

Advance Questions for Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Goldwater-Nichols was landmark legislation that led to dramatic improvements in operational effectiveness, unity of effort, and civilian oversight. There is now a generation of military leaders who are experienced with operating in a coordinated and joint, multi-service environment. At this time, I do not see the need to change the provisions of this legislation.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

See my previous answer.

Relationships

What do you see as the relationship between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense

Under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs advises the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DoD interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Middle East, and Africa.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs advises the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DoD interest that relate to the nations and international

organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Middle East, and Africa.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs provides similar support to the Under Secretary as described above.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

At the direction of the Under Secretary for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works closely with the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Deputy to achieve the Secretary's objectives and ensure that policy formulation and execution are well informed and supported by intelligence. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs also provides policy input, as appropriate, to intelligence activities handled by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the President and the National Security Council, the Chairman has a unique and critical military role. At the direction of the Under Secretary or Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works with the Chairman and Vice Chairman to provide support on matters that affect strategy and policy for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, working to ensure that military advice is taken into account in an appropriate manner.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of issues related to international security strategy and policy.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works with the Chiefs of Staff of the Services on a broad range of issues related to international security strategy and policy.

The Combatant Commanders, in particular the commanders of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation/Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works closely with the commanders of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. European Command, and

Supreme Allied Commander Transformation/Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command to support the efforts of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Secretary and Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of strategy and policy, contingency planning and policy oversight of operations.

The Commanding General, Multi-National Force, Iraq

In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works closely with the Commanding General, Multi-National Force, Iraq to provide policy oversight of strategy, plans and operations in Iraq in support of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States.

The Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan

In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs works closely with the Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan to provide policy oversight of strategy, plans and operations in Afghanistan in support of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States.

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The ASD(ISA) is the principal advisor to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on international security strategy and policy relating to the countries and international organizations of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs

The ASD(ISA) works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs to provide sound policy advice to the Under Secretary and the Secretary on cross-cutting international security strategy and policy issues, such as the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs

The ASD(ISA) works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs to provide sound policy advice to the Under Secretary and the Secretary on cross-cutting international security strategy and policy issues, such as arms control policy and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities

The ASD(ISA) works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities to provide sound policy advice to the Under Secretary and the Secretary on cross-cutting international security strategy and policy issues, such as countering violent extremism, stability operations, and oversight of security cooperation programs.

The Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency

The ASD(ISA) works with the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency on implementation of security cooperation activities, such as Foreign Military Sales, with countries in Europe, the Middle East and Africa to ensure that these activities support national security policy objectives and strategies.

The proposed Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Integration and Chief of Staff

Although I have not had the opportunity to review the responsibilities of the proposed Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Integration and Chief of Staff, the ASD(ISA) would work with this organization on cross-cutting policy issues to support the objectives of the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

The proposed Deputy Under Secretary for Policy for Strategy, Plans, and Forces

Although I have not had the opportunity to review the responsibilities of the proposed Deputy Under Secretary for Policy for Strategy, Plans, and Forces, the ASD(ISA) would work with this organization on cross-cutting policy issues to support the objectives of the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Duties

Department of Defense Directive 5111.07 (11/7/2008) delineates the functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD ISA). Under this Directive, the ASD(ISA) is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DOD interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia), the Middle East, and Africa, their governments and defense establishments; and for oversight of security cooperation programs.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs?

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs primary responsibility is to advise and support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on defense policy and strategy for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

Under the proposed reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense - Policy, what specific changes do you anticipate and please discuss what you believe to be impact these changes to your functions and duties?

I look forward to speaking with the Secretary and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy further about how I could best support their efforts beyond those set forth in Section 134(b) of Title 10.

How would the proposed creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs impact the functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, particularly with regard to Russia?

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs will have to coordinate closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs to balance the regional and functional perspective in the development of international security strategy and policy, including the U.S. approach to nuclear arms reductions negotiations with Russia, and in providing advice to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense.

Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

I believe that my 32 years of experience in the Foreign Service dealing with national security issues provide me with the necessary background to handle the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Throughout my State Department career, I worked closely with the Department of Defense in shaping and implementing U.S. policy toward the former Soviet Union and NATO, in contributing to U.S. efforts on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism, and in managing a wide range of international conflicts and crises. Over the years, I have come to appreciate the importance of close civil-military coordination to the achievement of U.S. objectives – something that is especially important in meeting the new threats and challenges of the 21st century.

Strategy and Contingency Planning

One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning.

What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

I believe that civilian leadership is critical in the formulation of strategy and planning. Civilian defense leadership is particularly vital in translating broad national security policies and principles into the strategic goals that ultimately drive military planning. The Joint Staff is a critical partner in the development of guidance for contingency planning and provides independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. In addition to the

provision of written guidance, an important civilian role is to review contingency plans submitted for approval by the Combatant Commanders.

In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy and contingency planning?

As the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy, has said, the United States is at a critical time in history – with multiple wars, enduring threats, and imminent challenges. Strong civilian and military partnership on the range of national security issues facing our nation is vital. If confirmed, I will examine this issue closely and seek to ensure that civilian leadership has the appropriate level of oversight on the full range of strategy, planning, and use-of-force issues, while respecting the importance of receiving independent military advice from the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commanders.

What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy and contingency planning?

I support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s view that the strategy and planning capacity in the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be strengthened. If confirmed, I would strive to provide the best advice possible to the Under Secretary of Defense in the provision of written policy guidance and in the review of contingency plans for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs?

If confirmed, my office will likely play an important role within the Department and the interagency process in developing policy for a number of key issues, including among others: responsibly ending the war in Iraq; ensuring that NATO develops and employs a more effective strategy in Afghanistan and the surrounding region; working to prevent WMD proliferation; combating terrorism; strengthening security and stability across the Middle East; strengthening America’s alliances with key partners and allies; and shaping a more constructive relationship with Russia while supporting the sovereignty and independence of Russia’s neighbors. Beyond ensuring that the Secretary of Defense receives the best possible policy input on these vital questions, another major challenge will be to strengthen the organizational capacity to support these efforts.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I would engage closely with my counterparts at the Department of State and NSC to develop comprehensive and coordinated strategies that bring to bear all elements of national power to advance U.S. interests.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs?

If confirmed, I would give priority to the major challenges identified by the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary for Defense Policy and to strengthening the organizational capacity of ISA to address them. I would also give priority to ensuring effective working relationships with both military and civilian counterparts through the Department and the interagency.

Iraq

The President has announced his plans for the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and their transition to an overwatch mission, to be completed by the end of August 2010. The U.S.-Iraqi agreement on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq (the “security agreement”) requires that U.S. combat forces withdraw from cities and towns by June 2009 and that all U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq by the end of December 2011. Additionally, if Iraqi voters reject the security agreement in a referendum scheduled for July 2009, U.S. troops would be required to withdraw by July 2010.

What in your view are the greatest challenges facing DOD in meeting these deadlines and what actions, if any, would you recommend to maximize the chances of meeting these requirements?

The challenge in Iraq will be to continue the phased redeployment of U.S. forces while maintaining a secure environment to support elections, political reconciliation, and economic development. If confirmed, I would review DoD plans and work with colleagues across the Department and in other agencies to make any necessary recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

What is your understanding and assessment of U.S. plans to support implementation of the President’s drawdown plans and the SOFA requirements for repositioning and redeployment of U.S. forces, including contingency planning relating to the Iraqi referendum?

The President’s drawdown strategy reflects a careful consideration of events on the ground and respect for the bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Iraq. If confirmed, I look forward to implementing this strategy and working with the Joint Staff and our commanders to ensure we continue to meet our obligations under the Security Agreement and plan for contingencies, while we continue to support the Iraqi government and help its security forces develop into a professional, non-sectarian force.

Iraq Lessons Learned

What do you believe to be the major lessons learned from the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?

One of many critical lessons learned from the Iraq invasion and the ongoing stability operations, is that better and more integrated civilian-military planning is required before any military endeavor. It is essential for policymakers to recognize that wars in the 21st century require preparation and competence along the entire spectrum of conflict—not just military, but often times political, ethnic, and social. The military cannot be prepared only for high-intensity combat. The government, as a whole, must be prepared to plan and execute an effort to win the peace. We have also learned that the appropriate force strength must be deployed to accomplish our objectives as well as account for a broad array of contingencies and the changing reality of the battle-space. Furthermore, our forces must plan and train with their civilian counterparts and be prepared to operate effectively in all phases of conflict, as well as post-conflict environments. The Iraq War also teaches us that the right training and doctrine must also be in place prior to any incursion.

NATO

What are the greatest challenges and opportunities that you foresee for NATO over the next 5 years?

The United States continues to have an enormous stake in a strong, capable and mutually supportive NATO alliance. Both the President and the Secretary of Defense have stressed their strong desire to adapt and modernize transatlantic security relationships to meet 21st century security challenges. Over the next five years, the primary NATO-related challenges include, first and foremost, achieving durable progress on Afghanistan; developing a common approach toward managing relations with Russia, drafting a new Strategic Concept to define emerging threats and required capabilities, and improving the prospects for unity-of-action between NATO and the European Union.

Do you envision further enlargement of NATO, beyond Albania and Croatia, within the next 5 years? What criteria should the United States apply in evaluating candidates for future NATO enlargement?

The President has stated that NATO enlargement should continue so long as new candidates are democratic, peaceful, and willing to contribute to common security. NATO's door remains open to all European democracies that share our values and who can contribute to our common security. Precisely which countries and within what applicable timeframe NATO would undertake further enlargement are important questions which the Administration will need to address in close consultation with Congress and our allies. It is important that each NATO aspirant be judged on its individual merits and progress in implementing political, economic, and military reforms. No country outside NATO can exercise a veto over other countries' NATO aspirations.

What more can the United States do to encourage NATO members to develop the capabilities and provide the resources necessary to carry out NATO missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere?

We will continue to look to our allies to shoulder a significant share of the military burden in Afghanistan, Kosovo and other theaters, and to allocate sufficient resources to the modernization of their defense capabilities. At the same time, the President and Secretary Gates have both stressed the need for the United States and NATO to invest more in non-military instruments of national power. Many of our NATO allies have unique civilian governance capabilities that can enhance the overall effort in Afghanistan; the European Union has developed a capability to provide police and police training to help in stabilizing post-conflict situations. Forging a shared strategic view of the emerging threat environment and updating NATO's Strategic Concept from both a military and civilian governance perspective will be critical to success in Afghanistan and future operations.

What are your views on the potential for the NATO-Russia Council to serve as a useful forum for improving security relations between NATO and Russia?

The NATO-Russia Council has the potential to be a useful forum for developing security cooperation between NATO and Russia in areas of common interest, such as Afghanistan, non-proliferation, counter-piracy, counter-terrorism and possibly missile defense. The NRC also can serve as a venue for dialogue with Russia on European security issues, including areas where we disagree, such as Georgia.

What is your assessment of the impact of France rejoining the integrated military structure within NATO?

President Obama has already underscored to French President Sarkozy his strong support for France's full participation in NATO's integrated military structure. As Vice President Biden stated in his speech to the Munich Security Conference in early February, "France is a founding member of NATO and a major contributor to its operations. We would expect France's new responsibilities to reflect the significance of its contributions throughout NATO's history, and to strengthen the European role within the Alliance."

Deeper than this, full French participation in NATO's forces planning processes will result in French military capabilities being formally and openly designated for Alliance use. The Alliance will also benefit from having well trained French officers in the integrated military structure and from having full French participation in NATO common budgets. We believe that France will play an important role in the Alliance's development of a new Strategic Concept.

NATO-EU Relations

A potential challenge facing the United States and NATO in the months and years ahead is the European Union's (EU) implementation of its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), that is, an EU capability to conduct military operations in response to

international crises in cases where “NATO as a whole is not engaged.” At the same time, NATO and EU are working alongside each other in addressing a number of common security challenges, including police training in Afghanistan and crisis management in Kosovo.

In your view, what should be NATO’s position with regard to European efforts to strengthen the ESDP and build military capacity within the European Union?

NATO and the EU have agreed to ensure that their capability development efforts are “mutually reinforcing.” In defense and security-related realms, I would consider NATO to be the preferred vehicle for cooperation between our European allies and the U.S. in responding to shared security challenges. At the same time, NATO has rightly reaffirmed the value of a stronger, more capable ESDP in dealing with crises in which NATO as a whole is not engaged, and has agreed to provide planning and material support in such cases, based on our shared security interests. I believe we have already seen the benefits of this approach in Bosnia, where the EU has assumed greater responsibility as NATO redeployed its forces elsewhere.

What steps do you believe the United States and NATO should take to ensure that ESDP is implemented in a way that strengthens the Alliance?

Over the past several years, ESDP-related activities have grown in number and diversity, to include the EU’s current anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. Given these trends, high priority must be given to promoting policy-level consultation and coordination, good communications, and a common operating picture between NATO, its allies and partners.

What is your view of the future of NATO-EU relations in areas relating to security, defense, and crisis management? Should NATO do more to institutionalize cooperation between the two organizations?

Both NATO and the EU have important roles to play in meeting future security, defense and crisis management challenges. As noted above, from an Alliance perspective, it is important for DoD and U.S. interagency partners to take a clear-eyed view of the entire range of current EU-activities – from civilian policing, to military, border control or other missions – to identify both areas of duplication and where closer NATO-EU coordination is required. NATO should fully use the valuable existing NATO-EU cooperation mechanisms, and consider additional mechanisms where they could help strengthen cooperation.

Engagement Policy

One of the central pillars of our national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises, combatant commander exercises, humanitarian demining operations, and similar activities were used to achieve this goal. However, the demands of supporting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have drained resources needed by combatant commands to sustain military engagement activities.

Do you believe that military engagement activities contribute to U.S. national security? If so, what do you consider to be the main benefits of these activities?

Yes. I believe military-to-military contacts contribute to U.S. national security in a variety of important ways and, as such, I support continued military-to-military engagement. Such activities can build capacity among partner nations to participate in coalition operations to counter terrorism and other transnational threats, potentially relieving stress on U.S. forces. They can help harmonize nations' views of common security challenges. Military-to-military activities can also help sustain investments made by other U.S. assistance programs. Finally, when performed effectively, military-to-military activities should show by example how military forces can act effectively while respecting human rights and civilian control.

If confirmed, would you advocate for continuing or expanding U.S. military-to-military engagement? If not, why not? If so, what would you recommend to address the combatant commanders' need for additional resources dedicated to these activities?

If confirmed, I will support continued U.S. military-to-military engagement. I believe the current and emerging security environment will require robust engagement with the militaries of our partners and allies around the world, and building productive relationships with many states in which our past military-to-military engagements have been limited or absent entirely. I have not had an opportunity to investigate the specific resource needs of combatant commanders. If confirmed, I will look into the resource needs associated with combatant commander military-to-military engagements.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. These include the global train and equip authority ("Section 1206") and the security and stabilization assistance authority ("Section 1207").

What should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

One of the greatest threats to international security is the violence that is sparked when human security needs are not met by governments. This creates space for terrorists, insurgents, and other spoilers to operate and, as the 9/11 attacks demonstrated, to threaten the United States and its allies. The goal, therefore, is to close this space through efforts that strengthen bilateral relationships; increase U.S. access and influence; promote militaries that respect human rights, civilian control of the military and the rule of law; and build capacity for common security

objectives. In addition to promoting regional and global security, enhanced partner capacity reduces the risk of future military interventions and reduces stress on U.S. armed forces.

Do these objectives differ by region, e.g. do our objectives within the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) differ from those in the AFRICOM AOR?

I am not in a position to render a definitive judgment on this important question. I will, if confirmed, study the matter and, if changes are needed, provide views to Secretary Gates and the members of this committee. My understanding is that the basic objective of the 1206 program is to build partner capacity to work with the U.S. or independently to address the threat of terrorism. My understanding is that 1207 allows DoD to transfer funding to the State Department with the goal of assisting State's reconstruction, security, or stabilization efforts. The overall objectives of these programs are the same around the globe. U.S. interests vary in different regions so I would expect that 1206 and 1207 activities would vary accordingly, though the core objectives are the same.

What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 global train and equip authority?

My understanding is that Section 1206 is intended to provide a quicker, more targeted ability to build partner capacity than the more traditional routes of security assistance, and is focused on building capacity to achieve security objectives. Under law, it has two discrete purposes: to build a partner's national military or maritime security forces' capacity either to (1) conduct counterterrorism operations or (2) conduct or support stability operations where U.S. forces are participating. I have not been involved in 1206 implementation, but I understand that the program has enthusiastic support from Embassies and COCOMs and reflects a close collaboration between State and DoD, which work together in a "dual key" process to approve funding allocations. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary in fully assessing how well this authority is working and whether it meets congressional intent.

What is your assessment of the implementation of the global train and equip program?

See my previous answer.

What is the relationship of the global train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics assistance and foreign military financing?

The Departments of State and Defense need to work together very closely to avoid duplication of effort among these important activities. The Global Train and Equip authority fills two specific legal requirements: to build capacity for counterterrorism and for stability operations where U.S. forces are a participant. Foreign Military Financing serves a broader set of diplomatic and foreign policy objectives such as improving bilateral relations, encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest, increasing access and influence, and building capacity particularly where host-nation and U.S. interests align.

Counternarcotics authorities are focused on providing DoD the ability to support U.S. or other Government efforts to counter the flow of narcotics globally. If confirmed, I will support any interagency assessment of potential overlaps and work to ensure that DoD programs are focused on supporting U.S. and other agency efforts to counter the flow of narcotics.

What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?

See my previous answer.

What is your understanding of the purpose of the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”)?

Section 1207 was, as I understand it, originally designed to help the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to become operational. It facilitates security, stabilization, and reconstruction missions – bringing civilian expertise to bear alongside or in lieu of U.S. military forces. I have not been involved in 1207 implementation, but I understand that the program has been useful in facilitating a “3D” (Development, Defense, Diplomacy) approach to security, stabilization, and reconstruction challenges. If confirmed, I will monitor this effort closely.

What is your assessment of how this authority has been utilized?

See my previous answer.

Secretary Gates has called for an expansion of the Government’s resources devoted to instruments of non-military “soft power” – civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance.

Do you believe that there is a need to expand the Government’s resources devoted to the ability of civilian departments and agencies to engage, assist, and communicate with partner nations?

Yes. The President and Secretary Gates have both made clear their strong desire to see more robust non-military instruments of national power. And Congress has the authority to expand significantly the Government’s “soft-power” resources and U.S. civilian agency capacity. If confirmed, I will certainly make it my priority to assist in this effort.

In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-à-vis other civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft power?

Generally, the Department’s role should be to support, not lead, in the exercise of “soft power.” But DoD plays a vital role in helping to promote – through the full gamut of planning effort,

exchanges, exercises, operations, and bilateral defense relationships – the conditions that enable these instruments to be applied with maximum beneficial effect.

What is your view of the criticism that these security assistance programs have contributed to a “militarization” of U.S. foreign policy?

In general, I believe that our national security challenges require that the President have a broad set of options. I have not had experience with the 1206 and 1207 programs. However, I understand that all 1206 activities are approved by both the Secretaries of Defense and State. Further, I understand that 1207 is intended to ensure that State can better carry out its reconstruction, stabilization, and security responsibilities. It may be that the critics do not appreciate how deeply State is involved in the approval and authorization of these activities. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure that 1206 and 1207 activities are framed and implemented appropriately, and based on thorough State-Defense coordination.

Do you believe that there is an independent value to Section 1206 and 1207 funded activities or do you believe these authorities and associated funding should be switched to the Department of State?

I do not believe that 1206 and 1207 authorities and funding should be switched to the Department of State. Although I am not intimately familiar with these activities, I understand that the Combatant Commanders find them extremely valuable. If confirmed, I will be able to develop a more informed opinion on this issue.

Russia

What role will you play, if confirmed, in establishing policy with respect to the U.S.-Russia national security relationship?

If confirmed, I will work with other members of the Administration to advance the President’s goal of building a more constructive relationship with Russia, while managing differences in areas where U.S. and Russian interests may diverge. This will involve exploring renewed cooperation in a wide range of priority areas, strategic arms control, non-proliferation, Afghanistan and improved cooperation on Iran.

What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russian security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?

As the President has stressed, it is in no one’s interest to see our relations return to a Cold War posture. Our interests clearly overlap in areas such as strategic arms control, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, Afghanistan, and counternarcotics. Ultimately, I believe we should work to create the conditions that make clear that stable, democratic neighbors on Russia’s borders are in Russia’s own interest.

In your view what steps should DOD take to improve security relations with Russia? For instance would you support increased military-to-military relations and exchanges with Russia?

If confirmed, I will make it a priority to assess areas where greater military-to-military and other exchanges with Russia might be beneficial. It is certainly important for U.S. security interests that we work to keep our lines of communication open and to cooperate to address key global challenges.

Would you support any joint development or other cooperative programs with Russia, including cooperation on, or joint development of, missile defense capabilities in relation to Iran?

If confirmed, I will explore the potential for additional cooperation with Russia in relations to Iran. I believe it is in our interest to continue to explore a potential joint missile defense architecture with Russia to counter the emerging ballistic missile threat from Iran.

Iran

Do you believe it would be in the interest of the United States to engage Iran in a direct dialogue to promote regional stability and security?

I support the President's view that the United States should be willing to engage with all nations, friend or foe, and with careful preparation, to pursue direct diplomacy. Furthermore, I fully support the President's view that we should not take any options off the table and that engagement is the place to start our efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and end its support for destabilizing activities and terrorism in the region.

Do you believe it would be in the interest of the United States to engage Iran in a direct dialogue regarding the narcotics problems in Afghanistan?

This issue is being examined as part of a broader interagency policy reviews on Iran and Afghanistan.

What more do you believe the United States and the international community could be doing to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program? Specifically, what actions do you believe that DOD ought to undertake to support diplomatic efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon?

I support the President's view that it is very important for us to make sure that we are using all the tools of U.S. power, including diplomacy, in our relationship with Iran. I fully support the President's view that we should be willing to talk to Iran, to express very clearly where our differences are, but also where there are potential avenues for progress. Furthermore, by working with our international partners and allies, and by creating more favorable conditions in the surrounding region, we can increase the chances of making useful inroads with Iran. DoD

should therefore continue developing ongoing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and other allies in the region, in support of the State Department's diplomatic initiatives.

African Regional Security Concerns

What do you see as the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests in Africa?

There are many national security challenges to U.S. interests in Africa. There is, however, a growing concern over the compounding effects that transnational threats -- such as the proliferation of small arms, the trafficking in illicit goods and persons, pandemic diseases, violent extremism, environmental degradation, piracy, and narcotics trade -- will have on an already vulnerable security framework.

How should the United States address the security challenges in the Niger Delta?

If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the State Department to enhance our security relationship with the Government of Nigeria by offering our assistance, as appropriate, in the areas of maritime security and military capacity building.

Is DOD the appropriate department to lead any U.S. Government effort in this area?

I believe there are certain situations within the African context where it is appropriate for the DoD to lead, usually in response to requests by the Department of State. There are other instances where DoD, while not in the lead, can and does play a significant role as an enabler or supporter to other USG agencies in advancing U.S. national security interests in Africa.

Given the increasing threat of piracy in East African waters, would you advocate an increased focus on maritime security assistance to regional governments?

I support DoD's efforts to work with the interagency to build the maritime security capacity of our African partners. Increasing African maritime capacity addresses not only the threat of piracy, but also other enduring security concerns, such as illegal fishing in territorial waters, smuggling of arms and drugs, and trafficking of people.

If not, what do you believe to be the most effective method for the United States to combat the threat of piracy?

I support DoD's efforts to work with the interagency to build the maritime security capacity of our African partners, and to encourage our Allies in Europe and Asia to contribute to counter-piracy efforts. Increasing African maritime capacity addresses not only the threat of piracy, but also other enduring security concerns, such as illegal fishing in territorial waters, smuggling of arms and drugs, and trafficking of people.

What is your understanding of planning to expand naval cooperation or offer new foreign military sales to improve the naval capabilities of U.S. partners in the region?

The U.S. already cooperates with multiple international partners to address piracy off the coast of Somalia. DoD established Combined Task Force 151, and international participants include Turkey, the UK, and Denmark. DoD is supportive of other interested partners joining this task force. In addition, DoD coordinates with other nations undertaking counter-piracy operations in the region, including Russia, China, Malaysia, India, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the European Union. Regarding a requirement for foreign military sales in the region, if confirmed I will work closely with the Department of State to assess the naval capabilities of partners in the area and possible requirements for foreign military sales in the region.

U.S. Africa Command

The creation of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has raised questions about the role of DOD in U.S. development efforts in Africa.

What do you see as the role of AFRICOM in U.S. policy towards Africa and in development and humanitarian engagement?

The Department of State and USAID lead U.S. foreign policy and development engagements abroad, to include Africa. President Obama has argued that USAFRICOM should promote a more united and coordinated engagement plan for Africa. Ideally, USAFRICOM's supporting role should be to promote national security objectives by working with African states, regional organizations, and the African Union to enhance stability and security in the region. In particular, USAFRICOM should continue forging closer U.S. military-to-military relations with states on the African continent. If confirmed, I will continue the close working relationship with State, USAID, other agencies and the Congress to ensure that USAFRICOM's roles and missions assist in advancing U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

What impact, if any, might AFRICOMs' lack of standing forces have on the command's counterterrorism activities or on its ability to maintain the level of security cooperation activities conducted with Special Operations personnel from U.S. Central and European Commands?

The Global Force Management (GFM) process allows USAFRICOM, like all the other Geographic Combatant Commands, to request forces as necessary to accomplish missions tasked by the Secretary of Defense. These requests are reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defense, allowing a dynamic balancing of military force application between emerging requirements and ongoing sustained operations. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Joint Staff in developing recommendations for the Secretary on allocation of forces to the regional Combatant Commanders.

Libya

In his testimony before the Armed Services Committee in March 2009, Commander U.S. Africa Command discussed AFRICOM's intent to expand engagement with the Libyans via military education exchanges and foreign military sales. Libyan leader Colonel Muamar Gaddafi has stated on more than one occasion that he is opposed to that command and has suggested it is a version of American colonialism. A recent New York Times article also suggested that the Libyans feel snubbed by the U.S. following their 2005 decision to give up their WMD program.

How do you see the U.S.-Libyan relationship moving forward on military-to-military engagement?

Speaking only about the defense part of the bilateral relationship, I understand that defense cooperation with Libya is continuing to develop in a positive direction. Our objective is to work with Libya to enable it to make a positive contribution to regional and continental security. The U.S. and Libya are discussing areas of cooperation that would be in our mutual security interest, such as border and coastal security.

In light of Gaddafi's reported concerns about establishment of AFRICOM, do you believe these issues can be overcome?

Yes, it is my understanding that those issues have already been overcome. General Ward recently visited Tripoli and was well received. This outreach provides a foundation on which to build and continue to develop our defense relations with Libya in a positive way.

What has been the impact of the recent agreement between the U.S. and Libya to establish a fund for settlement of outstanding claims related to terrorist acts committed by Libya?

I would defer to the Department of State on this question, as they led the U.S. side in negotiating this settlement with Libya. However, from DoD's perspective, the settlement opened up the relationship to the possibility of normalization.

Darfur

The United Nations (U.N.) has pledged to send approximately 26,000 peacekeepers to Darfur, but has sent less than half that number and has not provided them with the helicopters, vehicles, and other tools to fulfill their mission.

What do you believe is the appropriate role of the United States and, in particular, DOD, in assisting with the deployment and mobility of this peacekeeping mission?

I agree with President Obama's statements about the need to bring pressure to bear on Sudanese authorities in Khartoum to halt the genocide in Darfur. The UN has two major peacekeeping missions in Sudan that seek to create a secure environment conducive to a political settlement of the cultural, ethnic and religious differences that divide Sudan's periphery from the center. I

understand that the Departments of State and Defense have supported the deployment of African contingents to the UN Darfur mission by providing personnel, training, equipment, logistical expertise, deployment assistance, and, when required, airlift. If confirmed, I will look closely at what additional support DoD could reasonably provide in this area if so directed by the President.

United Nations Peacekeeping

DOD has provided logistics, communications, and headquarters staff to a variety of U.N. peacekeeping missions over the past several years.

In your view, what support, if any, should DOD provide to U.N. peacekeeping missions?

From Haiti to Liberia, Lebanon and other venues, the United States has important stakes in the success of UN peacekeeping operations. In addition to logistics, communications and headquarters staff-related assistance, the issue of DoD help for UN field missions should be studied closely and in close consultation with other UN member states.

In your view, should DOD provide U.S. military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping missions?

The U.S. can make important contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, though these should come in areas where we truly have an “edge,” such as leveraging of technology, organizational and logistics capabilities, etc. Given their high level of training, our military personnel can also play useful roles as Military Observers in areas where the UN is preserving stability in a relatively secure environment. I would be extremely cautious about assigning U.S. military personnel to traditional UN peacekeeping missions, though I would want the President to have the option of doing so if he deemed it appropriate.

The United States along with its partners in the G-8 sponsored an initiative to train 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010. This program, known as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), is run by the Department of State. DOD has provided varying degrees of support since the program’s inception.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in this program and, more generally, in the training of peacekeepers?

DoD plays an important role in bringing its expertise to bear in the training and equipping of peacekeeping units. DoD collaboration with State is important to successfully identifying and vetting viable partners, analyzing indigenous capacities, developing sustainable train-the-trainer programs, and promoting self-sufficiency in this critical area so that more nations can effectively contribute to the increasing demand for skilled peacekeepers around the world.

If confirmed, would you support or oppose an extension of the GPOI program and its mandate beyond its scheduled end date in 2010? Please explain.

President Obama has stated his support for continued funding for GPOI. In general, I believe the United States has a strong interest in effective training that expands the pool of available peacekeepers worldwide, including those with which we may need to operate jointly. If confirmed, my intent would be to work closely with State Department colleagues as well as members of Congress to ensure GPOI supports the President's objectives in this area.

Piracy

Piracy off the coast of Somalia grew at a significant rate in 2008. Dozens of successful acts of piracy have meant the capture of hundreds of hostages, valuable cargoes including arms, oil, and humanitarian aid, and have resulted in the payment of millions of dollars in ransoms. By all accounts, Somalia is unable to manage this problem, and the U.N. has adopted resolutions designed to generate international cooperation in addressing the scourge of piracy in that part of the world. Recently, the United States reached an agreement with Kenya regarding the detention and prosecution of suspected pirates.

What do you believe should be the role of the United States in general, and DOD in particular, in stemming the tide of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia?

The United States supports international efforts to address piracy off the coast of Somalia. To this end, DoD works closely with the interagency to support a multi-faceted approach to this problem. The interagency Counter-Piracy Action Plan (CPAP) outlines a strategic approach to address piracy off the coast of Somalia, including self-protection measures by commercial shippers, and international cooperation with authorities inside Somalia to address the land-based origins of the problem. In support of international efforts, DoD established Combined Task Force 151, a multinational task force that is executing counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa.

Given the lack of an effective government or functioning court system in Somalia, what should be done to assist Somalia in strengthening its own operational capacity to fight piracy and bring to justice those involved in piracy?

Long-term instability in Somalia has enabled piracy to flourish in the region. An effective solution to piracy will require Somalis to lead efforts to create governance mechanisms that are able to effectively secure their territory, while also providing economic opportunities to their people that reduce the appeal of piracy.

Are the international legal processes in place sufficient to ensure full and fair prosecutions of suspected pirates?

I am not in a position to render a definitive judgment on this issue. If confirmed, I will work with the interagency to review this issue and, as needed, provide recommendations to the Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy on this issue and how DoD can and should support efforts regarding the legal framework for prosecution of suspected pirates.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.

What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?

Like the President and the Secretary of Defense, I strongly support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States should be at the forefront of promoting the rule of law, including in the world's oceans. By becoming a party to the Convention, we would send a clear signal to all nations that we are committed to advancing the rule of law at sea. Additionally by joining the Convention, we would provide the firmest possible legal foundation for the navigational rights and freedoms needed to project power, reassure friends and deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain combat forces in the field, and secure sea and air lines of communication that underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.

From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?

Joining the Convention will give the United States a seat at the table when rights vital to our national interests are debated and interpreted, including the maritime mobility of our armed forces worldwide. The navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms codified in the Convention are essential for the global mobility of our Armed Forces and the sustainment of our combat forces overseas. America has more to gain from legal certainty and public order in the world's oceans than any other country. More than 150 nations are parties to the Convention. By becoming a party, the United States will be better positioned to work with foreign air forces, navies, and coast guards to cooperatively address the full spectrum of 21st century security challenges.

Bilateral Defense Trade Cooperation Agreements

Defense trade cooperation agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom and between the United States and Australia are currently pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

What are your views on the U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia defense trade cooperation agreements?

I have not had the opportunity to review these agreements in detail but support the general objectives of the U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties. I believe that robust interoperability with two key allies along with the enhanced protection of our defense articles pursuant to the Treaties will further our national security interests. If confirmed, I will

support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the State Department in working with the Senate to resolve any issues related to ratification.

In your view, are these agreements in the national security interest of the United States?

I have not had the opportunity to review these agreements in detail, but the intent of the Treaties to increase defense trade and interoperability with two key trusted allies is sound and in the interest of our national security. If confirmed, I will review the Treaties in detail and support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Department of State in working with the Senate to address any issues.

What do you consider to be the main advantages and disadvantages of these defense trade cooperation arrangements?

I am told that, if ratified, these two Treaties will allow, under defined conditions, the transfer of defense articles without prior written authorization. By reducing trade barriers to the exchange of defense hardware, technical data, and services, we will strengthen U.S.-Australia and U.S.-UK defense cooperation, increase interoperability, and lend greater support to current and future coalition operations. There will also be substantial benefit to the respective three industrial bases. The Treaties promise to enhance our bilateral government and industry research, development and production efforts by providing a flexible, agile export control environment that will expedite the delivery of new technologies to our warfighters. Moreover, the Treaties will increase competition in the defense marketplace by creating an approved community of companies in all three nations, which will result in improved quality and reduced costs in the defense equipment we provide to the men and women of our armed forces.

U.S. Military Basing in Europe

Current DOD plans provide for the drawdown of U.S. Army forces in Europe to 32,000 U.S. soldiers by no later than 2013. However, General Craddock, Commander, U.S. European Command, is reviewing a recommendation that the two brigades currently scheduled for redeployment back to the United States should remain in Europe, keeping U.S. forces based in Europe at a force of around 42,000 beyond 2013.

Do you support maintaining a larger U.S. force presence in Europe than the 32,000-force level planned for 2013? Why or why not?

I understand that the Department intends to review posture issues such as European basing requirements as part of the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review. If confirmed, I look forward to actively participating in the QDR process.

Arms Control

What role will you have, if confirmed, in future arms control negotiations, such as a follow on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty?

If confirmed, I would provide advice to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on arms control policy with respect to Europe, the Middle East and Africa and would perform any further duties as assigned by the Under Secretary. It is my understanding, however, that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs will have lead responsibility within DoD for talks on a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Private Security Contractors

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reported that federal agencies including DOD have spent more than \$5 billion for private security contractors in Iraq since 2003. Over this period, there have been numerous reports of abuses by private security contractors, including allegations of contractors shooting recklessly at civilians as they have driven down the streets of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities.

Do you believe DOD and other federal agencies should rely upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?

I understand the concerns of Congress on this issue and believe that a comprehensive review of the role of military contractors on the battlefield is needed in order to set the terms for how they might be utilized in the future. I also agree with President Obama's views on the need to improve oversight and transparency in how private security contractors are utilized and to establish clear standards regarding accountability, command and control, rules of engagement, and personnel policies. Currently, there are a number of international efforts supported by the Department to establish open, transparent and enforceable standards of conduct and good practices, such as the Montreux Document, that will enhance our ability to ensure that contractors perform in support of U.S. policies. If confirmed, I will work with civilian and military officials of the Department and others who have primary responsibility for policy development and employment of private security contractors.

In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Iraq?

I do believe that several high-profile incidents in Iraq involving private security contractors have harmed U.S. policy objectives in Iraq. In December 2007 DoD and the Department of State agreed on consistent procedures for use of private security contractors in Iraq; moreover, both Departments have been transitioning to greater use of local nationals wherever practical. If confirmed, I expect to work on this issue and will keep Congress informed.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?

The use of security contractors in any area of combat operations must be fully coordinated among all agencies that employ them. There must be unified procedures and strong oversight for all such contractors, regardless of which U.S. agency hires them. Commanders on the ground should have the authority to restrict or redirect their operations as appropriate. I believe there must be assured legal accountability for the actions of all security contractors, not just those employed by the Defense Department.

How do you believe the ongoing operations of private security contractors in Iraq are likely to be affected by the new SOFA between the United States and Iraq?

It is my understanding that since January 1, 2009, U.S. government private security contractors in Iraq no longer have immunity from host nation law. Furthermore, they must comply with host nation registration and licensing requirements. For all contractors, the SOFA has meant substantially more liaison and coordination with Iraqi authorities at all levels.

Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of all federal agencies?

Yes.

What is your view of the appropriate application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security contractors operating in an area of combat operations?

If confirmed, I would consult with the General Counsel on this question.

Contractor Performance of Information Operations

In October 2008, DOD announced a plan to award contracts in excess of \$300 million to U.S. contractors to conduct “information operations” through the Iraqi media. The purposes of this contract include building up support for the government of Iraq and the security forces of Iraq, and undermining Iranian influence in Iraq.

What is your view of the appropriate roles, if any, of DOD and the Department of State in media campaigns to build up support for the government and security forces of Iraq and undermining Iranian influence in Iraq?

I have not had an opportunity to become familiar with the details of these programs, but believe they deserve careful scrutiny. If confirmed, I would expect to look into these matters and discuss them with members of the committee.

What is your view on the effectiveness of information operations conducted by the United States through the Iraqi media?

See previous answer.

Do you believe that it is appropriate for the United States to pay for media campaigns to build up support for the government and the security forces of Iraq at a time when the Iraqi government has a surplus of tens of billions of dollars?

See previous answer.

Do you see a risk that a DOD media campaign designed to build up support for the government and security forces of Iraq could result in the inappropriate dissemination of propaganda inside the United States through the internet and other media that cross international boundaries?

See previous answer.

A spokesman for the Iraqi government has been quoted as saying that any future DOD information operations in the Iraqi media should be a joint effort with the Iraqi government. According to an article in the *Washington Post*, the spokesman stated: “We don’t have a hand in all the propaganda that is being done now. It could be done much better when Iraqis have a word and Iraqis can advise.”

Do you believe that DOD information operations through the Iraqi media should be conducted jointly with the Iraqis?

See previous answer.

Under what circumstances do you believe it is appropriate for the DOD to conduct information operations in a sovereign country without the knowledge and support of the host country?

See previous answer.

Detainee Treatment Policy

Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

In your view, is the prohibition in the best interest of the United States? Why or why not?

I believe the prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is clearly in America’s best strategic interest and consistent with our values. During the long history of the Cold War, when America’s way of life was challenged by a powerful competing ideology, we were ultimately successful, in part, because we held true to the best ideals and principles that

sustained America as a shining beacon to millions under totalitarian rule. Power in the 21st century will stem as much from the strength and appeal of our ideas and moral principles as from our military might. If we are to defeat violent extremism, we must hold true to those ideas that make this country great, and continue to inspire the growth of freedom and tolerance around the world.

If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes I will.

Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes.

In the past 2 years, significant changes have been made in Iraq in the way detention operations have been conducted in a counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of reintegration centers at theater internment facilities.

What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the changes to detention operations in Iraq?

I have not had an opportunity to study the changes in detention operations in detail in order to assess lessons learned. If confirmed as ASD(ISA), I would be interested in examining changes to detention operations.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.