

Advance Policy Questions for General Martin E. Dempsey, USA
Nominee for Chief of Staff of the Army

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

No.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

None. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has worked quite well in making the Armed Services an integrated joint force.

Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

I have over 35 years of experience in Army, Joint, and Coalition organizations from the tactical to the strategic levels of command, all of which have allowed me to see our Army at work in a broad variety of capacities and missions. Some of my most relevant experiences have been during periods of deployment when we have faced significant threats to our Nation's security. I served as a field grade officer during Desert Shield/Storm and then Operation Iraqi Freedom as the Commanding General of 1st Armored Division. Later as the Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq training Iraqi Security Forces I experienced firsthand the importance of preparing our Army for joint and combined operations. Returning from Iraq, I served as Deputy and then Acting Commander of US Central Command. Most recently, as the Commanding General for Training and Doctrine Command, I have had an opportunity to reinforce the training ethos of our Army as we look toward an uncertain future. I have travelled across our Army and at every turn have seen the sacrifices of our Soldiers and their Families. Our Soldiers are the best the world has ever seen, and they remain fiercely dedicated to our Nation and its security. If confirmed by this Senate, I

would be honored to serve as their Chief of Staff.

Duties

Sections 601 and 3033 of title 10, United States Code establishes the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?

The Chief of Staff, Army serves as the senior military advisor to the Secretary of the Army in all matters and has responsibility for the effective and efficient functioning of Army organizations and commands in performing their statutory missions.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that Secretary McHugh would prescribe for you?

I expect that Secretary McHugh would prescribe the following duties for me if I am confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the Army:

- (a) Serve as the senior military leader of the Army and all of its components;
- (b) Assist the Secretary with his external affairs functions, including presenting and justifying Army policies, plans, programs, and budgets to the Secretary of Defense, Executive Branch, and Congress;
- (c) Assist the Secretary with his compliance functions, including directing The Inspector General to perform inspections and investigations as required;
- (d) Preside over the Army Staff and ensure the effective and efficient functioning of the headquarters, to include integrating Reserve Component matters into all aspects of Army business;
- (e) Serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense, President, and Congress. To the extent that such action does not impair my independence as the Chief of Staff of the Army, in my performance as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would keep the Secretary of the Army informed of military advice rendered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters affecting the Department of the Army. I would inform the Secretary of the Army of significant military operations affecting his duties and responsibilities, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense;
- (f) Represent Army capabilities, requirements, policy, plans, and programs in Joint fora;
- (g) Supervise the execution of Army policies, plans, programs, and activities and assess the performance of Army commands in the execution of their assigned statutory missions and functions; and
- (h) Task and supervise the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, the Army Staff and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Army, elements of the Army Secretariat to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army would be responsible for providing advice and assistance in the execution of my responsibilities for those missions and functions related to manpower and personnel; logistics; operations and plans; requirements and programs; intelligence; command, control and communications; and readiness.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Army?

If confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will continually assess my ability to perform my duties and, if necessary, implement measures aimed at improving my ability to lead our Army.

Relationships

If confirmed, what would be your working relationship with:

The Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense, as the head of the Department of Defense and the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense, issues guidance and direction to the Military Departments. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will serve as a military adviser to the Secretary of Defense as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army properly implements the policies established by his office. In coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense in articulating the views of the Army.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The Secretary of Defense also delegates to him full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and exercise the powers of the Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary is authorized to act pursuant to law. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense, and to his deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. Also, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Deputy Secretary of Defense in articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to time, to issue guidance—and in the case of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction—to the military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman plans the strategic direction and contingency operations of the armed forces; advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets identified by the commanders of the combatant commands; develops doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports on assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces; provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.

In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will provide my individual military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be my duty to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to assist in his performance of these responsibilities. As appropriate, I will also provide advice in addition to or in disagreement with that of the Chairman. I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the Chairman, and will communicate directly and openly on policy matters involving the Army and the Armed Forces as a whole.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be my duty to ensure that the Vice Chairman is provided my frank views and opinions to assist him in his performance of his responsibilities.

The Secretary of the Army.

If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the Army would be close, direct, and supportive. Within the Department of the Army, a large part of my responsibility as Chief of

Staff would be to serve as the Secretary's principal military adviser. My responsibilities would also involve communicating the Army Staff's plans to the Secretary and supervising the implementation of the Secretary's decisions through the Army Staff, commands and agencies. In this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary. In my capacity as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would also be responsible for appropriately informing the Secretary about conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and about significant military operations, to the extent such action does not impair independence in the performance of my duties as a member of Joint Chiefs of Staff. I anticipate that I would work closely and in concert with the Secretary to establish the best policies for the Army in light of national interests.

The Under Secretary of the Army.

The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary prescribes. His responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary, and to the Under Secretary for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary to ensure that the policies established by the Office of the Secretary of the Army are properly implemented. I will communicate openly and directly with the Under Secretary in articulating the views of the Army Staff, commands, and agencies.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army serves as the principal advisor and assistant to the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Vice Chief of Staff, Army.

The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.

The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army.

The General Counsel of the Army.

The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army. His/Her duties include coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the Army on any legal question or procedure, other than military justice matters, which are assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship

with the General Counsel to assist in the performance of these important duties.

The Inspector General of the Army.

The Inspector General is responsible for inspections and certain investigations within the Department, such as inquiring into and reporting to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff regarding discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army with continuing assessment of command, operational, logistical, and administrative effectiveness; and serving as the Department of the Army focal point for Department of Defense Inspector General inspections and noncriminal investigations, as well as the Department of Defense inspection policy. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Inspector General to ensure effective accomplishment of these important duties.

The Judge Advocate General of the Army.

The Judge Advocate General is the military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and all officers and agencies of the Department of the Army. The Judge Advocate General provides legal advice directly to the Chief of Staff and the Army Staff in matters concerning military justice, environmental law; labor and civilian personnel law; contract, fiscal, and tax law; international law; and the worldwide operational deployment of Army forces. The Chief of Staff does not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the personal authority to remove him. This enables The Judge Advocate General to provide independent legal advice. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the TJAG as my legal advisor and I will assist him in the performance of his important duties as the legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

The National Guard Bureau is a joint bureau of the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force. Appointed by the President, he serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. The Chief, National Guard Bureau is also the principal advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on matters relating to the National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, National Guard Bureau to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau, as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army.

The Director of the Army National Guard.

The Director, Army National Guard is responsible for assisting the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau, as they relate to the Army National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Director, Army National Guard to foster an

environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau. This will be essential as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and improve Army National Guard's operational capabilities.

The Chief of the Army Reserve.

The Chief, Army Reserve is responsible for justification and execution of the personnel, operation and maintenance, and construction budgets for the Army Reserve. As such, the Chief, Army Reserve is the director and functional manager of appropriations made for the Army Reserve in those areas. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, Army Reserve as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and improve the Army Reserve operational capabilities.

The Chiefs of the Other Services.

If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be my duty to engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and opinions with my fellow Service Chiefs. I look forward to developing strong working relationships with these colleagues.

The Combatant Commanders.

Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of their commands to carry out missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the unified and specified combatant commands or to the United States element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, to perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and the authority of combatant commanders under Title 10, United States Code, section 164(c), the Service Secretaries are responsible for administering and supporting the forces that they assign to a combatant command. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant commanders in performing these administrative and support responsibilities. I will establish close, professional relationships with the combatant commanders and communicate directly and openly with them on matters involving the Department of the Army and Army forces and personnel assigned to or supporting these commands.

Vision for the Future

What is your vision for the Army of today and the future?

The Army will remain a critical component of the Joint Force, providing an affordable

mix of tailorable and networked organizations operating on a rotational cycle, providing a sustained flow of trained and ready land forces for full spectrum operations, prepared for unexpected contingencies and at a tempo that will sustain our All-Volunteer Force.

What roles do you believe the Army should play in contingency, humanitarian, and stability operations?

We are capable of executing contingency, humanitarian or stability operations, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, under the control of the appropriate Combatant Commander. We are also capable of assisting our international partners in building their own operational capacity. Through security force assistance, we can increase the ability of other nations to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic order, protect its citizens during natural disasters, and avoid conflicts, which would otherwise require U.S. military support.

Do you see any unnecessary redundancy between Army and Marine Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army light or medium weight divisions and Marine Corps divisions?

No. We each have unique but complementary capabilities that provide the National Command Authority with options for dealing with emerging threats and contingencies.

Army Role in the Joint Force

The U.S. military fights as a joint force and strives to achieve realistic training in preparation for military operations. The Army provides trained and equipped forces for joint military operations.

How do you believe the Army can best contribute to improved joint military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities and culture?

The Army works our relationships with Sister Services diligently while maintaining our unique values, culture and traditions. The Army provides forces for prompt and sustained combat operations on land as a component of the Joint force. Through sustained operations on land and among populations, we make permanent the advantages gained by joint forces.

Major Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Chief of Staff of the Army?

We've got to win our current conflicts while simultaneously preparing for future security

challenges. We must take care of our Soldiers, our wounded, and their families. We must meet this challenge in an environment that demands more efficient use of limited resources.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

The Army, with support from Congress, is already working to understand and address many of these challenges. Although we don't have all the answers yet, it is clear that to be prepared for an increasingly complex and unpredictable future, we need thinking, adaptable, and resilient leaders. Investments in our human capital, both uniformed and civilian, coupled with a sustainable rotational force structure model, will ensure we are postured to meet the challenges of the future.

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?

At this point, I am not aware of any problems that would impede the performance of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

I am committed to working to ensure that our management systems are maintained or refined to meet challenges facing the Army. I have not yet determined specific plans to modify systems currently in place or under revision but if confirmed will carefully assess how we execute our management functions to ensure appropriate stewardship of our resources.

If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?

If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to talk with the Secretary of the Army, to develop priorities for our force. In my current position, I've asserted that we must be a learning organization, we must make training credible and relevant at home station so that it replicates more closely the challenges of the operational environment, and we must develop our leaders differently. It's also clear that we must work to preserve the All-Volunteer Force, care for our Wounded Warriors, continue to work to deliver Full Spectrum Capabilities, and transform systems and processes to build true adaptability into our institution.

Acquisition Issues

Major defense acquisition programs in the Department of the Army and the other military departments continue to be subject to funding and requirements instability.

Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems?

A variety of factors contribute to increased risks of cost increase and delay, depending on the program, the technologies involved, and the acquisition strategy employed. However, I agree that the foundation for any successful large acquisition program rests on carefully refined requirements, a sound program strategy, and funding stability.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to address funding and requirements instability?

Requirements must be carefully refined to meet realistic and affordable objectives, and they must account for the rate of technological and scientific change in meeting needed capabilities.

What is your view of the Configuration Steering Boards required by statute and regulation to control requirements growth?

I support efforts by the Congress to control costs, refine requirements and reduce program risk in our major acquisition programs. The Configuration Steering Boards play a significant role in oversight of acquisition programs and compliment Army efforts to validate requirements and eliminate redundancies through Capability Portfolio Reviews. In tandem, these oversight processes help the Army avoid cost increases and delays in our programs.

What role would you expect to play in these issues, if confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?

If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will work diligently with the Secretary of the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics & Technology to ensure that all oversight mechanisms for acquisition programs are used effectively to reduce cost and schedule risk. In the area of requirements, I will work with TRADOC to refine requirements to meet affordable and achievable acquisition strategies.

The Comptroller General has found that DOD programs often move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, lack clearly defined and stable requirements, include immature technologies that unnecessarily raise program costs and delay development and production, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes at appropriate junctures in the development process.

Do you agree with the Comptroller General's assessment?

I agree that this assessment is valid with respect to some of the Army's past programs.

However, the Army has already adopted different approaches in the development of more recent programs. I understand that prior to the release of the Ground Combat Vehicle Request for Proposals (RFP) in November 2010, the program's requirements were carefully reviewed, prioritized and weighted in the RFP to avoid reliance on immature technologies, mitigate cost and schedule risk, and provide an achievable and affordable framework for a new vehicle. The GCV program involved close coordination between acquisition, requirements and resourcing experts to provide a solid program foundation. The Army is vigorously working to avoid the characterizations in the Comptroller General's assessment in future programs.

If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the Army should take to address these problems?

The Department of the Army has already begun taking significant steps to address these concerns. There is a renewed emphasis on collaboration between the requirements and acquisition communities in the development of new programs. Last year, Secretary McHugh commissioned a thorough review of the Army's acquisition process led by The Hon. Gil Decker and Gen (Ret.) Lou Wagner that provides a blueprint for improvements to the acquisition process. I understand the Army is now studying these recommendations and developing a plan to implement those that help our process. As a whole, the Department must continue to build on these efforts to avoid unnecessary cost and delay in our programs.

What role would you expect to play in these issues, if confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?

If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will continue to work with Department of the Army leadership to implement any necessary changes to ensure that the Army's acquisition programs succeed in providing needed capabilities to our Soldiers.

Beginning in 2010, the Army began a series of capabilities portfolio reviews that have contributed to the rationalization of the Army's modernization plans and resulted in significant programmatic decisions, including the termination of major weapons programs.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's capabilities portfolio reviews and process?

The Capabilities Portfolio Reviews have been successful in identifying redundancy and finding efficiencies across system portfolios. The Army is now studying how to best institutionalize the Capabilities Portfolio Reviews Process to identify additional efficiencies, and then work to achieve them.

If confirmed, what actions would you take, if any, to institutionalize the portfolio review process within the Army?

If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the studies to institutionalize Portfolio Review Process to identify and achieve further Army efficiencies.

Army Modernization

In general, major Army modernization efforts have not been successful over the past decade. Since the mid-1990's, Army modernization strategies, plans, and investment priorities have evolved under a variety of names from Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, to Future Combat System and Modularity. According to press reports, a recent modernization study done for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the Army Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner found that the Army has spent \$3.3 billion to \$3.8 billion annually since 2004 on weapons programs that have been cancelled.

What is your assessment, if any, of the Army's modernization record?

Over the last ten years, our Army has achieved a remarkable degree of modernization in areas such as improving Soldier protection, increasing battlefield intelligence, and bringing the network to individual soldiers. At the same time, we have nearly completed the modular conversion of over 300 brigade level organizations and to complete the conversion of our division and higher level headquarters to enable mission command in the operational environments we anticipate in the first half of the 21st Century. If confirmed, I look forward to studying the Decker-Wagner recommendations to identify areas where we can improve.

If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program for the Army?

I recognize that a stable modernization strategy and program is an important component to both a balanced Army and to exercise good stewardship of resources entrusted to the Services. If confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary McHugh on how to achieve this.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's current modernization investment strategy?

While it is true that several of our major modernization efforts over the past decade have been unsuccessful, I would submit that the American Soldier today is the best equipped and enabled Soldier this country has ever fielded. Successes such as the Stryker vehicle, world class body armor, Soldier night vision equipment, Soldier weapons, Precision fire systems such as Excalibur and HIMARS, and vehicles such as the Family of Medium Trucks all suggest to me that the Army has had some tremendous success in modernization.

I believe the Army has learned some valuable lessons and now has both the processes and the mindset to more carefully and rigorously review programs both before we initiate them and while they are in progress. This will be an area I will assess more deeply if I am confirmed as Chief of Staff and will periodically give this Committee my frank assessments.

Do you believe that this strategy is affordable and sustainable?

If confirmed, I plan to closely examine this strategy to ensure it is affordable and sustainable.

In your view does the Army's current modernization investment strategy appropriately or adequately address current and future capabilities that meet requirements for unconventional or irregular conflict?

From my current position, I believe the current modernization investment strategy strikes an appropriate balance between current and future capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to studying this further with the Army Staff.

Does the investment strategy appropriately or adequately address requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with a peer or near-peer enemy?

From my current position, I believe the current modernization investment strategy appropriately and adequately addresses requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with the peer or near-peer enemy we can reasonably foresee in the FY12-16 FYDP time horizon.

If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any, would you pursue with respect to unconventional or conventional capabilities?

I have not yet formulated investment initiatives particular to either conventional or unconventional capabilities that are different from those the Army is currently pursuing, but I look forward to doing so, if confirmed.

If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to ensure that all these initiatives are affordable within the current and projected Army budgets?

To be good stewards of the resources provided, the Army must continue to internalize a "cost culture" that considers "affordability" as an essential element of all (not just modernization) initiatives. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Secretary to ensure future initiatives are affordable within current and projected budgets.

In your view, what trade-offs, if any, would most likely have to be taken should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is planned to fund the Army's

modernization efforts?

While I do not have that information at this time, I believe trade-offs must occur after all areas of risk are carefully considered and coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and Congress.

Army Weapon System Programs

What is your understanding and assessment of the following research, development, and acquisition programs?

Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).

In the development of the Ground Combat vehicle - the replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle - the Army is fully committed to the "Big Four" imperatives: Soldier protection; Soldier capacity (squad plus crew); the capability to operate across the Full Spectrum of operations; and Timing (seven years to the first production vehicle from contract award). The Ground Combat Vehicle will be the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to operate in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment. Modular armor will allow commanders the option to add or remove armor based on the current threat environment. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be designed with the capacity for Space, Weight, and Power growth to incorporate future technologies as they mature. The Army is using an incremental strategy for the Ground Combat Vehicle with the first increment being an Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army is currently reviewing proposals from vendors for Technology Development contracts.

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).

I believe that the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical is one of the Army's most important programs. It provides the broadband backbone communications for the tactical Army. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 1 (formerly Joint Network Node) began fielding in 2004 to provide a satellite based Internet Protocol network down to battalion level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2 begins fielding in Fiscal Year 12 to provide an initial On the Move capability, extending down to company level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3 will provide improved capabilities, including higher throughput, three to four times more bandwidth efficiency, and an aerial transmission layer, to all 126 brigades/division headquarters with an on-the-move requirement.

EIBCT Network Integration Kit (NIK).

The E-IBCT investment provides the infrastructure that will allow the Army to grow the tactical network capability, and an opportunity for both large and small companies to support the Army's tactical network strategy.

The NIK is a necessary bridge solution that allows the Army to continue evaluation and development of incorporated network technologies.

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) including the Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radios.

Joint Tactical Radio System is the Services' future deployable, mobile communications family of radios. They provide Army forces dynamic, scalable, on-the-move network architecture, connecting the Soldier to the network. FY12 procurement funding supports fielding of Joint Tactical Radio System capability to 8 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to meet Fiscal Years 13/14 network requirements.

The Ground Mobile Radio is the primary vehicular radio capability using the Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform to meet tactical networking requirements.

The Man Pack and Rifleman Radio are the primary Joint Tactical Radio System capability for battalion and below tactical operations. The man pack supports the Soldier Radio Waveform and interoperates with legacy waveforms (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems, Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications). Rifleman Radio primarily serves the dismounted formation and utilizes the Soldier Radio Waveform to provide voice and individual location information from the dismounted soldier to the leader. The combination of the three radios helps the Army to push the network to the individual Soldier.

Stryker combat vehicle, including the Double-V Hull initiative, procurement of more flat-bottom vehicles, and the Stryker mobile gun variant.

The current Stryker vehicle has exceeded its Space, Weight and Power and Cooling (SWaP-C) limits due to add-on appliqué (armor and devices) required for ongoing combat operations. In the near term, it is imperative to increase crew protection with the Double-V-Hull (DVH) Stryker. In the midterm, Stryker modernization will improve protection and mobility by recouping SWaP-C, enabling future growth and allowing integration of the emerging network for all Stryker variants. Fleet-wide modernization for all variants upgrades protection, counter-IED, drive train, suspension, electrical power generation and management, and digital communications and network integration.

Double-V Hull: Stryker Double-V Hull (DVH) is on track for June 2011 fielding. The initial DVH test results are positive, indicating the vehicle will be ready for fielding as scheduled.

Non-Double V Hull and NBCRV: The Army will procure 168 Stryker NBCRVs in FY12 and 13 for a total quantity of 284 (an ARFORGEN rotation quantity). These vehicles are in normal Hull configuration. The Stryker NBCRV provides a unique capability to the

Joint Force including a critical mission of Homeland Defense, for which DVH protection is a lesser consideration.

Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS): The Army has procured and fielded 142 of 335 MGS. In August 2009, the Army decided to not pursue additional MGS procurement at this time with forthcoming fleet-wide modernization.

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is a joint program with the USMC, Navy and the Army; the Australian Army is also currently a partner in the Technology Development phase. I believe that the JLTV is a vital program to fill the force protection and payload gaps not currently satisfied by HMMWV. It will also fill the mobility, transportability and communication architecture gaps not satisfied by the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles being used in Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) roles. The Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy plans for the JLTV to replace about a third of the LTV fleet, which is roughly 46,000 vehicles. The Army is currently examining the attributes of the JLTV program to ensure it meets our needs for the future Army light tactical fleet, especially in terms of protection.

Armed Aerial Scout (AAS).

I agree the Army has an enduring requirement for an armed aerial scout as was reaffirmed after the termination of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program.

This requirement will be validated by the ongoing Armed Aerial Scout Analysis of Alternatives whose findings are scheduled for release in 3rd quarter FY11.

M1 Abrams tank modernization.

In my view, the Abrams modernization is necessary and will initially enable integration of the emerging network and provide ability to fire the next generation of 120mm ammunition. Future modernization will provide capability improvements in lethality, protection, mission command, mobility, and reliability intended to maintain the Fleet's combat overmatch and restore Space, Weight and Power margins to keep the Tank relevant through 2050. The Abrams modernization program is funded in the FY12 Budget Request. If confirmed, I will be able to offer an assessment as the program matures.

M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization.

The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) will be replaced by the Ground Combat Vehicle beginning in 2018. Bradley Non-Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Cavalry, Engineer and Fire Support variants) modernization will address recoupment of Space, Weight and

Power to provide platform growth and enable improvements in protection, mobility and ability to integrate the emerging network.

Logistics Modernization Program (LMP).

I understand the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) is an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system in the Operation and Support phase of its life-cycle.

Based on commercial-off-the-shelf SAP software technology, LMP provides the Army with an integrated end-to-end supply chain solution at the National level that improves overall synchronization of information.

I concur with the Army's vision to achieve a seamless, end-to-end modernized logistics enterprise and to develop and implement logistics enterprise architecture with joint interoperability. To support that vision, the LMP will integrate with other Army ERPs, including General Funds Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), and Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A), to provide a seamless enterprise-wide logistics environment spanning the factory to the foxhole in accordance with the approved Army ERP Strategy.

Paladin Integrated Management Vehicle program.

I understand that the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program is an effort to address an existing capability gap in the self-propelled artillery portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the termination of prior howitzer modernization efforts [Crusader and Non-Line of Sight-Cannon (NLOS-C)]. The PIM program provides upgrades that allow the Army to meet existing and future needs, and leverages the commonality with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis and automotive components. PIM should provide growth potential in Space, Weight and Power and capacity for network expansion to accommodate future howitzer related needs, to include the addition of such Force Protection packages as add-on armor.

M4 Carbine Upgrades/Individual Carbine Competition.

The Army continues to make improvements and upgrades based on operational lessons learned through the M4 Product Improvement Program. The Army's effort is designed to integrate full automatic firing, an ambidextrous selector switch and a more durable "heavy" barrel. Simultaneously, the Army has initiated a full and open competition to confirm the best possible Individual Carbine solution. Results of the competition are expected in FY13.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles

If confirmed, what would you propose should be the Army's long term strategy for

the utilization and sustainment of its large MRAP and MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle fleets?

The Army needs to continue to provide the best level of protection for our deploying Soldiers. Given what we have learned during the last ten years, I believe we should attempt to provide MRAP levels of protection to deploying forces worldwide commensurate with the mission assigned. The Army will integrate MRAPs into the force.

Quadrennial Defense Review

The 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provides guidance that military forces shall be sized to prevail in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war against Al Qaeda as well as for conducting foundational activities that prevent and deter attacks or the emergence of other threats.

What is your assessment of the Army's current size and structure to meet the QDR report's guidance?

The Army's size and structure have proven adequate to meet the demands of our defense strategy as we know them today, although a very heavy demand has been placed upon Soldiers and their Families for nearly ten years. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and our combatant commanders to match endstrength, structure, and tempo in our ARFORGEN rotational model to meet demands as they change.

If confirmed, what size or structure changes would you pursue, if any, to improve or enhance the Army's capability to meet these requirements?

The nature of the strategic environment requires the Army to continuously assess its capabilities and force requirements. It's taken 10 years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can reasonably describe as balanced. We are accustomed to change, and we will undoubtedly need to continue to change. As we do we must seek to maintain a balance of capabilities that are available to meet the nation's needs at a sustainable tempo.

The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for improved capabilities in the following six key mission areas.

For each, what is your assessment of the Army's current ability to provide capabilities to support these mission requirements?

If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve the Army's capabilities to support:

Defense of the United States.

The Army is fully capable of fulfilling its responsibility to defend the homeland through detection, deterrence, prevention, and if necessary, the defeat of external threats or aggression from both state and non-state actors. A specific program recently undertaken to enhance this ability include the fielding of the enhanced STRYKER Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. This provides us with a much improved technical assessment and decontamination capability.

Support of civil authorities at home.

The Army is well postured to provide support to civil authorities. We are organized and trained to provide responsive and flexible support to mitigate domestic disasters, CBRNE consequence management, support to civilian law enforcement agencies, counter WMD operations and to counter narcotics trafficking activities. We continue to address the challenges associated with this mission set including unity of command, integration with civilian authorities, and the integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces.

Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations.

We are highly proficient in counter insurgency, stability and counter-terrorism operations. This has been the focus for the Army for much of the last 10 years and we have institutionalized lessons learned across the operating and generating force.

Build the security capacity of partner states (including your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces in the security force assistance role).

General Purpose Forces have a clear role in building sustainable capability and capacity of partner nation security forces and their supporting institutions. Peace time engagement is our best opportunity to shape the future operating environment. General Purpose Forces are well suited to support these activities through Security Force Assistance.

Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments.

The Army's ability to deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments as part of the joint force is adequate to meet the demands of the current security environment. That said, there are some tasks and skills to which we have not trained due to the demands of our on-going conflicts. We must restore our proficiency in those tasks. We work with our sister Services to assess our capabilities to conduct entry operations as part of the joint force and watch closely

the improved anti-access/area denial capabilities being developed by potential adversaries.

Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction.

The Army provides highly trained and ready forces with capabilities to support Combatant Commander requirements to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Current capabilities include operating effectively within a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment, specialized teams to locate and neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and an operational headquarters with expertise in eliminating WMD.

Operate effectively in cyberspace.

We are on the right glide path to support US Cyber Command and our geographic combatant commanders to operate effectively in cyberspace. On 1 October 2010, the Army stood up a new three star command (U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd Army), to direct the operations and defense of all Army networks, and when directed, provide full-spectrum cyberspace operations. The Army is bringing the forces of network operations, defense, exploitation, and attack under one operational level command to integrate and synchronize global operations for the first time.

Modularity

Modularity refers to the Army's fundamental reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based structure. Although somewhat smaller in size, modular combat brigades are supposed to be just as, or more capable than the divisional brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix of equipment—such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment. To date, the Army has established over 90 percent of its planned modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully equip this force as required by its design has slipped to 2019.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modularity transformation strategy?

The modular transformation strategy reorganizes Army brigades, divisions and corps headquarters, and theater armies and subordinate commands into standardized designs. 98% of all Army brigades have converted or are in the process of converting to modular design. The remaining 2% are projected to begin modular conversion by 2013. Modular transformation improves the Army's ability to meet combatant commander requirements and national security strategy objectives by providing tailorable formations and leaders who are accustomed to building teams based on changing requirements.

In your view, what are the greatest challenges in realizing the transformation of the Army to the modular design?

The most significant challenge associated with modular transformation is the full fielding of authorized equipment. Although all units will be organized in a modular design by the end of FY13, full fielding of some items of equipment will take longer.

If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you propose relative to the Army's modular transformation strategy?

If confirmed, we will continue to review Army plans and strategies, including the modular transformation strategy, to ensure the Army continues to provide the joint force with the best mix of capabilities to prevail in today's wars, engage to build partner capacity, support civil authorities, and deter and defeat potential adversaries. If confirmed, I will continue to assess Army structure against current and potential threats to provide the best mix of capabilities and the highest levels of modernization possible.

What is your understanding and assessment of the employment and performance of modular combat brigades and supporting units in Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom?

These modular capabilities increase the effectiveness of the Army by better supporting the needs of Combatant Commanders across the full spectrum of operations.

What changes, if any, would you propose to the modular design, the mix of combat and supporting brigades, or modular unit employment to improve performance or reduce risk?

At Training and Doctrine Command, we are currently working with current and former commanders, to examine our organizations to see if they are the best we can provide. We are continuously looking at alternate force designs and force mixes to see how we can improve, in both effectiveness and efficiency, our force structure.

With respect to the Army's modular combat brigade force structure design, press reports indicate that the Army is reassessing its heavy and infantry brigade structures and may add a third maneuver battalion to each where there are only two battalions now.

If confirmed, how would you propose to implement a decision to add a third maneuver battalion to the heavy and infantry combat brigades?

We are examining the current brigade designs and associated force mix including the number and type of brigades. This will produce alternatives to be analyzed. As the results of this analysis emerge, we will make appropriate decisions on the implementation of any of such proposals and their affect on our available resources. No decisions have been made regarding future force design or force structure changes.

Active-Duty End Strength

The Army has increased its active-duty end strength over the last several years to meet current and what was believed to be the demands of future operational requirements. Authorized active duty Army end strength is now 569,400. The Secretary of Defense has announced Army active duty end strength reductions beginning this year through 2014 of 22,000 soldiers followed by another 27,000 beginning in 2015. The Fiscal Year 2012 budget starts this reduction by requesting 7,400 fewer soldiers.

In your view, what is the appropriate Army active-duty end strength needed to meet today's demand for deployed forces, increase non-deployed readiness, build strategic depth, and relieve stress on soldiers and their families?

We are continuously assessing the factors that affect endstrength including assigned missions, operational demands, unit readiness, Soldier and Family well-being, Reserve Component capability and capacity, and fiscal constraints in order to determine required active-duty end strength. Our active duty endstrength is adequate to meet current demand. As future demand is better understood, we will assess its impact.

In your view, what is the appropriate Army active-duty end strength needed to meet the likely future demand for deployed forces, maintain non-deployed readiness, ensure ground force strategic depth, and avoid increasing stress on soldiers and their families?

I am not yet prepared to provide you with an answer on future Army end strength.

Plans for the reduction of Army end strength assumes that the cuts will be made gradually over several years.

What, in your view, are the critical requirements of the management of this end strength reduction to ensure that should strategic circumstances change the cuts can be stopped and, if necessary, reversed?

End strength reductions are not automatic. They are conditions based and will require periodic assessment. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Army Leadership to develop a plan that will allow us to accomplish current and projected missions, balance the well-being of Soldiers and Families, and keep us prepared to meet unforeseen operational demands.

The gradual reduction of end strength may provide a hedge against an unforeseen contingency requiring sufficient and available Army forces, however, savings from the reduction of forces could be realized sooner and with greater long term advantages with faster implementation.

What, in your view, are the most important advantages and disadvantages of faster end strength reductions?

The Army's deliberate and responsible draw-down plans will proceed at a pace necessary to ensure mission success, the well-being of Soldiers and Families, compliance with directed resource constraints and flexibility for unforeseen demands.

The advantage of drawing down faster would be the flexibility to invest in other required areas. The disadvantages lie in the reduced flexibility for meeting unforeseen demands and the precision to maintain the skills and quality of the remaining force.

End strength reductions totaling 49,000 soldiers will also require force structure reductions as well.

If confirmed, how would you propose to reduce Army force structure, if at all, to avoid the problems associated with a force that is over-structured and under-manned?

The Army is coordinating the end strength reductions with its deliberate Total Army Analysis process to ensure Army force structure contains required capability and capacity to meet current and future operational requirements within authorized end strength.

How will these planned end strength reductions impact the Army's plans for overseas basing of its units?

In my present position, I have not had a chance to examine the potential impact of end strength reductions on overseas basing.

The Army has had two other major post-conflict end strength reductions in the last 40 years after Vietnam and after Operation Desert Storm.

What, in your view, are the critical elements of the planning and management of a major force reduction to ensure that the health of the Army as a whole is not crippled impacting ongoing operations or general readiness?

End strength reductions are conditions based and must be deliberate and responsible. The Army's plan should ensure accomplishment of its assigned missions, operational readiness for future demands, compliance with directed resource constraints while treating Soldiers and their Families with the dignity and respect they deserve.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that the planning and management of an end strength reduction minimize the negative impact on the readiness of the Army and soldier families?

Throughout my entire career, I have focused on taking care of Soldiers and Families. If confirmed, I will look carefully at the impact on Soldiers and Families.

Does the Army have the legislative authority it needs to properly shape the force as part of the personnel drawdown?

At this time, I am not aware of any additional legislative authority the Army needs to shape personnel drawdown. If confirmed, I will consult with Secretary McHugh and Senior Army personnel leadership to determine if additional authorities are necessary.

Strategic Risk

Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create increased levels of strategic risk for the United States based on the lack of availability of trained and ready forces for other contingencies?

In my current position, I have not yet had the opportunity to examine strategic risk given our global demand. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs, I will have the opportunity to look closely at this issue.

If so, how would you characterize the increase in strategic risk in terms of the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy and employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?

As mentioned in the previous question, I have not yet had the opportunity to examine strategic risk.

What is the impact of the decision to increase Army forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security obligations in other parts of the world?

The impact is manageable as we have available forces in the Train/Ready pool of forces to meet potential future requirements with an acceptable degree of risk. The Army is currently meeting all requirements and mitigates the Afghanistan additional commitment with forces made available commensurate with the drawdown in Iraq. The Army continuously balances meeting current requirements against building/maintaining strategic depth and capacity for contingency, full spectrum operations.

How and over what periods of time, if at all, will reductions to Army end-strength increase or aggravate this risk?

These projected reductions, as mentioned by the Secretary of Defense in his 6 January announcement, are based on the condition of a decrease in demand. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to ensure our force structure is adequate to meet all future

demands.

If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?

The Army has a mature planning process to determine force structure changes within the approved end strength for all Army components. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the full readiness of units generating to deploy to known operations in or in preparation for contingency operations.

"Institutionalizing" Support for Irregular Warfare

A major objective of the Department over recent years has been increasing emphasis on lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability type operations. All of which are areas that place a high premium and demands on Army capabilities. In order to ensure that a rebalance achieves this objective, and perhaps more importantly is then sustainable, Secretary Gates has stressed the need for the Department to "institutionalize and finance" the support necessary for the irregular warfare capabilities that have been developed over the last few years and will be needed in the future.

What, in your view, does it mean to "institutionalize" capabilities and support for irregular warfare capabilities in the Army?

The Army views Irregular Warfare as an operational theme rather than a particular type of operation. We must be able to conduct Stability Operations, Counter-Insurgency, Counter-terrorism, and Foreign Internal Defense and support the Special Operations Forces in unconventional warfare. I understand "institutionalize" to mean that the Army's operating forces and generating forces view operations under the theme of Irregular Warfare as a core capability. We must be able to execute missions across the full spectrum of conflict, to include irregular warfare.

What is your understanding and assessment of Army efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?

The Army has institutionalized Irregular Warfare. We have an Irregular Warfare proponent within Training and Doctrine Command supported by an Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell that synthesizes Army Irregular Warfare efforts including those from the Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Counter-Insurgency centers and others. The Army includes Irregular Warfare in our professional military education. The Army has built four Counter-Insurgency Centers, a Security Force Assistance training brigade, increased the military police, and significantly increased Special Operations and Civil Affairs forces.

In your view, what are the obstacles, if any, to institutionalizing this kind of support,

and what will be necessary to overcome them?

I have not seen any particular obstacles to institutionalizing this kind of support. The Army has to balance risk across the range of missions it may be called on to perform.

While force structure and program changes may be necessary, they are unlikely to prove sufficient to achieve full institutionalization. The greater challenge may be found in changing Army culture, attitudes, management, and career path choices, for example through adjustments to organization, training, doctrine, and personnel policies.

In your view, what are the most important changes, if any, that might be necessary to complement programmatic changes in support of the further institutionalization of capabilities for irregular warfare in the Army?

We have to retain the flexibility, adaptability, and agility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended distances and in missions requiring the establishment of security over wide areas regardless of what kind of threats populate the battlefield.

Institutionalizing support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability capabilities in the force does not mean ignoring the requirement for the Army to be trained, equipped, and ready for major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of operations.

If confirmed, how would you propose to allocate the Army's efforts and resources to ensure that the force is prepared for major combat while at the same time it increases and institutionalizes support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability operations?

We are training and educating our soldiers and leaders to understand that they must be capable of both combined arms maneuver and wide area security. In training, we replicate the threats and conditions they are likely to face in their next mission. For ten years, that has meant irregular threats and conditions common in the wide area security role that supports counterinsurgency operations. As the demand for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is reduced, we will introduce threats and conditions in training common in the combined arms maneuver role. The goal however is to avoid the false dichotomy of “regular or irregular” warfare. The future battlefield will be populated with hybrid threats—combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups—and we must train and educate our leaders and units to understand and prevail against them.

Do you anticipate that the Army will continue to train and equip general purpose force brigades for the “advise and assist brigade (AAB)” mission after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to an end?

I anticipate that there will be an ongoing requirement for Security Force Assistance activities of the type carried out by these Brigades into the future. I believe building partnerships and partner capacity will be key roles for the Army in the future. If

confirmed, I will continue to assess requirements and work with this Congress to ensure we have the resources and flexibility required to meet them.

If so, what mission essential task list changes do you plan to institutionalize this mission set in training for the general purpose force brigades?

If confirmed, I will work with our Joint partners to identify the mission essential tasks for Security Force Assistance and incorporate them into the Unified Joint Task List and Army Unified Task List.

Do you foresee that general purpose force brigades will be regionally aligned to carry out an AAB-type mission?

I believe it is too early to tell. I believe some Brigades may be regionally aligned. The number and type of brigades will depend upon what we have available after the priority requirements in the CENTCOM AOR, and the other COCOM requirements. If confirmed I will work with Secretary McHugh to determine the best allocation to support operational requirements.

If so, what changes to training and equipping of the ARFORGEN model will be necessary for regional alignment?

The ARFORGEN model and our modular design are well-suited to the kind of adaptations that will be required to meet security force assistance requirements in the future.

Lessons Learned

What do you believe are the major lessons that the Department of the Army has and should have learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) regarding its title 10, U.S. Code, responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping the force?

We have learned that Soldiers require more than a year to fully recover from extended deployments and to prepare for another deployment. In addition, the ability to adapt rapidly is the key to success in the current and future operational environments. We have also learned that a fully integrated Reserve Component is critical to meet force requirements.

If confirmed, which of these lessons, if any, would you address as a matter of urgent priority?

They are equally important and all must be addressed.

Rotation Cycles/Schedules

Although improving recently, the active Army's ratio of time spent deployed to time at home station has remained fairly steady at 1:1 – that is for each year deployed a soldier spends about one year at home station. The active Army objective is 1:2 where soldiers can expect to be home for two years for each year deployed. The Reserve Component objective is 1:5 where soldiers can expect to be home for five years for each year deployed.

What impact do you expect the proposed troop reductions in Iraq to have on the so-called “dwell time” of Army soldiers? Is it possible that the reduction of demand for Army forces in Iraq alone will allow the Army to achieve the 1:2 dwell time goal by the end 2011?

The proposed troop reductions in Iraq will allow the Army to gradually increase dwell if there is not a significant increase in demand in Afghanistan or in other contingencies. We do not believe that the reduction of demand in Iraq alone will allow the Army to meet the 1:2 dwell goal.

What is your assessment of the potential impact of the decision to decrease Army end-strength on the rotation schedule and meeting the dwell goal of 1:2 for active duty forces?

With the proposed troop reduction in Iraq and projected decrease in Afghanistan, we will see improvement gradually in dwell, but the Army has not yet met its dwell goal of 1:2 for active duty forces. The decreases in Army strength are conditions based and I am not in a position at this time to assess whether there will be an impact to the dwell goal of 1:2 based on these reductions.

How, in your view, will the proposed reductions in Iraq impact the ability of the Army National Guard to respond to Homeland Defense and support to civil authorities?

The return of these Army National Guard forces to state control should provide the Governors and Adjutants General with increased forces to conduct Homeland Defense, disaster response, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. These forces will be better trained and more experienced due to their Iraq combat deployments. Although the National Guard has been able to meet all disaster relief requirements, the return of forces will allow more flexibility to accomplish local missions.

Equipment Availability

Both deploying and non-deploying active and reserve component Army units are training without all their required equipment. Deploying units do not receive some of their

equipment until late in their pre-deployment training cycle or as they arrive in theater.

In your view, has deployment of additional brigades to Afghanistan increased the strain on maintenance systems and further reduce equipment availability for training?

There have been some challenges with equipment being available for training when it has been fielded directly to theatre. We're beginning to overcome this challenge.

What is the impact of our drawdown from Iraq in this regard?

The drawdown from Iraq should improve availability of equipment for units to conduct pre-deployment training. For some systems, such as tactical wheeled vehicles, it will have a larger positive impact. For other pieces of more high demand equipment in short supply across the Army, I anticipate it will have a lesser impact.

Do you believe that the Army has enough modern equipment to fully support the pre-deployment training and operations of deploying units?

The Army does not have enough equipment to fill all units to their fully modernized capabilities. This means there are some instances in which the most modern equipment is not available until later in a unit's pre-deployment cycle or until it arrives in theater. However, the Army uses the force generation model to resource units with adequate levels of the available modernized equipment to conduct their pre-deployment training and assigned mission upon deployment.

What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for training and operations?

The Army is short Unmanned Aerial Systems and some non-Line of Sight communications equipment. Due to the nature of the warfare in Afghanistan, we face shortages in light infantry specific equipment. As we continue to reset equipment returning from Iraq we will see a steady improvement in on hand equipment for units training for contingency force missions.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and operate?

If confirmed, I will continue our capability portfolio reviews to evaluate our priorities against mission requirements and adjust our resource allocations to ensure the Army continues to strike the critical balance between having enough modern equipment to fully support pre-deployment training and operations in theatre. If confirmed, I would support the Army Force Generation Model of phased equipping through which the Army intensively manages our equipment on-hand to ensure next deploying units, from all components, have sufficient equipment for training and deployment.

Equipment Repair/Reset

Congress provided the Army with approximately \$15 to \$17 billion annually to help with the reset of non-deployed forces and accelerate the repair and replacement of equipment. However, the amount of reset funding requested for DOD in FY2012 decreased to \$11.9 billion from the FY2011 request of \$21.4 billion.

In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only prepare Army forces for operations in Afghanistan but to also improve the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies?

It is my understanding that the \$4.4B requested for reset in FY12, though lower than requests in FY10 and FY11, is adequate to replace equipment lost in combat and to repair equipment available for reset. If confirmed, I will closely examine this issue.

Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset?

My understanding is that repair depots are operating at required capacity but not at their full capacity.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?

There are certain measures, such as contract augmentation or rebalancing workload that could be used to increase capacity at our facilities. At this time, I am not in a position to determine whether these measures are necessary or appropriate.

What impact is it likely to have on the ability of Army National Guard units to respond to Homeland Security and support to civil authorities missions?

I understand that the reduction of reset funding for FY12 is commensurate with the reduction of troop and equipment levels supporting Operation New Dawn. I believe that the ARNG will still be able to respond to Homeland Defense missions and provide support to civil authorities.

Missile Defense

The Department of Defense recently decided to terminate the Army's Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM), and not to proceed with procurement and fielding of the tri-national Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), two Army air and missile defense systems.

Do you consider missile defense to be one of the Army's core missions?

Yes. The Army has confirmed on many occasions that Air and Missile Defense is a core competency. Protection of our deployed forces is the priority. The Army provides this protection in coordination with our sister services and coalition partners.

How do you believe the Army should manage the risks that result from these decisions?

I believe the Army needs to continue to monitor the threat and prioritize required future capabilities to ensure we provide effective affordable solutions in a timely manner to our forces.

The Army has recently proposed transferring a number of its air and missile development programs to the Missile Defense Agency.

In your view, what is of the proper relationship between the Army and the Missile Defense Agency?

It is my understanding that the Army relies on the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to develop and produce the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The Army works with MDA to provide those BMDS capabilities to the Combatant Commanders. The Army maintains a relationship with MDA through the Army/MDA Board of Directors and its four standing committees.

The Army has recently completed a review of its air and missile defense portfolio.

In your view, what are or should be the Army's responsibilities, if any, with respect to development, procurement, and operation of missile defense systems?

The Army's responsibilities depend on the type of missile defense system being developed and guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Space

The Army Space support to Strategic Command works closely with Air Force Space Command in getting space based communications to the warfighter. Recently the Army has begun to look at the possibility of expanding the scope of data that could be provided to the last tactical mile from space.

In your view, what are the needs that the Army could address from space, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that this is coordinated with OSD?

While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment, I understand that the

importance of space programs continues to increase across DoD, and the Army needs to keep pace to fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space systems are appropriately prioritized within both DoD and the Department of the Army.

If confirmed, what would be your vision for the Army space forces in the future?

While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment, one of my priorities, if I am confirmed, is to position the Army to keep pace to fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space systems are appropriately prioritized and resourced.

The Army, as do all the services, tends to lag behind in the acquisition of ground and other terminals to work with new satellite systems. Acquisition of GPS M-code capable equipment is just one example of where there is needed capability on orbit but terminals will not be available in a timely fashion to utilize the capability.

What is your view on this lag and, if confirmed, what actions would you propose taking to resolve the lag?

If confirmed, I would need to examine this issue more closely. While I understand that all of the services have specific requirements to meet specific needs for their forces and that the Army depends heavily on these systems, I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment.

Low Density/High Demand Forces

If confirmed, how would you address the Army's management of low density units such as special operations forces, military police, civil affairs, and others which are in extremely high demand in this new strategic environment?

If confirmed, I would use the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to identify the capabilities necessary, within resource constraints, to achieve the full spectrum of missions expected of the Army. When requirements for additional low density/high demand capabilities are identified through this process, they are resourced within acceptable risk. This process will help determine where these capabilities should reside: the active component, the reserve component, or a mix of both. The Army balances the inventory of these low density units to ensure availability of an affordable mix of flexible forces capable of accomplishing the missions required within the most likely security environment.

Are there functional changes among the active and reserve components that you believe should be made?

I am not yet aware at this time of any changes that may be necessary.

Army Readiness

How would you characterize Army readiness in its deployed and non-deployed units?

I have some concerns about the readiness levels of deployed and non-deployed units. In the ARFORGEN model, deployed and deploying Army units are given the highest priority for manning, equipping and training to achieve the Combatant Commander's wartime/mission requirements. Non – deployed Army units are used to provide the additive resources to ensure that deployed and deploying Army units can meet mission requirements. This requires the Army to continue to do risk assessment so non – deployed units do not fall below an unacceptable level of risk.

Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is acceptable?

In my opinion, the Army is prepared to accomplish current missions.

How do you see operations in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called upon to respond to an attack or another contingency?

The current demand for Army forces coupled with the cumulative effect of nearly 10 years of conflict impacts the Army's flexibility to provide forces to other contingencies.

Iraq and Afghanistan Deployments

Many soldiers are on their fourth and some their fifth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Beginning in August 2008 Department of Defense policy has been to limit deployments for Active Component soldiers and mobilization of Reserve Component soldiers to not longer than 12 months.

What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial active duty obligated service has been completed?

The Army monitors retention very closely, given the high operational demand and multiple deployments that Soldiers are experiencing. Statistics reveal that multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq are not adversely impacting retention. Continuous improvements to Army benefits, such as world class healthcare advances for wounded Soldiers, enhancements in family support programs, and additional monetary bonuses have encouraged large numbers of our Soldiers to continue their commitments beyond their obligated service periods.

What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline.

The indicators of stress on the force that the Army tracks continuously include: Reenlistments, Chapter separations, Divorce, Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, Enlisted Desertion, AWOL offenses, Drug and Alcohol Enrollments, Drug Positives, Courts-Martial and suicides.

I understand that Army discipline and misconduct rates, including desertion, absence without leave and courts-martial have remained steady or declined in the past year. Other indicators of stress on the force, such as substance abuse and domestic violence have increased. However, the significant increase in the number of Soldier suicides is of the greatest concern. Soldiers and their Families continue to make significant personal sacrifices in support of our nation. If confirmed, I am committed to providing Soldiers and Families with a quality of life commensurate with their service and to continuing Army efforts to develop multi-disciplinary solutions directed at mitigating risk behaviors and enhancing Soldier and Family fitness and resilience.

For how long do you believe these levels of commitments can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?

I am concerned about the long term health of the force if we are unable to achieve the appropriate deployment to dwell ratio for the deploying Soldier. Adequate dwell time should help the visible and invisible wounds of this protracted conflict. If confirmed, I will closely monitor indicators of stress on the force and work to ensure that the Army has plans and programs to confront these issues appropriately.

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey has stated that the Army is "out of balance."

What is your understanding and assessment of the concept and efforts to achieve "balance" for the Army?

I understand balance to be the Army's ability to sustain the Army's Soldiers, Families, and Civilians, prepare forces for success in the current conflict, reset returning units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments and contingencies, and transform to meet the demands of the 21st Century. With the help of Congress, we have made significant progress over the past three years to restore balance.

If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to achieve and sustain Army "balance"?

If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Army leadership to adopt measures and strategies to achieve and sustain balance. Building resilience among our forces will be one of my highest priorities.

Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's Reserve Components as an operational reserve, as opposed to its long standing traditional role as a strategic reserve?

The demand for US ground forces over this past decade has required continuous use of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces in order to meet the Army's operational requirements. The RC is no longer solely strategic reserve. Current and projected demand for Army forces will require continued access to the RC. Mobilization and operational use of the RC will continue for the foreseeable future.

In your view, what are the major challenges to maintaining and enhancing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as a relevant and capable operational reserve?

In my opinion, the Army must ensure continued access to the Reserves as an essential part of the Total Force. If confirmed, I will work to ensure they have the necessary training equipment to accomplish all missions. Maintaining an appropriate level of resourcing for the Operational Reserve and mobilizing these forces on a predictable and recurring basis will be challenges for the Army.

What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve Component forces in meeting combat missions?

In my view, Reserve Component forces play a critical role in enabling the Joint Force Commanders to meet assigned missions. Today's force is structured to balance maneuver capability in the Active Component with a majority of the enablers in the Reserve Component. This balance should provide capabilities to meet operational requirements.

In your view, should the Department of Defense assign homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions exclusively to the Reserve?

Reserve Component forces are uniquely positioned to be the first responder to these missions: however, the Army's Total Force must be able to execute homeland defense or other global or domestic support missions.

In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of the all-volunteer Reserve force?

Once the Army can restore its balance and stress on the force has been significantly reduced, a predictable cycle that ensures full recovery and training will support the viability and sustainability of the all-volunteer Reserve Force. I think the exact ratio—whether 1:4 or 1:5—requires further analysis.

Mobilization and Demobilization of National Guard and Reserves

In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical readiness monitoring, errors caused by antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve force management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as “inefficient and rigid” and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What is your assessment of advances made in improving Army reserve component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still exist?

I understand the Army is currently reviewing all of its mobilization policies to ensure that the systems in place are effective and responsive for Reserve Component Soldiers. I believe Reserve Components are a critical part of the Total Force, and if confirmed, I will continue the effort to ensure that Reserve Component Soldiers are mobilized and demobilized in the most effective and efficient way possible and that their needs and the needs of their families and employers are met.

What is your understanding and assessment of the sufficiency of current Reserve force management policies?

As I understand current Reserve force management policies, the goal is to manage the force to produce a supply of units to the Combatant Commanders with a short-term goal of one year of mobilization every five years with a long-term goal of one year of mobilization every six years. The challenge the Army has faced has been that demand has been greater than the supply and has caused the need for more frequent mobilizations. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan start to draw-down, the Army should be better able to attain the mobilization to dwell goals.

What do you consider to be the most significant enduring changes to the administration of the reserve components aimed at ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?

The Army Force Generation Model fundamentally changes the way the Army builds unit readiness for mobilization requirements. The ARFORGEN model presents a structured progression of readiness through a multi-year long cycle.

Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?

At present, I am not aware of a need to modify current statutory authorities to facilitate mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to review the statutory authorities to determine if they are sufficient.

Individual Ready Reserve

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war was problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning is a failed concept.

What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All Volunteer Force?

I believe the IRR has proven an invaluable asset to all Army components to support contingency operations around the world.

What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Army force management planning?

The IRR can serve as a source of experienced and highly skilled Soldiers to help the Army meet critical skill and grade requirements.

If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making to the Army's IRR recall policy?

At this time, I do not have sufficient information to recommend changes to this policy. If confirmed, I will consider input from all components to determine the best IRR recall policy.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in place for members in the IRR receiving orders to active duty to request a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in place for appealing the Army's decision on that request?

While this is an important part of the IRR mobilization, I do not have sufficient familiarity with this policy to recommend changes.

Recent studies of Army suicides show higher rates among the IRR.

What should the Army and DOD do to address this concern?

Suicides in the IRR are often more difficult to address because those Soldiers are not affiliated with a unit. If confirmed, I will consider all methods to integrate IRR Soldiers into the Army's Health Promotion/Risk Reduction efforts.

Personnel and Entitlement Costs

In addition to health care costs, personnel and related entitlement spending continues its steep upward growth and is becoming an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to control the rise in the Army's personnel costs and entitlement spending?

We need to strike a balance between preserving the all volunteer force, accomplishing operational missions and retraining an Army that is affordable to the nation. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense on how best to achieve it.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to avoid a requirement for massive end-of-year reprogramming to cover personnel costs?

My understanding is the President's budget is adequate to meet current personnel costs.

What would be the impact of a year-long continuing resolution on Army personnel funding?

If the Army is given the flexibility to manage total resources (both Base and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds) to pay its force, then FY11 continuing resolution will have minimal impact on Military Pay and Allowances.

Medical and Dental Readiness of Army National Guard and Army Reserve Personnel

Medical and dental readiness of reserve component personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the Committee, and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for improved policy oversight and accountability.

If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the reserves?

I believe the Army should develop and resource mechanisms to routinely identify screen and assess Reserve Component medical readiness. If confirmed, I will work with

Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Army Reserves, the Director of the Army National Guard, and the Surgeon General to develop policies for more effectively identifying personnel that are non-deployable for medical reasons.

How would you improve upon the Army's ability to produce a healthy and fit reserve component?

This is a very important issue, and I will work with the Army's active and reserve component leadership to assess whether there are challenges in this area. The Army is moving forward with a Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. If confirmed, I would determine how this program applies to Reserve Component and National Guard Soldiers.

National Guard Organization, Equipment, and Readiness

What is your understanding and assessment of changes in the global and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard and the National Guard Bureau?

The Army National Guard is a component of the Reserve and Total Force. It responds to emergencies within the United States and deploys to support contingency operations overseas. Throughout the last ten years, the Army National Guard has transformed from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. The National Guard, with the support of the National Guard Bureau, has proven critical to the Army's Total Force, and I believe it will continue to do so in the years ahead.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's commitment to fully fund 100 percent of National Guard equipment requirements? In your view, do Army processes for planning, programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the National Guard?

I understand efforts are underway to modernize the Reserve Components and to ensure they are equipped to fulfill their missions. If confirmed, I will examine the funding of the National Guard to ensure it receives the appropriate level of resources to maintain its role as a vital component of the Total Force.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing needs of the Army National Guard are fully considered and resourced through the Army budget? In your view, what is the appropriate role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to ensure that Army National Guard requirements/needs are appropriately synchronized with Army priorities and resourcing strategy.

What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of increasing the grade of the Chief of

the National Guard Bureau to General (O-10)?

The increase in grade reflects the significant responsibilities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

In your opinion, should the Chief of the National Guard Bureau be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

In my present role, I have not had the opportunity to consider this issue.

What is your understanding of the role and authority of the Director of the Army National Guard?

The Director of the Army National Guard assists the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, organizing and managing its personnel and other resources to accomplish the responsibilities and functions. The Director of the Army National Guard assists in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Army.

In your view, should the Director of the Army National Guard be “dual hatted” as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army?

In my present role, I have not had the opportunity to see how these positions would function together and have not formed an opinion.

Army Science and Technology (S&T)

What do you see as the role that Army science and technology programs will play in continuing to develop capabilities for current and future Army systems?

It is my understanding that the Army’s science and technology investment strategy is shaped to foster invention, innovation, and demonstration of technologies for the current and future Warfighter. The science and technology program should retain the flexibility to be responsive to unforeseen needs identified through current operations.

What in your view have been the greatest contributions, if any, of Army science and technology programs to current operations?

I believe the most significant contribution the Army science and technology community has offered to current operations is the ability to use technology to significantly improve warfighter capabilities. Technological innovations have resulted in the rapid development and deployment of lightweight and adaptable Armor solutions that have been critical to addressing emerging threats, enhancing intelligence capabilities, and better protecting our deployed forces.

What metrics would you use, if confirmed, to judge the value and the investment level in Army science and technology programs?

To judge the value and investment level in Army science and technology programs, I would use metrics that demonstrate improved warfighter capabilities; improve acquisition programs; and align technology development to warfighter requirements.

What new S&T areas do you envision the Army pursuing, for instance to lighten soldier load, and to improve the survivability and combat effectiveness of dismounted soldiers and ground vehicles?

If confirmed, I will engage the Army's science and technology program and its stakeholders, including the acquisition community, Training and Doctrine Command and the combatant commanders to discuss the needs of the warfighter and the "art of the possible" for future technology-enabled capabilities to ensure the Army remains the best equipped force in the world.

Army Laboratories and Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDEC)

How will you balance the role of Army laboratories between long-term fundamental research, support to current operations and the development of new capabilities to support current and future Army missions?

The Army laboratories are science and technology performing organizations and as such have and will continue to play a major role in supporting current operations with best capabilities available. Through their broad range of investments in key strategic science and technology areas, they also provide critical new capabilities for Soldiers.

If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army laboratories and R&D centers have the highest quality workforce, laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can continue to support deployed warfighters and develop next generation capabilities?

Army laboratories and Research and Development Centers need to maintain the resources required to continue initiatives and advancements that support the warfighter. If confirmed, I will learn more about their operations and support efforts to improve best practices and workforce quality necessary for mission accomplishments.

Army Test and Evaluation (T&E) Efforts

In the past, the DOD Test Resource Management Center did not certify the Army's test and evaluation (T&E) budget due to identified shortfalls in T&E range sustainment, operations, and modernization.

If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army's T&E infrastructure is robust enough to test new systems and technologies and reliably verify their combat effectiveness and suitability?

Testing is a crucial capability for maintaining the Army's combat edge and modernizing the force. I fully recognize the value of testing to ensure new technologies and equipment address the capabilities our warfighters need. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Army T&E community and the Office of the Secretary of Defense T&E leadership to ensure the Army's T&E infrastructure is adequately resourced to address testing requirements and maintain robust test capabilities.

Army Information Technology (IT) Programs

What major improvements, if any, would you like to see made in the Army's development and deployment of major information technology systems?

I believe the Army needs to implement and enforce technical standards, make acquisition of commercial off the shelf (COTS) or near-COTS technology easier, and field new technology to operational forces more quickly. This is in line with the congressional mandate you gave us in section 804 of the 2010 NDAA.

As Commanding General for Training and Doctrine Command, I helped establish a center for network integration at Fort Bliss, TX- the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF). It will serve as the Network's primary test unit with a two-fold intent, to remove the integration burden from the operational units and to provide an operational venue to evaluate new technologies and network capabilities prior to fielding to operational units. The new capabilities they develop should ultimately provide the impetus for future acquisition and equipping decisions.

How will the consolidation of IT systems announced under Secretary Gates efficiency initiative reduce the IT support cost per user to the Army?

I understand the two primary Army initiatives that fulfill Secretary Gates' mandate are Enterprise Email and consolidation of Army data centers. Implementation of these initiatives should help reduce the cost of information technology support to the Army.

Human Terrain Systems

What is your understanding of the Army's plans to institutionalize the Human Terrain System (HTS) program? Given the proliferation of such capabilities across the Services, what are your views, if any, on developing a joint HTS capability?

The Army has institutionalized the Human Terrain System as an enduring capability

assigned to Training and Doctrine Command and funded capability starting in the fiscal year 2011. I believe there is merit to developing a joint capability. In September of 2010, I directed a Training and Doctrine Command capability based assessment of all Socio-cultural capabilities throughout the combatant commands and Services. The intent is to identify other on-going socio-cultural initiatives, to determine potential synergies and best practices in order to develop and evolve an enduring joint capability. The results of this assessment are due in the spring of 2011.

Operational Energy

Prior to and since the creation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Program, a number of the Services have made progress addressing concerns associated with operational energy. The Army has announced its operational energy aspirations for the future but, unlike the other Services, the Army's five strategic energy security goals appear vague and lack quantitative metrics against which to measure progress.

If confirmed, how would you propose that the Army address its operational energy challenges, requirements, and opportunities in the immediate short-term?

The most important issue with operational energy is the amount of fuel used to meet our operational needs. Most of our fuel is used in generation of electricity. The Army has implemented, and accelerated deployment, of generators that use less fuel as well as microgrid systems that tie generators together to operate more efficiently. We are developing more efficient motors for helicopters and vehicles to reduce our operational energy footprint and, ultimately, wars are won or lost by dismounted soldiers, so the Army is addressing excessive soldier loads, driven in large part by energy and power constraints. As the Commanding General of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, I'm a charter member of the Army's Senior Energy and Sustainability Council, which is responsible for addressing energy challenges across the Army. If confirmed I will continue efforts currently underway to increase our energy efficient capabilities in theater and emphasize energy awareness through the military chain of command, and across the Army, to foster a more energy-aware culture.

What is your understanding of the Army's progress with respect to testing and deploying operational energy technologies?

The Army is taking advantage of every avenue, to include industry, to help us develop technologies that can reduce our operational energy footprint. Renewable energy systems and insulated tentage are some of the systems being piloted and tested. We are also evaluating technologies that will help lighten soldier loads and reduce the amount of batteries and fuel we must procure and deliver to theater. We will continue to pursue more efficient devices and employ energy management capabilities that are essential to retain energy as an operational advantage.

What is your understanding of how the Army is taking advantage of its labs and research, engineering and development centers to further its operational energy and security goals?

The Army has integrated the national laboratories with Department of Energy and Army laboratories to develop solutions to a range of operational energy, power and security needs. Some of the initiatives include research to reduce the size and weight of components, broadening alternative energy sources, leveraging various emergent energy efficient technologies. These new technologies will increase energy efficiency and improve power supplies for contingency bases, forward operating bases and equipment carried by individual soldiers. If confirmed I will work to ensure that the research conducted at Army facilities continues to focus on meeting the operational energy needs of the current and future Army.

Investment in Infrastructure

Witnesses appearing before the Committee in recent years have testified that the military services under-invest in their facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-investment in our installations have led to increasing backlogs of facility maintenance needs, created substandard living and working conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies that could increase productivity.

What is your assessment of Army infrastructure investment?

Since FY07, with BRAC, Transformation, and Grow the Army initiatives, the Army has made significant MILCON investments in its infrastructure. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installation, Energy and Environment, and the Commanding General at Installation Management Command to assess our infrastructure investments.

If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?

Proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the Army to fully sustain the current facilities, dispose of our excess facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities and build-out our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to support the mission.

If confirmed, I will evaluate the proper balance of funding, to include evaluating whether the Army should increase operation and maintenance (O&M) funding for restoration and modernization (R&M) and Demolition.

Army Policies Regarding Drug and Alcohol Abuse

What is your understanding of the Army's policy with respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you agree with this policy?

Army policy directs commanders to initiate administrative separation for all Soldiers involved in trafficking, distribution, possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs. While the policy requires initiation of separation, commanders have the authority to retain or separate a Soldier.

I concur with this policy.

What is your understanding of the Army's policy with respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?

Army policy requires that the separation authority consider a Soldier drug offender's potential for rehabilitation and further military service. For this reason, Soldiers who commit drug and alcohol offenses are required to be evaluated by a certified substance abuse counselor through the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). Commanders consider the recommendation of ASAP counselors when determining a Soldier's potential for rehabilitation and retention.

I concur with this policy.

Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?

My personal experience at various command levels since 2001 has been that the Army devotes sufficient resources to implement these objectives. If confirmed, I will assess and closely monitor the level of resourcing for this important area.

What measures are being taken to improve the Army's performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?

Army policy requires a comprehensive approach by commanders, law enforcement and the medical community for drug and alcohol abuse. The Army is working diligently to improve its surveillance, detection, and intervention systems for drug and alcohol abuse.

The Army investigates all reported drug and alcohol incidents to assist commanders in properly adjudicating the offense. The Army is also enhancing detection capabilities through the Drug Suppression Teams.

The Army is also working to improve intervention systems. In addition to increasing the number of ASAP counselors to accommodate the increasing demand, the Army continues

to expand the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program to build resiliency in the force. The Army is also conducting the Confidential Alcohol Treatment and Education Pilot program at six installations to promote help seeking behavior by allowing Soldiers to confidentially seek help for alcohol problems.

Medical Personnel Recruiting and Retention

The Army continues to face significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both active and reserve components.

What is your understanding of the most significant personnel challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the Army?

There continues to be a national shortage of medical professionals that challenges the Army's efforts to recruit and retain healthcare professionals. The Army competes with governmental and non-governmental agencies, as well as private healthcare organizations to attract and retain the most skilled and talented healthcare providers, in a uniformed or civilian capacity. The Army continues to evaluate initiatives to provide more flexibility to allow the Army to adequately compete in these areas.

If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new requirements for 2011 and beyond?

I believe it is important to review medical support requirements on a regular, recurring basis. With that in mind, if confirmed I will assess whether the Army should undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army.

If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives, if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill ongoing medical support requirements?

Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 at this time, I do not believe additional legislative authorities are needed to ensure that the Army fulfills medical support requirements. If confirmed, I will closely monitor this area and will work closely with the Administration and Congress to seek any additional authorities identified as necessary to maintain this goal.

Women in Combat

What is your view of the appropriate combat role for female soldiers on the modern battlefield?

Female soldiers have been and continue to be an integral part of our Army team, contributing to its success and overall readiness as they perform exceptionally well in specialties and positions open to them. Women are employed in units and positions and trained in theater – specific roles that often necessitate combat action such as defending themselves or their units from attack or accompanying patrols.

In your view, should the current policy prohibiting the assignment of women to ground combat units be revised or clarified in any way to reflect changing roles for female soldiers and the changing nature of warfare?

Existing Army policy is more restrictive than the 1994 Department of Defense policy. If confirmed, I will assess Army policies against the evolving nature and realities of modern combat.

Do you believe that it is appropriate for female soldiers to serve in positions in which they may be exposed to combat?

Yes. Women are serving in positions that expose them to combat today and continue to make tremendous contributions as well as demonstrate their selfless – service and sacrifices in roles and responsibilities critical to the safety and security of our Nation and to the readiness of the Army.

Foreign Language Proficiency

A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by the Department of Defense in March, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities to include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military and civilian personnel.

What is your assessment of the progress the Army has made in increasing its foreign language capabilities in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

As Commanding General for the Training and Doctrine Command, I witnessed a tremendous increase in foreign language capabilities in support of OIF/OEF. The Army revolutionized its recruiting processes to enlist native and heritage speakers into vital interpreter/translator positions. Pre-deployment training for the General Purpose Force Soldiers and Civilians has transformed to include Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands Program, Language Enabled Soldiers training, the Rapport Program, and other Soldiers and Civilians with Culturally Based Language Training. The Reserve Officer Training Corps has introduced a very successful Culture and Language Program, which provides incentives and immersion opportunities for cadets who take foreign language and related cultural studies. Overall, these initiatives have provided enhanced capabilities for

counterinsurgency operations and building partner capacity overseas.

In your view, what should be the priorities of the Department of Defense, and the Army in particular, in responding to the need for improved foreign language proficiency and improving coordination of foreign language programs and activities among Federal agencies?

In my opinion, one of the highest priorities for the Department of Defense should be the continued support of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, which provides Culturally Based Language Training to all Services and Department of Defense Components. With the increasing demand for Pashto and Dari instructors, and foreign language professionals in general, the Department of Defense must coordinate with Federal agencies to ensure best practices are shared to recruit and retain personnel with these critical skills.

Protection of U.S. Forces Against Internal Threats

One year ago, 13 people were slain and scores wounded during a shooting rampage allegedly carried out by a U.S. Army Medical Corps officer. A Department of Defense review of the attack concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization of military personnel.

What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at Fort Hood?

The lessons learned are invaluable to the Army as we strive to improve the Army Protection Program for individuals and units against emerging threats. Through a holistic Protection approach, the Army is aggressively fielding material and non – material solutions to address internal and external threats.

If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?

If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to integrate and synchronize the many Army Protection Programs that protect our Soldiers, Family members and Department of the Army Civilians by ensuring that Commanders and leaders have the information and tools needed to address the ever changing threat environment.

Religious Guidelines

The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that “DoD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization” and recommended that the policy be updated.

What is your view of the need to clarify the policy regarding religious accommodation in the Army?

The policies for religious accommodation in the Army are published in AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*. The policy must be clear and provide appropriate guidance to both Soldiers and Commanders regarding how the Army accommodates for religious beliefs and practices. To this end, if confirmed, I will assess the current policy and determine if further changes are necessary.

Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the Army?

Your question raises a valid concern. However, the Army is a diverse force. As Soldiers in the profession of arms, we understand the key role that good order, discipline, morale, and safety have in ensuring units are at all times ready to defend this nation. The Army has long been a place where people from all walks of life can serve proudly and where the many become one – a United States Army Soldier.

If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the Army?

The Army has a long standing commitment to treat all Soldiers with dignity and respect. Treating Soldiers with dignity and respect requires continuous leader emphasis and vigilance.

Do Army policies regarding religious practices in the military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles with religious significance?

Regulations regarding wear of religious clothing or items are found in two regulations (AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy* and AR 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*). The policy provides the authority to wear religious jewelry, apparel or articles if they are neat, conservative, and discreet and compliant with these regulations.

In your view, do these policies accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

In my opinion, current Army policies provide commanders with adequate flexibility to balance accommodation for religious beliefs and maintain good order and discipline.

In your opinion, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious

beliefs and the rights of other service members with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?

The Army does not have a policy regarding public prayer by military chaplains. As a matter of practice, however, chaplains are encouraged to be considerate of the audience.

Family Support

The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

In my view the most pressing family readiness issues include sustaining the Army Family Covenant and improving communication and awareness of the extensive range of available support programs and services the Army has to improve Soldier and Family quality of life.

In 2007, the Army Family Covenant was unveiled to improve quality of life by providing programs and services that enhance Soldier and Family strength, readiness, and resilience. Since then, the Army has made great progress and continues to fulfill its commitment to provide Soldiers and Families a quality of life commensurate with the quality of their service.

The Army Family Action Plan, Survey of Army Families, and other studies revealed that Soldiers and Families may not be aware of the myriad of available support services. To address this concern, the Army is transforming Army Community Service (ACS) to help connect Soldiers and Families to the right service at the right time. This transformation will create a more streamlined and modular support structure that better supports our modular Army at every installation. The Army has begun piloting ACS transformation and anticipates completion by October 2011.

The Army has made great progress in building a wide range of support capabilities over the last few years, but the strain on the force continues. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our support services and ensure our programs efficiently meet the needs of the Soldiers and Families who use them.

How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, and lengthy deployments?

If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure that Army Family programs reach out to all Soldiers and their Families, regardless of geographic location or deployment status. I

will also work to ensure that Family Program platforms and delivery systems keep pace with a mobile Army and utilize technological advances and social networking so services are available to the Soldiers and Families who need them.

If confirmed, how would you ensure support of reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as active-duty families who do not reside near a military installation?

I am committed to ensuring Soldiers and Families remain connected to Army Family services and programs, whether by internet, telephone, or in person regardless of geographic location or Component. Army One Source (www.MyArmyOneSource.com) is the website of choice for information on Army Family programs and services. Army OneSource highlights Active and Reserve Component Family Programs, is publicly accessible, and thus available to all Components and immediate and extended Family members.

The State Joint Force Headquarters is the platform for support of geographically dispersed Service Members and Families. This platform projects the Joint Family Support Assistance Program resources, ARNG Family Assistance Centers (FACs), ARNG Family Readiness Support Assistants, and the ARNG Child and Youth program in support of Reserve Component Families and Active Component Families that do not reside near the installation. Additionally, Army sponsored programs including Operation Military Kids and Community Based Child Care and Respite Care programs build community capacity for the geographically dispersed Army population. These programs offer similar services and assistance to geo-dispersed Reserve Component Families as would be available on installations and are connected to local resources that Soldier and Families are eligible to use.

Mental Health Advisory Teams

The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) studies in Iraq and Afghanistan have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in combat theaters. The most recent report, MHAT VI, stated that multiple deployments were related to higher rates of acute stress and psychological problems, that service members on their third and fourth deployment "reported using medications for psychological or combat stress problems at a significantly higher rate," and that "soldiers with short dwell –time report high mental health problems, high intent to leave the military and low morale."

Based on the findings of MHAT VI that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple deployments and short dwell time, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?

The MHAT studies play a key role in proactively identifying how changes in the operational environment impact the ability to provide behavioral health care. Since OEF MHAT VI, the number of behavioral health personnel in theater was significantly increased to improve the ratio of behavioral health specialists to Soldiers. Specifically, the MHAT team recommended one behavioral health personnel should be deployed for every 700 soldiers, and this ratio was met. Second, the MHAT team recommended a redistribution of behavioral health personnel to ensure that each BCT had one additional dedicated provider to augment their organic provider. This “dual provider” model was designed to ensure that a provider would be available to travel to remote outposts to see soldiers who had limited access to the larger Forward Operating Bases. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to develop and synchronize the expeditionary components of health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention programs and services.

What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army’s Mental Health Advisory Teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied to future deployments?

One of the most valuable findings from the MHATs has been to document that soldiers on multiple deployments report higher mental health problems. This finding was first observed in 2005 (MHAT III), and has been replicated in every subsequent MHAT. Another valuable finding noted in the question was the observation that mental health problems are related to dwell-times. Specifically, short dwell-times are associated with a heightened increase in reports of mental health problems. Other key findings include the observation that deployment length is strongly associated with reports of mental health problems and deployments have put a strain on marital relationships. Overall, the willingness to take a systematic look at the behavioral health care system and the behavioral health status of Soldiers through programs such as the MHATs has ensured that the Army is being responsive to the needs of deployed Soldiers to include refining behavioral healthcare delivery models.

Suicides

The Committee continues to be concerned about the continuing increase in soldier suicides, especially the sharp increase in Reserve Component suicides. In June, 2010, the Army released a report on Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention that analyzed the causes of suicides in the Army and reported disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. Chapter III of this report discussed the lost art of leadership in garrison.

In your view, what is the cause of this surge in the number of suicides of Reserve Component members?

The number of ARNG suicides for CY2009 and CY2010 were 62 and 112, respectively. The increase in suicides is due in part to improved reporting over the past 18 months for the reserve components. This increase is not directly associated with deployments or unemployment as over 50% of ARNG Suicides were Soldiers who never deployed.

The Army is focusing attention on the differences between our Active-Duty (AD) and non-Active-Duty suicides because there are external variables at play. The Army believes that factors such as the economy (particularly a difficult labor market) are creating stress in our non-AD population. Data indicates that unemployment among our young non-AD Soldiers is above 30% and we are experiencing an increase in requests for employment assistance through ESGR (Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve). Additionally, Reserve Component Soldiers do not have the same access to medical care as their AD counterparts.

We continue to pull all accessible National data to better understand current trends. As you know, the CDC has a 3-year lag in reporting. So, while we have anecdotal indication of increased suicide in some civilian sectors, we don't have a clear picture of the National suicide rates for CY08-CY10. This is particularly important because these unreported years encapsulate the largest recession since WWII (Dec 07 – June 09). The Army is improving awareness of and access to training and resources; working with employers and private sector to mitigate economic stress; and improving the quality and access to health care for all Reserve Component Soldiers.

What is your assessment of the Army's response to the continuing increase in suicide rates?

Leaders across the Army have taken aggressive steps to improve the health of the force, decrease high risk behavior and stem the increasing rate of suicides in our formations. This is a very tough issue and it is going to take consistent vigilance to fully understand the causes for this increase, identify the indicators and implement appropriate intervention measures. After nearly a decade of war, we are working to keep pace with the expanding needs of our strained Army, and continuously identify and address the gaps that exist in our policies, programs and services. The Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention Report 2010, along with the DoD Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces and other strategic reports, serve as the foundation for our systemic effort to improve.

What is the Army doing to address the issues raised in the Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention?

The Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention (HP/RR/SP) report was a focused 15 months effort to better understand the increasing rate of suicides in the force. This candid report informed and educated Army leaders on the importance of identifying and reducing high risk behavior related to suicide and accidental death, and reducing the stigma associated with behavioral health and treatment. Important issues raised in the

HP/RR/SP Report include: gaps in the current HP/RR/SP policies, processes and programs necessary to mitigate high risk behavior; an erosion of adherence to existing Army policies and standards; an increase in indicators of high risk behavior including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts and an increased operational tempo.

To address gaps in the current HP/RR/SP policies, processes and programs necessary to mitigate high risk behavior, the Army has taken actions such as disseminating policy addressing the issues of polypharmacy, requiring a comprehensive medical review of any Soldier who is receiving four or more medications when one or more of those is a psychotropic or antidepressant.

To address the erosion of adherence to existing Army policies and standards, the Army has issued Commanders a compendium of Army policies emphasizing the Army's current policies and systems for surveillance, detection and intervention of high risk behavior. This has already increased our compliance and utilization rates across numerous proven policies and processes.

To address the increase in indicators of high risk behavior including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts, the Army has taken actions such as instituting a new online system giving Medical Review Officers improved access to drug and alcohol information systems resulting in enhanced identification of prescription/illicit drug use.

To address stressors associated with an increased operational tempo, the Army has increased the number of Military Family Life Consultants. These consultants work with Soldiers and their families to provide them support during transitions and separations. They are available to support Soldiers both prior to deployment/mobilization and during reintegration upon return from deployment.

What is your assessment of the status of the Army's Resiliency program in ensuring the readiness and well being of the Total Force?

The Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program is a ground breaking way of addressing stress on the force. We have migrated from treating stress and stress-related outcomes to developing resiliency in our young Soldiers to get ahead of the effects of this hazardous occupation. We are shifting our focus from intervention to prevention, from illness to wellness.

It is my view the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness is a critical component to the Army's holistic approach to the wellness of the Force. As part of our program we have fielded Master Resiliency Trainers into our training base to start early in developing resiliency among our recruits and trainees. We are gradually expanding this fielding to incorporate all units, particularly timed to our deploying forces during pre and post-deployment phases.

The National Institute of Mental Health is currently performing a 5-year study on suicides in the Army.

Has the Army received any interim reports from this study that may influence Army suicide prevention programs?

The Army has received several interim reports from NIMH and is evaluating the findings. The Army continues to work with our National partners in academia to develop groundbreaking programs and initiatives, in particular the Army STARRS (Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Service Members) being conducted by the NIMH.

If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose that the Army take in the meantime to enhance its suicide prevention program?

If confirmed, I will sustain the extensive leader focus on this issue and its challenges. This is an enduring problem that requires enduring solutions.

Support for Wounded Soldiers

Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from the Army for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the revelations at Fort Stewart in 2003 and Walter Reed in 2007 revealed, the Army was not prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded soldiers.

In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior care since 2001?

The quality of military medical care is in my opinion cutting edge and unequalled. In my opinion, at the outset of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Army's infrastructure was lacking in the area of housing and managing outpatient care for returning wounded, ill, and injured soldiers received. Additionally, we identified shortcomings in Traumatic Brain Injury, Post Traumatic Stress, Behavioral Health, and Pain Management. Since 2001, we have invested significant research, resources and developed formal programs to improve warrior care.

What is your assessment of the Army's response?

With the support of Congress, the Army has addressed the issues of housing wounded and injured soldiers, developed well resourced Wounded Warrior Transition Units and effectively centralized our Army programs under the Warrior Transition Command.

How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service?

In 2004, the Army created the Wounded Warrior Care program to provide follow on assistance to wounded personnel who separated from service. Under the program, the Army maintains contact with Soldiers to provide a continuum of care and support.

How effective, in your view, are those programs?

With more than 170 Advocates stationed around the country in Department of Veterans Affairs medical facilities, at Warrior Transition Units, and everywhere severely injured Army Veterans reside, the Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) Program is where it needs to be to support those who have bravely served this great nation. As part of the Warrior Transition Command, AW2 is now positioned to ease the transition from soldier to veteran as part of a continuum of care and support that stretches from the battlefield to where they reside today.

If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

If confirmed, I will continuously assess the efficiency and appropriateness of the Army's support for wounded personnel. I would implement strategies and seek resources as needed to ensure that the Army meets the needs of wounded soldiers.

Studies following the revelations at Walter Reed point to the need to reform the Army's disability evaluation system.

What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's disability evaluation system?

If confirmed, I will closely examine the disability evaluation system to reveal any areas that need to be improved or that could be streamlined. I would also work with Army, DOD and VA stakeholders to decrease the length of time to complete these evaluations and facilitate the transition to civilian life for those determined to be not fit for duty.

If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to address any need for changes in this system?

If confirmed, I would work with experts in this area and with the stakeholders in the Army, DOD and VA to identify elements of the current system that should be changed and develop a strategy for accomplishing those changes.

Army Warrior Care and Transition Program

The *Pittsburgh Tribune-Review* recently published a series of articles that alleged that the Army's 38 Warrior Transition Units had become "a dumping ground for criminals,

malingers and dope addicts” creating an imbalance of soldiers who need complex medical case management and soldiers that commanders do not want to take on combat deployment.

Does the Army have adequate guidelines to ensure that only those soldiers with qualifying medical needs are assigned to Warrior Transition Units?

I am concerned that Warrior Transition units maintain the focus on complex medical care management and support those Soldiers with a genuine need. If confirmed, I will continuously assess guidelines to ensure that only Soldiers with qualifying needs are assigned to the WTUs.

In your view, are the Warrior Training Units serving the purpose for which they were created?

Over the past 4 years, the Warrior Care and Transition Program has significantly improved the quality of care and support Soldiers and families have received.

If confirmed, do you plan to make any changes to the criteria for assignment to a Warrior Training Unit?

While I do not have plans to change the criteria for assignment to Warrior Training Units at this time, this is an issue I will thoroughly assess if confirmed. Also, I will continually assess the effectiveness of the Warrior Care and Transition Program to ensure it provides the level of care and support our wounded warriors deserve.

Staffing of Warrior Transition Units has been a major issue, especially at installations experiencing surges of redeploying troops.

In your view, are the Warrior Transition Units staffed with sufficient numbers of qualified personnel?

I am not fully aware of the existing staffing levels in the Warrior Transition units. I will, if confirmed, learn more about this area and to ensure appropriate resourcing of Warrior Transition Units to support the soldiers under their care.

Implementation of the Repeal of "Don't Ask Don't Tell" Policy

What is your assessment of the Army’s readiness and capability to implement the repeal of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy?

The Army is on track with its implementation plan in accordance with DOD guidance and timelines, and I believe the Army is fully capable of executing the implementation. Our plan includes periodic assessments to review and consider feedback from the field

throughout the implementation.

What in your view are the major challenges, if any, that could confront the Army in implementing the repeal of DADT? If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose taking to deal with these challenges?

The most important challenge is that we educate our Soldiers who are in combat situations with a minimum of disruption and risk. We are making every effort to train units prior to deploying. We will also provide the training to currently deployed units and we will follow up with these deployed units to ensure that all Soldiers receive the required training upon their return from deployment.

What measures is the Army taking to focus training on combat units and other deployed units and ensure that repeal of the current policy does not adversely affect combat operations?

The Army is using a Chain Teach methodology, where each commander is responsible for educating his/her subordinates and they in turn train their Soldiers. Commanders and leaders will carefully manage deployed units' training to minimize impact on the mission. The Army is making every effort to train units prior to deployment.

If confirmed, what conditions or circumstances would you expect to be achieved, if any, before recommending that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs certify that DADT can be repealed without adversely affecting the Army?

If confirmed, I would base my recommendation on the input I receive from commanders and leaders consistent with the requirements established by the Congress and Department of Defense leadership. I would also seek to ensure that the Army completes training according to Army guidance.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving soldiers in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan have been reported over the last several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They asserted that the Army failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services, including medical attention and criminal investigation of their charges and, ultimately, appropriate disciplinary action.

What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?

I am very concerned about reports of sexual assault anywhere in our Army but especially

in deployed locations. We cannot tolerate this behavior wherever it occurs. While the deployed theatres pose special challenges, the Army is committed to providing victims in deployed units with appropriate medical care, resources and support. The Army has taken a number of significant steps to improve the assistance to victims of sexual assault, including enhanced recognition of the special circumstances posed by deployed soldiers. The Army's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SHARP) Program includes medical, advocacy, chaplain, investigative and legal services. This program requires every brigade sized unit to appoint and train a deployable sexual assault response coordinator and every battalion to appoint and train unit victim advocates.

What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to prevent additional sexual assaults at deployed locations as well as home stations?

In 2008, the Army implemented its I. A.M. (Intervene, Act, Motivate) Strong Sexual Assault Prevention Campaign. The campaign includes strategic, operational and tactical level execution of the I. A.M. Strong Campaign, with heavy emphasis on Soldiers' commitment to intervene and protect their fellow Soldiers from the risk of sexual assault and from the risk of sexual harassment. The campaign places additional emphasis on establishing a command climate that deters sexual harassment and assault.

What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

While increasing emphasis to prevent sexual assaults before they occur, the Army continues to emphasize victim services and response capabilities, to include enhancements to investigation and prosecution resources.

The SHARP program is a great start to managing strategies, policies and resources necessary to adequately prevent and respond to incidents of sexual assault. This is a challenging problem that will require leadership and constant vigilance at all levels.

Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

Prior to implementation of the I. A.M. Strong Prevention Campaign, the focus of the Army program was primarily on victim response. Part of that response focus was the implementation of confidential reporting, or restricted reporting, which is an effective way to allow a victim to come forward and have their personal needs met without fear that may be associated with a criminal investigation. If confirmed, I will continue to look closely at the Army's sexual assault program.

What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?

Getting victims to trust the system and come forward can be challenging; however, I am

not aware of any specific problems with the current reporting procedure. Confidential reporting, or restricted reporting, allows a victim to come forward and have their personal needs met without fear that may be associated with a criminal investigation.

What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?

Perhaps the most important role of any Senior Army Leader is to ensure there is an adequate assessment of an organizational climate, where such behavior is not tolerated and where victims feel free to report incidents without fear of reprisal.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure senior management level direction and oversight of Departmental efforts on sexual assault prevention and response?

If confirmed, I will have an active role in the oversight and implementation of the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program. I will work with the Secretary and the Army leadership to ensure the Army's SHARP program continues to receive the appropriate level of supervision, guidance, and support needed to drastically reduce incidents of this unacceptable crime.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including active duty and reserve personnel, and their eligible family members.

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Army MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

The Army has taken steps to ensure we care for and retain Families through a broad range of meaningful initiatives, to include many Family and MWR programs and services. In October 2007, the Army leadership unveiled the Army Family Covenant, which institutionalized the Army's promise to provide Soldiers and their Families with a quality of life that is commensurate with their service to the Nation. The Soldier Family Action Plan provided the original roadmap to implement the Army Family Covenant, and includes such important programs as Soldier Family Assistance Centers, Survivor Outreach Services, improved services to the geographically dispersed, Exceptional Family Member respite care, Army OneSource, Child, Youth and School Services (CYSS), Child Development Center and Youth Center construction, and more.

A challenge will be to sustain a consistent level of funding for these programs. If

confirmed, I will consult with commanders, soldiers and families to ensure that these programs are adequate and meet their needs.

Detainee Treatment Standards

Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes. The U.S. military has always adhered to one simple, enduring principle regarding detainees: they are to be treated humanely, no matter what the circumstances of their capture, and no matter how the conflict is characterized.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes. Both of these documents provide effective, practical guidance and direction to the field on critically important issues relative to detainee treatment, detainee operations training, and the interrogation of detainees.

Do you believe it is consistent with effective military operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes. The requirements of Common Article 3 are nothing new to the U.S. military. The protections outlined in this article have been a part of U.S. policy on the law of war and the treatment of detainees for some time.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

First and foremost, I would set the right tone for the force by taking every opportunity to talk about the importance of ethical conduct on the battlefield. I would stress that the Army earns the trust and respect of the American people by our actions, especially our actions in combat. I would tell them that by adhering to the laws of war, treating detainees humanely, and showing compassion and restraint, we prove to America and to the world that we are what we say we are: a disciplined, professional fighting force.

Secondly, I would sustain and improve our existing systems for helping our Soldiers understand and adhere to the proper standards for detainee treatment, detention

operations, interrogations, etc.

Finally, the Army is committed to adherence to the Law of War and the humane treatment of detainees. When allegations of wrongdoing by Soldiers surface, the Army must continue to fully investigate. If misconduct is substantiated, there are procedures in place to hold Soldiers accountable.

In the past two years, significant changes have been made in Iraq in the way detention operations have been conducted in a counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of reintegration centers at theater internment facilities.

What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the changes to detention operations in Iraq?

The two primary lessons learned from detention operations in Iraq were the need for centralized command and control and the requirement to nest with the host nation's correctional system and rule of law.

Centralized command and control of detainee operations is necessary to ensure uniform implementation of policy.

The other lesson we learned from Iraq was that detainee operations cannot stand alone; it must nest with the host nation's correctional system and rule of law. Integration of detainee operations with host nation police, judiciary and penal systems is essential to a smooth transition to host nation control.

What is your understanding of how these lessons are being applied in Afghanistan?

Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) 435 in Afghanistan incorporated the above lessons learned. The CJIATF incorporates detainee operations, corrections, and rule-of-law concepts that provide assistance to the GIROA to assume full detention and correction responsibilities. The CJIATF works closely with the Department of State and the host nation.

What should be done to incorporate those lessons learned into Department of Defense doctrine, procedures and training for personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations?

As the DoD Executive Agent for detainee operations, the Army is working closely with DoD and the Services to incorporate these lessons learned into DoD-wide doctrine, procedures and training. The Army continues to compile and assess lessons learned to inform and update policy, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff of the Army?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.