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Before the
Senate Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities
On the
Fiscal Year 2012 President's Budget Request
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Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member Portman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 President's Budget Request for the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). This budget request will enable the NNSA to meet its commitments to the American people and our international partners to reduce nuclear and radiological dangers around the world. The request also provides the science, technology, and engineering capabilities necessary to allow us to address the broader national security challenges of the 21st century.

While recognizing the economic challenges facing our nation, the President has demonstrated through this FY 2012 budget request his strong commitment to nonproliferation and nuclear security. This unprecedented investment in DNN's mission represents a commitment to implement the President's nuclear security agenda, but does so in a way that balances our highest priorities with continued focus on efficiency and effectiveness.

During his speech in Prague in April 2009, the President unveiled an ambitious nuclear security agenda, which identified the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and keep dangerous nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists, as a top national security priority. Meeting this objective, however, requires international commitment and action. The success of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was the first concrete demonstration of broad international commitment, resulting in 47 heads of state coming together and jointly endorsing global nuclear security objectives. Today, there is a robust international effort under way to secure the most vulnerable nuclear material around the world and to build on the success of the 2010 Summit.

NNSA's vision is to make the world a safer place. The words are simple, but the challenges to realizing that vision are substantial. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation's role in the NNSA mission is to leverage its technical expertise, creativity, and other unique capabilities and resources to confront the challenges of nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism around the world. Our strategy includes engaging our domestic and international partners in a global effort to secure the most vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide; impeding the proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies, information, materials and expertise; providing technical support to the President's nonproliferation and arms control

agenda; developing a new framework for nuclear energy that minimizes proliferation risks; and advancing the science, technology and engineering base that supports DNN's missions.

Implementing the President's Nuclear Security Agenda

The FY 2012 NNSA budget request includes \$2.55 billion for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation for FY 2012 and \$14.3 billion over the next five years to reduce the global nuclear and radiological threat by detecting, securing, safeguarding, disposing and controlling nuclear and radiological material, as well as promoting the responsible application of nuclear technology and science. Each fiscal year from FY12 until FY16 has been analyzed for priorities to achieve Presidential and operational objectives. This includes stemming the risk of weapons-expertise proliferation through innovative science and technology partnerships. The budget request provides the resources required to continue making progress on the President's international effort to secure the most vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, a key national security goal.

This budget request recognizes significant accomplishments of NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation programs in the past year and seeks the resources needed to continue to work toward the President's goals. NNSA along with the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government departments and agencies, working with countries around the world, is implementing Prague speech commitments to a focused and intensified international effort to lock down or remove vulnerable nuclear materials. We are executing an integrated, prioritized strategy that aligns authorities, capabilities, and resources to address global nuclear threats. This three-tiered strategy covers the site, country and global levels. NNSA takes a lead role in many of the activities that meet this goal, including removing or eliminating special nuclear material when possible, securing that material when not and providing critical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

For example, this request provides the necessary resources to support commitments secured from international partners to remove all remaining highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Belarus, Ukraine and Mexico by April 2012, and to carry out the removal of nuclear material from other countries. It also contributes to preventing nuclear terrorism by working with Russia and other countries to secure and eliminate vulnerable weapons-usable material. The budget request also provides resources to work with the Department of Defense to strengthen international nuclear security cooperation. And it will enable NNSA, working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to continue leading international efforts to implement more stringent standards for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities worldwide.

The request of \$2.55 billion is an increase of 10 percent from the FY 2011 Continuing Resolution, and an increase of 19.6 percent over the FY 2010 appropriation. This 10 percent, or \$230.8 million increase will support efforts to secure the most vulnerable nuclear materials within the President's stated timeframe. The NNSA budget request remains consistent with our

overall strategy to ensure that programs supporting the President's commitment lead to an international effort to reduce nuclear dangers.

In addition, the budget request supports the efforts of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) related to radiological material, as well as the activities of the International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation (INMP&C) program to enhance the ability of our foreign partners to detect nuclear smuggling both at fixed border crossings and internal checkpoints. The budget request also continues to support the Fissile Materials Disposition (FMD) U.S. plutonium disposition mission to include the three construction projects, as well as the U.S. uranium disposition program.

Specifically, our \$2.55 billion FY 2012 request includes:

- More than \$508 million for GTRI to remove and secure high-priority vulnerable nuclear material around the world in four years, accelerate additional conversions of HEU fueled research reactors to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, and to provide a comprehensive approach to permanently deny terrorists access to nuclear and radiological material at civilian sites worldwide;
- More than \$890 million for the FMD program to dispose of U.S. surplus plutonium and highly enriched uranium by constructing a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and a Waste Solidification Building, and developing a capability to disassemble nuclear weapon pits and convert the material for use in MOX fuel. The FY 2012 request also supports programmatic activities that are not part of the line item construction projects but are essential to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium, including: MOX fuel qualification, executing utility contracts, obtaining plutonium feedstock from LANL in advance of a full-scale pit disassembly capability, obtaining depleted uranium oxide feedstock, storage of feed materials, and transportation.
- Over \$571 million for the INMP&C program for additional Material Protection Control & Accounting (MPC&A) upgrades and sustainability support, expansion of MPC&A cooperation with countries outside of Russia and the former Soviet Union, and additional deployment of radiation detection systems with enabling support for sustained operations to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials under the Second Line of Defense (SLD) program;
- Over \$417 million for the Nonproliferation and Verification Research & Development (R&D) program to provide the key technical support for the President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda, as well as to provide funding for the University of California pension obligations; and
- Nearly \$162 million for the Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program to safeguard nuclear material; ensure adequate security of U.S.-obligated nuclear material provided to other countries and enhance work with partners to strengthen security globally; control the spread of WMD technologies, equipment, and expertise; and verify nuclear reductions and compliance with international regimes, treaties, and agreements.

An Integrated Effort to Achieve the Goal

Different people perceive the “threat” in different ways; we all have our views on how to make the world safer. At NNSA, we have formed our view collectively through discussions with our counterparts from across the U.S. Government. Working with a strong team from the National Security Staff and with the intelligence community, we have developed strategies and identified priorities for programmatic and diplomatic engagement. No matter what the risks and threats are, the most effective approach is to integrate our efforts and capitalize on our unique capabilities to work effectively across NNSA, within DOE and the interagency, and with our foreign partners. In that respect, the threat priorities of our international partners are also taken into account.

As One-NNSA, all of NNSA’s major components work together closely. For example, the Office of Defense Programs and DNN collaborate on approaches to transparency and monitoring for treaty-related purposes; DNN and the Office of Emergency Response work together to carry out training in partner countries. This pattern of collaboration is important because our missions are so closely interrelated and we because share resources across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. For example, investments that sustain the stockpile will also support our full range of nuclear nonproliferation missions. In addition to the substantial support that our National Laboratories and facilities receive from Defense Programs and other parts of DOE, DNN also makes a major contribution to preserving and developing world-class expertise that can support all of NNSA’s missions. We must continue to invest in the future.

We also have important common ground with our colleagues in the Offices of Nuclear Energy and Environmental Management at DOE as we all develop strategies to address the expansion of nuclear energy and the disposition of nuclear and radiological materials in a safe and secure way. We maintain constant contact with our partners throughout the interagency, particularly at the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Defense, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the National Security Staff (NSS). For instance, the NSS currently leads a strong interagency team that meets regularly to prioritize activities and to assess risk by material type and country, which in turn informs how we execute our programs. As the largest nonproliferation account in the government, NNSA’s FY 2012 budget request was developed with the interagency effort in mind and in the context of a well-defined scope of work within the President’s timeframe for the four-year effort.

But no matter how coordinated and integrated our efforts are in the United States, none of our efforts would be possible without the full engagement and cooperation of our foreign partners. The United States cannot control knowledge, material and technology as we did in the past. Globalization requires us to pursue partnerships based on shared nonproliferation objectives.

NNSA is one of several U.S. agencies actively working on the President’s nonproliferation agenda, and has taken the lead in a number of areas. These capabilities are reflected in our FY 2012 Budget request, including:

Securing Nuclear and Radiological Material from Theft and Diversion. NNSA is the interagency leader in making sure that nuclear material worldwide is secured from theft and diversion at its source.

Through GTRI, NNSA leads U.S. efforts to convert research and test reactors from HEU to LEU, remove excess or unwanted weapons-usable nuclear and radiological material, and enhance the security of risk-significant quantities of nuclear and radiological materials in use at civilian sites around the world to help prevent terrorists from acquiring what they need to make a nuclear weapon or radiological “dirty bomb.” Since President Obama’s April 2009 Prague speech, NNSA has removed 963 kilograms of HEU and plutonium from 19 countries around the world. That is enough material for more than 38 nuclear weapons. Six countries have had all of their HEU removed since the Prague speech. In November 2010, NNSA completed a large-scale campaign to move spent fuel from Kazakhstan’s BN-350 plutonium production reactor to a secure storage facility in eastern Kazakhstan. The spent fuel contains 10 metric tons of HEU and three metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium – enough material for more than 775 nuclear weapons. NNSA plans to complete a number of important projects in FY 2012, including the removal of all HEU from Ukraine, Belarus, and Mexico in cooperation with each of those countries. NNSA will continue efforts to remove HEU from Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Poland, and Hungary in 2013. In FY 2012, NNSA will continue to lead U.S. efforts to secure or recover high-risk radiological materials, enhance security at an additional 158 buildings worldwide, and recover an additional 1,900 disused or unwanted radioactive sealed sources here in the United States.

The INMP&C program has two main components. Under Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A), the program prevents nuclear terrorism by working in Russia and other regions of concern to secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons exploitable material. Under its Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program, NNSA works with international partners to deploy radiation detection systems at international crossing points, airports, and seaports, and to provide mobile systems for use at interior checkpoints to detect and deter the illicit transfer of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Training and sustainability support are also key components of this program. Since the President’s 2009 Prague speech, the program has completed MPC&A upgrades to 33 buildings containing weapons-usable material in Russia; initiated new upgrades at a number of Russian facilities; placed a cumulative total of 25 MPC&A regulations in development in Russia and other FSU countries to strengthen nuclear security safeguards; cooperated with the FBI to provide mobile detection training in four countries; deployed radiation detection systems at 162 sites; downblended over two metric tons of HEU to LEU in Russia; and initiated cooperation with India and China to develop nuclear security Centers of Excellence to help those nations become regional centers on nuclear security culture and training. The budget request will allow INMP&C to: complete MPC&A upgrades at 3 additional buildings in Russia with weapons usable nuclear material; provide additional MPC&A upgrades at 25 Russian nuclear material sites; continue to support the transition of security upgrades to sustainable operations

at 76 sites in Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine; complete Russian Ministry of Defense training centers (Ochakovo, Krasnoyarsk, Abramovo); continue Russian inspections support activities and training, and support for secure transportation sustainability, measurement methodologies, and protective force programs; and will downblend an additional 1 MTs of HEU. SLD plans to install detection systems in 30 foreign strategic transit and border sites (cumulative total of 448 of 650 planned), to complete 3 Megaports in Cameroon, Vietnam, and Italy (for a cumulative total 48 of 100 planned), and to deploy mobile detection systems in eight more countries.

In FY 2012, marking one of the first major accomplishments of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan, NNSA led the U.S. Government and international efforts to finalize the fifth revision of the IAEA's *Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities* (IAEA Information Circular 225). In FY 2012, through the Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) Program, NNSA will lead U.S. and global efforts to implement INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and work closely with foreign partners to operationalize its recommendations. Such efforts will include facilitating the exchange of information on best practices for securing nuclear material in facilities and in transport. NNSA's NIS program will continue to lead U.S. interagency physical protection assessment visits to other countries that have received U.S.-obligated nuclear material under Section 123 Agreements for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. In doing so, NNSA and its predecessor organizations will have led over 125 visits to 48 countries since 1974. Additionally, NIS will continue to engage foreign partners and multilateral organizations on nuclear security initiatives globally through technical projects and nuclear security training activities.

NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is working to strengthen the international safeguards system, a central pillar of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Safeguards ensure the timely detection of diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful activities. As NGSI works to advance the President's call in Prague for "more resources and authority for international inspections," it is simultaneously creating the next generation of dedicated nonproliferation experts, developing cutting edge technology for use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other safeguards organizations, and working with international partners to strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards.

Preventing Nuclear and Radiological Smuggling. As a complement to our facility-based physical security efforts that serve as a first line of defense, NNSA executes a number of programs that provide an additional layer of defense by detecting and preventing illicit transfers of nuclear-related material, technology and equipment. These programs help implement the President's call during his April 2009 Prague speech call to build on efforts to break up nuclear black markets and detect and intercept dangerous materials in transit.

Within INMP&C, the SLD Core program cooperates with foreign partners to install radiation detection equipment at borders, airports, and strategic ports in Russia, other former Soviet Union states, Eastern Europe, and other key countries, and provides mobile detection capability to law enforcement as well as related training and support. The SLD Megaports Initiative likewise cooperates internationally to deploy radiation detection equipment and provide related training to key strategic and high-volume ports. The FY 2012 budget request provides for SLD installations at an additional 30 sites in Estonia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Mongolia, Croatia, and Moldova, mobile detection capability to eight countries, and completion of Megaports installations and activities at three additional foreign seaports with ongoing installation activities at an additional 13 ports. The SLD Program will continue to provide some level of sustainability support to over 250 sites in over 40 countries.

NNSA's R&D program funds research to deliver nuclear detectors that are more sensitive, have better discrimination and are easier to deploy facilitating the discovery and identification of contraband radiation materials. The R&D program also delivers state-of-the-art imaging equipment that identifies chemical trails at a distance.

Within NIS, the International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) supports U.S. Government efforts to combat illicit trafficking of dual-use commodities required to manufacture WMD and their means of delivery. Specifically, INECP improves partners' export control systems and their ability to prevent illicit smuggling – particularly threats posed by black market networks. Notably, INECP collaborates with partners to develop sustainable national training capabilities, including outreach to strategic industries to improve compliance and efforts to strengthen our partners' frontline inspection and other enforcement capabilities. Since 2001, INECP has trained over 17,000 frontline personnel to recognize WMD dual-use commodities in 65 countries, 19 of which have adopted domestic programs.

Moreover, to help governments investigate the illicit use of nuclear materials and deter illicit trafficking of those materials, NIS's Confidence-Building Measures Program is advancing international cooperation in nonproliferation nuclear forensics. Nuclear forensics applies scientific techniques to identify unique characteristics of nuclear and radioactive material. Promoting cooperation among countries in nuclear forensics can produce investigative leads to link a seizure by one country with diversion in another, helping to better prosecute those involved. NIS's Confidence-Building Measures Program sponsors technical collaborations to strengthening the global capacity for effective nuclear forensics and increase data sharing.

Permanent nuclear material disposition. Part of the challenge in making the world a safer place is to be ever mindful of the challenges associated with disposing of large quantities of Cold War nuclear weapons materials. Disposition not only permanently reduces the risk that these materials could be stolen or diverted for use by rogue

nations or terrorists but it also allows us to reduce the number of sites where these materials are stored thereby significantly reducing the cost associated with guarding and storing the material. In this regard, the President is seeking \$890 million for the FMD program, which supports continued efforts to down-blend surplus U.S. HEU as well as to continue construction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, Waste Solidification Building, and efforts to disassemble nuclear weapons pits at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. Not only will these facilities be used to permanently eliminate more than 34 metric tons of surplus weapons plutonium, they will do so in a way that produces electricity for consumers right here in the United States. Similarly, as part of our broader nonproliferation effort, Russia will also be disposing of 34 metric tons of surplus weapons plutonium in a way that will provide energy for Russia. As I like to say, this is the ultimate swords to plowshares program, and a key element of the President's nuclear nonproliferation agenda.

Ensuring Transparent and Verifiable Compliance. The budget request allows NNSA to provide national leadership with continuous, global, real-time assurance that nuclear test agreements are respected through the U.S. Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) satellite payloads. DNN is leading interagency re-evaluation of system requirements and implementation to sustain needed capability at an affordable cost. The Nuclear Detonation Detection seismic model and sensor development raises confidence of policy makers about the nature, magnitude, and location of explosions that could be tests of nuclear devices.

The budget request will also support the monitored elimination of an additional 30 metric tons of Russian weapons-grade HEU in FY 2012. This is one of the final steps toward completing the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement in 2013. The Agreement has been one of NNSA's most successful nonproliferation efforts to date and is on track to convert 500 metric tons Russian weapons-grade HEU, the equivalent of 20,000 nuclear weapons, into nuclear fuel used to generate nearly 10% of all U.S. electricity.

The 1997 Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA) between the United States and the Russian Federation has a goal of eliminating plutonium production for use in weapons. The Agreement has monitoring provisions to ensure that shutdown U.S. and Russian production reactors remain shutdown and that at least nine metric tons of Russian plutonium oxide produced from the last three operating Russian production reactors is not used in weapons. DOE is the Executive Agent for the PPRA, is a member of the U.S. component of the bilateral Joint Implementation and Compliance Commission that oversees PPRA activities, supplies technical experts for the monitoring visits in Russia, and hosts the Russian monitors at DOE sites during the shutdown reactor visits.

An important PPRA milestone has been reached—the three remaining operating Russian plutonium production reactors recently were shut down. The two reactors in Seversk were shut down in 2008, and the closure of the last, at Zheleznogorsk, was announced

at the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010. In accordance with the Agreement, those reactors will be transitioned to the established PPRA monitoring regime to ensure that they remain permanently shutdown. Of the 27 plutonium production reactors covered in the Agreement, including 14 in the United States and 13 in Russia, 11 have already been decommissioned to the point that they have been removed from monitoring and will never be used again for plutonium production. The United States and Russia will continue to monitor the remaining reactors until they are similarly decommissioned and the subject plutonium oxide is transitioned to another monitoring regime or is eliminated.

Technical Support to the President's Nonproliferation and Arms Control Agenda. DNN provides technical expertise, drawing from NNSA's nuclear security enterprise, as well as negotiating and policy expertise, to support the development, negotiation, and implementation of treaties and agreements, including the New START Treaty with Russia. While contributing to overall U.S. national security objectives, our focus is to meet our current and potential future treaty commitments and obligations while at the same time continuing to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.

Drawing upon our expertise, including work in support of past arms control and nonproliferation agreements, DNN is playing an essential role in technology development to address future arms control and nonproliferation challenges. This includes developing the next generation of radiation detection equipment, advanced tamper indication and unique identification capabilities, and methodologies to support potential future warhead and material identification and verification requirements. We are also capitalizing on the resources in place at the National Center for Nuclear Security in Nevada. Such resources enable us to advance and demonstrate capabilities to address verification, monitoring, and transparency requirements by increasing confidence in our ability to detect and discriminate signatures of interest and capabilities that address technical nuclear forensics requirements and other nonproliferation initiatives, as described in the Nuclear Posture Review. We work in close cooperation with NNSA's Defense Programs and our U.S. Interagency counterparts to develop initiatives that accomplish U.S. objectives while minimizing any potential impacts across our own enterprise.

Investing in our future. The Nuclear Science and Security Consortium builds a stable pipeline of highly trained nuclear nonproliferation technical expertise for the NNSA laboratory system, sponsors basic research in nuclear nonproliferation, and bridges the nuclear nonproliferation knowledge bases in academia and the NNSA Laboratory system. By ensuring DNN maintains a vital R&D program to fund cutting edge nonproliferation technologies in the National Lab complex, we also make an investment in human capital development at the labs. Challenging research opportunities and world class facilities enable our labs to attract and hire the best and brightest young research scientists, technicians, and engineers, and thereby renew the workforce for

generations to come. In addition, the DNN programs engage with national laboratories and facilities across the DOE complex to ensure the long term capabilities and expertise necessary to serve all of our missions.

International Engagement. We are also continuing to build upon our existing partnerships with foreign colleagues and to initiate new partnerships. Our traditional defense partnership with the United Kingdom, for example, is decades old. Our collaboration on technologies and methodologies to support monitoring and verification initiatives is now in the beginning of its second decade, and provides an essential mechanism to evaluate and test approaches in alternative environments. We hope to build upon this success by engaging with other key allies and partners as we work toward addressing the range of global nuclear security challenges, including potential future arms limitations and reductions agreements.

NNSA strives to build strong cooperative relationships with our international partners, both old and new. DNN's NIS program provides training and other support to enhance the capabilities of our partners to meet the commitments they made at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. The pledges from Japan and the Republic of Korea to develop Centers of Excellence for nuclear security and nuclear nonproliferation are two examples as NNSA is collaborating with both to develop nuclear security training curriculum, nuclear security test beds, and international workshops in nuclear security for their respective centers. The Obama Administration is also working closely with strategic partners such as China and India to advance regional centers of excellence, with the overarching goal of spurring deeper engagement in preventing the spread of WMD-related material, technology, equipment and expertise.

As outlined in his 2009 Cairo speech, the President has also called for a more comprehensive engagement with Middle East and North African countries, stressing science and technology partnerships focused on issues of common concern. Since 2003, NNSA has advanced regional security cooperation through the Middle East Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS), formerly known as the Cooperative Monitoring Center, in Amman, Jordan. As a regional center of excellence, MESIS provides a forum for training and dialogue on regional security and proliferation concerns, including export controls, border security, and nuclear safety, security and safeguards. It marshals regional, U.S., and international resources to cultivate indigenous nonproliferation expertise. The Institute also facilitates workshops and training efforts for other NNSA and U.S. Government nonproliferation programs, and leverages U.S. Government and international nonproliferation efforts in the region.

Preparing for the Threats We Don't Know. As threats evolve and our knowledge of the world changes, NNSA must constantly re-evaluate its efforts to ensure that we have the flexibility to accomplish our goals. This constant re-evaluation must stretch from advanced technology research and development to working with our international partners to prepare for unknown threats by asking them to consider the plausible range

of adversary capabilities, strategies, and tactics—including insider and cyber capabilities—when designing security systems. In this way, all of DNN’s programs, along with the complementary activities of our partners throughout NNSA, DOE and the rest of the U.S. Government, are forward looking and prepared for any eventuality.

Conclusion

NNSA carefully evaluates its security needs in a fluid, uncertain, and challenging international landscape. In coordination with the rest of the U.S. Government, NNSA has charted a path forward for DNN that shows our unwavering commitment to our Nation’s security and enhances our formidable capabilities to address broader security challenges.

The NNSA is a technically-based organization with a strong nuclear heritage that serves as the base for our contribution to a wide range of national security solutions. NNSA is rooted in the management of our Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile and the application of nuclear energy for naval propulsion. Additionally, NNSA capabilities support a broad range of U.S. and international activities that address existing dangers, identify and prepare for future challenges, and advise the U.S. Government and our international partners on nuclear security matters.

This budget request takes DNN into the future and strengthens the capabilities that are themselves integral elements of our national security. The challenge is to retain the capabilities that continue to be essential, and to identify and develop those capabilities that are needed for the future.