

Advance Policy Questions for General Raymond T. Odierno, USA
Nominee for Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

The Department has made great progress in the joint arena since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols. The changes to the Joint Officer Management process enacted by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 have corrected some long standing shortfalls. I don't believe there is a need for any major modifications to the Act; however, as we learn more about ourselves given the current world environment and the challenges we face, it is important that we continue to refine and review joint and interagency operations and requirements.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

We have learned the absolute necessity for strong civil-military cooperation. Congress should consider means to increase integration of all USG agencies in appropriate training and force readiness environments in order to build the foundation for more effective "whole of government" approaches to crisis prevention or crisis resolution.

Continue Departmental efforts, such as Capability Portfolio Management, to integrate acquisition and resource allocation processes in meeting joint capability requirements. In other words, Services develop 'Service-Specific' systems and capabilities after joint review and authorization to ensure joint/ interoperability issues are addressed.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command?

The Unified Command Plan focuses the command on two main missions: 1) providing conventional forces trained to operate in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment, and 2) transforming the US military's forces to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command serves as the chief advocate for jointness and

interoperability, championing the joint warfighting requirements of the other combatant commanders. As such, he is responsible for five major areas:

- *Serves as the Primary Joint Force Provider for conventional forces. In this role, USJFCOM analyzes conventional forces worldwide to identify the most appropriate and responsive sourcing solutions that are then recommended to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet combatant commander requirements. Commander, USJFCOM provide those forces under its combatant command authority as trained and ready joint-capable forces to the other combatant commanders when directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the Department's Joint Deployment Process Owner, it maintains the global capability for rapid and decisive military force projection and redeployment.*
- *Serves as the lead Joint Force Integrator, responsible for recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to integrate Service, defense agency, interagency and multinational capabilities. As the Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio Manager responsible for leading DOD's effort to improve interoperability, minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness.*
- *Serves as the Executive Agent for Joint Concept Development and Experimentation. In this role, USJFCOM leads and coordinates the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCDE) efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies. Additionally, CDRUSJFCOM integrates multinational and interagency warfighting transformation and experimentation efforts to support joint interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities.*
- *Serves as the lead agent for Joint Force Training. This effort is focused at the operational level with an emphasis on Joint Task Force Commanders and their staffs and the ability of US forces to operate as part of a joint and multinational force. Additionally, USJFCOM is responsible for leading the development of a distributed joint training architecture and developing joint training standards.*
- *Provides operational joint enabling capability packages that deploy on short notice to assist combatant commanders to rapidly form, organize, and operate a joint force headquarters. Additionally, assists combatant commanders in the planning, forming, training, and operation of their designated JTF-Capable headquarters.*

Background and Experience

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I'm very fortunate to have had the opportunity to not only serve for 34 years in uniform, but also to have commanded troops from the platoon level up to my present assignment as Commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq. Commanding in a joint, combined, interagency environment

for almost six years, mostly in combat, at the Division, Corps, and Force-level has provided me a unique perspective on joint interagency operations. I have conducted full-spectrum operations, counterinsurgency operations, and stability operations and have been on the leading edge of ground-breaking Army and Marine Corps doctrine. In every assignment I was fortunate to serve for, and lead, brave, innovative, and hardworking people, both in uniform as well as senior civilian leadership. Above all, I have tried to learn, mentor, and lead at every chance. All of this has prepared me for this opportunity.

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command, to the following:

The Secretary of Defense

The Commander, US Joint Forces Command performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and is directly responsible to him to carry out its assigned missions.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in accordance with established authorities, and except as expressly prohibited by law, has the full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense upon any and all matters concerning which the Secretary of Defense is authorized to act pursuant to law. If confirmed, I will keep the Deputy Secretary of Defense informed on appropriate matters.

The Under Secretaries of Defense for:

The Under Secretaries of Defense, as the principal staff assistants (PSA), provide advice, assistance, and support to the Secretary of Defense in managing the Department and in carrying out such duties as prescribed by the Secretary or by law. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretaries in the areas of their responsibilities.

- **Policy**

The Under Secretary for Policy is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

- **Personnel and Readiness**

The Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for Total Force management; National Guard and Reserve affairs; health affairs; readiness and training; military and civilian personnel; language; dependents' education; equal opportunity; moral, welfare, recreation; and quality of life matters.

- **Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics**

The Under Secretary for Policy is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the DoD Acquisition System; research and development; modeling and simulation; systems integration; logistics; installation management; military construction; procurement; environment, services; and nuclear, chemical, and biological programs.

- **Intelligence**

The Under Secretary for Policy is the Principal Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman is established by Title 10 as the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman serves as an advisor and is not, according to law, in the operational chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary to each combatant commander. The President directs communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This keeps the Chairman fully involved and allows the Chairman to execute his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the Chairman is to speak for the combatant commanders, especially on operational requirements. If confirmed as Commander, USJFCOM, I will keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which I am personally accountable.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs duties as prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When necessary, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and shall perform the duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until and successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I will keep the Vice

Chairman informed on matters as appropriate.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned to the combatant commands. The Commander, US Joint Forces Command coordinates closely with the secretaries to ensure the requirements to organize, train, and equip forces assigned to USJFCOM are met. Close coordination with each Service Secretary is required to ensure that there is no infringement upon the lawful responsibilities held by a Service Secretary.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure preparedness of his assigned forces without the full cooperation and support of the Service Chiefs. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. The experience and judgment of the Service Chiefs provide an invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed as Commander, USJFCOM, I will continue the close bond between the command, the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the US Coast Guard in order to fully utilize their service capabilities, and to effectively employ those capabilities as required to execute the missions of US Joint Forces Command.

The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

SACT is one of two co-equal Strategic Commanders within NATO's command structure. SACT supports NATO in the education, training and transformation of functional commands and staff elements that plan for and conduct operations, with multinational and joint forces, over the full range of Alliance military missions authorized by the North Atlantic Council/Defense Planning Committee. I believe the vision to place NATO's North American Strategic Command in Norfolk alongside US Joint Forces Command was exactly correct. Our current enemy mandates that we continue to build and support the symbiotic relationship between Joint Forces Command and Allied Command Transformation. Currently there is great synergy, collaboration, and support between the two Commands, and it is very much a two-way street that benefits both NATO and the US.

The other combatant commanders

In general, JFCOM is a supporting command – its job is to make the other combatant commands more successful. If confirmed, I will continue the close relationships with other combatant commanders to increase the effectiveness we've created, and continue to build mutual support. The joint capabilities required by Combatant Commanders to perform their missions – today and in the future - forms a large basis of JFCOM's mission. Today's security environment

dictates that JFCOM work very closely with the other combatant commanders to execute our national military strategy.

The Commanders of each of the Service's training and doctrine commands

JFCOM's relationship with each of the Service's training and doctrine commands is marked by close cooperation and routine collaboration. U.S. Fleet Forces Command and USA TRADOC are key partners in training and doctrine issues given their close proximity to JFCOM in the Hampton Roads area. JFCOM participates with all Service Doctrine Centers in Joint Doctrine Community conferences and the JFCOM Doctrine staff is in daily contact with Service doctrine centers. DOD training programs that JFCOM manages such as the Joint National Training Capability and Joint Knowledge Online could not function without the direct support of the Services.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges and problems confronting the Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command?

From my present view, the most significant challenge is meeting the COCOM's force sourcing requirements. The task of providing trained and ready joint forces on a predictable and stable schedule that is reactive to combatant commanders and minimizes stress on families while providing adequate time for training, will continue to be a challenge for anyone with the Global Force Provider mission.

The second challenge is the continued implementation of Irregular Warfare competencies in the General Purpose Force and maintaining the appropriate level of balance between conventional and irregular capabilities.

With my unique combat experience over the past seven years, it will provide an opportunity to review and institutionalize joint warfighting and civil-military lessons learned and ensure the Joint Force is proactive and adaptive to the complex environment we will face today and in the future.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing them?

Certainly, if confirmed, I will continue to work with the other combatant commanders, as well as the Services through JFCOM's component commands, to shape JFCOM's ability to provide the most logical and effective sourcing solutions for the Joint Warfighter. With respect to Irregular Warfare, I will continue to follow SECDEF's guidance and seek balance between our conventional, irregular, and nuclear capabilities. Finally, I will develop a mechanism to capture and implement Joint and interagency operational and strategic lessons learned.

Joint Force Provider

What is your understanding of the role of Joint Forces Command as the joint force provider to meet combatant commander requirements?

As the conventional Joint Force Provider (JFP), it is USJFCOM's goal to source all validated rotational and emergent force requirements in support of the combatant commanders. To accomplish this, USJFCOM provides DoD leadership with recommended force sourcing solutions to make proactive, risk-informed force management and allocation decisions. USJFCOM works to source these force requirements by collaborating with JFCOM service components, each of the Services (both active and reserve) and Combatant Commands to meet Combatant Commands' force requirements.

From your experience as Commander, U.S. Forces - Iraq, what are your observations and evaluation of the performance of Joint Forces Command in meeting your command's force requirements?

Overall, JFCOM, along with the other stakeholders in the Global Force Management process are doing a good job in supporting the combatant commands' force requirements. But as you know, demand is currently outpacing force supply in specific capability areas and the current systems are not perfect. Problems remain: force stress, persistent shortfalls, use of In-Lieu-Of forces, etc. At times, the force providing processes have not proven agile enough to keep up with the pace of change and unplanned requirements. This is the source of some frustration. To their credit, however, JFCOM and other stakeholders in the Global Force Management Process are reviewing their processes: determining how to streamline procedures and increase visibility in order to increase responsiveness to combatant command force requirements.

In this regard, include your observations and evaluations of the use of 'in lieu of' forces to meet theater requirements.

In my judgment, In-Lieu-Of (ILO) forces have provided effective solutions to meet theater requirements. In-Lieu-Of solutions are, by definition, substitutions of force when the standard force is unavailable. As such, ILO solutions provide capability to meet theater requirements that would otherwise go unfilled. I have been extremely pleased with the ability of the Joint Force to adapt to the needs of the theater commander. Of critical importance as In-Lieu-Of forces are continued to be employed is ensuring that they have received the proper training and equipment in order to enable their effectiveness. The quality of preparedness has been outstanding.

Based on your evaluation, what in your view are the most urgent challenges requiring Joint Forces Command attention and how would you propose to meet these challenges or improve the command's efficiency or effectiveness as the joint force provider to our combatant commands?

The most urgent challenge impacting Joint Forces Command's effectiveness as Primary Joint Force Provider is access to high quality force readiness and force availability data. JFCOM is teaming with OSD, the Joint Staff, Service headquarters and technical organizations (DISA) in several initiatives that will integrate policy, processes, authoritative databases and technology that affect Joint Force sourcing and Global Force Management.

Joint Force Readiness

Joint Forces Command's current mission statement acknowledges its responsibility to provide "trained and ready joint forces" to our combatant commanders. The readiness of our non-deployed forces, especially our ground forces, for worldwide commitment has been impacted by the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

What is your unclassified assessment of the readiness of our non-deployed land, air and sea forces in general, and specifically with respect to homeland defense and counter-terrorism missions?

That portion of the armed services making up the ground force is essentially either deployed forward supporting our Overseas Contingency Operations or is in some stage of resetting for future deployment. Those units that are in reset are challenged in their readiness by equipment needs, rotation of manpower and time to train. The Services have proven adaptive in preparing ground forces for their next deployment – but in many cases, they achieve a deployment ready state just in time for their next deployment rotation. The air and maritime forces are more ready across the board, but specific skill sets within those forces are also stressed due to deployments (e.g., Military Intelligence, EOD). As forces draw down in Iraq and the Army begins to realize some relief from its current high operational tempo (except in high demand skill sets), it is important we develop mechanisms to increase readiness of our non-deployed ground forces and develop ready force packages to meet worldwide needs.

What policies, programs, or actions would you specifically propose to strengthen the readiness of our non-deployed air, land, and sea forces?

Continued support of current joint training and readiness programs that prepare our forces and joint headquarters to be ready when called upon by a combatant commander. Additionally, I will look to support initiatives such as inserting joint enabler into the immersive training environment, as well as continuing civil-military cooperation in a training environment.

Readiness Reporting Systems

Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) measures unit readiness for combat missions at the high end of the spectrum of war rather than counterinsurgency, stabilization or other contingency missions. The Department has

developed and begun fielding the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to replace GSORTS.

Based on your years of command experience, both in garrison and while deployed, what are your views of the importance of a comprehensive, objective, accurate, reliable, adaptable, and timely readiness reporting system?

A readiness reporting system as you have described is obviously important. Such a system should incorporate both resource assessments as well as mission assessments. This will provide the basis for force analysis that underpins JFCOM's recommended sourcing solutions to meet the geographic combatant commander's force needs.

What in your view should be the requirements of a readiness reporting system capable of meeting Joint Forces Command's mission as joint force provider?

In general terms, the readiness system should reflect objective readiness metrics and subjective assessments of a force's ability to carry out specific mission tasks or a spectrum of military missions.

In this regard, is it more important for Joint Forces Command to have a clear picture of available Service capabilities or the readiness data on specific units and systems, or both?

JFCOM would require both to perform its Joint Force Provider role. JFCOM currently works with its Service components and each Service to generate the shared understanding of what Service capabilities are available and why they are available – based on unit readiness data. In its effort to improve Joint Force Provider processes, JFCOM has defined needs for information including:

- *Force availability*
- *Force capabilities*
- *Force structure*
- *Force readiness*
- *Global Force Management (GFM) strategic guidance (priorities)*
- *Force location*
- *Force apportionment*
- *Common operating picture*
- *Works in progress (pending changes in the force)*

What weight would you assign to each of the requirements you identify?

High priority items include: force availability, force capabilities identifier, force structure, force readiness. GFM strategic guidance, force location and force apportionment are medium priority. Common operating picture and works in progress are low priority.

What is your understanding of, or experience with, the new Defense Readiness Reporting System?

I have very little experience with this system. Theoretically, I believe this system will be an improvement over the current Joint Readiness System, although I need to discuss DRRS with the service components to determine their confidence in the system before declaring my own overall assessment.

How would you evaluate this new system's ability to assess the personnel, equipment, and training readiness of forces and its utility in support of Joint Forces Command's joint force provider process?

My brief understanding is that DRRS includes a subjective readiness reporting system that focuses on evaluation of a force's ability to execute mission essential tasks rather than just measuring equipment, supply, manning and training levels as a means of assessing readiness.

One of the concerns about the GSORTS and DRRS is the use or misuse of the commander's "subjective upgrade." Commanders are authorized to raise or lower their reported level of readiness in a more subjective fashion than is otherwise required in a strict application of objective standards as defined in the readiness reporting regulation.

During your years of command, in general have you used this authority to subjectively upgrade or downgrade your readiness reports? If so, what philosophy has guided your use of subjective upgrade or downgrade?

I have used subjective reporting in the past within the parameters of the reporting system at the time. If the reporting system directs an assessment of a unit's full spectrum combat mission, then the full suite of equipment, manning and training is necessary to ready that unit to the full spectrum level. If the unit is tasked with a less demanding mission, for example, disaster relief – then a subjective report of readiness against that lesser mission is helpful to reflect that the unit is capable of success with the current state of manning, equipment and training. It's important to keep in mind that readiness reports are intended for senior headquarters consumption and their information needs and intents are key variables in defining any readiness system. I have never hesitated to apply my military judgment in assessing the readiness of units I commanded. No one understands the capabilities or shortfalls of a unit better than a commander and his chain of command. Quantitative assessments alone cannot adequately articulate a unit's readiness and I strongly endorse holistic appraisals by commanders.

How have you mentored your subordinate commanders in their use of subjective upgrade in their readiness reporting to and through you?

The Army trains leaders to be honest, forthright, critical thinkers and they are selected to leadership positions based, in large part, on their demonstration of good judgment. I have relied

on the good judgment of my subordinate commanders to reflect accurately their unit's capabilities within the parameters of the readiness reporting system. The readiness of their units has been a subject of frequent discussion with my subordinate commanders. I expect them to apply their judgment and report their honest assessment, even in open-ended environments where current readiness reporting does not apply.

What in your view are the benefits and dangers of the use of subjective upgrades or downgrades?

The obvious danger is an overestimation of capabilities that may be used as the basis for a decision to commit a unit to a mission that it is not prepared to undertake. But commanders as well as their chain of command have a firsthand understanding that allows reflection of capabilities that are not measured in an objective based system (e.g., a unit with a great deal of leadership experience, but has not yet completed all training may be more capable than objective assessment reveals).

If confirmed, how would you monitor the use of subjective upgrades or downgrades in the readiness reporting system to ensure that Joint Forces Command has the most accurate, reliable, and timely information necessary to meet its responsibilities as joint forces provider?

I will monitor reports of force readiness through my Service component commanders who are in the best position to continually assess the accuracy and reliability of readiness reports. I will also travel and observe unit training and share Joint training lessons learned.

Joint Force Trainer

Joint Forces Command also serves as a major joint force trainer. In this role, the command certifies the training readiness of Joint Task Force headquarters to plan, organize and manage the execution of joint force operations at all levels of conflict. The command supports combatant commander joint exercises and mission rehearsal exercises prior to deployment of major headquarters. However, Joint Forces Command does not certify the training readiness of deploying forces at the unit or "tactical" level.

Based on your experience as Commander, U.S. Forces - Iraq, what is your evaluation of the readiness of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units as they are arriving in Iraq?

Overall, the readiness of units arriving in Iraq has been high. The strain on the force after nine years of conflict is significant but I believe the Services have done a good job in resetting units and getting them ready to deploy.

There will always be issues with manning, equipment, and training, but the Services have been adaptive and incorporated feedback from the theater by making necessary adjustments in their force preparations. There has been constant dialogue with JFCOM and the Service

training centers to provide immediate feedback in order to adjust training and the training environment.

Based on your observations and evaluations, should U.S. Joint Forces Command be assigned a greater role in setting standards and the certification of the training readiness of tactical units prior to their deployment?

I believe the supported combatant commander should set the requirements for what units need to be trained in, and in what conditions, and to what standard, if a standard can be determined. If there is something we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan it is that this enemy is adaptive and does not follow doctrine. Trying to set a standard for everything that a unit must do is challenging but it should be done where possible.

I also believe that the Services understand their role in providing trained and ready forces based on the supported commander requirements. When a unit commander states to his boss that he has conducted the required training then we must take that commander at his word.

What JFCOM can do is facilitate the articulation of the supported commander's requirements to the Services. This can be done with the annual Joint Training Plan which provides training guidance to the Service Components. JFCOM should also support the Service training programs in replicating the environments of Iraq and Afghanistan in their training.

Contracting Senior Mentors

The number of contractors working under U.S. Joint Forces Command currently exceeds the number of uniformed military personnel assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command. Those contractors who are hired as Senior Mentors can earn upwards of \$1,600 per day for their services.

In your view, what value do contracted Senior Mentors provide to U.S. Joint Forces Command and do you believe they are being overpaid?

Senior mentors bring years of experience and expertise and they are vital to how we train, teach and mentor our commanders to lead complex, joint and combined operations. I have personally experienced the advantage of senior mentors as I prepared for combat operations as a Division, Corps, and Force Commander. They provide unique perspective and experience to manage large organizations and help solve complex problems. Not everyone is qualified to provide these unique insights.

Our senior mentors are a key component of a training team that includes mid-grade active duty officers who act as Observer-Trainers. The senior mentor provides credibility for this training team due to his many years of experience.

The impact of senior mentors on our exercise program and in senior leader education programs such as CAPSTONE, KEYSTONE and PINNACLE cannot be overstated.

It is difficult to put a price on the value of our senior mentors but the amount of time they spend mentoring a commander and staff during an exercise can often be significant. Their duties

sometimes take them to locations such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Djibouti where they might log significant amounts of time in austere locations.

In your view, is the Senior Mentor Program transparent enough with respect to potential conflicts of interest?

I have not been involved in monitoring the program to provide an absolute yes. In all the years I have benefitted from senior mentors, did I ever experience or believe there was a conflict of interest. I understand that as part of the transition from Senior Mentor to a Highly Qualified Expert position, these Flag and General officers will undergo ethics and conflict of interest training / counseling and be required to file an OGE Form 450.

How can the current process be made more cost-efficient and effective?

My understanding is that USJFCOM has been working with Department of the Navy, their Executive Agency, over the last two months to develop a quality senior mentor program at USJFCOM that is fully in line with the SECDEF's intent while ensuring they don't risk ongoing or planned mission support. It will be important to develop a risk mitigation plan phasing SM HQE transitions to ensure continued mission support during this time period. We will work to ensure every senior mentor has transitioned as soon as practicable and have a management process that will be in place to manage and support their mission activities.

Given the decision by Secretary Gates to convert and in-source contractors into government employees, could U.S. Joint Forces Command also benefit from such a shift given the high percentage of contractors currently residing in U.S. Joint Forces Command?

I believe JFCOM is currently striving to do this. JFCOM is currently working on a plan to transition many of the Senior Mentors used in the past, to government employees in the form of Highly Qualified Experts. In addition, JFCOM will comply with the President's directive to reduce the portion of work performed by contractors and to hire government employees.

Lessons Learned

One of Joint Forces Command's missions is to conduct lessons learned studies that can result in changes to joint tactics and doctrine. These efforts are informed by the command's wargaming experimentation program, as well as a number of advisors, including retired general officers, who have been sent to Iraq to review the operational situation.

Based on your experience as Commander, U.S. Forces - Iraq, what are your observations and evaluation of the Joint Forces Command's lessons learned efforts?

JFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) embeds collection teams with the supported Combatant Commands and Joint Task Forces to conduct lessons learned collection during the course of operations. This approach is a great leap forward over conducting interviews to collect information after the fact as we've historically done. It provides a level of timeliness, fidelity and impact that has not been achieved in previous lessons learned programs. Service teams also use this approach. From these collection efforts, JFCOM not only improves tactics and doctrine, but improves Joint warfighting across the full DOTMLPF spectrum. This has permitted rapid adaptation and sharing of "best practices" among our various services and units. Lessons learned are a proven force multiplier in making us a truly adaptive force.

What are your observations and evaluation of how these lessons learned impacted the conduct of operations in Iraq?

I observed two types of impacts: the first is the immediate impact provided by forward collectors' observations to the operational commanders, and the second is the result of subsequent analysis and recommendations being shared with senior DOD, USG, and Coalition leadership. JCOA analysis identified lessons and derived recommendations that were fed into multiple efforts. As a result of the sharing of joint and service lessons learned, training has been re-oriented in real time, organizations have been modified, and doctrine rewritten to strengthen our intellectual approach to this form of war. We have also on several occasions asked JCOA to conduct specific assessments of our ongoing programs such as Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, and Joint-Combined Staff Integration.

If confirmed, how would you propose to improve the command's lessons learned systems?

Key to the collection of needed data is trust in the purpose and concept of JCOA's embedded missions. I intend to work with my fellow combatant commanders to set positive conditions at the highest level for JCOA's employment as a tool for analytical support. We will continue to infuse a sense of urgency in disseminating best practices uncovered by sharing lessons learned.

Additionally, the ability of US forces to turn world-wide collected lesson observations into knowledge has reached a new level with the implementation of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). JLLIS is the DoD Program of Record for Lessons Learned managed by the Joint Staff J7. It allows for transparency among all the service and combatant commands' lessons learned databases. The key for JFCOM will be the development of business models to process this large amount of information into knowledge, which we can then use to guide improvements for the Joint Warfighter.

Finally, if confirmed, I intend to engage the Secretary of Defense and Chairman on methods for ensuring resource allocations to the recommendations that go forward.

National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions

An issue of concern to the Congress is the apparent low levels of readiness of the National Guard for its domestic or civil support missions. The reality is that we do not know with great confidence the true "readiness" of the Guard for its domestic support missions because there is no national readiness reporting system that objectively captures the Guard's personnel, equipment, or training requirements or their status relative to those requirements.

What is your assessment of the Guard's current readiness to respond to the range of domestic contingencies that our states may face?

I believe the National Guard maintains a good level of readiness to respond to the range of domestic contingencies normally faced by a state in a given year. This year National Guard forces have responded, or are expected to respond under state control, to floods, fires, hurricanes, oil spills and tornadoes. Governors and their TAGs generally will not offer National Guard forces for deployment if they believe that offering will negatively impact the state's ability to respond to its citizens needs. The National Guard forces that have returned from deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan generally are at lower readiness levels and the Army is working diligently to reset these forces.

What in your view is the role or responsibility of Joint Forces Command, as the joint force provider, in developing a readiness reporting system that monitors the Guard's readiness for civil support missions?

I believe once the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) is fully evolved and National Guard units are reporting readiness via DRRS, the mission essential task based readiness system could reflect Guard readiness for civil support missions.

Joint Requirements Oversight Council

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has the responsibility to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements to meet the national military strategy and alternatives to any acquisition programs that have been identified.

How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the Department's acquisition process?

As the Multi-National Forces – Iraq and now the United States Forces – Iraq Commander, I am the end user of capability requirement and development decisions the JROC makes. I believe the JROC is effective at engaging the acquisition and programming

communities early on by validating COCOM, Service, and Agency requirements / capability gaps. The JROC has approved a streamlined method for managing requirements achieved through information technology. This requirements governance process allows the operational user more flexibility in prioritizing delivery of requirements as operational needs change and will synchronize well with the proposed changes in the IT acquisition process. The JROC is very effective in assessing and conveying the COCOMs' needs to the acquisition process through a rigorous Capability Gap Analysis process.

Do you see the need for any change in the organization or structure of the JROC?

I think the Department is already pursuing necessary changes to improve the process and I strongly support the VCJCS and JROC efforts to include an "up-front" assessment of cost, schedule and performance as part of the requirements process; including the evaluation of trade-off alternatives. The JROC provides independent military advice to our senior leaders regarding which issues become validated military requirements and which do not. I think the JROC is organized and structured effectively to provide that independent military voice. I also believe the combatant commanders need a voice through the JROC to influence the resource and acquisition processes as they relate to joint requirements. If confirmed, I look forward to investigating options that include combatant commander representation in the JROC.

Again, the JROC has already taken steps in this direction by delegating Joint Capability Board (JCB) authority to several of the functional Combatant Commands. This delegation included naming the Deputy Commander of JFCOM as the Chairman of the C2 JCB addressing all command and control requirements. This puts JFCOM very much in the role of primary advisor to the JROC on command and control issues. Similarly, the Deputy Commanders of SOCOM and TRANSCOM have been delegated JCB Chairmanship for their respective functional areas.

Further, the SASC has proposed in the 2011 NDAA to allow the Commander or Deputy Commander of any Combatant Command to participate in a JROC which has topics that significantly impact their operations and requirements. This will also enhance the ability of the combatant commanders to influence the JROC decisions.

In your view, should the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, have a seat on the JROC?

I do not believe it is necessary for the JFCOM Commander to have a seat on the JROC in order to be effective at influencing the direction and types of joint force capabilities. In October, 2008, the JROC delegated the chairmanship of the command and control Joint Capabilities Board to the JFOCM Deputy Commander. In that role, JFOCM is the primary advisor to the JROC on command and control capabilities.

If confirmed, how would plan to interact with the JROC in pursuing the development of improved joint force capabilities?

I would offer the JROC as it is chartered is sound, and I am confident that General Cartwright will continue to lead us in the right direction. I will continue in the path set forth by General Mattis to bring significant issues to the attention of the JROC and leverage the JFCOM Chairmanship of the C2 JCB to the maximum extent possible to influence the development of joint force capabilities.

Do you feel that the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, should have a larger role in the activities of the JROC, given the unique JFCOM mission to support joint warfighting?

In my view, we must continue to “operationalize” the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and acquisition processes to respond with agility when Warfighter Challenges are presented and validated. The Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is designed to impact mid- to far-term capabilities and funding (3 years and beyond). The process has less flexibility to quickly respond to emerging requirements within the PPBE process in the near-term budget years (1-2 years). I strongly support initiatives such as the Information Technology Oversight and Management process that provides the required flexibility to take full advantage of evolving commercial information technology and incorporate it throughout a program's lifecycle. USJFCOM's expanded role as the Chair of the C2 JCB provides a stronger voice in the JROC process.

The Joint Urgent Operational Needs process has been used effectively over the last several years. However, there still exists a gap in our ability to deliver joint warfighting capabilities that are needed in the 1-3 year range due to issues with all three core processes: requirements, acquisition and programming. I will be working with the VCJCS to identify ways to bridge this gap, potentially through changes in the JROC/JCIDS process that will then influence how we can acquire these capabilities in a timelier manner.

Joint Requirements

Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command, is responsible for advocating for the interests of combatant commanders in the overall defense requirements and acquisition process.

From your perspective has the U. S. Joint Forces Command effectively represented the requirements and needs of combatant commanders to the JROC and the military services?

Yes, US Joint Forces Command has well represented the requirements and needs of the combatant commanders to the JROC.

In your view, are combatant commanders capable of identifying critical joint warfighting requirements and quickly receiving needed capabilities?

Yes, as one of the component commanders for US Central Command it is my belief that the combatant commander, in working with their component commanders is perfectly and uniquely suited to identify those joint urgent needs for adjudication by the JROC. Enhanced representation by the combatant commanders on the JROC will ensure that these needs are given the appropriate priority for delivery.

What suggestions, if any, do you have for improving the requirements and acquisition process to ensure that combatant commanders are able to quickly receive needed joint warfighting capabilities?

The combatant commanders often face issues that require new capabilities in the near-term that cannot be supported by the traditional requirements, acquisition and programming processes. While the Services have some flexibility to adapt to these needs, current processes are often too bureaucratic and focused on the long-term to meet these needs. I will work with the JROC to advocate improvements to the existing requirements process that will accelerate our ability to provide the required joint warfighting capabilities. Flexibility and adaptability of our processes is essential as we continue to operate in a dynamic and changing operations and strategic environment.

Joint Capability Development

In your view, how successful has U.S. Joint Forces Command been in developing and delivering new joint capabilities to the warfighter?

I think very successful. USJFCOM continues to work with the COCOMs to determine warfighter gaps and challenges and look for solutions. USJFCOM develops new capabilities, often partnering with the Services, and leverages experimentation expertise, Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations, and interim joint capability development efforts to find solutions that can be operationally tested and fielded. In response to a CENTCOM Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) USJFCOM partnered with the Services to develop and field test the Joint Airborne Communication System (JACS). The JACS systems have evolved under the USJFCOM Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) from a 1000lb package that required aircraft support to a 100lb package that is currently undergoing final testing for ultimate integration on existing Service UAS platforms. The JACS system more than triples the communication range capability of ground forces operating at extended ranges from forward bases. The early versions of JACS have been successfully tested in the IRAQ AOR.

What steps would you take to improve JFCOM's efforts in this area?

The ability to expeditiously develop new capability hinges not only on identifying the right technology, but also on having access to the resources (manpower and funding) to effectively pursue solutions that meet the warfighter's needs. In addition to R&D funding, interim solutions also require temporary O&M to ensure sustainability. If confirmed, I will work with my staff to ensure that JFCOM in partnership with OSD AT&L and others as appropriate,

are adequately funded and provided the authorities necessary to enable the development and fielding of interim solutions, until a Service Program of record is available to meet COCOM urgent needs.

Budget and Resources

Since 2001, the U.S. Joint Forces Command budget authority has risen considerably because of additional functional mission responsibilities assigned to the command.

Have the increases kept pace with the JFCOM taskings and do you foresee the need for future growth?

As any organization reacts to changes in organizational priorities, customer demands (DoD and COCOMs), and other external influences, that organization is forced to reassess the resources available to it and the resource structure in place to meet the demand. I understand building the resources to support JFCOM missions and functions has been a departmental effort over 10 years, and the informed allocation of those resources is intended to provide for that mission in support of delivering the appropriate tools to the warfighter. At this point in time, I can only assume that the resources have kept pace with the growing mission responsibilities.

I do not believe the JFCOM headquarters has any excess capacity, and a recent DoD COCOM Management Headquarters Analysis bears that out. So, as Joint Warfighting capability gaps are identified, it will be critical for the department to assess the risk as it relates to the overall ability of the force to complete its mission, and then determine the appropriate allocation/reallocation of resources as required to mitigate or accept that risk. We must seek efficiencies and constantly assess and adjust within the resources we have been given. However, with the current economic condition of our country, and the expected downward pressure on the overall budget, I view the near-term opportunity for growth unlikely.

In what specific areas do you see the need for future growth?

Without having the opportunity to assess and evaluate JFCOM, I am not able to provide an informed answer to that question.

Do you believe that JFCOM has adequate staff to efficiently manage this increase in budget authority and mission responsibilities?

I believe the answer is yes, but once again, that is something I will have to assess for myself. Anytime an organization experiences rapid growth like JFCOM, there is always concern about failure to address the management and oversight elements.

Approximately two-thirds of JFCOM headquarters staff is composed of government civilians or contractors.

In your view, what explains this large civilian and contractor workforce?

From the recently completed COCOM Baseline Review, I understand USJFCOM's management headquarters staff is the leanest of any COCOM. Like every COCOM HQ, the civilian and contractor components of the workforce augment the military component. Taken together, I expect the components operate as a team to execute the unique missions and functions assigned by the Unified Command Plan and other directives. USJFCOM's government civilians generally perform duties that are inherently governmental in nature, such as financial and program management, while our military personnel provide the essential element of recent and relevant operational experience and perspective. I expect to find the contractor component of USJFCOM's workforce to be lean and well-managed by a trained cadre of government acquisition professionals and held accountable to specific and rigorous performance standards.

Do you believe that JFCOM has an appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel?

I simply do not know at this time. This is something I will have to review and assess once I am there. I understand significant workforce rebalancing is occurring in response to the legislative enablers, and the Department's guidance, on acquisition reform and in-sourcing. Hopefully, these initiatives will lead to a workforce that is both more effective and less expensive.

Joint Forces Command Limited Acquisition Authority

Congress has provided Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command, with the authority to develop and acquire equipment for battle management command, control, communications, and intelligence and other equipment determined to be necessary for facilitating the use of joint forces in military operations and enhancing the interoperability of equipment used by the various components of joint forces.

What is your assessment of the benefits of this authority?

Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA), which was delegated by the Secretary of Defense to U.S. Joint Forces Command from 2004 through 2008, proved to be a useful and flexible tool for U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to support other Combatant Commands. LAA to JFCOM was discontinued at the end of FY 08.

Do you concur with the findings and recommendations of the Government Accountability Office in its April 2007 report which were somewhat critical of JFCOM's use of limited acquisition authority?

I am not familiar with the results of the GAO report.

What internal changes, if any, would you recommend to improve the execution of the authority?

If confirmed I would commit to studying this more thoroughly.

Do you believe that an increase in acquisition staff size is necessary?

I am not in a position to speak for USD (AT&L) on makeup or organization of the Defense Acquisition Work Force in DoD. I understand that JFCOM has no acquisition staff and none is required at this time, but we will study this more thoroughly.

Do you believe this authority should be made permanent?

If confirmed, I will commit to studying this more thoroughly.

What additional acquisition authorities, if any, does U.S. Joint Forces Command require to rapidly address such joint warfighting challenges?

If confirmed I will review. My initial reaction is none at this time.

Do you believe similar acquisition authority should be extended to other combatant commands, and, if so, which commands and why?

SOCOM already has acquisition authority to meet specific needs of their special operations mission. It is my understanding that LAA was given to JFCOM to meet the unique interoperability and C2 missions assigned to the command under the UCP and reinforced recently by the Joint C2 CPM mandate of the DEPSECDEF. For those missions, JFCOM should be the single entity determining the joint solutions to interoperability and C2 problems faced by all the COCOMs.

Will you recommend that the Department directly fund JFCOM to support the authority - which has not occurred to date?

No. Again, if the LAA statute was extended, or made permanent, and JFCOM was empowered by USD (AT&L) to execute all aspects of acquisition authority, I would recommend funding by way of an acquisition contingency fund (Program element) made up of RDT&E, O&M and OP subheads available to USD (AT&L) to fund LAA approved projects.

What role, if any, should oversight officials from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology play in the utilization of JFCOM's acquisition authority?

If the LAA statute was extended, and JFCOM was empowered by USD (AT&L) to execute LAA, I strongly believe approval of LAA projects should remain the decision of Commander,

USJFCOM. USD (AT&L) should have a responsibility to arrange funding for the LAA projects and continue to perform an oversight role in ensuring JFCOM doesn't violate acquisition regulations in the execution of the LAA mission.

Defense Science and Technology Programs

The Department's Science and Technology (S&T) programs are designed to support defense transformation goals and objectives. These programs are intended to ensure that warfighters -- now and in the future -- have superior and affordable technology to support their missions and to give them war-winning capabilities.

Do you believe there is an adequate investment in innovative defense science and technology activities to develop the capabilities the Department will need in the future?

The Department's current S&T investment level is probably about right. If confirmed, I must continue JFCOM efforts to steer that investment on solutions to debilitating capability gaps and on the future warfighter enablers. That requires continuing to work closely with OSD and Joint Staff, other COCOMS, and the Services to ensure we are making the most effective and efficient use of the funding we currently receive. I know JFCOM has developed partnering relationships with the Services, Agencies, other Federal labs as well as with large and small private sector companies which need to be embraced to help speed capability development at reduced costs and promote that necessary future capability development.

Do you believe the Department's investment strategy for S&T programs is correctly balanced between near-term and long-term needs?

This is an area where I plan to review and analyze more closely should I be confirmed. The challenge is ensuring that we have a proper S&T portfolio that allows us to invest in the more risky, revolutionary technologies; yet, sustain our investments in technologies that are needed for the current fight and programs of record in the POM. I intend to continue working closely with OSD, Joint Staff, other COCOMs, and the Services to ensure we maintain the proper balance to develop future capabilities while addressing the gaps identified in the Science and Technology Integrated Priority Lists and the identified Joint Warfighter Challenges.

What is the role of JFCOM's modeling and simulation program in the development of new warfighting capabilities for DOD?

I believe JFCOM modeling and simulation (M&S) should focus on developing new warfighting capabilities, and facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the national and global security environment of the 21st century. It needs to replicate the complexity and terrain of the security environment without placing Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines in harm's way. In addition, JFCOM M&S should enable complete integration of the other key players in

national security, such as multinational and interagency partners, with little attendant risk (politically and operationally). Distributed operations allow participants greater access to joint venues through the network, and from their home stations, thus driving down costs and encouraging participation.

Modeling and simulation not only enables development of new warfighting capabilities, but constitutes a new, emerging warfighting capability in itself. For instance, an experimental modeling and simulation capability that permitted the rapid assessment of enemy transportation routes through mountainous areas during laboratory experiments has been fielded and is in active use in Afghanistan. Other M&S transformational capabilities developed through experimentation and demonstration may be useful capabilities in planning, mission rehearsal, mission execution, and assessment in direct support of operators.

How would you characterize JFCOM's relationship between DARPA and the Services on S&T programs and how could those relationships be improved?

My understanding is JFCOM has enjoyed a good relationship with DARPA and the Services. JFCOM supports a DARPA Intern program, and also recently appointed the DARPA Director as a member of the JFCOM Transformation Advisory Group. This provides the JFCOM senior leadership with key strategic insight. I understand actions are ongoing to more fully embrace DARPA's capability and strengthen collective efforts. The Services' involvement with JFCOM appears healthy with a program that has Service officers at JFCOM to understand Joint and coalition needs, work on JFCOM's mission areas, and pull in Service equities and capabilities. JFCOM, in coordination with OSD and Joint Staff, leverages the Services S&T efforts to find opportunities for tighter integration of S&T programs in Joint capability development activities, such as Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD). I will look to strengthen these relationships by keeping DARPA and the Services continuously informed of Joint and coalition needs, thus allowing them to address these needs within the Department's budget cycle.

Technology Transition

The Department's efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.

What are your views on the success of JFCOM programs in transitioning new technologies into use to confront evolving threats and to meet warfighter needs?

JFCOM has an established track record of identifying Joint capability gaps and then developing solutions to meet the Joint WarFighter need. I have seen the results of these efforts first hand in Iraq. I do believe we need to work harder at fielding solutions faster using off-the-shelf technology and leverage private sector best practices. As the threat in the Irregular

Warfare arena continually evolves at a quickening pace, we must be proactive in meeting the warfighters needs in a timely manner.

Do you believe there are improvements that could be made to transition critical technologies more quickly to warfighters?

I believe our process for identifying capability gaps and Joint WarFighter requirements is solid – in the past I have made my fair share of recommendations. However, the solution development process under JCIDS (Joint Capability Integration Development System) is overly complex, burdensome and unable to respond quickly to urgent warfighter needs. All critical JUONs (Joint Urgent Operational Need) require expediting within the existing JRAC (Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell). Increased resourcing and empowerment of the JRAC to address these needs would ensure quicker solution delivery.

What are your views on the current balance of activities in the Joint Experimentation portfolio across battlespace awareness, building partnerships, command and control, force application, logistics, and protection?

A balanced joint experimentation portfolio is an important element of the Departments comprehensive approach to address the operational requirements of the warfighters. The UCP tasks JFCOM to lead and coordinate JCD&E efforts across the Department. JFCOM does this through an enterprise approach in order to balance the varied experimental needs of the Combatant Commands and Services.

Joint Command and Control (JC2) Capability Portfolio Manager

DOD recently assigned JFCOM the acquisition oversight role of JC2 Capability Portfolio Manager. Note: DOD recently assigned JFCOM as the military lead for the C2 Capability Portfolio.

As you understand it, what does this responsibility entail and do you believe it is consistent with the overall JFCOM mission and funding levels?

Given the Unified Command Plan (UCP) responsibilities assigned by the President to US Joint Forces Command, specifically in the area of joint integration and interoperability, I think our assigned role as the military lead for the Department's Command & Control (C2) capability portfolio is consistent with our mission and appropriately resourced. Command and Control is obviously a critical military capability, at every echelon and across the Services. We fight and operate as a joint force, which in turn requires that our C2 capabilities are integrated and interoperable. Our ability to manage information and present it to commanders in order to make decisions is imperative for success. The information environment becomes more complex every day. How we manage information to improve integrated Battle command must be a top priority.

What do you see as the major challenges towards the development and deployment of joint, interoperable command, control, and communications systems?

The major challenge is trying to integrate all the C2 capabilities developed and fielded by Title 10 Service providers. This may sound like a simple task, but C2 requirements vary across the Services and Joint Force. There are also technical challenges associated with trying to integrate complex systems of systems, networks, data, C2 software interfaces and communications/delivery (space, aerial and surface layers). My preference is obviously for the Services to develop joint, interoperable C2 capabilities on the "front-end" rather than the Joint Force Commander having to integrate these capabilities in theater. We are not there yet. We must work together to develop joint warfighting concepts, doctrine, requirements, training, and integrated joint architectures and standards.

Joint Experimentation

How would you rate the success of the joint experimentation activities of JFCOM, and the Department as a whole, in supporting the development of new concepts of operations?

I understand that significant improvements in relevance and impact have been achieved in joint experimentation over the past few years. JCD&E results are delivering real change across DOTMLPF for the joint warfighter in response to DoD's most pressing problems. JFCOM's joint experimentation activities are an important element of the Department's efforts to ensure we remain superior in the future threat environment. JCD&E efforts generate solutions for the Combatant Commands' and Services' most significant challenges and provide a framework to understand the challenges of the future joint operating environment and the ways in which the joint force will operate. Warfighters are directly involved in developing and validating concepts, and transitioning solutions across the full spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF).

What changes would you recommend to increase the effectiveness of joint experimentation activities?

The joint experimentation community must continue to improve the relevance and impact of concepts and capabilities for the warfighter, while ensuring focus on the most pressing warfighter challenges while ensuring visibility and transparency of concept development and experimentation. Projects must focus on precisely defined military problem statements and produce results in 12 months or less. We must formalize partnerships between experiment sponsors, subject matter area experts and transition agents to ensure the accuracy and rapid transition of results to drive enduring change for the joint warfighter.

Based on your experience, do you believe that the overall Department commitment and investment in joint experimentation is adequate to ensure the effective integration and interoperability of our future forces?

We are better, but we still have much work to do. The integration and interoperability of joint forces is improving; however, security challenges we face now and in the future mandate a comprehensive approach to include interagency and multinational partners. My guess is that additional funding for joint experimentation would be needed to facilitate this broadened body of work.

What do you believe to be the appropriate role for JFCOM in determining how the respective Services should invest their experimentation dollars?

The UCP assigns JFCOM responsibility to lead joint concept development and experimentation (CDE) and coordinate the CDE efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies to support joint interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities. The Commander of JFCOM is also tasked with leading the development, exploration, and integration of new joint warfighting concepts and serving as the DoD Executive Agent for joint warfighting experimentation. This does not require strict JFCOM control of how Services invest their experimentation dollar, but does require a clear communication of the planned activities of Service experimentation and the ability to develop a common vision of the course of experimentation with the CJCS and Joint Chiefs.

JFCOM must be the proponent that creates an awareness of experimentation activities in the department and serves to synchronize the efforts of the JCD&E Enterprise. Services can then exercise their appropriate fiscal authorities under Title 10, guided by that common vision of the course of experimentation.

Urban Operations

JFCOM's experimentation and lessons learned efforts have had significant recent activity dedicated to understanding and development of urban operations concepts.

What is your assessment of current DOD capabilities to conduct urban operations?

We are much better today than we were 8 years ago because our troops and their leaders are more experienced, truly adaptive and superbly trained. But we must now develop realistic training environments combined with simulations to continue to improve our ability to operate in an urban environment. If the enemy adapts, we must have the ability to think and constantly adapt. We must be able to confront an adaptive enemy that simultaneously combines irregular and conventional tactics, weapons and organizations.

What major issues need to be addressed to improve those capabilities?

- *Increased capacity for human intelligence.*
- *Greater urban operations reconnaissance and surveillance to assist in the counter-IED fight. This includes C-IED organization and doctrine.*
- *Joint command and control systems that enable the integration not only of military capability, but also of interagency capability in a coalition environment that enables true information sharing with our partners.*
- *Precise and non-lethal weapons that minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties.*
- *Strategic communications capabilities that improve our ability to help the population understand the truth about what we are doing and gain their support. Additional investment in language and cultural awareness for our troops who interact on a daily basis with the population we hope to positively influence is also essential.*
- *The ability to better visualize the urban operating environment, including the ability to sense through the massive structures of the city.*
- *Force tracking in the urban environment to ensure we know exactly where all of our forces are located.*
- *Abilities to Process, Exploit, and Disseminate the tremendous ISR capabilities that we possess to the lowest tactical levels.*
- *Creation of processes and simulation that enable the development of our small units to perform at increasingly higher levels.*

Based on results from the JFCOM Urban Resolve 2015 experiment last year, efforts are being made to promote the concept and fielding of airborne persistent surveillance assets such as Angel Fire.

What is your assessment of the value of the development of improved sensors, aircraft, and downlink technology and the field testing and integration of these assets with feeds from other battlefield sensors?

It is incredibly valuable. My experience in Iraq tells me that one of the keys to success in counterinsurgency is a focus on the environment that allows commanders to gain a view of the enemy that enables timely decision-making. The increase in numbers of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms does not ensure that the information derived from those sensors is properly fused. A critical component in implementing this approach is the development/implementation of capabilities to combine the information from these ISR platforms in a form accessible by the commander at the lowest operational level. If confirmed, I intend to continue to emphasize the development of improved sensors and to ensure processes are jointly synchronized and focused to enhance ISR integration with warfighting capabilities. ISR is working in Iraq because tactical leaders are maximizing the effectiveness of a limited resource. The optimal use of ISR is enabled through decentralized control that provides the greatest flexibility at the lowest levels within the command.

Irregular Warfare

The Secretary of Defense has stated that irregular warfare must become a Department core competency.

What, in your view, does it mean to make irregular warfare a core competency and how will we know if that has been achieved?

In my opinion, this means enhancing our ability to conduct a variety of missions such as: train, advise, and assist foreign security forces; create a safe secure environment in fragile state; provide essential government services and humanitarian relief as necessary; and identify and defeat irregular threats from both state and non-state actors. We will know that Irregular warfare has been achieved as a core competency when we have institutionalized many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan into our joint training and doctrine. We must define the role of conventional and unconventional forces and broaden the spectrum of operations so that we can routinely conduct operations in a variety of complex physical and mental environments.

What is your evaluation of the Department's efforts to date to achieve this objective?

Significant lessons have been learned from recent operations, and the Services have made progress adapting force structure and fielding necessary capabilities to succeed in these complex environments. Modular Brigades, Human Terrain Teams, expanded Counter-IED capabilities, revised doctrine and concepts, enhanced pre-deployment training are among many of the relevant, necessary adaptations that have been made. Nevertheless, U.S. forces must continue to adapt to stay ahead of determined adversaries intent on exploiting our weaknesses.

What, in your view, is the role of U.S. Joint Forces Command in achieving this objective for the Department and with each of the Services?

US Joint Forces Command is uniquely positioned to assist the Department in developing the right concepts and capabilities required to ensure irregular warfare becomes a core competency of the joint force. Specifically, JFCOM can assist the Department in establishing joint standards for IW relevant training and readiness, recommending mechanisms for increasing interoperability and integration of SOF and GPF related activities. Furthermore, JFCOM can assist in developing joint IW relevant doctrine and concepts, and regularly assessing the readiness and proficiency of the joint force to conduct Irregular Warfare related operations.

What, in your view, are the most important challenges to overcome in making irregular warfare a Department core competency?

The challenge as we forge ahead is to improve our ability to be agile and responsive enough to stay ahead of an irregular enemy. This requires balance and agility. Additionally, to obtain a

balanced force we must gain irregular warfare proficiency without forfeiting our conventional and nuclear dominance and do this in a resource constrained environment while engaged in two major contingencies. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to increase our flexibility and adaptability for fielding capabilities on the battlefield in the present warfight as well as further institutionalize irregular warfare in military doctrine, training, capability development and operational planning.

What initiatives or improvements would you recommend, if any, to overcome these challenges or accelerate the achievement of this objective?

Adoption of institutional education for NCOs and Officers is absolutely critical to developing adaptive leaders with the understanding and skills necessary to overcome our future challenges. What quickly became clear to me from my deployments to Iraq, is that in war, human beings matter more than any other factor. We must equip our leaders with an education that gives them the understanding of the political, strategic, historical and cultural framework of a more complex world as well as a deep understanding of the nature of war. In addition, we must include our interagency partners in our training and education programs. Irregular warfare must include all of our interagency partners and their unique skills.

"Whole of Government" Approach in Joint Operations

The Secretary of Defense has emphasized a "whole of government approach" to national security policies, programs, and operations.

What, in your view, does a "whole of government approach" in joint operations mean?

A "whole of government approach" to joint operations is applying all potential resources available within the US government to solve complex problems. It implies working with our civilian interagency partners throughout the process of assessing the situation on the ground, planning to address the challenges, executing strategies, and developing assessment tools to monitor our progress. In Iraq we have developed a comprehensive Joint Campaign Plan that integrates the unique capabilities of our interagency partners, the UN, NGOs, and other governmental agencies.

What is your evaluation of the Department's efforts to bring a "whole of government approach"?

At all levels, departmental, Service, COCOM and in the field DoD is making an all out effort to improve our ability to coordinate and collaborate with our civilian agency teammates. In the field, civilian counterparts are imbedded with military units, like Provincial Reconstruction Teams. At the Service level, we use civilian consultation in the development of capabilities to address our security force assistance responsibilities. COCOMs have

aggressively sought to improve civilian agency coordination and outreach functions and OSD and Joint Staff have taken steps to include civilian agency input in the development of our plans. But we must continue to break down interagency barriers to more effectively deal with the complexity of the modern security environment.

What, in your view, is the role of U.S. Joint Forces Command in developing and implementing a "whole of government approach" to joint doctrine, training, planning, and operations?

JFCOM is in a supporting role for an overall DoD effort. Its particular niche is ensuring that all Joint doctrine, training, planning and approach to operations use a whole of government and comprehensive approach. Additionally, JFCOM's UCP charter makes it responsible for the conduct of interagency and multinational experimentation and concept development. Joint leadership training programs from Capstone to Pinnacle must provide a forum for our senior leaders to grow, adapt, and forge interagency relationships.

What, in your view, are the important challenges to overcome in making a "whole of government approach" a central part of joint doctrine, training, planning, and operations?

JFCOM is and has been addressing this challenge for a number of years, and I am told that the term "whole of government" approach was coined in a JFCOM experimentation effort. I think the most important challenge in making a "whole of government" approach a reality is to get buy-in from our interagency partners. This will build their capacity so that we can consistently train together, encourage them to participate in and consult with us on the development of improved methods and capabilities for planning and operations thru experimentation, and the revision of Joint doctrine.

What initiatives or improvements would you recommend, if any, to overcome these challenges or accelerate the achievement of this objective?

I believe an assessment focused on the advantages and disadvantages of increasing their capacity would be the key to accelerating the achievement of this objective.

Stability and Support Operations

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and support operations in DOD planning and guidance in order to achieve the goal of full integration across all DOD activities.

What is your assessment of the Department's current emphasis on planning for post-conflict scenarios?

The Department has made great progress in its emphasis on military planning for post-conflict scenarios. These efforts have helped to codify the best practices and procedures that the recent experiences have taught us. Additionally, Department planning guidance now emphasizes activities associated with both precluding contingency plan execution as well as post-conflict requirements comparable to what we have historically placed on preparations for major combat operations.

However, these activities require a whole of government effort. Typically during a crisis, those in military and civilian agencies have come together with the best intentions and eventually respond in a unified manner. The lack of integrated planning can make the initial efforts awkward, uncoordinated, and inefficient. The Department is an active participant in the Executive Branch's efforts to improve the integration of U.S. Government efforts.

How can the new directives on post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations be better implemented?

The DoD Instruction on Stability Operations (16 Sep 2009) provides comprehensive guidance to the Department to ensure the development of both the capability and capacity to conduct stability operations. One of the most important highlights is the need to institutionalize and expand the Department's efforts towards integrated, "whole-of-government" planning and execution. If confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, I will keep the emphasis on matters for which I am personally accountable such as:

- *Capturing the Joint lessons learned and improving our ability to share them with our interagency partners*
- *Developing Joint concepts in collaboration with interagency partners*
- *Supporting the continued expansion of Interagency partner participation in both the planning and execution of joint training and experimentation events*
- *Integrating Interagency partners into Joint Command and Control solutions.*

What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Most lessons learned from our experiences of planning and training for post-conflict operations are related to the importance of integrating our Interagency, Multinational and host nation partners. The integration issues emphasize the need to invest in:

- *Defining the lead and supporting roles and responsibilities in the planning process*
- *Developing collaborative decision-making processes*
- *Developing compatible information systems to include interface controls, data sharing and disclosure processes*

Continuing to expand opportunities to train with our interagency and multinational

partners in order to improve planning, execution and enhance mutual understanding.

Responses to WMD Threats and Natural and Man-Made Disasters in the United States

The responses of federal, state, and local agencies to Hurricane Katrina and, more recently, to the catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, have generated debate about the appropriate role for military forces in responding to national crises.

In your view, what is the appropriate role, if any, for U.S. Joint Forces Command in supporting civil authorities responding to natural and man-made disasters or WMD threats within the United States?

JFCOM's role is that of the Primary Joint Force Provider to Commander, NORTHCOM, or any other designated Supported Commander, following a WMD incident. JFCOM is tasked to develop sourcing solutions to meet force requests of the Supported Commander in a timely manner. JFCOM does not generally provide forces to Governors or TAGs who have purview over their own State National Guard forces. However, if those forces are federalized by the President, they could be provided to the Supported Commander by JFCOM. It is generally assumed that in case of a WMD incident the President would choose to use forces under Title 10, but there is no guarantee of that eventuality. Should the response be limited to Title 32 forces, JFCOM would have a limited role in the response.

Hurricane Katrina has demonstrated the importance of joint and interagency training in preparation for support disaster operations.

In your view, how could U. S. Joint Forces Command influence joint and interagency training to enable better coordination and response for natural and man-made disasters operations?

There are probably two high-impact approaches JFCOM can use to enable coordination and response during natural disaster operations: experimentation and training. The first discovers best practices and the second trains the entire interagency and non-governmental partners in those best practices.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Response Units

What role do you believe U. S. Joint Forces Command should play in the training, assessment of readiness, and employment of units with WMD response missions, such as the Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams and the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force?

JFCOM, in its role as Primary Joint Force Provider, will develop sourcing solutions for

the Defense CBRN Response force and two Command and Control CBRN Response Elements as defined in the QDR 2010 and the most recent Guidance for Development of the Force. JFCOM ensures that Service training plans are aligned with NORTHCOM Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMET) for consequence management units, and will also assess readiness against those JMETs and report that assessment to DOD leadership monthly. JFCOM will not employ those units, but will provide them in a timely manner to a supported combatant commander following SECDEF allocation decision.

Joint Qualified Officers

How do you assess the necessity for and effectiveness of the current joint qualification system for military officers, including requirements for promotion to general/flag officer rank and professional military education?

The fundamentals of the Department's professional military education programs that provide joint qualifications are sound, but there are areas that need improvement. As the Secretary articulated in his policy for the Department's Joint Qualified Officer program (DODI 1300.19), today's joint force requires the largest possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities. Officer career management plans that identify, develop, and track high-potential officers for joint qualifications are crucial to ensure our best officers are prepared for joint duty assignments and eventual promotion to general/flag officer rank.

In your opinion, does the existing framework for joint qualification contribute sufficiently to producing military leaders who possess the skills, intellect, and motivation to succeed in modern warfare, including counterinsurgency and stability operations?

As confirmed by the recent House Armed Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Report on in-residence officer Professional Military Education, the Department's PME system is still basically sound. However, there are areas of PME that need improving. A significant challenge is that capacity limitations preclude every officer from completing this Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) requirement within traditional in-residence institutions. One way in which the Department is addressing this challenge is by developing paths for officers to earn joint qualification through alternative joint education, training and experience. These alternatives include online training and broader opportunities for officers to earn points toward joint qualification through operational experience. Another challenge that was confirmed by the HASC study is that curricula change is too often reactive rather than anticipatory. This reactive nature of PME curricula is particularly challenging in the dynamic mission areas of modern warfare such as counterinsurgency and stability operations.

What is your understanding of the role U.S. Joint Forces Command currently plays in overseeing the professional development of joint qualified officers, and do you

think that role should change?

I understand that U.S. Joint Forces Command works closely with the Joint Staff in overseeing the professional development of joint qualified officers. U.S Joint Forces Command actively supports the Chairman and the Joint Staff in development of both the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) and Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education Policy (EPMEP). U.S. Joint Forces Command is actively engaged with the Joint Staff and Offices of the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a sustainable individual joint education and training program with the capacity to meet the Chairman's intent to ensure the largest possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities.

Allied Command Transformation

Joint Forces Command is responsible for leading the transformation of joint U.S. forces in the areas of providing joint forces to combatant commanders, joint training, joint interoperability, and joint innovation and experimentation. Until September 2009, the Commander of Joint Forces Command was dual-hatted as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).

What role, if any, does Joint Forces Command currently have in assisting SACT in accomplishing his mission of leading the transformation of NATO's military structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines to improve interoperability and military effectiveness of the Alliance and its partner nations?

Similar mission sets and geographic co-location, provides both JFCOM and ACT an excellent opportunity for U.S. and NATO collaboration on joint and coalition warfighting issues. The work JFCOM accomplishes in the areas of Joint Experimentation and Joint Training directly complements similar efforts being undertaken by ACT. The expansion of the NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan has increased the frequency of cooperation between the two commands. Lesson learned in Afghanistan by NATO can be applicable for U.S forces in Iraq and the Horn of Africa.

What actions would you anticipate taking, if confirmed, to assist the SACT and his command in improving the capabilities of NATO?

The co-location of NATO's Transformation Command with JFCOM has already proven to be an invaluable resource to the militaries of all NATO countries, including the United States. I believe SACT and JFCOM enjoy a transparent and collaborative relationship. Within all appropriate authorities, my intent is to build upon that positive relationship. Additionally, where our missions are complimentary, I intend to fully support SACT to improve our Alliance warfighting capabilities.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U. S. Joint Forces Command?

Yes

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes