What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented? 

The Department has made significant progress in implementing the defense reforms. The success of the reforms affecting the top-level organizational structure was very apparent during Desert Storm. The chain of command is now much clearer, the roles and authority of the CINCs and the Military Departments are clearly enunciated, and the President and the Secretary of Defense are better served by having the Chairman of the JCS as their principal military adviser. In addition, obtaining inputs from the CINCs in the planning and requirements process; improving the linkage among the DoD’s defense strategy, force structure, and resources; and a greater emphasis on Joint Operations and Special Operations are critically important initiatives in the defense reform. The acquisition reform changes, while not as mature as the changes to the chain of command, are still being implemented. The Service Acquisition Executives and the Acquisition Corps have laid the foundation for acquisition reform. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress and the Department to continue to improve the way the DoD operates as an institution. 

What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms? 

I believe the most important aspect of the defense reform has been the stronger, clearly defined role for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and for the combatant commanders. 

I agree with the goals of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

Do you anticipate that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals? 

If confirmed, I would work with Congress to develop and carry through new legislation, if and when required, to continue the reform process. 

Will you, if confirmed, have direct access to the Secretary of Defense on all issues or are there any issues on which you will be required to report to the Secretary through the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology? 

As the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), I would report directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)). While working with the USD(A&T), I expect that I would have access to the Secretary of Defense while carrying out the day-to-day business of DDR&E. 

What will be your relationship with: 

I look forward to working closely with each of the Under Secretaries to accomplish the mission of the Department. If confirmed, I would serve as Dr. Gansler’s advisor on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), research, and engineering issues. 

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense 

The USD(A&T) has the authority to direct the heads of all other elements of the DoD with regard to matters for which the Under Secretary has responsibility. If confirmed as DDR&E, I will work closely with all the Assistant Secretaries of Defense on WMD, research, and engineering issues. 

The Defense Agencies 

If confirmed, I would have a special responsibility to advise Dr. Gansler on WMD, research, and engineering issues for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). In addition, DODD-5134.3 states that the DDR&E shall "exercise authority, direction, and control over" the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). If confirmed, I would expect to review the budgets submitted by these agencies to the USD(A&T) and would participate in the selection of senior officials.

 The Secretaries of the Military Departments 

If confirmed, I would provide direction to the Secretaries of the Military Departments with respect to S&T activities as outlined in DODD-5134.3. 

The National Defense Technology and Industrial Base Council 

The National Defense Technology and Industrial Base Council functions have been absorbed by the National Economic Council, which is an agency of the Executive Office of the President.  

The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council 

By charter, the USD(A&T) represents the DoD on the FAR Council. If confirmed, I would support Dr. Gansler as directed. 

The Economic Adjustment Committee 

The USD(A&T) has oversight responsibility for the Office of Economic Adjustment, thereby serving as the executive agent. If confirmed, I would support Dr. Gansler as directed. 

The Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization? 

The BMDO is a defense agency reporting directly to the USD(A&T). As previously stated, if confirmed, I would have a special responsibility to advise Dr. Gansler on R&D issues for BMDO. 

Assuming you are confirmed, do you expect that Secretary Cohen or Dr. Gansler will prescribe additional duties for you? 

If confirmed, I would expect that Secretary Cohen or Dr. Gansler will, from time to time, prescribe additional duties as required. 

If so, what do you expect those additional duties will be? 

While it is not possible for me to anticipate now the additional duties that may be assigned to DDR&E, I would expect that any additional duties that Secretary Cohen or Dr. Gansler may ask of me, if confirmed, will relate to research and engineering matters as provided by 10 U.S.C. 137. These duties are likely to deal with the management of DARPA, the BMDO, and the DTRA.  

Do you anticipate that you will be given authority to issue binding regulations and orders to the Defense Agencies and the Military Departments without obtaining approval in advance from the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense? 

As stated by the current DDR&E Charter (DoDD 5134.3), I understand that the DDR&E has the authority to issue DoD Instructions, DoD Publications, and directive-type memoranda, and therefore to provide direction to the Defense Agencies and Military Departments with respect to science and technology issues. 

Do you anticipate that you will be given authority to issue binding regulations and orders directly to the Service Acquisition Executives or will you be required to take such action through the Secretaries of the Military Departments? 

If confirmed, I generally would not expect these sorts of matters involving the Service Acquisition Executives to be under my purview. I would expect to work through the USD(A&T) on those matters that do arise that involve the functions of the Service Acquisition Executives. Any directives I would issues, however, would be to the Secretaries of the Military Departments.  

In what substantive areas do you anticipate you will have authority to issue binding regulations and orders? 

As stated by the current Charter (DoDD 5134.3), DDR&E has the authority to provide direction to the Defense Agencies and Military Departments in the assigned fields of responsibility, namely science and technology issues. 

In what areas do you anticipate you will serve only as an advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and technology? 

At this point, I do not know of any areas that I would serve only as an advisor, if confirmed. 

Do you believe that any significant changes should be made in the structure and decision-making procedures of the Defense Department with respect to acquisition matters? 

I know that the Department has been undergoing significant organizational changes. I fully support the Department’s initiatives to devolve programs to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. If confirmed, I intend to work with Dr. Gansler, the Secretary, and the Deputy Secretary to achieve full implementation of the Defense Reform Initiative.  

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering? 

There are two important challenges. First is the establishment of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to deal with the problems created by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons around the world. It is very important that this agency have the technical competence to address various aspects of WMD threats, counterproliferation efforts, and monitoring compliance with arms control treaties. Establishing, staffing and organizing the new agency will be a high priority. The second major challenge is to maintain and enhance the capability to sustain long-term development of weapons systems based on new technology. I have had long personal experience in this area, and let me give you an example. In 1970, I was Director of the NASA Ames Research Center, and I was asked by the Lockheed Corporation to perform wind tunnel tests on the first stealthy configuration aircraft that the "Skunk Works" had proposed. We performed these wind tunnel tests and as a result some experimental airplanes of this kind were built. When I was serving as Secretary of the Air Force in 1979, it fell to me to recommend to the Secretary of Defense that we sign a contract with the "Skunk Works" to produce what is now the Lockheed F-117, an aircraft based on the technical principles developed in earlier tests. As you know, the aircraft were built, and they turned out to be one of the decisive weapons in the victory that we gained in the Gulf War in 1991. This is what I mean by taking new technology and establishing a long-term development program -- 20 years in this case-- to create a working weapons system.  

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? 

The plan for establishing the new Defense Threat Reduction Agency has already been developed. I am in agreement with the plan, and my first priority, if confirmed, would be to assist the USD(A&T) in implementing it. If confirmed, the second challenge I want to address would be to continue the process initiated by my predecessors to create and sustain technology development programs required to maintain a superior and flexible military force in the post-Cold War world. Specifically, I would look for weapon systems that could give small U.S. forces deployed around the world decisive advantages. 

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the management of research and engineering functions in the Department of Defense? 

I already alluded to the problem of sustaining long-term engineering developments that would exploit new scientific breakthroughs in my answer to your first question in this section. The second issue that has to do with management is to define the right mix of government laboratories, industrial organizations, and universities to carry out these long-term projects. There is no single formula which applies to all cases. Some years ago I co-authored a book, "The Management of Research Institutions", which distills some historical experiences as to how such efforts must be organized. I can assure you that, if confirmed, I would apply what I have learned in more than forty years experience in managing large research projects in performing the duties of DDR&E. 

If confirmed, what management action and timetables would you establish to address these problems? 

Because of the many contacts that I have in the academic community and also in the defense industrial complex, if confirmed, I would be very active in arranging meetings and conferences to explore what these important resources can bring to bear on a few important specific programs. The most significant thing to remember, however, is that the Director of Defense Research and Engineering is the one senior official in the Pentagon who should think about very long term "timetables", running perhaps into the decades. There are technologies on the horizon today that have promising and perhaps even decisive applications for which small but long term development programs should be maintained. One such example is the use of electromagnetic forces to accelerate artillery projectiles. I would see to it that a number of such "far term" efforts are part of the defense research and development program.  

What are your views of the Defense Science Board Report and what actions do you believe should be taken with regard to FFRDCs? 

I am well aware of both sides of this issue. I have been both on the Board of Trustees of the MITRE Corporation, an FFRDC, and on the Board of Directors of BDM International, Inc., a Commercial Professional Service Corporation. Thus, I have seen both sides of the debate over the proper functioning of such organizations. I agree with the general observation that FFRDCs are performing unique and valuable work for the Department. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage the active oversight of FFRDCs by the DoD, ensuring that these organizations are used only when it is appropriate to do so. 

What are your views of the DUAP and COSSI programs? 

The Dual Use S&T Program and the COSSI program are parts of an overall strategy to leverage commercial technology to meet defense needs. These programs provide for a more rapid insertion of technological advances taking place in commercial industry. This reliance on the commercial sector helps to increase the pace at which commercial technological improvements are incorporated into defense systems. In addition, it also reduces the cost of those systems through the same competitive pressures and market-driven efficiencies that lead to accelerated development of technologies and savings in the commercial sector. 

What would be your long-term objectives for these programs? 

If confirmed, I will support the Department’s long-term objective to continue to leverage commercial technology to meet defense needs and have the Military Departments assume more operational responsibility. 

What do you see as the model for future DOD research in the post-Cold War environment? 

During the Cold War, the principal threat was an invasion of Europe by the Soviets. Shortly after the end of the Second World War, General Henry H. Arnold and Professor Theodore Von Karman, in a study called "Blue Horizon," developed a response. They argued that the U.S. would always be outnumbered in a conventional ground war and that the only way to prevail was to develop and maintain superior military technology on a consistent and long-term basis. Our strategy, based on this "model", was the major factor that led to our victory in the Cold War. 

Today the situation is more complex. In my judgement there are three important conditions that define the threats which might develop: 

As was the case half a century ago, our ability to develop and maintain superior weapon systems and to use them with intelligence and in a decisive manner will depend on technology. The "model" thus remains the same as it was during the Cold War, but the technologies will be different. More emphasis must be put on those technologies related to intelligence gathering, transportation, sensors and their associated guidance systems, robotic vehicles of all kinds, human factors both in performance and in defending troops against biological and chemical weapons, and finally, technologies oriented to defending U.S. territory.  

How do you plan to focus the research to meet the needs of the future? 

I believe that the current research plans have been structured to meet the future needs of the military. I understand that the Department has in place a robust, annual strategic planning process for its science and technology program. There are four basic plans which document the Department’s science and technology goals, strategy, and efforts. The science and technology community has historically provided the DoD with technology for future weapons and capabilities which has made the American military the most modern and most capable in the world. If confirmed, I would do my utmost to continue that tradition. 

What are your views of the ManTech program? 

ManTech supports force modernization and readiness by reducing the risk of transitioning technologies from the laboratory into fielded systems and providing large savings in manufacturing design and fabrication lead times. I have always supported new methods of cost reduction. When I was serving as Secretary of the Air Force in 1980, I saw to it that the General Dynamics Corporation introduced automated manufacturing procedures in the F-16 production plant in Fort Worth. 

What do you believe should be done to improve the management of the program and ensure stable funding? 

The DDR&E provides overall policy guidance, goals, and objectives for the program. Projects are executed by the Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel, composed of the ManTech Directors of the Military Departments and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Panel members work closely together to translate the policy guidance into specific program-based objectives, identify and integrate common requirements, conduct joint program planning, and develop joint strategies. If confirmed, I will work with Congress and the Military Departments to ensure that stable funding is provided to support initiatives, such as ManTech, which provide savings in manufacturing design and fabrication lead times and costs. 

Do you support this approach to technology development? 

Yes, I support the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program which exploits "sufficiently mature" advanced technologies to solve important military needs identified by the CINCs and Military Departments. A declining budget, significant change in the threat, and the pace of technology have increased the need to transition rapidly technology from the developer to the user.  

If so, how do you believe that congressional support for the ACTD process should be strengthened? 

The ACTD process provides for a closer working relationship between the technology developers and the warfighter. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that the warfighter continues to be an integral part of the science and technology planning process.  

Are you committed to maintaining the growth in the defense technology base? 

Yes. The Annual Report to the President and Congress calls for the Department to maintain funding for science and technology at the FY 1999 President’s Budget level, adjusted for inflation. Although this does not provide for growth after inflation, it is one of the difficult choices that must be made to achieve a balanced and affordable defense program. The Department has several important objectives, including a high readiness, forces adequate in size to sustain the DoD’s strategy of global engagement, and increased resources for procurement to underwrite the DoD’s modernization program - as well as a robust science and technology program to maintain the DoD’s technological edge in the future. Today’s force is dramatically smaller than that at the end of the Cold War, and it is unlikely to increase during peacetime. Therefore, this smaller force is dependent upon possessing technological superiority. To attain the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Vision 2010, the DoD must continue to reach ahead to new discoveries and develop new technologies. The DoD must stay committed to a robust Defense Technology Base to assure the technological advantage that has been, and will be, the foundation of our country’s national security. 

What is your assessment of the value of cooperative research, development, and production programs with our allies? 

The many different international research and development (R&D) agreements overseen by DDR&E are of substantial value to U.S. Defense interests for their pure value in international science and technology cooperation. Additionally on a larger strategic level, these cooperative programs develop and cement working relationships with our coalition partners and allies. Such cooperation allows the DoD to reduce international duplication of effort and to leverage dollars spent against agreed R&D goals. The international partners also place high value on these ongoing reciprocal collaborative efforts. In the evolving environment of coalition warfare, limited resources, and a global industrial and technology base, the DoD needs to utilize such cooperative programs to the maximum extent feasible, consistent with sound business practice and with the overall political, economic, technological, and national security goals of the U.S. 

What are the obstacles to more effective cooperation in this area, and how would you overcome them? 

I see two major obstacles to effective international cooperation for research and engineering efforts. Each obstacle can be overcome by management vision and consistency over time. The first obstacle is often identifying the opportunities within the DoD that lend themselves to international partnership and the appropriate international counterpart, and then building an effective working relationship. The second obstacle is that of unexpected program cancellations. Simply put, trust with international partners is built over time and must be maintained by consistency, time, and mutual respect. My approach to resolve these issues, if confirmed, would be to provide a consistent long-term position advocating strong bench-level relationships and providing assistance to the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and international partners to nurture such efforts. 

Could such cooperation contribute to sustaining our industrial base, especially for those military systems that the United States might like to continue developing or producing at a low rate solely to maintain an industrial base? 

I understand that the DoD supports cooperative research, development, and production programs with its allies for numerous reasons including the desire to ensure interoperability and reduce costs. Such programs normally are not designed solely to maintain an industrial base. I believe that international cooperative efforts offer a real opportunity to enhance interoperability with allies and to stretch scarce U.S. defense dollars. 

Are you familiar with the current process? 

I am becoming familiar with the current planning process. I have a copy of the latest Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan, dated February 1998. It contains a joint perspective, looking horizontally across the Military Departments and Defense Agencies, to ensure that the DoD Science and Technology programs address priority joint warfighting capabilities.  

What is your assessment of its current strengths and weaknesses? 

I understand that the current process used to develop the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan is rigorous. This process of involving the Joint Staff and the CINCs in developing the plans lays the foundation for a strong linkage between the technology and warfighting communities. This relationship is extremely helpful in identifying technology solutions for operations requirements. At this time, I see no weaknesses in the process used to develop the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan.  

Do you believe the process is worthy of continued support? 

Yes. There is a requirement for the DoD to deliver the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan to Congress each year on March 1, and I believe the current process has delivered a quality product. I understand that both the military and civilian research communities and the warfighter have found this to be a useful process to ensure future technological superiority. 

What changes do you believe need to be made to the current process? 

I am not aware at this time of any changes that need to be made in the current process. If confirmed, I will learn more about the current strategic planning process and will support further improvements, if warranted, to strengthen the process. 

What specific steps should the Department take to improve the coordination of research and development investments across the services? 

The Department has strengthened the science and technology (S&T) strategic planning, investment, and assessment process through the creation of integrated Defense S&T Reliance. The Defense S&T Reliance process is a team effort involving the OSD, the Military Departments, and the Defense Agencies. The Reliance process provides the framework to enable the DoD S&T community to work together to enhance the S&T role in the Department’s acquisition program and strengthen cooperation among the Military Departments and Defense Agencies; thereby improving responsiveness to their warfighting and acquisition customers. The products of Defense S&T Reliance are the DoD S&T vision, strategy, plans, and objectives for the planners, programmers, and performers of the Defense S&T program. If confirmed, I will work with the Defense Science and Technology Advisory Group, which provides oversight and guidance for the Defense S&T Reliance process, to identify areas for improvement. On the surface, Defense S&T Reliance appears to be doing an excellent job. 

Do you expect to have sufficient authority, as Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to prevent the military services from making research and development investments that you consider to be duplicative or redundant? 

Yes. The DoD Directive 5134.3 currently gives the DDR&E the responsibility and authority to provide direction to the DoD Components that will be used in planning their respective Technology Base Programs. The Directive further requires the DDR&E to, "certify in writing to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, through the USD(A&T), that the DoD Components’ Technology Base POM submission and Budget Request reflect the best allocation of Technology Base resources, or, as necessary, identify reallocations required to achieve the intended results." If confirmed, I envision being able to resolve any research and development investment issues through the Defense S&T Reliance process, rather than elevating them to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for resolution. 

If this transfer occurred, do you feel that you would be able to perform these additional functions and why, and what special skills and abilities would you bring to these responsibilities? 

I have a long history of nuclear weapons experience. I believe that I can perform the additional duties that may accrue with the transfer of oversight of nuclear programs to DDR&E, if confirmed. From 1955 to 1969, I was associated with the University of California’s nuclear weapons laboratory at Livermore as a staff member and a division leader (1960-1964). I have led research groups working in nuclear and atomic physics and have developed instrumentation used in testing of nuclear weapons. I am also familiar with the design, packaging, manufacture, and storage of nuclear weapons. In addition, I have participated in the development of military doctrines that governed the ultimate use of nuclear weapons. I believe that I have the skills and abilities to advise effectively the USD(A&T) on nuclear weapons matters. 

How would you carry out this responsibility? 

If confirmed, I have no plans to change the coordination process between the DoD and DOE. I believe that streamlining the related DoD efforts will improve the effectiveness of the Nuclear Weapons Council. 

Do you fully support the DOE program? 

Yes. I fully support the DOE program. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the DOE. The separate roles of the DoD as the customer working with the DOE as a service organization provide the appropriate checks and balances to the nuclear weapons program. 

Do you have confidence the US can maintain the nuclear weapons arsenal without testing? 

Yes. I have confidence in the stockpile stewardship and management programs in a non-testing environment. The successful subcritical experiments conducted in l998 are evidence of this capability, and I would anticipate a healthy subcritical testing program in the future if confirmed. 

Is it your understanding that you would have direct access to the Secretary of Defense in the event there is a problem identified with the nuclear weapons stockpile? 

As stated above in the Relationship Section, if confirmed, I would report directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)). I would expect to interact frequently with him while carrying out the day-to-day business of the Office of the USD(A&T) and the DDR&E. For matters of safety and reliability I will, if confirmed, have direct access to the Secretary of Defense. 

What is your understanding of the relationship between the Director of Defense Research Engineering and this new Agency? 

It is my understanding that the DDR&E will advise the USD(A&T) on all management and technical matters concerning the DTRA. 

If you are confirmed and if you became the staff director of the Nuclear Weapons Council, what would be your highest priorities for the Council? 

If confirmed and if I become staff director of the Council, my highest priority for the Council would be to continue the important and productive relationship that has existed between the DOE and the DoD. 

What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the Council? 

In 1975, I served on a committee to study the relationship between the Energy Research and Development Administration (later the DOE) and the DoD. Our recommendations 20 years ago strengthened the visibility of the DoD into the nuclear weapons program through the Council. These provisions are still in place and are working well. 

How would you improve the Council? 

I can not answer this question yet, but, if confirmed, I will submit any suggestions I have to the Council for review in the future. 

What do you see as being the top three responsibilities of the Council? 

I see the top three responsibilities of the Council to be nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, long range planning, and the safety and reliability of the stockpile. 

Do you support the CTBT? 

During the Cold War, I supported arms control measures that limited the geographic deployment and the number of weapons. I did not support treaties that limited the development of technology, which included testing. I took that position because the Soviets usually were willing to deploy more weapons than we could afford and thus limiting deployments was to our advantage. Since we were better than the Soviets in developing technology, treaties that limited technology development were generally not to our advantage. With the end of Cold War the situation has changed and such a treaty now has value and I support it. However, I would caution that a treaty alone is insufficient to deal with this problem, and other measures will be necessary to limit proliferation. Some states will not sign up and will continue to conduct nuclear tests. Others, like Iraq, will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and will continue to pursue development of nuclear weapons. While I support the treaty, I do not regard it as a final solution to nuclear weapons proliferation.  

If confirmed, how would you envision the Director of Defense Research and Engineering participating in this effort? 

Advanced computational capabilities will play an increasingly important role in both the acquisition and operational communities. I have a long history of promoting the development of new computers starting with the Illiac IV, the first large parallel computer (64 CPUs) in 1970, then the Massively Parallel Processor (MPP) at Goddard Space Flight Center in 1984, and most recently the development of THEnet in Texas. I strongly support application of such computers in the modeling and simulation area. I would continue to be very active in this area, if confirmed. 

How would you ensure that various computing initiatives supporting defense functions are coordinated? 

Recently, the Acting DDR&E reorganized the computing and modeling efforts within DDR&E so that not only the basic technology development but also the wide-spread use are well coordinated through a central point. The DDR&E Director for Information Technology now has oversight of the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, the High Performance Computing Office, and the Information Technology programs at DARPA. This streamlining will allow for better coordination of computing initiative among the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. If confirmed, I will continue to support initiatives to ensure defense functions are well coordinated. 

If Russia ratifies the START II treaty, do you believe that it is appropriate to reduce the amount of tritium required? 

If Russia ratifies the START II treaty, I believe that it could be appropriate to reduce the amount of tritium required.  

If you are confirmed, would you commit to have the Nuclear Weapons Council undertake a serious review of long term tritium requirements? 

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Nuclear Weapons Council seriously reviews the long term tritium requirement, especially if the START II Treaty is ratified by Russia. 

If confirmed, would you commit to looking specifically at the tritium requirements for each option? 

I believe that the differences in the two treaties will result in different tritium requirements. If confirmed, I will request that the Nuclear Weapons Council review the tritium requirements. 

What is your view of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act? 

I strongly support the IPA and the ability it provides to bring people into the government who would not otherwise be able to serve. I have been on both sides of the fence in my long career. As director of the NASA Ames Research Center, I brought people into the center from universities for many responsible positions up to and including division leader. This ability greatly enhanced the quality of the center’s research efforts. On the other side, during my time as Chancellor of the University of Texas System, which has over 7,000 faculty members, I urged our faculty to accept IPA appointments. These appointments enhanced the ability of faculty members both to do research relevant to practical applications and to teach undergraduates more effectively about the real world.  

When should it be used? 

I believe that the IPA should be used when it provides a means to bring requisite talent that is not readily available otherwise. 

If the individual is qualified, I have no problem having the head of a Defense Agency serve under the Act. The current Director of the NASA Ames Research Center, with 3,000 employees (civil service plus contractors) and a budget of almost $400 million dollars a year, serves under the Act as a professor on leave from the Pennsylvania State University. The Federal Government could not have brought this highly talented individual to Ames if it were not for the Intergovernmental Personnel Act.  

In your view, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the special access program? 

The primary strength of special access security controls is that they enable the DoD to accomplish very sensitive, high payoff acquisition, intelligence, and operational activities. In my view, without special access controls, many of these activities would not be possible, and the effectiveness of the operational forces would be reduced as a result. This was demonstrated during Desert Storm, when casualties were significantly reduced by the effectiveness of weapon systems that were developed and acquired under special access controls. Foremost among these is the F-117 stealth fighter, which was a totally unacknowledged program during its development and initial acquisition phases. In fact, as this committee knows, certain technical features of the F-117 remain under special access protection at present. I am convinced that special access controls are critical to the success of such highly sensitive activities and that programs such as the F-117 save American lives in combat. 

To be successful, special access programs must enforce strict "need to know" requirements and must be compartmented as a result. Compartmentation creates a management challenge and a requirement for aggressive oversight to prevent overlap or duplication among related programs. Restricted access programs also create additional management oversight challenges since the number of people involved in the review of technical, cost, and schedule performance is limited. I recognize these challenges and believe that to meet them, the Department must continue to assign its most capable people to these programs. In addition, the Department must have an effective oversight process. I believe that within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, there is such a management and oversight process based on the Special Access Program Oversight Committee (SAPOC), which the Deputy Secretary of Defense chairs.  

What changes, if any, do you anticipate making in the management and review of special access programs, particularly in view of the end of the cold war? 

If confirmed, I consider it my responsibility to ensure that research and engineering investments are targeted on the areas that will yield the highest payoffs when likely future adversaries are considered. With the end of the Cold War and related developments on the international scene since then, potential adversaries have changed dramatically, as have the potential conflict scenarios and locations. I will fully support Dr. Gansler, in his role as Vice Chairman of the SAPOC, in reviewing and screening SAP for relevance in the post cold war world, just like all other activities.  

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position? 

I have spent more than forty years working to apply S&T to the problems of national defense, in industry, in government, and in academia. From 1955 to 1969, I was associated with the University of California’s nuclear weapons laboratory at Livermore. I worked on problems related to nuclear weapons measuring the x-ray output during a nuclear detonation. I also became familiar with the design, packaging, manufacture, and storage of nuclear weapons. Finally, I participated in the development of military doctrines that governed the ultimate use of nuclear weapons. From 1969-1977, I was Director of the NASA-Ames Research Center and participated in the development of many military aircraft. Between 1977 and 1981, I served in the Pentagon as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office and also as Under Secretary and Secretary of the Air Force. The management of the reconnaissance satellite program gave me a detailed understanding of how senior policy makers and military commanders can best use intelligence obtained from space-based sensors. I also participated in organizational matters, specifically the establishment of the U.S. Air Force Space Command. In the past six years, I have been associated with a laboratory at the University of Texas which has had the lead role in developing electro-magnetic guns. This has given me recent "hands-on" experience in a modern technology development program and familiarity with the problems faced by the people in the trenches. I believe this experience will stand me in good stead if I am confirmed to undertake the responsibilities of the office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.  

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering? 

While I have maintained connections with the DoD through my membership on the Army Science Board and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Science and Technology Advisory Board, if confirmed, I will want to review changes that have occurred recently in the operation of the Department. I intend to study these changes intensively should I be confirmed. I look forward to working with the members of the Congress in developing the important programs for which I will have responsibility. 

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress? 

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power? 

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Director, Defense Research and Engineering?