

**Advance Questions for Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN  
Nominee for Commander, United States European Command and  
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe**

**Defense Reforms**

**The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.**

**Based on your experiences in U.S. Southern Command, do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions or the Special Operations reforms?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, I do.

**If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The Goldwater-Nichols Act vastly improved the way our joint force operates. Today, our military functions extremely well in the joint world. I believe the next step toward increasing effectiveness of our national security apparatus is to institute similar provisions that encourage an interagency approach. Many working groups at the national level have been thinking through the possibilities for this kind of legislation, including the Project on National Security Reform. I believe this would increase efficiency in our whole of government initiatives. One of the ways to enable increased interagency cooperation is to incentivize interagency assignments throughout the government, and particularly within the military, similar to what Goldwater-Nichols did by incentivizing joint assignments.

Additionally, there may be benefit in amending the Goldwater-Nichols Act to encourage Professional Education in the civil service employee sector, as the original legislation did for military officers. As more of the force is civilianized, it is in the Department's interest to promote joint educational opportunities for civilian employees of the Department of Defense.

**Duties**

**What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The Commander of the U.S. European Command is responsible for coordinating and conducting all U.S. military operations and activities across the 51 independent states in the European Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) in pursuit of U.S. national military objectives. This AOR includes all of Europe (including Turkey), the Caucasus Region, and Israel. He is also responsible for the health, welfare and security of the approximately 85,000 service members forward deployed within that AOR. And, he coordinates the efforts of the Service Component Commands assigned to the European Theater.

The NATO Military Command Structure assigns specific roles and duties to SACEUR. These include:

- Strategic planning: Identifying and requesting forces for the full range of Alliance missions and contributing to crisis management and effective defense of NATO territory and forces.
- Operational leadership: Upon aggression, executes military measures within the capability of the command to preserve or restore the security of NATO nations.
- Transformation: Cooperates with the Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SAC-T) on integrating transformation efforts. Contributes to stability throughout Euro Atlantic area for developing contacts and participating in exercises and activities with NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) partners.
- Strategic Analysis: Conducts strategic level analysis to identify and prioritize type and scale of capability shortfalls. Manages NATO allocated operation and exercises resources to accomplish operational missions as directed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

The responsibilities of the Commander EUCOM and the SACEUR are complementary. The fact that they have traditionally been vested in one officer facilitates near-seamless coordination between the U.S. and NATO military command structures.

**What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?**

**ADM Stavridis:** I am deeply honored by the President's nomination to be Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander, U.S. European Command. Over the past three decades, I have served in a wide variety of Navy and Joint Commands that I believe have prepared me well for the challenges ahead if confirmed by the U.S. Senate.

Operationally, I have served in several key operational command positions for the Navy, including destroyer and destroyer squadron command, and culminating in command as a Rear Admiral of a Navy Carrier Strike Group, which conducted operations in the Southern Command AOR as well as in the Mediterranean and the Arabian Gulf. I have also served on the Joint Staff, the Secretary of Defense Staff, the Secretary of the Navy Staff, and Chief of Naval Operations Staff. During my time in each of these locations, I actively worked on issues involving European Command's AOR, as well as NATO military issues.

Most recently, I was the Commander of U.S. Southern Command, an interagency oriented Combatant Command whose mission is to conduct military operations and promote security cooperation to achieve U.S. Strategic objectives in the Americas. Although the issues are vastly different and unique in each region, there are some basic principles that are shared among geographic combatant command regions that I would bring to Europe, if confirmed.

- International - Building the capacity of our partners ensures stronger defense for the U.S. and our allies and takes some burden off of our troops.
- Interagency - Cooperation is important to address the complex spectrum of issues facing any region. I am a military officer, so if confirmed as SACUER, I will ensure security of the US and our allies. However, there is more to the region's stability than just defense. While State Department does Diplomacy and USAID works on Development, we of course focus on Defense. I believe our success will depend on all of us working together in a robust interagency approach.
- Cultural understanding – In order to truly cooperate successfully with our allies, we must walk in their shoes and understand their culture. This is a lesson learned from my time at SOUTHCOM.
- Strategic communication – important in any part of the world – The U.S. must get our message out in a way that resonates with our international allies, as well as our own citizenry.
- Counternarcotics and Counterinsurgency – Dealing with the challenges of narcotics has clearly been a large part of my portfolio at SOUTHCOM and there are lessons learned that I could bring to Europe and Afghanistan. I do not believe in the term “war on drugs,” but rather on a shared international, interagency, and even private-public approach to dealing with this issue.

Other specific experiences and background include:

- PhD in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, where my work was partially focused on NATO.
- I have been involved in multiple NATO operations throughout my career, including operations in Haiti, the Balkans, and Afghanistan.
- Working knowledge of Spanish and French, and am currently studying Portuguese.
- Lived in Europe for three years in my youth and have traveled extensively throughout the region.

**Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, EUCOM, or NATO SACEUR?**

**ADM Stavridis:** If confirmed, I will engage with key officials and personnel within the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. government to uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States for the region through the missions established and executed within the Command. To this end, I will also engage with the governments and militaries of our allies to understand the magnitude and interdependent issues within the region. I will seek the cooperation of the Alliance leadership to work together to engage on vital regional issues. I will also continue to study the languages and culture of the region to better understand the populations with which I would be engaging.

## **Relationships**

**Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, EUCOM/NATO SACEUR, to the following:**

### **The Secretary of Defense**

**ADM Stavridis:** The Secretary of Defense exercises authority over the Armed Forces through the EUCOM Commander for those forces assigned to the EUCOM AOR. The EUCOM Commander exercises command authority over assigned forces and is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of the Command.

### **The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

**ADM Stavridis:** The Deputy Secretary of Defense is delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the powers of the Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary is authorized to act pursuant to law. The EUCOM Commander coordinates and exchanges information with the Deputy Secretary on matters delegated by the Secretary. The Commander directly communicates with the Deputy Secretary on a regular basis.

### **The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

**ADM Stavridis:** A direct command relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the EUCOM Commander does not exist. However, the EUCOM Commander regularly interacts, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on policy issues relating to NATO, European, and Eurasian affairs. The Commander directly communicates with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on a regular basis.

### **The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence**

**ADM Stavridis:** There is not a direct command relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the EUCOM Commander. However, the EUCOM Commander regularly interacts with, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence on intelligence related matters.

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs**

**ADM Stavridis:** There is not a direct command relationship between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the EUCOM Commander. The EUCOM

Commander and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs work together on coordinating international security policy and strategy.

### **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**ADM Stavridis:** The Chairman functions under the authority, direction and control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman transmits communications between the National Command Authority and the EUCOM Commander as well as oversees the activities of the EUCOM Commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between the Combatant Commander, Interagency, and Service Chiefs.

The EUCOM Commander keeps the Chairman informed on significant issues regarding NATO and the EUCOM AOR. The Commander directly communicates with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a regular basis.

### **The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

**ADM Stavridis:** The Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned or attached to the EUCOM Commander. The Secretaries fulfill their responsibilities by exercising administrative control (ADCON) through the Service Component Commands assigned to EUCOM.

### **The other combatant commanders, in particular Commander, U.S. Central Command**

**ADM Stavridis:** Formal relationships between the EUCOM Commander and the geographic and functional Combatant Commanders derives from command authority established by title 10 USC, section 164. Combatant commanders closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish all assigned missions.

### **Commander, International Security Assistance Force**

**ADM Stavridis:** The EUCOM Commander has no formal relationship with COM ISAF; however, COM ISAF is “dual-hatted”: 1. As the Commander U.S. Forces in Afghanistan he reports to Commander, U.S. CENTCOM (national C2); 2. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe exercises command authority over the Commander ISAF via the Commander, Joint Forces Command Brunssum in the Netherlands (operational C2).

### **The Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation**

**ADM Stavridis:** Both NATO’s Strategic Commanders, SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), carry out roles and missions assigned to them by the North Atlantic Council or in some circumstances by NATO’s Defence Planning Committee. SACEUR and SACT work together to ensure the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities and interoperability that support Allied Command Operations.

## **The U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council**

**ADM Stavridis:** There is not a direct command relationship between the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and either the EUCOM Commander or the SACEUR. The North Atlantic Council provides direction to NATO military authorities and the U.S. Permanent Representative is one of 28 members of the North Atlantic Council. The EUCOM Commander works with the U.S. Permanent Representative on matters of mutual interest, such as EUCOM military operations and security cooperation activities that support U.S. objectives and military contributions to NATO.

## **U.S. Chiefs of Mission within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility**

**ADM Stavridis:** There is not a formal command relationship between the EUCOM Commander and the U.S. Chiefs of Mission for the 51 independent states in the EUCOM AOR. In a foreign country, the U.S. Ambassador is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating and supervising all U.S. Government executive branch employees in the host nation, except those under the command of a United States area military commander. The EUCOM Commander coordinates and exchanges information with U.S. Chiefs of Mission regularly on matters of mutual interest, to include military operations and engagement activities that support the Ambassador's approved in-country U.S. strategy for engagement. In addition to the regular exchange of information with the U.S. Chiefs of Mission, past EUCOM Commanders have hosted regional conferences. If confirmed, I intend to continue this practice.

## **U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan**

**ADM Stavridis:** As the EUCOM Commander, I have no formal relationship with the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. In my role as SACEUR, while no formal relationship exists, I would expect to periodically meet informally with the various NATO nations and partner nation ambassadors to Afghanistan -- for which the U.S. Ambassador is one of 42 -- to garner their perspectives, as well as address their questions.

## **Major Challenges**

**In your view, what are the major challenges and problems you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, EUCOM, and SACEUR?**

**ADM STAVRIDIS:** As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, one major challenge to be confronted is successfully conducting the Alliance military operations in support of Trans-Atlantic Security, including International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Kosovo Force (KFOR), OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, and OPERATION ALLIED PROTECTOR. All of NATO's forces, from Kosovo to ISAF to those conducting counter-piracy and other missions, deserve the best guidance and planning as well as the necessary resources and support to conduct operations. Of these operations, ISAF will likely prove to be most important to our security as well as pivotal to the Alliance's further adaptation of strategies, capabilities, and internal processes to address the myriad of 21<sup>st</sup> century risks and threats

confronting our nations. ISAF not only reflects the Alliance's will to address the instability in a country destabilized by extremism and terrorism, but it reflects the Alliance's will and capability to conduct operations at strategic distance outside the traditional NATO area. Success in Afghanistan will contribute to stabilizing a very important region and demonstrate that NATO in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is politically prepared and militarily capable of dealing successfully with risks and threats to Trans-Atlantic Security at strategic distances far from the borders of the US or European members.

Secondly, we face the challenge of resetting the NATO-Russia relationship and building a predictable, mutually-beneficial relationship that strengthens security. Military cooperation with Russia should figure prominently in the reset of this strategic relationship. This relationship has been stressed by policy differences over the years, and continues to be a complex relationship given the comprehensive nature of US-Russia engagement across the full spectrum of regional and global security matters. It is a strategic relationship that we must get right, and one that the Russians must demonstrate that they value in both words and deeds. There is great opportunity in the US-Russia relationship as well as great challenge. In many cases we share common strategic challenges that present opportunities for beneficial engagement, such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I look forward to working in support of overall US national security objectives to help forge a constructive, reliable, and predictable relationship with Russia.

Thirdly, the Heads of State and Government tasked the NATO Secretary General to develop a new strategic concept for the Alliance. The last concept was developed in 1999. A new NATO strategic concept is crucially important to forging a common perspective on the regional and global security environment; the risks and challenges we face in the 21<sup>st</sup> century such as energy security, cyber defense, or counter proliferation; the role Alliance members want NATO to play in addressing these risks based on a common perception and common goals; and the strategies, capabilities, and internal processes necessary to successfully be prepared. The Alliance will engage in debate on these important issues. My initial assessment is that the military authorities will seek a balance of collective defense and global operations. Once the political leaders reach consensus, further development of military tasks and defining capabilities will be no easy task and must be done with a realistic understanding of the means available. I look forward to contributing my military advice to the development of a new NATO Strategic Concept, a concept that will drive and frame NATO's role in the international security sphere for years to come.

Finally, French reintegration into the NATO military structure would also be a key area of focus. As France has always been a very active partner in NATO's ongoing operations, their reintegration is nominally only a "formal" step to capture their current participation. Their further involvement in NATO's military command structure will provide an avenue for greater involvement – especially in the planning processes.

In addition to the above stated challenges, I believe there will be additional challenges facing the next EUCOM Commander such as defense cooperation in Eastern Europe and further progress in the Balkans, especially Kosovo.

As the focus of European security continues to shift from Central to Eastern Europe, EUCOM strategic plans and activities to address the challenges in Eastern Europe and Eurasia complement NATO efforts to strengthen new Alliance partner capability in this region. EUCOM efforts to stage U.S. forces in Bulgaria and Romania will focus on military-to-military activities that continue to build the military capacities of new NATO Alliance and prospective Alliance countries along with strategic partners in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Ukraine and Georgia, considered exceptionally important countries in the EUCOM AOR, will continue the trend of bilateral relationships and capacity building. EUCOM continues to assist both countries with their NATO-oriented defense transformation and institution-building efforts, which have begun to bear fruit with peacekeeping presences in Kosovo, Operation Active Endeavor, and Africa.

**If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?**

**ADM Stavridis:** In the previously mentioned areas, the key to success will be proactive engagement and clear direction. The next SACEUR and EUCOM Commander must establish clear priorities and provide a strategic vision to guide transformation, foster relationships, and set the conditions for successfully implementing the full spectrum of measures necessary to contribute to security. Additionally, constant reassessment of these challenges and coupled with the ability to adjust will be critical enablers as we address evolving security challenges in the EUCOM AOR.

NATO has provided for peace and security in Europe for 60 years because of an unwavering commitment to the founding principles and the understanding that the best solution will always be found in working together. The strategic landscape is continually evolving and SACEUR must continually engage military and political leaders to understand the range of perspectives inherent in an Alliance of 28 members. He must effectively communicate key elements required for military success both today and in the future. It is imperative the SACEUR work closely with the 28 nations of the Alliance, Partnership for Peace nations, and other special partners to forge common understanding of the challenges we face together and the measures necessary to address them together.

If confirmed, my approach will be collegial, international, and interagency focused. I will also work hard to build effective strategic communications, which I believe are key to our work throughout the spectrum of challenges.

**NATO Commitment to Afghanistan Mission**

**The NATO International Security Assistance Force has grown and will include some 68,000 U.S. troops by this fall and more than 32,000 soldiers from NATO and other allies. NATO ISAF is responsible for providing security throughout Afghanistan and assisting the Government of Afghanistan in extending its authority.**

**What challenges do you foresee for NATO ISAF as the Administration's new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is implemented?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan has been briefed to the North Atlantic Council on numerous occasions by senior U.S. political and military officials. It is clear that NATO Allies support the new U.S. strategy, welcome the increased resources to be provided by the United States, and want to work with the U.S. in a NATO-framework as well as bi-laterally to support the range of political and military initiatives associated with the new strategy. NATO nations recognize the importance of ISAF and its contribution to the overall efforts of the International Community in Afghanistan. Enhancing security in Afghanistan through both ISAF operations and further developing the capacity of the Afghan national Army and Police is essential to all other efforts in Afghanistan and the region and will be the greatest initial challenge of implementing the strategy.

**How confident are you that NATO is prepared to sustain its long-term commitment to ISAF given the challenging security situation in Afghanistan? If confirmed, are there additional steps you would recommend in order to help sustain that commitment?**

**ADM Stavridis:** From all that I can see thus far – but without the benefit of actually speaking to any allies personally – I am confident that NATO is capable and willing to fulfill and sustain its commitment to ISAF. The NATO Alliance took a significant step when it decided to conduct military operations in Afghanistan. That it did so reinforces its commitment to wider security and NATO’s belief that this effort is central to continued peace and stability in Europe. It was a decision made with deliberation and a significant commitment of resources. Thus far, NATO forces have shown determination and resilience. The Alliance has given no indication as having any doubt in their decision and I am confident that member nations will stay the course in providing Afghanistan the stability and security it needs to move forward. If confirmed as SACEUR, I will continue to devote a high priority to force generation working with NATO nations and partners to maintain the appropriate forces and resources for the ISAF operation.

**National caveats restricting the use of certain NATO members forces in Afghanistan continue to impede ISAF operations and are a source of friction within the alliance.**

**What is your assessment of the impact of national caveats on NATO ISAF operations and how can their impact be reduced?**

**ADM Stavridis:** In a perfect world, there would be no caveats, as they constrain the commander’s ability to plan and limit capabilities to execute operations. Some caveats will reflect limitations imposed on a nation’s forces by that country’s constitution. Others reflect the military reality of a nation’s inability to sustain its forces outside a particular geographical area, it is that inability which is the constraint, not the caveat that reflects it. Others apply to very small numbers of troops or personnel, contributions that show political commitment and solidarity, but which are at the limits of what some are capable of contributing. Where caveats have a sizeable effect on the commander’s flexibility to achieve his mission, either through their content or the number and capabilities of the forces they affect, then we should devote all our efforts to addressing the issues which stimulated them in the first place, thereby removing them. I will work with national Chiefs of Defense individually and work with the North Atlantic

Council to explain the operational impact of national caveats and the importance of removing as many of them as possible.

### **Command Structure in Afghanistan**

**The Commander, ISAF, has been dual-hatted as Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, and reports to both the SACEUR and the Commander, U.S. Central Command. In addition, Secretary Gates has recently created a three-star position of Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, to handle day-to-day operations in theater.**

**What is your assessment of the command structure for ISAF and for USFOR-A?**

**ADM Stavridis:** In general, the current ISAF command structure combines the military doctrine of ‘unity of command’ with the special requirements arising from the multinational composition of ISAF – the key to successful allied operations. I support the Secretary of Defense and his recent decision to establish a three-star position of Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to handle day-to-day, tactical operations in theater. The operations in Afghanistan are complex for many reasons. The additional commander and headquarters will prove to be advantageous to the conduct of operations in theater. At the same time, this new structure will allow the ISAF Commander and Commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan to focus on the strategic level, working with other components of the Afghan government and the organizations of the international community.

**What changes, if any, would you recommend to these command structures?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Without having witnessed ISAF operations first hand, but having been briefed numerous times, my initial reaction is that this new structure is about right. All military structures undergo minor changes and modifications with time to correspond to unique characteristics of specific operations. I am sure this new structure will be no exception. Naturally, if confirmed, I will assess it personally.

**In your view, should the three-star position of Deputy Commander, USFOR-A, also be dual-hatted within the NATO ISAF command?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The dual-hatting of a U.S. commander as a NATO commander should be based on the inherent operational benefits of such an approach, the impact of unity of effort, and the resource implications associated with this command arrangement. At the same time, these benefits must exist for both the US and its Allied forces in the operation and in the NATO chain of command. In the end, a decision on amending the NATO chain of command in Afghanistan is both a military decision and a political decision, and requires approval by the North Atlantic Council. This can be one of the issues we look at in the future – how successful the structure has been in its initial setup and whether we believe it would increase synergy to expand/dual-hat the role to include NATO ISAF Command. Assessing this will be primary order of business for me if confirmed.

**As additional U.S. forces flow into southern Afghanistan, what adjustments, if any, should be made to the theater and regional command to take into account the larger U.S. presence?**

**ADM Stavridis:** NATO has a system which takes into account the composition of ISAF's command structure based on national contributions to combat forces. As U.S. forces increase, so will its representation in the ISAF command structure. However, we should take into account the multinational nature of this operation and should be cautious not to create the impression of a unilateral command structure. The significant increase of US forces in Afghanistan will have an impact on the tempo of operations and the number of concurrent operations in-theater, along with the associated logistical and support aspects of the forces. I would not wish to pre-judge the situation on the ground or preempt the recommendations of tactical and operational commanders in the field – views and recommendations that may well be provided in the future from the tactical level to COMISAF to the strategic level. As SACEUR, I would seek the advice and recommendations of subordinate commanders and work with the nations individually and collectively in the Military Committee and North Atlantic Council to gain their support.

### **Building the Afghan National Security Forces**

**The Administration's new strategy calls for fully resourcing the growth of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to 134,000 and 82,000 personnel, respectively, by 2011. Some observers, however, believe that the currently planned end strength levels for the ANA and the ANP will be insufficient over the long-run to provide security throughout Afghanistan.**

**Do you believe that the realities on the ground in Afghanistan necessitate growing the Afghan National Security Forces beyond the currently-planned end strengths of 134,000 for the ANA and 82,000 for the ANP?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The Administration's new strategy does call for a rapid build-up of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police to 134,000 and 82,000 personnel respectively over the next two years. U.S. and NATO support to these approved strengths should be in our current focus. However, the new strategy also allows for additional enlargements as circumstances warrant. As Afghan Forces mature, we can work with the Afghan government and our Allies to re-evaluate these end strengths.

**The Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has the mission to provide training, advice, and assistance to Afghan security forces.**

**What is your assessment of CSTC-A?**

**ADM Stavridis:** CSTC-A is a U.S.-led organization under the command of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan and subsequently U.S. Central Command. Therefore, I leave any judgment on improving their performance to those capable commanders. From all I can see thus far, I believe CSTC-A has been a critical part of the success achieved in Afghanistan in terms of both building a capable Afghan National Army and taking on the additional tasks of developing the Afghan

National Police. Together the ANA and ANP contribute to current NATO-led and Coalition-led operations. More importantly, they represent the future capacity of the Afghan government to secure and protect its citizens from the threat posed by extremists without further international assistance.

**If confirmed, what plans do you have, if any, to improve the effectiveness or efficiency of the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan?**

**ADM Stavridis:** As CSTC-A is a U.S.-led program outside my remit as either SACEUR or EUCOM commander, I do not have specific plans for enhancing the effectiveness or efficiency of CSTC-A. However, I will work with great interest to see how NATO nations may wish to work more closely with CSTC-A in training the Afghan National Army and National Police. Heads of State and Government tasked NATO to develop proposals on a possible NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, similar to the current NATO effort in support of U.S.-led coalition training in Iraq. NATO military authorities are examining options on how to proceed on the basis of determining what would be NATO's added value. I believe NATO does have added value in the training of ANA and ANP, and I believe this is a very important new tasking for the Alliance to consider. I will be working closely with General Petraeus on this specific issue, which is crucial to the overall effort in Afghanistan.

**Witnesses at Committee hearings have cited a number of challenges impeding the acceleration of expanding the Afghan National Security Forces, including: 1) a lack of training or mentoring teams to embed with Afghan units; 2) a lack of equipment; and 3) developing leadership among officers and non-commissioned officers.**

**What in do you view as the greatest challenge to accelerating the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces?**

**ADM Stavridis:** These are all major challenges impeding expansion. However, I share General Petraeus's opinion that the greatest challenge is the lack of training teams to embed with Afghan units. We currently have 54 Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) in place, which does not meet the current requirement of 66 OMLTs. By December 2010, it is estimated that we will have 70 OMLTs in place, but actually require 91. The expansion of the Afghan National Security Forces over the next two years is directly tied to the number of partner nations we can get contributing to the fight. The sooner we can expand the Afghan National Security forces and build their capacity to secure Afghan territory, the sooner U.S. and Allied forces can begin to withdraw. Additionally, the issues of illiteracy, lack of sufficient time to train effective leaders, and an operational tempo for the Afghan Army and Police all further impact the training and development of their military.

**If confirmed, how would you recommend addressing this challenge?**

**ADM Stavridis:** This is one area with opportunity for greater cooperation with our Allies and partners. If confirmed, I would work with the Allies and partners to find ways in which they can contribute to the NATO Mission in Afghanistan, such as rapidly filling the remaining training teams (OMLTs) and developing the institutional military training schools necessary for the

continued professional development of the Afghan military. A number of allies and partners are willing to contribute additional military forces to operations in Afghanistan, but lack the capability to operate safely and effectively with coalition forces. I would work to build the capacity of these countries to enable them to deploy interoperable and effective forces to Afghanistan. In addition, Furthermore, with the establishment of the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), Allied Command Operations will have an opportunity to play a greater role in supporting the training of the Afghan police – an area in critical need of improvement. There are excellent law enforcement capabilities in Europe like the Carabinieri and the Gendarmerie that could deploy to train the Afghan National Police. I will continue to work with Chiefs of Defense and leaders of Allied nations to fully resource the ISAF mission. EUCOM has a robust security cooperation program, including exercises, high-level visits, State Partnership Program, and component activities that can be leveraged to influence and enable further participation in ISAF as well.

**The European Union has launched the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) to contribute to establishing a sustainable and effective Afghan police force by providing mentoring, advising and training at the national, regional and provincial levels.**

**In your view, what should be the relationship between CSTC-A and EUPOL for building the Afghan National Police?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Again, as CSTC-A is under the command of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan and subsequently U.S. Central Command, I leave any judgment on its activities to those capable commanders. While both organizations are valuable contributors to ANP development, I cannot speak to the details of their relationship. In general terms, all organizations and national efforts need to be integrated where possible and coordinated to the greatest extent. This is an area I will pursue if confirmed.

**What more should NATO and EUPOL do to improve the capabilities and effectiveness of the police?**

**ADM Stavridis:** I understand great effort is being made to find synergy between all national and international actors. While EUPOL is responsible to the EU, it is the responsibility of the ISAF mission to foster and maintain a productive relationship with all major security and sector reform actors in Afghanistan in order to bring coherency to all efforts. NATO leaders acknowledge that development of the ANP is a critical element of security and stability in Afghanistan, but police training is not identified as a key military task in the Operational Plan for ISAF operations. Some NATO nations are conducting police training on a bi-lateral basis. The EUPOL Mission mentors and advises the Afghan Ministry of Interior, but with only 400 personnel they have limited ability to assist the regions and provinces. NATO military authorities are examining options on how to contribute further, possibly through a NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan.

**NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan**

**At the NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in April, NATO Heads of State agreed to establish the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. However, there continues to be a shortfall in the number of Operational Liaison and Mentoring Teams (OMLTs) available to embed with Afghanistan units.**

**What should be done to encourage NATO allies to provide more OMLTs? Are there steps that NATO or the United States should take to assist NATO members in generating more training teams?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The United States should continue to work with Allies and partners to fully resource the ISAF mission, whether they provide OMLTs, forces, equipment, or funding. The United States should also be prepared to provide immediate assistance -- be it training, equipment, or other forms of support -- to partners and Allies that are willing to contribute OMLTs (and other forces) to Afghanistan. EUCOM will continue to leverage security cooperation activities to build partner capacity, enabling deployment of forces to ISAF. For example, through the State Partnership Program, EUCOM has arranged the augmentation of partner nation OMLTs with a limited number of National Guard personnel. This has proven to be a highly effective means of enabling Allies and partners to deploy additional OMLTs to Afghanistan. By expanding upon existing capacity-building programs and pursuing new and more agile ways of recruiting, training and equipping partners, we will enhance the contributions of all partner nations in Afghanistan.

### **Counternarcotics**

**What is your assessment of the current U.S. and NATO strategies for combating the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics in Afghanistan? What changes, if any, would you make in those strategies?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Clearly the illicit drug trade is a critical issue that must be addressed in order to reach our objectives in Afghanistan. This is a complex issue that requires significant resourcing and there is no singular solution. From what I have learned so far, the Afghan authorities are working closely with international partners to execute the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. This five pillar approach includes efforts in institution building, judicial reform, law enforcement, alternative livelihoods, and demand reduction. My impression is that recent efforts to disrupt the flow of funds from the drug trade to insurgents, including NATO's expanded authority, will be beneficial. I am hopeful that my experiences in dealing with counter-narcotic issues in the Southern Command region may be helpful in allowing me to work with partners and develop new ideas and approaches.

**In December, Secretary Gates approved an expanded set of rules of engagement for U.S. forces combating narcotics in Afghanistan. NATO has reportedly approved a comparable expansion of the rules of engagement for NATO forces operating in Afghanistan.**

**Please discuss your understanding of the reasons behind these changes in the counternarcotics rules of engagement.**

**ADM Stavridis:** NATO Defense Ministers in October 2008 approved expanded authorities for ISAF to address both the illegal narcotics business and its facilitators because of the support rendered to the Taliban. Each year the narcotics trade provides \$100 million directly to the insurgency, in addition to fueling corruption, undermining the rule of law, and impeding long-term economic growth of legitimate agriculture and business. Prior to the decision at the Defense Ministerials, ISAF assistance was primarily in-extremis support, while some nations provided additional support on a bi-lateral basis and through their Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Recognizing the nexus between the narcotics trade and the insurgency, ISAF forces are now authorized to take direct and deliberate action against drug laboratories and traffickers providing support to the insurgents.

**What is the impact of these changes in the rules of engagement to the best of your knowledge?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Since the approval of enhanced ISAF counternarcotics (CN) authorities in early 2009, over 40 CN operations, the majority of which were Afghan-led, have been conducted. To date, several tons of drugs with an Afghan domestic value of over \$4 million and over 50 tons of various precursor chemicals needed to process Opium have been seized and destroyed. Apart from these initial effects on the capabilities to produce and deal with drugs, CN operations in Afghanistan clearly underline the U.S. and NATO will and capability to effectively engage the narcotics network, which is fueling the insurgency.

**In March 2009, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan carried out a joint counter-narcotics operation. The operation was part of a U.N. initiative, called the Rainbow Strategy, aimed at getting the three countries to carry out joint patrols and share intelligence on the members of the drug trade that process opium poppy into heroin and smuggle the drug to markets in Europe. The NATO Secretary General has discussed his desire to boost these joint efforts to counteract the illegal drug trade and trans-border organized crime from Afghan territory.**

**What are your views on the possibility of NATO and U.S. opportunities to conduct joint efforts, including with Iran, to counter narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The illegal narcotics industry is a transnational threat that reaches far beyond the borders of Afghanistan. With more than 90% of the world's opium originating in Afghanistan, countering the production and trafficking at the source is a key aspect of reducing the global impact of the drug trade. Most of the opium-producing areas of Afghanistan are along the Iranian and Pakistani borders, so joint efforts such as the Rainbow Strategy are encouraging and further similar efforts will be beneficial.

### **Afghan National Solidarity Program**

**One program that contributes to enhancing development and empowering governance at the local level in Afghanistan is the National Solidarity Program (NSP). This program provides block grants directly to locally-elected Community Development**

**Councils, which are responsible for identifying, planning and managing their own development projects. Funding for the NSP comes from the World Bank/International Development Association, bilateral donors, and through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. According to its website, the NSP has provided more than \$500 million in payments to 21,000 Community Development Councils, which have financed more than 39,000 subprojects to improve access to infrastructure, markets, and services.**

**Are you familiar with the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, I am. The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is an effective tool enabling community councils to participate in decisions, planning, and management of local development projects. With funding from a variety of international sources, including the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund and bi-lateral national donations, combined with facilitating partners, the NSP has reached 34 districts and 359 provinces. With tangible benefits to the population, including the most impoverished and vulnerable, NSP builds local governance capacity and ultimately extends the reach of the government.

**Would you support expanding the National Solidarity Program as a means of building local governance and strengthening development?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The NSP is one of many valuable efforts to support reconstruction, development, and governance throughout Afghanistan. In my view, it makes sense to build on this success and continue the program from what I understand about it at this point.

### **Civilian Casualties**

**What is your assessment of the impact of civilian casualties on the success of the coalition's counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan?**

**ADM Stavridis:** U.S. and Allied forces always try their very best to avoid civilian casualties through prudent planning and conducting operations with extreme care and the highest concern for innocent lives. In contrast, the extremists we combat in Afghanistan actually target innocent civilians as a means of terrorizing and intimidating the Afghan people to achieve their aims. Civilian casualties are inconsistent with our aims since the Afghan people are our center of gravity. Civilian casualties, however, are in fact a tactic deliberately employed by the Taliban to achieve their aims. The Taliban intentionally operates among civilians as part of its strategy to undermine public trust of coalition forces, and has frequently used innocent civilians as human shields. We will take all actions to avoid civilian casualties in what is an extremely complex operating environment.

**In your view, what additional steps, if any, need to be taken to address the issue of civilian casualties in Afghanistan?**

**ADM Stavridis:** ISAF takes every precaution to avoid civilian casualties and makes adjustments to the existing tactical directive as the situation on the ground permits and necessitates. Ultimately, reducing or eliminating ISAF caused civilian casualties requires a fully

trained and equipped Afghan National Security Force capable of conducting operations and ensuring the security of the population. This is an issue I will work upon with great diligence, as any counter-insurgency effort must place the security and confidence of the people squarely at the center of the equation.

## **France**

**What is your assessment of the impact of France rejoining the integrated military structure?**

**ADM Stavridis:** I believe that the full reintegration of France back into the integrated military structure of the Alliance is a very positive thing for NATO. France was a founding member of NATO and has contributed greatly throughout its history. France's full participation will only strengthen the Alliance and further build European defense capabilities.

**Do you support giving France the position of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation? Why or why not?**

**ADM Stavridis:** As a major contributor to the Alliance's integrated military structure, France has been given a major command inside the Alliance – one of two NATO strategic commands. This decision, agreed to by Alliance members, reflects the contributions of France to the military structure in terms of manpower, resources, and budget as well as their contributions to NATO operations. I support the idea of Strategic Commander-Transformation as a French military officer and I understand the importance the French military accord to NATO's transformation policy and believe it will be a very good and effective arrangement.

## **NATO Enlargement**

**What are your views on whether NATO would benefit from further rounds of enlargement?**

**ADM Stavridis:** This is a purely political issue, one that is the remit of the NATO nations. Heads of State and Government have reaffirmed that NATO's door remains open, as reflected in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. My understanding of the North Atlantic Treaty is that any European nation that is willing and capable of undertaking the commitments and obligations of being a member state is welcome to join the alliance, should all members agree. This was articulated in the Alliance's Declaration on Alliance Security, approved at the Strassbourg-Kehl Summit in April of this year.

**What criteria should the United States apply in evaluating candidates for future NATO enlargement?**

**ADM Stavridis:** NATO considers and accepts new members in accordance with the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, and the NATO Membership Action Plan. With careful consideration, they developed over 30 separate political, economic, defense, military, financial, security, and legal criteria, which each NATO aspirant is

expected to meet. The United States, as a NATO member, uses these same criteria to evaluate candidates. The successful integration of new members and their contributions to the Alliance demonstrates this process is working. In the end, new NATO members must be contributors to security – not consumers of security – as well as meet all the criteria as outlined above that provides for a country to enter the Alliance.

**In your view, is there a limit to how far NATO can be enlarged and still be an effective military organization capable of making decisions and acting in a timely fashion?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Expansion of the Alliance is a result of deliberate action taken by each member's government, which follows a collective decision of the Heads of State and Government to accept new members. NATO maintains an open door policy according to all of the documentation and study I have undertaken thus far; in particular, Article 10 of the Washington Treaty states clearly that NATO membership is open to all European nations. Democratic reform, defense reform, and interoperability all play a key role in a country's eligibility to be a member.

### **Georgia**

**In your view, how should the United States and NATO proceed on the issue of NATO membership for Georgia?**

**ADM Stavridis:** NATO has clearly stated that Georgia and the Ukraine will become NATO members, though the timing and path have not been determined. Georgia is currently in a process of Intensified Dialogue with NATO, and continues to participate in Partnership for Peace activities and supports NATO military operations. Based on the political decisions in the North Atlantic Council, the NATO military will have a supporting role in advancing defense reforms in Georgia and developing interoperability. EUCOM, as guided by U.S. Government policy, will work in concert with NATO Allies, to assist with the military and security related part of this reform. This is an important part of advancing Georgia's partnership with NATO.

**Would you support further U.S. military assistance to Georgia to help it rebuild its military?**

**ADM Stavridis:** I think it is reasonable for Georgia to possess a capable military for its own defense and to participate in coalition operations. I agree with current, prudent policy to focus our security cooperation with Georgia on fundamental intellectual issues like training, doctrine, and personnel management – the recent Partnership for Peace exercise in Georgia was an example of this. This provides a measured and meaningful way to help a country that has helped us in Iraq and has voiced its willingness to assist the US in Afghanistan.

**In your view, is there a way to implement military assistance in a manner that does not provoke Russia and do you consider that to be advisable?**

**ADM Stavridis:** As we discussed earlier when we were speaking about cooperation with Russia, the key to this will be to pursue common interests with Russia, while being transparent

concerning our cooperation with Georgia. Prudent transparency concerning our assistance to Georgia would help Russia to see that ultimately we are merely trying to help catalyze regional stability and enable Georgia to do its part in working against many of the same transnational threats that worry both Russia and the US. The NATO-Russia Council, for example, is a good mechanism to provide this kind of transparency.

## **Russia**

### **How do you see the NATO-Russia relationship evolving in the future?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The conflict between Russia and Georgia last year led NATO to temporarily suspend the NATO-Russia council but has since been re-instated. Decisions about NATO-Russia relations, and subsequent military engagements, are made at the political level. However, I believe that the NATO-Russia relationship will be a high priority for the Alliance at both the political and military levels. NATO and Russia have numerous arrangements in place to discuss a broad security agenda, enhance confidence and mutual security, as well as build the capability for joint military operations. Since the end of the Cold War, the relationship has been marked with successes like the joint operations in Stabilization Force (SFOR), Kosovo Force (KFOR), and OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, and political differences such as those over Kosovo, Georgia, CFE, and Missile Defense. The relationship will continue to evolve at a pace determined by the success in breaching these differences and forging common perspectives and ultimately common approaches to security. I do believe that both NATO and Russia believe that the relationships with one another are vital, and see utility in the restarting of the relationship to address common concerns.

### **What steps, if any, should NATO take to help mitigate Russian concerns about further enlargements of NATO?**

**ADM Stavridis:** It is expected that Russia will continue to voice concerns about further enlargement of NATO. NATO's leaders have made clear they desire a constructive partnership with Russia. NATO does not see enlargement as a choice between good relations or poor relations with Russia. NATO enlargement is not a zero-sum security equation, accomplished at the expense of Russia's or other countries' security. It is designed to support the expansion of the community of democracies and market economies, and strengthen regional security. However, the Russian government has a different view. NATO clearly wants to use the full range of cooperation and partnership under the NATO-Russia framework to build a constructive relationship with Russia, and use this very same framework to address the issues where NATO and Russia have different perceptions.

### **What do you believe are appropriate objectives for U.S.-Russian security relations, and what do you believe are the areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The U.S. and Russia share many areas of common interest. We have ample opportunity to engage with the Russians on strategic arms reduction and arms control, military-to-military engagement, energy security, humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism, counter-

piracy, counter-proliferation, and counter-narcotics. Interoperability is a fundamental requirement for successful operations, and the U.S./NATO and Russia should be prepared for missions our political leaders may task us to conduct jointly or within the same framework of an action by the international community. NATO-Russia military activities have evolved since the Rome Summit and have incrementally increased in terms of the number and complexity of events. These events include exercises, seminars, academic exchanges, and technical conferences. These activities will play an important part in developing common approaches with Russia as well as the trust and confidence in these approaches to addressing a wide variety of risks and threats together.

Furthermore, if confirmed as EUCOM Commander, I envision EUCOM's objectives for engaging Russia to be two-fold. First, we want to ensure compliance with National policy in anything we plan to do with respect to military-to-military engagement with Russia. The EUCOM staff has already taken steps in developing a plan intended to re-invigorate the mil-to-mil programs, albeit at a cautious and measured pace. Second, and probably more important, we want to address those areas of mutual understanding that support the interests of both the U.S. and Russia.

### **European Missile Defense Options**

**The Obama Administration is currently reviewing the previously proposed deployment of missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland, and is also considering a variety of options and possible alternatives to that proposed deployment, to include using the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor either on Aegis BMD ships or on land. One consideration is that the proposed deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic, which neither nation has yet ratified, would not provide coverage of Southeastern portions of NATO Europe, some of which are already within range of Iranian missiles. Such incomplete coverage would be inconsistent with the central NATO principle of the indivisibility of security of all NATO members. Another consideration is the desire to have cost-effective and operationally effective missile defense systems.**

**Do you agree that it is in our security interests to explore the full range of options and alternatives for possible future missile defense capabilities in Europe that would meet the security interests of NATO and our other allies and partners in the region?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, based on what I know at this time and without the benefit of actually discussing this with allies, I do agree. Rogue states in the Middle East and Southwest Asia possess a current ballistic missile capability that threatens a major portion of Europe. Iran is aggressively expanding the range and sophistication of its ballistic missiles and is pursuing nuclear capabilities that dramatically expand the threat to the entire European region. The deployment of ballistic missile defense assets in Europe would make a significant contribution to the protection of the United States and Europe from a Middle Eastern ballistic missile threat. Ballistic missile defense must remain a priority so that we are postured to counter threats to the United States, deployed forces and allies. Ballistic missile defense is directly linked to the other theater priorities such as deterring/defeating the use of missiles and WMD as a means of

terrorism, defending against cruise missiles, and protecting peacekeeping forces from these threats.

United States ballistic missile defense assets are dedicated not only to defense of the U.S. homeland, but also to the defense of deployed forces and allies from the growing ballistic threat from rogue states. Sea-based (Aegis with SM-3) and transportable land-based assets (THAAD and Patriot) are integral components of a comprehensive ballistic missile defense system, but cannot defeat the entire range of threats by themselves. Sophisticated sensors are required for early acquisition and target discrimination and ground based interceptors are needed to defeat longer range missiles. In addition, The U.S. is working towards synergistically integrating its ballistic missile defense capabilities with current and emerging NATO missile defense capabilities and concepts. We need multi-layered missile defense capabilities stationed and operational in the region before a threat fully emerges to ensure our common European allies and partners' security.

### **Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia**

**Secretary of Defense Gates has stated his interest in pursuing cooperation with Russia on missile defense relative to potential future Iranian missile threats, including the possibility of Russia sharing radar data from its Gabala and Armavir radars. NATO communiqués have repeatedly expressed support for missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia.**

**Do you agree that it is in our security interests to pursue missile defense cooperation with Russia relative to potential future Iranian missile threats?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, I do, based on my preliminary understanding of the situation. I believe Missile Defense is a potential area of cooperation with Russia that is well worth exploring.

**Do you believe that such cooperation could help in our efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, I do believe the potential exists to achieve such an effect, although this of course is a diplomatic issue outside of my specific purview.

### **NATO-Russia Council**

**The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) has served as an important venue for discussions and cooperation between NATO and Russia, including missile defense cooperation such as the Theater Missile Defense exercise program. Recent NATO communiqués have expressed support for expanded cooperation through the NATO-Russia Council, including on missile defense.**

**Do you believe the NATO-Russia Council has valuable potential as a forum for NATO-Russian cooperation, including cooperation on missile defense?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, I do. The NATO-Russia Council's (NRC) role is to provide a forum for consultation, cooperation, and consensus building between NATO and Russia. The NATO-Russia Council has facilitated discussion and cooperation on a broad range of issues over the past years. The NATO-Russia program of cooperation has included activities in the past in the sphere of theater missile defense cooperation. This area has been a long standing priority activity for both NATO and Russia. I believe that the NRC will continue to play an important role as a vehicle for discussion and cooperation in this sphere and in other areas of mutual interest.

**Do you support continuation of the Theater Missile Defense exercise program within the NATO-Russia Council?**

**ADM Stavridis:** NATO nations approve the NATO-Russia annual work plan, including all aspects of cooperation – civilian and military – between NATO and Russia. The Alliance is restarting the relationship with Russia after a lengthy suspension and the NATO nations will be making decisions on the priority areas of work and cooperation. I would not want to make a judgment on the role and place of a specific exercise program until the appropriate political authorities had determined the political scope, breadth, timing, and objectives for restarting the relationship. Clearly, military cooperation will have a role, but it will be a supporting role and one that serves the overall objectives of the U.S. national security policy and Alliance decisions.

**Patriot Battery to Poland**

**The United States and Poland have agreed that the United States will deploy a U.S. Patriot air and missile defense battery to Poland, although the terms and details remain to be worked out.**

**Do you believe that it could be of benefit to NATO nations for the United States to deploy a Patriot battery to Poland, potentially on a rotating basis, as a NATO training battery, to improve the skills of NATO forces on the Patriot system?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, from what I currently understand and without the benefit of speaking to our allies, I do believe that deploying U.S. Patriot battery rotations to Poland for training and exercises could benefit NATO nations, assuming Poland continues with its planned future acquisition of a Patriot system.

**Kosovo**

**What do you see as the major challenges in Kosovo, including in connection with the stand down of the Kosovo Protection Corps and the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The security situation in Kosovo remains calm and the progress and success in Kosovo has led NATO to decide to move to the next stage in the mission, Deterrent Presence, which includes a significant reduction of forces in place. The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is drawing down, and the European Rule of Law Mission

(EULEX) has now achieved full operating capability. Following its deactivation in January, the Kosovo Protection Corps remains on track for its official stand-down in June and the Kosovo Security Force is on schedule to reach Initial Operating Capability in September with an effective strength of around 1500. An extensive training program is in place which includes the first 400 civilian recruits. However, shortages in the trust fund and donations will have a tangible impact on delivering a force equipped to carry out its tasks and we may have a trained force that remains incapable of fulfilling its role in Kosovo.

### **NATO- European Union**

**The NATO - European Union (EU) relationship is viewed by some as competitive and by others as complementary.**

**How would you characterize the NATO-EU relationship today?**

**ADM Stavridis:** This matter is a largely a political issue outside the purview of the role of the SACEUR. My understanding is that NATO has an established arrangement with the EU for supporting EU military operations called “Berlin Plus”. This has worked effectively and has improved EU-NATO coordination. The political level relationship also has improved, but probably not to the level of expectations by some countries. I understand this matter is seen as an important priority at the political level. If confirmed, I intend to explore areas for cooperation in the military sphere in a complementary way.

**In your view, what should be NATO’s position with regard to European efforts to strengthen the European Security and Defense Policy and build military capacity within the European Union?**

**ADM Stavridis:** NATO’s position will be decided at the political level. Without detailed information on existing capabilities, I am not prepared to take a position on development of EU military capacity. From a purely military perspective, however, every initiative strengthening or improving the military capabilities of our European allies should be welcomed; and if confirmed, this is an area in which I would seek to develop complementary activities.

**What is your view of the future of NATO-EU cooperation in areas relating to security, defense, and crisis management? Should NATO do more to institutionalize cooperation between the two organizations?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Future cooperation in these areas first depends on further development of the political relationship between NATO and the EU. It is my understanding that the “Berlin Plus” arrangement has been effective and I would prefer to reserve judgment about future possibilities until I have the benefit of experience in the European theater and NATO. As I mentioned earlier, this is an interest area of mine and if confirmed I would pursue it in a collegial and complementary way.

### **Building Partner Capacity within the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)**

**In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. These include the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”) and the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”). Some have argued that security assistance has traditionally been a State Department responsibility and that these programs ought to be transferred from the Department of Defense to the Department of State.**

**What should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?**

**ADM Stavridis:** In the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), the President has established theater strategic objectives for the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Building partner capacity is one of many means through which EUCOM achieves its Theater Objectives, while supporting US national objectives in the AOR. In general, capable, well-resourced Allies and Partners are critical enablers for all eight of EUCOM’s Theater Objectives. Specifically, building partner capacity in the EUCOM AOR supports the following objectives:

- NATO is capable and willing to conduct out-of-area operations
- Partner nations have the capacity to provide for their own security and to sustain regional stability
- Local crises are prevented from becoming regional conflicts

**Do these objectives differ by region, e.g. do our objectives within the EUCOM AOR differ from those in the SOUTHCOM AOR?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, each Geographic Combatant Command has specific theater strategic objectives outlined in the GEF and its own theater strategy. The GEF objectives for the EUCOM AOR and EUCOM’s theater strategy are specifically tailored to the opportunities and challenges found in Europe and Eurasia.

**What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 global train and equip authority?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The purpose of Section 1206 is to provide Combatant Commanders the ability to respond to urgent and emergent threats or opportunities in their AORs by building the capacity of allies and partners to conduct counterterrorism operations or support stability operations in which U.S. military forces are participating. The law requires the Secretary of Defense to coordinate with the Secretary of State when executing global train and equip authority.

**What is the relationship of the global train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as DOD counternarcotics assistance and foreign military financing?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Global train and equip authority complements other security assistance authorities. It enables Combatant Commanders to respond to urgent situations or opportunities in the near-term and render assistance to allies and partners that cannot be provided under other

authorities. When appropriate, it can and should be used in combination with other security assistance authorities as part of a comprehensive approach to building partner capacity.

**What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Avoiding duplication of effort with other assistance programs involves two key measures. The first is adherence to the criteria of the global train and equip authority established in the law and DoD policy. The second is robust internal and interagency coordination in the development of proposals for funding under the global train and equip authority.

**What is your understanding of the purpose of the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”)?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The purpose of Section 1207 is to facilitate non-military, interagency support to reconstruction, stabilization and security activities in foreign countries. It is an important tool in EUCOM’s efforts in the Balkans and the developing Eastern European countries.

### **Interagency Organization Model**

**While you were the Commander of U.S. Southern Command, the SOUTHCOM command structure was reorganized into an interagency model, where officials detailed from other agencies, such as the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), are embedded as staff members within the command. U.S. Africa Command has adopted a similar organizational structure.**

**What were the reasons behind the decision to alter the command structure of U.S. Southern Command and the lessons learned after a little more than a year of operation under this model?**

**ADM Stavridis:** As a Combatant Command, war fighting will always be the core competency at SOUTHCOM. However, SOUTHCOM reorganized to become a more interagency-oriented organization to address the specific challenges and opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Secretary of Defense authorized this reorganization in September 2007, and SOUTHCOM’s efforts were also highlighted as one of the Top 25 Department of Defense Transformation Priorities. A principal driver for the reorganization stemmed from my assessment of the regional security environment, based upon the underlying conditions that foster the security challenges of the SOUTHCOM area of focus, such as narco-trafficking and other illicit-trafficking activities, and organized crime and gangs. Exacerbated by conditions of poverty, income inequality, and social exclusion, these security challenges are transnational in terms of impact and manifestation, and cross roles and mission lines of U.S. Government departments and agencies.

I am a strong supporter of the “3 D” approach – State does Diplomacy, AID does Development, and DoD does Defense. I believe that our ability to work together, and for us in DoD to be helpful to our partners, is a key element in providing security for our country. Our approach at SOUTHCOM is designed to ensure we do that in the best and most efficient way.

In this regard, the new SOUTHCOM organizational structure is designed to allow the Command to collaborate proactively with the U.S. Government interagency community and with partner nations in the region—ultimately improving collective responses to regional and transnational security challenges.

**What staffing support did you receive from other government agencies?**

**ADM Stavridis:** SOUTHCOM has received a reasonable level of support from the interagency. There are 22 interagency personnel assigned to and working full-time at USSOUTHCOM headquarters. Additionally, there are 13 part-time liaison officers with full access and to the headquarters building and use of SOUTHCOM credentials for email, data sharing and web page browsing. Beyond these 35 personnel, there are some 40 interagency personnel (in Miami; Washington, DC; and elsewhere) that have habitual relationships with SOUTHCOM via assignments by their home agencies (and many have either visited the headquarters or conducted brief 1-2 week orientation assignments).

The Department of State continues to take an active role in SOUTHCOM’s transformation. Ambassador Paul Trivelli has been assigned as the Civilian Deputy to the Commander and retains the role of Political-Military Advisor. USAID has also assigned a Senior Development Advisor to the Command. The SOUTHCOM Security and Intelligence Directorate is led by a two-star U.S. Coast Guard Admiral.

**Based on your experience with this new interagency command structure, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you consider regarding the command structure for EUCOM? What metrics would you use to make a determination?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Although some principles associated with the concept of functioning with an interagency approach have universal applicability and utility, every Command and region of the world is unique. The changes my team and I made at SOUTHCOM to the Command structure may not necessarily be the best approach for operations in the European theater. If confirmed, I would assess the security environment and challenges in that region and take a hard look at the current Command structure at EUCOM to ensure that it is maximized for effectiveness and efficiency. At this point, and based on what I know now, I do not anticipate undertaking significant organizational changes at EUCOM.

**NATO Transformation**

**What is your assessment of the role of Allied Command Transformation in effecting positive change among NATO member nations?**

**ADM Stavridis:** The role of Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT) is to identify, facilitate and advocate the continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to maintain and enhance the military relevance and effectiveness of the Alliance. SACT leads the transformation of NATO's military structure, forces, capabilities, and doctrines to improve interoperability and the military effectiveness of NATO. SACEUR and SACT work in cooperation, not competition, to realize effective change across the alliance.

**What will you do, if confirmed, to ensure that military capability and interoperability remain top priorities for NATO?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Military capability and interoperability should remain top priorities for NATO. Without the necessary military capabilities, armed forces will not be able to provide an effective contribution to whole-of-government efforts. From the Alliance's perspective, interoperability is the key to any multinational operation because in today's, world armed forces can no longer operate in an isolated manner, but have to share a very dynamic battle space and critical information. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo provide "real world" experience upon which to base our future plans. If confirmed, I would ensure that our ability to work together will be enhanced by these experiences.

### **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea**

**The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.**

**What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, I support U.S. accession to the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

**From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?**

**ADM Stavridis:** As the CNO has testified, the Law of the Sea Convention provides a robust legal regime for global operations by U.S. Armed Forces. It codifies navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms that are necessary for mobility of our forces. It is completely in line with and supports the U.S. National Security Strategy. To date, 157 nations are signatories to the convention and I believe it is in our national security interests to do the same. Our current non-party status constrains our efforts to develop enduring maritime relationships with Partner Nations. It also inhibits our efforts to expand the Proliferation Security Initiative and elevates the level of risk for our Sailors as they undertake operations to preserve navigation rights and freedoms. We need to eliminate seams as much as possible when we operate in difficult circumstances in the maritime environment with like-minded partners – the Law of the Sea Convention would allow us to do that.

### **U.S. Military Basing in Europe**

**Current DOD plans provide for the drawdown of U.S. Army forces in Europe to 32,000 U.S. soldiers by no later than 2013. However, General Craddock, the Commander, U.S. European Command, has recommended that the two brigades currently scheduled for redeployment back to the United States remain in Europe, keeping U.S. forces based there at a force of around 42,000.**

**Do you support maintaining the current U.S. force presence in Europe beyond 2013? Why or why not?**

**ADM Stavridis:** US European Command and its forces have undergone significant transformation in recent years, transformation that was necessary in light of the changing geopolitical and security environment. That transformation continues today and will continue in the future as we continue to monitor and assess the security environment and US requirements to ensure our safety, security and protection of our national interests.

The decisions that were made in the past regarding U.S. force presence in Europe were made based on an assessment of the geopolitical and security realities at the time. It would be prudent of me, if confirmed as the EUCOM Commander, to conduct a fresh assessment of the security environment and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on the best mix of U.S. forces in Europe now and in the future.

### **Quality of Life Programs for Military Families**

**The top three quality of life issues in the EUCOM AOR include obtaining quality living accommodations; gaining predictable access to health care to include family member dental support; and ensuring high-quality dependent education programs provided by the DOD Dependent Schools. Commanders in the EUCOM region have emphasized their support for and reliance on EUCOM resources to provide crucial morale programs, enhance retention, and foster esprit de corps.**

**What do you see as the most significant long-term challenges for EUCOM in preserving and enhancing the quality of life for assigned personnel while force redeployments to the United States proceed?**

**ADM Stavridis:** We are demanding a great deal from our force today and must remain focused on our warriors and their families. As we adjust our basing posture in Europe to become more operationally effective, we must also take the opportunity to address and enhance our Quality of Life posture as well. If confirmed, I will support existing EUCOM programs and processes that leverage our partnership with supporting agencies and service components to build effective quality of life programs for our military families, and continue to focus on improving support to sustain our military personnel and their families. EUCOM service members and their families (some facing their second or third deployments) deserve a quality of life commensurate to the nation they serve. If confirmed, quality of life programs is one of the first topics I will discuss with the component commanders.

**If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the adequacy of support services for military families during the transition to ensure that vital support mechanisms, such as Department of Defense Schools, morale, welfare and recreation services, family housing, and commissary and exchange facilities continue to serve military personnel?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Every year EUCOM hosts a DoD renowned Quality of Life conference to discuss Quality of Life requirements and shortfalls with military members of all ranks and their families. If confirmed, I will continue the practice of listening directly to the men and women of the command on what we are doing right and where we need to improve. I would continue to work closely with our Quality of Life Partners to focus resources where needed. For example, I am aware that EUCOM has worked extensively with DoDEA to ensure that our military families' dependents are receiving a quality education, and to substantially improve school investment to restore our aging school infrastructure. It is essential we retain and sustain this level of effort in the coming years. The EUCOM team, comprised of service component and HQ EUCOM policy and technical experts, will continue to partner to ensure full support for our warriors and their families.

### **Sexual Assault Prevention and Response in EUCOM**

**Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in have been reported over the last several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate investigations and emotional support. Assertions have been made that their Command failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services, including medical attention and timely disposition of their charges.**

**What is your understanding of the resources and programs in place in EUCOM to offer victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, investigative, and legal help that they need?**

**ADM Stavridis:** I am not aware of any shortfalls or deficiencies in command leadership, personnel, or training to prevent or respond to sexual assault in the EUCOM Area of Responsibility. I will certainly look at the totality of these programs as a significant command responsibility.

I understand the entire EUCOM AOR has robust resources and programs in place to offer victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, investigative, and legal help required. If confirmed, I will work with service component commanders to ensure they continue to have the appropriate resources and support to manage sexual assault prevention and response training programs. In addition, I will ensure every measure is in place to support victims.

**What is your view of steps the Command has taken to prevent sexual assaults in EUCOM?**

**ADM Stavridis:** From the briefings I have received, I believe that EUCOM works directly with service components and their leadership in building robust training programs to prevent sexual assault. All military and civilian members across the command have mandatory training requirements on an annual basis focused on prevention. Education has proven to be critical in preventing sexual assault, therefore EUCOM will continue to educate all of our military and civilian members annually.

**What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in EUCOM to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Across the EUCOM AOR, I am told there are adequate training and resources in order to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will work with the component commanders to ensure we continue to emphasize the importance of training and resources to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault.

**Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?**

**ADM Stavridis:** I am not aware of any problems with current sexual assault policies and procedures.

**What problems, if any, are you aware of regarding the manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?**

**ADM Stavridis:** I am not aware of any problems in this regard.

### **Mental Health of Servicemembers and Stress on the Force**

**The Committee is concerned about the stress on military personnel resulting from lengthy and repeated deployments and their access to mental health care to deal with this increased stress. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently said that the shooting of five servicemembers at a stress control clinic by a troubled Army sergeant in Iraq speaks to “the need . . . to redouble our efforts” and “the issue of multiple deployments” and increasing dwell time “to try to improve to relieve that stress.” This tragic incident, as well as increasing suicide rates in every service, are clear reminders that servicemembers, particularly those who have been deployed multiple times, are under tremendous stress and need access to mental health care.**

**In your view, are there sufficient mental health assets in EUCOM to address the mental health needs of the military personnel and their families?**

**ADM Stavridis:** I understand there is a shortfall in health care professionals to assist military personnel and their families. However, this shortfall is being addressed in the FY10 budget under the Warrior and Family Mental and Behavioral Health Support Program. EUCOM has

requested \$12.5M in FY10 for additional mental health care professionals to evaluate and counsel military and family members.

**If confirmed, what actions will you take to address the mental health needs of military personnel and their families in EUCOM?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Following budgeting actions, I would ensure all mental health professionals are hired in an expeditious manner.

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, I do.

**Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, I do.

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U. S. EUCOM and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, I do.

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, I do.

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

**ADM Stavridis:** Yes, I do.