

Advance Questions for Malcolm Ross O'Neill, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

1. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

This milestone legislation is now more than 20 years old and has served our nation well. I believe that the framework established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved inter-service and joint relationships and promoted the effective execution of responsibilities. However, the Department, working with the Congress, should continually assess the law in light of improving capabilities, evolving threats, and changing organizational dynamics. Although I am currently unaware of any reason to amend Goldwater-Nichols, if confirmed, I hope to have an opportunity to assess whether the challenges posed by today's security environment require amendments to the legislation.

2. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

As noted above, I have no specific proposals to modify Goldwater-Nichols. As with any legislation of this magnitude, however, I believe it may be appropriate to review past experience with the legislation with a view toward identifying any areas in which it can be improved upon, and then consider with the Congress whether the Act should be revised.

3. Do you see the need for any change in the roles of the civilian and military leadership of the Department of the Army regarding the requirements definition, resource allocation, and acquisition processes?

I have no specific proposals regarding the roles and assigned missions at this time, however, it may be appropriate to review roles of the civilian and military participants in this process with a view toward identifying areas that can be improved upon.

4. What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the service chiefs in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-allocation process?

It is my belief that the existing role of Service Chiefs in overseeing the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in validating joint capabilities requirements is appropriate. Similarly, their collaboration in the resource allocation process is very important.

5. What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the combatant commanders in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-allocation processes?

In my view the existing war fighting responsibilities of combatant commanders, and their role as cited in the Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, is appropriate. I support the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act language that the input of combatant commanders must be considered in the development of joint requirements.

6. Do you see the need for any changes in the structure or operations of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)?

I have no current basis to assess the effectiveness of either the structure or organization of the JROC at this time. However, based upon my past interaction with the JROC, I always felt that the USD(ATL) should have been a full member for the purpose of providing technical insights on various system options. Also, under certain circumstances, it would be helpful for Service Acquisition Executives to be invited to participate in the JROC.

Duties

Section 3016(b)(5)(A) of title 10, United States Code, states that the principal duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASAALT) shall be the overall supervision of acquisition, technology, and logistics matters of the Department of the Army.

7. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASAALT?

The ASA(ALT) is one of five Assistant Secretaries of the Army. The principal duty of the ASA(ALT) is the overall supervision of acquisition, logistics, and technology matters within the Department of the Army. The ASA(ALT) serves, when delegated, as the Army Acquisition Executive, the Senior Procurement Executive, the Science Advisor to the Secretary, and as the senior research and development official for the Department of the Army. The ASA(ALT) also serves, when delegated, as the Army Science Advisor to the Secretary, and as the senior research and development official for the Department of the Army. The ASA(ALT) appoints, manages, and evaluates program executive officers and direct-reporting program managers and manages the Army Acquisition Corps and the Army Acquisition Workforce. The ASA(ALT) executes the DA procurement and contracting functions, including exercising the

authorities of the agency head for contracting, procurement, and acquisition matters pursuant to laws and regulations, the delegation of contracting authority; and the designation of contracting activities. He or she oversees the Army Industrial Base and Industrial Preparedness Programs and ensures the production readiness of weapon systems. The ASA(ALT) oversees all DA logistics management functions, including readiness, supply, services, maintenance, transportation, and related automated logistics systems management.

8. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the ASAALT, as set forth in section 3016(b)(5)(A of title 10, United States Code, or in Department of Defense regulations pertaining to functions of the ASAALT?

I have no specific recommendations at this time. If confirmed, however, I look forward to the opportunity to serve in the position before recommending any potential changes in the duties and functions of the ASA (ALT).

9. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Most recently, I served as a consultant and Chairman of the Board on Army Science and Technology of the National Academies, responsible for leading a team of scientists, engineers, and policy experts who discern key Army technical issues and define the areas in which studies by the National Research Council can assist the Army to exploit advanced technologies in Army systems.

From 2000 until my retirement from Lockheed Martin in 2006, I was Vice President and Chief Technical Officer of Lockheed Martin Corporation and provided staff supervision for Lockheed Martin's approximately 60,000 engineers and scientists, planned the independent R&D investment portfolio across the corporation, and sponsored cooperative technology development efforts with GE Global Research Center and Sandia National Laboratory.

My acquisition, logistics, and technology experience spans 43 years. I was a career Army officer serving for 34 years, having served as a uniformed acquisition specialist at the end of my career. I have a Ph.D. in Physics from Rice University, was a program manager for DARPA, NATO, the Army, and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. I commanded the Army Laboratory Command and served in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition. As Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, I was Head of a Contracting Agency (HCA). All of these positions have cumulatively prepared me for this position if confirmed.

10. What background or experience do you have in the acquisition of major weapon systems?

I was a program manager for DARPA, NATO, the Army, and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. Also, I was Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, an independent procurement activity reporting directly to the USDA.

11. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASAALT?

I believe that my experience provides a unique mix of qualifications that will enable me, if confirmed, to discharge the responsibilities of the Office. However, one must become familiar with the current situation and should always be looking for opportunities to expand knowledge to make well-informed decisions. If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to visit Iraq and Afghanistan to better understand the acquisition footprint and how we can better support the soldiers on the ground.

12. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you?

If confirmed, I would expect that I would be held accountable for the Army's acquisition, logistics and technology efforts.

Relationships

13. In carrying out your duties, what would be your relationship with:

a. The Secretary of the Army

If confirmed, I will support the Secretary of Army's priorities in acquisition, logistics and technology.

b. The Under Secretary of the Army

If confirmed, I will support the Under Secretary of the Army, both in his role as the Under Secretary and in his role as Chief Management Officer.

c. The Chief of Staff of the Army

If confirmed, I will work with the Chief of Staff of the Army to ensure that our soldiers receive world class equipment and support to perform their missions within available resources.

d. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

If confirmed, I will work with the USD(AT&L) in connection with Army acquisition, logistics and technology programs, and I will support the USD (AT&L) in the discharge of his responsibility to supervise Department of Defense acquisition. I assume that my duties as Army Acquisition Executive will bring me into close working contact with the USD(ATL), and I am

confident that our collaboration will be very beneficial for the Army and DOD.

e. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to support their efforts to provide DoD with independent analysis and resourcing assessments for weapons systems programs.

f. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation

If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to ensure appropriate operational testing oversight for Army acquisition programs.

g. The Director of Procurement and Acquisition Policy

If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Procurement and Acquisition Policy to ensure appropriate oversight for Army acquisition programs, procurement and contracting.

h. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering

If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to rapidly field technologies and capabilities to support ongoing operations and to ensure the Army and the nation maintain a strong technical and engineering foundation to reduce the cost, acquisition time, and risk of our major defense acquisition programs.

i. The Director of Systems Engineering

If confirmed, I will rely on the expertise and advice of the Director, Systems Engineering, encourage early involvement in supporting acquisition programs, and consider his independent assessments and recommendations in decisions pertaining to Major Defense Acquisition Programs.

j. The Director of Developmental Testing

If confirmed, I will work with the Director of Developmental Testing for oversight of developmental testing for Army acquisition programs.

k. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council

If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Requirements and Oversight Council to ensure maximum collaboration with other Military Services for joint programs to the benefit of the Department.

l. The Service Acquisition Executives of the other Military Departments

If confirmed, I will collaborate with the other Service Acquisition Executives to share information about relevant acquisition programs, seek opportunities to improve acquisition processes, and support the policies and practices of the Department.

- m. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works**
If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works where relevant to Army acquisition programs and management of contracting.
- n. The Chief Systems Engineer of the Army?**
If confirmed, I will ensure that the Chief Systems Engineer will become a highly visible and vital player within the ASA(ALT) office.
- o. The Commander of the Defense Contract Management Agency**
If confirmed, I will work with the Commander of the Defense Contract Management Agency to ensure effective administration of Army contracts.
- p. The Defense Business Systems Management Committee**
If confirmed, I will work with the Defense Business Systems Management Committee in connection with Army acquisition, logistics and technology programs.
- q. The Business Transformation Agency**
If confirmed, I will work with the Business Transformation Agency in connection with Army acquisition, logistics and technology programs.
- r. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration**
If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration in connection with Army acquisition, logistics and technology programs.
- s. The Chief Information Officer of the Army**
If confirmed, I will work with the Chief Information Officer of the Army in connection with Army acquisition, logistics and technology programs.
- t. The General Counsel of the Army**
If confirmed, I will work with the General Counsel to ensure all Office of the ASA(ALT) actions comport with law, regulation and policy.
- u. The Inspector General of the Army**
If confirmed, I will work with the Inspector General of the Army in connection with Army acquisition, logistics and technology programs.
- v. The Surgeon General of the Army**
If confirmed, I will work with the Surgeon General of the Army in connection with Army acquisition, logistics and technology programs

w. The Army Business Transformation Office

If confirmed, I will work with the Army's Chief Management Officer and the Office of Business Transformation in connection with Army acquisition, logistics and technology programs.

x. The Judge Advocate General of the Army

If confirmed, I will work with the Judge Advocate General of the Army when appropriate.

y. The Auditor General of the Army

If confirmed, I will work with the Auditor General of the Army in connection with Army acquisition, logistics and technology programs.

z. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau

If confirmed, I will work with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to ensure that the National Guard receives world class equipment to perform their missions within available resources.

aa. The Director of the Army National Guard

If confirmed, I will work with the Director of the Army National Guard to ensure that our soldiers receive world class equipment and the best logistic support to perform their missions within available resources.

ab. The Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

If confirmed, I will work with the Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology to ensure that appropriate oversight and direction is provided to the Army acquisition workforce and Army acquisition programs, policies, procedures and contracting efforts.

Major Challenges and Problems

14. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the ASAALT?

I believe the principal challenge facing the ASA(ALT) is effectively supporting the Army during a time of war while concurrently achieving essential and efficient modernization.

15. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will work closely with senior Department of the Army officials, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to address these challenges and meet

the acquisition priorities of the Secretary of the Army. Meeting these challenges will require a holistic focus on the overall Acquisition system that includes requirements generation, the allocation of fiscal resources, and sound acquisition program management. I would maintain emphasis on enhancing the acquisition workforce and on adopting sound business practices to ensure that the Army achieves the maximum benefit from its scarce fiscal resources.

16. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the management of acquisition functions in the Army?

I believe the shortage of human capital in the skill sets and quantities required presents an enormous challenge in executing the Army's acquisition mission.

17. What management actions and timetables would you establish to address these problems?

I expect that it will take several years before the right skill sets are resident within the Army acquisition workforce, but I believe the Army has the flexibilities today to deliver warfighting capability more rapidly, and if confirmed, I will work to institutionalize those enablers and will also pay close attention to human capital planning and development.

Major Weapon System Acquisition

18. Do you believe that the Army's current investment budget for major systems is affordable given historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current operations, projected increases in end strength, and asset recapitalization?

I have not had the opportunity to assess the Army's current investment strategy for its major defense acquisition systems; however, if confirmed I will become familiar with the various competing interests associated with the fielding of modern capability and the resource environment that supports this process.

19. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue?

If confirmed, I would work with the Army resource and requirements communities to assess the Army's major weapons systems programs to ensure that the Army's investment strategy for those systems is both affordable and operationally relevant.

20. What would be the impact of a decision by the Army to reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability issues?

I do not yet have access to the information needed to assess what impact reducing the purchase of major systems would have on the Army. If am confirmed, I will

carefully consider potential impacts and ensure that any decisions made in this area is fully informed and based on all available information.

Nearly half of DOD's 95 largest acquisition programs have exceeded the so-called "Nunn-McCurdy" cost growth standards established in section 2433 of title 10, United States Code, to identify seriously troubled programs. Section 206 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 tightened the standards for addressing such programs.

21. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure sufficient transparency of technology development programs to ensure that uncontrolled cost growth or breaches of critical cost growth thresholds established in the "Nunn-McCurdy" provision are identified for appropriate action?

The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 reinforces the oversight and reporting process for major programs. It will take some time for the results of these actions to be seen in individual acquisition programs. If confirmed, I would insist on clarity and rigor in the oversight of major programs to ensure the acquisition process supports the needs of the force and is a responsible steward of the resources available.

22. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to address out-of-control cost growth on Army's major defense acquisition programs?

It is my understanding that cost growth in many Army programs has resulted from emerging requirements arising from operating in a wartime environment. If confirmed, I would insist on clarity and rigor in the oversight of major programs to ensure the acquisition process supports the needs of the force and is a responsible steward of the resources available.

23. What steps if any do you believe that the Army should consider taking in the case of major defense acquisition programs that exceed the critical cost growth thresholds established in the "Nunn-McCurdy" provision?

I am not currently familiar with the specific requirement imposed by law in cases where a program experiences a "critical" Nunn-McCurdy breach. However, to the extent that the law requires that actions be taken to determine whether a program should continue or be terminated, I will, if confirmed, insist on strict compliance with all statutory and regulatory requirements associated with the Nunn-McCurdy reporting process.

24. Do you believe that the office of the ASAALT, as currently structured, has the organization and resources necessary to effectively oversee the management of these major defense acquisition programs?

I have not yet had the opportunity to assess this matter. If I am confirmed, I intend to conduct an assessment to ensure that the Office of the ASA(ALT) is structured and

adequately resourced to effectively oversee the management of the Army's major defense acquisition programs.

25. If not, how would you address this problem?

If confirmed, I intend to conduct an assessment to ensure that the Office of the ASA(ALT) is structured and adequately resourced to effectively oversee the management of the Army's major defense acquisition programs. If the structure of the ASAALT office was not sufficient in either organization or resourcing to accomplish its statutory mission, I would make that fact clear to Army, DOD and Congressional leadership. I believe that, with the cooperation of Executive and Legislative bodies, we could work to resolve any issues of this nature.

26. Do you see the need for any changes to the Nunn-McCurdy provision, as revised by section 206?

I am currently unaware of any reason to amend the Nunn-McCurdy provision as revised by section 206 of the Weapon System Reform Act of 2009. However, if confirmed; I will have an opportunity to assess whether the challenges posed by the cost growth in major programs require amendments to the legislation.

27. What principles will guide your thinking on whether to recommend terminating a program that has experienced "critical" cost growth under Nunn-McCurdy?

It is my view that a decision on whether to recommend terminating a program that has experienced critical cost growth under Nunn-McCurdy must be made on a case by case basis and must be fully coordinated with all stakeholders.

Systems Engineering and Developmental Testing

One of the premises for the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 was that the best way to improve acquisition outcomes is to place acquisition programs on a sounder footing from the outset by addressing program shortcomings in the early phases of the acquisition process. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Developmental Test and Evaluation reported in May 2008 that "the single most important step necessary" to address high rates of failure on defense acquisition programs is "to ensure programs are formulated to execute a viable systems engineering strategy from the beginning."

28. Do you believe that the Army has the systems engineering and developmental testing organizations, resources, and capabilities needed to ensure that there is a sound basis for key requirements, acquisition, and budget decisions on major defense acquisition programs?

Based on previous experiences, I believe the answer may be no. If confirmed, I will assess the state of the Army's capability in this discipline.

29. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to build such organizations, resources, and capabilities in the Army?

See response above.

30. Do you believe that the nation as a whole is producing enough systems engineers and designers and giving them sufficient experience working on engineering and design projects to ensure that the Army can access an experienced and technically trained systems engineering and design workforce?

No. The development of system engineering talent and the expanding of system engineering curricula in universities to include systems-of-systems is a major focus of industry. Good systems engineers are earning top dollar. More well-trained systems engineers can only benefit the United States.

31. If not, what do you recommend should be done to address the shortfall?

If confirmed, I will work with to enhance DOD's ability to compete with industry for this talent.

Technological Maturity

Over the last several years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that private sector programs are more successful than DOD programs because they consistently require that new technologies achieve a high level of maturity before such technologies may be incorporated into product development programs. Section 104 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 addresses this issue by tightening technological maturity requirements for major defense acquisition programs.

32. How important is it, in your view, for the Army to mature its technologies with research and development funds before these technologies are incorporated into product development programs?

In my view, it is very important to mature technologies within the research and development program. Research and development should be used to reduce program risk, by demonstrating that component technologies can be integrated into systems and perform as required in a relevant environment. Making the investment to mature technologies in research and development can reduce the risk of costly overruns in subsequent phases of the development process.

33. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the key components and technologies to be incorporated into major acquisition programs meet the Army's technological maturity goals?

If confirmed, I will ensure that all technologies are peer reviewed for maturity before they transition to a program of record, and ensure the application of recent DoD policy requiring early systems engineering activities prior to Milestone B.

34. Do you believe that the Army should make greater use of prototypes, including competitive prototypes, to ensure that acquisition programs reach an appropriate level of technological maturity, design maturity, and manufacturing readiness before receiving Milestone approval?

Yes.

35. If so, what steps do you believe the Army should take to increase its use of such prototypes?

It is my understanding that the use of competitive prototyping is already a key part of Army development programs. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize its importance and ensure adequate resources are made available to support prototyping.

Section 2366a of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Milestone Decision Authority for a major defense acquisition program to certify that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of maturity before Milestone B approval.

36. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that the Army complies with the requirements of section 2366a?

If confirmed, I will ensure the Army conducts Technology Readiness Assessments (TRA) to document that technologies have reached an appropriate level of maturity before receiving Milestone B approval. I will also ensure that processes, tools and resources are available to meet the requirements of section 2366a, and also ensure that MDAs are aware of their responsibilities as they pertain to section 2366a.

37. What is your view of the recommendation of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Manufacturing Technology Program that program managers should be required to make use of the Manufacturing Readiness Level tool on all programs?

While I have not had the opportunity to assess the Defense Science Board's recommendation, it has been my view, that program managers should be very sensitive to the manufacturing maturity of their systems, since the cost and performance of their programs could be significantly affected by a mistake in this area. Manufacturing Readiness Levels provide a tangible measure of manufacturing maturity which can be useful in helping them identify manufacturing risks earlier in the process.

38. Beyond addressing technological maturity issues in acquisition programs, what other steps should the Army take to increase accountability and discipline in the acquisition process?

Although I have not had the opportunity to fully assess the current acquisition process, if confirmed, I will assess current milestone review and reporting processes and, in coordination with appropriate stakeholders and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, make appropriate adjustments, as appropriate.

Unrealistic Cost, Schedule and Performance Expectations

Many acquisition experts attribute the failure of DOD acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces overly optimistic cost and schedule estimates and unrealistic performance expectations. Section 101 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 is designed to address this problem by establishing an independent Director of Cost Assessment and Performance Evaluation, who is charged with ensuring the development of realistic and unbiased cost estimates to support the Department's acquisition programs.

39. Do you agree with the assessment that overly optimistic cost and schedule estimates and unrealistic performance expectations contribute to the failure of major defense acquisition programs?

Yes.

40. If confirmed, how do you expect to work with the Director of the new office to ensure that the Army's cost, schedule and performance estimates are realistic?

The Director, CAPE has a key role in the 2366a and 2366b certification process, and as such, if confirmed, I will work closely with him to ensure that cost, schedule and performance estimates are performed early, independently validated, and managed throughout a program's life cycle.

Section 201 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 seeks to address this problem by promoting early consideration of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives in major defense acquisition programs.

41. Do you believe that early communication between the acquisition, budget and requirements communities in the Army can help ensure more realistic cost, schedule and performance expectations?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the requirements and budget communities to ensure that we are enabling the rapid delivery of capability to our Warfighters with acceptable risk, and work to establish a culture within the acquisition community to

team with their counterparts in the requirement and budget communities to this end as well.

42. If so, what steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure such communication?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the requirements and budget communities to ensure that we are enabling the rapid delivery of capability to our Warfighters with acceptable risk, and work to establish a culture within that acquisition community to team with their counterparts in the requirement and budget communities to this end as well.

The Department of Defense has increasingly turned to incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches in an effort to make cost, schedule and performance expectations more realistic and achievable.

43. Do you believe that incremental acquisition and spiral development can help improve the performance of the Army's major acquisition programs?

I do not have firsthand knowledge regarding the Army's experience with spiral development or incremental acquisition process. However, in my experience, spiral development adds cost and schedule delays in achieving the objective capability. As long as interim capability is useful, and time to reach objective capability is not fixed, this is an excellent way to reduce performance risk. If confirmed, I will seek to apply these tools when appropriate in managing the Army's acquisition portfolio.

44. What risks do you see in the Army's use of incremental acquisition and spiral development?

See response above.

45. In your view, has the Army's approach to incremental acquisition and spiral development been successful? Why or why not?

See response above.

46. What steps if any do you believe are needed to ensure that the requirements process, budget process, and testing regime can accommodate incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches?

See response above.

47. How should the Army ensure that the incremental acquisition and spiral development programs have appropriate baselines against which to measure performance?

See response above.

Funding and Requirements Stability

The poor performance of major defense acquisition programs has also been attributed to instability in funding and requirements. In the past, the Department of Defense has attempted to provide greater funding stability through the use of multi-year contracts. More recently, the Department has sought greater requirements stability by instituting Configuration Steering Boards to exercise control over any changes to requirements that would increase program costs.

48. Do you support the use of Configuration Steering Boards to increase requirements stability on major defense acquisition programs?

I am aware that Configuration Steering Boards have been instituted throughout the Department of Defense, and I fully support the objectives behind their establishment. If confirmed, I will have an opportunity to more fully assess whether these forums are achieving the desired results.

49. What other steps if any would you recommend taking to increase the funding and requirements stability of major defense acquisition programs?

I believe that funding and requirements stability is an essential component of successful acquisition programs. If confirmed, I would work closely with senior officials within the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to improve this aspect of the Department's business practices.

Fixed Price-Type Contracts

Recent Congressional and DOD initiatives attempt to reduce technical and performance risks associated with developing and producing major defense acquisition programs so as to minimize the use of cost-reimbursable contracts.

50. Do you think that the Army should move towards more fixed price-type contracting in developing or procuring major defense acquisition programs? Why or why not?

It is my opinion that the Army should use the type of contract that is best suited for the acquisition at hand, considering primarily complexity and risk, and also any other factors that may be relevant to effectively incentivize efficient and economical contractor performance. If confirmed, I will ensure that Army acquisition strategies reflect sound business judgment in selecting the appropriate contract type.

Technology Transition

The Department continues to struggle with the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms. Further, the Department also has struggled with moving technologies from DOD programs or other sources rapidly into the hands of operational users.

51. What impediments to technology transition do you see within the Army?

In my view, the most significant impediment to technology transition is the alignment in schedule and funding of acquisition programs with the availability of the mature technologies. Assessment of technological maturity, i.e. the Technology Readiness Level of the desired improvement is also a major consideration. Close and continuous coordination between technology developers and acquisition programs is a key to ensuring successful technology transition.

52. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?

If confirmed, I will ensure that acquisition programs coordinate with the science and technology developers to transition mature technologies as appropriate.

53. What can be done from a budget, policy, and organizational standpoint to facilitate the transition of technologies from science and technology programs and other sources, including small businesses, venture capital funded companies, and other non-traditional defense contractors, into acquisition programs

It is my understanding that the Army is engaged in a variety of initiatives to effectively transition technologies to the Soldier. If confirmed, I look forward to becoming more familiar with the various programs and policies that impact on the Army capability to transition capability from the science and technology base to acquisition programs.

54. Do you believe that the Army's science and technology organizations have the ability and the resources to carry technologies to higher levels of maturity before handing them off to acquisition programs?

See response above.

55. What steps if any do you believe the Army should take to ensure that research programs are sufficiently funded to reduce technical risk in programs so that technological maturity can be demonstrated at the appropriate time?

If confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders to ensure that the Army science and technology effort is resourced to accomplish its mission.

56. What role do you believe Technology Readiness Levels and Manufacturing Readiness Levels should play in the Army's efforts to enhance effective technology transition and reduce cost and risk in acquisition programs?

Although I have not had the opportunity to fully assess this issue, it is my view that Technology Readiness Levels provide a standardized metric to identify the maturity of new technologies, or existing technologies used in a new or novel fashion. By ensuring that new technologies are at adequate maturity levels to warrant continued progression through the acquisition process, the Army mitigates the risk of having schedule and cost overruns that can result from having immature technology matured within an acquisition program. It is my understanding that Manufacturing Readiness Levels are an evolving tool, and if confirmed I will evaluate their effectiveness in reducing cost and risk in acquisition programs.

Multi-Year Contracts

The statement of managers accompanying Section 811 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 addresses the requirements for buying major defense systems under multiyear contracts as follows: "The conferees agree that 'substantial savings' under section 2306b(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, means savings that exceed 10 percent of the total costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts, except that multiyear contracts for major systems providing savings estimated at less than 10 percent should only be considered if the Department presents an exceptionally strong case that the proposal meets the other requirements of section 2306b(a), as amended. The conferees agree with a GAO finding that any major system that is at the end of its production line is unlikely to meet these standards and therefore would be a poor candidate for a multiyear procurement contract."

57. What are your views on multiyear procurements?

I am convinced that multiyear procurements can bring useful savings to acquisition programs, stimulate private investment by industry, and improve the health of supporting activities, i.e. subcontractors, training agencies, sustainers, etc. It is my understanding that current federal acquisition policy addresses how and when multi-year procurements should be used. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that this procurement approach is applied properly.

58. Under what circumstances do you believe they should be used?

Multiyear contracts should be used when the use of such a contract will result in substantial savings over the costs of annual contracts, and the contracts will result in increased efficiency, through reduced administrative burden and substantial continuity of production or performance.

- 59. What is your opinion on the level of cost savings that constitute “substantial savings” for purposes of the defense multiyear procurement statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2306b?**

I have not formed an opinion on the subject at this time; however, if confirmed, I will examine the issue and, if warranted, offer suggestions for revision.

- 60. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, do you anticipate that you would support a multiyear contract with expected savings of less than 10 percent?**

I have not yet formed an opinion on this subject. If confirmed, I will insure that Army acquisition practices remain transparent and support any decision reached regarding savings associated with multiyear procurements.

- 61. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, would you support a multiyear contract for a major system at the end of its production line?**

See response above.

- 62. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that a multiyear contract should be used for procuring weapons systems that have unsatisfactory program histories, e.g., displaying poor cost, scheduling, or performance outcomes but which might otherwise comply with the requirements of the defense multiyear procurement statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2306b?**

See response above.

- 63. Under what circumstances, if any, should the Army ever break a multiyear procurement?**

See response above.

Continuing Competition and Organizational Conflicts of Interest

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Industrial Structure for Transformation recommended last summer that “DOD must increase its use of creative competitive acquisition strategies, within limited budgets, in order to ensure long-term innovation and cost savings, at both prime and critical sub-tier elements. Competition would not be required beyond the competitive prototype phase, as long as the current producer continuously improves performance and lowers cost – but other contractors should always represent a credible option if costs rise or performance is unacceptable.” Section 202 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires DOD to take

steps to promote continuing competition (or the option of such competition) throughout the life of major defense acquisition programs.

64. Do you agree with the recommendation of the Defense Science Board?

I am not yet familiar with the details of this Defense Science Board study. If confirmed, I would carefully consider these recommendations for their potential implementation in appropriate circumstances.

65. Do you believe that continuing competition is a viable option on major defense acquisition programs?

In general, I agree with this statement. I understand, however, that the availability of technical data is often a limiting factor to using competitive contracts for major weapon systems. If confirmed, I intend to look in to this area with a view toward improving the Army's ability to compete major weapon systems when appropriate.

66. In your view, has the consolidation of the defense industrial base gone too far and undermined competition for defense contracts?

No, not yet, but it could happen. I believe that the interests of the government are always best served by an industrial base that is sufficiently broad to support meaningful competition.

67. If so, what steps if any can and should the Army take to address this issue?

I support the need for DoD review, in conjunction with the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, of any mergers which would further limit competition. If confirmed, I would ensure that Army acquisition managers look beyond their specific programs to also assess the impact of consolidation on future programs.

Section 203 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act requires the use of competitive prototypes for major defense acquisition programs unless the cost of producing such prototypes would exceed the lifecycle benefits of improved performance and increased technological and design maturity that prototypes would achieve.

68. Do you support the use of competitive prototypes for major defense acquisition programs?

Yes.

69. Under what circumstances do you believe the use of competitive prototypes is likely to be beneficial?

If confirmed, I will examine this issue to ensure the Army optimizes the use of prototyping.

70. Under what circumstances do you believe the cost of such prototypes is likely to outweigh the potential benefits?

See response above.

Section 207 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act requires the Department to promulgate new regulations to address organizational conflicts of interest on major defense acquisition programs.

71. Do you agree that organizational conflicts of interest can reduce the quality and value of technical support services provided to the Army and undermine the integrity of the Army's acquisition programs?

Yes.

72. What steps if any do you believe the Army should take to address organizational conflicts of interest in major defense acquisition programs?

I cannot list any specific steps at this time, however, if confirmed, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine and implement appropriate policies, procedures, and other measures necessary to address this problem.

73. What are your views on the use of system engineering and technical assistance contractors that are affiliated with major defense contractors to provide "independent" advice to the Army on the acquisition of major weapon systems?

I support the applicable statutory and regulatory guidance that governs the use of such contractor personnel. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that Army acquisition programs closely adhere to the guidance in this area.

74. What lines do you believe the Army should draw between those acquisition responsibilities that are inherently governmental and those that may be performed by contractors?

The Army must continue to ensure that inherently governmental functions are performed only by government employees. If confirmed, I will work with senior leaders throughout the DoD to provide the acquisition workforce with clear guidance concerning inherently governmental functions.

75. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure that defense contractors do not misuse their access to sensitive and proprietary information of the Army and other defense contractors?

If confirmed, I will review the issue and determine the best method to ensure that defense contract employees are informed regarding the potential misuse and safeguarding of sensitive and proprietary information of both the Army and other defense contractors.

76. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure that defense contractors do not unnecessarily limit competition for subcontracts in a manner that would disadvantage the government or potential competitors in the private sector?

If confirmed, I will evaluate the issue and work with my staff to develop or reinforce policies that will encourage defense contractors to utilize competitive procedures for the award of subcontracts so that the government and potential private sector competitors are not disadvantaged.

Lead System Integrators

Section 802 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 prohibits new contracts for lead systems integrator functions in the acquisition of a major system after October 1, 2010.

77. What is your view of the benefits and risks of using lead systems integrator to help the Army manage major defense acquisition programs?

While I am not yet in position to offer an informed view of the benefits and risks associated with using a lead systems integrator (LSI), I understand that there is a general perception of lack of Government control and oversight over a program that employs the lead systems integrator as the prime contractor.

78. Do you believe that the Army currently has the capacity to manage its major defense acquisition programs without the assistance of lead system integrators?

I am not yet in position to provide an informed assessment of whether the Army currently has the capacity to manage its major defense acquisition programs without a LSI. I believe that the Army's acquisition community should be structured organizationally to manage its major acquisition programs with or without the utilization of LSIs.

79. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Army develops the required capability?

If confirmed, I would examine the size and the age of the acquisition workforce and its impact on the oversight of acquisition programs today and into the future. As you know, the October 2007 "Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations," often referred to as the Gansler Commission Report, recommended an increase in the stature, quantity, and career development of military and civilian contracting personnel and recommended additional training and tools for overall contracting activities. I understand that the Army is in the process of implementing these recommendations.

Operating and Support Costs

Operating and support (O&S) costs far exceed acquisition costs for most major weapon systems. Yet, DOD has placed far less emphasis on the management of O&S costs than it has on the management of acquisition costs.

80. Do you believe that the Army has appropriate organizations, capabilities, and procedures in place to monitor and manage O&S costs?

It has been my experience that O&S costs have not been managed as intensely and professionally as acquisition costs. If confirmed, I will review this issue to ensure the Army manages O & S costs as intensely and professionally as acquisition costs.

81. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to develop such organizations, capabilities, and procedures?

See response above.

Contracting for Services

Over the past eight years, DOD's spending on contract services has more than doubled, with the estimated number of contractor employees working for the Department increasing from an estimated 730,000 in Fiscal Year 2000 to an estimated 1,550,000 in Fiscal Year 2007. As a result, the Department now spends more for the purchase of services than it does for products (including major weapon systems).

82. Do you believe that the Army can continue to support this rate of growth in its spending on contract services?

If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment of the acquisition of services to include organization, policy and processes to ensure the Army has an effective management structure in place that is properly resourced.

83. Do you believe that the current balance between government employees (military and civilian) and contractor employees is in the best interests of the Army?

It is my opinion that a blended workforce of military, government civilians, and contractor employees is necessary. If confirmed, I will lead the effort to identify the best mix of resources that would be in the best interest of the Army.

84. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to control the Army's spending on contract services?

If confirmed, I will lead the effort to conduct strategic spend analyses of the Army's service contracts. This will hopefully generate useful recommendations to enhance the Army's overall management of the service contracting process.

At the request of the Committee, the GAO has compared DOD's practices for the management of services contracts to the practices of best performers in the private sector. GAO concluded that leading companies have achieved significant savings by insisting upon greater visibility and management over their services contracts and by conducting so-called "spend" analyses to find more efficient ways to manage their service contractors. Section 801 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 required DOD to move in this direction. Sections 807 and 808 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 built on this provision by requiring inventories and management reviews of contracts for services.

85. Do you believe that the Army has appropriate organizations, capabilities, and procedures in place to manage its service contracts?

At this time I have no basis to offer a response. If confirmed, I will assess the Army's organizations, capabilities and procedures in place to manage its service contracts.

86. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to develop such organizations, capabilities, and procedures?

If confirmed, I will use the results of my analysis to determine the optimum organizations, capabilities and procedures for the management of service contracts.

87. Do you believe that the Army should conduct a comprehensive analysis of its spending on contract services, as recommended by GAO?

See response to question number 84.

88. Do you support the use of management reviews, or peer reviews, of major service contracts to identify "best practices" and develop lessons learned?

I understand the Army has implemented peer reviews to address statutory requirements for independent management reviews of contracts for services, and for the sharing of lessons learned gleaned from those reviews. If confirmed, I will continue to study and support the mechanisms that effectively facilitate the identification of best practices and sharing of lessons learned to benefit the Army enterprise, including peer reviews.

89. If confirmed, will you fully comply with the requirement of section 807 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, to develop an inventory of services performed by contractors comparable to the inventories of services performed by federal employees that are already prepared pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act?

If confirmed, I will support the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to ensure compliance with Section 807 in reporting and maintaining the inventory of contractor activities, as well as identifying activities that should be considered for conversion to employees of the Department of Defense.

90. What additional steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to improve the Army's management of its contracts for services?

If confirmed, I will investigate what steps the Army has taken thus far in response to recent General Accountability Office testimony on Acquisition Reform.

Contractor Performance of Critical Governmental Functions

Over the last decade, the Department has become progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result, contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions as DOD employees.

91. In your view, has the Army become too reliant on contractors to support the basic functions of the Department?

If confirmed, I will assess the Army's reliance on contractors to determine the appropriate mix of military personnel, civilian employees, and contractors. This assessment will include the Army's ongoing effort to increase the acquisition workforce.

92. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal services contracts is in the best interest of the Army?

If confirmed, I will review this issue to fully understand the extent to which personal services contracts are currently used and whether their use is appropriate.

93. What is your view of the appropriate applicability of personal conflict of interest standards and other ethics requirements to contractor employees who perform functions similar to those performed by government employees?

In my opinion, appropriate personal conflict of interest standards and other ethics requirements should be applied to contractor employees when they are performing functions similar to those performed by government employees. It is my understanding that standards and requirements are applied to contractor employees in a manner consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (and its Defense and Army supplements). It is also my understanding that this subject has been studied and is being further studied by DoD as to the appropriate way to accomplish the goal. If confirmed, I will use the resources of my office to ensure that such standards and requirements are applied as intended. The Army must always be an honest and transparent steward of the taxpayer dollars.

U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have relied on contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S. military operations. According to widely published reports, the number of U.S. contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan have exceeded the number of U.S. military deployed in those countries.

94. Do you believe that the Army has become too dependent on contractor support for military operations?

In my opinion, contractors provide vital life, safety, and health support to both wartime and peacetime military operations. Their contributions allow the military personnel to focus more on warfighting operations. In the absence of contractor support, the Army would be required to significantly increase its strength level in order to provide comparable support. That said, we should constantly evaluate whether the use of contractors provides the greatest effectiveness and efficiency in support of the mission. We should ensure that the Army maintains core competencies within its ranks, and does not inappropriately contract out inherently governmental functions.

95. What risks do you see in the Army's reliance on such contractor support?

In my opinion, the Army has come to rely on such support as an essential element of its ability to conduct operations. This situation presents potential operational risks in future situations where comparable contract support may be unavailable. It also may result in the Government incurring excessive costs for this support.

96. What steps do you believe the Army should take to mitigate such risk?

From what I have read, the number of qualified Contracting Officer Representatives has increased allowing for the requisite degree of oversight of contractor performance. Additionally, I understand that the Office of the Secretary of Defense is fielding a database to better track information on contractor personnel and contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

97. Do you believe the Army is appropriately organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?

I believe the Army's initiatives in increased contracting manpower authorizations and training have been a critical first step which will lead to more effective utilization of operational contract support. However, in my opinion, it will take time to fill the increased authorizations with properly trained acquisition professionals, and fully train the non-acquisition commanders and staffs.

98. What steps if any do you believe the Army should take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?

In my opinion, the Army has made significant strides in developing new Policy, Doctrine, Organizations, Material solutions and Training focused on improving Operational Contract Support. It is my opinion that continued Army senior leader emphasis on the full implementation of these initiatives is required.

Government Contracting Reform

In a memorandum to the heads of all federal agencies, the President on March 4, 2009, directed a government-wide review of contracting procedures, stating that "executive agencies shall not engage in noncompetitive contracts, except in those circumstances where their use can be fully justified and where appropriate safeguards have been put in place to protect the taxpayer."

99. If confirmed, what role would you play in determining whether the use of noncompetitive contracts could be fully justified?

I fully support the President's direction in this important area. It is my understanding that, subject to direction by the Secretary of the Army, the ASA(ALT) serves as the Army's senior procurement executive. If confirmed, in that capacity I would be responsible for reviewing and approving all noncompetitive contracts over \$78.5 million, as well as for the promulgation of Army-specific policy relating to competition.

100. In your opinion, how would the direction in this memo affect the use of single-award and multiple-award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contracts

In principle, I believe that either contract vehicle may be used consistent with the need for competition. It is essential, however, that competition be fully considered during the acquisition planning process to ensure selection of the most appropriate contract type. If confirmed, I would carefully assess this issue in conjunction with the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy.

Contracting Methods

The Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the Department of Defense have long agreed that federal agencies could achieve significant savings and improved performance by moving to “performance-based services contracting” or “PBSC.” Most recently, the Army Environmental Program informed the committee that it has achieved average savings of 27% over a period of several years as a result of moving to fixed-price, performance-based contracts for environmental remediation. Section 802 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as amended, established performance goals for increasing the use of PBSC in DOD service contracts.

101. What is the status of the Army’s efforts to increase the use of PBSC in its service contracts?

I understand that the Army is making strides in using PBSC and if confirmed, this is an area that I intend to study.

102. What additional steps if any do you believe the Army needs to take to increase the use of PBSC and meet the goals established in section 802?

See response above.

In recent years, the Department of Defense has relied heavily on time-and-materials contracts for the acquisition of services. Under such a contract, the Department pays a set rate per hour for contractor services, rather than paying for specific tasks to be performed. In some cases, contractors have substituted less expensive labor under time-and-materials contracts, while continuing to charge federal agencies the same hourly rates, resulting in effective contractor profits of 25 percent or more.

103. What is your view of the appropriate use of time-and-materials contracts by the Army?

I understand that time-and-material contracts are the least preferred contract type. They may be appropriate in limited circumstances such as when the requirement cannot be defined and work must start. Once the requirement becomes better defined, however, time-and-materials contracts should be replaced with fixed-price or cost type contracts.

104. What steps if any do you believe the Army should take to minimize the abuse of time-and-materials contracts?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Army reviews its contract portfolio on a regular basis to identify those that can be converted to other more appropriate contract vehicles.

Section 852 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 requires the Department of Defense to promulgate regulations prohibiting excessive “pass-through” charges on DOD contracts. Pass-through charges are charges added by a contractor for overhead and profit on work performed by one of its subcontractors, to which the contractor provided no added value. In some cases, pass-through charges have more than doubled the cost of services provided to the Department of Defense.

105. What is your view of the regulations promulgated by the Department of Defense to implement the requirements of section 852?

If confirmed, I intend to review regulations promulgated to implement section 852.

106. What additional steps if any do you believe the Army should take to address the problem of excessive pass-through charges?

I am not familiar with the degree to which excessive pass-through charges are a problem in Army contracting. If confirmed, I will review this matter to determine what additional steps, if any, may be necessary.

Interagency Contracting

GAO recently placed interagency contracting – the use by one agency of contracts awarded by other agencies – on its list of high-risk programs and operations. While interagency contracts provide a much-needed simplified method for procuring commonly used goods and services, GAO has found that the dramatic growth of inter-agency contracts, the failure to clearly allocate responsibility between agencies, and the incentives created by fee-for-services arrangements, have combined to expose the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to the risk of significant abuse and mismanagement.

107. If confirmed, what steps if any will you take to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the actions currently underway or planned regarding Army’s use of other agencies’ contracts?

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army’s acquisition workforce implements these policies and procedures by making interagency contracting an item of special interest in Army program management reviews.

108. Do you believe additional authority or measures are needed to hold Army or other agency personnel accountable for their use of inter-agency contracts?

I understand that recent guidance was issued by the government to provide for adequate measures of accountability. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army implements these policies and procedures.

109. Do you believe contractors have any responsibility for assuring that the work requested by Army personnel is within the scope of their contract?

Yes, in my view contractors have a responsibility to ensure the work they perform is within the scope of their contract. A contract is a bilateral document and both parties have responsibilities. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army acquisition workforce reinforces this concept.

110. Do you believe that the Army's continued heavy reliance on outside agencies to award and manage contracts on its behalf is a sign that the Army has failed to adequately staff its own acquisition system?

While I would not characterize it as a failure to adequately staff the Army's acquisition system, the Army's compliance with downsizing directives has possibly resulted in an over reliance on outside agencies to award contracts.

Acquisition of Information Technology

Most of the Department's Major Automated Information System (MAIS) acquisitions are substantially over budget and behind schedule. In particular, the Department has run into unanticipated difficulties with virtually every new business system it has tried to field in the last ten years.

111. Do you believe that unique problems in the acquisition of business systems require different acquisition strategies or approaches?

If confirmed, I will review whether different strategies are appropriate for MAIS acquisitions.

112. What steps if any do you believe the Army should take to address these problems?

See response above.

113. If confirmed, how would you work with the Chief Information Officer of the Army to take these steps?

If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Army Chief Information Officer in all matters under his purview.

Problems with computer software have caused significant delays and cost overruns in a number of major defense programs. Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required DOD to establish a program to improve the software acquisition process.

114. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to address delays and cost overruns associated with problems in the development of software for major weapon systems?

I have not been briefed on the Army's delays and cost overruns associated with problems in the development of software for major weapon systems. If confirmed, I will make the study of this matter a priority.

Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a new acquisition process for information technology programs.

115. Do you believe that the acquisition of information technology systems is sufficiently different from the acquisition of other systems to justify the development of a unique acquisition process?

Not at this time, but if confirmed, this is a matter that I will review and assess in greater depth.

116. If so, what do you see as the unique features that would be desirable for an information system acquisition process?

See response above.

117. What types of information technology programs do you believe should be covered by the new process?

I am not in a position at this time to make recommendations in this area. However, if confirmed, I will review the acquisition process for the Department's IT programs.

Acquisition Workforce

Over the last 15 years, DOD has reduced the size of its acquisition workforce by almost half, without undertaking any systematic planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the specific skills and competencies needed to meet DOD's current and future needs. Since September 11, 2001, moreover, the demands placed on that workforce have

substantially increased. While DOD has started the process of planning its long-term workforce needs, the Department does not yet have a comprehensive strategic workforce plan needed to guide its efforts.

118. Do you believe that Army's workforce is large enough and has the skills needed to perform the tasks assigned to it?

I understand the Secretary of Defense announced on April 6, 2009, an initiative to grow the capacity and capability of the defense acquisition workforce by 20,000 new personnel by fiscal year 2015, and that the Army is in the process of implementing this initiative. If confirmed, I will assess the composition the Army's acquisition workforce in all discipline areas to determine if there are any shortages or gaps in necessary skills.

119. In your view, what are the critical skills, capabilities, and tools that the Army's workforce needs for the future? What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the workforce will, in fact, possess them?

At this time, I am not sufficiently informed as to which critical skills sets, capabilities and tools are needed by the Army's workforce. If confirmed, I will evaluate the state of the current acquisition workforce in light of existing and future program needs. Generally speaking, I believe there is a need for talent in system engineering, and the science and technology discipline. I have read also that the Army has taken steps to build the size and skill level of its contracting workforce, and if confirmed, I will assess the health of this community to determine if additional emphasis is needed.

120. Do you agree that the Army needs a comprehensive human capital plan, including a gap analysis and specific recruiting, retention and training goals, to guide the development of its acquisition workforce?

I agree that a comprehensive human capital plan would be useful in evaluating current workforce capabilities and determining future needs and gaps. An Army acquisition human capital plan should be aligned with an overarching Army plan and also be consistent with a DoD human capital plan, specifically as it relates to the acquisition community.

121. What steps if any do you think are necessary to ensure that the Army has the ability it needs to attract and retain qualified employees to the acquisition workforce?

I believe it is essential that the Army has effective recruiting and retention tools. At this time I cannot suggest specific steps that should be undertaken, but if confirmed, I would assess this area to determine whether changes in regulation or policy may be needed.

- 122. What are your views regarding assertions that the acquisition workforce is losing its technical and management expertise and is beginning to rely too much on support contractors, FFRDCs, and, in some cases, prime contractors for this expertise?**

It is well known that since the end of the Cold War, the Army has seen a significant reduction in the size of its government/acquisition workforce. This situation has resulted in a tremendous loss of managerial and technical expertise. Concurrently, workload has increased substantially, which has resulted in a growing reliance on support contractors. If confirmed, I will further study this area and work to appropriately rebalance the acquisition workforce.

- 123. What is the appropriate tenure for program managers and program executive officers to ensure continuity in major programs?**

I understand that tenure requirements for program managers are based on the Acquisition Category level of the Program and range from three to four years. I also understand that the Army and/or Defense Acquisition Executive have the authority to adjust the tenure requirement based on unique aspects of the program. I believe this policy represents the appropriate balance between program continuity and the professional development of the workforce.

Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help the Department of Defense address shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund would provide a minimum of \$3 billion over six years for this purpose.

- 124. Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund is needed to ensure that the Army has the right number of employees with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost effective manner for the taxpayers?**

Yes, I believe the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund is essential to carry out Secretary of Defense's guidance to grow the capacity and capability of the defense acquisition workforce. Providing the emphasis and resources to support the recruiting and hiring, training and development, and retention of this workforce is crucial.

- 125. If confirmed, what steps if any will you ensure that the money made available through the Acquisition Workforce Fund is spent in a manner that best meets the needs of the Army and its acquisition workforce?**

If confirmed, I will ensure decisions on use of the Fund are supported by appropriate analysis, and that the Army has meaningful metrics in place to ensure the Fund is executed in a manner consistent with its statutory purpose.

Procurement Fraud, Integrity and Contractor Responsibility Issues

Recent acquisition scandals have raised concerns about the adequacy of existing mechanisms to uphold procurement integrity and prevent contract fraud.

126. What is your view of the adequacy of the tools and authorities available to the Army to ensure that its contractors are responsible and have a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics?

A number of tools and authorities have been developed over the years to ensure contractors are responsible and have a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics. If confirmed, I will become familiar with current authorities and ensure that the Army does business with contractors that have a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics.

127. In your view, are current “revolving door” statutes effective?

In my opinion, they are effective, but require continued monitoring and oversight.

128. What tools other than law enforcement measures could be used to help prevent procurement fraud and ethical misconduct?

In my opinion, aggressive oversight of contractor and government performance is critical to minimizing procurement fraud and ethical misconduct.

129. Are there sufficient enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with laws and regulations?

Yes, I believe that there are sufficient enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with laws and regulations.

“Buy America” and the Defense Industrial Base

“Buy America” issues have been the source of considerable controversy in recent years. As a result, there have been a number of legislative efforts to place restrictions on the purchase of defense products from foreign sources.

130. What benefits do you believe the Army obtains from international participation in the defense industrial base?

Based on my experience, foreign firms often bring innovation and cost control. I also recognize that the US is a major exporter of defense equipment and that reciprocal

trade arrangements have been beneficial to US defense contractors. If confirmed, I will look for opportunities to avail ourselves of needed defense technologies from all sources.

131. Under what conditions, if any, would you support the imposition of domestic source restrictions for a particular product?

If confirmed, I will comply with all applicable laws and departmental policy prohibiting foreign purchases.

132. What is your opinion of “Buy America” legislation and the “Berry Amendment”?

See response above.

133. What is your view of the current state of the U.S. defense industry?

The U.S. Defense industry has been generally stable over the last decade largely because of Defense spending levels.

134. Do you support further consolidation of the U.S. defense industry?

The interests of the Army are usually best served by maintaining competitive markets for required products and services. I will support DoD in reviewing, in conjunction with the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, proposed mergers which may impact DoD’s competition objectives.

135. What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S. defense sector?

I believe it is important for the Department of Defense to carefully review foreign investments in U.S. firms providing defense technology in order to minimize risk to national security.

136. What steps if any do you believe the Army should take to ensure the continued health of the U.S. defense industry?

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continually assesses the condition of the U.S. industrial base and take appropriate steps to ensure its viability.

Army Modernization

In general, major Army modernization efforts have not been successful over the past decade. Since the mid-1990's, Army modernization strategies, plans, and investment priorities have evolved under a variety of names from Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army

After Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, to Future Combat System and Modularity. Instability in funding, either as provided by DOD or Congress, has been cited by the Army and others as a principal cause of program instability. For the most part, however, the Army has benefited from broad DOD and Congressional support for its modernization and readiness programs even when problems with the technical progress and quality of management of those programs have been apparent—the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter is a recent example.

137. What is your assessment of the Army's modernization record?

The Army's modernization record clearly depicts the complexities of an Army in transition during a time of war. I believe that the Army must continue to adapt to a rapidly changing threat environment. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary of Defense and Congress to equip and modernize the force.

138. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program for the Army?

Stable, predictable Total Obligation Authority allows the Army to balance its needs, chart a course, and stick to it. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of Defense and the Congress to arrive at that stable funding level, and subsequently, a stable modernization program.

139. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modernization investment strategy?

I understand that the Army's Modernization Investment Strategy is built on assessing the likelihood of evolving threats and planning future capabilities to mitigate that threat. It is an imprecise science, and requires almost constant review and correction, and must balance investments in future development with improvements to today's equipment. If confirmed, I plan a thorough review of these investments.

140. In your view does the Army's modernization investment strategy appropriately or adequately address current and future capabilities that meet requirements for unconventional or irregular conflict?

My preliminary assessment is that the Army is making appropriate investments to counter unconventional and irregular threats. The key for me, if confirmed, will be to ensure the Army successfully balances current and future initiatives.

141. If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any, would you pursue in this regard?

I do not have sufficient knowledge to make an accurate assessment at this time. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a full review of the Army's investment initiatives.

142. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to ensure that all these initiatives are affordable within the current and projected Army budgets?

I believe one of the strengths of the Defense Program is to specifically address affordability and the out-year projection of long term funding requirements. Those processes have been strengthened by initiatives within OSD and by Congress. If confirmed, I believe I would have the required visibility and management structure that would allow me to provide these judgments to Congress.

143. In your view, what trade-offs would most likely have to be taken should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is planned to fund the Army's modernization efforts?

While I do not have sufficient insight into what actions might be required, any trade-offs must occur after all areas of risk are carefully considered in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and Congress.

Army Weapon System Programs

144. What is your understanding and assessment of the following research, development, and acquisition programs?

a. Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team modernization.

While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team modernization program, I understand that the Army's goal is to improve the situational awareness, survivability, and lethality of the Soldiers who travel into harm's way through a comprehensive and dedicated process of incremental improvements. It is my understanding that the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team Modernization program takes the best equipment available that was developed under the former future combat systems program and inserts them into the units that need them the most, the Infantry Brigades.

b. Ground Combat Vehicle.

I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of the Ground Combat Vehicle program. I have been advised, however, that the Ground Combat Vehicle is likely to be a new design that uses the best assets of the current combat vehicles as well as proven technology from the cancelled Manned Ground Vehicles program.

c. Stryker combat vehicle, including the Stryker mobile gun variant.

I am not yet in a position to offer an informed assessment of the Stryker program; however, I understand that Stryker variants have been in production since 2004 and that this system has been used successfully in Iraq and is preparing to deploy to Afghanistan.

d. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV).

While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of JTLV, I understand that it is a relatively new joint Service developmental program which consists of a family of vehicles with companion trailers, capable of performing multiple mission roles.

e. Armed Aerial Scout Helicopter (AAS).

I understand that the Armed Aerial Scout program is needed to meet existing capability gaps in the area of manned armed aerial reconnaissance. I have been informed that the Army is currently studying alternatives to meet the gaps, and if confirmed, I will undertake a thorough review of this program.

f. M1 Abrams tank modernization.

The Abrams Tank has been an integral part of the Army's force structure for decades and requires modernization. I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of this effort. If confirmed, I will become more familiar with this program.

g. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization.

The Bradley also has been an integral part of the Army's force structure for decades and requires modernization. I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of this effort. If confirmed, I will become more familiar with this program.

h. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).

I am not able to provide an informed assessment of the WIN-T program. I understand that WIN-T is the Army's network modernization program that is absolutely essential to the Army. It delivers the high speed secure voice, video, and data, while allowing for full mobility of the network. If confirmed, I will become more familiar with this program.

i. Logistics Modernization Program.

I am not able to provide an informed assessment on LMP at this time. I understand this Program is the ongoing effort to modernize the primary business systems of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) Commodity Commands. If confirmed, I will become more familiar with this program.

j. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS).

I understand that JTRS is a DoD initiative to develop a family of software-programmable tactical radios that provide mobile, interoperable, and networked voice, data and video communications. At this time, however, I am not able to provide an assessment of the JTRS program. If confirmed, I will become more familiar with this program.

k. UH-58D Kiowa Warrior safety and life extension program.

It is my understanding that the Kiowa Warrior life extension program is a necessary upgrade to improve aircraft performance safety and reliability. At this time, however, I am not able to provide an assessment of the Kiowa Warrior life extension program. If confirmed, I will become more familiar with this program.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles

145. If confirmed, what would you propose should be the Army's long term strategy for the utilization and sustainment of its large MRAP vehicle fleet?

I understand that the MRAP vehicles were procured in response to a Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement from Multi-National Corps-Iraq in June 2006. While I am not yet in position to provide an informed assessment of MRAPs, if confirmed, I would work to determine the appropriate long-term strategy for the utilization and sustainment of the Army's fleet of MRAPs.

Residual Future Combat Systems Lead Systems Integrator Contract

The Future Combat Systems (FCS) program has now devolved into three elements: a new ground combat vehicle (GCV) program, a plan to continue small technology spin outs to infantry brigades in increments, and a residual effort to develop software based on the system of systems common operating environment (SOSCOE) system. Plans for restructuring the spin outs for an early fielding to select infantry brigades appear to be close to completion. However, most of the base contract for what used to be FCS remains in place, including the Lead System Integrator (LSI) fee structure, with only the manned ground vehicle portions terminated.

146. What is your understanding and assessment of the former and restructured elements of the now terminated FCS program?

While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of the former and restructured elements of the terminated FCS program, I understand that the Army terminated its lead systems integrator relationship with The Boeing Company. Boeing now serves as a traditional prime contractor under the revised contract for Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD).

147. What is your understanding and assessment of the FCS program's residual LSI management concept and contract?

I understand that under the revised contract for Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD), Boeing is performing the functions of a prime contractor and conducts the normal systems engineering and integration work that is required for any developmental program. If confirmed, I would examine the FCS program's residual LSI management concept and contract in order to provide an informed assessment.

148. In your view, what should be the current and future role of the LSI and, if confirmed, what modifications, if any, would you propose to the LSI contract and fee structure; on what timeline?

It is my understanding that the Army has terminated its LSI relationship with The Boeing Company. If confirmed, I will review this matter and make recommendations as appropriate.

Management of the Ground Combat Vehicle Program

As of December 2009, Program Executive Office – Integration, the former Program Executive Office responsible for oversight and management of the terminated FCS program, will oversee and manage the new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program. This is despite the fact that Program Executive Office – Ground Combat Systems has the depth of expertise and experience necessary to successfully oversee and manage the development of tracked combat vehicles for the Army.

149. What is your understanding and assessment of this management structure for the Army's next generation GCV?

I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment of the management structure for the Army's next generation GCV. I have been advised, however, that the current management structure under Program Executive Office-Integration for development of

the Ground Combat Vehicle leverages the last eight years of Manned Ground Vehicles development.

150. If confirmed, what current or future modifications, if any, would you propose making to the oversight and management structure of the GCV program?

If confirmed, I will become more familiar with this program and make modifications as required.

Modularity

Modularity refers to the Army's fundamental reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based structure. The new modular brigade combat team is supposed to have an increased capability to operate independently based upon increased and embedded combat support capabilities such as military intelligence, reconnaissance, and logistics. Although somewhat smaller in size, the new modular brigades are supposed to be just as or more capable than the divisional brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix of equipment—such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment. To date, the Army has established over 80 percent of its planned modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully equip this force as required by its design has slipped from 2011 to 2019.

151. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modularity transformation strategy?

It is my understanding, that the Army's modular transformation was designed to create a more expeditionary capable force that will address the full-spectrum of missions emerging from a post-Cold War strategy. I have been advised that the Army continuously addresses changes to its unit designs by incorporating lessons learned and changes in technology that keep the formations relevant and effective. If confirmed, I look forward to making an assessment of the strategy.

152. In your view, what are the greatest equipment and sustainment challenges in realizing the transformation of the Army to the modular design?

I have been advised that the Army faces two major challenges with regard to transformation - restoring balance to a force experiencing the cumulative effects of eight years of war and setting conditions for the future to fulfill the Army's strategic role as an integral part of the Joint Force. The Army must sustain equipment in the current fight while modernizing future capabilities.

153. If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you propose relative to the Army's modular transformation strategy and plans for equipping and sustaining the force?

I am not yet in a position to provide an informed assessment on the Army's modular transformation strategy and plans for equipping and sustaining the force. If confirmed, I would closely examine the transformation strategy to ensure a focus on resources that sustain the current fight while making critical investments to Army modernization.

Manufacturing Issues

The recent Defense Science Board (DSB) study on the Manufacturing Technology Program made a number of findings and recommendations related to the role of manufacturing research and capabilities in the development and acquisition of defense systems.

154. Have you reviewed the findings of the DSB Task Force on the Manufacturing Technology Program?

I have not yet reviewed the findings of the DSB Task Force on the Manufacturing Technology Program.

155. What recommendations, if any, from the Task Force would you plan to implement if confirmed?

If confirmed, I will review the Army's current funding and implementation strategy and look for opportunities to increase effectiveness and efficiency.

156. What incentives do you plan to use to enhance industry's incorporation and utilization of advanced manufacturing processes developed under the manufacturing technology program?

The Army invests in manufacturing technology areas that promise to provide the most military capability or cost reduction to end items in production. The Army's industry partners benefit from this investment by their increased competitive advantage.

Science and Technology

157. What, in your view, is the role and value of science and technology programs in meeting the Army's transformation goals and in confronting irregular, catastrophic, traditional and disruptive threats?

It is my understanding that the Army's Science and Technology (S&T) investment strategy is shaped to foster innovation and accelerate/mature technology to enable Future Force capabilities while exploiting opportunities to rapidly transition technology to the Current Force. It is my view that the S&T program should retain

the flexibility to be responsive to unforeseen needs identified through current operations.

158. If confirmed, what direction will you provide regarding funding targets and priorities for the Army's long term research efforts?

I believe that it is important to maintain a balanced and responsive science and technology portfolio. If confirmed, I will review S&T investment, objectives, and metrics and determine an appropriate future strategy.

159. What specific metrics would you use, if confirmed, to assess whether the Army is making adequate investments in its basic research programs?

It is my understanding the Army currently has a number of periodic reviews of its in-house and extramural basic research programs. If confirmed, I intend to carefully evaluate these reviews to derive appropriate metrics for the Army's basic research investments.

160. Do you feel that there is sufficient coordination between and among the science and technology programs of the military services and defense agencies?

Coordination between these science and technology programs is vitally important. If confirmed, I will assess the coordination process.

161. What is the Department's role and responsibility in addressing national issues related to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education and workforce development?

I believe the Army, which is significantly dependent on science and technology to fulfill its national defense mission, has effective policies and programs in place to help maintain the technical edge our Nation needs to ensure its security and to be globally competitive. It is important to recognize that the Army not only needs to attain and retain the talent today, but also needs to develop a talented future workforce to maintain the technical edge. If confirmed, I plan to continue and strengthen, where necessary, Army educational outreach programs and initiatives.

162. What steps if any would you take to support efforts to ensure that the nation has the scientific and technical workforce needed for its national security technological and industrial base?

If confirmed, I will take advantage of the current legislative authorities and encourage full participation and engagement throughout the Army's laboratory complex to build the Nation's scientist, mathematician, engineering and technician talent pool, including reaching underrepresented populations, and recruiting and retaining the highest quality workforce.

163. How would you use science and technology programs to better reduce technical risk and therefore potentially reduce costs and schedule problems that accrue in large acquisition programs?

In my view, it is very important to mature technologies within the research and development program. Research and development should be used to reduce program risk, by showing that component technologies can be integrated into systems and perform as required in a relevant environment. Making the investment to mature technologies in research and development can reduce the risk of costly overruns in the product development phase.

164. Do you feel that the science and technology programs of the Army are too near-term focus and have over emphasized technology transition efforts over investing in revolutionary and innovative research programs?

If confirmed, I will assess this balance, solicit guidance regarding levels of acceptable risk, and rebalance S&T investments accordingly.

165. Are you satisfied that the Army has a well articulated and actionable science and technology strategic plan?

If confirmed, I will assess the Army plan and determine if it provides an appropriate path for the evolution of Army Science and Technology.

166. Do you see a need for changes in areas such as hiring authority, personnel systems, financial disclosure and ethics requirements, to ensure that the Army can recruit and retain the highest quality scientific and technical workforce possible?

If confirmed, workforce quality will be one of my highest priorities. There are tools in place, including direct hire authority and flexible personnel system to grow and maintain a high quality workforce. I look forward to working with Congress on maintaining and enhancing these authorities as appropriate.

Defense Laboratories

167. What is your view on the quality of the Army laboratories as compared to the DOE national laboratories, federal laboratories, academic laboratories and other peer institutions?

In my view, the quality of the Army laboratories compares favorably to other laboratories and institutions. If confirmed, I will undertake a review of Army laboratory capability with a view toward enhancing their capability.

168. What metrics will you use, if confirmed, to evaluate the effectiveness, competitiveness, and scientific vitality of the Army laboratories?

If confirmed, I will work closely with my staff to identify and develop appropriate metrics to evaluate laboratory effectiveness. It is my understanding that the Army currently conducts peer reviews annually to assess the vitality of the laboratories.

169. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to increase the mission effectiveness and productivity of the Army laboratories?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Army laboratories have the best possible workforce, facilities, and processes to meet the technology needs of the Army. I intend to closely monitor the effectiveness of the laboratories and implement improvements as necessary.

170. Do you see value in enhancing the level of technical collaboration between the Army laboratories and academic, other federal and industrial scientific organizations?

I believe there is value in technical collaboration and it is my understanding a strong collaboration between Army, industry and universities already exists. The Army's Science and Technology (S&T) program is shaped collaboratively through close partnerships with Warfighters, S&T developers across the Department of Defense, other federal agencies, industry, academia, and international partners. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Army continues to collaborate when appropriate.

171. Do you feel that past investments in research equipment; sustainment, repair and modernization; and facility construction at the Army laboratories have been sufficient to maintain their mission effectiveness and their standing as world class science and engineering institutions?

I am not sufficiently informed to determine if past investments have been adequate to support the Army's research facilities; however, maintaining appropriate levels of funding in this area for the future will be critical. Recent legislative authorities provided by the Congress will be helpful in maintaining mission effectiveness and standing of Army research facilities.

Test and Evaluation

The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these systems are put into production.

172. What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of the Army's acquisition programs?

I believe it is appropriate to have an independent operational test and evaluation authority separate from the materiel developer to plan and conduct operational tests, report results, and provide evaluations on operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and survivability.

173. Are you concerned with the level of test and evaluation conducted by the contractors who are developing the systems to be tested?

If confirmed, I will examine the amount of reliance the Army has on system contractors performing developmental testing to confirm none are performing inherently governmental functions. It is my understanding that system evaluations are generally performed by Army organizations.

174. What is the impact of rapid fielding requirements on the standard testing process?

I understand that the Army test and evaluation community has adjusted processes as necessary and has worked diligently ensuring systems fielded to Soldiers are safe, effective, and reliable. If confirmed, this is an area that I would further study to determine whether any enhancements are appropriate.

175. If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that all equipment and technology that is deployed to warfighters is subject to appropriate operational testing?

If confirmed, I will provide policy and oversight in this area, as well as continue the effective working relationship that the Army acquisition community has with the Army and DoD test community.

176. Do you believe that the developmental testing organizations in the Army are adequate to ensure an appropriate level of developmental testing, and testing oversight, on major defense acquisition programs?

I am not fully informed at this time to make an appropriate assessment of this matter. If confirmed, I will review this area and work closely with the Army and the Department of Defense test community to optimize this capability.

177. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to address any inadequacies in such organizations?

If confirmed, I will monitor the status of these organizations to ensure that they remain capable of accomplishing their mission.

As systems grow more sophisticated, networked, and software-intensive, DOD's ability to test and evaluate them becomes more difficult. Some systems-of-systems cannot be tested as a whole until they are already bought and fielded.

178. Are you concerned with Army's ability to test these new types of systems?

I am aware that testing of system-of-systems requires consideration of live, virtual, and constructive test capabilities. I understand that system-of-systems testing is challenging; if confirmed, I will work to continue to ensure that system capabilities and limitations are clearly established before testing of these systems.

179. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to improve its test and evaluation facilities to ensure adequate testing of such systems?

If confirmed, I will provide support to the Army test and evaluation community and support efforts to ensure that they are properly resourced.

Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program

180. What do you see as the major successes and challenges facing the Army SBIR program?

I understand that the Army has a successful SBIR program that has transitioned technology to the Soldier. If confirmed, I will make every effort to ensure that the SBIR program reaches out to innovative small businesses that have not traditionally dealt with the military.

181. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that the Army has access to and invests in the most innovative small businesses?

A cornerstone of the SBIR program is the identification of innovative approaches to Army requirements. If confirmed, I will continue to effectively communicate Army needs to the thousands of innovative small businesses through an aggressive outreach program to the small business community as well as continuing to develop high impact SBIR topics that can provide innovative solutions to Soldier needs. Close coordination among the SBIR program, small businesses and the Acquisition community ensures that these innovative solutions will be available to the Soldier.

182. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that successful SBIR research and development projects transition into production?

If confirmed, I will take all steps available to maximize the opportunity for the successful transition of SBIR technology into production.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

183. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

184. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASAALT?

Yes.

185. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

186. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.