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Senator Lieberman, Senator Thune, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the ongoing development of our nation's land power. Due in no small measure to the remarkable capabilities of the other components of our armed forces, I believe that land power will be the deciding factor in our nation's wars in the early decades of the 21st century. The United States remains the pre-eminent global power in conventional warfare, a fact well-understood by our opponents. It is far easier for an enemy to challenge the capabilities of American forces in an asymmetric fashion. Some opponents will seek to neutralize our technological advantages through terrorism and insurgencies; others may produce nuclear weapons that threaten massive destruction. In short, our enemies will most likely avoid fighting the type of wars the United States has organized and trained its armed forces to fight.

In the 1990's various military officers and defense analysts posited a coming revolution in military affairs based on information dominance coupled with precision weapons. Concepts such as network-centric warfare envisioned near-perfect intelligence from manned and unmanned sensors, satellites, and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Accurate and timely information would lead to battlespace dominance, prompt attacks on targets from extended ranges, and the execution of rapid, decisive operations that would quickly and precisely collapse an enemy armed force or regime at its center of gravity. Advanced sensors and precision guided munitions, however, are tactical and operational capabilities – they are not a strategy. Those leaders who staked the outcome of the Iraq War on rapid, decisive operations misread the nature of war – and not just the nature of war in the post-Cold War era, but the nature of war in any era. Despite our high-tech capabilities, uncertainty and the interplay of friction and chance on military operations will remain integral to war for the indefinite future.

There is a larger point here. The emphasis on technology over an understanding of the realities of war and conflict reflect the ahistoricism not only of too much of the officer corps but of the American educational system as well. Our mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan have come through a pervasive failure to understand the historical framework within which insurgencies take place, to appreciate the cultural and political factors of other nations and people, and to encourage the learning of other languages. In other words, we managed to repeat many of the mistakes that we made in Vietnam, because America's political and military leaders managed to forget nearly every lesson of that conflict.

Accordingly, The United States must understand and apply the strategic, operational, tactical, and doctrinal lessons of the wars we are now waging in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has already learned a great deal, but there is much more work to be done in developing and inculcating counterinsurgency doctrine, refining professional military education, revamping promotion systems, and establishing relevant tactical and operational capabilities in our armed forces.

As appealing as high-tech warfare with standoff weapons may seem, those who advocate it in the current environment are guilty of mirror-imaging our opponents. State and non-state actors are using proxy forces and insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere to advance their political goals along with their social and religious agendas. We cannot rely on high tech weaponry to check these groups. Strikes with unmanned aerial systems across national borders inflame local opinion and often serve to create more terrorists than they destroy. High tech weapons designed for combat at stand-off ranges are ill suited for combating insurgents in urban strongholds. Sensors are a poor substitute for personal interaction. Therefore, we must closely examine expensive, high-tech programs such as the Army's Future Combat System to determine if they are useful in the current operational environment, where the typical engagement range is less than 500 meters and the need to engage the population is the paramount priority.

History has underlined again and again that counterinsurgency warfare can only be won on the ground, and only by applying all elements of national power to the struggle. Insurgency and counterinsurgency are struggles for legitimacy and for competing visions of governance and the future. The side will win that can gain the people's trust and confidence or, failing that, to control their movements and actions. These struggles are troop intensive, for the counterinsurgent must secure and control the population, deliver essential services, and provide a basic quality of life. These requirements take energy, resources, and above all, time.

Requirements vary by location and circumstances, but a historically based rule of thumb is that successful counterinsurgencies require 20 to 25 security force personnel for every 1000 people. Although the requirement to sustain such forces for extended periods suggests the need for considerable expansion of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, the best way to provide more ground forces is to procure them from the host nation. This realization mandates a significant focus on advisory duty and foreign internal defense, along with the creation of an institutional home for these activities in the armed forces.

We must design our military forces with a balanced set of capabilities, but it is essential that they be capable of operating effectively in a counterinsurgency environment. During the 1990's, U.S. Army leaders believed that units trained for major combat operations could easily adjust to take on other missions, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance. In Iraq and Afghanistan we have learned that counterinsurgency warfare requires a long list of added capabilities that training for conventional, high-end combat does not address. Indeed, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are really four types of security operations lumped together—a counterinsurgency campaign to protect the population and subdue insurgents, a counterterrorism fight to destroy terrorist

operatives, a peacekeeping operation to separate hostile factions, and a law enforcement operation to fight organized crime and corruption. Each of them requires unique competencies not normally found in military organizations designed for conventional war fighting. Nation-building tasks add even more complexity to this mixture. In short, counterinsurgency is a thinking soldier's war.

Military intelligence structures must also change or risk irrelevance. The most effective intelligence system in these conflicts combines human intelligence with technical intelligence. Insurgents can hide in plain sight, but our forces can target them when they move, shoot, or communicate. This happens when conventional military and police forces dominate an area and force the insurgents and terrorists to reposition, at which point they become vulnerable. The use of signals intelligence, persistent sensors, biometric identity systems, and armed unmanned aerial vehicles are vital capabilities that we must continue to expand. These capabilities, however, are no substitute for human intelligence and cultural understanding. One cannot divine tribal structures, insurgent networks, sectarian divisions, and ethnic mosaics through technological means. As the United States ramped up its math and science education following the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, so must it now pursue excellence in humanities programs such as history, cultural anthropology, regional studies, and languages. Our nation's universities, to include my home at the Ohio State University, stand ready to assist in this endeavor.

The transformation of American land power for the wars of the 21st century remains incomplete. In *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, Allan Millett lays out three prerequisites for effective military innovation: revised doctrine, changes in professional military education, and the creation of operational units that meet real strategic needs. The U.S. Army has met the first two fundamentals, but not yet the third. Although bulky divisions have given way to smaller, modular, more easily deployable brigade combat teams, these units remain largely configured for conventional combat – and imperfectly at that. Brigades that are tailored for counterinsurgency operations would include more infantry; a full engineer battalion; a large intelligence section built mainly around human and signals intelligence, with significant analytical capability; military police, engineer, civil affairs, information operations, and psychological operations cells; a contracting section; adviser and liaison sections, with requisite language capabilities; human terrain teams, with the capability to map tribal and social networks; explosive ordnance demolition teams; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets—particularly armed reconnaissance units that can engage the people and fight for information, along with armed unmanned aerial vehicles and ground sensors. The need for more infantry and engineers is especially critical, so much so that the Army should forgo the creation of additional brigade combat teams until existing units are reconfigured with the addition of a third maneuver battalion. The paucity of the current brigade combat team structure has forced brigade commanders to attach armor and infantry companies to the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition squadron, which is otherwise too lightly armed to act as a combat force. A triangular organization would be more effective not just in counterinsurgency warfare, but would give our maneuver commanders the resources they need to fight more effectively in conventional conflicts as well.

The culture of the U.S. Army must continue to change, or the organization will be unprepared to fight and win the wars of the twenty-first century. While retaining the capability to conduct major combat operations, the Army must continue to embrace missions other than conventional land force combat. We must adapt the current personnel system, with its emphasis on rewarding technical and tactical competence at the expense of intellectual understanding and a broader, deeper grasp of the world in which we live, to promote those leaders with the skill sets and education needed for the wars America will fight in the decades ahead. In other words, to win the fight against 21st century opponents, we must first adapt the organizational culture of our military forces to the realities of 21st century warfare.

Thank you.