Yes I fully support. As you suggest, I’ve seen the "before and after" picture and the difference is like night and day. These reforms have unquestionably strengthened our Armed Forces and the warfighting combatant commander’s ability to coordinate and conduct joint and combined operations.

I believe the entire Department of Defense has fully embraced these reforms and vigorously pursued implementation. "Jointness" is the heart and soul of our operating style and with each passing year becomes even more a part of our institutional fabric and culture.

Without a doubt, the most important legacy of Goldwater-Nichols is its ability to focus the strengths of each Service together into a potent joint team. The Act served as the impetus to improve joint doctrine, professional military education, strategic planning, and operations. An essential feature is the clarity of each CINC’s responsibility and authority to execute his assigned mission and prepare his forces. Goldwater-Nichols is tailor-made to complement our national strategy by enabling CINCs to shape, prepare, and respond in their areas. Clearly, this legislation is accomplishing what Congress intended.

Yes. These goals, including better teamwork, are critical to effectively and efficiently executing our National Security and Military Strategies. As I stated earlier, we’ve seen the results speak for themselves in several crises and contingencies. They have also been effective in our peacetime planning and advocacy—the chain-of-command is clear and direct, authority matches responsibility, there is candor between the CINCs, SECDEF and CJCS, and CINCs have a strong voice in stating their needs.

Our experience with Goldwater-Nichols coupled with our sense of the unfolding strategic environment points to at least one potential modification. I believe a combatant commander should run Joint Warfighting Experimentation. I support the SECDEF’s decision to assign USACOM as the executive agent for this mission. If confirmed, I will work with Admiral Hal Gehman, USCINCACOM, in his effort to integrate air, land, sea, and space into joint warfare experimentation to strengthen our joint doctrine, organization, training, education, and operations to counter threats in the 21^st Century. This proposal clearly reinforces the fundamental premise behind Goldwater-Nichols.

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Space Command to the following offices:

With two exceptions, all Assistant Secretaries are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. This means any relationship SPACECOM would have with an Assistant Secretary would be working with and through the applicable Under Secretary of Defense. Since the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for C3I and Legislative Affairs are principal deputies to the SECDEF, this relationship would be conducted along the same lines as with the various Under Secretaries.

The Chairman is clearly established by Title 10 as the principal military advisor to the National Command Authority (NCA). However, he serves as an advisor and is not, according to law, in the chain of command that runs from the NCA directly to each combatant commander. The law does allow communications of the President or SECDEF with the combatant commanders to be transmitted through the Chairman. President Clinton has directed this policy in the Unified Command Plan to keep the Chairman fully involved so that he can execute his other legal responsibilities. A CINC’s duty is to work with the Chairman to provide for the security of his command and execute NCA-directed taskings.

When functioning as the acting Chairman, the Vice’s relationship with CINCs is exactly that of the Chairman. The 103^rd Congress amended Title 10 to give the Vice Chairman the same rights and obligations that other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have to submit an opinion or advice to the President, National Security Council, or SECDEF if their views disagree with those of the Chairman. As a CINC, I would readily listen to and discuss with the Vice Chairman his thoughts on any general defense matter considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Vice Chairman also plays a key role on many boards and panels that affect programming and therefore the preparedness of SPACECOM. I believe his insights are extremely valuable and I would certainly seek his counsel.

As you know, this relationship is a very familiar one to me. The Unified Command Plan appoints CINCs as the single point of contact for providing military representation within assigned areas of responsibility. Specifically, the most recent Unified Command Plan assigns CINCSPACE the responsibilities to serve as the single point of contact for military space operational matters and to provide military representation to US national, commercial, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations. To meet these responsibilities, all CINCs must be fully engaged in the interagency process as it considers matters under their purview. I know that the Assistant to the Chairman has an extensive charter to represent the Chairman in the interagency process. While there are no direct lines connecting the Assistant to the Chairman to any combatant commander, what the Assistant knows and can share about the interagency process with any CINC is useful and will be requested. The Assistant to the Chairman also works on matters of personal interest to the Chairman that may require him to consult with me as a combatant commander. I intend to continue these strong lines of communication.

I am also very familiar with this relationship. The Director of the Joint Staff has many significant responsibilities that require interaction with SPACECOM. More importantly, the Director is generally the point of contact for soliciting information from all the CINCs when the Chairman is developing a position on any important issue.

Title 10, section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SECDEF and subject to the authority of combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces they have assigned to combatant commands. The authority exercised by a combatant commander over Service components is quite clear, but requires close coordination with each Secretary.

Service Chiefs now have two significant roles. First and foremost, they are responsible, in accordance with Goldwater-Nichols, to organize, train, equip, and provide trained and ready forces for CINCs to employ across the spectrum of conflict--peace, crisis, and war. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no CINC can hope to ensure the preparedness of his assigned forces for whatever missions the NCA directs. Next, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice to the NCA. Individually and collectively, the Joint Chiefs are a source of experience and judgment that every CINC can and should call upon. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a full dialogue with the Chiefs of all Services.

My relationship with other CINCs will be one of mutual support, continued dialogue on key issues, and frequent face-to-face interaction during periodic CINC conferences and other meetings as required. In today’s security environment, an atmosphere of teamwork, cooperation and complete trust is critical to executing US national policy. CINCSPACE must have a particularly close relationship with the other combatant commanders due to his responsibilities to support their operations, advocate their space needs, work ballistic missile defense requirements, and act as their single point of contact for military space matters.

I firmly believe space capabilities play a vital role in the defense and economic well- being of our nation and that this will increase as new space applications and technologies become available. As I see it, space systems must deliver if we are to achieve the strategies outlined in JV2010. Moreover, the recent loss of service from a single satellite, the Galaxy IV, demonstrates just how much life on Earth is linked to space. I am both a believer in and an advocate for space capabilities.

As directed by the National Space Policy, I will be a strong advocate for the space systems I believe are necessary to provide for the security of the US within the context of applicable policies, laws, and treaties. In this case, while we support on-going arms control negotiations, it is an inherent job of military leaders, myself included, to advocate options for our nation’s leadership should diplomacy fail.

Dynamic reconfiguration of the signal and regional-level directional signal enhancements are part of the initiatives I mentioned. Funding for these issues as well as an overall enhanced system is a concern. Since the GPS system significantly benefits both the military and civilian sectors, I don’t believe the military should be responsible for the entire bill. An overall funding strategy must be developed so the US can maintain this most important national treasure. In any event, I believe DoD should maintain its fair share of the funding for GPS through the FYDP.

In my judgment, space control is a critical mission assigned to SPACECOM in the Unified Command Plan. It is growing in relative importance to its more traditional support missions. As I see it, our increasing dependence on space also represents a significant vulnerability. This is why space control—assuring our use of space while denying the same to an adversary when required—is a main pillar of the President’s National Space Policy and of SPACECOM’s Vision for 2020 and its Long-Range Plan. I am aware of SPACECOM’s documented requirements in the JROC-validated Mission Need Statement. A technology development program would enable the Services to further develop this vital mission area and help SPACECOM execute its assigned mission.

The SPACECOM Long-Range Plan outlines several areas to focus resources for space control. My suggestion is to apply FY99 funds across a range of offensive and defensive counterspace technology programs to include studies, analyses, laboratory, and on-orbit experiments. The funds should be executed through the applicable Service lab on the enabling technologies to address space control deficiencies in the areas of satellite vulnerabilities and improved theater capabilities such as mobile low-power laser jammers.

In support of the SPACECOM Long-Range Plan, Air Force Space Command is generating requirements documentation for a space maneuver vehicle (SMV) and has developed a worthy operations concept for a space operations vehicle (SOV). The basic difference is that the SOV is a reusable launch vehicle; the SMV is a reusable upper stage. It appears the SOV could provide a wide range of useful functions across all four space mission areas (Space Support, Force Enhancement, Space Control, and Force Application). Through partnership with NASA, we will work together to develop a cost-effective, responsive reusable spacelift system. I am particularly intrigued by the potential for SMV and other reusable spacelift technologies to provide more responsive, less expensive access to space. Reusable access could enable multiple missions such as augmenting on-orbit space capabilities in a crisis or quickly replenishing lost service. I understand that the National Space Policy gives NASA the charter to develop reusable launch vehicles and DoD handles expendable systems. However, it's prudent for DoD to leverage reusable advancements to develop demonstrator vehicles with residual military capability.

Assured access to space and the ability to move freely to, through, and from space is a core military requirement. The SMV is a key enabler with the potential to provide assured access. Such a vehicle could have the potential to support satellite repositioning, on-orbit servicing of space assets, as well as recovering politically sensitive platforms from space. Moreover, this technology could become a central piece of our efforts to ultimately reduce the cost of access—which is the key prerequisite to achieving the full promise of space. Development and validation of military requirements for an SMV and the potential to follow it with a more robust and capable SOV should be a priority science and technology effort.

The individual DoD and Service institutions and processes by which space requirements are defined and systems acquired are well-founded, efficient, and time-tested. We are making great progress in ensuring new requirements are validated and integrated into affordable and technologically achievable architectures. The fundamental question here, which I believe is the critical link, is how to translate these operational requirements and approved space architectures into programmatic guidance and acquisition action. I feel the organizational and space management improvements submitted to the DEPSECDEF in response to Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) #11 will better bridge approved requirements and architectures with systems acquisition. As you know, DRID #11 tasked CINCSPACE and DNRO to: (1) realign the non-policy responsibilities of DUSD (Space), (2) better integrate the functions of the DoD and NRO Space Architects, and (3) recommend streamlined approaches to defense and intelligence space management and oversight. I believe the solution achieved these goals. For example, the National Security Space Architect (NSSA) will play a key role as an advisor to the various DoD requirements and acquisition boards on space-related topics. He will also advise the ASD (C3I) of appropriate inputs to budget and guidance documents to ensure consistency with approved space architectures and transition strategies. The National Security Space Senior Steering Group, which succeeds the Joint Space Management Board will ensure that consensus is achieved and policies satisfied before architectures are presented to the Defense Resources Board for approval. Again, I believe we are moving in the right direction, and that the new organizational changes will optimize the overall process of translating space architectures into acquired systems.

The creation of the NSSA is critical to the closer integration of national and military space systems and support of warfighter needs. I fully support this important new initiative. The NSSA, with a joint DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) staff, will combine into one organization the present functions of the DoD Space Architect with key architecture elements of the NRO. Under the old organizational structure, the DoD Space Architect coordinated with the NRO on IC space architectures in an effort to achieve one architecture. Although each of these offices has been effective within its own environment, the net result was predictable -- with two separate architects (DoD and IC), we have not been able to fully synchronize black and white architecture efforts and achieve the desired level of integration. With the NSSA, there will be one office tasked to develop, coordinate, and integrate one DoD and IC space system architecture across all mission areas. If confirmed, I will work closely with the NSSA to ensure military space operational requirements are well integrated with developing and planned space systems and architectures.

The collective effect of the reorganizations within DoD as a result of DRIDs #11, #17 (realignment of the functions of ASD (C3I)), and #42 (transfer of space policy functions) will be a tremendous benefit for streamlining and integrating the management and oversight of space activities. The transfer of the space systems and architectures, space acquisition and management, and space integration functions of the former DUSD (Space) to the newly reorganized ASD (C3I), and the recent shift of space policy functions to the same office, will now provide a single focal point for DoD space policy, guidance, and program oversight within OSD. Placing these functions within ASD (C3I) is a move that makes great sense to me. This will now allow a synergy of sensors across all operating environments (i.e., ground, sea, air, and space), within a broader context, rather than isolating space as a distinct medium by itself. Also, renaming ASD (C3I) to "Space and Information Superiority" is indicative of the significant priority which space retains within OSD. In my opinion, this name change is essential to state the real responsibilities of this reformed OSD organization.

I, along with Air Force senior leadership, am committed to achieving full integration of air and space. Integrating space into air operations sets the stage for migrating missions to space when operations concepts, requirements, and technologies dictate. We recognize that although the Air Force provides over 90 percent of the DoD space budget and over 90 percent of its personnel, we still have work to do to infuse space throughout our institution. The main obstacle, of course, is changing our culture. Education will help and we have several initiatives here. Most significant is the Aerospace Integration Plan we’re building to guide our people to plan and execute integrated space and air forces. I’m confident this program will move us forward to a seamless aerospace force.

Five military missions are already migrated to space – navigation, communications, weather, warning, and intelligence. I believe technologies (both space-based and related ground systems) have matured to the point where we can seriously consider migrating the next mission to space—surveillance. Demonstrations are planned for the Mid-Course Experiment satellite and an AF/DARPA/NRO Moving Target Indicator project to show the most promising technologies in this area.

AFSPC developed an excellent document to provide a roadmap for achieving the space capabilities envisioned for the coming years. This plan represents the maturation of the Air Force’s mission planning process and is viewed as the model for the rest of the Service. As an integrated planning document, the Strategic Master Plan provides a prioritized and fiscally constrained view of how the Air Force can provide future space capabilities. We should continue to hone the plan’s concepts as we analyze our nation’s future space needs and achieve technological successes.

The 20 percent figure is what we expect to achieve between 2003 and 2015. We currently show only marginal increases over the FYDP. The percentage of Air Force TOA allocated to space should slowly increase from about 9.03 percent in FY98 to 9.63 percent by FY04. The significant increase, to about 20 percent of Air Force TOA, will occur in the out years. These recommended percentage levels represent what we believe is a manageable growth profile and one that will allow us to field the space capabilities we need to achieve the vision.

My vision for this partnership is to continue to build upon the excellent progress made in the last couple years by General Howell Estes and the Director of the NRO, Mr. Keith Hall. It’s clear to me that operating space along separate "black" and "white" stovepipes is unacceptable. Warfighters need an integrated picture of the fight from one organization. Continued separation of black and white space costs more and provides less to the warfighter, possibly keeping us from achieving our goal of a transparent battlefield. Furthermore, fused information is a key enabler of our smaller force structure. I am aware of progress this partnership is making toward developing a common operating picture, creating a collaborative Integrated Priorities List, increasing personnel cross-flow, working on common satellite system performance metrics, and providing that "single face to the user." If confirmed, I’ll support this partnership and will work with Mr. Hall to ensure our staffs aggressively pursue those initiatives while looking for other areas of mutual benefit.

As mentioned earlier, I believe the reforms made under DRID #11 will pay huge dividends. In terms of these partnership activities, there are several promising areas where this collaboration may reap benefits. The opportunity to combine payloads on the same platform, use common launch services, and combine satellite operations and share system data across multiple disciplines are efforts already in the works, and ones that should be continued. I will remain on guard to ensure that military and national space programs evolve with a minimum of stovepiped solutions.

From the common operational picture to wargames to the development of common performance metrics, these partnerships are geared towards improving support to the warfighter from space. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hall has visited military theaters to describe implemented improvements and to identify support shortfalls. General Estes has joined him on some of these visits and I plan to accept the invitation from Mr. Hall to continue this process, if confirmed. I know of no better way to coordinate support to the combatant commanders than to get the feedback right from them and their staffs. Both the DNRO and CINCSPACE have liaison officers, serving out of a common office, established with the other combatant commands, and I’ll get an independent read from them on the status of our support. Finally, I know that CINCSPACE and DNRO personally conduct meetings at least quarterly while their staffs meet on a monthly basis. In addition to the standing issues, such as personnel crossflow, that I’ve already mentioned, IPTs are formed as needed to work a specific issue or functional area. For example, the proposals made in response to the DRID #11 tasking were worked out within one of these IPTs. Another IPT is investigating the dual use of common satellite platforms. With the combatant commander as the ultimate beneficiary, these are terrific initiatives that greatly enhance the coordination of activities between SPACECOM and NRO.

UCP responsibilities have recently changed to enhance the SPACECOM role in advocating requirements of all the warfighting CINCs. Therefore, it makes great sense to move NRO and SPACECOM operations closer together to better serve the CINCs while fulfilling CINCSPACE’s new role as the single point of contact for military space. SPACECOM has the responsibility to take the lead and coordinate those efforts needed to meet identified requirements. The current Future Imagery Architecture requirements are a testament to the success of that effort. Progress is also being made with the NRO to assume a more appropriate role in common operational reporting.

This is an area the two staffs are investigating constantly. Common satellite platforms and the resultant data fusion, coupled to near-real-time reporting to the theaters would clearly benefit the warfighter, as would common operations, where appropriate. We call this "TPED" for tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination. It’s a concept that ranks on a par with capacity issues, such as the sensors and data pipelines. In TPED, we seek to make the data more useful. Without doubt, the rapid fusion and dissemination of "black" and "white" data into a common operating picture would better serve the warfighter and other national customers. Another area is secure access to overhead satellite reconnaissance information to support deployed forces, especially in coalition activities.

Again, our space systems are key enablers of the smaller force structure we have today and plan for the future. Frankly, all of us are struggling to strike a balance between the information needs of coalition forces, and the protection of our sources and methods for gathering intelligence and warning data. Some of our systems are more resistant to denial and deception methods than others, and we should take great care to protect these national assets while attempting to maximize the amount of information we can provide to our deployed forces and their coalition partners. I’ll be keeping a close eye on these activities and won’t hesitate to support initiatives where necessary.

Significant progress has been made over the last two years to create "normalized" organizational structures and processes that mirror those of the other warfighting commands. In particular, work identifying CINC-to-CINC relationships, command and control procedures, and focused planning and execution cells has been most impressive. I have every confidence that SPACECOM is ready to fulfill its support responsibilities.

Additionally, the UCP assignment of CINCSPACE as the single point of contact for military space operational matters gives the regional CINCs a single place to go to for space forces support. Through centralized planning at SPACECOM and decentralized force execution through the service space components, the other CINCs receive the space capabilities needed for joint force execution. Some work is still needed to organize the staff to reflect all of the responsibilities that come as part of the recent Unified Command Plan revisions. I also believe we may need to reevaluate the internal structure of SPACECOM in relation to the Long Range Plan. There is a lot of work ahead to implement this vector to the future and in order to accomplish these increased requirements SPACECOM may need to adjust its organization.

I do not anticipate significant changes in the near future. If confirmed, my primary goal is to continue the work underway at SPACECOM to implement as expeditiously as possible the new responsibilities assigned by the latest UCP and internalize the concepts from the Long Range Plan.

I would plan to review the current SPACECOM organizational structure and refocus and/or reorganize accordingly. General Estes started this process by having the US Army Manpower Analysis team conduct a functional review and I expect to see the results soon after assuming command. I understand that we must make every effort to consolidate and streamline where possible. My main objective would be to increase SPACECOM’s ability to optimize all space capabilities – civil, commercial, international, and military -- to meet all CINC and national security requirements, and to protect US interests and investments in space. I plan to further strengthen partnerships with industry, national and international agencies, and friendly space-faring nations in order to obtain needed space capabilities. To do this, I would focus and organize SPACECOM accordingly.

Yes. One way in which Space Command ensures integration for space forces into the CINCs’ planning is by being directly involved in their deliberate planning process, that is, the development of their theater operations plans and concept plans. As far as integration into operations, I know of several initiatives to ensure this gets done. First, SPACECOM has assigned liaison officers (LNOs) to the regional CINCs’ staffs to provide in-residence expertise and facilitate direct liaison. These LNOs are assisted by space support teams from SPACECOM headquarters. In addition, service space support teams, formed from SPACECOM’s three component commands, are providing support to the theater CINC’s respective components. SPACECOM has also established a 24-hour Space Operations Center whose primary mission is to be the focal point for all CINCs on the status of space support to their regions and to generate the mission orders to provide rapid space forces response to CINC needs. The regional CINCs understand the importance of space as evidenced by their demand for deployment of the teams, the continuous process of integrating space into theater war plans, and frequent use during Unified Command exercises.

If confirmed, I will keep the momentum and positive progress going. This area lies at the heart of another key pillar in the vision and Long Range Plan – Full Force Integration. We need to continue to educate and train forces on space capabilities by integrating this information into professional military education, Service-specific courses, and exercises. Also, I understand that, among those already cited, the intent for assigning LNOs to the regional CINCs was to help them grow their own space expertise on staff so they can begin to provide their own indigenous space planning support. This is part of the effort to get the CINCs staffs to view space as an integral part of their total air, land and sea package and not as a separate force structure. Thus, a related intent is to change the way space is integrated into the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. I agree with these goals and will work with the other CINCs to follow through.

I’ve had the chance to review the plan and I commend SPACECOM for putting together such a comprehensive roadmap for the future of military space and for involving DoD, civil agencies and commercial industry in the process. I need to study the plan further in the context of my new responsibilities and assess its degree of acceptance within the wider space community over time. We’ve always understood that this plan is a "living document", but I’m certain its major tenets will stand the test of time.

The US is more reliant on space assets than any other nation. As I’ve mentioned, the Galaxy IV episode is a commercial example of just how dependent we’ve become on satellites. Emphasizing small satellite technology will provide payoffs in several areas. For example, smaller satellites could reduce the cost of getting to orbit. Also, the modular design of micro-satellites may allow us to fulfill a variety of missions at reduced cost by not having to design unique systems for each mission.

In addition to those I’ve just discussed, several other potential benefits come to mind. For instance:

• Proliferation: A constellation of smaller, cheaper, less-capable satellites places less of the total system capability at risk with the loss of a single satellite.
• Launch on Demand strategies are more feasible and cost effective with lighter spacecraft. On-demand satellite deployment capability may be necessary to augment and replenish constellations to support crises and combat operations. Quick replenishment of lost or damaged satellites will lessen vulnerabilities from gaps in coverage.
• Defending our military satellites from natural and man-made hazards is crucial. One protection strategy could include defensive maneuvering; however, weight and power requirements have been prohibitive. Miniaturization may help ensure their incorporation on future satellites. Smaller payloads will also help make our systems more difficult to detect.

Yes, because we need unimpeded access to and through space. Assured access must be routine, inexpensive, responsive, and readily accessible. Micro-sats could be a cost-effective space control solution for ensuring space superiority. Because of their wide applicability, continued micro-sat development will enable us to meet a variety of warfighter needs.

Through increased research, development, and testing, emerging micro-satellite technology will improve and expand our capabilities in all military space missions. Although budgets will remain tight, I can envision potentially larger returns from the initial investment. In order to achieve micro-satellite technology, we need to continue our partnerships with NASA, NRO, and the commercial sector. I’m not prepared at this time to make a definitive proposal on funding levels until I’ve had a chance to review our various efforts.

While I am satisfied with both the funding profile and schedule, SBIRS High funding is extremely tight and there are challenges in the FY00 POM. The planned launch schedule supports SPACECOM’s ability to provide improved service to Combatant CINCs. SBIRS is CINCSPACE’s #1 priority because it is very important for strategic and theater missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization. Therefore, we need to continue working with OSD and the Air Force to ensure adequate funding so as not to delay SBIRS.

I support first launch in 2004 as long as it does not affect the SBIRS High funding or schedule. Slipping SBIRS Low would delay critical support to the National Missile Defense (NMD) mission. SBIRS Low is required in the NMD architecture to ensure sufficient coverage to defend all 50 states. Additionally, delaying SBIRS Low impacts our ability to provide improved support to theater missile defense and intelligence. SBIRS is a highly integrated system of satellites in multiple orbits. The system is designed to optimize the advantages, while offsetting the limitations, of each orbit, at minimum cost to the taxpayer. SBIRS High must come on line first to ensure there is no operational reduction in our current capability while providing a substantial improvement over today’s technology.

Absolutely! This decision provides a long-term competitive environment that strengthens the US launch industry, helps our nation recapture a greater share of the world launch market, and reduces launch costs. Since we expect commercial launches to be three to four times greater than the number of government launches, this decision allows us to leverage off commercial needs to maximize savings. As competition drives down the cost of access to space, we’ll have more funds to invest for operations in space.

DoD will be able to function in a manner similar to that of commercial entities. We are already moving from an oversight to an insight role on our launch teams. Because of mission assurance concerns, we may differ in the level of involvement in production and launch operations. For example, the Air Force may continue to be responsible for safety, launch site security, and resource protection for both commercial and government operations. I understand Space Command hosts regular summits with commercial CEOs across the space industry as part of its partnership program. This forum is currently exploring ways to best provide launch services and to determine the right mix of responsibilities between industry and the governments. The potential outcome of their work may be to create a national spaceport—a concept I find very appealing. I’ll keep you posted.

The NRO and the head of NIMA established a process to validate FIA requirements. Although not required by law or current policy, this process ensured a voice for all agencies affected by this future architecture. Over the course of eighteen months, FIA accomplished the most thorough scrub of national and warfighter requirements in NRO history. This FIA requirements and development process is a real success story.

Although many requirements were pared back to stay within the cost cap, the program, as presented to the JROC, is both executable and provides a substantial increase in the critical area of imagery support to the warfighter. That said, we have already heard rumblings of budget cuts to FIA before we even begin the program. This is unfortunate. Significant cuts were made during this process and reduced FIA to the core. These core requirements are just that – the core – and they must be maintained to ensure an acceptable measure of warfighter support.

While recent changes in the UCP did not declare an Area of Responsibility (AOR) for CINCSPACE, he was given most of the same authorities as a geographic CINC. The newly assigned responsibilities provide many advantages to SPACECOM, to DoD and to our nation. I believe they make clear CINCSPACE has the authority to serve as the single point of contact for military space operational matters. There should be no question as to whom a CINC or the NCA should call concerning military space issues. Additionally, these new responsibilities make clear the authority for SPACECOM to represent the military to US national agencies, commercial and international agencies in matters relating to military operations. It is also clear SPACECOM plans and assesses the space related security assistance programs needed to build trust and confidence with our international partners; serves as the military point of contact to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in space; and coordinates and conducts space campaign planning. I believe the authority invested in SPACECOM will significantly enable it to work with all CINCs and Services, to improve command and control, and to shape the international space community and environment, respond to threats, and prepare for the future. I further believe that assigning SPACECOM an AOR may eventually happen.

I believe it is an economy of force theater today. I also believe we must prepare for the eventuality of having to fight someday in space. Clearly, we must develop the necessary capabilities to deter adversaries from threatening our space systems and if necessary, defeat hostile or aggressive acts. I believe space will become a priority theater in the future. The region of space and space capabilities are vital to our national interests. Space capabilities are integral to our nation’s ability to execute its national instruments of power – economic, political, diplomatic, social and military. I believe we must continue to prepare to protect these invaluable capabilities. Our nation’s future depends on it.

Today there are limited threats. But it’s just a matter of time until the center of gravity of US military and commercial space will be challenged. We need to invest in methods for us to detect and understand our systems are being threatened or attacked. Furthermore, I would like to suggest that perhaps the major threats to our satellite infrastructure may not be exclusively to the portion of the systems in space. It may be far easier and less expensive to attack space infrastructure on the ground or the systems’ communications links than to develop sophisticated weapons to attack satellites themselves. That said, I think it is necessary for a comprehensive look at the vulnerabilities of those systems from an end-to-end perspective and to develop a prudent plan to protect them against the most likely threats. I suggest that such an evaluation will require a close partnership with the builders of our systems and would include a look at the commercial systems with emphasis on those used by the military as well as our organic military and National systems. I appreciate the cost of space system hardening and the corresponding weight penalty which translates to dollars lost by our industry partners. I believe a plan to protect this infrastructure can contain a broad spectrum of useful measures which, if implemented with the cooperation of industry, would provide mutually beneficial results for peacetime as well as during crises at reasonable cost.

Space has been militarized for decades given the broad array of reconnaissance, communications, nuclear detection and other systems deployed to support defense requirements. While I would not like to see an arms race in space, I recognize our growing dependence on space for military and commercial needs. Just as air, land, and sea forces guard lines of communication, space will become a vital line of communication for us. Thus, if the threat materializes, it could be necessary to provide some type of space-based protective measures to guarantee their security.

Traditionally, joint matters are defined as the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces in such matters as strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command. That joint definition extends to space forces as well. Space gives us the ability to project and sustain our military capability worldwide. SPACECOM is the unified command where all Services are contributing to developing the framework of how we operate to, through, and from space to support the warfighter. If confirmed, I would commit to keeping our Service component structure strong and viable to encourage greater "jointness" in space.

Whether our armed forces are being asked to engage in combat, enforce peacekeeping or support the distribution of humanitarian aide, space capabilities are essential to our success. Robust communications, reconnaissance and surveillance, weather, warning, and navigation are vital throughout the full spectrum of conflict.

SPACECOM has been involved throughout the JV 2010 process and I’m confident space requirements and capabilities will continue to be strongly supported every step of the way. As we look to the next decade, our smaller force will be much more effective because of the information available to it. Much of this information will come from space-based sensors and virtually all of it will pass through space to our forces. As oil has been key to the successes of the industrial age, space systems are and will be key to the information age. Thus, space must deliver in order to enable the JV 2010 strategy.

The Air Force is currently investigating the feasibility of using some of our deactivated ballistic missiles, already existing national assets, in a conventional role.

The conventional ballistic missile may give us a non-nuclear precision weapon with the ability to hold an adversary’s high-value, highly defended, and hardened targets at risk. The conventional ballistic missile may also provide some utility against Strategic Relocatable Targets, Prompt Global Strike, and Weapons of Mass Destruction production facilities.

The growth in proliferation of ballistic missile technology may, in time, lead to a potential adversary with a capability to strike beyond their regional focus today to North America. While deterrence still remains a viable counter to the Russian nuclear force, this may not apply to those rogue nations that might seek vengeance or revenge against the United States.

A conventional ballistic missile may offer rapid strike options against high-value targets in areas of the world in which we do not have pre-positioned forces or easy access. Its very existence could, as is the case with our strategic ballistic missiles, provide a strong deterrent against nations taking actions adverse to US vital national interests.

I believe the space-based laser is one of the promising technologies that could enable a space-based National Missile Defense capability in the future. A properly sized constellation of space-based lasers could provide one form of boost-phase intercept capability for both national and theater missile defense. Such a space-based laser system could have the potential to counter shorter-range theater-class ballistic missiles as well as providing a first line of defense against missiles launched at the United States.

I understand the Air Staff is currently working with the Space and Missile Systems Center, Joint Program Office in Los Angeles and Headquarters Air Force Space Command to provide this answer. I will do my best to provide a report within 45 days of assuming command.

These sensors contribute to the warfighters’ nuclear force management requirements, yet they are primarily for ensuring compliance with the Limited and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties. Even though the threat of a strategic nuclear war has diminished, in light of the recent events in Pakistan and India, we should continue to evaluate the contributions these sensors can make.

Technology Safeguard Monitoring is not a SPACECOM mission, so I am not sure if I’m best suited to answer that question. Monitoring is an export compliance function delegated from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense. Responsibility for technology safeguards rests in the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) which is part of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. As the lead agency within the Air Force, Air Force Space Command provides administrative management for volunteers from the command and other Air Force units.

I am aware that DTSA is reviewing the existing volunteer arrangement because of its drain on Air Force mission resources and the anticipated continued rise in requirements for monitors. I welcome that review.

In addition to continuing our long-standing efforts to educate policymakers, the public, and warfighters on the value of, and our dependence on, space for national security and economic competitiveness, I see four other areas of top concern:

The US military has done a terrific job, in my opinion, of getting me ready for this assignment. My professional journey to date has encompassed over three decades of working under some of our nation’s greatest leaders and mentors while serving in the most dynamic organizations. They have prepared me well. As you’ve described in your lead-in, I truly appreciate the significance of these times. My experience has run the gamut from Vietnam to the fall of the Soviet Union to DESERT STORM and Bosnia; from the "hollow force" of the 1970s to the buildup of the 1980s to our current strategic pause. Most notably I have been fortunate enough to command at the squadron, weapons school, wing, numbered air force, and major command levels. Equally important are my many tours developing tactics, defining requirements, evaluating readiness, writing plans, and acquiring weapon systems at the squadron, major command, Air Force, or Joint Staff levels. While I have not served in SPACECOM, I would say that I’ve had direct involvement with this great organization over eight years as a general officer – most significantly as a customer who relies on space and, from an Air Force perspective, as a partner in our Combat Air Forces. I have also worked hard to integrate space into my current command in the Pacific. Having spent an entire career executing, observing, and thinking about warfare, coupled with the practical aspects of being on the supported end of the space business, gives me an excellent understanding of the warfighters’ needs. These experiences will prove invaluable to carrying out my responsibilities, if confirmed.

As I stated earlier, I’m well prepared and ready to assume command now. The steps I’ve taken to reach this point represent the culmination of an entire career’s experiences. Most recently, I’ve had frequent, direct, and comprehensive discussions with General Estes. With his help, I’ve gained an even deeper appreciation for the history, current issues, and future challenges surrounding space. The SPACECOM Deputy CINC, Directors, staff, and components are the finest professionals anywhere. If confirmed, I know we will do great things together for our nation.

The separation of powers among our three branches of government is one of the most cherished tenets of the Constitution I have sworn and dedicated my service to protecting and defending. I’ve had several experiences appearing before congressional committees and offering my candid testimony on current issues and programs under my purview of interest to Congress. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our relationship and the evolving dialogue we’ve established on space. The answer to your questions is an emphatic yes.