efforts to improve air and maritime domain awareness, interagency information sharing, and consequence management operations. As we move forward with these efforts and others this year, we solicit and appreciate your continued support.

##### *Aircraft Recapitalization*

Legacy fighters, tankers, and airborne early warning aircraft in use today adequately meet all aspects of the Air Sovereignty Alert mission; however, recapitalization of these legacy aircraft is critical to the future success of the NORAD mission set.

Legacy fighters are aging and will be stressed to maintain reliability and capability as we move into the 2015–2030 timeframe. Recapitalizing the fighter, tanker, and airborne early warning aircraft will remain a challenge, given the DOD's post-September 11 long-term mission requirements. NORAD's mission readiness will be affected if Air Sovereignty Alert aircraft are not recapitalized in accordance with the fiscal year 2011 President's budget request.

#### *Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace*

NORTHCOM is fully engaged with the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) community through our membership on the Joint UAS Center of Excellence Advisory Council; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics-led UAS Task Force; and our participation on the Policy Board for the Federal Aviation UAS Subgroup. NORTHCOM is also an advisory member to the newly formed UAS Executive Committee, co-chaired by the FAA and DOD, which is addressing the numerous national airspace access issues for public users. We are eager to team with our partners in the interagency community as they expand their UAS operations to achieve synergy in our homeland defense and civil support efforts. We continue to work with the FAA on finding the best way forward on employing UAS in the National Airspace outside restricted airspace.

#### *Deployable-Integrated Air Defense System*

One of the greatest challenges facing the Commands is the lack of an integrated air and cruise missile defense capability to counter threats from low-flying aircraft, UAS, and cruise missiles. As these threats grow, it becomes increasingly important to develop an integrated air and cruise missile defense system-of-systems to defend the homeland. In the past year, NORAD and NORTHCOM worked closely with the Joint Air Defense Operations–Homeland Joint Test Team as the operational sponsor in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for a Deployable-Integrated Air Defense System capability, which could be employed to protect a particular venue or city which may be threatened or at risk.

National Security Implications of Arctic Change. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is a seminal agreement of the extensive international legal framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean. Global interest in the Arctic region shows no hint of ebbing, evidenced by the summer 2009 transit of two German-owned cargo vessels through the Northern Sea Route, westbound from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. Increased activity necessitates that the United States become party to the Convention in order to protect and advance national interests in the Arctic by enhancing our national security (including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces), securing U.S. sovereignty rights over extensive marine areas (including the valuable natural resources they contain), and giving the United States a seat at the table when rights vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.

To bolster our efforts for the Arctic region, I support the stated desires of our respective U.S. and Canadian civilian defense leadership to reinvigorate the Permanent Joint Board on Defense as highlighted by Secretary of Defense Gates' and Minister McKay's November 2009 Halifax Security Talks.

#### FUTURE CAPABILITIES

As we investigate existing technologies and capabilities for innovative uses, we are also focusing on emerging technologies to meet our requirements. We urge Congress to support the following initiatives.

##### *Air Domain Awareness*

In March 2007, the National Strategy for Aviation Security (NSAS) was published to enhance public safety and economic growth by promoting global aviation security through reducing vulnerabilities. The NSAS states: "Together, the Strategy and seven supporting plans present a comprehensive national effort to prevent hostile or illegal acts within the air domain, promote global economic stability, and protect legitimate aviation activities."

To achieve the objectives of the NSAS, the whole-of-government must be committed to the guidance provided within the NSAS and supporting plans to achieve global air domain awareness (ADA). ADA crosses many Departments and Agencies within the government, thus requiring a coordinated approach. Historically, the operational synergism and cost efficiencies associated with the principle of unity of effort have not been completely realized for ADA because neither an interagency governance mechanism nor an information sharing infrastructure has yet been established.

To meet this challenge, NORAD and NORTHCOM have teamed with DHS and other organizations across the U.S. Government to collaboratively develop solutions

and lay the foundation for ADA. The desired end-state is development and implementation of a work plan leading to a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational ADA governance mechanism, interdepartmental capabilities and resourcing roadmap, and information sharing infrastructure to synchronize the disparate efforts of ADA mission partners.

DHS, NORAD, and NORTHCOM hosted an Interagency ADA Summit on 13–14 January 2010 bringing together senior leaders from numerous Federal agencies. The summit leadership provided guidance to three working groups facilitating development of processes for governance, information sharing, and capabilities and resources. Additional summits are planned at 6-month intervals and will bring in participation from industry, State, local, tribal, and international partners.

#### *NORAD and NORTHCOM Defense Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy*

Wide-area surveillance is a key component of Air Domain Awareness and is critical to air and missile defense of the homeland; however, NORAD and NORTHCOM lack adequate real-time, persistent, multi-domain surveillance. The NORAD and NORTHCOM Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy proposes to rectify this problem by providing the Commands with a foundation to develop a family of systems permitting persistent wide-area air and maritime surveillance to enhance defense against threats in the interior of and in the approaches to North America.

The C2 Gap Filler Joint Capability Technology Demonstration will demonstrate a capability that enables efficient, secure, timely and trusted exchange of information resulting in enhanced C2 capabilities for NORAD and NORTHCOM.

A second effort is the Next Generation Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) Technical Risk Reduction Initiative (TRRI) Phase 1 project. TRRI was developed to minimize the technical risks of building a next generation OTHR prototype while simultaneously raising technical readiness levels of advanced radar technologies. Over-the-horizon radars are proven, wide-area surveillance systems with the ability to detect and track thousands of air and maritime targets at ranges exceeding 1,500 miles from the radar site. When completed, these initiatives will improve wide-area surveillance around North America.

#### *Radar Interference*

Comprehensive Air Domain Awareness will not be attained unless we can resolve the growing issue of radar interference. As such, NORAD and NORTHCOM support the establishment of an interagency process to allow the accurate assessment of existing and future plans for obstructions that potentially disrupt various radars within our area of operations. A formal vetting process is required with the necessary authorities to prevent projects from interfering with the defense of North America, while supporting the expansion of alternative energy sources, such as wind farms. To that end, NORAD has taken the initiative to form a radar obstruction evaluation team to quantify the impacts of proposed wind energy projects in close proximity to our radars.

#### *Long-Range Radar Sustainment and Future Plans*

DHS, NORAD, and NORTHCOM use long-range radars to detect and monitor non-cooperative targets. Many of these radars are 1950s vintage technology and in some cases are well beyond their life expectancy. To help with the maintenance of these radars, the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) was approved, has been funded since fiscal year 2006, and again requested in the fiscal year 2011 President's budget. Upgrades to the radars are currently being completed. The goal is to sustain the existing systems another 15–20 years and use modern technology to play an integral part in the SLEP.

#### FINAL THOUGHTS

NORAD and NORTHCOM have demonstrated our ability to meet emerging threats to the homeland and support civil authorities in times of crisis. We are committed to remaining strong and reliable partners, working together to protect and defend our Nations, people, and way of life.

Our Commands' success depends on the dedication, professionalism and sacrifice of our service men and women. We appreciate what the members of this committee have done to ensure the men and women of NORAD and NORTHCOM have the best possible resources to maintain world-class capabilities.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General, for your testimony. Thank you for bringing Chief Master Sergeant Usry with you, as a matter of fact. We welcome him, as well.

General Fraser.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF,  
COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND**

General FRASER. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee. I'm honored to have this opportunity to appear before you today and provide my assessment of SOUTHCOM and our assigned area of responsibility.

I'm joined this morning by my wife, Rena. I just want to echo what General Renuart has said. Her dedication, her support has been immense throughout, so I just appreciate that continued support.

It's also my privilege to share this table with my good friend and mentor, General Renuart, because our appearance together represents the close coordination, alignment, and relationship between our two combatant commands. I also want to thank the members of this committee for your continued strong support of SOUTHCOM and your outstanding soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen, and the civilian personnel, whom I'm privilege to lead.

I've personally seen what these outstanding men and women are capable of doing during the response to the earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010. The devastation was tremendous. Latest U.N. estimates indicate that over 222,000 people were killed, 300,000 people injured, and 1.2 million people displaced by the earthquake. The U.S. response was swift, coordinated, and aggressive and comprised Federal, State, military and civilian agencies and units, exemplifying joint and interagency teamwork, all under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as the lead Federal agent.

Fortunately, several DOD and U.S. Government assets were in the vicinity of Haiti when the earthquake happened. As you mentioned, Chairman Levin, Lieutenant General Keen, the Deputy Commander of SOUTHCOM, was visiting Haiti when the earthquake happened. He remains in place, commanding JTF-Haiti, providing superb leadership to the JTF-Haiti.

Within the 24 hours of the earthquake, a U.S. Coast Guard cutter was off the coast of Port-au-Prince, and a U.S. Coast Guard C-130 was on the ground supporting relief efforts. Air Force elements began surveying the international airport. U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft, from our cooperative security location at Comalapa, El Salvador, conducted the first U.S. aerial reconnaissance of the area affected by the earthquake. Members of SOUTHCOM's Standing Joint Force Headquarters landed and began the initial assessments. The first U.S. Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Team, a 72-member unit from Fairfax County, VA, arrived. U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and Air Mobility Command had established an air bridge. Additionally, the aircraft carrier USS *Carl Vinson* and the USS *Bataan* Amphibious Ready Group with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked were ordered to make best possible speed to Haiti. Joint, interagency, Federal, and State responders, all these agencies were working to support the people and Government of Haiti before the first 24 hours had elapsed.

Over the span of the next 3 weeks, the size and scope of the military response grew to a peak of just over 22,000 personnel involved in the relief effort, including an Airborne Brigade Combat Team,

the hospital ship USNS *Comfort*, a second MEU, as well as engineer, planning, communications, and medical experts. They coordinated with the U.S. Embassy, USAID, the United Nations, and other international organizations to determine where the capabilities of the military could rapidly be brought to bear to support the Government of Haiti.

Supported by TRANSCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and every branch of our Armed Forces, our forces dramatically expanded the airport's capacity and opened the seaport to enable the vital flow of supplies. JTF-Haiti forces distributed 2.6 million liters of water, 2.2 million meals, and 149,000 pounds of medical supplies, performing 1,025 surgeries, and assisting the World Food Programme in distributing 17 million pounds of bulk food.

As the capabilities of the Government of Haiti, USAID, U.N., and nongovernmental organizations have increased, and as the relief needs have been met, we are transitioning many of our functions to capable partners, and are conducting a deliberate, conditions-based drawdown of our forces.

The men and women who deployed to Haiti have performed magnificently and are the very embodiment of the teamwork and the jointness across DOD. They have been outstanding representatives of our military with their professionalism, sense of urgency, focus, and compassion. They continue to make us all extremely proud.

I would not have been able to perform this mission to the level of success we achieved without the support of the other geographic commanders, and unified combatant commanders, the Services, Joint Staff, and the Office of Secretary of Defense. General Gene Renuart and NORTHCOM provided invaluable assistance. We could not have accomplished so much so quickly without the personnel his command and others sent to augment our staff, both in Miami and on the ground in Haiti.

Less than 2 months after the catastrophe in Haiti, tragedy once again struck in the region, when an 8.8 magnitude earthquake shook Chile. Working through military liaison personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy, SOUTHCOM offered to assist in whatever manner the Government of Chile needed. Within a day of the earthquake, we distributed imagery of the affected areas to the Chileans, and sent satellite phones. Additionally, we are supporting Chile with transport aircraft, a field hospital, and a port survey team. As the U.S. Embassy coordinates with the Government of Chile to determine what additional support is needed, we stand by to assist whenever possible.

While the majority of our attention and resources recently has been focused on responding to natural disasters in Haiti and Chile, we continue to address other challenges in our region. Illicit trafficking, narcoterrorism, gangs, and potential for the spread of weapons of mass destruction pose the principal security threats in the region. The region remains very dynamic. Brazil continues its rapid emergence as a regional leader with global influence. Globalization of information, markets, resources, and financial transactions remain a force for change in the region, both positive and negative. Competing ideologies within the region are stressing democratic and human rights advances. The increasing engagement of international players from outside the region, such as

China, Iran, and Russia, continues to broaden the regional outlooks and positions.

Addressing the challenges of our region requires the truly whole-of-government approach in which DOD normally plays a supporting role. To that end, SOUTHCOM works not only to strengthen partner capability and capacity, but also to build important cooperative security relationships throughout the region with our partners, foreign and domestic, military and civilian, in the public and private sector. For the most part, our military-to-military relations throughout the region remain strong.

Finally, I'd like to thank this committee for your continued strong support for the WHINSEC and for the hard work of my fellow board members who sit on this committee. As a customer of WHINSEC, I can attest to its critical role in our security cooperation, especially in its focus on human rights.

Let me close by saying that the tragedy in Haiti is a stark reminder of the nature and potential severity of challenges we face in the region. The culture of cooperation, openness, and transparency we have developed, the relationships we have built through our enduring and consistent engagement throughout the region, and the emphasis SOUTHCOM has placed on partnering in the past few years have all paid a particularly high return on the investment in Operation Unified Response (OUR), the largest humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mission ever conducted in the region.

I think also, Mr. Chairman, it's important to recognize that General Keen attended the Brazilian Staff College. One of his classmates was the commander of the Brazilian United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)—or the U.N.-led MINUSTA force on Haiti, so the relationship had started a long time ago, and paid huge dividends during OUR.

Once again, thank you for your interest in our vital region, and your support of SOUTHCOM. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Fraser follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF

#### INTRODUCTION

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the U.S. Southern Command and our area of responsibility in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is my privilege to report to you on the successes and accomplishments of our men and women over the past year, and to share our appreciation for the outstanding support Congress has shown us. The devastating earthquake in Haiti has shown how suddenly the strategic environment can change; but it has also shown how your investments in U.S. Southern Command through the years enable us to respond to such challenges. With your continued support, we will build upon this foundation and strengthen the bonds of security cooperation throughout this region.

The nations of the Americas are strongly linked together in ways beyond physical and sociological proximity: our hemisphere is linked demographically, economically, socially, politically, culturally, linguistically and militarily. These shared qualities and beliefs connect us and provide the basis for addressing the common challenges that affect the security and stability of all nations in the region, today. These common traits also enable strong partnerships and serve as the foundation for the enduring relationships we will need as we face the future together.

As globalization trends continue, our security will depend upon expanding cooperative engagement with multinational, multiagency and public-private partners in our hemisphere. We will be better able to meet complex challenges of the 21st cen-

tury security environment by building robust, enduring partnerships now. Together we are stronger and more effective than working as a single organization or nation operating individually. Our vision embodies this belief.

#### THE REGION—ENDURING AND EVOLVING

U.S. Southern Command is responsible for conducting military operations and promoting security cooperation in Central America, the Caribbean and South America in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. Successfully accomplishing this mission enhances the security and stability in the Western Hemisphere and ensures the forward defense of the United States.

The Americas, a home we share, is a strategically vital, culturally rich, and widely diverse and vibrant region. Since taking command 9 months ago, I have traveled extensively throughout the region and have witnessed the challenges facing regional leaders and their people. I have also learned that many of these challenges are shared by all of us. Although our Nations may at times disagree on political and economic matters, we are united by a common view that we can settle our problems through negotiated agreements. This view provides the key for security for our citizens and requires a steadfast dedication to protecting our fundamental liberties and defending our common commitment to maintaining democracy and the rule of law.

International commerce and trade between the United States and Latin American and Caribbean countries is strong, and experts forecast this growth to continue. The Western Hemisphere is the United States' largest market with nearly 38 percent of U.S. trade travelling north and south, equating to \$1.5 trillion.<sup>1</sup> We obtain more crude oil imports—52 percent—from this region than from the Persian Gulf, which only provides 13 percent.<sup>2</sup> The Panama Canal is paramount in strategic and economic importance as nearly two-thirds of ships transiting the Canal are going to or coming from a U.S. port, carrying 16 percent of U.S. trade; expansion of the Canal is expected to almost double the capacity to approximately 600 million tons a year.<sup>3</sup> The Commerce Department reports the overall sum of U.S. foreign direct investment in the hemisphere (minus Canada) is 17.8 percent of our total foreign direct investment worldwide. Further, 10 of the 17 U.S. Free Trade Agreements are with countries in the Americas. In terms of percentage, our total foreign direct investment in the hemisphere (including Canada) equals our direct investment in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, combined. Additionally, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) studies estimate \$42.3 billion in remittances flowed from the U.S. to the region in 2009, slightly more than two-thirds of the IADB's estimated worldwide total of remittances.<sup>4</sup> Economic partnerships are strong today, and according to Commerce Department and World Trade Organization data, by 2011, U.S. trade with Latin America is expected to exceed trade with Europe and Japan.

In addition to demographic and economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean, we share social and political views rooted in a common commitment to democracy, freedom, justice and respect for human rights. Compared to three decades ago when the form of government in the majority of these countries was nondemocratic, most nations in the region now subscribe to democracy and agree that free governments should be accountable to their people in order to govern effectively.

We are fortunate to share similar main languages and interwoven cultures. Although there are many different dialects, people of the region use four primary languages: English, Spanish, Portuguese and French. While the United States is thought of as a primarily English-speaking nation, we are also the fifth largest Spanish speaking country in the world. Our significant cultural ties will grow stronger in the decades ahead, as by 2050, the number of people in the United States citing Hispanic heritage will comprise approximately 30 percent of the total U.S. population.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the constant ebb and flow of political tides in this hemisphere, U.S. Southern Command has been fortunate to maintain strong professional relationships with our military and security force counterparts in almost every nation in

<sup>1</sup> Economic Interdependence 2008 Trade Figures ([www.census.gov/foreign-trade](http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade)). ~38 percent to Western Hemisphere versus ~31 percent to PACRIM and ~21 percent to Europe.

<sup>2</sup> Energy Information Administration ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)) Aug 2009 Figures: More than 52 percent from Western Hemisphere (incl CAN and MEX), 30 percent from LATAM (incl MEX), 19 percent from AOR, versus 13 percent from Persian Gulf.

<sup>3</sup> Panama Canal Authority ([www.pancanal.com](http://www.pancanal.com)) 5 percent of world trade transits the canal/ 16 percent of U.S. trade transits the canal, two thirds ships transiting Panama Canal are going to/from U.S. ports.

<sup>4</sup> Inter-American Development Bank, Press Release, Migrant Remittances, October 18, 2009, December 7, 2009, <http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/articledetail.cfm?Language=En2&artType+PR&artid=3348>.

<sup>5</sup> Source: Pew Research Center, U.S. Population Projections: 2005–2050: February 2008.

the region. We engage with these nations continuously during peacetime through numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises, conferences, and other training engagements designed to prepare for the host of challenges that may confront us. Regional partnerships with and among our partner forces directly enhance hemispheric security and stability, as evidenced by the outstanding professional teamwork and unity of effort displayed by the region's militaries as part of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Operation Unified Response.

In addition to our more than 20 large-scale joint and combined exercises annually, we host and sponsor hundreds of unit and individual exchanges, and assist with arrangements for approximately 5,000 students from Latin America and the Caribbean who attend U.S. military schools and training sessions throughout the region. Future senior military leaders interact with U.S. military personnel at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Inter-American Defense College, and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy. The camaraderie developed and the school's strong emphasis on democratic values and respect for human rights contribute to the professionalization of military establishments who are subordinate to civilian control and capable of effective combined operations.

Despite the number of enduring linkages we share with our neighbors in the region, we are also in a period of profound strategic change. Globalization has enabled nations, non-state actors, multilateral institutions and nongovernmental organizations to affect—both positively and negatively—the condition of millions throughout our region and across the globe. Our world is shrinking. The Atlantic and Pacific oceans are not the borders or barriers they once were. There are multiple approaches in several domains—including, increasingly, cyberspace—by which adversaries can enter the United States. At U.S. Southern Command, we remain committed to helping achieve hemispheric security by developing and maintaining strong partnerships to meet the dynamic and uncertain future.

#### CHALLENGES

The nations within our area of responsibility are largely at peace with one another and have formally foresworn the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Military spending on a per capita basis remains lower in Latin America and the Caribbean than anywhere else in the world. The likelihood of conventional 20th century military threats also remains low for the foreseeable future. However, we do face nontraditional challenges that threaten security and stability throughout the hemisphere.

These challenges are multiple and complex and include a broad and growing spectrum of public security threats, the possibility of natural and manmade disasters, and an emerging class of issues, such as those relating to the environment. More specifically, illicit trafficking, transnational terrorism, crime, gangs and the potential spread of WMD pose the principal security challenges within the region, none of which fall to DOD to take the lead in confronting. Most of these issues, in turn, are fueled by the endemic and underlying conditions of poverty, income inequality and corruption. Thus, our primary focus is on doing what we can to support other agencies of our government and our partner nations as they confront these problems and try to prevent them from becoming issues that require the military to address.

#### *Poverty and Income Inequality*

Perhaps the single factor contributing most to unrest, insecurity and instability in our region is the pervasive nature of poverty. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in 2009, the number of people living in poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean—defined as living on less than \$2 a day—rose for the first time in 6 years, increasing by 1.1 percent over the previous year, from 180 million to 189 million people, or just over 34 percent of the population. The number of truly destitute—those living in extreme poverty, defined as living on less than \$1 a day—increased from 71 to 76 million. That is an additional 9 million people living in poverty and 5 million living in extreme poverty. These figures illustrate in very real terms the enormous challenges faced by our partner nations and neighbors in the region. Coupled with this poverty is a disparity in income levels that is, according to the World Bank, the most unequal subregion in the world. The richest 10 percent of the Latin American population earns 48 percent of the region's income, 30 times the percentage of the poorest 10 percent, which earns 1.6 percent.

Areas with lower levels of economic investment, development, and growth can provide a breeding ground for illicit trafficking, other related criminal activities, and the full range of terrorism. Impoverished citizens, with little trust in their govern-

ments or hope for a better life, are easy prey for illicit traffickers, terrorist organizations and political demagogues. They provide fertile soil in which international criminals and terrorists can recruit, take root, and flourish, thus directly undermining State sovereignty, threatening public safety, and contributing to rising regional instability.

#### *Illicit trafficking*

The confluence of money, power, and the ability to breach the integrity of national borders makes the illicit trafficking problem a significant security challenge for nations throughout the Americas. Border insecurity, increased violence, public fear, corruption, weakening support for democratic institutions, and heavily burdened local, county, and State agencies are the by-products of this illegitimate and criminal activity, which is estimated to cost legitimate economies more than \$245 billion annually. Furthermore, the same routes and networks by which illicit traffickers smuggle 1,250–1,500 metric tons of cocaine per year around the region, could be used wittingly or unwittingly to smuggle weapons, cash, fissile material or terrorists. As a threat to our homeland and the long-term stability of the region, illicit trafficking is of critical concern as it provides a possible nexus for transnational terrorism and the potential proliferation of WMD.

Internal and cross-border—via air, land and/or sea—trafficking in drugs, weapons, human beings, money and terrorists poses a threat to every nation's security and stability. Revenue from illicit trafficking has weakened state structures throughout the region, subverted the rule of law, and ripped apart the fabric of social order. I am particularly troubled by the progressively negative impact of these activities on the Caribbean and Central America regions. As progress in Colombia continues, air and maritime interdiction efforts are increasingly effective, and the Government of Mexico continues to apply pressure to drug trafficking organizations, these traffickers are being progressively squeezed out of their previous operating locations. This resultant “balloon effect” causes the trafficking organizations to seek safe havens in “undergoverned spaces” like the Petén in Guatemala, the Miskito Coast in Honduras and Nicaragua, and the Darién regions in Panama. Similarly, our Caribbean neighbors are also seeing an increase and return of illicit trafficking organization presence in their territories, particularly the island of Hispaniola. The governments and institutions in these countries contend with the onslaught of violence, instability and insecurity associated with illicit trafficking as best they can, but they do not yet possess the capability or capacity to do so without help.

Underlying all this is the illegal narcotics industry. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, 31,000 deaths in the United States each year are attributed directly to drug-induced causes. The demand for drugs in the United States remains strong and creates incentives for illegal activities. The Andean Ridge produces nearly all of the world's cocaine and it and Central America are increasingly providers of heroin consumed in the United States. Of the approximately 1200 metric tons of export quality cocaine that shipped from source countries in South America in 2009, approximately 60 percent of that was headed north, destined for the United States; in addition, we are seeing a growing amount (approximately 30 percent) heading to new and expanding markets in Europe and the Middle East, as evidenced by Spain becoming the world's largest per capita drug user.

This is not simply an issue of supply and demand for illegal narcotics, however. Traffic is bidirectional and equally congested in both lanes with contraband. As traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in the transit zones, transit nations become drug consumers as well. Brazil provides an illustration of how such an evolution can occur, as it is now the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world behind the U.S. While drugs and people tend to go out from the region, increasingly, we are seeing money, arms and technology/know-how (from communications gear to gangland tactics) flowing back into the region. This cycle has expanded to become more than a localized or even regional issue—it has become a global enterprise and thus requires a global strategy to countermand it. While partner nations are willing to work with us to develop regional approaches to counter the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics, effective and sustainable counter illicit trafficking operations severely test the capabilities and capacity of their thinly stretched forces. I see the illicit trafficking threat as a multi-faceted equation—demand, production, transit and finances—all supporting micro-markets of instability and violence.

The Drug Enforcement Administration estimates the illegal worldwide trafficking industry to be a \$394 billion per year industry. In addition to illegal narcotics, illicit human trafficking nets approximately \$32 billion per year; illegal arms smuggling nets roughly \$10 billion per year, and the exotic wildlife industry nets a surprising \$80 billion a year. Traffickers are constantly developing new means of preventing interference with their illegal activities. As we modify our tactics, drug producers

and traffickers find innovative methods to develop the drugs as well as alternative trafficking routes to transport them. The traffickers of yesterday have become much more lethal today, and this trend is expected to continue.

#### *Terrorism*

The blurring of the lines that used to separate terrorists from narcotics traffickers can be seen in groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. These entities define a category of “narco-terrorists” and they derive a majority of their funding and power from their involvement in the illicit drugs industry. These organizations and a number of extremely violent gangs have driven up the rates of homicide and kidnappings throughout the region and do not operate within traditional nation-state boundaries—they live among and terrorize the populace, and take advantage of ungoverned and undergoverned spaces without any regard or respect for national sovereignty.

As these two threat vectors merge into one new hybrid, so must our efforts to counter it. We thank Congress for providing the dedicated resources necessary for this mission and for working with us in the specific case of Colombia to authorize flexible funding sources that allow us to adapt and stay ahead with a blending of counterterrorism (CT) and counternarcotics (CN). This expanded authority and flexibility is essential to helping us rapidly address emerging capability gaps with our partners as the strategic situation continues to evolve. We now need to ensure that we have this authority in other areas as appropriate where we see this nexus potentially occurring, such as Peru.

#### *Crime and gangs*

A close corollary of the spread of illegal trafficking is the alarming growth of criminal violence in the region. Rising crime, coupled with corruption, exacerbates the conditions of poverty and inequality, hampering development efforts and reducing an already fragile economic growth environment. One out of every three homicides in the world takes place in our region, as does one out of every two kidnappings. According to United Nations data, Latin America and the Caribbean’s annual homicide rate is one of the highest in the world, with more than 27 homicides per 100,000 people—murder now ranks as one of the five main causes of death in several Central American countries. Central America is the region with the highest levels of non-political crime worldwide, with an average murder rate of 33 per 100,000 inhabitants last year, three times greater than the global average, according to the UN Development Program (UNDP) Report on Human Development in Central America 2009–2010. These reports all emphasize the toll—both human and economic—of insecurity, violence and crime on the day-to-day decisions of the population, making insecurity a clear impediment to development and a destabilizing element for many nations in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in recent surveys of the region, delinquency and lack of personal security rank as the top social ill for the majority of countries.<sup>6</sup>

The growing presence and influence of gangs contributes to rising crime rates and severely challenges personal security in many areas. In Central America, Jamaica, and major cities in Brazil, gangs are infecting society’s ability to provide basic functions and necessities, and are thus becoming a significant security priority. The overall gang population is estimated to reach into the hundreds of thousands, primarily filling their ranks with disenfranchised youth. According to a comprehensive study conducted by the National Public Security Council in El Salvador in 2008, violent crime cost the five countries examined a combined \$6.5 billion, equivalent to 7.7 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).<sup>7</sup> The GDP losses to crime came at the expense of government investment in social services like spending on development, infrastructure, public safety and education. Increasingly, the threat posed by gangs reaches beyond Latin America and the Caribbean—the more sophisticated

<sup>6</sup>Latinobarómetro.

<sup>7</sup>Los Costos Económicos de la Violencia en Centroamérica (The Economic Cost of Violence in Central America), El Salvador, 2008, pp. 13–14. In 2008, the National Public Security Council of the Salvadoran presidency’s office commissioned a study compiling the excess direct spending and losses caused by violence in five Central American countries in four areas, namely: increased health care; increased government spending for crime prevention, law enforcement and justice; spending on private security; and, material losses from crime. This landmark analysis found that in 2006, violent crime cost the combined States \$6.5 billion—equivalent to 7.7 percent of GDP. Though all nations suffered significant losses, the total cost of violence varied between countries: \$2.9 billion in Guatemala (7.7 percent GDP); \$2.01 billion in El Salvador (10.8 percent GDP); \$885 million in Honduras (9.6 percent GDP); \$790 million in Costa Rica (3.6 percent GDP); and, \$529 million in Nicaragua (10.0 percent GDP).

groups operate regionally and even globally with deep reach back into the United States from California to Washington, DC, and increasingly into Europe.

The compounded effects of urban violence and transnational gangs are an undeniable threat to our national security and to the larger long-term security and stability of the region. The Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) each have programs that fit together to augment the efforts of the Nations most affected by youth violence. In each case, U.S. Southern Command closely coordinates with and supports the lead Federal agency and the U.S. Ambassador; at the same time, we continue working arm-in-arm with partner nation military and security forces in the region to build the necessary capabilities to enable them to provide their own national security and be able to provide responsible support to civilian authorities when required.

#### *Competitive Marketplace*

Because of globalization and its inherent empowerment of new actors, the United States can no longer take for granted that our way of life is the sole ideology of choice in this region. We must now actively compete to ensure our message is accurately transmitted and received by the appropriate audience. Populism, socialism and democracy are all now prevalent ideas within the region. Money, trade, and other interaction from expanding players like China, Russia and Iran exist in Latin America and the Caribbean. We are also beginning to see a renewed polarization in the region. All of these factors combine to form a competitive marketplace of ideas, within which nontraditional actors have become very adept at operating.

To compete in this venue, we engage proactively and counter anti-U.S. messaging with persistent demonstrations of our goodwill, competence and professionalism. We convey the strength of our ideas in both words and deeds by training and working with our regional partners to improve security, provide humanitarian assistance, and respond to disasters. We remain engaged in this marketplace through dialogue and open discussion with partners within the region as well as players external to our AOR.

China's evolving relationship with Latin America through a growing number of linkages and longer-term investments is impacting the strategic landscape in the region and further emphasizes the interconnectedness of the 21st century. According to the International Monetary Fund, total bilateral trade between China (excluding Hong Kong) and Latin America has risen from \$39.3 billion in 2004 to almost \$147 billion in 2008. China is already the second largest user of the Panama Canal. The rapid growth of China's trade with Latin America and the Caribbean shows the likelihood China could become an enduring part of the economic landscape of the Americas.

We have also noticed a marked increase in military-to-military and technology-based relations between China, Russia, Iran, and the region. China is conducting more military training and educational exchanges, entering into a larger number of technology transfers agreements, and selling sophisticated defensive military items such as air surveillance radars and military aircraft. China is also finding new areas for cooperation in the commercial space sector as seen in the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite program. Russia has followed suit, with arms sales and a naval tour of the Caribbean. Russia has publicly stated that improving relations with Latin America is a top priority, focused primarily on Cuba and then Venezuela. They have also increased their outreach to other countries in the region as evidenced by signing a military and scientific bilateral agreement with Peru, offering increased support to Bolivia's counter-narcotics operations, and seeking a Free Trade Agreement with Chile.

Iran, too, is strengthening its ties to the region, focusing primarily on Venezuela, while developing relationships with other nations, as evidenced by opening 11 new embassies with a 12th expected to open in the Caribbean later this year. Iran's trade activities have thus far focused on infrastructure development, medical exchanges, agriculture, mining and the oil industry. Finally, a Trade Memoranda of Understanding between Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela since 2005 has now surpassed \$7 billion.

As we face this complex, dynamic and continually evolving security environment at Southern Command, we are constantly reminded that achieving our desired end state of secure stable, democratic and prosperous States throughout the Americas requires a wide variety of tool sets beyond pure military activity. We continue to look for creative ways to approach partnerships throughout the region. We seek innovative ways to organize, plan, train, and operate; to adapt new technology to ever-changing challenges; and to communicate, including how we describe and frame our challenges both with our partners and with the public in general.

## STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK: INITIATIVES, EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS

Our strategic approach is balanced and prioritized—confronting the most pressing and probable threats to the Nation today, while at the same time, posturing the joint, combined and multinational force to prevent, and if necessary, defeat the most consequential threats to tomorrow. We take a regional, global, and long-term view of our strategic environment, our objectives, and the implications for strategic risk. It is imperative we remain capable of executing our plans, while still engaging throughout the region at the appropriate levels: building, complementing or enhancing, as appropriate, partner capability and capacity; improving international and interagency cooperation; and, fostering both security and stability.

As we confront the considerable range of challenges before us in our AOR, we continually ensure coordination across multiple levels in more than one agency and in more than one nation. This is a prerequisite for any project, exercise, initiative or operation within our region: each issue needs to be assessed as part of an interconnected and unified strategy. For example, the illicit trafficking issue cannot be adequately addressed in isolation from issues of illegal narcotics, migration, arms trafficking, money-laundering, and radical ideological terrorists. Furthermore, our strategic approach is based on the affirmation of common values held throughout the hemisphere: democracy, liberty, and human rights.

In terms of military-to-military contact, Latin America and the Caribbean represent many opportunities of U.S. engagement. We have witnessed numerous positive results from nontraditional approaches to partnering that integrate talents and capabilities from foreign and domestic, military and civilian, public and private sector entities. These efforts may be relatively low visibility, but they have a huge impact on U.S. military and partner nation military and security force readiness, particularly when they are accomplished in a consistent and enduring manner. We pursue a host of programs in support of other lead agencies and government entities to include numerous training exercises, educational programs, technology sharing, intelligence sharing, security procurement assistance, humanitarian aid, among others. Our evolving engagement strategy commits us to build or enhance the security capability of our military counterparts and to expand the capacity for all of us to work together. Joint, international, interagency, and public-private is the essence of everything we do.

#### *Joint Interagency Task Force-South*

At the tactical and operational level within U.S. Southern Command, a model for this regional engagement and international and interagency coordination is Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) located in Key West, FL. JIATF-South exists to spearhead the effort to fight one of the most pressing challenges facing the region—illicit trafficking—with an acknowledged potential nexus with narco-terrorism. This interagency task force, which celebrated 20 years of excellence last year, is led by a U.S. Coast Guard Rear Admiral and is comprised of truly amazing individuals from all 4 branches of the military, 14 different agencies, and 13 partner nations. This group, beyond doubt, is a team: a joint, interagency, international, combined and allied team—a creative and innovative body that defines “synergy”, the blending of experience, professionalism and knowledge being greater than the sum of its individual parts.

JIATF-South continues to make incredible headway, producing extraordinary results every year. For example: JIATF-South’s joint operating area (JOA) covers nearly 42 million square miles, almost 21 percent of the Earth’s surface; in the 20 years it has been conducting operations in this region, 2,500 metric tons of cocaine have been seized, 705,000 pounds of marijuana interdicted, 4,600 traffickers arrested, 1,100 vessels captured, and a grand total of approximately \$195 billion taken out of the pockets of the drug cartels. They have accomplished these results while possessing zero assets of their own—every aircraft and vessel involved with detection, monitoring, interdiction and apprehension is allocated through the Department of Defense Global Force Management process, Department of Homeland Security Statement of Intent, and International contributions that place the assets under tactical control (TACON) of JIATF-South, which can be recalled by their service provider or operational control (OPCON) authority if unexpected circumstances warrant, such as Haiti relief efforts, search and rescue (SAR), or other national interests. In 2009, JIATF-South had TACON of USCG, USN, and international ships for a total of 2,915 on-station days, equating to an approximately 8.0 surface asset laydown on any given day within the JIATF-South JOA. Similarly, JIATF-South had TACON of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), USCG, DOD and international long range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) for a total of 9,446 on-station hours, equating to an approximately 3.0 air asset laydown on any given day within the

JIATF-South JOA. Based on JIATF-South's analysis, a 14.0 surface asset laydown and a 5.0 air asset laydown are required to meet the National Interdiction goal of 40 percent.

In addition to the need for organic surface and air assets, additional challenges that restrict JIATF-South from realizing their full effectiveness include: policy limitations on the amount and degree of intelligence and other data that can be shared with partner agencies and nations; structural and technological hurdles in situational awareness, particularly Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA); and, an unequal level of "end game" capabilities present in the military and security forces in the AOR. Still, in 2009, JIATF-South was responsible for greater than 61 percent of all global transit zone seizures and disruptions, and 45 percent of all cocaine seizures in the world; additionally, they were responsible for the interdiction of 226 metric tons of cocaine, equivalent to a net \$4.5 billion loss for the cartels and traffickers. While doing all this, JIATF-South set the benchmark for workplace quality in a recent organizational study.<sup>8</sup> This kind of success demands total commitment from the entire organization—inspirational leadership, complete integration, collaboration and partnership which exists at every level throughout the command. JIATF-South is the standard for integrating and synchronizing "whole of government", "whole of nation", and "whole of many nations" solutions in confronting challenges to our national and shared regional security.

#### *Exercises*

Southern Command is committed to being a good partner—more to the point, we want to be the enduring partner of choice throughout the region. Day in and day out, year after year, we dedicate the majority of our resources toward strengthening the security capabilities of our partners, while working to encourage an environment of cooperation among all the Nations in the region. We conduct frequent and wide-ranging multinational exercises and international exchanges with our partners, send thousands of partner military and civilian experts to various leading academic institutions, and provide other critical security assistance to our friends in the region. All these activities focus on strengthening regional bonds and enhancing collective capabilities we believe are integral to U.S. national security and stability in the Western Hemisphere as a whole. These exercises focus on confronting regional threats such as maritime insecurity, terrorism, illicit trafficking, and illegal migration, while also increasing partner nation ability to support peacekeeping, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. The fruit of these labors can be seen in the overwhelmingly positive and unified response in Haiti.

#### *Panamax, Unitas, and Fuerzas Comando*

Building confidence, capability, and cooperation within our AOR is essential to confronting today's security challenges. Our exercise Fuerzas Aliadas (Allied Forces) Panamax has matured over the last 7 years and has become one of our flagship programs as well as the world's largest multinational and multi-agency training exercise. Panamax focuses on improving the hemisphere's ability to provide air, sea and land forces to assist the government of Panama in its excellent work of securing the Panama Canal and defending it from traditional and non-traditional threats. The exercise began in 2003 as a limited naval exercise with just three participating nations: Panama, Chile, and the United States. Due to past successes and efforts to expand partnerships, the exercise has grown to include a roster of more than 20 nations, several U.S. Government departments and agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and multiple military branches of Service.

Another large-scale exercise we support that emphasizes such cooperation and integration is Unitas, which trains participating forces to ensure maximum interoperability in future coalition operations. We hosted the 50th iteration and celebration in Jacksonville in May 2009. Seven thousand international sailors and mariners participated, including personnel from Canada and Germany, making it the longest running multinational maritime training exercise in the world.

Shortly afterward, U.S. Southern Command hosted Counter Terrorism Exercise Fuerzas Comando in Brazil in 2009. This unique exercise consisting of 21 partner nations involved a competition in counterterrorism (CT) skills by the elite CT units in the region as well as bringing together civilian counterterrorism leadership from each of the countries to exchange ideas on training and complementary evolutions. Exercises like Panamax, Unitas, and Fuerzas Comando provide excellent forums for military-to-military relationship building and I thank Congress for providing the flexibility in my Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement funds that allow us

<sup>8</sup> 2009 Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) Organizational Climate Survey: JIATF-South surpassed the national average in every category (13 of 13).

to execute these kinds of exercises, as well as the funds designed to assist the participation of the developing countries within our AOR.

*Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief*

While our programs and initiatives focus primarily on security, increasingly our approach has broadened to support stability efforts as part of a larger national path to true partnering and engagement in the Western Hemisphere. A key element of these efforts is a variety of humanitarian goodwill activities that directly help those in need while providing needed training to our team. These engagement missions range from planned events such as the construction and/or refurbishment of wells, schools, community centers and medical facilities to rapid response missions in the wake of disasters.

In 2009, as part of our annual operation Continuing Promise, USNS *Comfort* returned to our waters with the mission to bring short-term modern medical care, provide preventive medicine engagement, and conduct long-term medical training and education. With over 100,000 patient encounters, 1,600 surgeries performed, 135,000 pharmacies dispensed, 13,000 animals treated and 37,000 students trained, we were able to engage on a scale previously unimaginable just 4 years ago. In 2010, through Continuing Promise in combination with our Medical Readiness and Dental Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs and DENTRETEs, respectively), we hope to surpass the '1 million patient treatments' mark since the inception of this program.

The impact of Continuing Promise on the Host Nations has been greater than just numbers, however; the types of procedures performed and training conducted speak to the long-term positive effects on society and citizen security as our joint, combined and integrated crews focused on hysterectomies, thyroids, cataract removals, and education on disease prevention. The impact has been more than just the USNS *Comfort*, as well. On the engineering side for example, Construction Battalions (Sea-Bees) personnel repaired and improved five hospitals and clinics; provided refurbishments to seven schools; and renovated one baseball field. Additionally, in direct support of existing USAID projects, USNS *Comfort* personnel assisted in a laboratory completion in the Dominican Republic and assisted in dock repairs in Panama that buttressed a USAID eco-tourism project.

Access to health care is a critical component of security and stability and the *Comfort's* mission is only one of many medical outreach efforts. As mentioned previously, U.S. Southern Command also sponsors MEDRETEs and DENTRETEs, consisting of military medical teams that treat over a quarter of a million patients annually in the region, focusing primarily on needy rural, isolated populations. These unique training exercises have had tremendous impact inland throughout the AOR over 75 separate locations—changing lives, providing alternative perceptions, and spreading goodwill through quality donated medical assistance. In 2009, 89 MEDRETEs were conducted in 18 countries, treating over 220,000 patients, performing almost 1,200 surgeries and inoculating and treating more than 31,000 animals. More than just a medical deployment, these humanitarian assistance missions have also provided dental care to approximately 50,000 patients, conducted medical training for almost 60,000 host nation students and medical providers, and sponsored over 40 construction and restoration projects at local schools and health care facilities. These visits also extended veterinarian services throughout their journeys, treating and vaccinating thousands of animals, which constitute the livelihood of many families.

Throughout the year, U.S. Southern Command's Humanitarian Assistance Program augments traditional military-to-civilian engagement activities in order to increase our partner nations' ability to respond independently to natural and man-made disasters. New Horizons (Andean Ridge) and Beyond the Horizons (Caribbean and Central Americas) are a series of joint and combined humanitarian assistance exercises that U.S. Southern Command conducts with Latin American and Caribbean nations to provide readiness training for U.S. Engineer, Medical, and Combat Service Support units, but also provide great benefit to the host nation. Each exercise lasts several months and usually takes place in remote areas. We strive to combine these efforts with those of host nation doctors and civic personnel. Our programs help local populations who can benefit from completed projects such as schools, clinics, community centers, orphanages, emergency operations centers, disaster response warehouses, wells, and potable water systems. In 2009, we conducted these exercises in 6 countries in the AOR, supporting the renovation, construction, and repair on 12 schools, 2 community centers, 4 health clinics, 3 water wells, 2 sports complexes, 2 road repairs, and 1 pedestrian bridge, in addition to providing critical training programs for first responders, disaster managers, firefighters, and disaster warehouse managers.

These examples of our consistent and enduring engagement throughout the region further advance our strategic messaging and help build confidence, capability, and goodwill in numerous countries in the region, bring renewed hope to those enduring hardship and challenging conditions, and serve as a visible and lasting counterweight to anti-U.S. messaging. The cumulative effects of our humanitarian assistance missions have directly and indirectly touched and bettered the lives of several hundred thousand throughout our shared home, as well as laying the foundation for relationships and experience that pays large dividends when the United States responds to a humanitarian crisis in the region ... as we did and are still doing in Haiti.

#### HAITI—OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE

On January 12, the nation of Haiti experienced a 7.0 magnitude earthquake with an epicenter located approximately 10 miles WSW of its capital city, Port au Prince. The size and destructive capability of this temblor was made even worse by several contributing factors, namely: the earthquake was relatively shallow, making the shockwaves much more pronounced; the capital city was overcrowded and over-developed with construction standards inconsistently applied and loosely enforced; and, much of Haiti was still recovering from a string of three hurricanes and one tropical storm that struck during a 23-day period in the summer of 2008. It had been almost 150 years since an earthquake of this magnitude had struck Haiti and the devastation was tremendous. Latest U.N. estimates indicate over 222,517 people were killed, 300,000 injured, and 1.2 million displaced by the earthquake and the 59 subsequent aftershocks. Thirteen of the 15 government ministry buildings were completely destroyed. Between 40–50 percent of all buildings sustained significant damage in Port au Prince and surrounding villages, with some suffering as much as 80 percent damage as in Leogane. The airport control tower was rendered inoperable and more than half the seaport was left in ruins. Later that night, the President of Haiti declared a national state of emergency and in doing so, requested the United States assist in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief aid. The U.S. Ambassador to Haiti responded by issuing a disaster declaration, confirming the situation warranted U.S. Government assistance.

The U.S. response was swift and comprised of Federal, State, military, and civilian agencies and units. There were several DOD and U.S. Government assets already in the vicinity of Haiti. Just before dawn the next morning, 13 January, the USCG Cutter *Forward* arrived off the coast of Haiti, established a liaison with the Haitian Coast Guard facility at Killick to conduct damage assessments, set up critical command and control procedures, and began providing humanitarian assistance, helping the most seriously wounded, and evacuating injured American citizens. Shortly thereafter, two USCG C-130 aircraft also arrived to support U.S. relief efforts.

At 10:20 that morning, President Obama expressed “the deep condolences and declared the unwavering support of the American people” and ordered a “swift, coordinated and aggressive effort to save lives” with USAID designated as the Lead Federal Agency. During the course of the day, an Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) assessment team landed in Port au Prince to survey the airport while elements of the First Special Operations Wing arrived to reopen Port au Prince International Airport. A U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft from the Cooperative Security Location of Comalapa, El Salvador, conducted the first U.S. aerial reconnaissance of the area affected by the earthquake. DOD officials ordered the aircraft carrier USS *Carl Vinson* and USS *Bataan* Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (22nd MEU) embarked to make best speed to Haiti. The first U.S. urban search and rescue team, a 72-member unit from Fairfax County, VA, arrived in Haiti before even 24 hours had elapsed.

Later that day U.S. Southern Command deployed two planeloads of personnel from our Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJFHQ) element, an organic, free-standing, deployable joint military headquarters, which included experts in the field of engineering, operational planners, communications specialists, medicine, inter-agency coordination, and a command and control group. They arrived and began coordinating with the U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince, as well as United Nations and other international personnel who were leading the initial recovery efforts. In addition, this core team began conducting assessments of damage and determining areas where the unique capabilities of the military could rapidly be brought to bear in support of the Government of Haiti.

On 14 January, the size and scope of DOD’s response grew as more forces flowed to the assistance and relief effort. Four more USCG Cutters and the USS *Higgins* arrived off shore. Throughout the day, P-3s continued aerial reconnaissance. An en-

gineering assessment team arrived and determined the pier and wharf at Port au Prince port were inoperable for movement of bulk stores. Later that night, the Secretary of Defense ordered the USS *Nassau* ARG with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24th MEU) embarked, the XVIII Airborne Corps, 2nd Brigade Combat Team 82nd Airborne Division, and the hospital ship USNS *Comfort* to deploy to Haiti. As elements of these assets and others arrived over the course of the next 4 days, they formed the core of DOD's overall contribution to the massive humanitarian assistance mission—providing unique capabilities and an initial surge capacity in what became our primary lines of operation: security, critical engineering, medical and logistics. To organize the response of the military forces, we established Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H) under the command of my Deputy, Lieutenant General Keen, who was already on the ground in Haiti for previously scheduled meetings.

The mission of JTF-H was to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) in support of U.S. Government efforts in Haiti, in order to mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate recovery. We would not have been able to perform this mission to the level of success we have achieved if not for the more than 500 augmentees we requested and received from every other geographic combatant command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation Command, the Services, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The General and Flag Officers, Action Officers and civilian personnel we received were immediately value-added and were instrumental in helping us develop well-coordinated planning efforts that translated into unity of effort on the ground. These personnel were also distributed to JTF-H in the form of planning staffs, the Joint Information Center (JIC), assessment teams, Joint Center Operational Analysis (JCOA) teams, and many other teams. The men and women of these contributing units have performed magnificently and been the very embodiment of teamwork and jointness across the Department of Defense. They have been outstanding representatives of your military with their professionalism, sense of urgency, focus and compassion. They continue to make all of us extremely proud.

#### *Security*

Apart from isolated looting incidents, small-scale crime and demonstrations which parallel the security environment prior to the earthquake, the situation in Haiti remains relatively calm. U.S. military personnel are engaged primarily with safeguarding humanitarian supplies and distribution networks in support of MINUSTAH, who has maintained a peacekeeping presence since 2004, comprised of primarily Latin American military forces under Brazilian leadership. They have been working with the Haitian government to provide security and build the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Our JTF Commander and the Brazilian MINUSTAH Commander have had an outstanding personal and professional relationship. This has permeated all levels of interaction and engagement between the two forces, alleviating many of the potential frictions that could arise from two parallel military command structures operating in the same vicinity. A division of labor was established whereby JTF-H military forces would provide local security for humanitarian assistance missions, while MINUSTAH and the HNP maintained overall responsibility for security in the country. To underscore the scope of responsibility, on 19 January, the U.N. Security Council authorized the expansion of MINUSTAH's force size by 2,000 military and 1,500 police personnel.

#### *Critical Engineering*

Initial assessment teams determined that although there was no physical damage to the airport runway, taxiway and field operations, the field was unusable because of no power and structural damage to the control tower. Similarly, a team of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers assessed the entire sea port at Port au Prince was unusable for large vessels, with buildings, cranes and piers damaged, and debris and containers in the water. The roads remained largely impassable except by motorcycle and foot traffic. Communication services in Haiti were severely degraded, with the power grid, radio, landline, and cellular telephone services working sporadically in pockets.

Assessments and emergency repairs continued throughout Haiti, but the primary focus of initial effort was the seaport in Port Au Prince. Haiti has other port facilities throughout the country, but due to proximity to the most affected areas and the depth of water, Port au Prince was critical to the relief efforts. The North pier was completely destroyed and the South pier, missing 700 feet, was determined to be non-operational. To address this requirement, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) immediately deployed Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO), a unit capable of port command and control and operations, followed closely by service

contributions in the form of Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS). The JLOTS capability consisted of boats, literage, cranes and crane ships allowing for rapid cargo offload at other locations within the harbor, thus overcoming the logistical hurdles caused by damage. TRANSCOM also contracted with marine engineering experts from Crowley Marine to begin installation of a combination of barges and cranes that would eventually restore operational capability to the port. Utilizing this combination of JLOTS and commercial capability, the seaport capacity exceeded pre-quake offload capacity by 22 January and steadily increased as additional over-the-shore assets arrived.

The current container per day capacity, based only on the in-place commercial capability, exceeds demand, thus enabling the GOH, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and USAID to manage flow based on the requirements on the ground while also enabling Haitian commercial capabilities to resume. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid Appropriation (OHDACA) funded repairs to the South Pier are underway, as are contracted removal of a gantry crane and other debris which had fouled the port during the earthquake. In addition, U.S. military engineer teams continue to assess critical infrastructure, including port facilities and piers, airfields, roads, bridges, water wells, and electrical grids to determine how best to assist repair and restore these essential needs. Future U.S. Southern Command-sponsored MEDRETEs, New Horizons and Beyond the Horizons medical, construction and engineering exercises will provide a consistent and continuing assistance to the Haitian people as part of our larger Theater Security Cooperation program.

#### *Medical*

The magnitude of the catastrophe necessitated the rapid deployment of military assets with sufficient medical capability to help alleviate suffering and save lives in the wake of the disaster. U.S. Southern Command responded by requesting the deployment of needed medical capability to Haiti. The USS *Carl Vinson* arrived on 15 January; the USS *Bataan* and JTF-B Forward Surgical Team (FST) on 18 January; the USNS *Comfort* on 20 January; and, the 24th Medical Group Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) on 24 January. USNS *Comfort* arrived on station just 6 days after the initial mobilization order; she and her nearly 1000 medical personnel—including medical and surgical teams from Project Hope, Operation Smile, Red Cross translators and support personnel, and medical schools around the U.S.—joined other DOD assets already on station to provide an immediate surge triage capability and 1400-plus bed capacity to help cope with the enormity of the task. We are fortunate to have worked with many of these professionals previously; they had come together to provide humanitarian assistance and preventative medical treatment and training as part of our annual Continuing Promise which visited Haiti in the summer of 2009 and will return to the many countries of the AOR during the summer of 2010. As of 28 February, DOD personnel were directly responsible for performing 964 total surgeries and treating 9,985 patients.

The GOH Ministry of Health initial priorities outlined to JTF-H were medical supplies and emergency/trauma medical care. Numerous field hospitals were established by international partners including Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Russia, Spain, and Turkey, in addition to the six Haitian hospitals that remained operational and another nine that were partially operational. Combined afloat and ashore medical professionals provided medical evacuation and care to thousands of injured Haitians daily and conducted hundreds of complex surgical procedures as part of the concerted international effort. The Program on Essential Medicine and Supplies (PROMESS) warehouse continues to be a key institution in post-earthquake Haiti. U.S. military medical logistics experts assisted in the initial setup and organization of PROMESS, which has now become a nerve center for distribution of supplies to healthcare facilities throughout Port au prince.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) supported USAID in its coordination of the U.S. medical and public health response and later activated the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) to facilitate the transfer of non-U.S. citizens to medical facilities in the United States. As of 28 February, 189 Haitian citizens in need of higher levels of care have been transferred via U.S. military aircraft to healthcare facilities within the United States. Despite initial fears, there was no indication of widespread communicable diseases and no report to indicate an imminent epidemic. Public health experts from the HHS Centers for Disease Control and Prevention continue to monitor health conditions related to water safety, food supply, shelter conditions and other health threats in order to prioritize immediate interventions aimed at preventing major health-related crises. The capability of off-shore medical treatment by our surface assets has largely been assumed by the

GoH, U.N. and nongovernmental organization expertise on the ground and we anticipate being able to release these assets in the near future.

#### *Logistics*

Joint Task Force-Haiti, in support of the lead Federal agency, USAID, focused on expanding and securing aid distribution networks to speed delivery of relief supplies to the Haitian people. With the port damaged, the only means of initially flowing relief supplies in—and evacuating U.S. citizens and eligible family members, orphans, and medical patients out—was through the Port au Prince airport. Although the control tower was destroyed, the runway was intact. We therefore immediately requested specialized capabilities to rapidly open the airport to receive relief supplies, equipment, personnel, and forces. This included the combat controllers of the 720th Special Operations Group who were on the ground within 26 hours of the earthquake, providing critical Air Traffic Control capabilities as well as directing ramp operations. From zero inbound traffic hours after the quake, these battlefield Airmen had the airport back operating at 60 flights per day within 72 hours, approximately triple the normal capacity before the earthquake. These specialists worked all-day, all-night, and in all weather conditions ... and they did all this without any radar. The special operators were followed closely by aviation elements from TRANSCOM as part of their JTF-PO deployment. To meet the tremendous demand, we also worked with the government of the Dominican Republic and opened additional air and sea ports of entry within their territory and contracted commercial carriers to move supplies and equipment overland from these airfields into Haiti.

Working with Haitian aviation administration officials, JTF-H personnel established the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center which constructed a phone, then web-based, system for flight slot allocation scheduling. This greatly increased our scheduling efficiency and tracking effectiveness, quickly bringing the airfield to a 120–140 flights per day average. The total number of flights eventually began a steady decline at the airport as demand decreased and efforts to reopen the seaport steadily progressed to eventually exceeding pre-quake delivery capacity. Today the majority of flights are being controlled by Haitian air traffic controllers. On 18 February, we safely and successfully evacuated the last of 16,412 U.S. citizens and eligible family members, perhaps the largest ever peacetime single evacuation of U.S. citizens. Beginning 19 February, commercial air service from American Airlines resumed with 3 daily flights between Haiti and the United States and twice a week Air France flights between Paris and Haiti. The return of service is a positive indicator of stability and signals to the international community that the situation is normalizing.

In addition to airlift assistance, elements of JTF-Haiti continue delivering supplies, equipment, and personnel. As of 26 February, DOD has distributed 2,292,431 meals and 2,615,888 bottles of water, in addition to assisting in expanding and securing aid distribution networks to speed delivery of relief supplies to the Haitian people. The demand for JTF assistance in the distribution of supplies has dropped significantly as the capacity of the U.N., USAID, and nongovernmental organizations has increased. Our personnel continue to coordinate with USAID and OCHA to define areas in which U.S. military support is required.

Under the leadership of the GoH, the WFP began a targeted and systematic food distribution effort using predetermined distribution locations. In consultation with the GoH and interested stakeholders, 16 different sites around the capital were identified to serve as fixed distribution points, instead of attempting to deliver to different settlements throughout the city. U.S. military forces from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 22nd and 24th MEUs worked closely with MINUSTAH forces and Haitian National Police personnel to ensure locations, routes and distribution of aid was calm, orderly and without incident. In total, the program provided humanitarian assistance (in quantities of 15-day rations) to approximately 9,000 families per site, per day. The initial 14-day operation was a large success in establishing a sustainable and predictable food distribution program that reached over 2.9 million Haitians, exceeding their original goal by almost 1 million people. WFP's Food Surge 7-day Phase 1B concluded on 20 February with an estimated 19,000 families reached. The WFP estimates that the Port-au-Prince area consumes 16–20 metric tons of rice per month. Through the combined efforts of the U.N., USAID, eight nongovernmental organizations, and U.S. forces, the surge was able to provide approximately two-thirds of the rice needed in the Port-au-Prince area for the past 30 days. The WFP began their current phase of operations on 6 March and has stated no U.S. military presence or other support was needed, as MINUSTAH and HNP personnel would be utilized exclusively.

### *Overall Assessment*

It has been 2 months since the earthquake and signs of recovery are emerging. The massive outpouring of international relief efforts, with strong support from Latin America and Caribbean countries, has not only sped up the recovery but also enabled the building of a better Haiti. The overall security situation remains stable and continues to improve, with only sporadic incidents of small-scale violence occurring. MINUSTAH forces, in conjunction with a revitalized Haitian National Police force, have a presence throughout the country with specific emphasis on historical hot spots like Cite Soleil and other areas in and around Port au Prince.

Consistent and predictive aid distribution remains the single-most important factor in maintaining the relatively calm security situation. The immediate needs of food and water have been replaced by the more enduring stability requirements of adequate shelter and proper sanitation, particularly as the rainy season approaches. Infrastructure repairs have begun and are primarily being carried out by civilian engineering experts under contract, like the arrangement between Crowley Marine and the National Port Authority (APN). Beginning 25 February, Crowley brought their own temporary barge, placed it in the inner harbor, and then the following day the *M/V Crowley Shipper* delivered 50 foot sections to be used as ramps. On 27 February, APN Blue—the Crowley temporary next to the north pier of Port au Prince achieved initial operational capability (IOC) for the first time since the earthquake. As a result of such relief efforts, airport and seaport commerce are returning to pre-earthquake or higher levels of business. From all sources, there are no indications an external mass migration is imminent.

Our original mission assigned to us was conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) in support of U.S. Government efforts in Haiti, in order to mitigate near term human suffering and accelerate recovery. As we near achievement of that mission, I am taking a broader look at how we will support the larger U.S. Government and U.N. through more traditional security cooperation means to sustain security and stability. Although we have made great strides, coordinated planning and on-going communications toward unity of effort remains a challenging task; these are critical enablers to ensuring the conditions are right for our transition. The Armed Forces will continue to execute the mission in support of USAID and the international community in providing humanitarian aid and disaster relief. We do not intend to leave a large military footprint, but we will continue to plan for and remain prepared to respond with a range of options to contingency situations, such as another natural disaster, which may necessitate a return to Haiti in the future.

When the appropriate conditions are met, we will effectively transition our relief efforts to other U.S. Government agencies, the U.N., and nongovernmental organizations, thereby demonstrating the ability to conduct an effective transfer of responsibility to civilian authority. The culture of cooperation, openness and transparency we have developed; the relationships we have built; and, the emphasis U.S. Southern Command has placed on partnering in the past few years have all paid a particularly high return on investment in Operation Unified Response, the largest humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mission ever conducted in this region. Haiti may serve as a rare unifying event, not only for the agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, but also for the Nations of this region—at the end of the day, we are all here for one reason: the people of Haiti.

Finally, I offer one personal observation: I have now made five different trips to Haiti—one before the earthquake and four since—and on each occasion, I continue to be amazed by the strength, courage and resiliency of the Haitian people. Their collective character is evident throughout this tragedy. This is a powerful display of stoic determination—accepting and enduring the reality of the present, while foreseeing, believing in and taking the first basic steps to ensure, the promise of a better future. The citizens of Haiti have shown themselves to be a proud, strong, and persevering people.

### REQUIREMENTS

Illegal trafficking, associated criminal activity, gangs, terrorist financing and recruitment, natural disasters—none of these recognize national sovereignty or stop at a nation's border. These challenges to collective security, stability and prosperity cannot be overcome by any one nation alone; they require transnational solutions. They cannot be overcome by the military alone; they require a truly integrated interagency, non-governmental organization and even private sector approach.

To that end, U.S. Southern Command works not only to build partner capability and capacity, but also to build strategically important cooperative security relationships throughout the region. Among the military and security forces in the region,

we focus on helping to build greater capability and capacity, as well as striving to improve our collective ability to plan, direct, and operate. Within the interagency community, we endeavor to enhance cooperation while advocating for our partner's greater capability and capacity at every opportunity. Finally, with the private sector, business community, and non-governmental organizations, we seek to leverage their skills and expertise to greatly improve our combined impact and effect.

#### *Supporting Interagency Partners*

While remaining fully ready for combat operations, diplomacy dominates so much of what we do, and development is a mandatory requisite feature of true, long-term stability and prosperity. We support our interagency partners who have the lead in addressing the significant illicit trafficking and crime challenges in the region. To that end, we support initiatives to increase the pool of resources available to our partner agencies who are the leads and experts in these arenas. As we engage and support the lead efforts of the State Department, USAID, DHS, Justice, and others in the field, we also lend our advocacy for increased resources for these agencies to more effectively deal with the endemic problems in the region, improve the capabilities of partner nations' police and law enforcement agencies, and strengthen judicial systems and institutions.

#### *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*

U.S. Southern Command has a continuous requirement for persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), defined as having the right asset able to observe and understand what is going on, especially in denied areas. Whether conducting CN/CT operations or large-scale foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, we need fast, flexible and properly vetted information that then becomes actionable intelligence and we pinpoint the locations where our forces and resources can do the most good—with sufficient time to get them there. However, this requires improved imagery intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor integration, signals intelligence, moving target indicators, layered ISR architecture and management tools, biometrics, counterintelligence and human collectors. The combined products create a common operating picture that can and needs to be shared with our partners and allies whenever possible. This requires, then, all-source synthesis-node sensor resource management. We continue to work with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and industry for innovative solutions to address additional ISR sources to gain improved situational awareness.

Throughout Operation Unified Response, ISR assets have been an invaluable resource. UAVs and other assets have provided outstanding situational awareness and early warning indicators in areas of potential violence, determining status of critical infrastructure, assessing gathering crowds, analyzing internally displaced person camps, determining traffic ability of lines of communication, and security at WFP distribution points. ISR assets have had a positive impact on decisionmaking by enabling the efficient use of scarce resources.

In particular, the information provided has assisted in placing only the necessary number of USAID and nongovernmental organization workers at distribution sites, scheduling the movement of supplies and personnel along the most efficient routes, and when and where to deploy security forces.

We conduct varied and diverse detection and monitoring operations that require a high state of readiness and a joint effort to link multi-intelligence collectors targeted against strategic, operational and tactical requirements. Expanding the melding of organic and national collection resources will improve operations and fulfill the ongoing requirement for continuous and persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). This effort requires the appropriate awareness systems, namely: unmanned aerial craft with rapid response and good transit and loiter capability; remote light detection and ranging for foliage penetration; high-speed, unmanned surface vessels for detection and identification to support maritime domain awareness; commercial satellite sensors with the ability to detect 'go-fast' boats; next generation 'over the horizon' radars; non-electro-optical imagery that enables change detection; and, novel applications of existing technology to facilitate cross-domain awareness.

#### *Continued Commitment to Colombia*

One of the most dramatic examples of U.S. Southern Command working to build partner nation capability and capacity in our AOR can be found in our enduring engagement through providing training, logistical, and technical support to the military and security forces of Colombia. Colombia is a strategic ally, an important friend, and a crucial anchor for security and stability in the region. Unfortunately, they are also the world's predominant source of cocaine and home to the narco-terrorist group the FARC.

Over the last 8 years, the Colombians have done a magnificent job of reclaiming their nation from both right-wing and left-wing illegal armed groups. Through its own military and whole-of-government efforts, and a steady stream of resources and support from the U.S., Colombia has made great strides towards building security and stability. Today, the approval rating of the democratically elected government led by President Uribe is just under 70 percent. The approval rating of the FARC, on the other hand, is less than 2 percent. Despite this dwindling public support, the FARC still maintains approximately 8,500 fighters in the field, down from approximately 18,000. They remain kidnappers, torturers, murderers, and drug dealers. This is essentially their 'business model' and they are unfortunately and definitively still in business.

The government's and military's efforts against the FARC have also significantly impacted drug cartels, as Colombia has extradited more than 900 drug traffickers to the United States. Although cocaine production is still a critical concern, interdiction and seizures of cocaine headed to the United States and to other destinations in the region and abroad, have more than doubled in the last 10 years. This increase indicates improved state control, successful government strategies, and overall better interagency and international coordination and collaboration. These efforts have helped contribute to the fastest sustained economic growth in a decade—greater than 5 percent annually from 2006–2008, providing a sense of positive momentum for the entire country.

We must now capitalize on the successes achieved thus far to ensure Colombia remains a long-term strategic regional and global partner. Continued U.S. commitment and support for the Colombian Armed Forces' campaign to defeat the FARC, as well as for Colombian interagency efforts to bring governance and economic opportunity to areas recaptured from the FARC, is essential. This support can come in many forms but should entail continued training and development of key capabilities we are seeing showcased in their cooperation with Mexico and deployment to Haiti, and human rights programs to continue the significant improvements in human rights by the Armed Forces in recent years. With U.S. help, a stable and secure Colombia is achievable in the near term as they emerge as a strategic partner, positive exporter of security and democratic model for the region, directly increasing the security of all citizens of the Americas.

#### *Countering Illicit Trafficking*

The November 2009 Central American and Caribbean Chiefs of Mission Conference held at our headquarters in Miami highlighted the need for a regional, synergistic whole-of-many-governments approach to counter illicit trafficking. Just as the successes of the Governments of Peru and Bolivia in reducing coca cultivation in their countries during the 1980s and early 1990s caused a shift in cultivation and production to Colombia, we are concerned that current eradication and interdiction successes in Colombia are causing a corresponding increase in Peruvian and Bolivian cultivation. For example, according to the most recent crop estimate from the U.S. Government, potential cocaine production in Colombia dropped 39 percent between 2007 and 2008. The potential production of pure cocaine fell from an estimated 485 metric tons in 2007 to 295 metric tons in 2008. Further, the area under cultivation dropped 29 percent during the same timeframe while Peruvian cultivation increased by 14 percent and Bolivian cultivation by 8 percent in the same time period. Furthermore, from 2000–2008, Peru's total area under illicit coca cultivation increased by 30 percent, while Bolivia's has nearly doubled.

Similarly, as President Calderon takes the fight to illicit trafficking organizations in Mexico, Central America is experiencing an increase in activity as traffickers are squeezed between Colombia and Mexico. This movement is exacerbated by successes of aerial and maritime interdiction efforts, which are pushing traffickers to favor land routes through the Central American isthmus. As traffickers and their support networks relocate to Central America, they also bring with them the associated ills of government corruption, crime, and gang activity which undermine good governance and threaten public security.

As a result of the discussions during the Chiefs of Mission Conference, we are working with the Intelligence Community to produce an analysis of the larger, regional and global illicit trafficking enterprise, looking at networks, routes and organizations throughout the entire region, as opposed to just one or two countries. The construct we are using encompasses the production, acquisition, storage and/or transfer of illicit drugs; illegal arms trafficking; money laundering; human trafficking and smuggling of special interest aliens; WMD and WMD precursors; and, all of their supporting activities.

This analysis will help the Department of State and the interagency community to coordinate an integrated approach to counter illicit trafficking and associated ac-

tivities in the Western Hemisphere. The Department of State already has several excellent sub-regional strategies to address this challenge such as Beyond Merida, the Central American Regional Security Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative. U.S. Southern Command performs Theater Security Cooperation activities that are in support of Merida Initiative and Caribbean security initiative efforts, and help to build partner nation military capability and capacity in Central America and the Caribbean. Lessons learned from U.S. support to Colombia show the importance of an integrated and unified overarching strategy to address insecurity and instability caused by the combined ills of illicit trafficking.

#### CONCLUSION

During my 9 months of leading the outstanding men and women of U.S. Southern Command, I have been fortunate to work closely with our civilian and military leaders, as well as with our partners to the south, to improve the security and stability of our region. Together we are continuing the great work of those who have gone before us and building upon the foundation of their efforts in seeking multinational, “whole of government” and in some cases “whole of society” approaches to create a secure and stable environment that set the conditions for long-term prosperity for the Americas.

This region plays a critical role in the security and prosperity of the United States. Despite some challenges, I believe that through the sharing of ideas, economic interdependence, cultural understanding and harnessing innovation, we can strengthen existing ties of friendship to build an integrated approach to partnering that will ensure U.S. Southern Command is a welcomed military partner of choice in this hemisphere. There are many opportunities ahead to improve hemispheric security cooperation. We will continue to pursue multinational, multi-agency and public-private partnerships to confront the challenges and embrace the opportunities of the Americas. We will continue to dedicate the majority of our resources to building and complementing the security capabilities of our partners while encouraging an environment of cooperation among the Nations in the region. We will continue to defend the United States, foster regional security, and be an enduring partner to help enhance regional hemispheric security and stability. The mutual benefits of these partnering efforts are profound.

Ultimately, our success in pursuit of these objectives depends upon our military and civilian personnel and their families, as well as those men and women serving with us from our partner agencies. I thank you again for your continued interest in, dedication to and support of the men and women of U.S. Southern Command and their families—they are volunteers and patriots, and I am humbled to lead them and serve with them every day.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Fraser.

We welcome, also, your wife here, but she must be a little bit jealous when she hears General Renuart’s wife is going to have her hubby back full-time.

Let me ask you some questions, General Renuart. First, one of the major objectives in the creation of NORTHCOM was to create a dedicated command to support civil authorities. DOD is now standing up a subunified Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), under U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), that—it appears that that command is going to provide direct support to civil authorities in cyberspace, both in defense of the government and in defense of commercial networks. Is there a role for NORTHCOM in cybersecurity? If so, what is it?

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, there absolutely is a role, and I think we have developed a very strong relationship with STRATCOM. As CYBERCOM fully stands up, we’ll continue that relationship with them.

Our role is, if you will, a consumer of the cybersecurity that STRATCOM and CYBERCOM have been designed to provide. We have a unique circumstance, in that many of our mission partners operate outside of the traditional so-called dot-mil [.mil] environ-

ment. So our partnership with DHS, as they provide protection to the dot-gov [.gov] domains, and then with the commercial private-sector partners, like Google and Microsoft and others, we are building a close relationship. We then determine the requirements that STRATCOM must meet in order to provide that security.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

I forgot to mention, let's have an 8-minute first round of questioning.

General Renuart, the administration has a policy of requiring operationally-realistic testing of missile defense systems, and there is a new Missile Defense Master Test Plan, that's designed to collect the data necessary to provide confidence in the operational effectiveness of all of our missile defense systems, including the GMD system. First, do you agree it is necessary to have operationally realistic testing? Do you agree with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), that the new test plan will provide operationally realistic data and will provide the basis for having confidence in the capability and the reliability of the GMD system over its service life?

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, I do support that, and I do believe it will give us good data to support the systems, and we work closely with the MDA on this.

Chairman LEVIN. Last year, Secretary Gates decided to cap deployment of the GMD system in Alaska and California at 30 operational ground-based interceptors (GBIs), and to make significant improvements in their reliability. This committee and Congress approved that plan. Do you agree with Defense Secretary Gates that deploying 30 operationally effective and reliable GBIs would provide an effective defense against the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile threat from North Korea and Iran?

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman I do believe it provides us that capability. I'm confident in the capabilities of the systems. I think the phased adaptive approach identified by the Secretary will allow us to grow a broader system of capability against potential growing Iranian threats.

Chairman LEVIN. As you just mentioned, the President announced a new missile defense plan for Europe that had been unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That plan includes a number of elements that are intended to enhance defense of the United States against potential future long-range Iranian missiles: a forward-deployed radar in southeastern Europe, and development of an improved version of the Standard Missile-3 Block II for deployment in Europe. Do you agree that this phased adaptive approach that's being planned for Europe will improve our capability to defend the homeland against potential future long-range missiles from Iran?

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely do agree. I think there is, and we'll continue to see the testing and development of the systems as they mature, but initial information looks very promising.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Finally, on this subject, there was a recent GMD flight test—it was at the end of January, I believe—where the system failed to achieve an intercept. Can you tell us why it failed?

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, I'm not a true expert at this, but my understanding, as the operational commander, is that the integration between the sea-based X-band radar and the missile—the test intercept vehicle itself—had a software glitch in there which prevent information from reaching the interceptor in an important phase of that flight test. I know that General O'Reilly is working very carefully to correct the software issues there, and we look forward to the FTG-07, which will be the next test, coming up in the not too distant future.

Chairman LEVIN. We understand there were two issues there, and if you would submit, for the record, whether that's accurate; and if so, what the second problem was.

General RENUART. Chairman, if I could, can I take that for—

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, for the record.

General RENUART. Please, and we'll get that specific detail back to the committee.

[The information referred to follows:]

The recent Ground-Based Midcourse Defense flight test number -06, conducted on 31 January 2010, did not result in an intercept. There were two issues and early indications are that either issue could have led to a failed intercept. The two issues appear unrelated at this time.

The first issue observed in the test was the Sea-based X-Band Radar stopped operating prior to providing adequate information needed by the interceptor in an important phase of the flight. The second issue observed in the test was the interceptor did not successfully complete the final phases of flight required for an intercept.

The Missile Defense Agency has an extensive investigation ongoing to determine the causes of the failure to intercept.

Chairman LEVIN. That would be fine.

General Fraser, last month the Colombian Constitutional Court ruled that President Uribe would not be permitted to run for a third term. Has there been a fallout from that? Is there enough time to have an appropriate election? It's a fairly short period, apparently, before that election takes place. Are things calm? Are there any concerns?

General FRASER. Chairman Levin, I do not have any concerns. I think there is adequate time to hold the election. The election process has been going on while their Supreme Court was deliberating on its decision, so I think there's adequate time. There's a number of candidates who are actively running, and so, I'm confident that Colombia will be able to run a fair and equitable election.

Chairman LEVIN. General Fraser, the—relative to Cuba—as I understand it, we have almost no military contact with Cuba. The only ongoing contact is apparently this low-level, kind of, monthly fence talks, I guess they're called. But, there's also a case-by-case cooperation in the antidrug efforts, particularly at sea. Apparently, there's notice if there's fast boats going through Cuban waters. I'm wondering, assuming that there is no prohibition in law—and we don't think Helms-Burton does have a prohibition of that kind of contact with the Cubans—is there any value in increased U.S. military contact with the Cuban military?

General FRASER. Chairman Levin, there is, as you mentioned, tactical-level interaction—fence-line talks—and the U.S. Coast Guard has a liaison in the U.S.-interest mission there in Havana. Our understanding—and I'll go back and check this—is that mili-

tary-to-military relations are prohibited until the Government of Cuba elects a democratically-elected government, and does not include either Fidel Castro or President Raul Castro in as part of that government. So that's our understanding of it, from an engagement with militaries, we look to engage with every military organization within the region. We continue to do that with all our partners. So if the opportunity is presented for us to do that, we would welcome that opportunity.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Well, doublecheck Helms-Burton, if you would, because——

General FRASER. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN.—we don't read it that way. We welcome your testimony.

[The information referred to follows:]

Senator, our understanding is Helms-Burton does not prohibit military-to-military contact with the Government of Cuba. Certainly, placing a U.S. servicemember at the Interest Section in Havana, could conceivably offer an opportunity to build rapport and trust. However, current Department of State and U.S. Government policy is that such military-to-military meetings and contact with the Government of Cuba are restricted as part of a U.S. Government effort to ensure consistency of message and to deny the Cuban regime the opportunity to mischaracterize contacts between U.S. and Cuban officials.

General Fraser, there's a—in terms of the situation in Haiti, I believe you—you've mentioned that there's some redeployments now that are going on, and that will continue, but there's some enablers that SOUTHCOM apparently will leave, some capabilities that you're going to leave in Haiti. Can you just describe that briefly?

General FRASER. Mr. Chairman, we're still early in the discussion and planning of that. It's an evolving situation. The focus right now on the ground is helping make sure shelter, sanitation, and security needs are met, especially for the numbers of displaced people. That is the evolving situation right now. So, we're looking to support USAID, the other international efforts, with the right types of capability. So, I don't have good definition for you right now of what that will be.

Chairman LEVIN. All right.

Let me ask both of you, on a subject which we've spent some time on, and obviously will be considering, and that's the possible repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Let me just ask you your personal views, essentially.

General Renuart, let me start with you. What are your personal views as to whether we should continue that policy or whether we ought to repeal it?

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, I think—my personal view, I think, probably is very close to what you heard with General Petraeus, his testimony a short time ago. I believe that we have all served, through the course of our tenure, with individuals who were gay or lesbian, and who were not allowed to talk about that. I think those individuals served honorably. I think the importance of maintaining the standards of discipline is critical to our military. But, I believe that we should not hold, if you will, those individuals "hostage" because of the policy we have.

So, I think it's appropriate that we conduct the detailed study the Secretary has asked us to conduct and—so that we understand the implications, and then we move forward.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay.

General FRASER, do you have a personal view?

General FRASER. Chairman Levin, my views very much correspond to that of General Renuart, and that is that I think it's really appropriate that we do a very deliberate understanding of what the President's intent is in relation to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." So I support what General Renuart said.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, thank you Mr. Chairman.

Obviously all of us have served with people who are of that sexual orientation. They have served honorably. That's not the question. It's the question, which I think you have answered, and I guess I'd ask you to repeat, is that we have to understand the implications of repeal before we make a decision on repeal. Would that be an accurate reflection of your views?

General RENUART. Senator McCain, it would be.

Senator MCCAIN. General Fraser?

General FRASER. Senator McCain, I agree.

Senator MCCAIN. So, a moratorium would obviously be a de facto repeal of the policy before we have understood the implications for battle effectiveness on the men and women in the military. So, I'd—I appreciate your views, and I share them. For the Congress of the United States to take action before we have had a thorough review of the policy, not of the way to repeal the policy would be the best way to proceed, would you agree?

General RENUART. Senator McCain, just to be clear, I guess. Is it my view that we should have a moratorium?

Senator MCCAIN. Yes.

General RENUART. I think we ought not to have a moratorium while we conduct this. I think, as the Secretary and the Chairman and the Service Chiefs have all indicated, that would cause, I think, some confusion in that process. So I think, better to let the study go, and then make a decision.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. Unfortunately, there are efforts to impose a moratorium, which would be tantamount to repeal. But, I'd like to move on.

General Renuart, could you describe to me, in—as short as possible, but terms that perhaps Americans can understand, how dangerous the situation is on our southern border vis-a-vis the drug cartels, the existential threat to the Government of Mexico—I'm asking you to make it short, but speak to the problems of corruption, and the possibility that that violence can spill over onto our side of the border. This is an issue that I—I don't know why we haven't—Americans haven't had the visibility of how great a threat and danger this is to the very existence of the Government of Mexico, and the effect that it's having on public opinion in Mexico.

General RENUART. Senator McCain, thanks for that question. This is, as you mentioned, really the principal struggle that the Government of Mexico is undergoing. President Calderon has courageously put his military in the field to take this on, where local

law enforcement officials have been corrupted or intimidated. That's not the traditional role of the Mexican military, and it does put some strain on them, but we are working very closely to share the lessons we've learned, in places like Afghanistan and others, to do that.

The violence in places like Juarez has been substantial. I think we are close to 7,000 murders that occurred in 2009.

Senator MCCAIN. At 7,000 murders.

General RENUART.—7,000, and I must say, drug-related murders that generally were cartel-on-cartel, but that spills over into the population. The Mexicans—

Senator MCCAIN. Murders of individuals who are part of the Mexican drug enforcement and military and others; they've singled them out for assassination, including those that have been trained by the United States.

Is that true?

General RENUART. Senator, I'm not sure about the last statement, "including those trained." I know we've had some people that we have trained in the past that were involved and corrupted—

Senator MCCAIN. No, I meant who were assassinated.

General RENUART. Senator, I believe there are a small number that were U.S.-trained Mexicans. But, certainly your other statement is absolutely correct. These are individuals who are competing for, if you will, market share in the drug business. Cartels are very aggressively taking each other on to, if you will, build the distribution process, the market share.

So, that continues, and we are working aggressively with our Mexican partners to help build an interagency capacity for Mexico to deal with this. I'm cautious, when we talk about the level of threat to the Mexican Government, because I think President Calderon is strong, I think he enjoys support, and I think he's aggressively working this, and growing an interagency team that can be effective.

Senator MCCAIN. I don't mean to interrupt you, but isn't it also true, though, that Mexican public opinion, because of this level of violence, is beginning to turn, frankly, in the wrong direction? Is that—

General RENUART. Yes.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have—

General RENUART. We have—

Senator MCCAIN.—indications of that?

General RENUART.—seen that the public opinion polls have come down, on this regard. Although, I will say, in recent—in just the recent month, I've seen some numbers where the Mexican people have continued to express their support in Calderon's efforts. So, it's a little bit of a balance in that regard.

Finally, Senator, just very quickly with respect to the border area, here—

Senator MCCAIN. Would you also mention the problem of corruption?

General RENUART. Absolutely. Across—especially in the local police areas, the local governing officials, that element of corruption has become significant. It is the means by which the cartels, if you will, create their influence on government, essentially to leave

them alone, to not interfere with the drug-trade business. There has been a substantial effort placed by the Mexican government to replace corrupt officials in the towns and communities; but it takes time to build those credible leaders back up, and that's still a work in progress.

Senator MCCAIN. Would you, for the record, provide the committee with recommendations of what more you think we need to do, including the success or failures of Plan Merida? I'd appreciate that.

[The information referred to follows:]

Senator, I believe the way ahead for Plan Merida is to focus a greater part of our effort on Central America via the Central American Region Security Initiative in an overall strategic framework to enhance our Central American partners' territorial control capabilities in the maritime, land, and air corridors. The end state would be to maximize our effectiveness to fight criminal organizations by assisting our regional partners in the disruption of illicit activities such as drug, weapons, and human trafficking that adversely impact the sovereign control of their territories and threaten the southern approaches to the United States. We have been successful by accelerating the expansion of the maritime interdiction capabilities of five of our Central American partners.

Senator MCCAIN. I understand we're spending about \$400 million in a year cooperating with the Mexican Government on this issue.

General RENUART. Yes, sir. That's correct. Senator McCain, if I could, for the record, give you a much more detailed look, both in that area and our cooperation with law enforcement along the border, because I think there's a good news story there.

[The information referred to follows:]

Through the Merida Initiative, \$415.5 million in Foreign Military Financing funds was appropriated in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the purchase of the following military equipment for Mexico:

- \$200 million for four CASA maritime surveillance aircraft
- \$110 million for three UH-60M helicopters
- \$105 million for eight Bell 412 helicopters, seven of which are funded.
- Congress is withholding 15 percent of the fiscal year 2009 Omnibus appropriation (\$5.85 million) due to their concerns over the Mexican military's human rights record
- \$500,000 for 13 handheld ion scanners

These deliverables will provide the Mexican military with urgently-needed capabilities in the areas of tactical rapid troop transport, overwater surveillance, and drug detection to support Mexican law enforcement. I believe they will be valuable additions to the Mexican military's capabilities that will immediately be used to help tackle illicit narcotics trafficking operations. As long as the Mexican military has a leading role in Mexico's national campaign to disrupt the capacity of organized crime to operate and manage their land and maritime borders, my belief is that they will continue to need these kinds of assets. This is a national-level campaign that requires national-level capabilities.

The Mexican Government has embarked on a long-term effort to rebuild their security institutions. Training is a major component of this initiative and focused equipment is necessary to building security capacity. Along these lines, they will need a large infusion of additional support to build the kinds of capacities needed to defend Mexican territorial sovereignty and counter transnational threats like illicit trafficking. Their most urgent needs are troop and equipment airlift; secure communications; information collection, analysis, sharing, and fusion with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement communities; riverine and littoral operations; border surveillance; and military justice reform (for dealing with an internal security situation for which they are not designed to handle). The Merida Initiative thus far has been an excellent injection of needed support under a shared U.S.-Mexican agreement. But, it's not the final solution to Mexico's security requirements.

The Mexican military is a transitional security force, working now in the cities and communities to make gains in combating the cartels until the Mexican law enforcement agencies are retooled and ready to rejoin the fight. When that happens, the deliverables provided by the Merida Initiative and related support should well

position the Mexican military to focus their emphasis on defending Mexico's territorial sovereignty, their air and maritime approaches, having the all-domain awareness to detect threats at a distance and interdict them before they reach Mexican land. This creates a layered defense for the United States and enables a more effective security partnership. For that mission, assets such as those from the Merida Initiative will assist in developing national-level capacities for all domain awareness, command and control, interdiction of threats such as weapons of mass destruction and other illicit materials.

[Deleted.]

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much.

General FRASER, could I turn to Cuba, a second? They, just in the last week or so, a young man named Orlando Zapata died on a hunger strike, as a political prisoner in Cuba. After a brief experimentation with a small amount of free enterprise, the Cuban Government has cracked down. They have even been more brutal in their repression of human rights, and their prisons have a large number of political dissidents who have simply sought to exercise their rights as human beings. Is that true?

General FRASER. Yes, Senator, that's true.

Senator MCCAIN. Isn't there also evidence that, from time to time, there has been the Cuban government and military facilitating the drug trade?

General FRASER. Senator, I can't confirm that. I'll have to take that for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

I have no evidence that the Cuban Government or military facilitate the drug trade.

Senator MCCAIN. Has there been any cooperation that you know of on the part of the Cuban government in trying to restrain the drug trade?

General FRASER. Senator, we have had cooperation, as I mentioned—and I'm not the expert on this, because it's really within the U.S. Coast Guard—as we look at migration as well as the drug trade there within the straits around Cuba.

Senator MCCAIN. Is there any doubt that the—that Raul Castro and Fidel have been more repressive in the last year or 2 than they were in the past?

General FRASER. Senator, I think they have continued to remain fairly strict on the populace, but I can't quantify whether that has been more restrictive over the last couple of years than before. So, I need to also get back to you on that.

[The information referred to follows:]

Since Raul Castro replaced his brother Fidel Castro as chief of state, the government's human rights record has been essentially unchanged. When comparing the last two to three years of each Castro's rule, the frequency of government crackdowns under Fidel (2003 and 2005) are consistent with Raul's directed crackdowns (2006, 2008, 2010), averaging one government crackdown on dissent every 2 years. More than 200 political prisoners are currently detained in Cuba; most began their sentences under Fidel's reign. For example, in the "Black Spring" of March 2003, the government arrested 75 human rights activists on various charges, ranging from aiding a foreign power to violating national security laws. As of March 2010, 54 of the original 75 prisoners remained incarcerated.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, then let me commend, for your reading, various human rights organizations who have written and testified that the Cuban Government is even more repressive. I strongly suggest you read that, General. It might be illuminating for you.

Finally, how do you assess the threat of the cooperation between Iran and Venezuela? Last week Spain's high court said the Venezuelan Government facilitated contacts between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and ETA to plan the assassination of Colombian officials visiting Spain, including President Uribe. Do you have any information on that and other activities on the part of the Venezuelan Government?

General FRASER. Senator, I do not have any direct information on that. We have continued to watch very closely for any connections between illicit and terrorist organization activity within the region. We have not seen any connections, specifically, that I can verify that there has been a direct government-to-terrorist connection. We are concerned about it. I'm skeptical. I continue to watch for it.

Senator MCCAIN. You have seen evidence of the relationship between FARC and the Venezuelan Government. I mean, that's been published many times.

General FRASER. Senator, I know that there's evidence of FARC.

Senator MCCAIN. I mean, they have the hard drives. When they raided the FARC camp on the Venezuelan side of the border.

General FRASER. Sir, the raid where that happened—

Senator MCCAIN. Excuse me. On the other side of the border.

General FRASER. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Yes.

General FRASER. So, there has been some old evidence, but I don't see that evidence. I can't tell you, specifically, whether that continues or not.

Senator MCCAIN. My time is expired.

I thank the witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks, to both of you, for your service and leadership.

General Renuart, let me add my personal thank you to you for four decades of service to our country. You've done it with real honor and excellence, and personally, it's been a pleasure to get to know you. I wish you the best in your next chapter. I know your wife, as you said, will be happy with your retirement, but having watched others retire, I would say, on her behalf, that I hope you at least get a part-time job.

General RENUART. Senator I'm going to work on that.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. I wish you the best.

Let me begin with you, General. I am, of course, as chair of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, very interested and appreciative of the way in which NORTHCOM has organized and consolidated the U.S. military's involvement in homeland defense. You bring unique and critically important skills together with DHS.

DOD has been standing up three brigade-size Consequence Management Response Forces (CMRFs) to respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack by terrorists or others on our Homeland. I've been very impressed by that, and appreciative of it.

I was unsettled a bit when the recent QDR said that it would basically scrap the second and third of those, and replace them with 10 smaller Homeland Response Forces to be put in each of the 10, basically, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions around the country, under DHS. I mean, the regional forces have some appeal, but I'm troubled by the loss of those two brigade-sized Response Management Forces because of the tremendous skills and specialties that they would have brought wherever an attack on our country, of this serious nature, might occur. So, I wanted to ask you as you depart this command, how you feel about that change and whether you feel it—these regional forces can do as good a job of homeland defense as the three brigade-sized CMRFs.

General RENUART. Senator, thanks. This is an issue that obviously went through a lot of discussion within the QDR. We've worked very hard to create those brigade-sized forces, over the last few years, and, with both the support of the committee and the Secretary, have crafted two of those. The third was to be made operational this year.

The concern within the discussions of the QDR is that these forces may not be as responsive as a force that is, if you will, deployed and lives out in each of these FEMA regions. After much discussion, the Secretaries made a decision to adjust this format a bit.

I think our role in this has been certainly involved in the discussions, but—to take the concept that was developed through the QDR discussions and turn it into an operational construct that is effective and executable. That work is ongoing today, Senator Lieberman. I think that there is some work to do, still, to ensure that, not only do you have trained and equipped forces in these regional areas, but they are accessible and agile and deployable enough to meet the expectations and the assumptions that were central to the QDR discussions.

We still have a little work to do on that. Is it possible that they will be as effective? Yes, sir, I think it is. It really depends on the fact that we will make a commitment to train and fund and make these integratable, if you will, into a capable force when a large-scale event occurs. That's our role in NORTHCOM. We're working hard on that. We still have work to do before I can give you a definitive answer.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. Well, we're going to keep in touch on that, because—and you phrased it exactly in terms of my concerns, which is whether these 10 regional forces will be able to quickly deploy with the range of skills to the site of an attack where we'll need something as large as a brigade, or two or three, to protect the people and stand up the region again.

I want to understand—make, just, clear for the record—will the one brigade-sized force remain in effect?

General RENUART. Yes, Senator, it will. In fact, it will grow—  
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.

General RENUART.—by about 700 individuals of—with those same critical lifesaving skill sets.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General RENUART. So, that will remain. It will be focused on an Active Duty brigade, so it gives you the most rapid access to that—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General RENUART.—to that force. In addition, then, we will have two smaller forces that will be predominantly the command and control, the logistics, the joint reception, and some immediate life-saving capability in those two smaller forces. But, they're really designed to receive so-called general-purpose forces in a large-scale event.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay.

Let me move on to the GMD system that has been mentioned. In the move to the phased adaptive system that we're going to now, the—there's some question about the future of the two-stage GBI. I know there's supposed to still be some testing of it going on.

I wanted to ask you, as you sort of prepare to retire, whether you believe we should continue to develop and test the two-stage GBI, for instance, as a hedge against a possible Iranian breakout, and whether—particularly in regard to the homeland defense, whether NORTHCOM has studied options for deploying a two-stage GBI in the United States to give another layer of defense to our homeland.

General RENUART. Senator, the operational test program does continue to include both the two- and the three-stage test. We are fully supportive of that. As we have had discussions with both DOD and with the MDA, our support for the phased adaptive approach is strong. We're confident that it has real potential, but we've also asked the Secretary and received, I think, budgetary support to not foreclose the capabilities that might be resident in a two- or a three-stage interceptor. So, we do support that continued testing; and my information is, that continues to stay on track.

With respect to the phased adaptive approach, I think that the—certainly the information, so far, looks very positive, a very capable system. So, we're supportive of that. We think it gives us great added depth to our homeland defense capability. Again, we don't want to foreclose any possibilities in the future, so continuing that testing is important to us.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good. Good to hear. I agree with that totally.

General Fraser, let me ask you a big-picture question, because I think we often find that the regional commanders have some of the best views of the regions in which they lead, because of the comprehensiveness of their context with the region. So, as you step back and look at SOUTHCOM, Latin America generally, plus, there seems to be, here, as in other parts of the world, an ongoing, sort of, conflict or competition between the forces of freedom, generally speaking, and the forces of dictatorship; the forces of socialist economies, and free economies; friends of the United States, and enemies of the United States. So, at this moment, where would you say the momentum is? Who's winning? How are we—and, in a more direct sense, how are we doing in the area of your responsibility?

General FRASER. Senator, I think, overall, we are doing well. We continue to have positive relations with most of the Nations within the region, especially from military-to-military standpoint; we see

that very directly. There's only a couple of instances where that has really been reduced. Our relations with the military in Venezuela is one of those; also, with the military in Bolivia, is another. But, overall, those relations remain good.

I see a real competition, as you mentioned, within the region, for various ideologies, and they're coming from various different directions. That competition continues today.

Really, I see the view of the United States growing. There's a 71-percent approval rating of the U.S. image within the general populace within Latin America. So, I see a positive trend from our relations within the region growing.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you for that. That 71-percent appreciation of the United States in Latin America may be higher than the appreciation of the United States in America today. I hope we can catch up with them.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me echo the comments everyone's made about your great service, and how much I appreciate both of you, your great wives, and all that stuff.

General Fraser, let me tell you what I'm not going to ask you. I'm not going to ask you if we ought to close Guantanamo Bay (GTMO). But, I do want to get something in the record here, of my personal feelings. I've had a chance to really get into it. I've studied it. There's never been a case of water-boarding, and the conditions, the treatment of the people, are good down there. It's a secure location. There are approximately 200 terrorists left. The low-hanging fruit is gone. Of that low-hanging fruit, about 20 percent have the—have been back in the fight, according to reports that I have. Once the terrorists are physically in the United States, there should be no doubt to anyone in this room that these terrorists will gain additional constitutional rights and fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts.

The attacks leading up to September 11 were not the result of holding detainees in GTMO. The attacks of September 11 were not the result of holding detainees. The repeated attempts to attack this country were not a result of holding detainees.

Moving detainees held in GTMO to the United States would not stop future terrorist attacks to this country. Those guys hate us. They want to kill everyone in this room.

The Americans across the country, they understand this. The polling is showing that 2-to-1 say that it shouldn't be closed. All these people who are coming up with these great ideas on what we can do to bring the terrorists to the United States for either incarceration or for trial go to all elaborate detail as to how we can do this, what it's going to cost, how we're going to build the courts. There's a simpler answer, just leave it open.

Now, again, I'm not going to ask you that question. But, I would ask you this. You have had opportunity to go there, General Fraser. Just very briefly, in terms of your impression of the operations and of the treatment of detainees, do you have any comment to make?

General FRASER. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Our responsibility in SOUTHCOM is for the safe, legal, transparent, and humane treatment of the detainees at the facility in GTMO.

Senator INHOFE. Are they being treated that way?

General FRASER. Yes, sir, they are very much being treated that way. I'm very proud of the men and women from the military who come and provide that—

Senator INHOFE. Okay, you don't need to elaborate. There's a Sergeant Major Carter from Fort Sill who had been stationed there several times. Her comment to me—she's in charge of the prison system we have at Fort Sill, and she said, "I don't know what's wrong with those people in Washington. Go back and tell them, that is a jewel that's been run properly." She's the one who has actually been there. I don't want to belabor that, because that's a decision that was made by your Commander in Chief, and I don't want to put you in an awkward position.

But, following up on something that has been said by Senator Lieberman, General Renuart, I—you and I talked about this in my office. It is true that I was very strongly in support of the third site in Poland. That's a site that would have given us the capability of knocking something down. At the time, by 2012—with slippage, maybe 2015—ironically, that's when we think that the Iranians are going to have the capability of sending something over. Now, I know, in response to the Chairman's question, that we have a lot of ground-based stuff out there. It's in California and Alaska. I'm not comfortable, when I look at these maps. So, I won't ask you how you would stand on going back to that position with the—with Poland and the Czech Republic, but I would say that, since we're looking at the SM-3 2B, out there someplace, to be determined—we don't have a date on that yet; we do have a date on the SM-3 2A, but that's for short and medium range—of 2018. I still believe that we should reconsider that. I would only ask you this question. Are you at all concerned that we're going to have the—well, it would have to be the 3M—SM-3 2B capability soon enough?

General RENUART. Senator, the intelligence estimates on when the Iranians will field a real capability obviously have moved around a bunch. So, we want to make sure that we are providing sufficient capability to defend our own country. I believe, with the current Alaska-based and Vandenberg-based systems, we can meet that need. If we see proliferation of capabilities from Iran, we certainly need to consider expanding that capability.

Senator INHOFE. All right, that's good enough. Now, since you're going to be bailing out of this—and we have talked about that. I certainly wish you luck. It's been 39 years, is that how long?

General RENUART. That's correct, Senator.

Senator INHOFE. Goodness. Well, that's great. It's been a great service. I would ask you, just in the remainder of the time that I have, now that you're going out and you can reflect back, and General Fraser knows, how strongly I feel about our partnership programs, our train-and-equip programs, my concern that I had, that perhaps the—some of these programs were not—like the 1207, the

civilian-to-civilian, maybe should have been left where it was. That's my own personal opinion.

But, in terms of one-size-fits-all, we're talking about the train-and-equip programs, International Military Education Training (IMET), the Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund programs, the Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and all of that. What's your thought about, between countries, the tailor-making of these things? Any thoughts you'd like to leave with us on that subject?

General RENUART. Senator Inhofe—

Senator INHOFE. It's a good program. We all agree with that, I think. But, can it be better if we could figure out a way to tailor it better?

General RENUART. Yes, sir. This is key and essential to all of our operations around the world. I spent 13 years in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), I've spent 5½ years in southeast—southwest Asia as part of the CENTCOM AOR, and, of course, in the Pacific, as well. In every case, those combatant commanders would tell you that the 1206, 1207, 1208, FMF, FMS, all of those building-partnership-capacity programs are critical to allow us to do just what General Fraser said, where Ken Keen and the Brazilian counterpart know each other because they've worked together, they've been to school together, we've created training relationships together. We have to absolutely keep those programs intact, and support them, and work through the department-to-department challenges between, primarily, State and Defense, on making them easier to take advantage of. They are critical to a combatant commander's success.

Senator INHOFE. I've spent a disordinate amount of time in some of the African nations, and I've left—not just there, but in the Balkans, and everywhere else—with the idea that we made a mistake, at one time, on our IMET program. We had a—we're kind of treating it as if we're doing them a favor by allowing them to come here to our country to train, and train with our people. I became pretty convinced, after a period of time, that we should have lifted, which we did, the article of response—requirement that we had before allowing them to come in, that it was really to our benefit more than it is to their benefit, that once these people come in, they train—whether it's a—it doesn't matter what facility it is, but train with our people, get that quality training—an allegiance is formed that never leaves. Do you think that's right?

General RENUART. Senator, very shortly, absolutely. I—my youngest son spent 27 months in Senegal in the Peace Corps, and he will tell you, firsthand, that the relationships of American outreach to these countries are incredible.

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Well, my time's expired, but, General Fraser, do you generally agree with our conversation here, and our opinions?

General FRASER. Yes, Senator, I completely agree.

Senator INHOFE. All right. Thank you very—thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

Senator REED.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your dedication to not only the American military but to the Nation. So, thank you very much.

General Renuart, a disturbing phenomena seems to be the increasing sophistication in armaments of the Mexican drug cartels—assault weapons, antitank weapons, sophisticated night-vision devices, sophisticated communication devices. Where are all these coming from?

General RENUART. Senator, thanks. On the very first meeting that I had in Mexico, their senior military leadership outlined their concern over what they called “U.S. trafficking of weapons into Mexico.” Clearly, there is no doubt that there are weapons moving north to south into Mexico, and we partner very closely with our law enforcement friends to help provide information from the Mexican military, as they’ve collected the forensics of these, so that we can, in fact, prosecute. There have been over 40 prosecutions, over the last 2 years, of—I’ll call them “weapons dealers.” But, certainly we see an involvement from here in this country with respect to illicit weapons trade. We’re also seeing that move from other nations around the world, as well.

So, I think this is a hemispheric problem—both General Fraser and I have talked about this—and something we need to continue to work.

Senator REED. But, do you think we’re taking effective steps? Again, what seems to be very ironic is that, in some of these recorded incidents, the drug cartels outgun the military and the police. That’s unfortunate.

General RENUART. Yes, sir. In fact, we see 50-caliber weapons, we see rocket-propelled grenades, we see a variety of those things being used. That is increasingly of concern to the Mexican military. It has resulted, by the way, in them being much more forthcoming with serial numbers and that sort of thing, so it allows our law enforcement to really take some action.

Senator REED. Do we have to do much more on our side of the border to control?

General RENUART. Yes sir, I believe we do. I think our law enforcement partners are very eager to do that. It’s continuing that information-sharing between the two nations that will assist.

Senator REED. On the other side—we’re supplying both sides, essentially, in this battle. Under the Department of State’s Merida Initiative, we provided the helicopters and light attack aircraft, inflatable boats, et cetera. Can you tell us if that’s being used effectively?

General RENUART. Senator, I can, and it is. The Mexicans were very appreciative that we accelerated that process to help meet the Merida objectives. We delivered the first five of the Bell helicopters this past December. We’ll deliver two or three more this year. Patrol aircraft, computer systems that will allow them to fuse information to do border security, to communicate better—all have been put in place—night-vision goggles. The Mexicans are also reaching out to us for the training associated with integrating these to be effective, and we’ve made great progress in that regard. We need to continue that effort. Merida shouldn’t just be a 1- or 2-year event, but it’s a relationship over time.

Senator REED. Is there a danger of some of the border States of Mexico becoming ungoverned spaces that would invite not just narco-gangs, but more sophisticated international terrorists to set up shop?

General RENUART. Senator, I think there's—I would not characterize “ungoverned spaces,” because I think there's—

Senator REED. I don't want to—I don't want to suggest that the Government of Mexico isn't competent, capable down to every level, but it's just the turmoil there, I guess, which—

General RENUART. There is significant turmoil, and certainly local governance is corrupted in some places, but that's very much on the focus of President Calderon and his senior—both attorney general, as well as his senior military leaders. That's allowed him to push—or it's enabled him to push forces out to try to help reduce that. We have a very good relationship with the Mexican border-state commanders, as well.

Senator REED. Thank you.

General Fraser, your comments on, sort of, the flow of weapons and other items, not from the United States, but from other areas in the hemisphere.

General FRASER. Senator, thank you.

We find that there is a flow. A lot of the flow is headed towards Colombia right now, but it also is into Central America. A lot of the weapons that are flowing originating—are originating in Central America from weapons that were sold there in the 1980s, but we also see a flow that's coming out of the United States in that direction, also.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Just—let me switch back to General Renuart, to the chemical, biological, radiological, high-yield explosive (CBRNE) teams that you've put together, and the CMRF. Can you give us an update of their deployment. There's two, I believe.

General RENUART. There are, sir. Just very quickly, we actually exercised one of those forces this year from a standing start; we mobilized them, deployed them, and put them into action in a very realistic scenario in Indiana, earlier—at the end of last year. Comments from the US&R Association, the professionals in this business, were that it was as good as any they've seen—the Fairfax unit, for example, that we've talked about—any they've seen in the world. So, I'm very happy with the quality and capability of these forces.

As I mentioned to Senator Lieberman, as we continue to grow this concept that has come from the QDR, we want to maintain that standard of capability for the people of this country, and we'll work hard at that.

Senator REED. Let me ask you a general question, General Renuart, and that is the status of the equipment for National Guard. Since they're a major partner in your efforts in NORTHCOM, can you give just a general view of—

General RENUART. Yes. Very quickly—and what I'll do is, if I may, provide some more data for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

For the Army National Guard, dual-use equipment (items identified as critical to domestic missions) is currently at 83 percent. Approximately, 65 percent of the dual-

use equipment is available to the Governors after accounting for items that are deployed in support of Federal missions.

General RENUART. But, the National Guard, on the average across the country now, is up from 40- or 50-percent equipage, now, to 70, 70-plus. That's new equipment. The training quality is up. We're especially pleased that the equipment related to these homeland support missions is close to 100 percent in most of the States.

Senator REED. Thank you.

General Fraser, you have many roles, both air, sea, and land, but, can you kind of brief us about SOUTHCOM's Naval Force's Southern Command, the naval forces and counternarcotics operations?

General FRASER. Senator, the DOD mission within counternarcotics is to support the detection and monitoring of the transit of illicit goods, if you will, primarily through the maritime environments, the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. So, working through JIATF-South, an interagency group, we support the detection and monitoring in those areas. The U.S. Navy ships do that, as well as U.S. Coast Guard ships, as well as aircraft. Then, once those are detected, then hand them off for intercept and detention to the law enforcement organization.

Senator REED. Just a quick followup. We all read recently about the growing use of submersible vehicles and submarines to move drugs around. Is that a continuing upward trend?

General FRASER. Actually, Senator, it's decreased. We saw 68 movements primarily in the Eastern Pacific in 2008. Last year, we saw 46. So, we've seen a decline. Now, that's just a 1-year sample size.

Senator REED. Right.

General FRASER. But, that's the most recent data, and that's the first decline we've seen.

Senator REED. Thank you, sir.

General, thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator LeMieux.

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your opening comments that discussed the connections between Iran and Venezuela. I know Senator McCain spoke about that, too.

General Fraser, you and I have had an opportunity to speak a lot about that. So, that's a topic that I want to explore today.

Start off by saying, thank you both for your service.

General Renuart thank you—39 years, that's incredible. Thank you, to both of your spouses. We put our spouses through a lot. So, I'm appreciative of them, as well.

In speaking about the growing projection of influence of Iran in the region, I recently had an opportunity to visit Colombia and to visit with our military folks there who are assisting with the military leaders in Colombia in the fight against the FARC. There is this concern. Senator McCain spoke about the recent revelations of the judge in Spain, about the assassination attempt on President Uribe. We know that the drug-trafficking flights are flying over Venezuela to get to Central America to bring those drugs into the United States. Do you consider Venezuela to be the biggest stabi-

lizing—destabilizing factor in the region, in terms of our national security interests?

General FRASER. Senator, I don't know if I would take it as far as the "biggest destabilizing factor." They are continuing on a pursuit of reducing U.S. influence in the region. They are working with various countries and entities to try and enable that.

Senator LEMIEUX. Let me try it this way. Is there a country in Latin America that is working against our interests as much as Venezuela?

General FRASER. Senator, I would argue that, as we look at Cuba, they're also in that same vein.

Senator LEMIEUX. We've seen some recent articles even calling it "Venecuba," that there are Cuban military officials working within the Venezuelan Government. The concern I have—and I think this touches on both of your focuses, with you, General Renuart, having the focus on Mexico, as well—is that we have this whole Central American region that runs—we have Colombia, obviously, on the tip of South America, and then it runs up through the region into Mexico. We have these drug trafficking chains. Some have described it to me as, "We squeeze the balloon in one place, they find another way to go." If we shut down the semisubmersibles, or we work against that, they take more air flights. If we stop them at sea—which, you just had a recent success, General—then they come over land. I know our Ambassador in Panama is concerned about the increased traffic through the isthmus there.

So what's your focus—and I assume that there's coordination between the two of you—what's the focus, and what's the plan, going forward, to combat this narco-drug trafficking? Do you have any concerns that, with the projection of influence of Iran in the region—the idea that we know that Hezbollah and Hamas are—have set up shop in the region—that there could be a combination between those groups and the narcotraffickers?

General FRASER. Senator, if I could start with that. From a destabilizing standpoint, the biggest concern I have in the region is illicit trafficking. I think it's growing as a regional issue throughout, and spreading to other parts of the region. Brazil is now the second largest cocaine user in the world. So, it is—the criminal elements of that is the illicit trafficking that really is my biggest concern. What we are looking to do is the—our national Intelligence Community is taking an opportunity to look at illicit trafficking as a regional enterprise, not just what's affecting individual countries, so that we have the opportunity to understand that enterprise, as an enterprise, to try and push on all sides of the balloon, if you will, rather than just on one part of that balloon, to see if we can start squeezing that balloon effect down. So, that's really the efforts that were ongoing. That's in direct correlation and coordination with NORTHCOM, JIATF-South, JTF-North. Everybody is working this—in addition, with law enforcement—to try to get a better understanding.

Senator LEMIEUX. General Renuart?

General RENUART. Senator, I'd first agree that—with General Fraser's comment, that this is an enterprise. We have to approach it as an enterprise. I'd add, that starts in our own cities; 230 cities in our country have seen increases in drug-related gang violence.

We need to work that internally. But, in addition, coordination from the supply through the demand is critical if you're going to really make a difference. Our two commands work very closely, and have partnered with Mexico from the south and the north, for example, to try to arrest some of that flow. The Mexicans have been increasingly eager for that coordinated support from both of us.

So, I think there's a real opportunity, and we're going to—we're both committed to continue working that. More importantly, we have support from our friends in Customs and Border and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the other Federal agencies.

Senator LEMIEUX. Well, I appreciate that. I appreciate your good work on that. I know, in traveling to Colombia, that now the Colombian military's going to be training some folks from Mexico on helicopter operations, so I think that's a good step.

I want to just—and I—General Fraser, you and I have discussed this, in private—is that—I want you to stay focused, if you will, on Iran's projection of influence in the region, because I'm worried that those trafficking chains could be used for other purposes. We had an Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee hearing yesterday, chaired by my colleague Senator Nelson, and, to a person, everyone acknowledged that Iran is the world's number one State sponsor of terror. When I see Ahmadinejad traveling the world, including spending several stops in Latin America, whether it's Venezuela or even some of friendly nations down there, I'm concerned about it. So, I want you—if you would, please keep a focus on that.

General FRASER. Senator, we're focused on that.

Senator LEMIEUX. Right.

Let me ask you a question, General Fraser, about Colombia, specifically. We've been trying to pass this Colombia Free Trade Agreement. I think it's an agreement that has implications beyond trade. I think it has implications to our alliances and our friendship with Colombia. Do you see that, in terms of our national security interests, as being a positive step forward, if we could get that agreement ratified?

General FRASER. Senator, I think it would be a very positive step forward. One of the things that supports security within the region is the opportunity to have stable economies, and vibrant economies. Colombia has that. I think a Free Trade Agreement would enhance that capability and give an alternative to the illicit traffickers.

Senator LEMIEUX. I would assume you would agree that a Free Trade Agreement with Panama would also be productive.

General FRASER. Yes, Senator, I would.

Senator LEMIEUX. Right.

General Renuart, just to switch gears a little, you—in your opening statement that I reviewed, you refer to Russian Bear Tu-95 flights probing American and Canadian airspace. Can you comment on the activities of the—those Russian airplanes? I know they weren't—they were probing our airspace, maybe not specifically in it. You sent up some fighters, I guess, in response. Can you talk to that a little bit?

General RENUART. Senator, just very quickly, we've seen an increase, in the last few years, of Russian—their words, “long-range training flights” approaching our sovereign airspace. In our

NORAD role, we have been conducting this surveillance and response mission for over 52 years. We have trained, well-equipped capabilities to monitor our airspace. Really, we attempt to identify any aircraft that is not on a flight plan, unidentified, not talking to people on the radio, so that we understand their intentions. We continue to do that. We've had a couple instances this year where the Russians have flown close to our airspace in the Aleutian Chain. Nothing is threatening us, their aviators act professionally. But, again, we want to make sure that we don't allow any aircraft from any source to enter our airspace without being identified.

Senator LEMIEUX. Do you have an assessment of their intentions?

General RENUART. I think the Russians have neglected their bomber force for many years. I think, because of financial concerns, they are—the influx of energy money has allowed them to refocus some of that, and we're seeing more of the training that they used to conduct, not at the levels of the Cold War days, but certainly enough to keep pilots proficient. That—I think it characterizes the most—the bulk of what they're doing.

Senator LEMIEUX. Okay. Thank you both.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.

Let me just quickly mention, since we've talked about Chile, that there's a report that, right in the middle, apparently, of President Pinera's inauguration ceremonies, there was a magnitude-7.2 quake reported in Chile. So, it's not as bad as the earlier one, obviously, but it's still a significant-size earthquake.

Senator BEGICH.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Actually, I thought I wouldn't have time, and I snuck around. I broke some rule, I'm sure. Doug, I gave your wife a hug. I hope—behind your back, I want you to know that, in all full disclosure. But, it's good to see you again, and Rena.

General Renuart, I have a couple questions first, and then I'm going to have a couple for General Fraser.

But, first with the Arctic and some of the work that's now going on, especially—on two fronts, one is the climate change that's occurring, and the Arctic ice melting, and that you have three commands, really, that kind of manage the Arctic. Is there discussion, or is there an opinion you have in regards to this, that—my personal view—and I leave it to the military to figure this out—that we probably have to unify this in—at some point, like we did—I think it was with—Africa Command was a similar situation, two or three commands.

Is there discussions now about trying to figure this out, as we move more and more into understanding what opportunities, but also, really, challenges—and I think Senator LeMieux just mentioned one of those, but that's in the Aleutian. Some would think that's close to Alaska. It is, but it's hundreds of miles from the north. But, are you now, as an organization, starting to think about this, or can you give me some thoughts on that?

General RENUART. Senator Begich, you bet. I was a former vice commander of Pacific Air Forces, in fact. Doug Fraser was the commander of 11th Air Force, and he wore four hats.

Senator BEGICH. I know.

General RENUART. I always felt that it was important for NORTHCOM and NORAD to try to help reduce the number of hats that we asked him to wear.

We continue that effort. We will have some discussions this year with the Chairman and the Service Chiefs in the unified command plan discussion, to help streamline that process.

Certainly, there is concern that we provide for an active defense capability for Alaska. During World War II, the Aleutian Chain were invaded and held by the Japanese. That's something we don't want to repeat. The missions of that homeland defense falls in NORTHCOM. So, we want to partner with Pacific Command and with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs, to try to better streamline that process. So, maybe we can take one hat or two hats off, and get down to just a manageable amount.

Senator BEGICH. Do you agree, as the Arctic continues its process—as we know, problem in 30 years, is the estimate, that all summer will be ice-free, that there's going to be a lot of other activity, civilian and military, by other countries, within that region, and thinking now about it is probably to our advantage, rather than thinking 10 years or 15 years down the line. Is that a fair statement?

General RENUART. Senator, absolutely. The Arctic—none of us are expert enough to know how much open water, for how long. But, certainly we're going to see more navigable water in the Arctic. It's an area where we had not focused our attention—national attention for quite a period of time. Before the last administration left, they published a paper indicating strategy for the Arctic. I think that's a great start. We need to continue that effort and, I think, partner with the Arctic Council nations on a common strategy for research and for development, to settle disputes.

Then, finally—and I know the Senate will continue to consider this—the U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty is something that is critical to give us a seat at the table to be involved in these discussions.

Senator BEGICH. The Law of the Sea.

General RENUART. We very much support ratification of that treaty as soon as we can.

Senator BEGICH. You have my next question, which was Law of the Sea. I guess one question that comes up—and tell me, if you can—very short answer—some are concerned that—by the United States being a part of that—the Law of the Sea—that we will give up some of our sovereignty. Do you believe that statement?

General RENUART. No, sir, I don't. I think U.S. sovereignty is something we hold and protect very dearly, and I don't believe we would give that up.

Senator BEGICH. Very good. Let me ask you, if I can, on the missile defense system in Alaska. Great debate last year, "Should it be 40-plus, or should it be 30?" The decision was, through mutual discussions—and I think this committee did a lot of work to get to the agreement of 30—and do you still agree with that statement, that it should be 30 operational GBIs there?

General RENUART. Yes, Senator, I think 30 is the right number. I would point out that the additional missiles that will be con-

structed are not restricted from being used, if we were to need them.

Senator BEGICH. Correct.

General RENUART. I think that gives us some capacity—

Senator BEGICH. Right.

General RENUART.—to plus, if that would be required.

Senator BEGICH. Right, and I had wanted to comment on that. I want to thank you for that, because I think one of the things you have done, especially in the last 4 or 5 months, maybe 6 months, is create that flexibility that, depending on the situation, you could plus-up and have a situation available, or infrastructure available, to handle that, is part of the plan. Is that a fair statement?

General RENUART. That's a fair statement. Yes, sir.

Senator BEGICH. In that regard, one of the things that I want to make sure—I know, in the 2010 budget, there's probably, I—I want to say—this might be close number—\$13-, \$14 million to continue to deal with Field 2 up there, to get it completed. We know, through our work and through your agencies—or agency of DOD, that it needs closer to about \$100 million to finish out all the work that's necessary to keep that flexibility as they close down Field 1, which is just—was kind of a test site of six. How do you think you'll be able to go about making sure those revenues, those resource are there to continue to make sure the base infrastructure is available to take care of the Field 1, which is in deplorable condition? Give me your—

General RENUART. Senator—

Senator BEGICH.—those are my words. I know those aren't the technical words, but—

General RENUART. If I could—let me provide you some more detail for the record.

Senator BEGICH. Okay.

General RENUART. But, we work very closely with General O'Reilly. I believe his view is that he has sufficient flexibility to be able to ensure that we can keep Field 2 on track, and—but let us get back to you with some more specifics on that.

Senator BEGICH. That'd be great. I just want to echo that, please, whatever he could do to keep that moving along, because the mobilization of the equipment and the people are working. When you demobe, it just is more costly, and this is a huge opportunity. So, I—I know he has a lot of flexibility, because the way we wrote that last year was to give him the flexibility, as he saw fit. So, if you could get us that that'd be great, and I'd encourage him to move forward.

General RENUART. Yes, sir, will do.

[The information referred to follows:]

The fiscal year 2011 President's budget requested the funding needed to continue the operations, sustainment, and maintenance of Missile Field 1 and to complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration. The request reflects funds required in addition to fiscal year 2009 funds previously appropriated for work on Missile Field 2 and fiscal year 2010 funds previously appropriated to suspend work on Missile Field 2. On February 17 2010, the Missile Defense Agency submitted a reprogramming request to the Department's Comptroller for the realignment of \$72.8 million of fiscal year 2009 research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds and \$16 million of fiscal year 2010 RDT&E funds within the Ballistic Missile Defense System Midcourse Defense program element for the continuation of Missile Field 2.

Senator BEGICH. Last question then. Doug—I don't want to leave you out—General Fraser. But, one—as more and more alternative renewable energy is being debated in Alaska, one of the big issues is wind turbines. General Renuart, this is the last question for you. Are you dealing with that and understanding—and I know it's a very small—but, I know we're starting to hear some concerns that it may interfere with the mission and airspace. Are you working with the civilian population to make sure we manage this correctly? Are there things we need to be looking out for as we deal, for example, with an energy bill and making sure that the military is not forgotten in this equation?

General RENUART. Senator, that's a great question. Very quickly, there is a challenge, as we develop, particularly, wind farms, but we also see with new building construction, where those—that development has—interferes with the send/receive capability of our ground-based radars. I sent a letter to Secretary Gates asking for a formal body to be formed, allowing us to review these, so that a developer has a place to come to ask these questions.

Senator BEGICH. Oh, great.

General RENUART. Secretary's committed—Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul Stockton—to lead that effort for that Department. We're partnering with the Federal Aviation Administration and others. But, we are—we need to continue to make this process mature. We've had questions from Senator Webb and others on similar issues, and we know that's a real concern, and we're committed to work that aggressively.

Senator BEGICH. Great. Please keep us informed on that. That'd be—that's great to hear that.

General RENUART. Yes, sir.

Senator BEGICH. General Fraser, I feel like I have to ask you a question, because I don't want to leave you there. You are a great addition to our Alaska team up there, and I know you're doing a great job in SOUTHCOM. We've had some great discussion in regards to that.

One of the things I want to just ask—you and I have had a conversation about a special unit within your organization that deals with, kind of, the humanitarian component and the work you do. Do you—and we talked briefly about—about how it's appropriate for your command, it may not be as appropriate for other commands—but, have you found that component, that unit, of high value for your command, in assisting you with some of the unique situations you have in Central America in the SOUTHCOM section? Maybe you could just expand a little bit on that.

General FRASER. Yes, Senator—

Senator BEGICH. I found it very intriguing that you had this underneath your—

General FRASER. You're talking human rights or—

Senator BEGICH. Yes.

General FRASER. Yes. We have a human rights office that has been in existence for quite a number of years now, has a human rights initiative in which 34 countries from around the region have all signed up to. A very active program. Has made and helped enable a lot of significant progress throughout the region. Colombia has come up fairly dramatically in their efforts and their

focus on this. Guatemala has the same. They're very much connected within this. So, it's a very vibrant office, and is out actively pursuing and enabling and enriching human rights discussions throughout the region.

Senator BEGICH. It's unique to SOUTHCOM, is that correct?

General FRASER. SOUTHCOM is the only combatant command that has one of these, and it's a resource that's available to any of the combatant commanders.

Senator BEGICH. Very good. I, again, want to thank you for our conversation, especially during the earthquake, and the work you have done there, and your troops have done, and all the affiliated services that, kind of, came to the call immediately. As—I had heard great descriptions of your capacity to stay up many long nights, and sleep on whatever's available, in order to continue to keep the command working. I just wanted to thank you and the troops for doing such a good job under a very unique situation, and how fast you mobilized.

General FRASER. Senator, it's a great team effort. Thank you.

Senator BEGICH. Very good.

Good to see you both. General, thank you very much.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Begich.

Let me just announce that, when we begin the second hearing, we will follow the same order of recognition that we've been following for the first hearing. We're not going to start a new or changed order, in terms of recognition of Senators, so that everybody can know where they stand.

Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

General, let me thank you for your 39 years of extraordinary service. I assume that, now that you're retiring, you will be able to get to Maine's Franco-American Festivals, that we've talked about before, to celebrate your heritage. I look forward to being your personal guide in any of those festivals.

I want to bring up an issue that is an increasing problem in my State, and that is the problem of drug trafficking across the northern border. There's been a great deal of focus, and indeed discussion this morning, about the problem with the Mexican drug cartels. Fortunately, the violence level at the northern border isn't anything close to what we're seeing at the southern border, but that doesn't mean that drug trafficking is not a problem. Indeed, it's such a problem that, last December, Maine's Federal judges met with me to express their alarm about the enormous increase in drug trafficking, particularly of methamphetamine, across the Canadian border. They told me that Canada is now one of the world's top producers of meth, and that this dangerous drug is increasingly being smuggled across the border in Maine.

I understand that the violence associated with the Mexican drug cartels demands that the majority of the resources be focused on that. But, I'm concerned about whether there is a sufficient focus on the smuggling of meth and other dangerous drugs into the State of Maine.

Could you give me more information on what you're doing to counter what you call, in your testimony, "a serious transnational threat to our country"?

General RENUART. Senator, first, I look forward to having you host me at a great event in Maine in the coming days. That would be wonderful.

I think you hit on a very important element. We do tend to focus on drug trafficking south to north, and if—as I talk to my Canadian counterparts, both in the military and in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), they also indicate an alarming increase in drug activity, drug-related violence, in Canada. We have our JTF-North, who is focused on DOD support along the borders, both north and south, as well as in the maritime. This year, we actually are increasing the number of small but effective operations that we will conduct along the northern border, in partnership with both our Federal law enforcement—DEA and others—and our RCMP friends.

Let me get that data with more specifics, and I'll take that question, if I may, for the record and get that back to you specifically as it looks to Maine.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I also noted that, in your testimony, you indicated that you had taken steps to identify threats similar to the threat posed by Major Hasan at Fort Hood. Have you specifically directed your personnel to do more training on the signs of violent radicalization, particularly Islamist radicalization within the ranks?

General RENUART. Senator, Secretary Gates directed a fairly detailed study of the Hasan case. Out of that, there are a number of recommendations. They're primarily pushed to the Services, because they have the responsibility for organize, train, and equip.

Our role is to ensure that, if you will, facilities are then provided the right kinds of information so that their local officials can focus on—focus their attention on specific events. To that degree, we have worked very closely with our friends in the law—in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on information-sharing of a nature that would be important to our military facilities. We've increased that kind of activity over the last, really, couple years and certainly accelerated some of the programs after the Hasan case.

So, I—our role is to look at how these Services all view these. We're comfortable that the recommendations out of the Secretary's investigation committee make a lot of sense, and we're continuing to support those.

Senator COLLINS. General Fraser, do you have anything to add on that issue?

General FRASER. No, ma'am. We're very much in the same position as General Renuart. So, it's really focused—the only other piece I would put in—those people who are assigned to our organizations, especially the headquarters, then we do have a specific focus on supporting their needs.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Finally, I want to associate myself with the comments that Senator Lieberman made about the change and the new teams that are going to take the place of two of the three CBRNE CMRFs. I'm very concerned about whether adequate resources are going to be invested so that we can respond effectively to a weapon of mass destruction. My specific question is how the new Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) would coordinate, plan, train, and exercise with the regional FEMA offices. I worked very hard to create a regional FEMA response team that would be across agency lines in response to the failed response to Hurricane Katrina. So, that kind of coordination is very important if we're going in a different direction.

General RENUART. Senator, again, just very quickly, we have been asked to create the concept of operations that ensures just that kind of coordination is done. I think there will be a resourcing element of that, that we have to focus on very clearly, because these HRFs are hosted by—under the command of a Governor. So on a day-to-day basis, we have to ensure that, across the enterprise of consequence management, all of those are talking. By the way, they are also connected to the Federal agencies, like FEMA. So, this is a bit of work in progress. We owe the Secretary back a concept brief at the end of this month, and I think we'll have identified some of those very issues that you mentioned.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.

Senator UDALL.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Generals.

General Renuart, thank you for taking the time to visit with me yesterday. As I thought more about your plans to retire in Colorado, I was struck by the old adage that a—at least for us elected officials, a statesman is a dead politician. We—some wag said, "We need more statesmen," but I'll leave that for another conversation. I don't know your long-term plans are, I don't know what the equivalent in the military is, but we're looking forward to the benefit of your advice and your senior retired status. Although you don't look senior to me; you're fit. I know we welcome you as a permanent resident in Colorado.

General RENUART. Thanks, Senator.

Senator UDALL. I'm going to lean on you for further insights and advice.

Would you talk about the National Guard commission recommendations, and specifically how you've increased guardsmen at the headquarters, and how they've been incorporated? I think you and I have talked about what a great opportunity this is to further enhance the role of the Guard, to better understand how we utilize and deploy the Guard. I want to tip my hat to you, in the Northern Command, for what you've done in that regard, but please elaborate.

General RENUART. Senator, we've—we have 50 full-time National Guard positions in our headquarters; 45 of those are filled. We've grown that number over time. That's very effective. But, across my headquarters, a substantial percentage of the military—Active military have served in a position where they've been associated with

either the Reserves or the Guard. A substantial percentage of my civilians have—are former members of the National Guard or the Reserve. So, we have a very good flavor and footprint in that regard.

In fact, the State of Colorado has been particularly supportive, as we have 25 Colorado guardsmen who are a part of that full-time support. I just hired a new military assistant for NORAD, and he will come from the Colorado Air National Guard. So, we've built a close relationship, and I'm very pleased with that.

I think we need to continue to look for opportunities to bring our Reserve component in as active participants in our headquarters. We have over 130 positions that could be filled, and we're working closely with both the Reserves of our Services, as well as National Guard Bureau, to try to keep those all as full as is possible.

So, we're very proud of our relationship. I think we've built a closer relationship with the National Guard Bureau itself than we've ever had before.

Senator UDALL. Kudos to you. I think you and I share a philosophy, and I think General Fraser does, as well, that the Reserves and the Guard in this era of the All-Volunteer Force, and as powerful and as sophisticated as it is, there's a tendency for it to become isolated from society. The Reserves and the Guard provide that pipeline, if you will, and that connection between civilians and those who serve us so ably in the military.

Let me turn to educational opportunities. General Fraser, I want to ask you to comment, as well. I know General Renuart's really been interested in this, particularly in the area of homeland security. Do you think the Joint Command educational opportunities should be expanded, maybe to include Ph.D. programs? In your experience, are those advanced degrees truly effective at bringing back a level of expertise to the force? If so, could they be enhanced? Maybe, General Renuart, start with you, and then——

General RENUART. Senator, I think——

Senator UDALL.—General Fraser, if you'd like to——

General RENUART.—the—in our traditional paradigm, the Services, each of them, direct the education programs for their individual people. As we've seen the growth of joint commands, I think that there is an opportunity for joint combatant commands to focus educational opportunities on skill sets that are unique to them. In our case, with homeland defense, homeland security, civil support, many of those skills don't traditionally reside in our service-focused education programs. So I think there is an opportunity for us to relook this paradigm and look for opportunities to allow combatant commanders to target, a small number potentially, but a number of unique education programs that will then benefit their commands. Then, I think we have to work the personnel system to allow us to take advantage of that. We do that, currently, with Chairman Mullen's initiative on the AfPakans, where we're developing, if you will, area experts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Senator UDALL. General Fraser, do you care to comment?

General FRASER. Yes, Senator, thank you.

I agree with General Renuart, and I would probably add on another part to that, especially as we've just—working through our experience in Haiti—and that is to also include an interagency part

to that. Because it's not only the joint piece, but it is understanding the other parts of our interagency, our counterparts there, that will have great benefit as we apply a whole-of-government approach in many of the situations that we face in the future.

Senator UDALL. Yes, that's helpful. General Renuart and I talked yesterday about DHS and the Mexican border situation and what's unfolding there.

Final question, General Renuart—and I think, in a sense, this is—strikes right at your legacy. Talk just a little about the relationship between the two commands that you oversee, NORAD and NORTHCOM. Why is it important to have a common commander and staff, in the future?

General RENUART. Well, I think, when the two commands were formed, there was clearly an opportunity there to create a transparent—or a transition from warning of threats, that NORAD has traditionally provided, to the real operational defense of the homeland, whether its missile or maritime homeland defense, into consequence management of a natural disaster or manmade event. Over the years, the relationships between those two commands have become truly interdependent. Today, you can't separate the functions of warning from the functions of defense actions from the functions of consequence management. The structure that it takes to operate in that spectrum is consistently tied at every level. While there is certainly a difference between the binational command, NORAD, and our—the operations there, and the U.S. national authorities for NORTHCOM, the opportunity to keep them connected, almost at every level, provides great synergy for the Nation.

In terms of the commander, I believe that it would be difficult not to have the same person in command of both of those headquarters because it—because of that synergy. I think we've seen, in the last 3 years, a real move to operationalize that. I think the results speak for themselves. We are increasingly effective in that regard, and very proud of that.

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that—insights. Again, thank you for your service.

Thank you, to both of you, for taking care of our hemisphere—the American Hemisphere and all the opportunities we have here, and in maintaining our leadership role.

Finally, a shout out to the Canadians, who've been such great partners of ours, and we're so fortunate to have them on our northern border, and to share a common culture and values and outlook. General, you've maintained, enhanced, and nurtured that relationship. I know they're—I've talked to some of the Canadian general officers, and they are sorry to see you go, because you've had such a great relationship with them.

General RENUART. Well, it's in my family blood, so I have to. Thank you.

Senator UDALL. That's right. That's right. Yes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to both of you for your great leadership, your service to our country.

General Renuart, as you wind down these 37 years—I know it's been a long time since your commissioning in 1972, but what great leadership, what great selfless service you have provided to our country. You're certainly a model to that next generation of leaders in every branch of our Service. So, thanks for your commitment. Thanks for your service. Personally, thanks for your friendship over the years. You've been a great asset to me as we've traversed through any number of issues. So, we appreciate you very much.

We're not going to let you retire yet, General Fraser. We're going to keep you around a while, so—[Laughter.]

Senator CHAMBLISS. General Fraser, in highlighting the importance of partnering in partnership with nations in SOUTHCOM area of operations, currently one of the best ways that we have to build and sustain those partnerships is through WHINSEC. I was pleased to see both of you comment on that in your opening statements, as well as your written statement.

Senator Levin and I are pleased to serve on the board for WHINSEC, and I've seen, firsthand, the value of the training that WHINSEC conducts and the partnerships with our southern allies that it helps to create. What are your thoughts regarding WHINSEC? How does it help you carry out your mission? What does it provide to nations that choose to send personnel to WHINSEC?

General FRASER. Senator, thank you for that question. It's a very important institution for us. It provides a lot of capability-building. It has a real focus on democratic values, on human rights instruction. In fact, 10 percent of the course load is specifically focused on human rights. But, as you mentioned, it's really that partnership-building. It's not only partnership-building with members of the U.S. military, but it's across all the militaries who attend those courses.

So, much like we've experienced in Haiti, where I've had at least a couple of instances where the U.S. officers had gone to school and—with, one case, a Canadian counterpart, in another case, a Brazilian counterpart, and they understood one another right away, and it really facilitated the operations in the future. So, no matter where we go, in a partnership-building capacity throughout the region, or specifically in working each—in working together on crises, it makes a huge difference for us.

Senator CHAMBLISS. The current Defense authorization bill contains a provision requiring public disclosure of names and—of students and instructors who attend WHINSEC, as well as their countries of origin. In your opinion, what effect will this provision have on foreign countries' willingness to send students, as well as instructors, to WHINSEC? What effect will it have on WHINSEC's ability to help SOUTHCOM carry out its mission?

General FRASER. Senator, I'm concerned that it will have a negative impact on it, that we have gone out and at least looked, and discussed with some of our partners there; they would be concerned if those names were released. I'm concerned, even for the U.S. military personnel and their families who support WHINSEC, with the

release of that. So, I personally do not support the release of names.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you.

General Renuart, as you complete your third year as the commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM, as we look forward, what do you think are the biggest challenges out there for these respective commands?

General RENUART. Senator, I think, as we see in many of the Services, recapitalization of our infrastructure is important to us. The age of our Air Sovereignty Fighter Force obviously is growing, and we want to continue to monitor very closely the development, the fielding of new systems that can allow us to maintain the air sovereignty of our two nations. The radar sites also are aging, and we have initiatives in place. So continuing to support the modernization of those are the things that I think are very important for the NORAD role.

For NORTHCOM, I think continuing to work more closely with our border security partners, our interagency partners, continue to work closely with Mexico, especially in this area of countering illicit trade and traffic, I think are some of the future challenges. As Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman mentioned, making sure that the CMRF is well-organized, trained, and equipped, and executable for the Nation. Because we don't know when one of those events will occur, we have to be ready at any moment.

Senator CHAMBLISS. In November 2007, over 450 F-15s were grounded due to structural concerns, a number of them under your command. As a result of that, in NORTHCOM we had to call on the Canadians, who flew CF-18s, to fill in for F-15s for a period of about 3 weeks. As our F-15 platforms continue to age—and they're a part of that aging fleet that you alluded to—and they make their way towards retirement, are you concerned about available assets and the level of acceptable risk in the conduct of your air sovereign mission?

General RENUART. Senator, I'm very concerned that we maintain an acceptable force level so that we can keep that mission intact. The Air Force is conducting a—if you will, a fighter force review that will target, not only the assignment of its aircraft in places, but where we invest money, from the Air Force's perspective, in maintaining that fighter force, as new systems come aboard. I think you're going to have a hearing about one of those in just a few minutes. I do monitor that very carefully. I've said, often publicly, on the record, that the baseline force that we have has to be maintained. I'm very comfortable, so far, that DOD—and certainly Department of the Air Force—are committed to maintaining that. But, it's something we monitor as you see adjustments in delivery rates or in aging rates of each of our systems.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Well, you're right, we're going to be talking about the F-35 here a little later on this morning. You and I have had opportunity to visit, relative to the performance of the F-22. I'd like for you to comment on that, as you have seen it firsthand. Second, what effect or impact will a slippage in the initial operational capability on the F-35 have on NORTHCOM?

General RENUART. Senator, first, on the F-22, it has proven itself to be an excellent weapon system. We've used it in our air defense

missions in Alaska and have found it to be a very capable system. I think the Department is committed to continue its spiral development into the modern versions of the airplane that were planned. So, I'm very comfortable that it give us a capability that's much needed in our Air Force.

With respect to the F-35 timing, again, if we see that program delay, then it's—of—it will be of interest to me to ensure that we maintain the quality and capability of our existing F-16, F-15 fleet—again, to maintain that air defense. For right now, I am not—I don't feel there's an unacceptable level of risk, because I think the two match pretty well. But, obviously if something changes, we'll monitor that very carefully.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. Thank you very much.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

We're ready to proceed, I believe, now, to our second hearing.

Senator Collins, if you don't have an additional question.

We thank you both. We are, again, very appreciative of the service that you have always provided this Nation; your families' great support, we thank them for that.

Again, General Renuart, all the best to you on your upcoming retirement.

General RENUART. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. We're going to take a 3-minute recess.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

##### HAITI RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF

1. Senator BILL NELSON. General Fraser, it is my understanding that the USNS *Comfort* has departed Haiti and we are in the process of drawing down our forces to approximately 8,000 over the next couple of days. What will be the biggest challenge as we draw down U.S. forces in Haiti and turn over responsibilities to the United Nations (U.N.) Peacekeeping Force?

General FRASER. Our greatest challenge as we draw down U.S. forces in Haiti is to ensure, together with our U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.N., and nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners, sufficient engineering improvement in Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps to weather the upcoming rainy season. We also may need to assist in the movement of as many as 9,000 at-risk people prior to the rainy season in order to prevent potential loss of life due to flash flooding and mud slides. For this reason, our drawdown will be somewhat slower than originally contemplated and we intend to maintain some capacity in Haiti through the hurricane season.

2. Senator BILL NELSON. General Fraser, what are your greatest security concerns in Haiti post-earthquake i.e. drug trafficking, gangs, general instability?

General FRASER. First let me say that the security situation in Haiti remains stable; however, challenges persist.

The most immediate security issue is the overcrowded camps due to the thousands of internally displaced Haitians living there, and in many cases, lacking adequate sanitation and internal camp security. Anecdotal reporting indicates crime within these camps, most prevalent after dark, ranges from petty theft to rape. I would note that the U.S., Government of Haiti, and the international community are taking steps to improve camp security, including additional police patrolling and physical improvement such as lighting.

Finally, I would like to say the Haitian populace has demonstrated a remarkable level of patience since the January 12th earthquake. While it is possible that general instability could result from the rainy season or hurricane season, we believe this is unlikely.

3. Senator BILL NELSON. General Fraser, a recent New York Times article on Haiti reports that, “according to a U.N. map of greater Port-au-Prince circulating among recovery teams, 21 out of the 500 makeshift settlements are considered high risk for flooding, landslides, or overcrowding. Seven—home to 150,000 to 200,000 people—are deemed life-threatening.” With the rainy season officially beginning on April 15, what are we doing to help internally displaced Haitians in and around Port-au-Prince with shelter and sanitation?

General FRASER. Shelter and sanitation continue to be the top priorities for the Government of Haiti. Operation Unified Response personnel qualified in building damage assessment recently trained Haitian responders in damage assessment, enabling them to continue assessments of buildings and homes across Port au Prince with an eye towards urging Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) to return to those homes deemed structurally safe. The distribution of shelter material continues to be a high percentage of total relief supplies distribution.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is working closely with the Haitian Government, U.N., and NGO partners, and camp populations to establish a real-time sanitation monitoring system. The system will track the sanitary situation in displacement sites and detect immediate and structural challenges. Over the coming weeks, IOM’s environmental health and sanitation unit will train residents in several camps to report on crucial health issues such as water, sanitation and hygiene issues. The teams will also focus on fighting mosquitoes in order to prevent malaria and dengue fever, as well as environmental hazards, especially flood and mud-slide risks.

Over the last several weeks, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and others have undertaken engineering projects at the most vulnerable camps to reduce the risk of flooding. At this point we believe that perhaps 9,000 IDP residents will need to be moved to safer sites.

4. Senator BILL NELSON. General Fraser, are you satisfied that our civilian agencies will pick up the slack on the humanitarian operations—including the security of food distribution—when the U.S. military departs?

General FRASER. Yes, I am satisfied that the Government of Haiti assisted by the U.N., USAID, and NGOs can and will successfully conduct the full range of needed humanitarian assistance as U.S. military forces continue to depart. I would stress that we have always linked any reduction of DOD forces to the clear capacity on the ground of other organizations to assume our activities.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

##### DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

5. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, I understand that you provide command and control for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) as part of your mission to conduct civil support operations. How do you integrate the forces of the National Guard and the Reserves of all Services into DSCA operations?

General RENUART. National Guard forces will normally respond to a catastrophic event in State Active Duty or Title 32 Status, under the command of a Governor. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) coordinates with the National Guard to synchronize and integrate Federal and State military operations to avoid duplication and achieve unity of effort.

NORTHCOM integrates Title 10 Reserve units and individuals into DSCA operations when they are mobilized or activated. For example, the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) program consists of more than 400 Reserve officers who belong to the Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and have volunteered to support DSCA operations. As reservists, EPLOs possess unique knowledge about their regions and States, including: capabilities, key infrastructure, transportation systems, and local geography. NORTHCOM will normally request EPLO activation before, during, or after an incident or event to assist the Defense Coordinating Officer and our components in coordinating DOD’s response. Additionally, NORTHCOM sponsors an annual workshop to train and educate EPLOs on DOD and NORTHCOM policies, plans, and procedures.

6. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, are there any restrictions?

General RENUART. Yes, in accordance with Title 10, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Federal reservists are only available for civil emergencies while in voluntary inactive duty for training status. To eliminate this restriction, we support a statutory change to allow the Secretary of Defense to order Army, Navy, Air Force, and

Marine reservists to active duty to provide assistance in large-scale, manmade, natural, and accidental disasters or catastrophes when the response capabilities of Federal, State, and local civilian agencies have been, or will be, exceeded. This authority will enable the nearest unit, which is often Reserve, to respond—saving time, money, and American lives.

7. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, what specific roles does the Coast Guard play in DSCA?

General RENUART. DSCA is conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD). Though a military service, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and therefore does not conduct DSCA. However, NORTHCOM and the USCG are mission partners in responding to domestic contingency operations. Additionally, the USCG, due to its statutory responsibilities, is engaged daily in civil support well before DOD assistance is requested.

NORTHCOM and the USCG coordinate routinely to ensure unity of effort in the area of civil support operations. Regular missions performed by the Coast Guard include maritime Search and Rescue, Port Waterways and Coastal Security, and waterways management, including prevention and response to natural and man-made disasters in the U.S. marine transportation system.

There are 20 full-time USCG positions, including one flag officer (Deputy Director of Operations), within the NORTHCOM headquarters.

8. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, how many personnel from other government agencies are permanently assigned to your command?

General RENUART. Thirty-one people from non-DOD government agencies are permanently assigned to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and NORTHCOM. In addition, there are 20 agency representatives, who reside with their parent agency, but are permanently assigned as the primary liaison between NORAD and NORTHCOM and their agency.

9. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, what are the advantages of having these agencies assigned versus detailed to your command?

General RENUART. Having agency representatives permanently assigned to NORTHCOM allows for a truly “collaborative” environment in which agencies jointly develop and execute integrated plans and operations, and processes which fuse our cultures together in a common purpose. Permanently assigned agency representatives throughout NORAD and NORTHCOM provide interagency synchronization. They assist and facilitate coordination of interagency issues, initiatives and operations between the NORAD and NORTHCOM Battle Staff, components, deployed assets and external agencies. Resident agency representatives also facilitate interagency information sharing.

Interorganizational representatives are the primary enablers in coordinating additional or refined connectivity as required with key external partners to ensure NORTHCOM is connected correctly to support day-to-day exercise and contingency operations. These representatives are essential for providing interagency context to our decisionmaking process, providing the interagency perspective to the NORTHCOM staff and providing the DOD perspective back to their parent organizations. This level of action and insight is only realized when an agency is fully integrated into the Command.

10. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, what role does Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) play in DSCA?

General RENUART. JTF-CS plans and integrates DOD support to the designated primary agency for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence management operations. When approved by the Secretary of Defense and directed by the Commander of NORTHCOM, JTF-CS deploys to the incident site and executes timely and effective command and control of designated DOD forces, providing support to civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support.

JTF-CS focuses on responding to the effects of a CBRNE incident after civilian resources have been utilized first and fully. Some typical JTF-CS tasks include incident site support, casualty medical assistance and treatment, displaced populace support, mortuary affairs support, logistics support, and air operations.

JTF-CS accomplishes its consequence management mission in strict adherence to existing Federal law, which carefully balances the support capabilities within the U.S. military with the needs of civil authorities during emergencies. In most instances, JTF-CS and its designated forces are deployed only after a State or territorial Governor requests Federal assistance from the president. In any domestic set-

ting, JTF-CS remains in support of the primary agency throughout the CBRNE consequence management operation.

JTF-CS can also conduct non-CBRNE DSCA missions at the direction of NORTHCOM. However, due to the unique capabilities that JTF-CS affords the national-level CBRNE response, considerations will be made at all levels to select alternative capabilities to meet non-CBRNE mission requirements.

11. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, is there a plan to give the civil support teams the ability to provide mission support and advice to the combatant commanders, in addition to their role to support the governors?

General RENUART. There is no plan to have Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) provide direct mission support to combatant commanders. However, WMD-CST situation reports do currently flow from the States to NORTHCOM through the National Guard Bureau.

#### LABORATORY PERSONNEL DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS

12. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, the command has permanently assigned members of the National Guard and the Reserves. Do you feel the mix of Active and full-time Reserve component personnel is sufficient to carry out the mission of the command?

General RENUART. There are over 50 full-time Reserve component authorizations in NORTHCOM headquarters; however, only 45 of those positions are filled. More work is needed to fund and fill these important positions. Our mix of Active Duty and Reserve component is about right, if we can get the current positions filled. We have a Reserve component presence in every staff directorate in my headquarters working alongside their Active Duty brethren with the heaviest concentration in the Operations Directorate. I'm confident the Reserve component is represented in everything we do in the headquarters. I would submit that any change would be driven by funding and availability. I need either Active Duty manpower to fill valid positions or the Reserve Component funding to compensate for active duty shortages. The mission will not suffer depending on the type of manpower, but a lack of manpower could increase risk. The National Guard has made a significant investment in personnel assigned to NORTHCOM. In fact, NORTHCOM has the largest concentration of Title 10 National Guard officers in a joint organization outside of the National Guard Bureau.

13. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, how do you interface with the DHS and are you in support of their efforts?

General RENUART. NORTHCOM routinely works with the DHS on operational planning, training and execution of homeland defense and civil support missions. For defense support of civil authorities missions, NORTHCOM supports requests from the DHS in accordance with direction from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

14. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, illegal drugs continue to be problematic in the Southwest Border (SWB) States. You have a role to play in providing support to that effort. How long do you anticipate that the SWB mission using National Guard troops will be required?

General RENUART. In order to effectively counter the threat of transnational criminal organizations in the SWB region, the U.S. Government needs to leverage the potential synergies among many agencies with homeland security, law enforcement, and defense missions while deepening the U.S. strategic alliance with the Government of Mexico.

The Joint Staff advised NORTHCOM in 2009 of a request for forces from the DHS for military support along the SWB. The request was in anticipation of potential spill over violence by Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations attempting to solidify control of territorial smuggling corridors. The request for DOD support was patterned after Operation Jump Start (2005-2007) to bridge capabilities until U.S. Customs and Border Protection could train new personnel to cover the expansion of requirements along the northern and southern borders of the United States. NORTHCOM has not been tasked by the Secretary of Defense to fill those positions with Title 10 forces. The National Guard Bureau, through the Joint Staff, has been tasked with planning how to support DHS with Title 32 forces.

15. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, how effective is your joint intelligence fusion cell in providing actionable intelligence/information to various law enforcement agencies?

General RENUART. [Deleted].

16. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, within the mission to provide theater security cooperation, what specific training programs do you provide Mexico?

General RENUART. NORTHCOM coordinates the following kinds of training for the Mexican military:

- Professional development
- Professional military education in U.S. War Colleges and Staff Colleges
- English language training
- Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection
- Combat medical training
- Port Security training
- Logistics, supply, and warehouse training
- Combat strategic intelligence training
- Human rights training
- Military justice/Rule of Law training
- Tactical intelligence training
- Public Affairs training
- Information Systems training
- Naval operations training
- Patrol craft operations training
- Ship repair training
- Initial helicopter pilot training
- Helicopter maintenance training
- Aircraft pilot upgrade training
- Aircraft maintenance training (hydraulics, electronics, pneumatics, corrosion control)
- Maintenance supervisor training
- Operational law training
- Anti-corruption workshop/training
- Aviation safety training
- Joint training
- Ship inspection and container security training
- Ship power plant—maintenance training
- Civil-Military operations training
- Urban operations training
- Riverine training
- Counter Terrorism fellowship training
- International Dynamics of Terrorism courses
- Senior executive level courses on global security threats
- Aircrew weapons director training
- Aircrew simulator training
- Counter Narcotics Operations training
- Aviation survival training
- Pilot instrument procedures training
- Army Ranger training
- Jumpmaster training
- Dive training
- Search and rescue training
- Hemispheric security and defense training
- Psychological operations training

17. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, what specific programs and DSCA support do you cooperate with Canada along our northern border?

General RENUART. Defense Support of Civil Authorities is not conducted outside of the United States and its territories. However, NORTHCOM has signed the Canada-U.S. Civil Assistance Plan (CANUS CAP) with Canada Command (CANADACOM) establishing the framework for the military of one nation to support the military of the other nation pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes. If support is provided to civil authorities, it is still under military-to-military support, that is, the military forces of one nation supports the military forces of the other nation that are providing military support of civil authorities. The CANUS CAP was used during crisis action planning in the 2008 hurricane season, and for deliberate planning in response to requests from the Government of Canada for support during the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games. During the 2010 Olympic

Games, NORTHCOM was prepared to provide support to CANADACOM as they supported Public Safety Canada.

#### DISASTER RELIEF IN HAITI AND CHILE

18. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, I want to commend your command for providing the initial support to the relief efforts in Haiti and your potential support to Chile. What impact will these operations have on your other efforts within your Area of Responsibility (AOR)?

General FRASER. Due to the increased operational tempo required of the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) staff and its components as a result of the Haitian and Chilean crisis, we canceled two of our Foreign Military Interaction exercises this year, Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias and the command post exercise portion of Peacekeeping Operations-Americas (PKO-A). Although these training opportunities were lost for this year, we anticipate executing them as planned next year, so there will not be any long term impact to the region. Other exercises will require some modification.

In order to support the U.S. effort in Haiti, 12 of the SOUTHCOM's Medical Readiness and Training Exercises (MEDRETEs) were refocused on Haiti (6 previously programmed in Haiti, 4 reprogrammed from other countries, and 2 were created). Although redirecting four MEDRETEs from their original countries impacted our original theater security cooperation priorities, the high level of need in Haiti demanded the change. More significantly, with the tremendous support of the Louisiana National Guard, we created an additional New Horizons exercise for Haiti. This Humanitarian Civic Assistance exercise includes engineering, construction, and medical projects, selected in consultation with USAID and the U.S. Embassy in Haiti that will complement the U.S. relief effort while providing U.S. troops realistic training.

With regard to SOUTHCOM Humanitarian Assistance Program, our ability to engage with other partner nations in the region and to fund potential disaster response operations throughout the AOR has been diminished until the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid baseline is restored by the pending Haiti supplemental request.

#### JOINT CAPABILITY TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS

19. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, I understand that you have been approved to conduct Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) to address a permanent solution for responding to foreign disasters. What are the objectives and expected outcomes of the JCTD?

General FRASER. SOUTHCOM is the operational lead or co-lead for three Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs) pertaining to military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) activities. While it is not possible to field a permanent solution to the multitude of HA/DR challenges, we expect each of these JCTDs to improve our ability to support interagency and international efforts when disasters strike.

Transnational Information Sharing and Cooperation (TISC) JCTD has an objective of adapting best-of-breed information sharing capabilities to facilitate collaboration with traditional and non-traditional partners in complex environments. It leverages Internet Web 2.0 technologies, such as interactive forums, chats, blogs, wikis, etc., to facilitate timely information sharing among U.S. and partner nation militaries, government agencies, non-governmental and international organizations, and other interested stakeholders. Central to TISC is a customized implementation of the All Partners Access Network (APAN), based on the Asia-Pacific Area Network hosted by the U.S. Pacific Command. TISC is in operational use today and has already yielded great dividends in Haiti. Within hours of the January 12, 2010 earthquake, a dedicated Haiti HA/DR community of 1,900+ registered members began sharing situational information, and quickly transitioned to using TISC's tools to coordinate actions.

The Cooperative Security (CS) JCTD goes beyond TISC/APAN information sharing, with an objective of providing harmonized activity planning, execution monitoring, and feedback between DOD and the many U.S. Government interagency organizations and cultures; and eventually provide interfaces to support other national and international stakeholders. Currently under development, the CS design is projected to incorporate further refinements to APAN, and integrate advanced knowledge management and decision support capabilities.

The Pre-positioned Expeditionary Assistance Kits (PEAK) JCTD recently kicked off with an objective of developing a modular, easy to transport kit that provides deployable water purification, renewable energy, basic situational awareness, and essential communications capabilities. PEAK will support a full spectrum of operations, to include HA/DR, bare-base deployments, peacekeeping operations, and support to law enforcement and civil authorities. The first six prototype units are projected to be available on or about June 30, 2010, less than 4 months from idea to fielded capability.

#### RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES

20. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, are you taking advantage of the civilian acquired skill sets that the Reserve component forces have to offer?

General FRASER. Yes, the Reserve components brings a wealth of experience and knowledge that SOUTHCOM uses every day. In Haiti, we leveraged this extensive pool of experience by filling critical hard-to-fill positions with reservists trained as surgeons, pilots, logisticians, and, search and rescue experts.

In addition, Reserve component civilian acquired skill sets are key to ensuring successful State Partnership Programs (SPPs) projects. For example this year events have been executed focusing on the following civilian skills:

- Full time civilian teachers who are soldiers at the New Hampshire National Guard and the Ministry of Education from El Salvador conducted a training project focused on improving the techniques of teachers of special education.
- Soldiers who work as divers for the New Hampshire police conducted exchanges on underwater search and rescue operations with El Salvador Police department.

Many projects are conducted in Latin America that are focused on developing the civilian capabilities of our partner nations in managing disaster response utilizing our National Guard members who work as civilians in U.S. government disaster management agencies.

Throughout the years, Reserve Component forces have also participated in projects focused on agricultural development, city planning, well digging and many more civilian acquired skill sets that have been key for engaging with our partner nations throughout SOUTHCOM.

#### SECURITY SECTOR REFORM PROGRAM

21. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, what countries are prime candidates for a successful security sector reform program?

General FRASER. SOUTHCOM participates in broader U.S. Government security sector reform (SSR) efforts through interagency review of U.S. Embassy requests for Section 1207 funds to support host nation SSR programs. Haiti, Colombia, Panama, and Paraguay received 1207 funding, and remain viable candidates for further security sector reform programs. In addition, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Jamaica are prime candidates for security sector reform programs. The security challenges posed by illicit trafficking in Peru, Central America, and Jamaica adversely affect the security of these States and their people. In addition, gangs in Central America and Jamaica contribute to serious security challenges. Integrating defense and police against illicit trafficking organizations and gangs, including measures to increase their effectiveness of their joint operations, is critical to the security of these countries and ultimately, the United States.

As one aspect of security sector reform, SOUTHCOM has worked with the defense establishments of various partners in the region, including Colombia and Panama, at their request, to realize more efficient and streamlined structures to manage their defense efforts. Professional militaries are a touchstone of stable and secure societies and professionalization begins at the individual level. To that end, DOD hosts a number of foreign defense establishment students at educational facilities such as the Western Hemisphere Institute of Security Cooperation and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, where DOD provides its best practices on a range of issues, including strategic planning, resource management, and human rights.

## COUNTERNARCOTICS AND COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

22. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, can you identify some examples where the military-to-military engagement has led to enhancing the U.S. counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts?

General FRASER. SOUTHCOM continues to coordinate and implement a focused Counter Narcotics (CN) program, a basic element of which supports the development of a more robust Partner Nation air/maritime interdiction capability. The intent of this effort is to enable Partner Nations to respond independently or in concert with other Partner Nations against the CN threat. When integrated into Joint Interagency Task Force-South's (JIATF-S) overarching CN architecture this capability provides needed synergy to a diminishing number of US air/maritime interdiction assets. Examples where this effort is proving its worth include the following:

Through the Enduring Friendship (EF) Program, SOUTHCOM has assisted Partner Nations in the Caribbean and Central America to enhance their maritime intercept and C2 capability to conduct counter illicit trafficking operations. In fiscal year 2009, SOUTHCOM delivered interceptor boats to the Bahamas (2), Belize (2), Dominican Republic (4), Honduras (4), Nicaragua (4), and Jamaica (2). Additionally, SOUTHCOM provided C2 capability: Harris HF/VHF radios (land based and shipboard), Over the Horizon Tactical Tracking System and Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System, a maintenance and spare parts package for boats and radios, and a training package consisting of command, control and communications (C3), tactical boat operations and equipment maintenance. Nicaragua is an excellent example of how this maritime interdiction capability is being used, as security forces from that nation consistently respond to JIATF-S cued intelligence to support Law Enforcement Agencies in the interdiction and apprehension of illicit traffickers.

Colombia Maritime Interdiction Capability—DOD purchased Midnight Express interdiction boats were delivered beginning in 2006 concurrent with the development of multiple supporting infrastructure projects on both the Pacific and north coast of Colombia. The initial 12 DOD purchased boats all actively engaged in CN maritime interdiction missions responding to Colombian/JIATF-S cued intelligence. Colombian Navy has purchased an additional 14 boats with their own funds with delivery of the first 6 scheduled in July of this fiscal year. Long-term sustainment for the capability has shifted to the Colombian Navy with minimal additional support from the Department of State Narcotics Affairs Section in Colombia. The boats have been active against the Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles threat particularly on the Pacific Coast in/around Buenaventura. JIATF-S and the Colombian Navy work closely in coordinating operations that employ the Midnight Express boats as a force multiplier in the maritime interdiction environment.

SOUTHCOM maintains military-to-military relationships and enhances Host Nation Military Counter Narcotics/Counterterrorism abilities with countries throughout the AOR by conducting a series of recurring engagements which include: Joint Combined Exchange Trainings, Combined Multinational Exercises, Counternarcotics Assistance Missions, Humanitarian Assistance Programs, Intelligence Sharing and Intelligence Cooperation, and Security Assistance Programs. These engagements serve as the foundation to the SOUTHCOM Commander's Theater Campaign Plan and directly enhance and assist these countries' Counter Terrorist Forces and Counternarcotics Forces' effectiveness while enhancing the U.S.'s own counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts.

## STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

23. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, how is the National Guard's SPP integrated into your theater engagement strategy?

General FRASER. The National Guard's SPP is integrated in the SOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy through a balanced approach of military to military, military to civil, and civil to military activities that sustain positive trends, reinforce successes, and cooperatively meet shared transnational challenges. It creates opportunities to develop capabilities within partner countries that support conditions to advance democracy, promote regional security, support hemispheric cooperation, foster future economic opportunities, and build partner nation capacity.

In addition through the office of the Governor, institutional and people-to-people relationships are developed that can be sustained over the long term. The State facilitates local government, academic, and economic contacts, as well as National Guard and civilian community involvement in people-to-people contacts with the Partner Nation. This involves linking the right people, with the right skills and qualifications, at the right time to accomplish the mission and support my SOUTHCOM Strategy 2020.

At this time 20 nations in the region are partnering with the National Guard from 17 States. Over the past year Guard units have participated in engagement opportunities such as engineering and medical exercises. Most recently, I am pleased to note Louisiana and Haiti are about to finalize the details of an SPP relationship.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE

24. Senator SESSIONS. General Renuart, although the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has established a Stockpile Reliability Program to ensure ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) reliability over its service life, there appears to be very little emphasis on actual flight testing. Instead, MDA believes it can utilize ground-tests and inspections, coupled with modeling and simulation, to assess the reliability of the ground-based interceptor (GBI). This obviates the need for flight testing, reducing the number of required GBIs, which in turn reduces costs. The GMD program manager and the MDA Executive Director have briefed staff that MDA plans to acquire only 52 GBIs: 30 will be deployed, while the remaining 22 will be used for testing. By fiscal year 2019, MDA assumes developmental testing will be complete and that three GBIs will remain for stockpile reliability testing through 2032. In other words, MDA concludes that only three GBI flight tests over 12 years will be sufficient to maintain system reliability. As the combatant commander responsible for defending the Homeland against ballistic missile attack, have you been asked to concur on MDA's stockpile reliability plan for the GMD system?

General RENUART. No, we are aware of the Missile Defense Agency's Stockpile Reliability Program, but have not been asked to formally review the plan.

25. Senator SESSIONS. General Renuart, do you agree with MDA's position that only three GBIs are required between 2019 and 2032 to conduct flight testing to assure the reliability of the GBI and the GMD system as a whole?

General RENUART. We believe that a reliability program does need to be based on a representative sample of empirical missile tests at the full up round and component level. In order for MDA to be able to do an increased number of tests, additional funding is required to procure an adequate number of new missiles. This empirical testing, coupled with a comprehensive modeling and simulation approach to assess system reliability, can be combined with the lessons we learn through the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP). The IMTP is not a replacement for a continued reliability assessment program. However, it is a useful tool for the warfighter, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) (as the Functional Manager and Synchronizer), and the combatant commands to work with MDA to develop a comprehensive long-term testing and reliability program.

26. Senator SESSIONS. General Renuart, if three to four flight tests are required for intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles every year to assure the Commander of STRATCOM and the Secretary of Defense that our nuclear deterrent remains reliable, why are only three GBI flight tests necessary over the course of a dozen years?

General RENUART. We believe that an effective stockpile reliability program is contingent on a sufficient number of items for testing as demonstrated by the reliability programs used by the individual Services for missiles like our ICBMs, Patriot, or current fleet of Standard Missiles. If further evaluation indicates a need for additional quantities, my understanding is that MDA can make that buy as late as fiscal year 2013 without incurring a production line break.

27. Senator SESSIONS. General Renuart, will you personally examine the MDA's plan for GMD stockpile reliability to ensure sufficient flight testing is built into the program to maintain system reliability over the life of the GMD system?

General RENUART. Yes, I look forward to reviewing and provide comments to the GMD stockpile reliability plan. Additionally, in coordination with MDA, I will work with STRATCOM and Joint Forces Component Command, Integrated Missile Defense as the functional manager and synchronizer to ensure our homeland defense requirements continue to be addressed throughout the life of the GMD program.

[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the committee adjourned.]