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THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

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Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a pleasure to join General Kevin Chilton, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, and Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in discussing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

The New START Treaty will strengthen strategic stability with Russia at reduced nuclear force levels, improve transparency with key data exchange and verification provisions, enable the United States to retain and modernize a robust Triad of strategic delivery systems, allow the freedom to alter our mix of strategic forces, and protect our ability to develop and deploy non-nuclear prompt global strike and missile defenses. In short, the New START Treaty will make the United States, and our allies and partners, more secure.

Nuclear Posture Review and New START

An early priority of the year-long 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was to develop U.S. positions for the New START negotiations, including how many strategic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads were needed to field an effective, credible, and flexible nuclear deterrent for the duration of the Treaty. The Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Chilton were all deeply involved in the NPR, and in decisions on New START Treaty limits.

The NPR's early, extensive, and continued attention to New START resulted in guidance to negotiators that ensured the key limits agreed to in the Treaty would allow U.S. strategic nuclear forces to meet all key strategic objectives for the United States. In particular:

- The Treaty's limit of 1,550 accountable warheads will allow the United States to sustain effective nuclear deterrence, including sufficient survivable nuclear forces for an assured devastating second-strike capability.
- The Treaty's limits of 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will support strategic stability by allowing the United States to retain a robust Triad of strategic delivery systems – while downloading all remaining Minuteman III ICBMs to a single warhead.

- The Treaty’s limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, launchers of SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will allow the retention of up to 100 ICBM and SLBM launchers, and nuclear-capable bombers, in a non-deployed status. When combined with the New START counting rule that a launcher is deployed only when mated with a missile, and the Treaty’s provisions on conversion of heavy bombers to a conventional-only configuration, this will allow the U.S. to minimize irreversible changes to nuclear force structure.
- By providing the freedom to mix U.S. strategic nuclear forces as we see fit, the Treaty will allow the United States to rebalance its strategic forces as necessary to adapt to any future technical and geopolitical challenges that could affect a given leg of the Triad.
- The Treaty allows us to maintain our stockpile of non-deployed warheads and an “upload” capacity for strategic delivery systems, which provide a hedge against adverse technical developments or a serious deterioration in the international security environment. More broadly, the Treaty does not in any way constrain the ability of the United States to sustain our nuclear weapons stockpile, and rebuild the nuclear security enterprise that supports it.
- The Treaty’s data exchange and verification provisions will increase transparency and confidence in the numbers and status of Russia’s nuclear forces, without imposing significant burdens on our ability to operate U.S. nuclear forces.
- As I will discuss in more detail, the Treaty does not constrain our ability to develop and deploy non-nuclear prompt global strike capabilities.
- As I will also discuss in more detail, the Treaty does not constrain the ability of the United States to develop and deploy effective ballistic missile defenses, including the ability to improve these defenses both qualitatively and quantitatively.

U.S. Nuclear Force Structure under New START

The Department of Defense has developed a baseline nuclear force structure for New START that fully supports U.S. security requirements without requiring changes to current or planned basing arrangements. Specifically, under baseline plans, the Administration plans to field a diversified force that meets New START limits by:

- Retaining 14 Ohio-class SSBNs and deploying no more than 240 Trident II D5 SLBMs at any time.
- Retaining up to 420 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, each with a single warhead.
- Retaining up to 60 nuclear-capable B-2A and B-52H heavy bombers, while converting remaining nuclear-capable B-1B and some B-52H heavy bombers to conventional-only capability.

This baseline force structure provides a basis for future planning. The Treaty affords the flexibility to make appropriate adjustments as necessary.

The Department of Defense plans to sustain and modernize U.S. strategic delivery capabilities, as outlined in detail in the classified report submitted to Congress in response to Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010. To this end, over the next decade, the United States will invest well over \$100 billion to sustain existing strategic delivery systems capabilities and modernize strategic systems.

The fiscal year 2011 budget request and future year program plans reflect a decision to proceed with the SSBN(X) to replace the current Ohio-class strategic submarines starting in the late 2020s, to sustain Minuteman III ICBMs until 2030 as directed by Congress, and to sustain dual-capable B-52H and B-2 bombers until at least 2035 and 2050 respectively. The DoD is currently conducting an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the next Air-Launched Cruise Missile, and will initiate study of options for a follow-on ICBM in 2011-2012.

Finally, DoD is currently studying the appropriate long-term mix of long-range strike capabilities, including heavy bombers as well as non-nuclear prompt global strike systems, in follow-on analysis to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the NPR; the results of this ongoing work will be reflected in the Department's fiscal year 2012 budget submission.

Non-Nuclear Prompt Global Strike

The deployment of a non-nuclear prompt global strike system would provide the United States with a capability that we currently lack: the ability to precisely strike a target

anywhere on the earth in less than one hour using a non-nuclear warhead. At the same time, depending on technical and operational details, such systems could raise a number of challenges, including potential over-flight of other countries, and the ability to distinguish the launch of non-nuclear as opposed to nuclear-armed systems.

While our analysis of non-nuclear prompt global strike is still underway, DoD has concluded that any deployment of conventionally-armed ICBMs or SLBMs with a traditional ballistic trajectory, which would count under the New START Treaty's limits, should be limited to a niche capability. For example, if the Conventional Trident Modification program were deployed, it would involve two missiles for each of twelve to fourteen submarines, and 24 deployed strategic delivery vehicles total and fewer than a hundred accountable strategic warheads. This number of SDVs and strategic warheads could easily be accounted for under the limit of 700 deployed SDVs and 1550 strategic warheads under the Treaty, while still retaining a robust nuclear Triad.

DoD is also exploring the potential of conventionally-armed, long-range missile systems that fly a non-ballistic trajectory (e.g., boost-glide systems). Such systems would have the advantage that they could "steer around" other countries to avoid over-flight and have flight trajectories distinguishable from an ICBM or SLBM. As we made clear during the New START Treaty negotiations, we would not consider such non-nuclear systems, which do not otherwise meet the definitions of the New START Treaty, to be "new kinds of strategic offense arms" for the purposes of the Treaty.

Sustaining the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile and Infrastructure

In addition to sustaining U.S. delivery systems, maintaining an adequate stockpile of safe, secure, and reliable nuclear warheads is a core U.S. objective identified in the 2010 NPR, and this requires a reinvigoration of our nuclear security enterprise. To this end, the Department of Defense transferred \$4.6 billion of its top-line to the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) through Fiscal Year 2015. This transfer will assist in funding critical nuclear weapons life extension programs and efforts to modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure. The initial applications of this funding, along with an additional \$1.1 billion being transferred for naval nuclear reactors, are reflected in the Defense and Energy Departments' FY 2011 budget requests. The NNSA budget request for weapons activities for FY 2011 represents a 10 percent increase over FY 2010, and increased funding levels are planned for the future, as reflected in the Administration's recent Section 1251 report. The U.S. nuclear force

posture under the New START Treaty will be strong, properly resourced, and supported by a revitalized nuclear infrastructure.

Verification

As Secretary Gates has testified, one of the greatest contributions of this Treaty is its strong verification regime. The Treaty's verification and data exchange provisions will increase transparency and confidence in the numbers and status of Russian nuclear forces, without imposing significant burdens on our ability to operate U.S. nuclear forces.

On-site inspections are a linchpin of the Treaty's verification framework. The Treaty allows each Party to conduct up to 18 short-notice on-site inspections each year, with up to ten Type One inspections conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and up to eight Type Two inspections conducted at places such as storage sites, test ranges, and conversion or elimination facilities where non-deployed systems are located.

On-site inspections work synergistically with other elements of the Treaty, including:

- extensive periodic data exchanges on the characteristics and locations of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers;
- unique identifiers associated with each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber; and,
- a requirement to report any changes in the status of strategic systems through timely notifications.

By enabling the United States to directly observe Russia's strategic nuclear forces and related facilities, on-site inspections will help the United States verify that Russia is complying with the provisions of the New START Treaty.

Inspections will also provide a deterrent to cheating. Because the Treaty provides for up to eighteen inspections per year at sites selected by the inspecting party, each side knows that the other will have a significant capability to uncover discrepancies between what is reported and what is actually happening. If the United States has concerns or encounters ambiguities during on-site inspections, we will immediately raise these matters with the Russians in the Bilateral Consultative Commission and seek prompt resolution. If necessary, we will pursue them at higher political levels.

Without the Treaty's verification measures, the United States would have much less insight into Russian strategic forces, thereby requiring our military to plan based on

worst-case assumptions. This would be an expensive and potentially destabilizing approach that this nation should not accept.

The force structure plans of the United States, as outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review and the Section 1251 report to Congress, reinforce the New START Treaty's verification regime by minimizing the value of any potential Russian cheating or breakout. Moreover, there is no breakout scenario in which Russia would be able to employ even a substantially expanded number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to undermine the second strike retaliatory deterrent capability of the United States. Because the United States will retain a diverse Triad of strategic forces, any Russian cheating under the Treaty would have little effect on the assured second-strike capabilities of U.S. strategic forces. In particular, the survivability and response capabilities of strategic submarines at sea and alert heavy bombers would be unaffected by even large-scale cheating. Nor could Russia achieve a sustained numerical advantage in deployed strategic warheads through such a breakout because the United States will retain the ability to "upload" large numbers of additional nuclear warheads on both bombers and strategic missiles deployed under New START. Therefore any breakout scenario would have, at most, limited military significance. Notwithstanding this conclusion, should there be any signs of Russian cheating or preparations to breakout from the Treaty, the United States would certainly raise this matter in the BCC, and if not resolved, at higher levels.

The New START Treaty's verification provisions and a diverse and survivable U.S. force posture combine to provide strong deterrence of Russian cheating or breakout under the New START Treaty. As the State Department's recent report on the verifiability of the New START Treaty states, these factors contribute to a New START Treaty that is effectively verifiable.

Ballistic Missile Defenses

As made clear in the report of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the ballistic missile threat to U.S. deployed military forces and to our allies and partners is growing rapidly, with potential implications for our ability to project power abroad, to prevent and deter future conflicts, and to prevail should deterrence fail. One of the most significant threats to the U.S. homeland is the continued efforts of Iran and North Korea to develop nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles to deliver them. The protection of the United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical national priority.

A core U.S. aim during the New START negotiations was to protect the U.S. ability to deploy the most effective missile defenses possible. U.S. negotiators achieved this objective. The New START Treaty does not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor does it add any additional cost or inconvenience. Rather, the Treaty enables this President and his successors to develop the missile defenses needed to defend the Nation, our deployed forces abroad, and our allies and partners from the threat of ballistic missile attack.

The New START Treaty addresses missile defenses in two places: the Preamble and Article V. First, the Preamble of the Treaty states that there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms, and that current strategic defensive forces do not threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the Parties' strategic offensive arms. Given that the United States has only thirty Ground Based Interceptors and Russia will likely field well over 1,000 ICBM and SLBM warheads under the Treaty, U.S. missile defenses can increase very significantly and the same would remain true. It is also important to note that the Treaty's preambular statement is not legally binding, and therefore does not require or prohibit either side from doing anything.

Second, Article V of the Treaty prohibits any future conversion of ICBM silos or SLBM launchers to house and launch BMD interceptors – or vice versa. Such conversion would be neither cost-effective nor necessary. For example, converting ten ICBM silos to house GBIs would cost about \$550 million, compared to \$360 million for building 10 new tailor-made GBI silos. The placement of midcourse missile defense interceptors in converted SLBM launchers would be operationally impractical and very expensive. Consequently, the Article V limitation on launcher conversion does not constrain U.S. plans or programs.

In addition, Russia made a unilateral statement about missile defense in connection with the Treaty. This statement is not part of the Treaty and is not legally binding.

The United States also made a unilateral statement associated with the New START Treaty, which makes clear that our missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia, and that we will continue to improve our missile defense capabilities to provide for effective defense of our homeland against limited missile attacks and of our deployed forces, allies, and partners against growing regional threats. We have also explained that the missile defense capabilities associated with the European Phased Adaptive Approach will not affect the U.S.-Russian strategic balance, and that we fully intend to proceed with that approach in the context of the extensive missile defense

program laid out in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. And we continue to seek Russian cooperation on missile defenses to improve both countries' ability to cope with the growing threat.

As the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our budgetary plans, the U.S. unilateral statement, and extensive testimony by Administration officials all make clear, the United States will continue to expand and improve missile defenses as necessary.

Accountability of Rail Mobile ICBMs and Their Launchers

Before concluding, I would like to address an additional issue that has arisen recently regarding the Treaty. Some have asked whether a Russian rail-mobile ICBM system, should Russia again deploy a system such as its former rail-based SS-24, would be accountable under New START. The answer is unequivocally yes. Such systems were not specifically addressed in the Treaty because, unlike the situation when the previous START Treaty was being negotiated, neither party currently deploys rail-mobile ICBMs. Nevertheless, the Treaty's terms and definitions cover all ICBMs and ICBM launchers, including possible future rail-mobile systems. Therefore, in the event that Russia deploys rail-mobile ICBMs in the future, the launchers and the ICBMs they carry would be accountable under the New START Treaty. Specific details about the application of the above mentioned verification provisions would be worked out in the Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Conclusion

The New START Treaty promotes stability and transparency in our strategic relationship with the Russian Federation, and is effectively verifiable. It allows us to maintain and modernize a robust Triad of strategic delivery systems, and if desired, deploy non-nuclear prompt global strike capabilities. The New START Treaty does not affect our ability to revitalize our nuclear security enterprise. Nor does it affect our ability or intent to improve our ballistic missile defense capabilities both qualitatively and quantitatively. For these reasons, the Department of Defense fully supports this Treaty.

Thank you. I look forward to answering your questions.