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THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

DR. MICHAEL NACHT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

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Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member LeMieux, members of the subcommittee, it is my pleasure to appear before you to discuss the Department of Defense's nonproliferation and threat reduction efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The Department is working hard to build upon our legacy of nonproliferation and threat reduction successes and to expand and adjust our programs to meet today's proliferation and emerging threats.

Strategic Environment and DoD's Strategy

Today, the threat environment posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is highly complex and unpredictable. As Director of National Intelligence Blair stated in his February 2010 testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: pursuit and possible acquisition of WMD will continue well into the future. He recognized that the intelligence community "continues to assess that many of the countries that are still pursuing WMD programs will continue to try to improve their capabilities and level of self-sufficiency over the next decade. Nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons—or the technologies and materials necessary to produce them—also may be acquired by states that do not now have such programs; terrorist, insurgent, or criminal organizations, acting alone or through middlemen." Such an intent to acquire WMD, combined with powerful cross-cutting global trends of the 21st century – such as technological advances, an increasingly interconnected global economy, the emergence of new strains of disease, the persistence of terrorism, black-market proliferation, and the frailty of strategically important states – create conditions that allow for dual-use technology, sensitive materials, and personnel with the scientific expertise to design and use those technologies to become increasingly accessible to potential state and non-state adversaries.

President Obama recognizes the challenges of today's WMD threats and he is pursuing a bold agenda to reduce proliferation dangers and to achieve the peace and security that comes from a world free of nuclear weapons. Recent diplomatic initiatives and policy reviews have increased broad awareness and expectations for the United States, the Department of Defense, and our international partners to work collaboratively to reduce and counter WMD threats. Ongoing efforts include:

- Presidential-led diplomatic initiatives, such as the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Nuclear Lockdown Initiative;
- Advancement of international nonproliferation and disarmament frameworks, including last week's Nuclear Security Summit, the recently signed New START Agreement between the United States and Russia, and the upcoming Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference;
- National-level strategies and policy reviews focusing on WMD threats, including the 2009 *National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats*, the 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (2010 QDR), and the 2010 *Nuclear Posture Review* (2010 NPR); and
- Independent studies, such as the *Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, known as the Graham-Talent report, and the congressionally-commissioned 2009 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study and report titled, *Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction*.

The Department of Defense is actively working to implement the President's vision. We have undertaken a series of policy reviews to develop a comprehensive approach to advance these goals and we are aligning our strategies and approaches accordingly. The 2010 QDR identified preventing WMD proliferation as one of six key challenges faced by the United States, and it recommended that the United States increase

its efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear materials and expand the biological threat reduction program. Most recently, the 2010 NPR elevated the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism to the top of the U.S. policy agenda and aligned U.S. nuclear weapons policies and posture to address these most pressing security threats.

Combined, evolving and emerging WMD threats along with unprecedented efforts to reduce those threats have raised the profile and priority of the Department's nonproliferation and threat reduction programs and tools. As President Obama made clear in his April 2009 speech in Prague, overcoming the twin dangers of WMD proliferation and WMD terrorism requires a comprehensive approach. The Department of Defense is aligning our programs to become more flexible, agile, and responsive to build upon our long legacy of securing our nation and the world from WMD threats. Here our approach is three-fold: First, we aim to support and rejuvenate multilateral nonproliferation initiatives and treaties. Second, we seek to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers at their source and in transit. And third, we seek to enhance our ability to detect and respond to emerging threats.

Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime

For years we have worked with our allies and partners to develop a global nonproliferation infrastructure that can reduce our collective vulnerability to these weapons. The current network of initiatives, regimes, and treaties offers some important tools for advancing this critical agenda – but much more remains to be done. Today, we are accelerating efforts to work with our allies and partners to rejuvenate and reinforce the nonproliferation regime, starting with a renewed commitment to the international legal frameworks that serve as the foundation for our efforts.

We are actively working to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) – the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the upcoming NPT Review

Conference in May 2010, we will seek an outcome that reaffirms parties' commitment to the treaty and shores up its three pillars: nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We want to discourage the abuses of the treaty withdrawal provision and ensure that there are real consequences for treaty violations. At the same time, we will emphasize our support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy that do not increase the risk of weapons proliferation. The NPT Review Conference is not an end in itself, but a critical milestone in the effort to enhance nonproliferation efforts worldwide. Efforts this May will contribute to our ambitious nonproliferation agenda.

In addition, President Obama has committed his Administration to pursue the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT is important to the nonproliferation effort because it restricts additional countries from developing, acquiring, and deploying nuclear weapons, and it hinders the ability of nuclear powers to develop new types of nuclear warheads. In the meantime, as a sign of our commitment to the CTBT regime, we will continue to maintain our unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons-testing. Finally, we will also seek a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that would ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

DoD fully supports these efforts. In particular, the FY 2011 budget request recognizes the nonproliferation value of these international agreements. It aims to fund technological improvements in instrumentation and software – such as air sample monitoring, analysis of seismic events, and improvements in infrasound detection – used for detection of treaty violations. These measures will ensure compliance with the NPT, CTBT and FMCT.

The Administration also recognizes the importance of a variety of multilateral activities and mechanisms that help to prevent proliferation, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Since its establishment in 2003, PSI has grown to include 95 endorsing countries. PSI builds political support for counterproliferation and increases cooperation through multinational endorsement of the PSI statement of principles and participation in PSI exercises, 30 of which have been conducted since 2003. By

endorsing the PSI, partners recognize the urgency of the WMD proliferation threat and commit themselves to taking action to stop shipments of proliferation concern on a voluntary basis, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law. The PSI also helps build the capacity of countries on the front lines of WMD transshipment to counter proliferation by hosting exercises in which countries share best practices, engage in scenario planning, and examine decision making processes. The U.S. Government has taken on an important new role this year by serving as the PSI “Focal Point,” providing support, improving information flow, and coordinating schedules of international activities among partners consistent with the President’s desire to turn the PSI into a durable international institution.

In addition, this Administration is seeking Export Control Reform. Under the rubric of "Higher Walls Around Fewer Items," our goal is to make exporting dangerous or sensitive items much more difficult, while at the same time lowering unnecessary barriers to profitable technology exports that pose no threat to our security. This broad-based interagency effort to review the current system and process of administering and enforcing U.S. export controls is close to making its final recommendations, and, with the cooperation of Congress, will then start the work of implementation.

Despite these efforts, we recognize that this nonproliferation regime is under serious strain, in large part because of countries that choose to violate both the letter and the spirit of their commitments and because some countries choose to live outside this regime altogether. Responding to this challenge, this Administration has gone on the diplomatic offensive to address nuclear proliferation threats, seeking to reclaim lost ground with allies and partners. This outreach is paying real dividends. Our demonstrated commitment to engagement and our efforts to find diplomatic solutions is helping us to put more pressure on the world’s two greatest current proliferation threats, Iran and North Korea. In the case of North Korea, the successful implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 has demonstrated the international community’s resolve to stem the DPRK’s ability to pursue nuclear, ballistic missile, and

other WMD-related activities, and to prevent proliferation to and from North Korea. The United States has undertaken close coordination with partners on full implementation of the resolution, which provides for, among other things, enhanced provisions regarding inspection of suspect cargo.

Reducing and Eliminating Threats

The second element of the Department's approach involves engaging in active international partnerships to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers both at their source and in transit. Vulnerable nuclear, biological, and chemical materials that are secured or eliminated cannot be used for harmful purposes by terrorists or other hostile actors.

As this committee is aware, the CTR Program has been working to reduce nuclear, biological, and chemical threats since its inception in 1992, and has established a successful track record. Building on that success, we are transforming and expanding the CTR Program to meet today's threats. Over the years, Congress has expanded CTR's authorities and created new opportunities for the program to embark on these important national and international security priorities. This legislation enables the CTR program to address emerging WMD threats and to achieve long-standing WMD nonproliferation goals more effectively and comprehensively. Accordingly, new funding mechanisms provide the Department with additional resources to think and act beyond traditional projects and activities.

Four broad principles – integration, responsiveness, stewardship, and cooperation – will guide our evolution and expansion. First, we are fully integrating CTR within broader whole-of-government counter-WMD approaches, as well as within productive and established bilateral and multilateral frameworks. Second, the CTR program is becoming both agile enough to accept targets of opportunity and flexible enough to utilize CTR in new regions and for new projects. Third, we are improving resource

management and stewardship by better aligning expenditures with priorities, improving execution and accountability of funds, and developing sustainable, long-term solutions and capacity-building opportunities for our partner countries. And fourth, the CTR Program has renewed its focus on the cooperative components of our program, including establishing mutually beneficial projects with our partner countries and ensuring that the vision for any project includes common awareness of threats and solutions. Local vulnerabilities will be met with local solutions.

With these principles as our guide, we will engage with countries and regions to achieve common goals and provide sustainable capabilities. Depending on the vulnerabilities, local capacity, and status of our relationship with a given country, we could employ any of the following four models as a template to expand CTR engagements and related projects and activities. First, the “Traditional Model” has been employed with individual former Soviet Union (FSU) states to establish an exceptionally high level of capability and national proficiency to deal with various materials and various levels of vulnerability. Next, a “Tailored Model” seeks to work bilaterally with countries to tailor CTR projects to identify and address specific vulnerabilities within the context of political and capability realities. A “Regional Model” seeks to develop baseline capabilities across a region to reduce the potential for future threats to emerge and to provide countries with the capacity to recognize those threats if they do emerge. Although key international partners will be important in each of the four models, the regional model is likely to rely most heavily on the participation and engagement of the international community. Our final model, known as “Centers of Cooperation,” will allow the Department to partner with key countries to increase information sharing and to develop best practices for appropriate CTR objectives. Instead of focusing our efforts on securing materials or building capacity at the source, our efforts will focus on developing long-term relationships that will have positive second- and third-order effects throughout the region.

Although I have discussed our broad strategy and new approaches to meet our requirements, we cannot do all that the President and the world demand without additional resources. The CTR budget has held steadily around \$430 million over the past three years. This year, however, we are taking real steps to exercise new legislative authorities to expand the CTR Program across the globe to reduce and eliminate emerging threats while simultaneously continuing our important work in Russia and FSU countries. This is why the President has requested a significant increase in the DoD CTR budget through FY2015. The overall FY2011 budget request for the DoD CTR Program is \$522.5 million, a 23% increase over FY2010. Program enhancements in FY2011 over the FY2010 baseline include an additional \$74.5 million to fund the Global Nuclear Lockdown Initiative and \$56.9 million to expand the Biological Threat Reduction Program. I would now like to describe some examples of recent successes and plans to implement this new strategy in several areas of our nuclear, biological, and chemical threat reduction efforts, as well as our Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI) and Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) programs.

As you are well aware, the CTR Program has been involved in reducing nuclear threats for a long time. It has been almost two decades since Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, the hallmark legislation that established the Nunn-Lugar Program. Within six months of its enactment, the United States and the Russian Federation signed the CTR Umbrella Agreement and began the arduous task of eliminating the enormous number of strategic offensive arms that had been built up by the Soviet Union. Although elimination work has largely been concluded in the other states of the former Soviet Union, it goes on to this day in Russia as ballistic missiles, launchers, and ballistic missile submarines continue to be dismantled. In addition, the Department continues to work closely with the Department of Energy and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (MOD) to ensure the appropriate infrastructure is in place to enable Russia to sustain over the long term the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of modernized physical protection systems that have been installed at nuclear weapons

storage sites. Finally, the Department continues to assist Russia in transporting nuclear warheads from operational locations to dismantlement facilities or more secure, consolidated storage sites.

Although we continue to focus on the Department's mission to reduce nuclear threats in Russia, we also are building upon our legacy of success to meet the President's broader nuclear nonproliferation agenda. The unprecedented gathering of 47 states to address these issues during the Nuclear Security Summit last week represents a critical step in the President's commitment to secure vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide by the end of 2013. The CTR Program is DoD's mechanism to support the President's initiative and the requested increase of \$74.5 million will support expanded security cooperation with Russia and additional efforts with new partner countries. As required by the FY2008 legislation, the CTR Program will seek a determination from the Secretaries of Defense and State to conduct CTR projects and activities with new partner countries outside the FSU. Working with partner countries, DOE, and other Interagency partners, and consistent with our Centers of Cooperation engagement model, we plan to support a nuclear security Center of Excellence in China and a Nuclear Energy Center with a nuclear security component in India, as was announced at last week's Nuclear Security Summit. By using the centers, countries and agencies involved will be able to provide lessons learned and an exchange of best practices without requiring access to actual material or weapons sites.

The Department is similarly expanding our biological threat reduction programs, and we are requesting a \$56.9 million budget increase to meet our new global health security requirements in support of the President's *National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats* and 2010 QDR recommendations. In Afghanistan, we are working at the request of the Acting Minister of Public Health to help consolidate an independent collection of diagnostic laboratories under a new National Public Health Laboratory in Kabul. The Department is also considering expanding the program into Sub-Saharan

Africa, where we believe there are opportunities to implement regional approaches for human and animal disease detection, diagnosis, surveillance, and reporting.

In addition to these expansion efforts, the BTRP continues to partner with FSU countries to enhance biosafety and security and to consolidate especially dangerous pathogens. In Georgia, we completed construction of a new Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) located in Tbilisi and also renovated other human regional diagnostic laboratories. In Kazakhstan, the CTR program is a member of a Kazakhstan government cross-functional working group appointed to design a new Central Reference Laboratory. A successful CRL groundbreaking ceremony took place on March 30, 2010, and actual construction is expected to begin in a few months. Lastly, in Ukraine, the CTR Program is working with the Ministry of Health to consolidate all of Ukraine's human especially dangerous pathogens at a DoD-renovated interim human central reference laboratory, and we are developing plans to renovate facilities for a permanent human central reference laboratory for reference diagnosis and safe secure research. We are also planning to construct a veterinary central reference lab to consolidate all of Ukraine's animal especially dangerous pathogens and provide for reference diagnosis and safe and secure research.

CTR's chemical programs continue to assist Russia with safe, secure, and environmentally sound destruction of a portion of its chemical weapons nerve agent stockpile that is most vulnerable to theft or diversion. This year we also hope to complete elimination of on-site equipment at the former nerve-agent weapons production facility at Novocheboksarsk. Our efforts are intended to achieve U.S. chemical agent proliferation prevention goals while helping Russia comply with its Chemical Weapons Convention requirements. At Russia's request, and in our judgment to the mutual benefit of the people of the United States, we will continue some technical support for the Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility, which began eliminating chemical weapons in March 2009. The United States contributed more than \$1 billion to the construction of this facility, and our continued technical support will assist in maintaining

the operational status of U.S.-furnished equipment, as well as equipment supplied by other donor countries, so that the elimination process continues expeditiously.

In addition to CTR's programs to secure nuclear, biological, and chemical material at the source, the WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI) is CTR's means to enhance our partners' abilities to detect and interdict WMD "on the move." DoD has just completed a multiyear effort with Azerbaijan's State Border Guard Service-Coast Guard and elements of its Navy to enhance maritime detection, surveillance and interdiction capabilities on the Caspian Sea and we will continue to provide sustainment to that project for another two years. In Ukraine, we are working with the State Border Guard Service to enhance maritime detection and interdiction capabilities on the Black Sea, as well as providing extensive assistance to land borders between the key ports of entry along the Moldovan border and in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone.

Although not an element of CTR, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)'s International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) complements the capital-intensive investments of the WMD-PPI program through its modest yet effective "train and equip" efforts. The ICP is unique in its legislative authority to partner explicitly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Customs in furtherance of deterring the proliferation of WMD across the FSU, the Baltic states, and in Eastern Europe. We are currently working with DTRA to determine how best to expand the program globally.

The final element of the Department's threat reduction efforts is the Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) Program, which is currently transitioning to meet changed legislative guidelines and expanded authorities to support specific relationship building opportunities for CTR engagement in new geographic areas. Under this new approach, the CTR Policy Office will develop policy guidance in close cooperation and coordination with OSD's regional offices, AT&L/Treaties and Threat Reduction, and the Unified Combatant Commands. DTRA's CTR Program Office will administer the program in accordance with that guidance.

Detecting and Responding to Emerging Threats

The third element of the Department's approach involves improving our ability to detect and respond to emerging WMD dangers. Here the Department has a particular responsibility to our nation, as well as to our allies and partners. For instance, instability resulting from the collapse of a nuclear-armed state would risk the global proliferation of nuclear material, weapons, or technology, posing a threat to our homeland and the homelands of our allies. We must be prepared to detect threats and defend ourselves against WMD dangers. This includes enhancements to interdiction and elimination capabilities as well as preparations to respond quickly to an attack should our preventive and deterrence efforts fail.

Our Quadrennial Defense Review identifies preventing proliferation and countering weapons of mass destruction as one of the top priority missions for the Defense Department, and our FY 2011 budget request reflects that commitment. This request will fully fund efforts to enhance SOCOM's ability to conduct counter-WMD operations by increasing funding by \$60 million. It will also establish the standing Joint Task Force Elimination (JTF-E) Headquarters to plan, train and execute WMD elimination operations. The JTF-E works in conjunction with special operations forces to locate, characterize, secure, disable or destroy hostile WMD programs or capabilities in a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment. It will also provide nuclear disablement, exploitation, and intelligence capabilities with increased capacity to coordinate operations with special operations forces. Currently the Joint Staff is developing several options for the command and control structure and force-sizing for the standing headquarters.

The budget request includes \$22 million to improve capabilities for national technical nuclear forensics technologies and the fielding of new capabilities, including funding for ground and air collection. Other key capability enhancements anticipated by this budget request include the modernization of WMD Civil Support Teams and CBRNE

Consequence Management Response Forces to assist state and local governments in the event of a WMD attack, as well as enhanced technical reachback capabilities to ensure warfighters have real time access to information on WMD. We are also working to adapt our architectures, plans, and operations so that we can respond to WMD crises with greater speed and agility.

Additionally, we must engage partner nations, allies, and the broader international community to improve our ability to detect and respond to such dangers and reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. Here we are working to support a number of multilateral efforts, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), an international partnership of nearly 80 states and 4 observers that enhances individual, regional, and collective capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism through deterrence, prevention, detection, and response objectives. Through multilateral activities and exercises, partners share best practices and lessons learned. The United States and Russia, co-chairs to the GICNT, are currently taking tangible steps that will transform the GICNT into an action-oriented and institutionalized program.

Closing Remarks

The world is changing and the Obama Administration is bringing a full court press to assemble like-minded countries to meet our collective national and international security obligations to make the world safe from all weapons of mass destruction. These efforts continue to underscore the need and relevance of the Department's nonproliferation, threat reduction, and WMD detection and response tools. The Department takes its responsibilities seriously and we are building on our legacy of success to evolve and expand to meet today's challenges.

Annex – CTR Budget Request

FY 2011 increases include \$+74.5 million for the new Global Nuclear Lockdown program and \$+56.9 million to expand the Biological Threat Reduction Program.

FY 2009-FY 2015 Budget (\$ in Millions)

Program	FY 2009	FY 2010	Δ FY 2011 and 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015	Total FY 2011 - 2015
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination	39.0	66.4	.3	66.7	70.9	78.2	64.0	40.2	320.0
Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination	6.4	6.8		6.8	6.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.6
Chemical Weapons Destruction	28.0	3.0		3.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0
Nuclear Weapons Storage Security	16.2	22.1	-12.5	9.6	7.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.3
Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security	58.8	45.9	-.9	45.0	28.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	73.0
Biological Threat Reduction	177.5	152.1	56.9	209.0	253.3	287.6	293.6	311.9	1,355.4
WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative	69.3	83.9	-4.1	79.8	52.3	54.9	54.7	55.0	296.7
Global Nuclear Lockdown			74.5	74.5	74.4	77.4	68.7	22.6	317.6
Defense and Military Contacts	8.0	5.0		5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	25.0
New Initiatives	10.0	17.0	-17.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Assessments/ Administrative Support	20.1	21.4	1.6	23.0	24.5	26.4	26.8	26.8	127.5
Total	433.2	423.6	98.8	522.5	523.9	529.6	512.7	461.5	2,550.2

Numbers may not add due to rounding.

- **Global Nuclear Lockdown (\$74.5 million)**

This new initiative supports the President's goal to secure all vulnerable weapons-usable nuclear material within 4 years. The CTR Program, working with DOE and the Interagency, plans to establish Centers of Excellence for Nuclear Security. The purpose of these regional centers, which are not located at material or weapons storage sites, will be to assess equipment and manpower, provide material security training, and demonstrate enhanced security procedures and processes. The centers would provide lessons learned without direct site access. Additionally, ongoing nuclear security and nonproliferation efforts in Russia and Kazakhstan will continue.

- **Biological Threat Reduction (\$209.0 million)**

The additional \$56.9 million in FY 2011 supports the expansion of the Biological Threat Reduction Program efforts geographically to consolidate and secure dangerous pathogens, collections, and research in a minimum number of facilities; improve human and veterinary biosurveillance capacity to detect, diagnose, report, and respond to EDP disease outbreaks, either man-made or natural, including pandemics; and facilitate strategic research partnerships.

- **Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (\$66.7 million)**

Continues the dismantling of Russia's Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), including silos and road-mobile launchers, and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), including SLBM launchers/compartments and defueling and sealing the reactor section of the strategic submarines, as well as overall WMD infrastructure dismantlement. As of October 2009, 767 ICBMs, 498 ICBM silos, 143 mobile ICBM launchers, 155 strategic bombers, 651 SLBMs, 476 SLBM launchers, and 32 Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) have been eliminated. The FY 2011 funding eliminates 8 liquid fueled ICBMs and eliminates 33 ICBM silos, 40 road-mobile solid fueled ICBMs, and 36 road-mobile launchers; decommissions and removes infrastructure from 2 road-mobile ICBM regiments; and dismantles 1 strategic submarine.

- **Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (\$6.8 million)**
Assists Ukraine by supporting storage and elimination of SS-24 ICBM rocket motors from dismantled SS-24 ICBMs.
- **Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) (\$3.0 million)**
Supports the program's response to emerging CWD requirements and retains capability to rebuild within 12 months the core competency necessary to destroy chemical weapons and precursors if requested by a state outside Russia.
- **Nuclear Weapons Storage/Transportation Security (\$54.6 million)**
Enhances the security, control, and accounting of nuclear weapons stored in Russia. Supports movement and consolidation of nuclear weapons from Russian Ministry of Defense operational sites to weapons dismantlement or more secure storage facilities. Provides sustainment to include training, maintenance, and depot support for nuclear weapon storage sites.
- **WMD Proliferation Prevention (\$79.8 million)**
Enhances the capability of non-Russian FSU states to prevent the proliferation of WMD and related materials that could be smuggled across their land and maritime borders. Upgrades capabilities to detect and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD, enhances surveillance and patrol capabilities, provides related training, and coordinates activities with other related assistance projects such as the Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense Program, the Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security Program, and related border security programs.
- **Other Threat Reduction Programs (\$28.0 million)**
Supports defense and military contacts. Supports Audit and Examination program to ensure CTR assistance is used for the intended purpose and is efficiently and effectively administered. Supports six DTRA/CTR offices at embassies across the FSU. Also, provides non-government advisory assistance and administrative support to DoD.