

*Advance Policy Questions for
Admiral Robert F. Willard, U. S. Navy
Nominee for Commander, U. S. Pacific Command*

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the special operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our armed forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

As former Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J8) on the Joint Staff and Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and now as Commander, U. S. Pacific Fleet, you have witnessed the effect of these reforms from both the joint and service perspective.

Based on your experience, what is your assessment of these reforms?

Goldwater-Nichols was landmark legislation that led to dramatic improvements in operational effectiveness, unity of effort, and civilian oversight. It has created a generation of military leaders who are experienced with operating in a coordinated and joint, multi-service environment.

Do you see a need to modify any Goldwater-Nichols provisions? If so, what modifications are appropriate?

At this time, I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for deterring attacks against the United States and its territories, possessions, and bases, to protect Americans and American interests and, in the event that deterrence fails, to win its Nation's wars. The Commander is also responsible for expanding security cooperation with our allies, partners and friends across the Asia-Pacific region.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Thirty six years of military experience, culminating in command of U.S. Pacific Fleet, have prepared me for assuming command of U.S. Pacific Command.

By serving as the 34th Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and twice as a flag officer on the Joint Staff, I gained invaluable insight into the administrative processes that underpin an effective Department of Defense, as well as a profound understanding of joint processes, interagency cooperation, and the whole-of-government approach.

My joint staff experience is complemented by my joint operational experience as a four-star Joint Task Force Commander and as the Joint Maritime Component Commander for two Operational Plans.

Additionally, I have gained extensive regional (Asia-Pacific) experience while serving as the Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, as Commander, Carrier Group 5 aboard USS KITTY HAWK (CV 63) in Yokosuka, Japan, and as Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, also in Yokosuka, Japan.

Finally, I'd offer that my wife, Donna, adds immensely to my qualifications. She is a remarkable representative of the U.S. Armed Forces, and an exceptional ambassador for our great nation. She has performed magnificently during our tenure at U.S. Pacific Fleet and I'm confident her strength, character, patriotism, and regional experience will continue to be a significant addition to my qualifications for Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

If confirmed, I intend to take every opportunity to enhance my knowledge of our relationships with our allies and partners across the Pacific. I look forward to engaging with senior leaders within the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and military and civilian leaders throughout the Asia-Pacific region in order to improve my understanding of U.S. interests in the region.

Relationships

If confirmed, what will be your command relationship with:

The Secretary of Defense

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, performs his duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. He is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the ability of the Command to carry out its missions.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs duties as directed by the Secretary and performs the duties of the Secretary in his absence. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, ensures the Deputy has the information necessary to perform these duties and coordinates with him on major issues.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Under secretaries are key advocates for combatant commands' requirements. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on strategic policy issues involving the Asia-Pacific region.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as needed to set and meet the Command's intelligence requirements.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman functions under the authority, direction and control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman transmits communications between the National Command Authority and the U.S. Pacific Command Commander and oversees the activities of the U.S. Pacific Command Commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the chairman is a key conduit between the Combatant Commander, Interagency, and Service Chiefs.

The U.S. Pacific Command Commander keeps the Chairman informed on significant issues regarding the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility. The Commander directly communicates with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a regular basis.

The Service Secretaries

The Service Secretaries are responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned to combatant commands. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command coordinates with the secretaries to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip Pacific Command forces are met.

The Service Chiefs

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, communicates and exchanges information with the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for organizing, training and equipping forces. Successful execution of U.S. Pacific Command's mission responsibilities requires coordination with the Service Chiefs. Like the Chairman, the service chiefs are valuable sources of judgment and advice for combatant commanders.

The other combatant commanders

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, maintains close relationships with the other combatant commanders. These relationships, which are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy, are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact and productive exchanges of information on key issues.

Commander U.S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command

As a subordinate unified commander, the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea receives missions and functions from Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. I recognize his role as Commander, CFC and will fully support his actions in that sensitive and demanding role.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command maintains a close relationship with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. This relationship ensures close coordination of U.S. policy within OSD and the Interagency.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, coordinates and exchanges information with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs on strategic policy issues involving the POW/MIA accounting mission worldwide and Personnel Recovery requirements in the Asia-Pacific region.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

I believe there are three major challenges in the Pacific Area of Responsibility. First, China's extensive military buildup and modernization are creating uncertainty in the region at large. Second, North Korea's conventional military, weapons of mass destruction and proliferation activities are a threat to regional security. Finally, maintaining and strengthening our alliances and partnerships are critical to the stability in the region.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

We must continue to mature our military-to-military relationship with China. In so doing, we reduce the chance of miscalculation, increase mutual understanding, and encourage cooperation in areas of common concern.

We will support whole-of-nation approaches to ensure a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula. Our forward military presence on the Peninsula assures South Korea and deters aggression by North Korea.

We must remain committed to strengthening our alliances and partnerships in the region; such as through the provisions of DPRI with Japan and the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S. to the ROK in 2012.

If confirmed, what priorities would you establish in terms of the issues which must be addressed by Commander, U. S. Pacific Command?

Maintaining a credible deterrent and military presence will be my top priority and is the single best way for U.S. Pacific Command to contribute to a secure and stable region.

With regard to China, the strategy is one of careful, measured military engagement with the Government of China and the PLA, pressing for transparency while also sustaining our military capabilities to fulfill our defense commitments in the region.

With regard to North Korea, we will work with the Department of State and regional partners to press North Korea to meet its commitments – including denuclearization – as agreed to during the Six Party Talks, while maintaining the capability to deter potential North Korea military threats and countering proliferation activities.

In order to sustain the realignment and transformation processes already underway, we need to review progress constantly and resolve challenges in the bilateral relations with

both Japan and South Korea.

We must build upon existing bilateral relationships to pursue more multilateral cooperation in the areas of counterterrorism, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance / disaster response.

Homeland Defense

What is your understanding of the role and responsibility of U. S. Pacific Command in homeland defense?

U.S. Pacific Command responsibility is to deter attacks against the Homeland as early and as far away as possible, defend the U.S. Pacific Command domestic Area of Responsibility, and work with and provide support to civil authorities when requested. Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command's Homeland Defense plan complements and is integrated with planning for the ongoing overseas contingency operations; Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Homeland Security and other relevant activities.

What is your understanding of how U. S. Pacific Command and U. S. Northern Command work together to ensure that their overlapping missions in this region do not create "seams" that might be exploited by our adversaries and how this process might be improved?

In September 2008, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command and Commander, U.S. Northern Command signed a Command Arrangement Agreement that "establishes procedures and delineates responsibilities" between the two commands. This agreement also prescribes employment of U.S. Pacific Command forces in support of U.S. Northern Command missions as well as the control of U.S. Pacific Command forces operating in Northern Command's Area of Responsibility. In my experience, this agreement between combatant commands has been highly effective. If confirmed, I intend to continue the close working relationship between the two commands.

How could U. S. Pacific Command forces and expertise contribute to more effective homeland defense capabilities?

U.S. Pacific Command's military and intelligence activities in the western approaches to the continental United States contribute to the Nation's active, layered defense and enhance situational awareness. A layered defense — deterring attacks far from our shores, gathering actionable intelligence through initiatives such as enhanced maritime domain awareness, exercising and training our forces alongside those of our allies and partners across the Asia-Pacific region— is the surest means for U.S. Pacific Command to contribute to the defense of our homeland.

Force Posture in the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Operations (AOR)

Perhaps more than with any other combatant command, military operations in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility are subject to the “tyranny of distance” in getting forces to points of exigency or conflict. Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region are planned over the next several years, including movement of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and relocation of U. S. forces within South Korea.

In your view, how important is a forward basing strategy to the ability of U. S. Pacific Command to execute its operational commitments?

Forward basing is essential to the U.S. Pacific Command strategy of Partnership, Readiness and Presence. Forward presence assures our friends and allies, while deterring potential adversaries. This strategy allows a more flexible force, positioning U.S. Pacific Command to respond with a variety of means in the event of a crisis or contingency.

What do you see as the implications of the proposed force structure changes in South Korea, Japan and Guam on security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and what impact, if any, do you expect the proposed changes to have on our ability to react to contingencies in the region?

I support the U.S. posture changes in Korea and Japan. I believe these changes will contribute to strengthening our alliances while continuing to posture U.S. forces forward in the region. The relocations in Japan and Korea address host nation concerns such as noise and encroachment, while improving our mutual defense infrastructure in the region through investment projects funded by the host governments. Additionally, better use is made of Guam’s strategic location to position U.S. forces more effectively for the evolving security environment.

Do you believe the relocation of about 8,000 U. S. Marines and about 3,600 other U.S. military members and dependents from Japan to Guam is in the best interest of the United States and our allies? Why or why not?

The relocation is the most comprehensive force change in over three decades. It helps to strengthen our alliance with Japan by addressing long standing concerns about the U.S. presence on Okinawa. It diversifies our presence in the Western Pacific by taking advantage of Guam’s strategic location and its status as a sovereign U.S. territory. It also allows a greater degree of flexibility to address regional and global threats, while providing the ability to train on U.S. territory in a forward location with partner nations.

How does the relocation of these Marines improve our security posture in the region?

This relocation improves our security posture in the region by spreading our capability and balancing our flexibility more broadly across the Pacific. It also provides an opportunity for combined training with partner nations in the region on sovereign U.S. territory. Security and stability are enhanced through balancing strengthened alliances with a more flexible positioning of forces.

What is your view about the advisability of requiring that construction companies pay their workers on Guam realignment construction projects wages equivalent to rates in Hawaii? What impact would this approach have on the cost of the move?

The Services have built Military Construction (MILCON) projects on Guam for many years including homes, runway repairs, piers and schools using the prevailing Guam wages. According to Department of Labor data, Hawaii construction wage rates are approximately 300% higher than those on Guam. The \$10.27B estimated cost for construction to relocate the Marines to Guam was based on historical wages experienced on Guam. In accordance with international agreement, the amount of funding that Japan will provide is fixed. Therefore, any additional cost will require more U.S. funding. The Joint Guam Program Office estimates application of Hawaii Davis-Bacon wage rates with fringes to Guam could increase the labor cost for the realignment by \$4.7B.

Some observers suggest that the United States is preoccupied in Central Asia and has not focused sufficiently on challenges in East Asia at a critical time in the development of that region.

What is your assessment of the U. S. levels of funding, manning and political-military engagement in U.S. Pacific Command's AOR as compared to other geographical regions, particularly Central Asia?

I understand the increased focus on the challenges in Central Asia. However, I do agree with Secretary Gates' observation that the United States has never been more engaged in the Asia-Pacific region than today. If confirmed, I will review levels of funding, manning, and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and, if there are shortfalls in existing resources, I will be a strong advocate for requesting an increase in levels of funding.

Many of the United States' key alliances in Asia were established years ago when global conditions and threats were different than today. In recent years, U.S. Pacific Command has given priority to the development of cooperative security arrangements with partners in the region.

Do you agree with this objective and, if so, what countries do you see as the top priorities for such arrangements to best enhance stability and security in the region?

Yes, I agree with this objective. The cooperative security partnerships established with top priority countries such as Singapore, India, and Indonesia have served to significantly enhance access, security, and stability throughout the Asia Pacific. To date, these developing partnerships have resulted in successes in combating terrorism, maintaining maritime security and providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.

Emerging Pacific Theater Threats

Regional powers and non-state actors in U.S. Pacific Command's AOR are making significant efforts to improve their ability to project power with respect to both conventional and irregular capabilities.

What are your biggest concerns with respect to development of advanced conventional and irregular warfighting capabilities by nations and non-state actors in U.S. Pacific Command's AOR?

Major concerns include the lack of transparency regarding China's development of advanced conventional and asymmetric weapons – beyond what is required for its national defense – and the ongoing North Korean missile programs. With regard to irregular warfare, several extremist organizations in South and Southeast Asia may continue to advance their agendas by importing foreign terrorist tactics and techniques that have proven most lethal elsewhere.

What do you see as the highest priority capability gaps that need to be addressed by the United States in order to meet these emerging threats?

Regional state and non-state actors are increasingly sophisticated at hiding their activities and intentions. U.S. Pacific Command requires a similarly agile and sophisticated intelligence enterprise to avoid strategic surprise through early detection and insight into an adversary's intentions and capabilities. This can only be achieved by combining improved intelligence collection systems using the proper mix of platforms and sensors, with the regional expertise and advanced analytic tools that enable us to anticipate threats rather than react to crises.

If confirmed, I will ensure that the process to develop capability-gap priorities carefully considers the full range of U.S. Pacific Command roles and missions, takes into account the issues and concerns of our component and subunified commanders, and that the resultant actions by the Services and force providers delivers needed capabilities to our operational forces.

Our military must be able to respond to emerging threats in a variety of domains,

including the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace, as well as the traditional air, maritime and ground domains.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that these needed capabilities are developed and deployed to warfighters?

If confirmed as Commander I will ensure that U.S. Pacific Command processes to identify needed capabilities remain responsive to both assigned missions and emerging threats. I will continue to use the annual Integrated Priority List memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advocate for those capability shortfalls most critical to operations in the Pacific theater. We will communicate these priorities to Services and force providers through proper channels, and we will provide feedback on the fielded capabilities and their effectiveness in closing identified capability gaps.

How should U.S. policies and engagements in the Asia-Pacific region change to best meet new threats and conditions?

U.S. Pacific Command in general is well positioned and resourced to meet most conventional threats in the Asia-Pacific theater. Countering the radical extremist threat, however, requires unique approaches to be most effective. Building indigenous CT capabilities and capacities into susceptible Asia-Pacific nations is one such approach. Equipped with supportive policies and resources, U.S. Pacific Command, in partnership with relevant agencies of the United States Government and private enterprise, can assist regional nations that are susceptible to radical extremism to become more self sufficient in combating terrorism.

North Korea

North Korea continues to represent one of the greatest near-term threats to U. S. national security interests in Asia and recent events underscore the possible destabilizing nature of certain North Korean activities.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

The 2009 North Korean TD-2 launch, probable nuclear test, and continued ballistic missile activity underscore the gravity of the North Korean threat. North Korea is pursuing a multi-dimensional strategy (includes provocative military actions and aggressive rhetoric) to achieve specific domestic, inter-Korean, and international objectives. North Korea's stated intent to depart from Six-Party Talks and conditions of the Armistice further demonstrates the uncertain security situation they are generating.

What is the value of diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to resume negotiations to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

A resumption of negotiations might return the Peninsula to a more rational status quo. The United States remains committed to the Six-Party Talks process, and calls on the DPRK to fulfill its commitments under the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return, at an early date, to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities, including the export of those capabilities?

North Korea's pursuit and development of WMD and ballistic missile capabilities, as well as its proliferation efforts, pose a significant threat to the U.S and our allies. The development of WMD and advanced ballistic missiles increases regional tension and could spur a limited arms race as neighbors seek to enhance their own deterrent and defense capabilities. North Korea has historically proliferated arms and military equipment to regimes such as Iran, Burma and Libya and may attempt to do so with WMD or longer range missiles.

What is the U. S. military's role in enforcing sanctions imposed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874?

As obligated by UNSCR 1874, the U.S. will remain vigilant of any North Korean activities that might contravene the resolution, and we will respond in line with the provisions of the resolution. UNSCR 1874 provides no authority for military enforcement outside a nation's territorial waters. However, the military provides support to the U.S. Government enforcement effort through tracking of maritime vessels of interest.

In your view, what, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula?

The United States has strong alliances in the region, and, if necessary, we will leverage these alliances to deter any aggression from North Korea. Our forces throughout the region train rigorously and are fully prepared to deal with any contingencies in upholding our treaty obligations to Japan and the Republic of Korea. Our commitment to the security of these close allies includes the U.S. strategic umbrella, which is an integral part of our extended deterrence.

Republic of Korea (ROK)

Over the next several years, the U.S.-ROK alliance, a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region, will undergo significant change in terms of command and control and force positioning.

What is your understanding of the current U. S. security relationship with South Korea?

The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) security relationship is an enduring partnership that has been the key to deterrence for over 50 years. It ensures peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. The major advances made by the ROK in recent years regarding defense capability, economic capacity and technology are supporting the transformation of this partnership. Our alliance has evolved to become a global one, as demonstrated by the ROK military's contributions to overseas contingency operations such as the UN mission in Lebanon and Counter-Piracy operations off the Horn of Africa.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, will you take, in conjunction with Commander, U. S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command, to improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, United States Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command to ensure there is no degradation in readiness or deterrence. I will ensure that U.S. Pacific Command supports the transformation initiatives, such as force realignment, return of unneeded facilities, development of command relationships and contingency plans.

The transfer of command and control to the ROK is planned for April 2012. In your view, is that date achievable and should this transfer occur as planned?

The U.S. and ROK military forces are on track to complete the transition of wartime operational control in 2012. This effort will enable the ROK military to take the lead role in the defense of Korea. If confirmed, I will ensure that U.S. Pacific Command supports the united efforts to achieve the transformation on time.

Do you support increasing the number of personnel assigned to Korea for two or three years of duty and the number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer tours of duty?

Yes, if confirmed I will support the Secretary of Defense, who favors the concept of Tour Normalization, increasing the number of personnel assigned for two or three year tours, as well as the number of accompanied tours. Normalization of tours will provide greater stability for service members and family members, improve operational readiness

in Korea, and clearly demonstrate the enduring U.S. commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance. The Quadrennial Defense Review is examining methods to best implement this concept, and if confirmed, I will ensure that U.S. Pacific Command staff continues to support this effort.

What are the key considerations, in your view, in approving the stationing of more dependents in the Republic of Korea and how is your view on this matter affected, if at all, by the current tensions on the Korean peninsula?

Enhancing the stability of our families, improving the operational readiness of our forces in the ROK, and clearly demonstrating the enduring U.S. commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance all support our efforts to address the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Implementation of these initiatives will contribute to increased deterrence and should lessen the likelihood of increased tensions on the Peninsula.

China

China is viewed by some as a potential threat and by others as a potential constructive partner. Either way, it is clear that China has an increasingly significant role in the security and stability of the region, and the United States must determine how best to respond to China's emergence as a major regional and global economic and military power.

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military relations?

Our military-to-military relationship continues to be characterized by cyclical ups and downs and, in general, lags behind the overall U.S. – China relationship in terms of maturity. The recent Defense Consultative Talks, led by USD (P) Flournoy in Beijing this past June, was the symbolic re-start of our military-to-military relationship, unilaterally suspended by China in October 2008 over the announcement of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Although the meetings went well and re-starting a military-to-military dialogue is a notable accomplishment, it highlighted the fact that there were no official military-to-military relations between the U.S. and China for almost nine months. In a more mature relationship, which we are seeking, the value of a continuous mil-to-mil dialogue is recognized and leveraged to advance areas of common interest and help resolve areas of disagreement.

How would you characterize the quality of the U.S.-China military-to-military engagements to date?

The general trend in military-to-military relations has been positive since the April 1, 2001 collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 and a PLA fighter. The past two years of reduced engagement are hopefully atypical, as they were affected by a suspension of high level events during the Beijing Olympics in August 2008 and a pause as China responded to the earthquake disaster in May 2008. If confirmed, I will seek to stabilize the mil-to-mil relationship and resume a positive trend in both quality and quantity of engagements.

If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, what do you envision as your role in military-to-military engagements with China?

U.S. Pacific Command should lead the military-to-military relationship with China. As China and the People's Liberation Army are also engaging worldwide, other Combatant Commanders will also play a role in advancing the relationship. U.S. Pacific Command will work with these Combatant Commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to rationalize mil-to-mil engagements with China in support of broader U.S. – China strategic objectives.

How do China's efforts to establish a strategic presence in various South Asian seaports affect its political-military posture and influence in the region?

As China grows and expands her presence, it will be increasingly important to understand her intentions and to help influence her development as a responsible stakeholder. Chinese influence in South Asia, like much of the world, has been facilitated mainly by economic penetration into this region's markets. Chinese assistance in the development of Indian Ocean ports is intended to facilitate access to trade, resources and investment. To date we have not observed a military component to these port development projects. A more mature and sophisticated military-to-military relationship could lead to a better understanding of PRC long-term goals and intentions in South Asia, and contribute to a lessened likelihood of miscalculation.

China's defense spending in 2009 will exceed its 2008 spending by 15%, continuing its trend of double-digit growth in each of the last 20 years.

In your view, what is China's intent in pursuing such rapid military growth and modernization?

For the past 20 years, the main impetus for China's military modernization has been to prepare for a potential Taiwan conflict involving U.S. intervention. However, investments also indicate a broader national agenda. Lacking transparency into the full range of Chinese military spending and planning, there remains uncertainty over the future direction and goals of an increasingly powerful PLA.

What do you believe are China's political-military goals in the Asia-Pacific region and globally?

China aims to create a military commensurate with its re-emergence as a global great power with expanded regional and strategic interests. China seeks to be increasingly self-sufficient in its ability to secure its interests, including areas around China that it regards as sovereign Chinese territory as well as the international sea lines of communication upon which its economy depends.

Recent incidents involving the U. S. Navy and Chinese ships, such as with the USNS IMPECCABLE in the South China Sea and the USNS VICTORIOUS in the Yellow Sea, suggest the need for improved mutual understandings between the United States and China in the maritime environment.

Please describe your understanding of the current U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement.

The U.S. – China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) has within its title “...A Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety.” The goal is to develop operational and tactical level understanding between military operators of the international norms for conducting safe operations in close proximity to one another.

Has that agreement been effective? If not, how can it be improved?

The agreement has been a qualified success. The MMCA has served as a durable forum for communications between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. For example, a Special Meeting held under the MMCA was the first official meeting after the April 2001 EP-3 incident. In 2006, the MMCA forum facilitated a successful two phase, bi-lateral Search and Rescue Exercise off Hawaii and San Diego. However, the Chinese continue to use the MMCA as a platform to discuss policy and legal interpretations and to criticize U.S. military operations. If confirmed, I will seek to mature MMCA discussions such that they achieve their goal of enhancing the safety of sailors and airmen of both nations.

What should be done to prevent future maritime incidents with China?

A more mature military-to-military relationship will allow better understanding of intentions and reduce the chances for misunderstanding and miscalculations. As part of these discussions, via the MMCA and all other levels on engagement, the necessity to observe international norms in maritime operations may be emphasized.

Taiwan

What is your assessment of U.S.-Taiwan military relations?

Guided by the Taiwan Relations Act stipulation that we will make available to Taiwan defensive articles and services as necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, we maintain a robust military-to-military engagement with Taiwan at all levels. The U.S. and Taiwan regularly conduct dialogues and exchanges. For example, U.S. Pacific Fleet conducted the Bi Hai ("Blue Sea") forum with the Taiwan Navy. U.S. Pacific Command conducts an annual observation of Taiwan's HAN KUANG joint exercises. While our relationship is based on the Taiwan Relations Act and related policies, it is also shaped by our common democratic cultures. It is something I will continue to strongly support.

What are the priorities, in your view, for U. S. military assistance to Taiwan?

We closely monitor the shifting balance in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan's defense needs and Taiwan has made significant strides in increasing its self defense capabilities. We should continue to emphasize the importance of joint training -- to include both command post exercises and realistic training in the field -- as well as their need to more fully integrate their capabilities, including air and missile defenses.

Also, to the maximum extent possible, we should assist in Taiwan's transition to an all volunteer force, including development of a professional NCO corps.

What is your assessment of the cross-strait relationship between China and Taiwan?

The Ma Administration's cross-Strait policies have contributed to a lessening of tensions in the region. We support the expanding dialogue and exchanges across the Strait. Presently, the PRC continues to increase and improve its cross-Strait military posture. In the longer term, we should observe for a commensurate reduction in PRC military power that threatens Taiwan.

What is your view of the relationship between the type of assistance we offer Taiwan and the stability of the region?

Adequate defense in Taiwan and our support to that capability is essential to maintaining peace and security in Northeast Asia. The Taiwan Relations Act, which shapes our support to Taiwan, has been in force now for over thirty years and has played a valuable and important role in our approach to the region. Helping Taiwan maintain its self defense will help ensure cross-Strait balance, stability, and regional prosperity.

India

What is your view of the current state of U.S.-India military relations?

Our military-to-military relations with India are very positive and expanding. Overall, both the U.S. and India view our military-to-military relationship as the foundation of our "strategic partnership." Due to the wide range of shared security interests, accompanied with the increasing complexity and maturity of our engagement, this relationship will continue to expand. Currently, we are engaging India on many fronts including foreign military sales, advanced training such as MALABAR and RED FLAG, and real world operations such as counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and U.S. POW/MIA recovery missions in northeastern India.

If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for the U. S. military relationship with India?

India's growing economic, diplomatic and military power makes them a key player not only in South and Central Asia but globally as well. A strong positive relationship with India is essential to achieving long-term U.S. goals such as regional security and stability, reduced tensions with Pakistan, and wide-ranging cooperation to counter extremism. We should continue to expand our military-to-military engagement to include multi-lateral partners and increasingly complex exercise scenarios that help to advance India's military capabilities. In coordination with U.S. Central Command, we will develop confidence building measures and events that help reduce India-Pakistan tension and support the greater U.S.- Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy.

How do our engagements in Pakistan and Afghanistan affect our relations with India?

India has voiced strong support for U.S. objectives to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan and Pakistan. While they voice their support, they also voice their concern that the U.S. might sacrifice our strong bilateral relationship and its long-term benefits for the sake of an immediate Afghanistan-Pakistan campaign strategy. Our best course of action to allay Indian concerns while garnishing their overall support for our ongoing regional efforts is to continue to strengthen our bilateral relationship with India across all agencies of government, including mil-to-mil.

What relationship, if any, do you believe exists between the armed groups conducting terrorist attacks in India, and the armed groups conducting attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Leaders of violent extremist groups such as Al Qa'ida, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba leverage personal relationships forged during the 1980s when many of these leaders joined together to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. These informal, non-organizational relationships continue to factor into some extremist operations in the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility.

Republic of the Philippines

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-Philippine military relations?

The Philippines is one of the United States' five treaty allies in the Pacific and is a committed regional security partner. Our alliance is exceptionally strong. The U.S. has a mature and focused engagement with the Philippines that is achieving results in the form of enhanced counter-terrorism performance, maturing maritime security efforts, and increased commitment to multilateral regional security activities.

What is your view of the effectiveness of the special operation forces assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against terrorist groups?

The U.S. military is working effectively "by, with, and through" the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to provide assistance while respecting the legal restrictions on foreign forces embodied in the Philippine Constitution. The U.S. provides active support through a variety of security assistance and engagement activities designed to increase AFP capability and capacity to fight violent extremist organizations. The result of these efforts is evident in the increased ability to respond effectively to the threat of terrorist organizations like the Abu Sayaf Group and Jemah Ismaliya by AFP.

What measures or guidelines would you employ, if confirmed, to control the circumstances, if any, under which U.S. personnel may become involved in combat in the Republic of the Philippines?

The United States respects the sovereignty of the Philippines. Our policy is clear: U.S. Forces are not authorized to conduct combat operations in the Republic of the Philippines or to accompany Philippine Security Forces to locations where contact with the enemy by U.S. forces is anticipated. If confirmed, I will continue to support current restrictions and enforcement mechanisms prohibiting a combat role for U.S. forces.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a key Asian power and the largest Muslim country in the world. Building on opportunities to improve and expand U. S. relations with Indonesia where possible should be a key goal.

What is your assessment of U.S.-Indonesian military relations?

The U.S.-Indonesia military to military relationship has steadily grown since the normalization of relations in 2005. The relationship has evolved from initial, small-scale, bilateral exchanges into a more complex, focused partnership which encourages the Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI) to take the lead in bilateral and

multilateral exercises. TNI is a demonstrated partner in Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), and leadership development. The Indonesian Government has demonstrated its desire to work multilaterally and be a partner nation through the TNI's participation in United Nations PKO missions in Lebanon, the Congo, and Sudan; leading the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Capstone exercise, GARUDA SHIELD; and taking the lead in the United Nations Force Headquarters in COBRA GOLD.

Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions?

If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-military contact within the confines of existing legal restrictions and in close consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.

What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adherence to human rights standards, improvement in standards of military justice, and cooperation with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

The Government of Indonesia continues to make progress in military reform. Early progress toward defense reform - separation of the police from the military, eliminating formal political roles for the TNI, increasing accountability, and human rights training - has been sustained. The 2002 Defense Law and the 2004 TNI Law formally codified the roles and responsibilities of the TNI as a mechanism to support, not replace, civilian government. It is worth noting the TNI's professional conduct during recently completed parliamentary elections. Continued "hard" reforms that the U.S. should continue to push for include full accountability for past human rights abuses, strengthening civilian control, putting the TNI fully "on budget", and continued professionalism of the TNI officer corps.

If confirmed, I would support TNI's continued progress by encouraging professionalism within the military with particular emphasis on accountability and respect for human rights through bilateral security discussions, joint training, military assistance, and military training programs. U.S. interaction with TNI soldiers is the most effective method to encourage professionalism in the Indonesian military.

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian government is cooperating with the United States in the fight against terrorist networks?

Based on my current understanding, I believe the Government of Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with the U.S. and our allies in combating global terrorist networks in the region. The government has shown tremendous success in arresting and convicting terrorists.

Do you believe increased engagement by U. S. special operations forces, particularly in a foreign internal defense capacity, would be positive for the U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relationship?

Engagement by all our forces has been steadily increasing as our military-to-military relationship continues to mature and expand. In every case, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) inclusive, increased engagement has had significant positive impact on our growing partnership. Regardless of mission, our training focuses on reinforcing professional military practices to include respect for human rights and the rule of law.

What do you believe is the biggest challenge to increasing special operations engagement in Indonesia?

Current U.S. military engagement with the Indonesian Special Forces is fairly robust; U.S. Pacific Command currently trains with the Indonesian Naval Special Forces, Indonesian Marine Special Forces, and Indonesian Air Force Special Forces. U.S. SOF engagement with key Indonesian special operations forces (specifically the Indonesian Army Special Forces known as KOPASSUS) remains a challenge in light of current vetting requirements designed to preclude specific units previously linked to human rights abuses from participating in U.S.-funded training. In this regard, I am firmly committed to U.S. policies and laws on human rights and I will support all efforts to make sure that no U.S. money or training goes to those individuals who have abused human rights in the past.

Australia

The U.S.-Australia alliance remains strong and stands as a key component of regional security and stability.

Please describe your understanding of ongoing U.S. collaborative efforts with Australia, particularly with respect to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities in the region.

In September 2007, the U.S. and Australia agreed to pursue three areas of Enhanced Defense Cooperation (EDC): ISR, HA/DR, and Joint Combined Training Capability (JCTC). The recent April 2009 Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMINS) Joint Communiqué highlighted progress made on these enhanced defense cooperation initiatives.

The U.S. and Australia are partnering in an Enhanced ISR Initiative to increase interoperability in the employment of Australian and U.S. ISR systems to collect, fuse and share intelligence to meet our mutual defense and national needs around the globe. Collaborative efforts have enabled both nations to efficiently employ their low density, high demand ISR assets and strengthen strategic partnership in the Pacific.

Combined efforts to develop a HA/DR capability that enhances our joint response to catastrophic regional events is progressing. Though neither U.S. Pacific Command nor the Australia Defence Force own HA/DR stocks, our coordination efforts reach to the interagency, for a whole-of-government approach. As the HA/DR initial responders, our respective militaries improve coordination through existing agreements and arrangements and are exploring respective control-center linkages.

What do you believe should be done to continue to promote cooperation between the U.S. and Australia and to further enhance interoperability?

The Australia-U.S. military relationship is mature and successful. Continued bilateral/multilateral training, exercises, along with sustaining the ongoing range of formal and informal dialogues will enhance interoperability between the U.S. and Australia.

The Joint Combined Training Capability (JCTC) is the third initiative under the EDC umbrella our countries agreed to in 2007. JCTC is a networked architecture linking U.S. and Australia simulations and live forces to create realistic combat training. The technology proven during our biannual, bilateral exercise TALISMAN SABRE in 2007 will be further explored this month in TALISMAN SABRE 09, as well as other exercises and operations this year. The JCTC directly enhances interoperability between our two militaries, reduces cost and improves unilateral and bilateral training quality.

Thailand

What is your view of the strategic importance of Thailand in the Asia-Pacific region?

Thailand remains a dependable U.S. ally and our 175-year bilateral relationship (our oldest in Asia) remains strong. Thailand was declared a Major Non-NATO Ally of the U.S. in 2003, and the Royal Thai Government (RTG) continues to provide strong support and close cooperation in combating sources of terrorism. Thailand is key for U.S. regional security goals and addressing regional challenges such as maritime security, counter-terrorism and disaster relief. Thailand provides important access to military facilities for force projection, military exercises and humanitarian relief. Thailand hosts more exercises with the U.S. than any other Southeast Asian country, averaging over 40 per year, some of which are multilateral.

If confirmed what approach would you take to strengthening U. S. relationships with the government of Thailand?

We will continue expand our partnership in addressing global and regional security concerns and challenges. In recent years, Thailand has supported U.S. coalition efforts

by dispatching military units to Afghanistan and Iraq, sent military observers to Indonesia to support the Aceh peace process, and pledged a peacekeeping battalion for the UN Mission in Darfur. If confirmed, I will encourage the RTG to continue joining international efforts promoting peace and stability. Additionally, we will use our military exercise program and training courses to maintain close relationships with Thai political, military, law enforcement and intelligence officials, build defense relations that promote specific U.S. security interests, and reinforce civilian control of the military.

Transnational Threats in the PACOM AOR

Do you agree that drugs, human trafficking and terrorism are transnational threats in the Asia-Pacific region?

I agree these are all extremely serious and interrelated threats to regional stability. Transnational crime and terrorism thrive on common enablers such as illicit transportation networks, weapons trafficking, corruption, and the financial underground. These threats impact political, social, and economic systems differently yet in equal measure by eroding the rule of law; undermining the legitimacy of governments and institutions; and shifting wealth and power to terrorist and criminal networks.

If confirmed how would you approach the prioritization of these threats? How would you assess the role of the U. S. military in addressing them, as well as the adequacy of resources to do so?

These threats are mutually supporting and must be addressed collectively with other USG agencies, foreign partners, and stakeholders such as NGOs and the private sector. We cannot achieve objectives against violent extremism without confronting criminal challenges that facilitate extremist and insurgent freedom of action. U.S. Pacific Command must continue to enhance cooperation with its partners to identify our comparative advantages and apply them cohesively toward achieving desired outcomes. The military priority is to further evolve its ability to support U.S. and partner nation law enforcement activities.

U.S. Pacific Command is currently limited in this endeavor by resources and authorities. Counterdrug (CD) programs are the primary means for providing military support to law enforcement. Additional CD funding, coupled with expanded authorities for other military-civilian engagement, would significantly enhance our contributions to overall effort.

Missile Defense Capability in the PACOM AOR

Do you believe the United States currently has sufficient missile defense capabilities to defend U.S. forward deployed forces and allies in the U.S. Pacific Command AOR against the existing ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea?

Yes, we currently have sufficient ballistic missile defense capability to defend against the North Korean ballistic missile threat.

Theater Missile Defense Focus

With the Fiscal Year 2010 budget request, Secretary Gates has refocused the Department's missile defense program more on effective theater missile defenses to protect our forward deployed forces, allies, and friends against existing short- and medium-range missile threats from nations like North Korea. The budget request would provide \$900 million in increased funding for more of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Standard Missile-3 interceptors, and more Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ships.

Do you agree with Secretary Gates' decision to increase the focus on effective theater missile defenses to defend our forces against existing regional missile threats from nations like North Korea?

Yes, I agree with the Secretary that regional and theater missile defense warrants increased focus. The preponderance of the threats we face in the Pacific are short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

Missile Defense Relationships

What is your understanding of the current relationship between U. S. Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Strategic Command with respect to ballistic missile defense deployments and operations, for both regional and long-range missile defense?

As defined in the Unified Command Plan 2008, Commander U.S. Northern Command is charged with defense of the homeland that includes the continental United States and Alaska. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for the defense of Hawaii and all other defended areas within the U.S. Pacific Command Area Of Responsibility. The two commands work together, either as the supported or supporting commander, contingent upon the threat and defended area, to defend their respective areas of responsibility. Commander, U.S. Strategic Command is the global synchronizer for planning and coordinating global missile defense.

Aegis-class Ship Assignments

What is your understanding of the arrangement whereby Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers of the U. S. Pacific Fleet will be made available, or dedicated, to ballistic missile defense missions, and what impact will this arrangement have on the capability of U. S. Pacific Command and U. S. Pacific Fleet to fulfill their other missions involving Aegis-class ships?

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command and Commander, U.S. Northern Command have established a system of readiness conditions for theater and global missile defense, respectively. Aegis requirements are clearly delineated in these readiness conditions, and they provide the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, the opportunity to integrate these requirements into his planning and resource allocation processes, ensuring his ability to fulfill the missile defense mission and the other Aegis specific missions for which he is responsible.

If confirmed, how would you propose to strike an appropriate balance between missile defense and non-missile defense missions for ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet?

If confirmed, I will promote and ensure close and frequent coordination between commanders with Ballistic Missile Defense responsibilities. Key to striking the right balance is U.S. Pacific Command's continued focus on integrating Patriot Advance Capabilities-3 (PAC-3), AN-TPY-2 Forward Based X-Band Radar Transportable (FBX-T), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) into the BMD architecture in order to improve its theater-wide BMD capability and reduce its reliance on Aegis ships. Finally, I will continue U.S. Pacific Command efforts to leverage potential allied contributions towards regional missile defense missions.

U.S. Special Operations Command

What is your understanding of the requirements for coordination and cooperation between U.S. Special Operations Command teams working to fulfill the global terrorism mission, U.S. Pacific Command, and the U.S. mission chiefs in the relevant countries?

Coordination and cooperation between U.S. Pacific Command, Ambassadors, and Special Operations Command teams remains essential to success in the Global War on Terror. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command assumes Operational Control (OPCON) of Special Operations Forces once those forces enter the AOR. In all cases, Ambassadors remain responsible for activities in their respective country, to include Theater Security Cooperation activities involving Special Operations Forces. As a result, the military commander exercising OPCON is required to coordinate activities with the respective Ambassador.

Additionally, coordination with U.S. Special Operations Command and Country Ambassadors continues even after OPCON has been assumed by Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. In certain circumstances, U.S. Special Operations Command may retain OPCON of forces conducting specialized missions or crossing Geographic Combatant Commander boundaries.

If confirmed, would you seek to change any aspects of these requirements?

I do not foresee recommending changes in the current command and support relationships.

Some have suggested that the rank of Theater Special Operations Commanders should be increased, as should the size of their respective staffs, to be commensurate with the level of special operations conducted in certain geographic regions.

Given the number of special operations personnel deployed in the U.S. Pacific Command theater in recent years, do you believe such measures should be considered?

In 2006, the Commander, Special Operations Command Pacific position was elevated from a one-star to two-star billet. At this time, I am comfortable with this rank structure. Additionally, Special Operations Command recently completed a manpower study that addressed SOF mission growth and the associated manpower to support. I am comfortable with this evolving process.

Technology Priorities

U.S. Pacific Command has been active in the Joint Concept Technology Development (JCTD) process and currently has several projects in the program, as well as cooperative activities with Service and Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) research programs.

If confirmed, what steps would you expect to take to make your requirements known to the department's science and technology community to ensure the availability of needed equipment and capabilities in the long term?

If confirmed, I will support efforts to strengthen the partnership between U.S. Pacific Command and the Science & Technology (S&T) community. In so doing, U.S. Pacific Command will help researchers better understand the context of our operational problems, while we gain better insight into solutions maturing through Service efforts. I plan to use the Integrated Priority List (IPL) as the foundation for these discussions. JCTDs will continue to be an important path for maturing S&T efforts into operational capabilities. Additionally, I will explore new S&T initiatives with key allies and partners across Asia Pacific to meet shared operational challenges and increase

interoperability. Ultimately, I would like to see at least one JCTD or Rapid Technology Transition project against each of the IPL gaps and corresponding S&T capability development partnership projects with key allies and partners in the Asia Pacific region.

Exercises and Training

What is your assessment of the current U. S. Pacific Command training and exercise program, including those designed to train personnel for peace and stability operations?

My assessment is the U.S. Pacific Command exercise program is very effective, as evidenced by successful disaster relief operations, responsive support to overseas contingency operations in the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command Areas Of Responsibility, and the improvements in the quality of our regional partners' peacekeeping forces..

I recognize the importance of a rigorous training and exercise program. If confirmed, U.S. Pacific Command training and exercises will continue to receive emphasis based on their value in maturing U.S. readiness and capabilities and improving our ability to operate with allies and partners in the region.

Do you believe that the U.S. Pacific Command's training and exercise program currently has adequate funding and personnel resources?

I do not yet have a full appreciation of the funding and resource status of the U.S. Pacific Command training and exercise program. I am aware of the Congressionally-created Combatant Command Exercise Engagement (CE2) account that supports joint training. From my observations, this account has significantly enabled conduct of our training and exercise program. If confirmed, I will ensure resources are effectively used and advocate for additional resources when necessary.

What are your views on how the U.S. Pacific Command, in concert with the Joint Forces command, could improve its training and exercise program, including training and exercises for peace and stability operations?

I view collaboration with U.S. Joint Forces Command and the continuous assessment such interaction fosters as central to improving the command's training program. I also anticipate the new Pacific Warfighting Center (PWC), when integrated into U.S. Joint Forces Command's global grid of warfighting centers, will allow U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command to continue to cooperatively develop transformational training concepts for traditional warfighting, peace and stability operations, irregular warfare, and a whole of government approach to mission execution. If confirmed, U.S. Pacific Command will continue to pursue Interagency and multinational and multilateral participation in its training and exercise program to

replicate the operating environment as realistically as possible.

Our Global Peace Operations Initiative training with partner nations continues to advance, successfully producing capable, ready forces to address peacekeeping-related requirements.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps has expressed reservations, in the context of the planned move of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam, about the ability to do effective collective training of Marines on Guam or in the Northern Marianas.

Do you share that concern?

I understand the Commandant's training concerns associated with the move to Guam. I believe continued collaboration with all of the elements involved with the move is critical to successfully working through the many issues associated with an endeavor of this magnitude.

POW/MIA Accounting Efforts

Recovery of remains of U. S. servicemembers from World War II, the Korean War, and the Viet Nam war continues to be a very high priority and the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) is critical to recovery and identification efforts.

What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the JPAC and its relationship to the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Office?

The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command conducts operations to support accounting of personnel unaccounted for as a result of hostile acts. U.S. Pacific Command provides higher headquarters support and direction, and interface between JPAC and the Joint staff and OSD. The Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) exercises policy, control, and oversight within the Department of Defense. DPMO and JPAC coordinate directly on routine POW/MIA issues.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts at JPAC and throughout the U. S. Pacific Command AOR?

JPAC resources and accounting efforts are focused not only in the U.S. Pacific Command region, but throughout the world. If confirmed, I will encourage full cooperation by the host nations where we conduct POW/MIA activities and continue to reinforce U.S. Government priorities and commitment in our accounting and recovery efforts with leaders of these countries and the respective U.S. Ambassadors.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the adequacy of resources available for this work?

If confirmed, it is my duty to ensure JPAC accomplishes their mission. I will work to ensure JPAC is fully resourced to accomplish its mission and pledge that we will not compromise the integrity of the mission or the ability of the U.S. government to provide the fullest possible accounting to the families of our Nation's unaccounted. I am committed to maintain and expand, when requirements dictate, the scientific expertise and integrity inherent in JPAC today. U.S. Pacific Command will provide the JPAC Commander its full support in the conduct of its mission.

Quality of Life

Combatant commanders have an interest in the quality of life of military personnel and their families assigned within their AOR.

In your view, what is the role and responsibility of combatant commanders for the quality of life of personnel assigned to their AOR?

The Combatant Commander is a strong advocate for improving the quality of life (QoL) for assigned personnel. The Commander ensures that QoL issues are articulated to community leaders, military installation commanders, DoD policy makers, and members of Congress. The Commander must also be a synergistic partner with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Area Of Responsibility sub-unified commands, other combatant commands, local industry, and government and non-DoD agencies to garner support and resources for QoL programs.

If confirmed, what would you do to enhance quality of life programs for military members and their families within the U. S. Pacific Command?

If confirmed, I would make QoL for the service members and families of U.S. Pacific Command one of my top priorities. People are our most important resource and constant focus on QoL initiatives is vital to effectively implementing our "partnership, readiness and presence" strategy in the region.

First and foremost, it would be my responsibility to commit resources and support funding for the broad array of initiatives and efforts that comprise an effective QoL program. I would ensure adequate and appropriate access for our service members to the high quality training, facilities, equipment, and technology necessary to ensure safe and effective mission completion. I would also ensure that our service members and their families have access to the exceptional services, facilities and programs they deserve given their commitment to our Nation (housing, medical/dental, commissary and exchange, child care, and morale, welfare, and recreations facilities).

Tailored and effective QoL programs and services demonstrate our commitment to our personnel, both at home and deployed, by appropriately compensating them for their service and providing for their families. Our fighting forces deserve exceptional access to such QoL programs and services and I stand committed to ensuring they get them.

What is your view of the challenges associated with global rebasing on the quality of life of members and their families in the U. S. Pacific Command AOR (including adequate health care services and DOD schools)?

The biggest challenge will be preserving the QoL for our service members and their families while we realign our forces in theater.

Throughout the transition process, we should focus our efforts on maintaining quality housing, DoD schools, commissary and exchange services, medical/dental facilities, higher education, work life, family and community support programs for our people. We should sustain current levels of service during the transformation 'out' phase and ensure these systems are in place before families arrive in the area.

What steps do you believe need to be taken in Guam to ensure that adequate services are available to U.S. personnel and their dependents?

As we plan for increased military development in Guam, we must ensure organizations and agencies that provide services to U.S. personnel and their dependents are included in the planning process, and adequate funding for expansion of these services is provided.

The Joint Guam Program Office, established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and tasked with executing this comprehensive redevelopment effort, is leading the planning process and is engaging DoD Components and other stakeholders to program and budget for adequate services for U.S. personnel and their dependents in Guam. If confirmed, I will ensure JGPO is fully informed of U.S. Pacific Command QoL requirements on Guam.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

What should be the role for the U.S. military in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region?

The role of the U.S. military during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief contingencies is to support U.S. efforts, specifically upon the request of host nations via U.S. Department of State, to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and preclude regional conflicts. The request for assistance is normally initiated by or through the U.S. Ambassador, and is typically of short duration for immediate needs that cannot be fulfilled by the host nation or the international relief community.

The Asia-Pacific region has experienced some of the worst natural disasters in recent history, including the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. In support of U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. government's broader relief efforts, DoD has played an instrumental role in the international response to recent Asian disasters (e.g. Burma, Philippines, Bangladesh, China) and is deeply involved in interagency disaster preparedness/mitigation planning efforts.

DoD HA/DR efforts have provided unique military capabilities (strategic airlift, logistics, transportation, communication) and have made significant contributions by saving lives, reducing human suffering, helping build partner capacities, and preventing crisis from becoming conflicts thereby increasing security and stability in the region. Such DoD contributions should continue in the Asia-Pacific region.

Are the resources necessary to fulfill this role currently available to the U.S. Pacific Command commander? If not, what additional resources are necessary?

The required resources are either currently assigned to U.S. Pacific Command or are readily available through normal mechanisms for providing logistical support or acquiring and providing specifically identified commodities, such as shelter, food, water, or medical supplies.

Law of the Sea Convention

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is pending consideration in the United States Senate.

What is your view on whether or not the United States should join the Law of the Sea convention?

Like the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, I strongly support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.

How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention help or hinder the United States' security posture in the Asia-Pacific region?

Being a party to the Law of the Sea Convention would enhance U.S. security posture in the Asia-Pacific region. As the Chief of Naval Operations has testified, the Law of the Sea Convention provides a robust legal regime for global operations by U.S. Armed Forces. Particularly important, it codifies navigation and over flight rights as well as high seas freedoms necessary for global mobility of our forces throughout the region. The Convention also codifies the right of warships to seize pirates and pirate vessels, the right of warships to approach and visit commercial vessels, the right to lay and maintain submarine cables (such as internet cables) on continental shelves, and the sovereign immunity of warships, public vessels, and military aircraft.

Many nations are already signatories to the Convention and I believe it is in our national security interests to do the same. Our current non-party status constrains our ability to develop enduring partnerships, inhibits our efforts to expand the Proliferation Security Initiative, and elevates the level of risk our sailors assume when they undertake their duties to preserve navigational rights and freedoms. I believe we ought to eliminate all barriers to collaboration and cooperation with like-minded partners in the maritime domain – accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would facilitate that process.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U.S. Pacific Command?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.