

**Advance Questions for General James E. Cartwright, USMC**  
**Nominee for the Position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**Defense Reforms**

**On two previous occasions you have answered the Committee's policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Action, the last time being in connection with your first nomination to be Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

**Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the Committee at your most recent confirmation hearing?**

*No. The Goldwater-Nichols reforms have clearly strengthened the warfighting and operational capabilities of our combatant commands and our Nation.*

**In your previous response to a question concerning whether you saw a need for modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment, you indicated that there [are a series] of ongoing reviews of Goldwater-Nichols and that you would study these reviews if confirmed.**

**In light of your experience as Vice Chairman and your study of the reviews do you see any need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

*The reviews of Goldwater-Nichols have been completed and the required modifications incorporated into how the Department manages joint officers.*

*During the past two years, the Joint Officer Management process has built on the strong foundation established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act with a flexible structure to meet the ever-changing landscape characterized by today's military environment. The new Joint Qualification System is more responsive to the warfighters in multi-Service, multi-national and interagency operations and produces fully qualified and inherently joint officers to meet the needs of our great Nation. Our emphasis will continue to focus on assigning high quality officers to joint assignments and ensuring they receive a joint experience that produces experts in joint matters. As we continue to advance Jointness, joint officer management will continue to evolve. As we evolve, we may find some areas of the law that may require some future modification. However, at this time, I believe we have the necessary tools.*

## **Duties**

**What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in section 154 of title 10, United States Code, and in regulations of the Department of Defense pertaining to functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

*None at this time.*

**Based on your previous experience as Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, and your current experience as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in chapter 6 of title 10, United States Code, as it pertains to the powers and duties of combatant commanders?**

*None at this time.*

## **Relationships**

**Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:**

### **The Secretary of Defense**

*As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.*

*Additionally, in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the absence or disability ceases. These duties include serving as the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense.*

*As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Vice Chairman may submit advice or opinions to the Chairman in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman submits such opinion or advice at the same time he delivers his own.*

*The Vice Chairman, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may also individually or collectively, in his capacity as a military advisor, provide the Secretary of Defense advice upon the Secretary's request.*

## **The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

*Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary. In addition, the Vice Chairman co-chairs the Deputies Advisory Working Group with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to work key resources and management issues for the Department of Defense.*

## **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

*The Vice Chairman performs the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, or during the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to sustaining a close and effective working relationship with the Chairman.*

## **The Under Secretaries of Defense**

*Title 10 United States Code, and current Department of Defense (DoD) directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistance and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DoD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretaries.*

## **The Assistant Secretaries of Defense**

*With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks & Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that described above for the Under Secretaries.*

## **The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

*Title 10, United States Code, Section 165 provides that, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.*

*The Chairman, or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Department conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the combatant commands.*

## **The Chiefs of Staff of the Services**

*As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. With respect to Title 10 responsibilities, they serve two significant roles. First and foremost, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no Combatant Commander can be ensured of the preparedness of their assigned forces for missions directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President.*

*Secondly, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Chiefs and their Vice Chiefs to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.*

## **The Combatant Commanders**

*The Combatant Commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. The Chairman provides a vital link between the Combatant Commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense, and as directed by the President, serves as the means of communication between the Combatant Commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense. When the Vice Chairman is performing the Chairman's duties in the latter's absence, he relates to the Combatant Commanders as if he were the Chairman.*

## **The Special Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan**

*Because the Special Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan is an officer serving in an agency outside the Department of Defense, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicates to that official through the Secretary of Defense.*

## **The Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security**

*The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council along with the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security. In this capacity, we will work together to oversee and coordinate the nation's nuclear weapons policies to include the safety, security, and control issues for existing weapons and proposed new weapons programs.*

### **Major Challenges and Problems**

**What are the major challenges that you have faced in your first term as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

*First, supporting the ongoing war against violent extremism. Second, ensuring COCOMs are better represented in the requirements, acquisition and resourcing processes. Third, ensuring needs of the COCOMs are realized in a timely affordable fashion.*

**What new challenges do you expect to face if you are confirmed for a second term?**

*First, the transition of our warfighting forces in support of the nations priority effort in Afganistan. Second, we face the threat of a diminishing deterrence capability able to address the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and violent extremism. Third, the emergence of cyber threats against, private citizens, the commercial sector and national security.*

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

*If confirmed I will first work to ensure our forces have the resources and capabilities to enable them to prevail in Afganistan. Second, I will work with the COCOMs, OSD and our interagency partners to develop the capabilities necessary to deter both the extremists that seek weapons of mass destruction and those who would either proliferate these weapons or who are ineffective in safe-guarding these weapons. Third, I will support the stand-up of the recently announced Cyber Command and the development of capabilities and protocols necessary to defend the nations' interests and protect the rights that define our way of life under the Constitution.*

### **Joint Requirements Oversight Council**

**As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you are now, and if confirmed, you would continue to be, the chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC has the responsibility to review and validate Service requirements.**

**What is your view of the modifications to the JROC process made by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009?**

*My basic goal if confirmed would be to enhance the voice of the customer (COCOM) in the requirements process. We are supportive of the overall goal of the changes mandated by the Reform Act. Many of the JROC process changes codified improvements we incorporated into our procedures over the last few years.*

**What additional steps do you believe that Congress or the Department should take to ensure that trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance objectives for major weapon systems are made at an appropriately early point in the acquisition process?**

*I do not believe any additional Congressional action is necessary at this point. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process, working in concert with the acquisition and programming processes ensures there is an assessment of tradeoffs between cost, schedule and performance throughout the lifecycle of a program. Recent changes to these processes, some codified in the 2009 Acquisition Reform Act, should be allowed to mature for a period of time before we make any additional modifications.*

**Are there any other recommendations that you would make to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?**

*In today's environment, the JROC needs to be as responsive as possible to warfighter needs. JROC should represent the Combatant Commanders' interests, Service interests, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I would recommend changes to the extent possible be codified in department level directives. Currently, the VCJCS sits as the chairman of the JROC as a delegated authority from the CJCS. Among the changes I would advocate are, the VCJCS should be designated as Chairman of the JROC. He should have the authority to delegate, when appropriate, requirements decision making authority to the Commander of a functional combatant command for specific capabilities or a portfolio of capabilities. I would also invest the Chairman of the JROC with the authority to make the final decision on requirements after having heard and reviewed the membership positions of the members of the Council.*

**How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the DOD acquisition process?**

*I believe the JROC is an effective partner with OSD in the acquisition process. We have tracked closely with OSD as the DOD acquisition process has been recently modified and have made changes to the requirements process to ensure we maintain our alignment. Through participation in many common forums, such as the Defense Acquisition Board and the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, we are able to identify any*

*disconnects early and make the necessary course corrections. We also closely track program performance through development*

**What is your vision for the role and priorities of the JROC in the future?**

*The priority for the JROC now and in the future will be to understand and be responsive to the needs of the Combatant Commanders. To that end, the JROC will continue to focus on meeting the urgent capability needs of today's warfighter while also working with the Combatant Commanders to define the capabilities required for the future force.*

**What changes, if any, would you recommend in the membership of the JROC?**

*Currently the combatant commands are invited to participate as advisors to the JROC at their discretion. I would like to see combatant command, OSD (P), OSD (AT&L) and OSD (C) participation formalized by including them as members of the JROC to ensure the JROC clearly understands the warfighter's concerns and issues before decisions are made. In order to ensure warfighter requirements are understood and consistent in translations to solutions. I also recommend OSD (P), OSD (AT&L) and OSD (C) be permanent members.*

**Do you believe the JROC process is sufficient to understand and identify where there are opportunities for multi-service collaboration or where programs could or should be modified to take advantage of related acquisition programs?**

*We can always improve but generally the JROC is effective in ensuring collaboration among the Services. The Services participate throughout the requirements vetting process. One new initiative is to use COCOM defined and prioritized attributes through the Senior Warfighter Forums (SWarF) process to balance cross service programs.*

**What principles guide your approach to inviting, and helping ensure the sufficient participation of other such stakeholders in the JROC?**

*I view the JROC as an open, collaborative forum where we solicit input and advice from any organization with a stake in the requirements being validated.*

**Acquisition Reform and Acquisition Management**

**What is your view of the changes made by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2010?**

*I fully support the changes made in the Acquisition Reform Act and am working to implement any necessary changes to the requirements process.*

**What role have you played, and do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the implementation of that Act?**

*As the Chairman of the JROC, I am working to implement any changes to the requirements process necessary to support implementation of the Act.*

**What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in the oversight and management of acquisition programs after requirements have been established?**

*I believe the JROC should continue to monitor the execution of acquisition programs to identify potential areas where requirements may be driving cost growth and schedule delays. To that end, we have established a trip-wire process to bring programs experiencing cost growth or excessive delays back to the JROC for review. During these reviews, we consider performance trades to mitigate further growth in cost and delays in schedule.*

**Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation or acquisition management processes?**

*No. I believe these roles are well-defined and effective in providing coherent integration between the three processes.*

**What is your view of the role played by Configuration Steering Boards in preventing cost growth due to requirements creep?**

*I think that the Configuration Steering Boards are still maturing, but can provide meaningful advice to the Milestone Decision Authority on areas where requirements imposed by acquisition officials could be adjusted to prevent cost growth and schedule slips.*

**What do you see as the proper relationship between Configuration Steering Boards and the JROC in managing requirements for acquisition programs?**

*When a Configuration Steering Board recommends adjusting requirements to prevent or mitigate cost growth or schedule delays, the requirements community should weigh the recommendations and provide clear guidance in support of the recommendations as appropriate. If there are concerns the concerns should be presented to the board in a timely fashion.*

**What is your view of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements for Major Defense Acquisition Programs that fail to meet cost, schedule and performance objectives?**

*The Nunn-McCurdy certification requirements force the Department to perform a fundamental reassessment of a program and to decide, to either restructure it or terminate it. From a JROC perspective, it is appropriate to ask the warfighter to*

*revalidate the program's essentiality and requirements. In 2007, the JROC established a trip-wire process to bring troubled programs back to the JROC for a review and to consider performance trade-offs to mitigate further cost growth and/or schedule delays before the program faced a Nunn-McCurdy review.*

**What do you see as the proper relationship between the JROC and those charged with implementing the Nunn-McCurdy requirements?**

*The role of the JROC as the military advisor to the Milestone Decision Authority is appropriate when assessing Nunn-McCurdy breaches.*

**There have been a number of studies in the past several years that have recommended a variety of changes in the way that the acquisition programs are managed.**

**What is your view of these studies and which recommendations, if any has the JROC implemented?**

*The JROC views the studies as providing valuable insight and recommendations to improve the requirements process and improve its linkage to the acquisition and programming processes. We have implemented many recommendations to streamline the requirements process, enhance the engagement of the Combatant Commanders in validating joint warfighter needs, and to critically assess cost, schedule and performance.*

**Do you see any need to make any changes to the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development (JCIDS) process?**

*We've just completed a major update to the JCIDS process and will continue to evaluate the need for further changes. This included changes to align the JCIDS process with the recent changes to the DOD Acquisition process. But more importantly we streamlined the process to reduce non-value added administration and improve visibility and access for all stakeholders.*

### **Nuclear Weapons Council**

**If confirmed for a second term as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you would continue to serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.**

**What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)?**

*If confirmed, I look forward to continuing my membership on the Nuclear Weapons Council as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

*My priorities will continue to focus on ensuring a safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile that can meet the current and future national security interests of the United State; and developing stockpile options, including warhead and*

*infrastructure modernization, that support the President's objectives and future arms control commitments.*

*I look forward to working with Congress to address these challenges to ensure we meet our national security requirements while assuring our allies with a secure, credible and modern nuclear arsenal.*

**What changes if any would you recommend to the organization, structure, or function of the NWC?**

*I support the current initiative to include the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force as members of the NWC.*

**What role is the NWC playing or should it play in the ongoing negotiations for a follow on to the Strategic Arms Control Treaty?**

*As a body, the NWC does not play an active role in the follow on Strategic Arms Control Treaty negotiations. However, the NWC itself is aware of ongoing negotiations efforts and is working closely with key leaders in both the negotiating and Nuclear Posture Review teams.*

**What role is the NWC playing or should it play in the ongoing deliberations on the Nuclear Posture Review?**

*The NWC is aware and providing input to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) deliberations and will play an important role in implementing the policy recommendations that result from the NPR's effort.*

### **Distribution of General and Flag Officers**

**At the request of the Secretary of Defense, Congress included a provision in the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 that designated up to 324 general and flag officer positions as joint duty assignments that are excluded from the limitation on the number of general and flag officers in each service, and specified the minimum number of officers required to serve in these positions for each service. The provision also reduced the number of general and flag officers authorized to serve on active duty in each service. Implementation of this provision was delayed until one year after the Secretary of Defense submits a report on the proposed implementation of the provision, which took place in June 2009.**

**What is your view of the merits of this provision?**

*The provision does not reduce the number of general and flag officers authorized to serve on active duty. Implementation of this provision will support the objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols act by a creating statutory framework that allows the Secretary of*

*Defense to reimburse the Services for participation in joint with G/FO authorizations. Importantly, the Joint Pool recognizes in-Service general and flag officer requirements to accomplish the mission organize, train and equip are separate from joint general/flag officer requirements.*

**In your view, what impact will implementation of this provision have on joint officer assignments?**

*The Joint Pool will increase competition for these senior joint duty assignments. The legislation provides incentives for the Military Services to nominate their best officers, from both their active duty and reserve components, thereby accelerating the competencies required for our Nation to continue to address the challenges that confront our forces. As proposed, the distribution of senior joint authorizations among the Military Services with a specified minimum distribution for each Service expands the number of positions open to nomination by all four Services.*

**In your opinion, should implementation of this provision be delayed until June, 2010, one year from the date the Secretary submitted the required report?**

*The Department is requesting enactment of conforming legislation in the Department's 2010 legislative package. This provides the Department the flexibility to rapidly meet emerging joint requirements.*

### **Rebalancing Forces**

**In a memorandum of July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed action by the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense aimed at achieving better balance in the capabilities of the active and reserve components. The Secretary noted that the Department "needs to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solution based on a disciplined force requirements process."**

**What progress has been made in achieving the Secretary's vision?**

*Much progress has been made but much work still lies ahead of us. As examples of progress made I would highlight:*

- 1. Access to our National Guard and Reserve forces has allowed the level of engagement we have been able to support in OIF / OEF.*
- 2. The integration of National Guard, Reserve and Active forces in our first CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force has given our nation a much needed capability to assist our civil authorities as we respond to homeland situations.*

**What do you consider to be the biggest continuing obstacles to achieving the goals that the Secretary of Defense has set forth in his memorandum?**

*Our biggest challenge in achieving the Secretary of Defense's goals is to determine the optimal balance of capabilities in AC and RC components based on a complex and changing operational environment. As an example in the QDR, we are working to determine how to get the most capacity out of our rotary wing forces. A key aspect of this work is the balance between active and guard / reserve forces including expectations of our guard / reserve personnel regarding access.*

### **Mental Health Issues**

**The final report of the Department of Defense Task Force on Mental Health issues in June 2007 found evidence that the stigma associated with mental illness represents a “critical failure” in the military, preventing individuals from seeking needed care. The report states, “Every military leader bears responsibility for addressing stigma; leaders who fail to do so reduce the effectiveness of the service members they lead.” In light of increasing suicide rates in each of the Services and service members diagnosed with post-traumatic stress, it is more important than ever to ensure that service members and their families have access to mental health care and that the stigma associated with seeking such care is eliminated.**

**If confirmed, what actions would you take to address the stigma associated with mental illness in the military?**

*The stigma associated with mental health illness is an issue in both the civilian community and the military. I consider the elimination of mental health stigma to be a leadership issue, not a health issue. I support the Chairman's determination to change our culture and I assure you this is a top priority for me as well. If confirmed, I intend to provide strong leadership to ensure that we overcome this impediment and expect leaders at every level to follow suit.*

*The Chairman chartered a task force of subject matter experts from across the Joint Staff to develop a Campaign Plan for Warrior and Survivor Care. The Campaign plan specifically addresses these issues. The Task Force, in partnership with the National Defense University and the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury, is facilitating the development of a psychological health leader education program for all National Defense University schools. We continue to actively seek out senior military leaders who have received psychological health care and gone on to excel in their careers, and use these leaders to mentor our leaders of the future. I will continue to include this topic as a priority in each of my interactions with service members and families, and actively encourage other leaders to address the issue across our spectrum of senior leader engagement opportunities.*

*We have started to address this issue within other areas of the DoD as well. The Services have implemented multiple initiatives to build resilience, prevent adverse effects of combat stress and provide increased access to mental health services, including initiatives such as embedding mental health personnel in our deploying units and performing post-deployment health assessments and reassessments.*

*In response to the 2007 Mental Health Task Force report, DoD developed an action plan to address over 365 recommendations from the Mental Health Task Force report as well as several other reports. We continue implementation of the action plan, and updates are provided to Congress each fall. I will continue to work closely with Congress, our military leaders, Veterans Affairs and other federal and civilian organizations to see that our service members' and families' psychological health and mental health issues are addressed.*

**What is your view of the need for revision to military policies on command notification when service members seek mental health care?**

*Because of the known connection between these policies and the issue of stigma that we currently face, I believe that all policies for command notification should be closely examined for their true association with military readiness and safety. Without question, when military readiness and safety are not adversely impacted, policies which mandate command notification should be changed.*

*Secretary Gates' recent announcement that the military security clearance process will no longer include questions about mental health care history is a significant step in attempting to remove the stigma of receiving mental health care among military members, particularly in a time of war when combat stress is impacting many of our service members.*

**Sexual Assault Prevention and Response**

**Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan have been reported over the last several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They assert that the Command failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services, including medical attention and criminal investigation of their charges.**

**What role, if any, should the Joint Staff have in monitoring progress within the military services and the combatant commands' areas of responsibility in order to ensure enforcement of a "zero tolerance" policy relating to sexual assaults?**

*As a member of the DOD Sexual Assault Advisory Council, it is important that the Joint Staff continues to partner with OSD, the military services and the combatant commands to assess the requirements and effectiveness of policies and procedures in place to enforce the "zero tolerance" policy. This is the appropriate forum to monitor progress and provide senior leader oversight.*

*The Joint Staff works closely with the Combatant Commands during the development of operational plans and personnel policy guidance to ensure the prevention*

*and response to incidents of sexual assault is addressed.*

**What reporting requirements or other forms of oversight by service leaders do you think are necessary to ensure that the goals of sexual assault prevention and response policies are achieved?**

*Currently reports are submitted through Service channels, the fielding of the new DOD sexual assault information database will improve communication protocols to better track victims services, case management and disposition, and identify trends and areas requiring additional emphasis.*

*The new database will also provide Combatant Commanders oversight of sexual assaults that occur in their areas of responsibility.*

**What is your understanding of the resources and programs in place in deployed locations to offer victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?**

*There is a 24/7 response capability in deployed areas. The services have primary responsibility to ensure sexual assault response personnel in deployed locations (Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, Victim Advocates, medical and mental health providers, criminal investigation and legal personnel) are well trained to support victims and investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault. If resources are not readily available where the alleged incident occurred, victims are transported to a facility where there is appropriate victim advocate support, medical and psychological care (regardless of service) and investigative/legal support.*

*I am aware that a number of recommendations were made to USCENTCOM in the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2008 Report on Sexual Assault in the Military, released in March. These included deploying Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Victim Advocates and outfitting larger field hospitals with Sexual Assault Forensic Examination kits for evidence collection. Initial, independent Service responses to these recommendations may have created areas where duplicative support structures exist. In these instances, opportunities may exist to better pool and employ resources to optimize coverage and improve response.*

*Also, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services is currently evaluating how effectively the Services are implementing the DoD sexual assault policy and procedures. They interviewed key sexual assault responders currently deployed in Afghanistan, including chaplains, counselors, medical and legal personnel, and Criminal Investigations Division agents regarding how they handle cases of sexual assault. In addition, the Task Force has surveyed Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Victim Advocates in Afghanistan regarding the level of resources and support they have, and regarding the effectiveness of restricted reporting in the deployed environment. Their findings and recommendations will be reported to SECDEF later this year.*

*Commanders at all levels must remain committed to eliminating sexual assault within our forces by sustaining robust prevention and response policies; by providing thorough and effective training to all assigned Service members, by identifying and eliminating barriers to reporting; and by ensuring care is available and accessible.*

**What is your view of steps the Services have taken to prevent sexual assaults in deployed locations?**

*The Services are implementing procedures and processes to meet the challenges of preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault in the deployed areas. All service members and first responders receive sexual assault and sexual harassment prevention training prior to deployment. The use of the internet and media are effective tools in keeping deployed personnel informed and trained in prevention techniques. Coordination among Service sexual assault response personnel has improved support to victims in the operational environment and provides additional resources to conduct additional training if needed.*

**What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?**

*The services are responsible for training sexual assault response personnel to ensure they are well trained to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault. This includes the investigative resources in deployed areas. However, as you may imagine, the combat environment and deployed operations are very dynamic. The investigative resources are often strained by other mission requirements. Access to resources may be complicated by remoteness of locations, availability of transportation to and from those areas or the level of ongoing operations. I believe the DoD training network in place now prepares them and investigators to handle sexual assault cases in a caring, responsive and professional manner. Our ability to respond and support victims is paramount.*

**Allocating more funding and resources to the SAPR program to adequately implement the all program requirements will improve response capability.**

**Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential, or restricted, reporting to be effective?**

*I believe current policies and procedures have improved care to victims of sexual assault; however, restricted reporting limits a commander's ability to support the victim, investigate and/or hold alleged offenders accountable.*

*Restricted reporting has been effective (original intent – to allow a sexual assault victim to confidentially receive medical treatment and counseling without triggering the official investigation process). Although the use of restricted, or confidential, reporting doesn't allow a commander to investigate alleged assaults, it does allow a sexual assault victim to confidentially receive medical treatment and counseling without triggering the*

*official investigation process. Since restricted reporting was implemented in FY 05, 406 restricted reports converted to unrestricted reports which allowed commanders to conduct appropriate investigations.*

*Unrestricted reporting supports a sexual assault victim who desires medical treatment, counseling but also provides for official investigation of his or her allegations within existing administrative reporting channels (such as their chain of command, law enforcement or through the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC)).*

*As our military members' confidence in the reporting and investigative policies and procedures improve, I believe more alleged offenders can be held accountable. The greatest effect still lies in preventive measures and eliminating sexual assaults.*

**What problems, if any, are you aware of regarding the manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?**

*Privacy for restricted and unrestricted reporting becomes a challenge in a deployed environment and remote locations where units are small communities where accountability of personnel is a critical task for units. In deployed areas confidential reporting becomes more difficult for the victim to reach out to the SARC or a victim advocate because of the need to keep track of all personnel movements within the theater and that support resources may not be co-located with the victim. The joint deployed environment could present additional difficulties in case management, delivering care and tracking services due to differences among Service programs. It is my understanding that the DoD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office is working to field a Joint Sexual Assault Database to improve our ability to communicate between the services. The database is currently projected for fielding in 2010.*

**If confirmed what actions would you take to ensure senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to sexual assault?**

*I am currently the only Military representative on the DOD Sexual Assault Advisory Council. I think the addition of the Service Vice Chiefs will add to the effectiveness of this senior body and help to ensure the policies and procedures are executable in the operational environment. This is an area of interest for the Joint Chiefs and Combatant Commanders.*

### **Commission on National Guard and Reserves**

**In a March 1, 2007 report to Congress, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves recommended, among other things, that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should not be a member of the Joint Chiefs. The grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has since been increased to general, as recommended by this Commission.**

**What is your view about making the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? What is your rationale for this opinion?**

*The idea of making the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been debated for quite some time. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR), in fact, took a very detailed look at the concept and recommended that the CNGB not be a member of the JCS. The Department of Defense concurred with the CNGR recommendation in 2006. I also believe that CNGB should not be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consists of the Chairman, Vice Chairman and the Chiefs of Staff for the Armed Services. The National Guard is a component of the Armed Services and is represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force. A separate representation of a portion of the reserve components from a portion of the serves would be inappropriate, confusing, and in my view divisive of a Total Force. As a four star General Officer, the CNGB is already participating in all appropriate Joint Chiefs of Staff Tank sessions and discussions concerning issues which fall under the purview of our National Guard. This is similar to the methodology used to include the Commandant of the US Coast Guard when specific Coast Guard equities are involved.*

**In its final report, issued January 31, 2008, The Commission made a number of findings and recommendations on increasing the capabilities and responsibilities of the National Guard and Reserves in the homeland. The commission concluded “DOD must improve its capabilities and readiness to play a primary role in the response to major catastrophes that incapacitate civilian government over a wide geographic area. This is a responsibility that is equal in priority to its combat responsibilities.” In response to a request for his assessment of the final report of the Commission, Admiral Mullen responded, on April 21, 2008: “I have some concern with the Commission’s ideas on enhancing the Defense Departments role in the Homeland. While the Reserve Component civil support requirements are important, they should not be of equal importance to DOD combat responsibilities.**

**What is your view of the Commission’s assertion that the Department’s role in response to major catastrophes should be equal in priority to its combat responsibilities?**

*I agree with the Chairman’s position that the Department of Defense should not have statutory or policy directives that elevate civil support to the same level as combat responsibilities. The Department has taken-- and continues to take—seriously its responsibility to provide support for civil authorities. Codification of civil support for domestic events as a core competency could unintentionally impede other Federal departments and agencies in the fulfillment of their own unique statutory responsibilities. Such codification would also erode the Defense Department’s ability to perform its statutory responsibility.*

**In its March report to Congress, the Commission also recommended that the Department of Defense “develop protocols that allow governors to direct the efforts of federal military assets responding to an emergency such as a natural disaster.” In its final report (January 31, 2008), the Commission reemphasized the importance of this recommendation.**

**In the statement of managers accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the conferees urged the Secretary of Defense “to address the nature of command relationships under which troops will operate during particular contingencies and ensure, as recommended by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, that necessary agreements are entered into as soon as practicable.” In the statement of managers accompanying the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the conferees stated: “The Department of Defense should engage with the community of governors to work out an understanding of unity of effort during domestic terrorist events and public emergencies.**

**In your view, should Governors have tactical control over military forces, including those in a title 10, United States Code, active status, operating in their state? What is your rationale for this opinion?**

*I do not believe Governors require the ability to exert tactical control over all military forces operating within their state when they are providing Military Support to Civil Authorities. Governors already have the authority to exert tactical control over National Guard forces in a state active duty or Title 32 status. Furthermore, Governors have the ability to request the assistance of federal forces in response to terrorist acts and or public domestic emergencies when the Governor believes such assistance is necessary. Available forces for such events will be placed under tactical control of the designated Joint Task Force Commander or under operational control of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command. The designated Commander working with the Governor and the state’s Adjutant General, will be able to provide the necessary support to restore order, save lives and secure property as the situation dictates.*

*This operational construct was developed in accordance with Title 10, United States Code and I believe that the procedures and relationships that have been put in place since Hurricane Katrina will enhance the unity of effort between Governors and the Federal forces that provide support when requested to assist in responding to acts of terrorism or natural catastrophes.*

### **Dwell Time**

**Dwell time goals still are not being met for either the active or reserve components, and recent testimony suggests that dwell time will not improve appreciably over the next 12-18 months.**

**In your view, what can be done to increase dwell time for both active and reserve component members, and when will these improvements be seen?**

*The current programmed growth in capabilities needed to support on-going operations, as well as the planned reduction in force levels in the OIF campaign, will lead to improved dwell ratios in both active and reserve components. As operational demand changes, we will continue to assess the impact to dwell time and make appropriate adjustments.*

**Would additional Army end strength in 2010 or 2011-improve dwell time ratios and reduce stress on the force?**

*Realizing any increase in endstrength requires time before operational capability is realized, additional Army endstrength in 2010 or 2011 would not provide immediate relief from the current stress on the force. The Department will continue to assess each Service's endstrength in light of operational demand and the National Military Strategy.*

### **End Strength of Active-Duty Forces**

**In light of the manpower demands of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, what level of active-duty personnel (by service) do you believe is required for current and anticipated missions?**

*Both the Army and Marine Corps are growing to 547,000 in FY12 and 202,000 in FY11, respectively. We continue to assess requirements of the active duty force as we draw down in OIF and increase our operational presence in OEF. This area is undergoing rigorous review as part of the QDR where we plan to include these recommendations in the President's FY 2011 Budget.*

### **Military Women in Combat**

**The issue of the appropriate role of women in the armed forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.**

**What is your assessment of the performance of women in the armed forces, particularly given the combat experiences of our military, since the last major review of the assignment policy for women in 1994?**

*Women in our armed forces continue to make tremendous contributions to our national defense. They are an integral part of the force and are proven performers in the operational environment and under fire. It is important to understand that DoD policies do not contemplate women being assigned exclusively to positions immune from threats endemic to a combat theater. In fact, women are assigned to units and positions that may necessitate combat actions – actions for which they are fully prepared to respond and to succeed.*

**Does the Department of Defense have sufficient flexibility under current law to make changes to assignment policy for women when needed?**

*The current law provides the Department sufficient flexibility to make changes to the assignment policy.*

**Do you believe any changes in the current policy are needed?**

*Not at this time. DoD policy and practices are reviewed on an ongoing basis to ensure compliance and effective use of manpower.*

### **Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS)**

**The Department and the Services have expended great time, effort, and resources towards the development of DIMHRS as a cross-service, fully integrated personnel and pay system. Achieving a joint, interoperable system was, and continues to be viewed as a priority; however, the goals of the DIMHRS program have not been achieved. Recent reports indicate technical difficulties will postpone the Army's implementation date and that the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps all question the requirement that they adopt the current version of DIMHRS.**

**What is the status of the DOD, and service by service, implementation of DIMHRS?**

*DIMHRS entered acquisition breach in January 2009. DIMHRS was certified by the Department for continued development of core requirements for each Service to develop as a separate system with a common data warehouse to capture information. The Department, the Services and the Joint Staff are developing a business case and costing data for several courses of action on how to proceed with DIMHRS development.*

**What is your current assessment of the need for, and feasibility of, an integrated, cross-service personnel and pay system?**

*I believe the requirement to develop an integrated pay and personnel system is still valid. The need for cross-service support has not diminished. I will continue to monitor the development efforts and provide advice as needed.*

**If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the implementation schedule and process currently in place?**

*Implementation schedules sometimes put unrealistic expectations for process completion ahead of providing a usable product. I would want to ensure the governance bodies of the DIMHRS implementation understand the value of balancing schedules with developing requirements of a viable DIMHRS product.*

## **Wounded Warriors**

**In Congressional testimony on the FY 2010 budget request, Admiral Mullen has stated that there is, “no higher duty for this nation, or for those of us in leadership positions, than to care for those who sacrificed so much and who must now face lives forever changed by wounds both seen and unseen.” The Chairman has taken an active role in advocating for services and support to the wounded and their families, including those suffering from PTSD and other mental health conditions.**

**What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Department and the services to improve the care, management and transition of seriously ill and injured service members and their families?**

*We have made great strides since 2004 with respect to treating the seriously wounded. We have gone from having a situation where families had a hard time finding anyone to help manage their problems to a point where families complain that there are too many people and too many voices. We are in the midst of consolidating our many processes through coordinated efforts with our VA partners and the Senior Oversight Committee.*

**What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be made?**

*I believe the greatest strength of the responses thus far has come from the involvement of senior leaders taking full ownership of the problem. At first look, people assumed this was a “medical” problem. Being wounded certainly requires medical care but it also requires personnel actions and transportation of families and pay actions and lots of other things that do not involve the skilled hands of doctors or nurses. The Chairman and I recognize the critical role of line leadership on this issue and every Service program we have today places line leaders in the center of the response.*

## **Defense Readiness Reporting System**

**In June 2002, the Department issued a directive to replace the current readiness reporting system, yet that replacement is yet to be fully operational.**

**What challenges still remain in the transition from the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) to the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and what is the plan to fully implement DRRS? Have any delays or obstacles been attributed to technological maturity or changing requirements?**

*To date, DRRS has developed a capability that enables reporting units to assess their designed and assigned mission readiness, articulated in terms of mission essential tasks. However, additional DRRS development and fielding challenges remain. Specifically, DRRS continues development efforts to replicate those readiness indicators that are migrating from legacy systems to DRRS. Additionally, current efforts are underway to ensure adequate tools are available for each of the Services to report*

*GSORTS data directly into DRRS. Once developed, rigorous functional, interoperability and operational testing will be necessary to ensure a seamless transition and integration with the Department's command and control systems. According to the DRRS Implementation Office's latest schedule, this testing will be complete in FY 11. When both capabilities based MET assessments and resource based GSORTS data are available in the DRRS we can move toward full implementation. I don't believe any delays or obstacles can be attributed to technological maturity of changing requirements.*

**The Government Accountability Office has reported that significant shortfalls remain in the implementation of DRRS, stability of requirements, adequacy of testing, and overall management and oversight of the program. What is your view on their findings?**

*Over the past two years, the Joint Staff has provided periodic updates on DRRS development. Those staff updates touched on some of the points you raise in your question. Though I have not read the draft GAO report firsthand, it is my sense that GAO's findings on DRRS, are likely consistent with my staff updates. That said, we've added rigor to the DRRS governance process to improve the DRRS deliverables and timeliness, and will explore the report for additional program improvement recommendations.*

**With respect to DRRS development and implementation, to what extent has the office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness worked or coordinated with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration)?**

*The DRRS Directive (7730.65) assigned USD (P&R) responsibilities for developing, fielding, and funding of the program. I don't have specific insight into the extent of which they have worked or coordinated outside of ASD (NII) participation as a member of the governance process established in FY 2008.*

### **Air Force Tactical Aviation**

**General John Corley, USAF, Commander of the Air Force's Air Combat Command, has been quoted as saying, "In my opinion, a fleet of 187 F-22s puts execution of our current national military strategy at high risk in the near to mid-term."**

**In your personal and professional opinion, does having a fleet of only 187 F-22s put execution of our current national military strategy at high risk in the near to mid-term?**

*No. Overall, the operational risk of having the planned fleet of combat coded F-22s is acceptable. Strategically, it is important to develop proper capability and risk balance while continuing to maintain our technological edge. The Department is striving*

*to have the right capability and risk balance established with our legacy aircraft, 5<sup>th</sup> generation capability, and unmanned aerial systems.*

**Do you personally support the Secretary's decision to end production at 187 planned aircraft?**

*Yes.*

**General Corley is also quoted as saying, "To my knowledge, there are no studies that demonstrate 187 F-22s are adequate to support our national military strategy."**

**Are there any studies or analyses supporting the decision by the Secretary of Defense to halt F-22 production at 187 aircraft?**

*Yes. OSD conducted a Joint Air Dominance Study that found the F-22 programmed buy of 187 aircraft was adequate to confront future opponents with robust air-to-air capabilities. The key insight from the analysis was the importance of providing the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps with 5th generation capabilities rather than concentrating 5th generation capabilities in one military Service. Additionally, the Joint Staff OA-08 study assessed the sufficiency/proficiency of the F-22 programmed buy. In OA-08, F-22 peak MCO and Steady State demands were found to be sufficiently covered with a total buy of 187.*

**If there are no studies or analyses, what was the basis of the Secretary's decision?**

*Not applicable.*

**If there are no studies or analyses, what is the basis of your personal and professional position on the appropriate size of the F-22 fleet?**

*Not applicable.*

## **Iraq**

**What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq, particularly as the withdrawal from urban areas is completed?**

*We are on track as we execute a responsible drawdown from Iraq. U.S. and Iraqi officials continue to conduct joint engagements which enhance stability, promote reconstruction, improve transparency, advance regional engagements, and lay the foundation for a diversified, growing economy. We are gradually building the capability and capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces, and they are stepping into the lead. Our withdrawal from urban areas in Iraq, while continuing to provide training and advice to the Iraqi Security Forces, demonstrates our commitment to the Security Agreement, and promotes a sovereign, stable, and increasingly self-reliant Iraq. The security situation*

*remains fragile, but Iraqi leaders across all political sects have shown their determination to avoid reverting back to ethno-sectarian violence to resolve disputes.*

**What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the United States made in Iraq? Which of these do you believe are still having an impact? Is there anything to be done now to mitigate such impact?**

*While I wouldn't refer to this as a mistake, I believe the United States was overly optimistic in gauging how quickly various Iraqi political sects would choose to seek political solutions to problems, rather than choosing violence. We did not anticipate that the collapse of the Saddam regime would lead to an insurgency, and we were slow to recognize the insurgency when it came. I also believe that no one in the U.S. government could have envisioned just how badly Iraq's infrastructure and its economy had deteriorated. The lack of essential services, health care, viable employment, and internationally compliant law enforcement mechanisms, all helped to fuel the insurgency in Iraq.*

*Our role is to increase the capacity of the Iraqi government to deal with these issues effectively. Working with the Iraqis, we are effectively defeating insurgent elements attempting to destabilize Iraq. Both General Odierno and Ambassador Hill are heavily engaged in continuing the slow but steady progress. I feel our continued support to Iraq based on the security agreement and President's strategy is the right policy.*

**What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq to prepare for the end of the combat mission by the end of August 2010 and the withdrawal of all U.S. forces by the end of 2011?**

*Per the President's plan, we seek an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self-reliant; an Iraqi Government that is just, representative, and accountable; neither a safe haven for, nor sponsor of terrorism; integrated into the global economy; and a long-term partner contributing to regional peace and security. The United States must continue to focus efforts on those sectors most critical to achieving these objectives to solidify the hard-fought gains we have achieved thus far.*

*On the security front, we must continue to develop the capability and capacity of the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior and assist the Iraqis in developing and fielding the logistics, fire support, intelligence and other key enablers they will need to be successful in 2012 and beyond. We also need to continue the political reconciliation and economic progress that will be the true foundation of stability.*

**What do you believe are the prospects for Iraqi political leaders to manage the changes associated with the U.S. withdrawal from urban areas?**

*I believe the prospects are good. The Iraqi Security Forces have continued to improve in their capabilities, and concurrently, the people of Iraq are more confident in the security conditions in their neighborhoods. If you had asked me just one year ago if we would see a provincial election cycle which was relatively violence free, which was judged to be credible and fair by the United Nations, and which all political parties in*

*Iraq recognized as fair, I would have expressed serious doubts. While not without incident, all 14 provinces which held elections successfully seated their new provincial councils and governors. We will continue to assist the political leadership to continue their efforts toward reconciliation, and develop provincial governments which are efficient and representative of all the people.*

**What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?**

*In the near-term, while we recognize that security has improved greatly in Iraq, there are significant milestones on the horizon that are critical steps in our drawdown. Most notably, successful and legitimate national elections early next year and the subsequent seating of the new government is a critical step in our drawdown plan. Other critical steps to maintaining stability include the central government's capacity to govern effectively and provide essential services, continued GOI commitment to national reconciliation and accommodation (e.g., the Sons of Iraq program), and establishing a solid foundation for the rule of law.*

**What is your assessment of the capability of Iraqi Security Forces today? What support in your view will the U.S. need to provide in the future and over what period of time?**

*I concur with General Odierno's assessment that based on current conditions, the ISF are ready to handle responsibilities for security in the cities and urban areas.*

*Operational readiness continues to improve for both the Ministry of Defense forces as well as the Ministry of Interior. With US assistance in the development and fielding of key enablers, I believe the ISF will be capable of handling internal security, to include counter-insurgency operations, by the time US forces depart in 2012.*

**What considerations will be factored into a decision regarding whether (and if so, what kind and how much) U.S. military equipment currently in Iraq should be left behind for use by the Iraqi Army?**

*Any decision to leave U.S. military equipment currently in Iraq behind for use by the Iraqi Security Forces will be based a number of factors, including (but not limited to):*

- *Whether or not the particular item is essential to establishing the Iraqis' ability to defend against internal threats by December of 2011*
- *The ability to meet the particular requirement through more traditional military assistance mechanisms*
- *Whether or not the equipment is deemed excess by the service that owns it*
- *The desire of the Iraqis to have the equipment*
- *The ability of the Iraqis to maintain the equipment if it is provided to them*
- *The replacement cost to the services*

- *The impact on Services' ability to reset and reposition the forces for current and future global commitments*
- *The cost to return particular equipment to the US and refurbish it compared to its fair market value and remaining useful life*
- *Production lead times for new equipment*
- *If no other options are feasible, whether or not specific items are so critical to Iraqi Security Forces' success that it is in the national interest of the United States to provide it to the Iraqis, even if the services do not declare it as excess (I recognize that the authority for Secretary Gates to do this does not yet exist)*

**As conventional forces are drawn down in Iraq, the requirement for Special Operations Forces is likely to remain the same or even increase, for the foreseeable future. Special Operations Forces, however, rely heavily on their conventional counterparts for many support and enabling functions including airlift, medical evacuation, resupply, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.**

**What is being done to make sure special operations forces in Iraq are being adequately supported as the drawdown progresses?**

*Special Operations Forces continue to play an important role in Iraq. The Joint Staff, CDRCENTCOM, CDRSOCOM, and Commanders in Iraq will ensure that special operations forces are properly supported as conventional forces are drawn down in accordance with the security agreement and the President's direction. We have coordinated closely with the Iraqi Security Special Forces following the Security Agreement, and we anticipate this close working relationship will continue, to the mutual benefit of both our forces as well as the Government of Iraq's. As we do so, we will carefully balance scarce enablers between Iraq and Afghanistan.*

### **Afghanistan**

**In your view, what are the greatest challenges that U.S. forces face in implementing the Administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan?**

*U.S. forces face numerous, complex, challenges in implementing the Administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan: a resilient Taliban insurgency, increasing levels of violence, lack of governance capability, persistent corruption, lack of development in key areas, a porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, illicit narcotics and malign influences from other countries. Taken together, these threats to regional stability increase the level of difficulty in implementing the Administration's strategy. However, the potential reemergence of Al Qaeda or other extremist safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan are critical threats to our national security and to our allies, which make it all the more important that the Administration's strategy is supported and implemented.*

**What is your assessment of the long-term prospects for Afghan military forces to effectively provide security throughout Afghanistan?**

*The ANSF today (approximately 90,000 ANA and 82,000 ANP) is not of sufficient size to provide long-term security and stability for the people of Afghanistan. I believe the current authorized ANSF force levels (134,000 ANA and 96,800 ANP) should be reviewed on a periodic basis to ensure they are sufficient to support the country wide security needs.*

**Do you believe that the current end strength targets of 134,000 for the Afghan National Army and 96,800 for the Afghan National Police are sufficient or should those end strength targets be increased?**

*I believe the current authorized ANSF force levels (134,000 ANA and 96,800 ANP) should be reviewed on a periodic basis to ensure they are sufficient to support the country wide security needs.*

*There are two ongoing studies that will help inform our recommendations and decisions regarding the future size and capabilities of the ANSF. The European Community (EC) has commissioned a study, expected to be complete in mid-summer 2009, to assess the required capabilities of the Afghan National Police. The Secretary of Defense also directed a detailed analysis, led by CENTCOM and the Joint Staff, be conducted in order to help us make informed recommendations on options for future end-strength and capabilities for both the ANA and the ANP. This study with assessed courses-of-action is due back to the Secretary on 29 Jul 2009. If confirmed, I will use the results of both of these studies to make recommendations on the future size and capabilities of the ANSF.*

**What in your view are the major challenges for accelerating the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces, and how would you recommend addressing these challenges, if confirmed?**

*The greatest international community challenge to accelerating the growth of the ANSF is the requirement for mentors for these forces. The greatest Afghan challenge is the development of leadership for the expanded force.*

*The President's decision in March to deploy the 4/82 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to provide additional mentors for the Afghan National Security Forces will allow us to meet our ANA embedded training team requirements for the 134K Army and will significantly increase the number of ANP police mentor teams. US COIN BCTs are also assuming responsibility for police mentors in districts within their battlespace. We must continue to encourage our NATO partners to provide these district mentors in order to build synergy for security within the battlespace and increase the number of districts with police mentor coverage. I also recommend encouraging NATO to use the proposed NTM-A as an opportunity to enhance its training and mentoring of the ANP.*

*Expanding the leadership capacity of the ANSF requires training and experience and both the ANA and ANP have leadership development programs in place. However, we must also recognize that leader development requires time and we must balance the pressing need for additional growth and progress in leadership with this reality in order to build forces that are self-sustaining over the long-term.*

**What should be the role of the Afghan National Army in preventing cross-border attacks by extremist militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan?**

*The Afghan Border Police (ABP) have primary responsibility for border security. The Afghan National Army provides direct support and support in depth to the ABP. Operational Coordination Centers (OCCs) are currently being established at the Regional and Provincial levels to improve information sharing and synchronization of efforts.*

*Preventing all incursions is difficult due to the length and porous nature of the border. However, practical cooperation between Afghan, Pakistani, and international forces improves border security. Effective military operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas are key to disrupt and eventually deny safe havens to Al Qaeda and the Taliban from which to launch these incursions.*

*ISAF and USFOR-A must continue to enhance the practical cooperation between ANSF, Pakistani military and international forces and increase the effectiveness of our counterinsurgency operations. Border and Joint Coordination Centers, regular tripartite engagements at all levels, and counterinsurgency training of Afghan and Pakistani forces are key to these efforts.*

**NATO has agreed to the establishment of a three-star command within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command structure to oversee the day-to-day execution of the conflict.**

**What is your assessment of the current U.S. and ISAF command structures in Afghanistan and what changes, if any, do you support to those command structures?**

*GEN McChrystal has proposed a new combined and joint command that would direct the operations of the five regional commands. We are currently in the process of developing the proposed structure for this command with our NATO allies.*

*GEN McChrystal and his staff are conducting an initial assessment and his recommendations will more specifically address the proposed operational command and any other structural changes.*

**Given the challenges that the topography of Afghanistan presents to operations, what are the unique challenges for which the U.S. needs new or modified equipment?**

*The varying topography in Afghanistan limits freedom of movement for U.S. and Coalition forces in throughout country which in turn affects movement of personnel and logistical resupply. The current influx of Strykers and additional fixed and rotary-wing assets into Regional Command (RC) South will improve freedom of movement within RC South and southern portions of RCs East and West but will have a limited impact on logistical support.*

*The U.S. and Coalition partners need a more robust capability to counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The employment of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, up armored Highly Mobile Multi Wheeled Vehicle (HWMV), equivalent up armored vehicles, and Route Clearance companies will improve survivability against IED attacks but the limited terrain clearance and power on these vehicles also limits their capability to traverse rugged terrain. Additional armored vehicles and Route Clearance Companies will improve the number of IED finds and personnel survivability during IED attacks.*

*The U.S. military is investing in improvements to air-delivery capabilities. Austere operating locations throughout Afghanistan do not support normal logistical resupply via surface or air movement. The U.S. needs an improved air-delivery capability and is accomplishing this by leveraging new technology on existing equipment in order to improve reliability and accuracy of fielded systems. Because of the topography, these improved systems are a critical requirement needed to meet the increasing logistical demands in Afghanistan.*

**In your view are there adequate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets available to support requirements in Afghanistan?**

*It is our assessment that there are not enough ISR assets to support requirements in Afghanistan and those requirements are growing.*

*There is a growing requirement for manned and unmanned aerial assets in Afghanistan used to support the NSC strategy and COMISAF's priority intelligence requirements. When employed effectively, these ISR assets are a combat-multiplier for US and allied forces and are able to cue additional platforms for precise intelligence collection. Additionally, the data collected by these systems requires a large amount of processing which must be shared among ISAF, NATO and other partners including Afghanistan and Pakistan.*

**What steps do you believe coalition forces and the international community need to take in the near-term to improve the lives of the Afghan people?**

*We need to reassure the people of Afghanistan that coalition forces and the international community are committed to helping them develop their country on a long term basis. In the near-term, we are focused on providing security to the population which will allow us to progress in implementing development projects and building greater governance capacity in the long term.*

**News reports indicate that Afghan resentment over civilian deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations and U.S. or NATO airstrikes continues to grow.**

**What steps, if any, do you believe ought to be undertaken to address the issue of civilian deaths in Afghanistan?**

*In addition to the tragic loss of life, I and all the leadership are acutely aware of the negative repercussions resulting from civilian casualties. Any time an innocent person is killed our mission becomes harder and our men and women in Afghanistan fully understand this. We have procedures in place which seek to make every effort possible to avoid civilian casualties because our purpose is to protect the population. However, we are fighting an enemy who conducts operations specifically designed to produce casualties that can be attributed to Coalition forces. As such, GEN McChrystal, as part of his initial assessment, is reviewing all tactical directives as they relate to avoiding civilian casualties.*

**From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from our experience in Iraq and how would you apply these lessons in Afghanistan and future conflicts?**

*It is important to realize that each conflict is different and you must apply strategies based on the current fight as it relates to the situation on the ground. Having said that I believe one of the greatest lessons learned from Iraq that can be applied to all conflicts is the multi-faceted approach to problem solving and issue resolution. Bringing together the best and brightest from across the spectrum of Military, US Government Agencies and Departments as well as the leaders of industry provides for the Whole of Government approach that when applied in concert with each other is very effective and dynamic.*

### **Pakistan**

**Administration officials have said that “no improvement” is possible in Afghanistan without progress in Pakistan, or that you can’t succeed in Afghanistan without “solving” Pakistan.**

**What in your view is the linkage between progress in Afghanistan and developments in Pakistan? Do you agree that the U.S. should be cautious about tying Afghanistan’s future too closely to developments in Pakistan?**

*Afghanistan and Pakistan stability are inextricably linked as extremist threats transcend regional boundaries. The strategy we have for Afghanistan and Pakistan is regionally focused in recognition of the fact that what happens in one country affects the other. Clearly, addressing extremist safe havens and cross border activities into Afghanistan from Pakistan is essential to success in Afghanistan. While we continue to enhance our bilateral relationship with each country based on its own merits we cannot ignore the historical, geographic, and economic ties between the two countries or the current security situation by de-linking Afghanistan's future from developments in Pakistan.*

**What is your assessment of Pakistan's commitment to confront the threat posed by Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other militant extremists in its western territory?**

*Pakistan's leaders recognize that extremist groups pose a great threat to Pakistan's national security. However, Pakistan must take sustained action, including engaging extremist groups within its borders and following operations with humanitarian assistance, in order to mitigate this threat. Recent operations in the North West Frontier Province are a promising start, and we are watching closely to see whether these operations are sustained and continued effectively into other extremist areas in western Pakistan. U.S. leaders engage regularly with the Government of Pakistan to convey both our concern about these threats and our political support and we are augmenting their efforts through military and economic assistance.*

**Do you agree that in order for U.S. military assistance to Pakistan to be effective, Pakistan's leadership must make it clear to the Pakistani people that confronting the threat poised by Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other militant extremists is essential for the sake of Pakistan's own security interests?**

*Indications from Pakistan senior leadership and outside observers are that Pakistan's military operations along the border currently have support of the Pakistani population as the Pakistani people are becoming increasingly aware of the threat poised by militant extremists. Clearly, it is important for the Government of Pakistan and the Pakistan military to have support of the population for these operations, and without it U.S. military assistance could not be as effectively employed. We also understand that the population needs to see a whole of government approach to the problems Pakistan faces or support for the Government and military operations could erode. Our broad assistance efforts support this by not only improving Pakistan's military/security capabilities, but also assisting the Government of Pakistan to improve education, agriculture, job creation and long-term economic development, as well as governance, in order to improve the lives of the Pakistani people.*

**The intelligence community assesses that Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the border with Afghanistan provide a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other extremists supporting the Taliban led insurgency in Afghanistan.**

**In your view, should the Pakistan government be doing more to prevent these cross border incursions, particularly across the border between Baluchistan, Pakistan, and Kandahar Afghanistan?**

*The Pakistan government and security forces face many challenges along the border including rugged terrain and isolated regions, lack of capacity and capability for conducting counterinsurgency and border operations, as well as a population in this region that has historically been autonomous and independent from central rule. U.S. senior military and government leadership continually engage with Pakistani counterparts on the importance of preventing cross-border activities and on ways that the US/coalition, Afghanistan and Pakistan can work together to improve border security. We have seen improvements in this cooperation though we have not yet achieved the level of effectiveness we need to reduce extremists' abilities to cross into Afghanistan and conduct operations.*

**What is your assessment of the current level of cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan in confronting the threat of militant extremists in the border region?**

*The relationship between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan has improved significantly from just a few years ago and the leadership of both countries continues to engage in discussion and broadening the relationship and cooperation. This cooperation also occurs at the lower levels through border coordination and other activities to meet the extremist threats in the border region. There is more that can be done and the U.S. continually works to facilitate and improve the cooperation between these two countries and with the coalition on the Afghanistan side of the border.*

**Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)**

**The Department has taken inconsistent positions on the disposition of ad hoc, but critical, entities created to respond to the urgent needs of combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of Defense has recently stated in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, that the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) task force should be phased out, while at the same time, the Department has decided to institutionalize JIEDDO. Some have expressed concern about the possible hasty demise of the ISR task force, and others have expressed concern about the premature decision to make JIEDDO permanent. While the JIEDDO reports to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plays an active role in reviewing and validating urgent operational needs emerging from Iraq and Afghanistan.**

**What are your views of JIEDDO and its role within the Department and within the Department's process for responding to urgent operational needs?**

*The Joint IED Defeat Organization is effective in its mission to lead, advocate, and coordinate the Department's C-IED efforts in support of Combatant Commanders. They are a highly valued capability that continues to demonstrate the agility to respond quickly to urgent operational needs by providing essential material and nonmaterial solutions to counter known, newly deployed, and emerging IED threats.*

**What are your views of the criteria the Department is using to determine which institutions should become permanent and which should not, and to demonstrate how these criteria are being consistently applied across organizations?**

*Organizations are often created in response to shortfalls identified by Combatant Commanders. There are several venues, including Senior Warfighter Forums and Deputies Advisory Working Groups (DAWG), to review and make recommendations to the Department leadership as to whether an organization should become permanent. In the case of JIEDDO, the C-IED SWarF and the DAWG concluded that the nature of the IED threat and continued Combatant Commanders' need for rapid solutions necessitated an enduring organization with the agility to rapidly respond to changing urgent operational needs. I will recommend the ISR Task Force be included until such time as warfighter needs can be met by such programs.*

### **Counternarcotics**

**Recently, senior U.S. government officials have indicated that the U.S. will begin to increase alternative crop development, public information, and interdiction programs, rather than continuing or expanding ongoing eradication efforts. This has been viewed as a u-turn of the U.S. counter narcotics strategy in Afghanistan and has been greeted with skepticism from some senior Afghan officials.**

**What is your view of this ongoing change in strategy?**

*I understand the U.S. government's intent to rebalance its counter narcotics strategy and I support this effort because I don't think that crop eradication alone is the right approach. I believe we need a multi-pronged approach that targets laboratories, traffickers and movement of drugs, and facilitators at the same time we work to provide alternative income opportunities for farmers.*

**What is your assessment of the eradication policy the U.S. has pursued in recent years?**

*The efforts of the US Government to support and fund the Afghan Government's eradication efforts have shown little success. The funding and energy for eradication programs should be redistributed to other counter narcotics activities that have proven far more successful such as interdiction, public information, and alternative development.*

**Do you believe that this shift in policy is adequately resourced?**

*If the resources dedicated to the elimination pillar of the US counter narcotics strategy were redistributed to interdiction, rule of law, public information, and alternative development this would be a step in the right direction. However, GEN McChrystal is currently conducting an initial assessment for the Secretary of Defense, and I would defer to the outcome of his assessment to determine if the shift in counter narcotics policy is adequately resourced.*

**What role do you believe the Department of Defense will play in each component of the new strategy?**

*The same roles will be played by DOD in the four pillars that do not involve Poppy Elimination: Public Information, Interdiction, Alternative Development, and Rule of Law. DOD currently supports the Poppy Elimination pillar through the development, training and deployment of the Counter-narcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK), and provides in-extremis support to Poppy Eradication activities when insurgents use violence to react to eradication missions. If USG support to Afghan government eradication activities ends the CNIK will be reintegrated into the ANA and in-extremis support to Afghan government eradication efforts will have to be reviewed on its contribution to the COIN mission.*

*A nexus exists between narcotics and the insurgency as well as corruption and criminality. Recent decisions by the NATO Defense Ministers and the Secretary of Defense, at the request of the Afghan Government, provided the guidance and authorities for both ISAF forces and the US Military to target the trafficking and production of narcotics where the nexus exists. Additionally, the recent change to DOD's international counter narcotics policy enabled more robust support and integration of capabilities with civilian law enforcement agencies operating in Afghanistan.*

**Counterdrug Operations**

**The Department of Defense expends more than \$1 billion per year in the fight against illegal narcotics trafficking. For much of the last two decades, the fight against illegal narcotics has taken place within the Western Hemisphere, but in recent years, counternarcotics operations have expanded to Afghanistan, West Africa, and Asia. U.S. Commanders in Afghanistan have identified success against narcotics traffickers as fundamental to the success of their mission to root out the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Despite this expanding focus to other parts of the globe and the focus of U.S. Commanders in Afghanistan, the Department often views counternarcotics operations as the job of federal law enforcement agencies.**

**Please discuss your views of the DOD's counternarcotics mission and the tension that exists within the Department about the proper role of the military.**

*The DoD is the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States (10 USC 124). We play a valuable*

*role in support of the counterdrug activities of Federal, State, local and international partner law enforcement agencies through entities such as Joint Task Force-North, a component of U.S. Northern Command located in El Paso, TX; Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) located in Key West, FL; Joint Interagency Task Force-West (JIATF-W) located in Hawaii. DoD is a full partner in numerous interagency counterdrug and intelligence and operational "fusion centers" located throughout the country including the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and the Office of National Drug Control Policy's High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA). In addition, the DoD supports 54 state and territorial counterdrug task forces through the National Guard's Counterdrug Governors State Plans (32 USC 112). The focus of these 2,600 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen is to leverage DoD resources and unique capabilities and to act as catalysts to better coordinate state and local law enforcement efforts with those of the federal government in attacking both the supply and demand for illicit drugs in our homeland.*

*I do not believe there is tension within the Department about the proper role of the military. DoD has a responsibility to ensure our military members support interagency activities that adhere to constitutional and legal restrictions, add measurable value to our whole-of-government counterdrug efforts, and enhance the readiness of our military and civilian members.*

## **Colombia**

### **What changes, if any, would you recommend for the role of the U.S. military in Colombia?**

*Our relationship is maturing from PATRON to PARTNER, and Colombian gains against illegally armed groups approach "irreversibility" (the point at which illegally armed groups are controllable by the police rather than the armed forces). Nonetheless, I would not, at this time, recommend a role change for the U.S. military in Colombia. Rather, we must continue to vigorously apply U.S. resources, to include high demand/low density assets that fill critical capability gaps, while further enabling the development of military institutions that will strengthen a nascent strategic partner. DoD's security assistance effort will remain completely synchronized with the U.S. Ambassador's Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI).*

### **What is your assessment of the progress achieved by the Colombian armed forces in confronting the threat of narcoterrorism?**

*The Colombian armed forces successes against narco-terrorists under the Uribe Administration are unquestionably significant, with tens of thousands of paramilitaries demobilized, the National Liberation Army (ELN) no longer a relevant threat, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) reduced by nearly 50%. However, although approaching the tipping point of "irreversibility," more progress is required. Our security assistance must not stop at the 10-yard line, but rather ensure the Colombians cross the proverbial goal line.*

## **Iran**

### **What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran's growing influence in the Middle East region?**

*Clearly, Iran an important, yet troubling, regional actors with regard to Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Gaza, and the remainder of the broader Middle East region. We fully support the administration's current approach of attempting to initiate engagement with Iran, essentially offering an unclenched fist. Should Iran choose to not accept these overtures, I believe it will be necessary to deliberately increase pressure in a carefully executed progression that includes a broad spectrum of partners. I also believe that our efforts at engagement only increase the likelihood that our partners will increase their pressure in concert. This increased pressure must begin with diplomatic and economic initiatives with regard to Iran, to include UN actions (both sanctions and financial measures), regional initiatives, and other forms of international pressure.*

*We also fully support the Department of State's Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) initiative to reassure our regional partners, including military aspects such as capacity building, border security, missile defense, and proliferation security initiatives. The GSD seeks to reassure our regional partners of U.S. commitment, change Iran's strategic calculus, and stop Iranian nuclear proliferation and sponsorship of terrorist organizations. The GSD seeks to bolster the capabilities of our regional partners (with the U.S. and others) to deter and defend against conventional and unconventional threats. It includes arms sales and other forms of assistance to include improving port security and protecting the key energy infrastructure of our regional partners and allies.*

### **Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq or Afghanistan could strengthen Iran's influence in the region?**

*The size and duration of U.S. and coalition force deployments are dependent on a number of factors, principally focused on the progress of security, development, and governance within those two countries. Moreover, we have clear guidance on conducting a responsible drawdown from Iraq, which is executing on time. While our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan is not oriented towards Iran, the surest way to ensure Iran's influence in the region is measured and positive is to enable capable and confident states within the entire region, including Iraq and Afghanistan.*

### **In your view, does Iran pose a near term threat to the United States by way of either its missile program or its nuclear program?**

*Open source reporting indicates that the USG does not expect Iran to have a nuclear weapons capability until mid to next decade (2010-2015). Open source reporting indicates that Israel assesses that Iran could have a weapon by late 2009. Iran does have the capability with their arsenal of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to threaten U.S. friends and allies in the region. Their multiple recent*

*weapons tests, and successful launch of a satellite earlier this year are indications of their advances in missile technology.*

*While these programs will not threaten the homeland in the near term, acquisition of nuclear weapons and missile delivery capabilities will embolden Iran to further threaten U.S. and partner interests in the region. These threats include Iranian use of proxies in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestinian territories, on the African continent, and even in the tri-border region of South America for example. Ultimately, these capabilities could directly threaten the United States.*

**If you believe either of these programs pose a near term threat, what in your view are the best ways to address such a threat?**

*As I stated earlier, we want to continue to support the current diplomatic initiatives with regard to Iran, to include UN actions, regional initiatives, financial measures, and other international pressure. We encourage Iran to fulfill its responsibility with regard to international agreements to the Non-proliferation Treaty and the additional protocol.*

*Background: The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international treaty signed in 1968 to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Iran is a signatory.*

**Other than nuclear or missile programs, what are your concerns if any about Iran?**

*Malicious Iranian activities throughout the region include the use of proxies to extend Iranian influence into sovereign nations by providing weapons, technology, training, and finance. We are concerned Iran's activities will negatively impact stability and potentially impact the regional economy. It is important to maintain and strengthen our relationships with our regional partners and allies by continuing to build their security capacity. We will continue to work in close coordination with all applicable USG departments to ensure our policies toward Iran assume a regional approach.*

**What concerns, if any, does the election related unrest in Iran raise from a military perspective?**

*We are concerned that the growing strength of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps over Iranian politics will result in the militarization of Iranian foreign policy. Nonetheless, we do not project any significant changes to Iran's overall foreign policy objectives. However, should the political unrest continue, it is possible that Iran could attempt to create an incident or other crisis that would draw its population's attention away from internal strife and towards a perceived common threat. Our forces are acutely sensitive to the need to avoid such an incident or crisis.*

## **Strategic Communications**

**Over the past few years, the DOD has funded a growing number counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization strategic communications programs. DOD does not have a separate budget outlining its strategic communication activities, but the GAO reports that DOD “spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year” to support its information operations outreach activities, including recent initiatives funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization and geographic combatant commands. Many of these ongoing programs are in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) from United States Special Operations Command are also deploying to United States embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.**

**What are your views on DOD’s strategic communications role and its integration into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives.**

*Strategic communication – the process of orchestrating our actions, images, and words to achieve U.S. objectives – is a critical component of DOD’s activities in support of national security. However, DOS is the designated lead for U.S. Government strategic communication efforts, and in conjunction with the National Security Council, identifies the key national objectives for strategic communication engagement. The Department of Defense strategic communications efforts support these national priorities. We believe they have been particularly effective in Iraq, and we are determined to improve our efforts in Afghanistan. It’s my view that U.S. foreign policy goals are best accomplished through whole-of-government efforts focused on engaging and listening to target audiences, then acting and communicating those actions in a manner that promotes our shared interests with the world. Strategic communication is vital in ensuring that our Department’s activities support these higher-level policy objectives.*

**What is your view of the apparently expanded role of the U.S. military in supporting U.S. strategic communications programs led by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan?**

*I believe this is a good news story that highlights our emphasis on security, diplomacy and development. DOD has a long history of providing support to State and USAID programs worldwide and will continue to support country teams and the Interagency wherever and whenever appropriate. I’m satisfied with the expanded role but need to emphasize that a whole of government approach is required for the programs that we support and DOD’s resources are not limitless. Nevertheless, we do have significant resources and capabilities which reinforce and enhance State’s and USAID’s efforts. These resources and capabilities, together with the personnel who have the skill sets, are critical to our programs led by the State Department and USAID as part of the national strategic objectives for any particular country or region.*

## **U.S. Relations with Russia**

**U.S. relations with Russia, although strained over a variety of issues, have recently improved in some areas. If confirmed, do you believe that there are any opportunities to improve relations through military to military programs, or other actions that you would recommend be taken?**

*President Obama is establishing a positive working relationship with Russian President Medvedev, which contributes immensely toward resetting our relations with Russia. This will afford us excellent opportunities to make headway in the realm of military cooperation. Both sides realize that the military-to-military relationship is a pivotal and stabilizing element to the broader bilateral security relationship. CJCS and the Russian Chief of Defense signed a Military Work Plan during the 6 - 7 July Presidential Summit in Moscow which contains events that will allow us to construct a more robust working relationship. We have agreed with our Russian counterparts to focus our exercise and training Work Plan on areas of cooperation to include counter-piracy operations, combating terrorism, missile defense, search and rescue, and maintaining peace in unstable regions. In addition, we seek to establish direct counterpart relationships between the Joint Staff and Russian General Staff that can facilitate issue mitigation.*

**You have testified before this committee and spoken on the potential for missile defense cooperation with Russia, what are the first steps that could be take in this area?**

*I believe there is great potential to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. I would not want to speculate at this time on what specific cooperative programs our countries could develop, as we currently have an internal governmental review on missile defense underway and our consultations with the Russians are in the developmental stage. I can envision that opportunities to cooperate on missile defense could begin with more detailed transparency, information exchanges and exercises.*

*Over the past three months, the United States and Russia have discussed opportunities to increase transparency through the exchange of ballistic missile warning information. The Joint Data Exchange Center or JDEC was conceived as a way for both countries to work together to reduce risk of a false attack warning. A JDEC Memorandum of Agreement, originally signed in June 2000 by former Presidents Clinton and Putin, pledged to establish a joint operations center to be manned by both Russian and U.S. officers.*

*In May of this year Ambassador Steve Mull led a U.S. delegation to Moscow and expressed our desire to implement the JDEC agreement as an important step towards greater cooperation. We are hopeful the final details will be addressed between our two nations within the coming months so we can move forward.*

*Continuation of exercises such as the US-Russian Missile Defense Cooperation Program would be a reasonable expectation, though I do not expect that it would resume this year. This program began in 1996 and has resulted in six major US-RF exercises being conducted during the last twelve years in both the United States and in Russia. Since the US and RF experts last met in July 2007, the US delegation has also continued to work on developing a US-RF wargame to be hosted in the US. This wargame was developed with the concept of working issues related to a simulated United Nations agreement to support a friendly nation under missile threat from a neighboring possible hostile country. The wargame was for the US and RF forces to work the deployment, employment and sustainment of their missile defense forces in this simulated theater. Such cooperative projects have proven to be very constructive to our mutual security objectives and could represent the initial stages of what could be done.*

**In your view, what are the specific actions that could be taken in other areas such as space and where would additional cooperation be beneficial?**

*DoD has worked closely with the State Department to engage the Russian Federation in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). Efforts focus on initiatives we term “Transparency and Confidence Building Measures” or TCBMs. TCBMs attempt to preserve the space environment and ensure safe and responsible operations for the benefit of all space-faring nations. With Russian support an agreement was reached within the past few years in the COPUOS on “Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines”. These voluntary measures will reduce the amount of debris created by newly launched satellites and boosters, significantly increasing space flight safety.*

*The U.S. and Russians have also been engaged in cooperative civil space applications in human and robotic space flight, space science, space applications and technologies, and the monitoring of the global environment. Cooperation between the Russian Federal Space Agency and NASA is especially close with regard to the resupply, operations and maintenance of the International Space Station. This cooperation will become even more critical in the coming years with the stand-down of the shuttle fleet.*

*As we move forward the department continues to explore opportunities for cooperation in Space. This issue is a specific focus area to be addressed as part of the Congressionally-directed Space Posture Review.*

**Recent NATO exercises in Georgia and upcoming Russian regional exercises have continued the high level of tension. In your view, what steps should the U.S. military take to train and supply Georgia, without further escalating tensions between Georgia and Russia?**

*Like Russia, the US engages in military exercises and security cooperation with a broad range of allies and partners in order to enhance our abilities to cooperate in operational missions and to support their aspirations to become contributing members to Euro-Atlantic security. These are also necessary and prudent courses of action to*

*address the myriad security challenges we and our allies face in the foreseeable future. That said, we are committed to regional peace and stability and will continue to emphasize transparency and enhanced communication in our military cooperation efforts with both Russia and Georgia. We are also grateful that Georgia has offered to participate in the International Assistance Force in Afghanistan.*

### **Building Partner Capacity**

**In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. These include the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”) and the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”).**

**What should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?**

*Building foreign partner capacity is fundamental to our security strategy and will remain so for decades. Its most immediate impact is to enable many of our partners to counter extremist groups that threaten their stability and that may present a direct threat to the U.S. It is critical to support and enable our partnerships with other U.S. Government agencies and key allies and friends abroad in order to improve policy, planning, and execution of national and homeland security missions. It also reinforces with our partners the notion of civilian control of the military.*

**What is your assessment of these temporary capacity-building authorities, in particular Section 1206 and Section 1207?**

*We are grateful for these authorities, and there are countless examples of their effectiveness. Although created in response to particular contingencies, these programs have proven useful in putting the U.S. Government on a stronger, more flexible security footing. They remain an absolutely vital tool cited by Combatant Commanders, and I hear repeatedly from them how important dependable authority and funding is for them to be able to adequately plan their theater security cooperation activities. Specifically these authorities:*

- *Save lives and reduce stress on our forces by helping partners solve problems before they become crises requiring U.S. military interventions.*
- *Create networks of partners. The U.S. does not have sufficient military forces to deny terrorists sanctuary everywhere in the world; nor will we ever. So we must rely on partners; help build their capacity; and help create networks of partners working together to counter terrorism. It takes networks to defeat networks.*
- *Capitalize on partner capabilities. If properly trained and equipped, foreign forces can be more effective than U.S. forces because they know the language, politics, and human terrain.*

- *Reduce U.S. footprint. Large U.S. military footprints abroad can be used by the enemy as a recruiting tool. Capable foreign forces can alleviate large U.S. footprints.*
- *Reduce terrorist capability. The U.S. is at peace with many countries where terrorists enjoy sanctuary. So we must work with and through them to reduce terrorist capability.*

**What should be the relationship of the global train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as DoD counternarcotics assistance and State Department foreign assistance and foreign military financing?**

*The authorities mentioned above all contribute to national security through building partner capacity, each with its own unique benefits and applications. We fully intend to apply these programs as designed.*

*Secretary Gates has been a strong and vocal proponent of DoD's authorities for building partnership capacity. Because Congress requires the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to jointly formulate and implement projects, both 1206 and 1207 have served as instruments of interagency cooperation—bringing State, USAID, and DoD together in applying a strategic, “3D” lens to country assistance. The different perspective each organization brings helps the USG look at country assistance holistically and place country-specific requirements in a broader regional and global context. As such, I see an enduring need for a flexible, responsive program that requires all “3Ds” to craft innovative country assistance programs designed to prevent or respond to crises.*

### **Integration of Space Programs**

**What is your view on the need to institute a more integrated approach to both the military and intelligence sides of the space community?**

*I agree strongly with the need to integrate military and intelligence space capabilities. Members of both communities participate in a number of joint bodies; we are jointly developing programs, and at senior levels have very integral relationships. However, when the needs of either diverge to the extent that solutions impose impractical cost on the government, consideration should be given to potential independent complimentary solutions.*

**The Air Force is also working on space programs with civilian agencies and there may be the opportunity or the need for additional cooperative programs. The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program is the subject of a very critical review that fundamentally questions whether cooperation is workable.**

**What are your views on the future of interagency space programs?**

*I support interagency space programs as we continue to look for efficiencies. We must be pragmatic about finding common ground that will allow all stakeholders to affordably reach a good enough solution.*

**Space Program Management**

**In many instances the military and intelligence space programs have experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties. In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with establishing realistic, clear, requirements and then maintaining control over the integrity of the requirements once established.**

**How in your view can or should the space systems requirements process be improved?**

*While encouraged by the improvements that have been made to space system requirements and acquisition process over the last several years, the space systems requirement process could be further improved with additional collaboration and coordination between the JROC and the DNI's Intelligence Resources Board. This would result in increased vigilance and scrutiny of the space requirements process. Additionally, where appropriate, adoption of commercial practices could help reduce the requirements approval time.*

**In many circumstances space programs take many years from conception to launch. The result is that the technology in the satellites is significantly outdated by the time the satellites are launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to a decision to terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as sunk costs are never fully amortized.**

**How in your view can this cycle be addressed?**

*This cycle can be addressed by reducing the complexity of spacecraft and lift vehicles, designing smaller, lighter single-purpose satellites rather than complex multi-purpose satellites which must be sub-optimized to perform a variety of missions, by adopting commercial practices to streamline the design and manufacturing process and by pursuing a "block build" strategy that allows for infusion of new technology as programs progress.*

**Operationally Responsive Space**

**Do you support the concept of operationally responsive small satellites and what do you see as the most promising opportunities for small satellites?**

*Yes. The concept can rapidly provide space capabilities to the emergent or near-term needs of the warfighter in a rapidly changing environment. This will enable the warfighter to integrate space capabilities when and where needed to produce the desired effect.*

### **Prompt Global Strike**

**As Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, you made development of a conventional, non-nuclear, prompt global strike capability a priority, and you have carried that priority into your current position.**

**What is your vision of the capability that should be developed for prompt global strike and the types of targets that would underpin the need to develop the capability?**

*The capability should be one that provides for prompt execution, precise targeting, lethal conventional effects, and sufficient range to hold time-sensitive or inaccessible targets at risk, from U.S. operating locations. Prompt global strike should also serve as an alternative to comparable nuclear weapons, particularly where the use of nuclear weapons would be inappropriate.*

### **Current Nuclear Weapons Stockpile**

**In your view is the current nuclear weapons stockpile safe, secure, and reliable?**

*Yes. As part of the 2008 annual report to the President on stockpile assessments, the directors of the National Laboratories and the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command reported on the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. They are confident the nuclear stockpile is not only safe but will perform as intended. I share their opinion, however we must now begin the investment necessary to ensure the same levels of safety, security and reliability in the future.*

**As Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, and now as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council you work closely with the National Nuclear Security Administration and its stockpile stewardship program.**

**What in your view are the longer term stockpile stewardship goals and what are the key elements that should be addressed from a DoD perspective?**

*Without a doubt, the key to sustaining our nuclear weapons capabilities is to gradually replace our existing legacy warheads with modernized warheads of comparable capability with greater safety, security and reliability. Additionally, modernized warheads should be less sensitive to manufacturing tolerances or to aging of materials. To do this, we must begin now to transform the supporting nuclear weapons research, development, and manufacturing infrastructure.*

**In your view is the stockpile stewardship program providing the tools to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing, and if not what tools are needed?**

*To date, the stockpile stewardship activities have enabled us to maintain a safe, reliable, and secure stockpile without testing. However, confidence in the overall reliability and military effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile continues to decline due to aging, the accumulated effects of weapon changes, and discoveries of various anomalies in the weapons. As I stated earlier, we need to invest in modernizing both our infrastructure and the stockpile. Consistent with the recommendation from the Strategic Posture Commission, we can best manage risk in ensuring the surety of the stockpile for the future by applying a spectrum of options that includes warhead refurbishment, warhead component reuse, and warhead replacement. Refurbishment alone remains an important near-term option but is insufficient to manage our long-term risk. While a mid-term reuse strategy can enable limited improvements in reliability and surety, replacement allows for the greatest flexibility in achieving the required reliability and surety characteristics for the future. However, we must have a fully responsive research, development and production complex that allows warhead replacement in order to achieve these surety and reliability gains.*

### **Reductions in Nuclear Weapons**

**The President has made a commitment with Russian President Medvedev to bilaterally reduce the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads.**

**Do you believe reductions in the total number of warheads, both reserve and operationally deployed are feasible?**

*The United States has made a commitment to reduce nuclear weapons and their role in our national security strategy, and to strengthen our non-proliferation treaties. The military supports these commitments. So long as the DOD and DOE are able to take the necessary actions to ensure that the nuclear arsenal we keep remains safe, secure and effective, then reductions are possible within mutually agreed limitations.*

**Do you believe reductions in the total number of START accountable delivery systems could also be reduced in a bilateral context?**

*Yes.*

**If your answer to the two questions above is yes, how should capabilities and requirements be evaluated to identify which warheads and delivery systems could be retired and dismantled?**

*The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is currently underway and will analyze and make recommendations to senior leaders as to the appropriate nuclear weapons mix and*

*force structure necessary to carry out the nuclear mission within our national security strategy.*

*As directed by Congress, the NPR is a comprehensive review of:*

- (1) The role of nuclear forces in United States military strategy, planning and programming.*
- (2) The policy requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence posture.*
- (3) The relationship among United States nuclear deterrence policy, targeting strategy, and arms control objectives.*
- (4) The role that missile defense capabilities and conventional strike forces play in determining the role and size of nuclear forces.*
- (5) The levels and composition of the nuclear delivery systems that will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans for replacing or modifying existing systems.*
- (6) The nuclear weapons complex that will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans to modernize or modify the complex.*
- (7) The active and inactive nuclear weapons stockpile that will be required for implementing the United States national and military strategy, including any plans for replacing or modifying the warheads.*

### **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea**

**Do you support U. S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?**

*I strongly support the U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea. The U.S. is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council and the only Arctic nation not a party to the Convention. With 157 nations party to the Convention, we are one of very few non-party nations, together with North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela.*

*The Convention codifies navigational rights and freedoms that are essential to the global mobility of U.S. armed forces and the sustainment of combat forces overseas. Moreover, the Convention codifies the right of warships to seize pirates and pirate vessels, the right of warships to approach and visit commercial vessels, the right to lay and maintain submarine cables (such as internet cables) on foreign continental shelves, and the sovereign immunity of warships and public vessels. Joining the Convention now allows us to “lock in” these rights and freedoms and puts us in the best position to protect them against encroachment from foreign coastal states.*

**How would you answer the critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?**

*Our nonparty status is currently having a negative impact on the national security interests of the United States. It creates a seam in combined operations, denies us a “seat at the table” when the Parties interpret or seek to amend the Convention, and requires us to rely on customary international law as the legal basis for our activities in and above the maritime domain. It is adversely affecting our ability expand the Proliferation Security Initiative, and our ability to effectively counter the People’s Republic of China’s sea denial strategy in the East and South China Seas, which is based on a distorted interpretation of the Convention. In contrast, accession to the Convention, the bedrock legal instrument for maintaining order in the maritime domain, will support our security strategy of building and sustaining a coalition of nations dedicated to the rule of law. Nothing in the Convention undermines our ability to conduct military operations; rather, the provisions of the Convention reinforce our international mobility, operational flexibility, and optimize the protection of our national security interests.*

**Treatment of Detainees**

**The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.**

**If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant Department of Defense Directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable to U.S. forces fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?**

*Yes, I will. The U.S. military is firmly committed to the proper safeguarding and care of detainees in our custody. We will ensure that our policies, practices, and procedures are in accordance with domestic law and our obligations under international law and the Geneva Conventions.*

**Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?**

*Yes. I do support the standards outlined in the documents you quote and I will ensure that we continue to operate a safe, humane, legal, transparent and professional enemy combatant detention operation that adheres to our obligations under U.S. and international law, and reflects the highest standards and values of the American people.*

## **Ballistic Missile Defense**

**Secretary Gates has stated on a number of occasions that he believes there is potential for cooperation between the United States and Russia on missile defense, and Russia has suggested the idea of sharing early warning and surveillance data from its Garbarla radar in Azerbaijan, and its Armavir radar in southern Russia.**

**What do you believe is the potential for US-Russian cooperation on missile defense, and are there steps you believe we should explore with Russia?**

*The United States is committed to working with Russia on a range of issues, including missile defense. Our experts are exploring cooperative opportunities that would complement our missile defense architecture. The radars Secretary Gates mentions would provide helpful information for early ballistic missile warning detection in the event of an Iranian missile attack. The department will continue to work towards identifying areas where cooperation is mutually beneficial for both countries as part of the Congressionally-directed Ballistic Missile Defense Review.*

**With the Fiscal Year 2010 budget request, Secretary Gates has refocused the Department's missile defense program on effective theater missile defenses to protect our forward deployed forces, allies, and friends against existing short- and medium-range missile threats from nations like North Korea and Iran. The budget request would provide \$900 million in increased funding for more of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Standard Missiles-3 interceptors, and more Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships.**

**Do you agree with Secretary Gates' decision to increase the focus on effective theater missile defenses to defend our forces against existing regional (short and medium-range) missile threats from nations like North Korea and Iran?**

*Yes. Our forces are increasingly threatened by shorter-range ballistic missiles and the proliferation of dangerous technologies among rogue regimes and non-state actors. In addition, states like Iran and North Korea continue development of longer-range ballistic missiles with which to coerce the United States and our allies and friends.*

**The Administration is considering a number of options for possible missile defense in Europe against a potential future Iranian missile threat, including the previously proposed deployment of missile defense capabilities in Poland and the Czech Republic.**

**From a technical standpoint, do you believe there are a number of options for a missile defense in Europe, and do you believe a land-based Standard Missile-3 interceptor could provide a useful capability against future Iranian missile threats, both to Europe and potentially to the United States?**

*Yes. I believe there are a number of technical alternatives for missile defense architectures in Europe. Land- and sea-based SM-3 interceptors, along with the necessary sensors and warning from both ground and space, could be key components of an alternative technical architecture.*

**The Fiscal Year 2010 budget request for the Missile Defense Agency includes an initiative to develop the capability to intercept ballistic missiles early in their flight, sometimes referred to as the “ascent phase.” This initiative would use the Standard Missile-3 interceptor and existing and near-term sensors. If this capability is successful, it could permit the United States to intercept long-range missiles from nations like North Korea well before the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system would have to be used to defend the Nation.**

**What is your view of the potential value of an ascent-phase capability?**

*An early-intercept capability would improve defense of theater areas and the homeland, and we are considering options for that potential capability. This defense capability would allow more intercept opportunities and potentially conserve interceptors by allowing more shoot-look-shoot vice salvo engagements. As a hedge against evolving future threats, destroying threat missile early in flight reduces the effectiveness of countermeasures.*

**As the Vice Chairman of the JCS, you are a member of the Missile Defense Executive Board, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. This gives you a unique perspective on the oversight and management of the Ballistic Missile defense System, including its requirements component.**

**Are there additional steps that you believe would make the BMDS more responsive to the operational needs of the combatant commanders, and are there additional steps that you believe would improve the requirements process for missile defense?**

*No. The additional steps needed to ensure the BMDS aligns more closely with the needs of the operational warfighter were addressed in the development of the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process (LCMP). This process, used to influence the FY-10 budget and the FY-11 review, is on track to fully guide FY-12 budget inputs.*

### **Future of NATO**

**In your view, what existing or new missions should be the focus of NATO’s strategic efforts over the next five years?**

*In my opinion, NATO should concentrate its strategic efforts first and foremost on Afghanistan. This will require continuing emphasis on sustaining and increasing the "whole of the international community" approach required for success. Strategic outreach, engagement, and cooperation with the international community, to include the*

*European Union and the United Nations, and other appropriate organizations will be critical in the upcoming years.*

*I believe that other strategic priorities for NATO include: the move to deterrent presence in Kosovo; consolidating gains and further capacity-building in Iraqi security forces through the NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I); and counter-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa. This latter mission is closely linked to NATO support to the African Union, which can address some of the root causes of piracy. For all of these strategic efforts, the same "whole of the international community" approach should continue to be applied, as NATO military forces alone cannot provide a long-term, lasting solution.*

**In your view, how should NATO proceed on the issue of further enlargement of the alliance over the next five years?**

*That is a political question that will have to be answered by the President and the Congress for the United States and by the governments of the other 27 NATO nations.*

**Are you satisfied with the progress of NATO member nations, particularly new member nations, in transforming their militaries, acquiring advanced capabilities, and enhancing their interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO member nations? Where do you see room for improvement?**

*Yes. While Allied progress in these three areas varies from nation to nation, each nation is continuing, within its own means and capabilities, to make progress. Much of this progress is driven by the increasing demands of the many on-going NATO-led operations, particularly, the operation in Afghanistan. The participation of the Alliance and of each of its individual member States over the past six years in ISAF is producing forces that are increasingly more deployable and sustainable, has led to the development of enhanced Alliance capabilities, and has significantly improved the interoperability between not only U.S. and the other Allied forces, but also between the 28 NATO nations and the 14 other partner nations participating in this operation. The new NATO nations, while typically very constrained financially, have appeared very eager to transform their militaries, and have typically been very supportive of our operations in Afghanistan.*

*Despite the Alliance's accomplishments, I believe that NATO needs to continue to develop its capability to respond to new threats and challenges such as cyber warfare and counter-piracy, and to enhance further its ability to work in a comprehensive manner with other international organizations, such as the European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, as well as non-governmental organizations to address and respond to these new threats and existing challenges, such as those we face in Afghanistan and Iraq.*

**What steps if any could or should NATO take, in your view, to reduce tensions with Russia?**

*NATO should continue to use the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as the primary mechanism for Russian and Allied consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint*

*decision and joint action, and as the forum for dialogue with Russia on all issues – where they agree and disagree – with a view towards resolving problems and building practical co-operation. In fact, the NRC Foreign Ministers met in Greece on 27 June, where among other things they identified common security interests, such as the stabilization of Afghanistan, arms control, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, crisis management, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and counter-piracy. As long as no events occur that would again increase tensions, I see NATO-Russian relations maintaining a positive trajectory.*

### **Special Operations Command**

**The Command of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) recently submitted a number of proposals to the Office of the Secretary of Defense designed to improve the coordination between USSOCOM and the Services related to personnel management issues, including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of special operations forces. Included in these proposals was a modification of section 167 of title 10, United States Code, that would change the role of the USSOCOM Commander from “monitoring” the readiness of special operations personnel to “coordinating” with the Services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect special operations forces.**

**Do you support the proposed change to section 167 of title 10, United States Code, to give the Commander of USSOCOM greater influence on personnel management decisions and policies related to special operations forces? Please provide rationale for your position.**

*The Service Chiefs, USSOCOM Commander and I had a detailed discussion on this topic last week. It is my recommendation that a change to ‘coordinating’ with the Services better accomplishes the desired amount of participation in the various manpower processes sought by the USSOCOM Commander in order to ensure the readiness of the Special Forces. This change may be effected as either a directive change or a statutory change .*

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important to this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if reconfirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree, if reconfirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to the appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

*Yes*

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

*Yes*