ADVANCE HEARING QUESTIONS FOR
GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS
More than a decade has passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of those reforms, particularly in your assignments as Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and as Commander, US Forces Japan.
Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?
Yes I fully support. As you suggest, Iíve seen the "before and after" picture and the difference is like night and day. These reforms have unquestionably strengthened our Armed Forces and the warfighting combatant commanderís ability to coordinate and conduct joint and combined operations.
What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?
I believe the entire Department of Defense has fully embraced these reforms and vigorously pursued implementation. "Jointness" is the heart and soul of our operating style and with each passing year becomes even more a part of our institutional fabric and culture.
What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?
Without a doubt, the most important legacy of Goldwater-Nichols is its ability to focus the strengths of each Service together into a potent joint team. The Act served as the impetus to improve joint doctrine, professional military education, strategic planning, and operations. An essential feature is the clarity of each CINCís responsibility and authority to execute his assigned mission and prepare his forces. Goldwater-Nichols is tailor-made to complement our national strategy by enabling CINCs to shape, prepare, and respond in their areas. Clearly, this legislation is accomplishing what Congress intended.
The goals of the Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.
Do you agree with these goals?
Yes. These goals, including better teamwork, are critical to effectively and efficiently executing our National Security and Military Strategies. As I stated earlier, weíve seen the results speak for themselves in several crises and contingencies. They have also been effective in our peacetime planning and advocacyóthe chain-of-command is clear and direct, authority matches responsibility, there is candor between the CINCs, SECDEF and CJCS, and CINCs have a strong voice in stating their needs.
Recently, there have been articles which indicate an interest within the Department of Defense in modifying Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national strategy.
Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?
Our experience with Goldwater-Nichols coupled with our sense of the unfolding strategic environment points to at least one potential modification. I believe a combatant commander should run Joint Warfighting Experimentation. I support the SECDEFís decision to assign USACOM as the executive agent for this mission. If confirmed, I will work with Admiral Hal Gehman, USCINCACOM, in his effort to integrate air, land, sea, and space into joint warfare experimentation to strengthen our joint doctrine, organization, training, education, and operations to counter threats in the 21st Century. This proposal clearly reinforces the fundamental premise behind Goldwater-Nichols.
Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Space Command to the following offices:
The Under Secretaries of Defense
Under current DoD Directives, Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DoD components, to include combatant commands, having related or collateral functions. If confirmed, as a combatant commander, I will respond and reciprocate. I will use this exchange of information as I formally communicate with the CJCS and provide the best military advice to the SECDEF.
The Assistant Secretaries of Defense
With two exceptions, all Assistant Secretaries are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. This means any relationship SPACECOM would have with an Assistant Secretary would be working with and through the applicable Under Secretary of Defense. Since the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for C3I and Legislative Affairs are principal deputies to the SECDEF, this relationship would be conducted along the same lines as with the various Under Secretaries.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman is clearly established by Title 10 as the principal military advisor to the National Command Authority (NCA). However, he serves as an advisor and is not, according to law, in the chain of command that runs from the NCA directly to each combatant commander. The law does allow communications of the President or SECDEF with the combatant commanders to be transmitted through the Chairman. President Clinton has directed this policy in the Unified Command Plan to keep the Chairman fully involved so that he can execute his other legal responsibilities. A CINCís duty is to work with the Chairman to provide for the security of his command and execute NCA-directed taskings.
The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
When functioning as the acting Chairman, the Viceís relationship with CINCs is exactly that of the Chairman. The 103rd Congress amended Title 10 to give the Vice Chairman the same rights and obligations that other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have to submit an opinion or advice to the President, National Security Council, or SECDEF if their views disagree with those of the Chairman. As a CINC, I would readily listen to and discuss with the Vice Chairman his thoughts on any general defense matter considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Vice Chairman also plays a key role on many boards and panels that affect programming and therefore the preparedness of SPACECOM. I believe his insights are extremely valuable and I would certainly seek his counsel.
The Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
As you know, this relationship is a very familiar one to me. The Unified Command Plan appoints CINCs as the single point of contact for providing military representation within assigned areas of responsibility. Specifically, the most recent Unified Command Plan assigns CINCSPACE the responsibilities to serve as the single point of contact for military space operational matters and to provide military representation to US national, commercial, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations. To meet these responsibilities, all CINCs must be fully engaged in the interagency process as it considers matters under their purview. I know that the Assistant to the Chairman has an extensive charter to represent the Chairman in the interagency process. While there are no direct lines connecting the Assistant to the Chairman to any combatant commander, what the Assistant knows and can share about the interagency process with any CINC is useful and will be requested. The Assistant to the Chairman also works on matters of personal interest to the Chairman that may require him to consult with me as a combatant commander. I intend to continue these strong lines of communication.
The Director of the Joint Staff
I am also very familiar with this relationship. The Director of the Joint Staff has many significant responsibilities that require interaction with SPACECOM. More importantly, the Director is generally the point of contact for soliciting information from all the CINCs when the Chairman is developing a position on any important issue.
The Secretaries of the Military Departments
Title 10, section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SECDEF and subject to the authority of combatant commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces they have assigned to combatant commands. The authority exercised by a combatant commander over Service components is quite clear, but requires close coordination with each Secretary.
The Chiefs of Staff of the Services
Service Chiefs now have two significant roles. First and foremost, they are responsible, in accordance with Goldwater-Nichols, to organize, train, equip, and provide trained and ready forces for CINCs to employ across the spectrum of conflict--peace, crisis, and war. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no CINC can hope to ensure the preparedness of his assigned forces for whatever missions the NCA directs. Next, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice to the NCA. Individually and collectively, the Joint Chiefs are a source of experience and judgment that every CINC can and should call upon. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a full dialogue with the Chiefs of all Services.
The other combatant commanders
My relationship with other CINCs will be one of mutual support, continued dialogue on key issues, and frequent face-to-face interaction during periodic CINC conferences and other meetings as required. In todayís security environment, an atmosphere of teamwork, cooperation and complete trust is critical to executing US national policy. CINCSPACE must have a particularly close relationship with the other combatant commanders due to his responsibilities to support their operations, advocate their space needs, work ballistic missile defense requirements, and act as their single point of contact for military space matters.
Advocate for Space
The current CINCSPACE, General Estes, is well known in Congress as a forceful and forthright advocate for space systems and space power.
Do you intend to continue this role?
I firmly believe space capabilities play a vital role in the defense and economic well- being of our nation and that this will increase as new space applications and technologies become available. As I see it, space systems must deliver if we are to achieve the strategies outlined in JV2010. Moreover, the recent loss of service from a single satellite, the Galaxy IV, demonstrates just how much life on Earth is linked to space. I am both a believer in and an advocate for space capabilities.
There are some who oppose the "militarization of space" and "weapons in space."
Consistent with U.S. policy, law, and treaty obligations, will you be an advocate for space power, even in the face of political opposition?
As directed by the National Space Policy, I will be a strong advocate for the space systems I believe are necessary to provide for the security of the US within the context of applicable policies, laws, and treaties. In this case, while we support on-going arms control negotiations, it is an inherent job of military leaders, myself included, to advocate options for our nationís leadership should diplomacy fail.
Enhanced Global Positioning System
Section 215 of S. 2057, the Senate Armed Services Committeeís reported version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, would require the Secretary of Defense to establish an Enhanced Global Positioning System Program with "an evolved satellite system that includes dynamic frequency re-configuration and regional-level directional signal enhancements."
Do you support such an enhanced GPS system?
I believe GPS enhancements are needed in some form to address legitimate military, civil, and commercial concerns. The key issue revolves around the potential friction between providing the signal, while also being able to deny it to an adversary. I am aware of the navigation warfare initiatives aimed at resolving this problem. The goal is to ensure our warfighters get the best service, prevent an adversary from using GPS against us, and assure signal continuity for safe, precision navigation to the commercial sector. In the interim, there are augmentation systems available to address some of these concerns. Two examples are nation-wide differential GPS and the Wide Area Augmentation System.
An interagency GPS Executive Board made up of both the civil and military communities is studying shortfalls to the system in order to determine the most cost-effective solutions. These might include changes to the GPS signal structure or the constellation design itself. If confirmed, I can provide you with a better sense of where weíre headed after Iíve reviewed the study results due out this fall.
Do you believe that such a program should be fully funded in the FYDP?
Dynamic reconfiguration of the signal and regional-level directional signal enhancements are part of the initiatives I mentioned. Funding for these issues as well as an overall enhanced system is a concern. Since the GPS system significantly benefits both the military and civilian sectors, I donít believe the military should be responsible for the entire bill. An overall funding strategy must be developed so the US can maintain this most important national treasure. In any event, I believe DoD should maintain its fair share of the funding for GPS through the FYDP.
Space Control Technology Development
In its markup of the Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1999, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended $30 million to establish a space control technology development program.
Do you support this activity?
In my judgment, space control is a critical mission assigned to SPACECOM in the Unified Command Plan. It is growing in relative importance to its more traditional support missions. As I see it, our increasing dependence on space also represents a significant vulnerability. This is why space controlóassuring our use of space while denying the same to an adversary when requiredóis a main pillar of the Presidentís National Space Policy and of SPACECOMís Vision for 2020 and its Long-Range Plan. I am aware of SPACECOMís documented requirements in the JROC-validated Mission Need Statement. A technology development program would enable the Services to further develop this vital mission area and help SPACECOM execute its assigned mission.
If so, how would you recommend that it be organized and executed?
The SPACECOM Long-Range Plan outlines several areas to focus resources for space control. My suggestion is to apply FY99 funds across a range of offensive and defensive counterspace technology programs to include studies, analyses, laboratory, and on-orbit experiments. The funds should be executed through the applicable Service lab on the enabling technologies to address space control deficiencies in the areas of satellite vulnerabilities and improved theater capabilities such as mobile low-power laser jammers.
Space Maneuver Vehicle
The committee is aware that CINCSPACE has been working on an operational requirements document for a space operations vehicle and associated programs such as the space maneuver vehicle.
What are your views of this activity?
In support of the SPACECOM Long-Range Plan, Air Force Space Command is generating requirements documentation for a space maneuver vehicle (SMV) and has developed a worthy operations concept for a space operations vehicle (SOV). The basic difference is that the SOV is a reusable launch vehicle; the SMV is a reusable upper stage. It appears the SOV could provide a wide range of useful functions across all four space mission areas (Space Support, Force Enhancement, Space Control, and Force Application). Through partnership with NASA, we will work together to develop a cost-effective, responsive reusable spacelift system. I am particularly intrigued by the potential for SMV and other reusable spacelift technologies to provide more responsive, less expensive access to space. Reusable access could enable multiple missions such as augmenting on-orbit space capabilities in a crisis or quickly replenishing lost service. I understand that the National Space Policy gives NASA the charter to develop reusable launch vehicles and DoD handles expendable systems. However, it's prudent for DoD to leverage reusable advancements to develop demonstrator vehicles with residual military capability.
If confirmed, do you intend to make this effort a priority?
Assured access to space and the ability to move freely to, through, and from space is a core military requirement. The SMV is a key enabler with the potential to provide assured access. Such a vehicle could have the potential to support satellite repositioning, on-orbit servicing of space assets, as well as recovering politically sensitive platforms from space. Moreover, this technology could become a central piece of our efforts to ultimately reduce the cost of accessówhich is the key prerequisite to achieving the full promise of space. Development and validation of military requirements for an SMV and the potential to follow it with a more robust and capable SOV should be a priority science and technology effort.
Space Command is a key player in establishing Department of Defense space requirements and hence is a key player in acquisition of materiel related to space.
Do you believe that the space acquisition structure of the Department of Defense is now optimized for efficient space architecture development and acquisition, or are improvements needed?
The individual DoD and Service institutions and processes by which space requirements are defined and systems acquired are well-founded, efficient, and time-tested. We are making great progress in ensuring new requirements are validated and integrated into affordable and technologically achievable architectures. The fundamental question here, which I believe is the critical link, is how to translate these operational requirements and approved space architectures into programmatic guidance and acquisition action. I feel the organizational and space management improvements submitted to the DEPSECDEF in response to Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) #11 will better bridge approved requirements and architectures with systems acquisition. As you know, DRID #11 tasked CINCSPACE and DNRO to: (1) realign the non-policy responsibilities of DUSD (Space), (2) better integrate the functions of the DoD and NRO Space Architects, and (3) recommend streamlined approaches to defense and intelligence space management and oversight. I believe the solution achieved these goals. For example, the National Security Space Architect (NSSA) will play a key role as an advisor to the various DoD requirements and acquisition boards on space-related topics. He will also advise the ASD (C3I) of appropriate inputs to budget and guidance documents to ensure consistency with approved space architectures and transition strategies. The National Security Space Senior Steering Group, which succeeds the Joint Space Management Board will ensure that consensus is achieved and policies satisfied before architectures are presented to the Defense Resources Board for approval. Again, I believe we are moving in the right direction, and that the new organizational changes will optimize the overall process of translating space architectures into acquired systems.
Do you support the creation of a national security space architect or do you believe that the existing Department of Defense space architect is adequate?
The creation of the NSSA is critical to the closer integration of national and military space systems and support of warfighter needs. I fully support this important new initiative. The NSSA, with a joint DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) staff, will combine into one organization the present functions of the DoD Space Architect with key architecture elements of the NRO. Under the old organizational structure, the DoD Space Architect coordinated with the NRO on IC space architectures in an effort to achieve one architecture. Although each of these offices has been effective within its own environment, the net result was predictable -- with two separate architects (DoD and IC), we have not been able to fully synchronize black and white architecture efforts and achieve the desired level of integration. With the NSSA, there will be one office tasked to develop, coordinate, and integrate one DoD and IC space system architecture across all mission areas. If confirmed, I will work closely with the NSSA to ensure military space operational requirements are well integrated with developing and planned space systems and architectures.
The Secretary of Defense has decided to eliminate the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space and to move the functions previously managed by this organization to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I (Space and Information Superiority).
What are your views with regard to this new organizational arrangement?
The collective effect of the reorganizations within DoD as a result of DRIDs #11, #17 (realignment of the functions of ASD (C3I)), and #42 (transfer of space policy functions) will be a tremendous benefit for streamlining and integrating the management and oversight of space activities. The transfer of the space systems and architectures, space acquisition and management, and space integration functions of the former DUSD (Space) to the newly reorganized ASD (C3I), and the recent shift of space policy functions to the same office, will now provide a single focal point for DoD space policy, guidance, and program oversight within OSD. Placing these functions within ASD (C3I) is a move that makes great sense to me. This will now allow a synergy of sensors across all operating environments (i.e., ground, sea, air, and space), within a broader context, rather than isolating space as a distinct medium by itself. Also, renaming ASD (C3I) to "Space and Information Superiority" is indicative of the significant priority which space retains within OSD. In my opinion, this name change is essential to state the real responsibilities of this reformed OSD organization.
Space and Air Force
The Air Force has developed a vision for becoming the "Space and Air Force", as described in the document Global Engagement. There is very little evidence in the Air Force budget or FYDP, however, that the Air Force has committed any resources to this vision.
In your view, can or should anything be done to accelerate this transition?
I, along with Air Force senior leadership, am committed to achieving full integration of air and space. Integrating space into air operations sets the stage for migrating missions to space when operations concepts, requirements, and technologies dictate. We recognize that although the Air Force provides over 90 percent of the DoD space budget and over 90 percent of its personnel, we still have work to do to infuse space throughout our institution. The main obstacle, of course, is changing our culture. Education will help and we have several initiatives here. Most significant is the Aerospace Integration Plan weíre building to guide our people to plan and execute integrated space and air forces. Iím confident this program will move us forward to a seamless aerospace force.
What missions do you view as the most likely candidates for migrating to space within the next 10-15 years.
Five military missions are already migrated to space Ė navigation, communications, weather, warning, and intelligence. I believe technologies (both space-based and related ground systems) have matured to the point where we can seriously consider migrating the next mission to spaceósurveillance. Demonstrations are planned for the Mid-Course Experiment satellite and an AF/DARPA/NRO Moving Target Indicator project to show the most promising technologies in this area.
Air Force Space Command has put together a Strategic Master Plan that envisions space becoming about 20% of the Air Force budget by the year 2015 and then maintaining that level indefinitely.
What are your views of the Air Force Space Command Plan?
AFSPC developed an excellent document to provide a roadmap for achieving the space capabilities envisioned for the coming years. This plan represents the maturation of the Air Forceís mission planning process and is viewed as the model for the rest of the Service. As an integrated planning document, the Strategic Master Plan provides a prioritized and fiscally constrained view of how the Air Force can provide future space capabilities. We should continue to hone the planís concepts as we analyze our nationís future space needs and achieve technological successes.
Is 20% of the Air Force budget sufficient over the long run to support the kind of vision you have for space?
The 20 percent figure is what we expect to achieve between 2003 and 2015. We currently show only marginal increases over the FYDP. The percentage of Air Force TOA allocated to space should slowly increase from about 9.03 percent in FY98 to 9.63 percent by FY04. The significant increase, to about 20 percent of Air Force TOA, will occur in the out years. These recommended percentage levels represent what we believe is a manageable growth profile and one that will allow us to field the space capabilities we need to achieve the vision.
Air Force-National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Cooperation
The Air Force has established a line item in the FY99 budget called "Air Force NRO Partnership" with a request of $17.6 million.
Please describe your visions for this "partnership", in fiscal year 1999 and into the future.
My vision for this partnership is to continue to build upon the excellent progress made in the last couple years by General Howell Estes and the Director of the NRO, Mr. Keith Hall. Itís clear to me that operating space along separate "black" and "white" stovepipes is unacceptable. Warfighters need an integrated picture of the fight from one organization. Continued separation of black and white space costs more and provides less to the warfighter, possibly keeping us from achieving our goal of a transparent battlefield. Furthermore, fused information is a key enabler of our smaller force structure. I am aware of progress this partnership is making toward developing a common operating picture, creating a collaborative Integrated Priorities List, increasing personnel cross-flow, working on common satellite system performance metrics, and providing that "single face to the user." If confirmed, Iíll support this partnership and will work with Mr. Hall to ensure our staffs aggressively pursue those initiatives while looking for other areas of mutual benefit.
Do you believe that we have adequately integrated Department of Defense space acquisition with the NROís acquisition system?
As mentioned earlier, I believe the reforms made under DRID #11 will pay huge dividends. In terms of these partnership activities, there are several promising areas where this collaboration may reap benefits. The opportunity to combine payloads on the same platform, use common launch services, and combine satellite operations and share system data across multiple disciplines are efforts already in the works, and ones that should be continued. I will remain on guard to ensure that military and national space programs evolve with a minimum of stovepiped solutions.
What additional steps, if any, would you advocate?
I believe itís premature to look at additional steps at this point. We need to give the DRID #11 reforms and these partnership activities time to mature and flourish. Iím confident they will, and if confirmed Iíll be keeping a close eye on their progress.
U.S. Space Command-NRO Integration
There have been discussions at various times about the appropriate division of effort and level of cooperation between CINCSPACE and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in supporting the needs of the various theater commanders in chief (CINCs). It has been suggested that U.S. Space Command should assume operational control of all national security space systems, including those currently controlled by the NRO.
Do you believe that the United States should be moving in this direction?
The NRO has an unsurpassed track record of support to the broader intelligence community. That said, there are definitely areas where their streamlined acquisition processes and operations expertise can be coupled to our operations and warfighter support expertise. As I mentioned previously, SPACECOM and the NRO should continue to look into areas of increased cooperation, to include combined operations where prudent. As our career space officers grow in maturity and expertise, they will have experience within both communities. As they become our future space leaders, these organizational distinctions may become less apparent. Exploring the appropriate level of operational control by both organizations will certainly be an agenda item in our on-going partnership discussions.
What are your personal views on the appropriate balance of responsibilities between CINCSPACE and the NRO?
If confirmed and I move into the CINCSPACE position, I will be able to provide a better view on the appropriate balance. Today, I can tell you the cooperation between SPACECOM and the NRO is unprecedented and is improving with every meeting the organizations have together. Certainly, the NRO has a long history of acquisition, launch and operations expertise. SPACECOM has matured rapidly in its operations and warfighter support expertise. I plan to evaluate the appropriate balance with the DNRO, SECDEF and DCI as conditions and our ongoing dialogue dictate.
Are you satisfied with the way that U.S. Space Command and the NRO coordinate their activities in support of the combatant commander?
From the common operational picture to wargames to the development of common performance metrics, these partnerships are geared towards improving support to the warfighter from space. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hall has visited military theaters to describe implemented improvements and to identify support shortfalls. General Estes has joined him on some of these visits and I plan to accept the invitation from Mr. Hall to continue this process, if confirmed. I know of no better way to coordinate support to the combatant commanders than to get the feedback right from them and their staffs. Both the DNRO and CINCSPACE have liaison officers, serving out of a common office, established with the other combatant commands, and Iíll get an independent read from them on the status of our support. Finally, I know that CINCSPACE and DNRO personally conduct meetings at least quarterly while their staffs meet on a monthly basis. In addition to the standing issues, such as personnel crossflow, that Iíve already mentioned, IPTs are formed as needed to work a specific issue or functional area. For example, the proposals made in response to the DRID #11 tasking were worked out within one of these IPTs. Another IPT is investigating the dual use of common satellite platforms. With the combatant commander as the ultimate beneficiary, these are terrific initiatives that greatly enhance the coordination of activities between SPACECOM and NRO.
Is this area in which Space Command should assume a dominant role?
UCP responsibilities have recently changed to enhance the SPACECOM role in advocating requirements of all the warfighting CINCs. Therefore, it makes great sense to move NRO and SPACECOM operations closer together to better serve the CINCs while fulfilling CINCSPACEís new role as the single point of contact for military space. SPACECOM has the responsibility to take the lead and coordinate those efforts needed to meet identified requirements. The current Future Imagery Architecture requirements are a testament to the success of that effort. Progress is also being made with the NRO to assume a more appropriate role in common operational reporting.
Do you believe that there are additional areas where cooperation between CINCSPACE and the NRO would benefit the theater CINCs?
This is an area the two staffs are investigating constantly. Common satellite platforms and the resultant data fusion, coupled to near-real-time reporting to the theaters would clearly benefit the warfighter, as would common operations, where appropriate. We call this "TPED" for tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination. Itís a concept that ranks on a par with capacity issues, such as the sensors and data pipelines. In TPED, we seek to make the data more useful. Without doubt, the rapid fusion and dissemination of "black" and "white" data into a common operating picture would better serve the warfighter and other national customers. Another area is secure access to overhead satellite reconnaissance information to support deployed forces, especially in coalition activities.
Again, our space systems are key enablers of the smaller force structure we have today and plan for the future. Frankly, all of us are struggling to strike a balance between the information needs of coalition forces, and the protection of our sources and methods for gathering intelligence and warning data. Some of our systems are more resistant to denial and deception methods than others, and we should take great care to protect these national assets while attempting to maximize the amount of information we can provide to our deployed forces and their coalition partners. Iíll be keeping a close eye on these activities and wonít hesitate to support initiatives where necessary.
Space Command Mission and Organization
If confirmed, one of your primary responsibilities as CINCSPACE will be to provide space support to the warfighting CINCs.
In your view, is Space Command properly organized to fulfill this mission?
Significant progress has been made over the last two years to create "normalized" organizational structures and processes that mirror those of the other warfighting commands. In particular, work identifying CINC-to-CINC relationships, command and control procedures, and focused planning and execution cells has been most impressive. I have every confidence that SPACECOM is ready to fulfill its support responsibilities.
Additionally, the UCP assignment of CINCSPACE as the single point of contact for military space operational matters gives the regional CINCs a single place to go to for space forces support. Through centralized planning at SPACECOM and decentralized force execution through the service space components, the other CINCs receive the space capabilities needed for joint force execution. Some work is still needed to organize the staff to reflect all of the responsibilities that come as part of the recent Unified Command Plan revisions. I also believe we may need to reevaluate the internal structure of SPACECOM in relation to the Long Range Plan. There is a lot of work ahead to implement this vector to the future and in order to accomplish these increased requirements SPACECOM may need to adjust its organization.
What improvements, if any, do you intend to pursue?
I do not anticipate significant changes in the near future. If confirmed, my primary goal is to continue the work underway at SPACECOM to implement as expeditiously as possible the new responsibilities assigned by the latest UCP and internalize the concepts from the Long Range Plan.
I would plan to review the current SPACECOM organizational structure and refocus and/or reorganize accordingly. General Estes started this process by having the US Army Manpower Analysis team conduct a functional review and I expect to see the results soon after assuming command. I understand that we must make every effort to consolidate and streamline where possible. My main objective would be to increase SPACECOMís ability to optimize all space capabilities Ė civil, commercial, international, and military -- to meet all CINC and national security requirements, and to protect US interests and investments in space. I plan to further strengthen partnerships with industry, national and international agencies, and friendly space-faring nations in order to obtain needed space capabilities. To do this, I would focus and organize SPACECOM accordingly.
In your view, is Space Command ensuring that the CINCs fully integrate space support into their planning and operations?
Yes. One way in which Space Command ensures integration for space forces into the CINCsí planning is by being directly involved in their deliberate planning process, that is, the development of their theater operations plans and concept plans. As far as integration into operations, I know of several initiatives to ensure this gets done. First, SPACECOM has assigned liaison officers (LNOs) to the regional CINCsí staffs to provide in-residence expertise and facilitate direct liaison. These LNOs are assisted by space support teams from SPACECOM headquarters. In addition, service space support teams, formed from SPACECOMís three component commands, are providing support to the theater CINCís respective components. SPACECOM has also established a 24-hour Space Operations Center whose primary mission is to be the focal point for all CINCs on the status of space support to their regions and to generate the mission orders to provide rapid space forces response to CINC needs. The regional CINCs understand the importance of space as evidenced by their demand for deployment of the teams, the continuous process of integrating space into theater war plans, and frequent use during Unified Command exercises.
If confirmed, I will continue to insist that SPACECOM work vigorously to ensure space support is fully integrated into all CINC plans and operations. I take this mission very seriously. SPACECOM will continue to assist all CINCs in updating their operation plans and thoroughly integrating space capabilities throughout their missions and functions.
What improvement, if any, would you recommend?
If confirmed, I will keep the momentum and positive progress going. This area lies at the heart of another key pillar in the vision and Long Range Plan Ė Full Force Integration. We need to continue to educate and train forces on space capabilities by integrating this information into professional military education, Service-specific courses, and exercises. Also, I understand that, among those already cited, the intent for assigning LNOs to the regional CINCs was to help them grow their own space expertise on staff so they can begin to provide their own indigenous space planning support. This is part of the effort to get the CINCs staffs to view space as an integral part of their total air, land and sea package and not as a separate force structure. Thus, a related intent is to change the way space is integrated into the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. I agree with these goals and will work with the other CINCs to follow through.
U.S. Space Command has recently published a Long Range Plan with a vision for 2020.
Do you support this plan? Are there any specific areas in which you might suggest modifications?
Iíve had the chance to review the plan and I commend SPACECOM for putting together such a comprehensive roadmap for the future of military space and for involving DoD, civil agencies and commercial industry in the process. I need to study the plan further in the context of my new responsibilities and assess its degree of acceptance within the wider space community over time. Weíve always understood that this plan is a "living document", but Iím certain its major tenets will stand the test of time.
In your view, should the Department of Defense seek to place greater emphasis on small satellites for a range of defense missions?
The US is more reliant on space assets than any other nation. As Iíve mentioned, the Galaxy IV episode is a commercial example of just how dependent weíve become on satellites. Emphasizing small satellite technology will provide payoffs in several areas. For example, smaller satellites could reduce the cost of getting to orbit. Also, the modular design of micro-satellites may allow us to fulfill a variety of missions at reduced cost by not having to design unique systems for each mission.
What areas would benefit the most from miniaturized space technology developments?
In addition to those Iíve just discussed, several other potential benefits come to mind. For instance:
Section 215 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires the Secretary of Defense to establish a Micro-Satellite Technology Program. This is something for which the current CINCSPACE, General Estes, has expressed strong support.
If confirmed, will you support the Micro-Sat program?
Yes, because we need unimpeded access to and through space. Assured access must be routine, inexpensive, responsive, and readily accessible. Micro-sats could be a cost-effective space control solution for ensuring space superiority. Because of their wide applicability, continued micro-sat development will enable us to meet a variety of warfighter needs.
Please describe your vision of how best to organize the Micro-Sat program, including the level of funding that would be required to optimize this activity, how it should be managed, and what the program goals should be.
Through increased research, development, and testing, emerging micro-satellite technology will improve and expand our capabilities in all military space missions. Although budgets will remain tight, I can envision potentially larger returns from the initial investment. In order to achieve micro-satellite technology, we need to continue our partnerships with NASA, NRO, and the commercial sector. Iím not prepared at this time to make a definitive proposal on funding levels until Iíve had a chance to review our various efforts.
Current Space Acquisition and Development Programs
Are you satisfied with the current funding and schedule for the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program?
While I am satisfied with both the funding profile and schedule, SBIRS High funding is extremely tight and there are challenges in the FY00 POM. The planned launch schedule supports SPACECOMís ability to provide improved service to Combatant CINCs. SBIRS is CINCSPACEís #1 priority because it is very important for strategic and theater missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization. Therefore, we need to continue working with OSD and the Air Force to ensure adequate funding so as not to delay SBIRS.
Do you still believe it is important to plan for a first launch of SBIRS Low in 2004?
I support first launch in 2004 as long as it does not affect the SBIRS High funding or schedule. Slipping SBIRS Low would delay critical support to the National Missile Defense (NMD) mission. SBIRS Low is required in the NMD architecture to ensure sufficient coverage to defend all 50 states. Additionally, delaying SBIRS Low impacts our ability to provide improved support to theater missile defense and intelligence. SBIRS is a highly integrated system of satellites in multiple orbits. The system is designed to optimize the advantages, while offsetting the limitations, of each orbit, at minimum cost to the taxpayer. SBIRS High must come on line first to ensure there is no operational reduction in our current capability while providing a substantial improvement over todayís technology.
Do you believe that the Air Force made the right decision in deciding not to down select to a single EELV contractor?
Absolutely! This decision provides a long-term competitive environment that strengthens the US launch industry, helps our nation recapture a greater share of the world launch market, and reduces launch costs. Since we expect commercial launches to be three to four times greater than the number of government launches, this decision allows us to leverage off commercial needs to maximize savings. As competition drives down the cost of access to space, weíll have more funds to invest for operations in space.
In your view, will the Air Force be able to function like a commercial entity in the future by simply purchasing launch services?
DoD will be able to function in a manner similar to that of commercial entities. We are already moving from an oversight to an insight role on our launch teams. Because of mission assurance concerns, we may differ in the level of involvement in production and launch operations. For example, the Air Force may continue to be responsible for safety, launch site security, and resource protection for both commercial and government operations. I understand Space Command hosts regular summits with commercial CEOs across the space industry as part of its partnership program. This forum is currently exploring ways to best provide launch services and to determine the right mix of responsibilities between industry and the governments. The potential outcome of their work may be to create a national spaceportóa concept I find very appealing. Iíll keep you posted.
To an unprecedented degree the NROís Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) is based on warfighting requirements. However, the congressionally imposed cost cap on FIA has required the NRO to eliminate certain requirements.
Are you concerned that important mission requirements may be eliminated from the FIA program? If so, please describe your concerns.
The NRO and the head of NIMA established a process to validate FIA requirements. Although not required by law or current policy, this process ensured a voice for all agencies affected by this future architecture. Over the course of eighteen months, FIA accomplished the most thorough scrub of national and warfighter requirements in NRO history. This FIA requirements and development process is a real success story.
Although many requirements were pared back to stay within the cost cap, the program, as presented to the JROC, is both executable and provides a substantial increase in the critical area of imagery support to the warfighter. That said, we have already heard rumblings of budget cuts to FIA before we even begin the program. This is unfortunate. Significant cuts were made during this process and reduced FIA to the core. These core requirements are just that Ė the core Ė and they must be maintained to ensure an acceptable measure of warfighter support.
At this point, I believe that within existing funding, our most important requirements will be met. However, I am concerned that any further cuts to the budget might force NRO to consider eliminating some of our most critical requirements or slip the program. Both of these options would create serious risks to our nationís warfighting capability. Any additional program delays will place serious strains on our existing space-based systems. SPACECOM has worked closely with the other CINCs and all agree that we must stand firm on the current FIA requirements if we are to provide our forces with the intelligence support they need to fight and win.
Unified Command Plan
There was some consideration given to making U.S. Space Command a "geographic," rather than functional, unified combatant command in the latest Unified Command Plan review.
What do you see as the advantages/disadvantages of such a redesignation?
While recent changes in the UCP did not declare an Area of Responsibility (AOR) for CINCSPACE, he was given most of the same authorities as a geographic CINC. The newly assigned responsibilities provide many advantages to SPACECOM, to DoD and to our nation. I believe they make clear CINCSPACE has the authority to serve as the single point of contact for military space operational matters. There should be no question as to whom a CINC or the NCA should call concerning military space issues. Additionally, these new responsibilities make clear the authority for SPACECOM to represent the military to US national agencies, commercial and international agencies in matters relating to military operations. It is also clear SPACECOM plans and assesses the space related security assistance programs needed to build trust and confidence with our international partners; serves as the military point of contact to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in space; and coordinates and conducts space campaign planning. I believe the authority invested in SPACECOM will significantly enable it to work with all CINCs and Services, to improve command and control, and to shape the international space community and environment, respond to threats, and prepare for the future. I further believe that assigning SPACECOM an AOR may eventually happen.
Given the National Defense Review Report, if U.S. Space Command were to become a geographic command, would you envision it as a priority or economy of force theater in the Future Years Defense Program?
I believe it is an economy of force theater today. I also believe we must prepare for the eventuality of having to fight someday in space. Clearly, we must develop the necessary capabilities to deter adversaries from threatening our space systems and if necessary, defeat hostile or aggressive acts. I believe space will become a priority theater in the future. The region of space and space capabilities are vital to our national interests. Space capabilities are integral to our nationís ability to execute its national instruments of power Ė economic, political, diplomatic, social and military. I believe we must continue to prepare to protect these invaluable capabilities. Our nationís future depends on it.
Force Protection in Space
Given the importance of satellites to global military command and control, our assets in space comprise a critical infrastructure requirement.
What do you see as the major current and potential threats to such infrastructure, and what plans and/or programs do you see as essential for protecting our space assets?
Today there are limited threats. But itís just a matter of time until the center of gravity of US military and commercial space will be challenged. We need to invest in methods for us to detect and understand our systems are being threatened or attacked. Furthermore, I would like to suggest that perhaps the major threats to our satellite infrastructure may not be exclusively to the portion of the systems in space. It may be far easier and less expensive to attack space infrastructure on the ground or the systemsí communications links than to develop sophisticated weapons to attack satellites themselves. That said, I think it is necessary for a comprehensive look at the vulnerabilities of those systems from an end-to-end perspective and to develop a prudent plan to protect them against the most likely threats. I suggest that such an evaluation will require a close partnership with the builders of our systems and would include a look at the commercial systems with emphasis on those used by the military as well as our organic military and National systems. I appreciate the cost of space system hardening and the corresponding weight penalty which translates to dollars lost by our industry partners. I believe a plan to protect this infrastructure can contain a broad spectrum of useful measures which, if implemented with the cooperation of industry, would provide mutually beneficial results for peacetime as well as during crises at reasonable cost.
How would you recommend that the United States hedge against the potential weaponization of space?
Space has been militarized for decades given the broad array of reconnaissance, communications, nuclear detection and other systems deployed to support defense requirements. While I would not like to see an arms race in space, I recognize our growing dependence on space for military and commercial needs. Just as air, land, and sea forces guard lines of communication, space will become a vital line of communication for us. Thus, if the threat materializes, it could be necessary to provide some type of space-based protective measures to guarantee their security.
As far as hedging against the weaponization of space, it may be possible to develop a system of dependencies and partnerships between the spacefaring nations which would inhibit the need for such actions. However, I have always believed the best way to guard against any breakout threat capability is to maintain a robust science and technology program. This offers the opportunity to both know the state of the art and the art of the possible to anticipate potential weapons capabilities. Equally important, it provides insight as to how we might counter emerging capabilities or how we might exploit them to enhance our own national security. Thus, I support research into space weapons technologies. I would caution as well that we must also stay vigilant to ensure future policies or treaties do not limit our ability to hedge in this critical area.
How do you define "jointness" and how does your concept of jointness apply to U.S. Space Command?
Traditionally, joint matters are defined as the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces in such matters as strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command. That joint definition extends to space forces as well. Space gives us the ability to project and sustain our military capability worldwide. SPACECOM is the unified command where all Services are contributing to developing the framework of how we operate to, through, and from space to support the warfighter. If confirmed, I would commit to keeping our Service component structure strong and viable to encourage greater "jointness" in space.
How does and can the U.S. Space Command contribute to the lower end of the full spectrum dominance envisioned in Joint Vision 2010?
Whether our armed forces are being asked to engage in combat, enforce peacekeeping or support the distribution of humanitarian aide, space capabilities are essential to our success. Robust communications, reconnaissance and surveillance, weather, warning, and navigation are vital throughout the full spectrum of conflict.
Are you satisfied that, with respect to Space Command, the implementation phase of Joint Vision 2010 is proceeding satisfactorily?
SPACECOM has been involved throughout the JV 2010 process and Iím confident space requirements and capabilities will continue to be strongly supported every step of the way. As we look to the next decade, our smaller force will be much more effective because of the information available to it. Much of this information will come from space-based sensors and virtually all of it will pass through space to our forces. As oil has been key to the successes of the industrial age, space systems are and will be key to the information age. Thus, space must deliver in order to enable the JV 2010 strategy.
Ballistic Missile Research and Development
Is it the policy of the United States to support development of a conventional ballistic missile?
The Air Force is currently investigating the feasibility of using some of our deactivated ballistic missiles, already existing national assets, in a conventional role.
In your view is there a requirement for a conventional ballistic missile?
The conventional ballistic missile may give us a non-nuclear precision weapon with the ability to hold an adversaryís high-value, highly defended, and hardened targets at risk. The conventional ballistic missile may also provide some utility against Strategic Relocatable Targets, Prompt Global Strike, and Weapons of Mass Destruction production facilities.
What is the threat scenario that a conventional ballistic missile would address?
The growth in proliferation of ballistic missile technology may, in time, lead to a potential adversary with a capability to strike beyond their regional focus today to North America. While deterrence still remains a viable counter to the Russian nuclear force, this may not apply to those rogue nations that might seek vengeance or revenge against the United States.
A conventional ballistic missile may offer rapid strike options against high-value targets in areas of the world in which we do not have pre-positioned forces or easy access. Its very existence could, as is the case with our strategic ballistic missiles, provide a strong deterrent against nations taking actions adverse to US vital national interests.
Space Based Laser
What is your personal view of the need for a spaced-based laser, and the threat that a space-based laser system would address?
I believe the space-based laser is one of the promising technologies that could enable a space-based National Missile Defense capability in the future. A properly sized constellation of space-based lasers could provide one form of boost-phase intercept capability for both national and theater missile defense. Such a space-based laser system could have the potential to counter shorter-range theater-class ballistic missiles as well as providing a first line of defense against missiles launched at the United States.
There are two sensor systems designed by the Department of Energy to detect nuclear explosions from U.S. satellites. Although important to U.S. monitoring and command and control capabilities, they may not be used on next-generation satellites for money reasons. The first sensor would detect the Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) from a nuclear explosion, and would be aboard GPS IIF satellites. The second sensor is a neutron and gamma-ray detector that would fly on the Space-Based Infrared System, high (SBIRS-high). Funding for the EMP sensor was included in the FY98 Defense Appropriations Bill as reported by the Senate Appropriations committee. Senate report 105-29, which accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report by Jun 1, 1998, to identify how funding for both these sensors will be provided. This report has not been submitted.
If confirmed, will you ensure this report be submitted to the Congress within your first 45 days as CINCSPACE?
I understand the Air Staff is currently working with the Space and Missile Systems Center, Joint Program Office in Los Angeles and Headquarters Air Force Space Command to provide this answer. I will do my best to provide a report within 45 days of assuming command.
What is your view on these sensors?
These sensors contribute to the warfightersí nuclear force management requirements, yet they are primarily for ensuring compliance with the Limited and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties. Even though the threat of a strategic nuclear war has diminished, in light of the recent events in Pakistan and India, we should continue to evaluate the contributions these sensors can make.
Technology Security Program
SPACECOM is the executive agent for the Department of Defense for implementing the technology security program for foreign launches of U.S.-built commercial satellites. SPACECOM relies on volunteer service members to serve as monitors for satellite export activities authorized by export licenses, including technical discussions and overseas monitoring of satellite payloads and launches.
Do you believe this system is adequate to protect U.S. security interests and prevent unauthorized transfer of technology to foreign launch providers?
Technology Safeguard Monitoring is not a SPACECOM mission, so I am not sure if Iím best suited to answer that question. Monitoring is an export compliance function delegated from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense. Responsibility for technology safeguards rests in the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) which is part of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. As the lead agency within the Air Force, Air Force Space Command provides administrative management for volunteers from the command and other Air Force units.
Are there improvements or modifications to this system that you believe should be considered or implemented to ensure that U.S. security interests are adequately protected when U.S.-built commercial satellites are launched on foreign launchers?
I am aware that DTSA is reviewing the existing volunteer arrangement because of its drain on Air Force mission resources and the anticipated continued rise in requirements for monitors. I welcome that review.
Major Challenges and Problems
In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Commander-in-Chief, United States Space Command? Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
In addition to continuing our long-standing efforts to educate policymakers, the public, and warfighters on the value of, and our dependence on, space for national security and economic competitiveness, I see four other areas of top concern:
sectors: The trends are clear: 1) in the next ten years or so we expect 1500-1800 new satellites on orbit, 2) the gap, starting in 1996 when commercial space revenues exceeded government expenditures for the first time, is widening, 3) space is becoming more critical to our military and economic instruments of national power, and 4) resources remain constrained. The challenge is to keep in tune with the explosion in commercial space, modernize our forces, and keep from getting disconnected from our allies. The solution is strong, active partnerships to augment military space power through leveraging these sectors. The result is more capability, quicker, at lower cost, with more utility for the warfighter while enabling the interoperability so essential to coalition warfare. I am aware of and wholeheartedly support SPACECOMís many activities under the Global Partnerships piece of the Long Range Plan. If confirmed, I intend to personally work at sustaining and expanding these initiatives from Day One.
∑ Putting substance behind SPACECOMís new role as the single point of contact for military space: As you recall, the recent revision to the Unified Command Plan significantly increased SPACECOM's responsibilities. The space control and force application missions will continue to grow in importance. To prepare for the future, SPACECOM sought a defined, designated, and assigned space Area of Responsibility (AOR). Although the Joint Staff decided it was premature to designate space as an AOR, SPACECOM picked up several new responsibilities as a result of the dialog. The most important of the new responsibilities is its designation as the single focal point for military space operational matters. These additional responsibilities allow us to better shape, prepare, and respond in the region of space. With this foundation in place, SPACECOM has already started the process of reorganizing the headquartersí staff to reflect its new roles. If confirmed, within my first few months, I intend to receive the results of an on-going functional review to describe our manning needs based on these changes. Moreover, I believe itís important to finish what was started and consider designating space as an AOR. This would significantly advance the process of "normalizing" space with the other warfighting commands.
∑ Ensuring support from the Services and other government agencies for the Long-Range Plan: My congratulations to General Estes for creating this seminal document on space. For the first time, in one place, are listed the capabilities of legacy systems and what is needed to achieve the vision for 2020 Ė thus, doing our part to support Joint Vision 2010. The plan lays out operations concepts, key technologies, trade space for migrating new missions to space, and more. It was clear this plan was not created in isolation, but rather involved NASA, NRO, NOAA, all the Services, and industry to ensure a credible effort. My goal would be to stay totally engaged in this important effort and ensure the plan does not collect dust, but remains a living document. SPACECOM is already working to automate the plan to track any changes in assumptions and is reorganizing the staff so that specific offices are charged with facilitating the work of other agencies to implement pieces of the roadmap. If confirmed, I will make it a top priority to keep the vector set and people moving down the right path. Your awareness of the issues that are "out of our lane" is critical to fully achieving the vision. These areas, like policies, treaties, and agreements, do not fall under the direct purview of SPACECOM; however, they represent a significant obstacle to fulfilling the plan. We are already discovering from war games in the 2020 timeframe that our ability to operate in and from space depends on getting the policies determined, understood, and agreed to from the beginning.
∑ Making greater progress integrating space into the joint fight: All military operations rely on space-based capabilities. Itís essential that we continue to "operationalize" our focus and integrate space power as seamlessly as we do air, land, and sea power. The challenge is that we have already started to posture and size our forces as though a certain level of information dominance exists today. I would intend to build on the significant progress already made in this area and take it to the next level. For example, Iím aware of several demonstration projects occurring early in my tenure to show off new operations concepts for space. Moreover, we should carry on with efforts to place responsibility for operating long-haul communications in SPACECOM to better support the warfighter. I also believe the plans to refacilitize the Colorado Springs area to create a Space Complex housing each of the Service components will pay huge dividends for integration. Finally, we should aggressively pursue a Total Force strategy and get the Reserves and Guard more involved in current and future space missions.
What do you consider to be the most serious problems within USSPACECOM?
If confirmed, what management action and timetables would you establish to address these problems?
Other than those four areas I just mentioned, let me just say that I am very familiar with the development of the Integrated Priorities List submitted by the Unified Commanders. I believe that SPACECOM, working in concert with their joint colleagues and commanders, and within the Unified Command system, have established visionary and responsive products to address modernization and the evolving space and information ages. If confirmed, I will be intimately involved in continuing this important task. Beyond the need for new systems, Iíll have to wait until I have an opportunity to view the situation firsthand before describing any new management actions.
If confirmed, you will be entering this important position at a time of concern about the adequacy of the budget, force levels and readiness of our forces.
What background and experience do you have that you believe qualified you for this position?
The US military has done a terrific job, in my opinion, of getting me ready for this assignment. My professional journey to date has encompassed over three decades of working under some of our nationís greatest leaders and mentors while serving in the most dynamic organizations. They have prepared me well. As youíve described in your lead-in, I truly appreciate the significance of these times. My experience has run the gamut from Vietnam to the fall of the Soviet Union to DESERT STORM and Bosnia; from the "hollow force" of the 1970s to the buildup of the 1980s to our current strategic pause. Most notably I have been fortunate enough to command at the squadron, weapons school, wing, numbered air force, and major command levels. Equally important are my many tours developing tactics, defining requirements, evaluating readiness, writing plans, and acquiring weapon systems at the squadron, major command, Air Force, or Joint Staff levels. While I have not served in SPACECOM, I would say that Iíve had direct involvement with this great organization over eight years as a general officer Ė most significantly as a customer who relies on space and, from an Air Force perspective, as a partner in our Combat Air Forces. I have also worked hard to integrate space into my current command in the Pacific. Having spent an entire career executing, observing, and thinking about warfare, coupled with the practical aspects of being on the supported end of the space business, gives me an excellent understanding of the warfightersí needs. These experiences will prove invaluable to carrying out my responsibilities, if confirmed.
Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, USSPACECOM?
As I stated earlier, Iím well prepared and ready to assume command now. The steps Iíve taken to reach this point represent the culmination of an entire careerís experiences. Most recently, Iíve had frequent, direct, and comprehensive discussions with General Estes. With his help, Iíve gained an even deeper appreciation for the history, current issues, and future challenges surrounding space. The SPACECOM Deputy CINC, Directors, staff, and components are the finest professionals anywhere. If confirmed, I know we will do great things together for our nation.
In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that his Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress? Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power? Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as CINC USSPACECOM? Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
The separation of powers among our three branches of government is one of the most cherished tenets of the Constitution I have sworn and dedicated my service to protecting and defending. Iíve had several experiences appearing before congressional committees and offering my candid testimony on current issues and programs under my purview of interest to Congress. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our relationship and the evolving dialogue weíve established on space. The answer to your questions is an emphatic yes.