

Advance Policy Questions for Wallace C. Gregson
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian & Pacific Security Affairs

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Goldwater-Nichols was landmark legislation that led to dramatic improvements in operational effectiveness, unity of effort, and civilian oversight. There is now a generation of military leaders who are experienced with operating in a coordinated and joint, multi-service environment. At this time, I do not see the need to change the provisions of this legislation.

Duties

Department of Defense Directive 5111.17 assigns the responsibilities, functions, relationships and authorities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (ASD (APSA)). The directive establishes ASD (APSA) as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on various matters relating to the Asian and Pacific regions, their governments, and defense establishments.

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD (APSA)? Will they differ in any way from those described in DOD Directive 5111.17?

The ASD(APSA) is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DoD interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of the Asian and Pacific regions, their governments, and defense establishments and for oversight of security cooperation programs, including Foreign Military Sales, in these regions.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Throughout my 37-year career in the United States Marine Corps, I had the privilege of serving the United States of America throughout the Asia-Pacific region along side my

fellow Marines, Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, Coast Guardsmen and civilians. From 2003 to 2005 I served as Commanding General of the Marine Corps Forces Pacific and Marine Corps Forces Central Command, where I led and managed over 70,000 Marines and Sailors in the Middle East, Afghanistan, East Africa, Asia and the United States. From 2001 to 2003 I served as Commanding General of all Marine Corps forces in Japan. Prior to my time in Japan I was Director of Asia-Pacific Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1998 to 2000. I am a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; the Pacific Council on International Policy; and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Relationships

If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

Commander, U.S. Central Command

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

Other Combatant Commanders

The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC & Interdependent Capabilities

If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I expect to develop and maintain a close working relationship with under secretaries and assistant secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with Combatant Commanders. As appropriate, if confirmed, I would also work closely with and coordinate with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within OSD Policy. Examples of this coordination include working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on the role of NATO in Afghanistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities on counterterrorism and Pakistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in Asia; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs on counter-narcotics, nuclear and security assistance matters.

Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next ASD (APSA)?

I believe there are six major challenges in Asia and the Pacific that the next ASD (APSA) will face. First, the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan both need support to counter and defeat al Qae'da and its extremist allies. Second, North Korea's conventional military threat, weapons of mass destruction and proliferation activities are a threat to regional security. Third, China's military buildup may be tipping the stability balance in the Taiwan Strait and poses an unknown risk to the region at large. Fourth, we must remain vigilant as we continue alliance transformation and strengthening of our important security alliances with Japan and South Korea. Fifth, a conventional or even nuclear confrontation between Pakistan and India would be a disaster. Finally, in Southeast Asia there are challenges in sustaining defense reforms and democratic consolidation, as well maintaining effective counter-terrorism cooperation.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Strategies for dealing with many of the challenges are in place at the Pentagon, but I am informed that since January, the Administration has been conducting a number of major strategy reviews, particularly the recently completed Afghanistan-Pakistan strategic review. These reviews are being conducted in close coordination with the interagency community and with consultations with Congress and our international partners. If confirmed, I will analyze current strategies, review the results of the recent strategy reviews, and participate in on-going policy reviews, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues that must be addressed by the ASD (APSA)?

Strategies for dealing with these challenges are largely in place at the Pentagon, among the U.S. interagency, and in agreements with our partners in the region. If confirmed, I see the challenge as principally one of careful, sustained execution of these strategies rather than devising new initiatives.

In Afghanistan, my principal focus would be on supporting coalition efforts to train and equip Afghan security forces, as well as integrating both the military and governance elements of the counter-insurgency. This also includes working with Pakistan to eliminate safe-havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Regarding North Korea, I would work with the Department of State and regional partners to press North Korea to meet its commitments – including denuclearization - as agreed to during the Six Party Talks, while maintaining the capability to deter potential North Korea military threats and countering proliferation activities.

With regard to China, the strategy is one of careful, measured military engagement with the Government of China and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), pressing for

transparency while also sustaining our military capabilities to fulfill our defense commitments in the region.

In order to sustain the realignment and transformation processes already underway, we need to review progress constantly and resolve challenges in the bilateral relations with both Tokyo and Seoul: these are complex, multi-stage projects that require sustained political and budgetary support on both sides of the Pacific.

In South Asia, I would work with the Department of State to promote confidence building measures between India and Pakistan while continuing to develop our bilateral security relations with both nations.

Finally, in Southeast Asia I would sustain and expand our relations with regional militaries to promote regional security, defense reforms and respect for human rights.

Engagement Policy

One of the central pillars of our national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises, combatant commander exercises, humanitarian assistance operations, and similar activities are used to achieve this goal.

If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military? If yes, would you advocate for expanding U.S. military-to-military engagement? If not, why not?

If confirmed, I will support continued U.S. military-to-military engagement. I believe the current and emerging security environment will require robust engagement with the militaries of our partners and allies around the world, and building productive relationships with many states in which our past military-to-military engagements have been limited or absent entirely.

Do you believe that these activities contribute to U.S. national security?

Yes.

Stability Operations

Experience in Iraq has underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of stability operations in post-conflict situations.

In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DOD and other departments of government in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?

DoD has and will continue to play a supporting role to civilian agencies in stability and support operations post-conflict.

What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq?

Recent operations in Iraq demonstrate that long-term success requires a robust capacity for integrated civil-military action and substantially more resources to support the expeditionary capacity of civilian departments. Long-term success will also require close cooperation between DoD and other US government departments in planning, preparing for and conducting stability and support operations, both in terms of DoD participation in whole-of-government efforts and for interagency participation in the development of military campaign and contingency planning.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations. These include the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”) and the security and stabilization assistance authority (“Section 1207”).

In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations in the Asian and Pacific region?

The strategic imperatives driving our partner capacity building efforts include strengthening bilateral relationships; increasing access and influence; promoting militaries that respect human rights, civilian control of the military, and the rule of law; and building capacity for common military objectives. These objectives differ by country and by context. DoD has a particular interest in building the capacity of partner-nations to participate in coalition operations or counter terrorism, or promote regional or global security in order to reduce stress on the US armed forces and reduce the risk of future military interventions.

What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 global train and equip authority? What is your assessment of the implementation of the global train and equip program?

As I understand it, section 1206 is intended to provide a quicker more targeted ability to build partner capacity than the more traditional routes of security assistance and is focused on building capacity to achieve security objectives. This authority has two discrete purposes outlined in law: to build a partner’s national military or maritime security forces’ capacity either to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations or (2) conduct or support stability operations where US forces are participating.

If confirmed, I will assess the program to ensure it is used in keeping with the intent of the authority and that it produces the intended security outcomes.

What is the relationship of the global train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics assistance and foreign military

financing? What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?

The Global Train and Equip authority fills two specific legal requirements (to build capacity for counterterrorism and stability operations where U.S. forces are a participant). Foreign Military Financing serves broad foreign policy objectives such as improving bilateral relations, encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest, increasing access and influence, and building capacity particularly where host-nation and U.S. interests align. Secretary Gates noted in April, 2008 that "...building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement – irrespective of the capacity of other departments." Counternarcotics authorities are focused on providing DoD the ability to support US or other Government efforts to counter the flow of narcotics globally.

We should avoid duplication of effort among these activities. If confirmed, I will do everything I can to deconflict among them.

What is your understanding of the purpose of the security and stabilization assistance authority ("Section 1207")? What is your assessment of how this authority has been utilized?

My understanding is that Section 1207 fills a gap in the Department of State's ability to provide stabilization and reconstruction assistance. It allows DoD to transfer funding to the State Department to help meet State's reconstruction, security, or stabilization efforts. Secretary Gates made clear in past testimony how he sees the purpose of "Section 1207" authority: "A touchstone for the Defense Department is that 1207 should be for civilian support for the military – either by bringing civilians to serve with our military forces or in lieu of them." I will monitor it closely, especially as it relates to the Asia-Pacific region, if confirmed.

Secretary Gates has called for an expansion of the Government's resources devoted to instruments of non-military "soft power" – civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance.

Do you agree with Secretary Gates that there is a need to expand the Government's resources devoted to the ability of civilian departments and agencies to engage, assist, and communicate with partner nations?

Yes.

In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis other civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft power?

Generally, the Department's role should be to support, not lead, in the exercise of "soft power."

Which department should have the lead in setting U.S. Government security assistance policy, the Department of State or the Department of Defense?

The Department of State should retain the lead in setting U.S. Government security assistance policy.

Afghanistan

In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in Afghanistan?

I believe that America's most enduring interest in the region is eliminating extremist threats in Afghanistan and Pakistan by disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaida and its safe havens in Pakistan and preventing their return to Afghanistan or Pakistan. If confirmed, I expect to support the Department's efforts in this critical challenge, which requires urgent and sustained attention.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to our current strategy in Afghanistan?

The President's new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan takes the important step of adopting an integrated approach between civilian and military elements and approaching Afghanistan and Pakistan as one theater for diplomacy. This will help achieve key objectives of disrupting terrorist networks, promoting a more capable, accountable and effective government in Afghanistan, developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces, supporting civilian control, constitutional government and a vibrant economy in Pakistan, as well as supporting international community involvement and UN leadership in the effort. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress in achieving the important goals of this strategy.

Do you believe that there is a need to develop a comprehensive civil-military plan for Afghanistan, akin to that used in Iraq?

Yes.

What is your assessment of the contributions of NATO allies to the effort in Afghanistan? Should the United States continue to press the NATO and other allied countries to increase their contributions to the Afghanistan effort, and if so, how might these countries do so?

Our allies and non-NATO partners contribute significant resources and personnel to the efforts in Afghanistan. Non-U.S. members of NATO, Australia and other non-NATO allies are contributing approximately 32,000 forces in Afghanistan. NATO countries also announced new commitments of personnel and resources at the recent NATO summit, with particular focus on building Afghanistan's own security forces. Japan has made significant financial contributions, including its recent \$1 billion commitment to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the challenges and needs in Afghanistan and Pakistan are even greater.

The United States should continue to look to our allies around the world to shoulder a significant share of the military and financial burdens in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I would support continued efforts to urge our friends and allies to increase contributions in their areas of greatest strength. I would particularly look forward to working with our partners in Asia toward that end.

General David McKiernan, USA, Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, has identified a need for four additional combat brigades and support units in Afghanistan, equaling up to 30,000 additional troops. President Obama has approved the deployment of an additional 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan in late spring and summer of this year. General McKiernan has said that these additional forces provide him what he needs for the coming months, but additional forces will still be needed to meet fully his request.

Do you support General McKiernan’s request for additional forces?

I have not been fully briefed on the details of current operations and threat assessments, or internal deliberations associated with the Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy review. If confirmed, I look forward to assisting the USD(P) and others to assess the appropriate level of military forces required.

If so, how should the Department support combat brigades increases in Afghanistan, ahead of the national elections? Would you support drawing down U.S. forces in Iraq faster or redirecting to Afghanistan combat brigades already slated to replace brigades in Iraq in order to meet General McKiernan’s request?

The President has approved the deployment of more than 21,000 additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan to meet urgent security needs, particularly in the volatile southern provinces, including the critical necessity to train additional Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). My understanding is that these forces will arrive in Afghanistan in advance of the presidential election in August. It is also my understanding that the Administration has looked to our Allies and partners to provide additional forces to ensure security during the elections as well as the success of the ANSF training mission, and many allies have recently made additional commitments. To my knowledge no decision has been made on the deployment of additional U.S. combat brigades beyond the 21,000 additional U.S. forces noted above.

Would you support the temporary extension of combat brigades already deployed to Afghanistan? Would you support the accelerated deployment of combat brigades slated to deploy later this year to Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I would expect to work closely with USD(P), the Joint Staff and Secretary of Defense to ensure deployment lengths of combat brigades in Afghanistan strike an appropriate balance between meeting our commanders’ operational requirements and maintaining the health and readiness of our forces.

The goal for increasing the size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been revised from 68,000 to approximately 134,000 soldiers.

In your view, should rapidly increasing the number of U.S. trainers to accelerate the expansion of the ANA be a top priority in Afghanistan?

Building an effective, broadly representative, and respected ANA requires significant resources, and the President's strategy review has made this objective a top priority. If confirmed, I will support the USD(P) and Secretary of Defense in providing oversight and guidance that ensures there are the right numbers of trainers, mentors, and advisors with sufficient resources to accomplish their mission.

What recommendations, if any, would you have for encouraging or enabling our coalition partners to provide more training team personnel to embed with ANA units?

It is my understanding that the United States and NATO have assumed a long-term commitment to develop Afghan forces that can eventually take the lead for security in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Department's efforts to encourage our coalition partners to deliver on their commitments to provide training team personnel.

One of the main threats to U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan comes from cross-border attacks by the Taliban and extremist militants who find safe haven in Pakistan's border regions. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair recently stated that "No improvement in the security in Afghanistan is possible without progress in Pakistan." He also stated, "No improvement in Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan taking control of its border areas and improving governance, creating economic and educational opportunities throughout the country."

What steps in your view need to be taken to eliminate or mitigate the threat posed by Afghan Taliban and extremist militants hiding out across the Afghan-Pakistan border?

As the President's strategy makes clear, Afghanistan and Pakistan are in many respects a single theater of operations, and both President Obama and Secretary Gates have cited the need to eliminate the terrorist sanctuary in the border regions of Pakistan. This sanctuary poses a potential threat not only to Afghanistan, but to the region and indeed to the United States. Clearly however, there is no purely military solution. The U.S. must pursue an integrated civil-military approach to promote development and prevent terrorism across the Afghanistan- Pakistan border region, as called for in our new strategy. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with my DoD and interagency colleagues to that purpose.

Would you agree that it is possible that developments within Afghanistan could lead to improvements in Afghanistan's security irrespective of developments in Pakistan's border areas?

I agree that many of Afghanistan's challenges are internal. This is true of certain insurgent activities, the problem of warlords, poppy cultivation and narcotics production, and general criminality. However, I believe that we have learned from years of conflict that insurgent and terrorist safe-havens in Pakistan and illicit cross-border activity must also be suppressed to establish sustainable security in Afghanistan.

The ANA has shown itself to be effective, well-motivated, and respected by the Afghan people.

Would you support giving the ANA the lead in stopping cross-border incursions, either by transferring the mission of patrolling the border to the ANA or by bringing the Afghan Border Patrol under the ANA?

The ANA has increasingly shown itself to be effective, well-motivated, and respected. Clearly securing the border areas from cross-border incursions and illegal smuggling is an important element of a successful long-term strategy. The issue of command relationships between the Afghan Border Patrol and ANA is an area that I have not examined in detail, and if confirmed, will study more closely.

Afghanistan – Counterdrug Efforts

The cultivation of poppies and trafficking of opium has reached alarming proportions in Afghanistan. Some estimate that over 50 percent of Afghanistan's gross national product is associated with the illegal opium trade and that Afghanistan is at risk of failing as a nation state. Coalition strategies for countering the opium trade have not been effective to date.

In your view, what strategy would be most effective in reducing opium production and trafficking in Afghanistan?

Opium traffic continues to distort the Afghan economy, corrode the judicial system, and exacerbate corruption and criminal violence. Countering the opium trade should include a nuanced and fully resourced coalition and Afghan strategy, including crop substitution and alternative livelihoods, interdiction and eradication, judicial reform, better law enforcement and intelligence sharing, and rural economic development and public information.

What is the appropriate role for coalition nations and the larger international community in effectively addressing the counterdrug challenge in Afghanistan and the surrounding region?

I believe it is critical for the international community to play a greater role across the full range of initiatives and operations designed to help the Government of Afghanistan strengthen Afghan institutions, ranging from the judicial and law enforcement system, to

its intelligence service, and the Afghan National Security Forces, so that it can better take the lead in combating narcotics in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan - Reconstruction

What is your assessment of the relationship between reconstruction and development in Afghanistan and achieving U.S. policy objectives in Afghanistan?

I believe that effective reconstruction and development programs are essential elements of an integrated civil-military strategy to achieve U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. These programs are especially important at the provincial and local levels where they can have the most direct impact in creating opportunity and improving lives. Unless young Afghans have reasonable economic opportunities there will never be stability and security in the country.

What are the main challenges facing the U.S. and international community's reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan?

In my view, high levels of violence in Afghanistan constitute the most immediate and pressing challenge to reconstruction and development efforts, which must feature prominently in any successful long-term strategy. The Afghan people have suffered through more than a generation of war, and the country's development challenges are immense. The majority of Afghans make their living from farming, yet extensive drought and failing agricultural infrastructure create openings for opium production to supplant the legal agricultural economy. While Afghanistan has seen improvements in health care in recent years, life expectancy remains below 45 years while more than half of Afghan children suffer from poor nutrition and disease. While progress has been made towards primary education in Afghanistan, fewer than half of adult males and only one in eight females can read, impeding the professionalization of the Afghan government and security forces and limiting economic growth.

What would be your priorities for addressing those challenges?

If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the USD(P) in working with interagency partners to help implement the Administration's strategy, including by engaging our coalition partners and the international community to advance reconstruction and development efforts in Afghanistan.

What changes, if any, would you recommend for the strategy, organizational structure, or resourcing of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan?

I believe that Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been critical to the development work undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years. If confirmed, I look forward to discussing the committee's concerns and ideas on the use of PRTs.

Pakistan

What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Pakistani security relations? Are there steps you would recommend to improve these relations?

Pakistan is a critical ally in the long-term struggle against extremism and terrorism. A confluence of overlapping security concerns – including the presence of al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban affiliated extremists, United States and NATO lines of communication to Afghanistan, nuclear weapons, and an unstable economic environment – make Pakistan a key national security interest for the United States. Pakistan and the United States share mutual interests in these areas and it is essential to continue to build and cultivate a long-term relationship built on respect and trust regarding security and other overlapping interests. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about all aspects of ongoing U.S.-Pakistan relations and helping the USD(P) shape effective policies for engagement by the U.S. military, the State Department, and other agencies.

What is your understanding and assessment of the efforts by the Pakistani Government to counter militant groups along the Afghan-Pakistan border and to fight terrorism in general?

Any enduring solution to the challenge of defeating the terrorist and cross-border insurgent groups that threaten Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the international community requires Pakistan's strong support. While the Pakistani government has conducted several military operations in the past against militants in border areas, the region remains a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and Taliban affiliated groups. The threat appears to be increasing.

In your view, is the Pakistani Government doing enough to combat these threats? If not, what more should it be doing? What in your view should be the U.S. approach vis-à-vis Pakistan?

While I have not been briefed in detail on any assessments of Pakistan's willingness and ability to combat these threats, I believe that any long-term success in countering them requires extensive and sustained attention by various elements of Pakistan's government. If confirmed, I look forward to assessing ways in which the U.S. and Pakistan can work better together to combat these shared threats.

India

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security relations?

A close and continuing security relationship with India will be important for Central Asia's security and for effectively managing Indian Ocean security in the twenty first century. The U.S. and India have a range of common security interests that include maritime security, counter-terrorism, and regional stability. I understand that U.S.-India security relations are currently quite positive, multi-faceted, and getting stronger. Military-to-military engagement is growing in size, scope, and sophistication as the two

militaries become more familiar with each other through frequent exercises and subject matter exchanges.

If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

If confirmed, I believe our priorities for this relationship should be focused on increasing maritime security cooperation, cooperating on counter-proliferation, collaborating on humanitarian assistance and disaster response, dealing with piracy, finding ways to cooperate on counter-terrorism, and deepening defense trade. Additionally, I believe there is potential for greater intelligence sharing on common threats, cooperation on missile defense, and working towards stability in Afghanistan.

What, in your view, is the effect on DOD interests, if any, of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India?

The civil nuclear cooperation agreement was a landmark agreement that significantly transformed the U.S.-India bilateral relationship. The agreement has also deepened the level of trust between the U.S. and India which will have positive effects on DOD interests and will hopefully lead to greater mil-to-mil cooperation and increased defense trade.

How do you assess the relationship between India and China and how does that relationship impact the security and stability of the region?

As Asia's two largest powers, India and China collectively will have a significant impact on Asia's future security landscape. Both countries are in the process of building their respective military capabilities. I understand India has concerns about China's increasing presence in the Indian Ocean, and also has outstanding border disputes with China. It is important to actively engage both of these Asian powers to ensure they both contribute in a positive way towards Asian stability and security.

The recent incident in Mumbai raises questions about what more might be done to help India guard against and react to terrorist incidents, and underscores the fragile nature of the relationship between India and neighboring Pakistan.

What do you believe the United States should do to assist the Indian government in the prevention of and response to terrorist events?

As the world's largest democracy, India is a critical strategic partner of the United States. Both India and the U.S. share an interest in preventing terrorism. After the Mumbai attacks, I understand there may be greater interest from India in counter-terrorism cooperation. If confirmed, I will work with the State Department to carefully consider all requests for counterterrorism assistance from India.

What is your assessment of the relationship between India and Pakistan?

Tensions between India and Pakistan significantly increased after the Mumbai attacks in November 2008. India's response after the Mumbai attacks was commendable for its restraint and responsible behavior. While the situation has stabilized somewhat since November, I believe relations between India and Pakistan remain fragile.

In your view, what impact has this rise in tensions between Pakistan and India had on the stability of the South Asia region, generally, and on the prospects for security in Afghanistan?

India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are linked by history, culture, language, and trade, and regional stability cannot be achieved without the cooperation of all three. It is in America's national interest to play a constructive role in helping defuse the recent rise in tensions and to help derive from the tragic attacks in Mumbai an opportunity for further cooperation between three of America's crucial partners. Doing so will allow Pakistan to commit more of its resources to its western regions against extremist elements that are undermining its stability, and will permit Afghanistan to focus its efforts on developing an effective government that is able to secure both its borders and its citizens.

Force Posture in the USPACOM AOR

Perhaps more than with any other combatant command, military exigencies in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) are subject to the "tyranny of distance" in getting forces to points of conflict. Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region are planned over the next several years, including movement of Marines from Okinawa to Guam and relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea.

In your view, how important is the forward basing strategy to the ability of USPACOM to execute its operational contingencies?

The United States' forward-basing strategy is critical to enable USPACOM's execution of its operational contingencies given the importance of providing capabilities that can be flexibly deployed, employed, and sustained in a timely manner across a spectrum of contingencies.

What do you see as the implications of the proposed force structure changes, particularly in Korea, Japan and Guam, with respect to the Asia-Pacific region in general?

I believe U.S. posture changes in Korea and Japan contribute to strengthening our alliances and better positioning U.S. forces to ensure a more sustainable and capable regional force posture. By relocating U.S. forces, the United States will address longstanding host-nation concerns such as noise and encroachment without

compromising their missions. The moves also improve and enhance mutual defense infrastructure in the region, incorporating and executing several large investment projects from the governments of South Korea and Japan. At the same time, the U.S. will make better use of Guam's strategic advantages by arraying U.S. forces in Asia more effectively for the evolving security environment.

How does the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam improve our security posture in the region?

This is the most comprehensive package of force posture changes in Japan and Guam in decades, and I believe that these initiatives will further several strategic goals. First, they will strengthen our alliance with Japan by addressing long-standing problems with our presence in Okinawa. Second, they will ensure the continued long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and in the Western Pacific. And third, by making better use of Guam's strategic advantages, they will array U.S. forces in Asia more effectively for the evolving security environment.

What impact, if any, do you expect the proposed changes in our force posture will have on the U.S. ability to defend South Korea and Japan or to react to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

These posture changes increase flexibility to respond when and where U.S. forces are needed, and strengthen the United States' overall capacity to deter coercive and aggressive action in the Asia-Pacific region. Planned posture changes in the region will strengthen deterrent and strike capabilities (i.e., U.S. maritime, air, and deployable ground forces) forward in the Pacific as well as strategic mobility and command and control (C2) support from the United States—all of which are relevant to supporting our allied commitments for self-defense in contingencies.

Some observers suggest that the United States is preoccupied in Iraq and Afghanistan and not focused sufficiently on the challenges in East Asia at a critical time in the development of that region.

How do you assess the U.S. engagement in East Asia relative to U.S. engagement in other parts of the world, particularly Central and Southwest Asia?

I agree with Secretary Gates' observation at the 2008 Shangri La dialogue that the United States has never been more engaged with more Asian countries.

Are the levels of funding, manning and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region appropriate as compared to other regions? Do you see a need to increase those levels in the coming years?

Strengthening partnership capacity, reinforcing existing alliances, and enhancing emerging relationships will continue to require investment of resources and attention. If confirmed, I will advocate for appropriate levels of funding, manning and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.

Many of our key alliances in Asia were established years ago when global conditions and threats to U.S. security were different than today. USPACOM has as a top objective the development of cooperative security arrangements with allies and partners in the region.

Do you agree with this objective and, if so, what countries do you see as the top priority for such arrangements to best enhance stability and security in the region? Why?

If confirmed, I will continue to support the development of cooperative security arrangements with allies and partners in the region. Access to regional ports, airfields, and logistical facilities on a non-permanent but recurring basis, increases the flexibility of our force employment options. Australia and Singapore are top priorities in this regard. I will work with the Commander, United States Pacific Command, to ensure a complementary approach to this important objective.

How should U.S. policies and engagements in the Asia-Pacific region change to best meet new threats and conditions

A critical step to meeting the new threats and conditions in the Asia-Pacific region is to execute the transformational security agendas we have with many allies and partners in the region. Additional significant changes will be guided by the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review process.

China

China is viewed by some in the United States as a potential threat and by others as a potential constructive international partner that should be welcomed and integrated into the international economic and political community.

How would you characterize the U.S. relationship with China?

I would characterize the U.S.-China security relationship as complex, with some elements of cooperation and others of potential competition. The military aspect of the relationship is embedded within an even more complex set of political and economic relationships between Washington and Beijing, and fundamentally colors our security relationships with Japan, South Korea, the Southeast Asian nations, and Taiwan.

To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of the United States and other major regional and international actors will affect the direction in which China develops, and the extent to which it becomes a cooperative partner or a competitor of the United States?

I believe that United States policies and actions can influence the direction of China's development. No country has done more to assist, facilitate, and encourage China's national development and integration into the international system than the United States. However, U.S. policy and actions, or the policies and actions of any country or group of

countries for that matter, cannot alone determine China's future which, in many ways, will be based upon the choices that China's leaders make. Today, as Secretary Gates noted in a speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace on October 15, 2008, "China is a competitor but not necessarily an adversary, and there is no reason for China to become an adversary." More fundamentally, the United States can also help to shape the environment in which China makes its strategic choices, and in so doing, encourage China to "do the right thing."

What do you see as the impact of the current global economic crisis on stability and security in China specifically, and in the region generally?

It is too early to gauge the full impact of the global economic crisis upon China and stability in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly. But those who manage defense and security issues must be attentive to the security-economic interconnections and be prepared to work together with colleagues in economic and diplomatic fields, both to guard against negative outcomes and also to seek positive ways forward where they may exist.

China's defense spending in 2009 will exceed 2008 spending by 15%. This continues China's trend of double-digit increases in defense spending every year since the late 1980s.

What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady increase in defense spending and its military modernization program?

I am deeply concerned about China's military modernization. China continues to invest heavily in strategic weapons, power projection, area denial, and asymmetric warfare. China appears focused in the near-term on generating capabilities for potential Taiwan contingencies, including those that would involve U.S. intervention. China is also developing longer range capabilities that have implications beyond Taiwan. Some of these capabilities have allowed it to contribute cooperatively to the international community's responsibilities in areas such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counter-piracy. However, some of these capabilities, as well as other, more disruptive ones, could allow China to project power to ensure access to resources or to enforce claims to disputed territories. China has left unclear to the international community the purposes and objectives of China's evolving doctrine and capabilities. Seeking to clarify this ambiguity is an important strategic goal for the United States. If China exercises responsibility and restraint in the pursuit of its legitimate aspirations, it will find a willing partner in the United States.

How should the United States respond to the Chinese military modernization program?

The pace and scale of Chinese modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency surrounding both capabilities and intentions, are a source of concern for the United States as well as for its allies and the region more broadly. An appropriate U.S. response would include efforts to fully comprehend the future direction of China's intentions and

capabilities, active engagement to reduce the potential for miscalculations and to manage unwanted competition, and, finally, defense preparedness to ensure the U.S. maintains an enduring strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific region, and retains an edge in areas that are critical to achieving specific operational objectives.

What do you believe are the Chinese political-military goals in the Asia-Pacific region? Globally?

Broadly, the overriding objectives of China's leaders appear to be to ensure the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, continue China's economic development, maintain the country's domestic political stability, defend China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and secure China's status as a great power. Within this context, preventing any moves by Taipei toward de jure independence is a key part of Beijing's strategy. Within each dimension there lies a mix of important challenges and opportunities for the United States that will continue to deserve priority attention.

How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship between China and Taiwan, and how can we help prevent miscalculation on either side?

Taiwan has made significant strides to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait. These initiatives should be encouraged. I believe the United States can help to prevent miscalculation on either side by continuing to abide by our longstanding policies, based on the three joint U.S.-China Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, to include making available to Taiwan "defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." Such a continued commitment by the United States will allow Taiwan to continue its outreach to the PRC without fear of coercion.

What is your view regarding the longstanding U.S. policy of selling military equipment to Taiwan despite objection and criticism from China?

U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that the U.S. "will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability (sec.3.a)." That policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for over 30 years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I believe our arms sales have been carried out in a responsible manner.

How do China's efforts to establish a strategic presence in various South Asian seaports affect its political-military posture and influence in the region?

China looks to South Asia as an area of strategic importance, which includes political objectives, access to resources, trade, and investment. In regards to South Asian seaports, the important question is how China intends to use its presence. The United States retains

strong relationships in South Asia and should continue to monitor China's growing presence in the region.

What are your views of China's recent deployment of warships to the west Indian Ocean to counter piracy in that area and how does this deployment contribute to China's ability to project power?

Generally speaking, I see China's participation in counter piracy operations as a positive development that contributes to solving a global security challenge and demonstrates China's ability to use its military in a positive, constructive, and responsible manner. It is more than likely that from this experience China could begin to develop capabilities that would enhance its ability to sustain a deployed force over an extended period of time.

Our military-to-military relations with the Chinese military have been characterized as "modest" and the Chinese approach to these relations can be accurately described as "on again, off again."

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

There are some signs of progress, but overall there is a lack of trust and mutual understanding, and the relationship continues to be marred by incidents such as those involving USNS IMPECCABLE in March 2009.

Do you believe that we should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

More can be done to improve the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, both in terms of the quality and the quantity of exchanges between the armed forces of our countries. If confirmed, I would look closely at exchanges with the Chinese armed forces at all levels and across a range of issues, including the recently opened dialogue on nuclear policy and strategy, which I understand is a priority for Secretary Gates. If confirmed, I look to engage in a wide range of areas where we can encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.

Recently, Chinese-flagged ships harassed the USNS IMPECCABLE, a U.S. military ship conducting ocean surveillance in the international waters of the South China Sea. The incident underscores the nature of certain Chinese maritime claims and the sensitivity associated with U.S. naval operations in these areas.

What is your assessment of the incident?

I view the harassment of the USNS IMPECCABLE within China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as a serious incident. The United States has a longstanding policy on freedom of navigation, consistent with customary international law and as reflected in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.

What can the United States do to help prevent such incidents in the future?

I believe the United States should clearly assert and exercise its rights, work with other states with similar interests and perspectives as appropriate, and ensure effective communications to reduce the risks of accident or miscalculation. I was very pleased by Secretary Gates' statement on March 18 that "... based on the diplomatic exchanges that have taken place, since the aggressive acts against the IMPECCABLE ...there won't be a repetition of this [incident]."

In its 2008 Report to Congress, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) concluded that China is asserting various excessive claims of sovereignty, including maritime, air and space, and also concluded that these claims have negative implications for the United States. Further, the Commission concluded that more must be done to ensure that China's rapid expansion of nuclear power does not result in the decline in safety or an increase in proliferation of nuclear weapons technology or expertise.

How should the United States respond to excessive claims of sovereignty by China? Would U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention be beneficial in this regard? If so, how?

As stated above, the United States has a longstanding policy on Freedom of Navigation, and as recent events relating to the USNS IMPECCABLE have demonstrated, does not acquiesce to excessive maritime, air, or space claims that restrict navigation and over-flight rights under customary international law (as reflected for example in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea). In addition to asserting U.S. rights, I believe the United States should work with other countries that have a stake in this issue to engage China.

I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. It is in America's enduring interest to be at the forefront of promoting the rule of law, including in the world's oceans. Were we to become a party to the Convention it would send a clear signal to the world that we are committed to advancing the rule of law at sea. Additionally under the Convention, we would provide the firmest possible legal foundation for the navigational rights and freedoms needed to project power, reassure our friends and allies, deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain deployed combat forces, and secure sea and air lines of communication that underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.

What is the role of DOD in helping to ensure that China's nuclear power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region?

The Obama Administration has reiterated that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, along with related technologies and materials, is a key goal for the United States. I believe that DoD should work in the interagency process

to ensure that any proliferation concerns relating to China including its nuclear power industry are expressed to the Chinese government in appropriate forums, and should similarly support the development of appropriate interagency responses in the event that China takes steps that do contribute to proliferation.

The USCC also concluded that cyber space is a critical vulnerability for the U.S., that China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and that China would likely seek to take advantage of the U.S. dependence on the internet and cyber space in the event of a potential conflict situation.

If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack?

We, as many other nations, have been the target of innumerable malicious activities via cyberspace from hackers, criminals, and unidentified entities, some of which may well be nation states. I understand that numerous steps have been taken to increase network defense and monitoring capabilities. This work continues aggressively today. The Department of Defense should also continue to evaluate all global threats to its networks and work closely with other government agencies, industry, and the international community in order to meet those threats.

On January 11, 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community.

What is your view of China's purpose in conducting this test?

In my view, this test was just one element of China's military modernization effort to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare.

What do you see as the long term implications of this test for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

Space systems are vital to our national interest. In this regard, the United States should seek ways to protect our interests in space.

If China were to conduct a second test, would that change your view? Why or why not?

A second test of such a system would reaffirm my view that this system is one element of China's broad military modernization program that features a number of disruptive elements designed to support a strategy of anti-access and area denial. More troubling than that would be China's blatant disregard for the concerns expressed by the international community after their January 2007 test if China were to conduct another such test in the future.

What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space and the international agreements to prevent space weaponization?

The safe and responsible use of space and preservation of the space environment are important issues for all nations, especially for space-faring nations. Encouraging responsible behavior through establishment of international norms, such as the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines led by the United States and endorsed by the UN General Assembly, is an excellent model.

Taiwan

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-Taiwan security relations?

The U.S. has a robust security relationship with Taiwan. I have had the privilege to go to Taiwan as a private citizen and observe first-hand how we support Taiwan during their annual Han Kuang Field Training Exercise. This is just one aspect of our relationship and I will continue to look for additional ways to work with Taiwan to bolster their defensive capabilities, consistent with our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.

What are the priorities, in your view, for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

I believe priority areas include: enhancing the training establishment; hardening of critical infrastructure; ensuring increased munitions are available to counter the threat; and an advanced integrated air and missile defense. If confirmed, I would continue to work with Taiwan to review its defensive needs considering the current and projected PRC threat.

What is your view of the relationship between the type of assistance we offer Taiwan and regional stability?

The United States is closely monitoring the shifting balance in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan's defense needs, and we are well aware of the increasing capability of the PRC military. Regional stability depends on a strong Taiwan. Taiwan must be able to deter PRC coercion, and the best deterrent available to Taiwan is a strong defensive military.

What is your opinion of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)? Enacted 30 years ago this year, do you see any need to modify the TRA to reflect the current state of affairs in the region? If so, how?

The Taiwan Relations Act has been in force for over 30 years, its flexibility has allowed it to accommodate changing circumstances on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, as well as Taiwan's evolving relationship with the U.S.

What is your assessment of the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act?

The TRA provides that the U.S. “will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability (sec.3.a).” That policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for over 30 years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Given the increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait, what is the best policy prescription to encourage Taiwan to invest more in its own self-defense?

The best method to improve Taiwan’s defensive capability is not just spending more; it must include spending more wisely. Taiwan can no longer out spend the PRC on its defense. However, they can invest more wisely to compensate for the current and future threats posed by the PRC. Taiwan needs to enhance the professionalism of their military, and transform their military to meet future threats. Some of these ideas were addressed by Taiwan’s QDR and, if confirmed, I intend to work closely with PACOM to improve Taiwan’s defensive capabilities.

What measures, if any, would you recommend be implemented to encourage China to soften its military posture vis-a-vis Taiwan?

Consistent with longstanding U.S. policy, I believe that the United States would support any resolution in the Taiwan Strait provided that it is arrived at peacefully and with the support of the people on both the Mainland and Taiwan. If confirmed I would look for ways to highlight to Beijing the inconsistency between its military posture opposite Taiwan and a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue that both sides can support.

The Korean Peninsula

North Korea represents one of the greatest near term challenges to U. S. national security interests in Asia. Deterring conflict on the Korean peninsula remains a top priority. At the same time, the United States and South Korean relationship, while strong, is undergoing substantial changes in terms of command and control and force laydown over the next several years.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to date to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

North Korea’s conventional military, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and proliferation activities continue to pose a significant threat to regional peace and security. Recent North Korean provocations, including its launch of a Taepo Dong-2 missile, are unhelpful to regional stability and relations. Working with our allies and other key parties in the region and internationally on diplomatic solutions is an essential element in

addressing the totality of security problems on the Korean peninsula, the most vital of which is the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. Likewise, it is essential to maintain the capabilities to deter North Korea's military threat and proliferation activities. Strong alliances with South Korea and Japan remain instrumental in this regard. These alliances help maintain the peace and stability that have allowed the wider East Asia region to prosper over the past several decades. Ongoing transformation and realignment efforts will continue to strengthen our alliances, ensure an enduring U.S. military presence, and improve U.S. capabilities to address future security challenges.

What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities, and the export of those capabilities?

I believe that North Korea missile and WMD programs pose a serious threat to the United States, our forces, and our allies. This threat was evidenced recently in North Korea's April launch of a Taepo Dong-2 missile. Strong alliances and allied security cooperation, regional partnerships, and forward military presence remain key means to deal with these threats and to uphold allied defense commitments. U.S. national capabilities, such as ballistic missile defense, are also an essential element in deterring the threat and defending our interests, and it is my understanding that these capabilities and related developments in this area played an important role in the improved cooperation with our allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea, surrounding the April 2009 North Korean missile launch.

What are the short term and long term military implications for the United States of the ongoing tension on the Korean Peninsula?

North Korea's actions and behavior pose a threat to the peace and stability of the Republic of Korea, the United States, Japan, and others in the region. While North Korea's conventional military continues to deteriorate due to a lack of force modernization and advanced training programs, the asymmetric threat it poses continues to grow. North Korea continues to maintain strong nuclear ambitions. In early April, North Korea demonstrated, against the will of the international community, that it intended to continue its ballistic missile development program. Additionally, North Korea's Special Operations Forces, the largest in the world, maintain a high operational readiness and training tempo, and its cyber capability is also increasingly concerning. Given these asymmetric capabilities, the combined U.S.-ROK defense posture on the Korean Peninsula continues to be instrumental in deterring North Korean provocation. The U.S. commitment to the Alliance and to the Republic of Korea plays an immeasurable role in containing the North Korean threat and in reducing the risk of the North's miscalculation on the peninsula.

How do we ensure that we continue to protect our vital regional interests, while continuing meaningful progress toward the transfer of command and control to the Republic of Korea and the relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula?

The U.S.' vital regional interests are well served by both the successful transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the Republic of Korea as well as the relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula to enduring facilities. With the transition of wartime OPCON, the South Korean people will take a leadership role in the Alliance and a greater role in the defense of their own country. While this is long overdue, completing this transition in 2012 will demonstrate to North Korea and the region that the Republic of Korea military is strong and capable, thereby enhancing the Alliance's deterrent and stabilizing role and shaping the attitudes of future generations of Koreans about the Alliance. Similarly, the relocation of U.S. Forces Korea is advancing U.S. vital interests in the region by ensuring a sustainable U.S. military presence for the long-term. The ROK's substantial investment in this relocation effort is demonstrating that it will continue to welcome this U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula for the foreseeable future. As a result of this combined realignment effort, the U.S. military's enduring presence will continue to provide an effective deterrent and ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the region, conditions under which the Republic of Korea developed into a thriving democracy and a robust free market economy (the world's 14th largest).

With recent speculation regarding the possible poor health of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, what, if anything, should the U.S. be doing now to prepare for the possibility of a change in leadership in North Korea?

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United States and our allies are capable of addressing sudden onset crises, other forms of instability, or any other scenario that may result from a change in North Korean leadership. Fundamentally, our focus should be ensuring we are ready to maintain stability in the region, support defense of the Republic of Korea and Japan, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or other dangerous technologies from North Korea.

The alliance between the United States and South Korea has been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.

What is your understanding of the current status of the U. S. security relationship with South Korea?

I believe that the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance remains strong and continues to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. In the face of changes in the regional security environment, the U.S. and the ROK have made great strides in transforming their collective deterrent and defense posture. In particular, the

ROK has made major strides in developing its defense capabilities, commensurate with its economic development. Consequently, the Alliance remains relevant and capable both for deterring aggression on the peninsula and for addressing regional and global security issues.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?

If confirmed, I would support the continued realignment of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and the return of facilities that our forces no longer require. The United States is also working toward developing new command and control relationships with Korea and should ensure that contingency plans remain appropriate to changing circumstances. Additionally, I believe it is important to ensure the U.S. and Korean publics continue to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived from this alliance, and that the U.S. work effectively with the Republic of Korea as it plays an increasing role in regional and global security issues commensurate with its economic status and influence.

What is your view regarding the timing of turning over wartime operational command to South Korea?

As Secretary Gates said publicly following his meeting with the Korean Minister of Defense last October, the ROK military forces and U.S. forces are on track to complete the alliance agreement to transition wartime operational control in 2012. This effort will enable the ROK military to take the lead role in the defense of Korea. If confirmed, I will support the efforts of the Secretary, this Committee, and others to ensure that the important transition in command relationships is carried out in a manner that strengthens deterrence and maintains a fully capable U.S.-ROK combined defense posture on the Korean Peninsula.

Do you support expanding the number of U.S. personnel assigned to the Korea Peninsula for two- or three- year tours of duty and increasing the number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer assignments?

Yes. If confirmed, I would support the expansion of tour lengths for service members assigned to Korea. Normalization of tours will provide greater stability for U.S. service members and their families in Korea, enhance operational readiness on the Peninsula, and demonstrate U.S. commitment to an enduring U.S. presence in the ROK.

What is your assessment of Beijing's relative influence over Pyongyang?

As North Korea's closest neighbor and historic ally, China's influence has waned in recent years. However, it still retains more influence than most. I believe that as the chair of the Six-Party Talks, China has used its influence to play an important role in our collective efforts along with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Russia toward achieving stability in the region through the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

What do you believe must occur within the framework of the Six-Party Talks to ensure North Korea discontinues its nuclear program, and what posture would you recommend in future negotiations on this subject?

My understanding is that in accordance with the September 2005 Joint Statement, the DPRK committed to abandoning its nuclear programs. Despite North Korea's recent statement of its intent to withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks and nullify any agreements, the U.S. should be prepared to resume negotiations to peacefully and verifiably denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

Do you believe that the security relationship with South Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or should U.S. forces stationed in Korea have a more regional mission?

In accordance with the commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula serves to deter potential aggressors from taking hostile actions that would threaten the peace and security of the Republic of Korea. This presence has both deterred further war on the Korean Peninsula and contributed to the stability of the Northeast Asia region. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is transforming to ensure a capable and relevant forward presence for the future security environment. As ROK military forces have served and will continue to serve with the U.S. military in places off of the Peninsula (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the Gulf of Aden), the U.S.-ROK Alliance will continue to serve an important role regionally and globally.

Japan

How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship?

The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security in East Asia. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in the region. Our alliance has held fast through the turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and some contentious trade disputes and now stands poised to become a truly global alliance. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a complicated realignment process that is part of a larger Alliance Transformation agenda that also includes a review of roles, missions, and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability, and cohesiveness of the Alliance for the next several decades. This is an ambitious agenda that is worthy of attention and increased effort.

How would you characterize Japan's relationship with its regional neighbors, mainly China, North Korea and South Korea?

I believe it is important for Japan to continue to cultivate constructive relations with all of its neighbors. By moving forward, Japan and other East Asian nations can increase their security cooperation. Working with other U.S. allies and friends in the region, Japan can

increase its contribution to peace, security, and prosperity throughout Asia and globally. Japan is a valued and essential partner in the Six-Party Talks process and in other important regional security architectures.

What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

The security environment in Asia is changing and the U.S. needs a more capable alliance with Japan to deal with those challenges, including greater interoperability between armed forces at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would work to encourage Japan's increasing contributions to the Alliance, both regionally and globally. Cooperation and the development of complementary and mutually reinforcing capabilities should range from missile defense to increased bi-lateral training opportunities – in Guam, for example.

What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense?

As we recently witnessed in the run up to the TD-2 launch, ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan is a success story for the Alliance and has resulted in Japan's fielding of both sea and land based missile defense systems. U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense plays an important role in supporting our common strategic objectives on defense. The SM-3 Block IIA is an important cooperative program that will result in a significant increase in SM-3 capability.

Should the United States be doing anything more to encourage the Japanese government to increase their participation in ongoing military operations, such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, or future operations?

Japan is considering how to conduct international security missions with its very capable Self-Defense Force while keeping its Asian neighbors' historical concerns over the Japanese exercise of military power in mind. The overall trend has been positive, but slow. The deployment of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers to the Horn of Africa to conduct escort operations to protect shipping from piracy is another step forward. The Department is looking forward to the dispatch of P-3Cs to join the counter-piracy mission, Japan's first-ever "joint" deployment.

Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?

I believe the cost-arrangement between the United States and Japan as outlined in the May 2006 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) document known as the Realignment Roadmap is equitable and appropriate. For relocations within Japan, the GOJ is paying the lion's share of the costs to develop new facilities. The GOJ also understood the

strong desire of Okinawa residents for the relocation of forces from Japan to Guam to occur rapidly and recognized that this move—which it explicitly sought—would not happen anytime soon without substantial investment on its part. Spending less than one percent of its gross domestic product on its national defense, yet desiring the continued regional presence of U.S. forces, Japan could also clearly justify financial support for U.S. military construction within a U.S. territory on the grounds that it is making a direct contribution to Japan’s own security and to overall alliance burdensharing. This decision was not without controversy in Japan, as it is highly unusual—perhaps even unprecedented—for a host country to pay for U.S. forces to relocate out of that country. It will be important for the Department of Defense to work closely with the GOJ on project scope, management, and other factors to minimize risks to the efforts.

Counter-Terrorism in South East Asia

Admiral Keating, Commander, USPACOM, has described South East Asia as “the central front against terrorism in the Pacific.” Indeed, the rise of Islamic militants in this region poses an ever-increasing threat to security and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific theater.

What more can the United States do in South East Asia to help combat the threat of terrorism?

The Department of Defense plays an important supporting role in combating terrorism, mainly by helping build capacity in partner nation’s armed forces through security assistance and security cooperation programs. If confirmed, I will work closely with the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT) which has primary lead on counter terrorism assistance.

Which South East Asian countries are most important in the fight against terrorism in that region and what should the United States do to enhance our relations with those countries?

Again, because of the prominent interagency role in building partner-nation counter-terrorism capacity, especially on the law enforcement side, the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism plays the critical role in synchronizing the efforts of the U.S. Government. It is my understanding that the U.S. Government takes a regional approach to counter terrorism and encourages intelligence cooperation and law enforcement cooperation within the region. For the Department of Defense, Indonesia and the Philippines should be the top priorities for counter terrorism capacity-building assistance in Southeast Asia, notably through National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 1206-funded programs, which remains one of the Department’s most effective tools in building partner capacity to combat terrorism. The Department enjoys good relations with Indonesia and the Philippines and, in close consultation with Congress and the Department of State, should sustain and enhance these relationships through continued policy dialogues, security cooperation and security assistance programs.

How do you assess the security situation in the Strait of Malacca and what can the United States do to better protect this important trade route?

The security situation in the Strait of Malacca has improved due largely to more effective coordination between the Governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The U.S. has also contributed to improved security through NDAA Section 1206-funded programs in Indonesia and USPACOM's robust security cooperation outreach in the region aimed at improving maritime security. It is important that the U.S. continue to work with regional governments and militaries to safeguard this critical trade route.

What improvements or changes would you make to the Proliferation Security Initiative?

If confirmed, I would recommend that PSI should continue, and, I would work with the appropriate offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to turn PSI into a "durable international institution" as President Obama called for during his April 5, 2009, speech in Prague. I would defer recommendations on improvements or changes to the incoming Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, which manages PSI for the Department of Defense.

Republic of the Philippines

What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine military-to-military relations?

The Philippines is one of the United States' five treaty allies in East Asia and is a committed bilateral and regional partner in combating terrorism. The alliance remains strong and the Philippines remain important to the United States and to regional stability in general. I believe the top two defense priorities with the Philippines should be counterterrorism cooperation and defense reform.

What is your assessment of U.S. military efforts in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U.S. assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against insurgent groups?

The U.S. military is working effectively with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to provide assistance that is consistent with Philippine Constitutional restrictions on foreign forces. The Philippine Armed Forces continue to professionalize and reform in a manner consistent with U.S. and Philippine defense goals and objectives. They benefit from various security assistance programs, exercises, and engagement opportunities that develop capacity and capability with their military. These efforts have resulted in numerous strides against Abu Sayaf Group and Jemah Ismailiya terrorists in the Southern Philippines and have resulted in better regional maritime security cooperation.

What do you believe the U.S. goals should be in the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?

U.S. Defense goals are to deny safe haven, sanctuary and training areas for Abu Sayaf Group and Jemah Ismaliya terrorists; and to partner in cooperative regional maritime security programs. These goals are best achieved through existing U.S. government security assistance and security cooperation programs.

What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in combat or law enforcement in the Republic of the Philippines?

The established current policy guidelines are clear: the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement guide bilateral policy with the Republic of Philippines. The Philippine Constitution prevents foreign forces from conducting combat operations in the Philippines. Deployed U.S forces will continue to be in strict compliance with these strictures.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a key Asian power, and is the largest Muslim country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and expand U. S. relations with Indonesia where possible.

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian Government is cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism?

If confirmed, I would consult with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities on this question. Based on my current understanding, I believe that the Government of Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with the United States and our allies in combating global terrorist networks in the region, particularly against Jema'a Islamiya.

What is your view of the current state of military-to-military contacts with Indonesia?

Current military-to-military contacts with Indonesia are positive and expanding. I believe that enhanced military contacts with the Indonesian military (TNI) can help cement the recent progress we have seen on human rights, particularly in conflict areas such as Aceh and Papua, maritime security and military reforms. I also appreciate Indonesia's contribution to peacekeeping operations – including Lebanon. Going forward, I would like to see military-to-military contacts with Indonesia deepen through a series of regular, predictable exercises and engagements.

Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-military contacts, in close consultation with Congress and the Department of State.

What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

The Government of Indonesia continues to make progress in military reform. Early progress toward defense reform - separation of the police from the military, eliminating formal political roles for the TNI, increasing accountability, and human rights training - has been sustained. Continued progress on the divestiture of TNI businesses would be unmistakable evidence of Indonesia's commitment to reform. The 2002 Defense Law and the 2004 TNI Law formally codified the roles and responsibilities of the TNI as a mechanism to support, not replace, civilian government. Continued "hard" reforms that the U.S. should continue to push for include full accountability for past human rights abuses, strengthening civilian control, putting the TNI fully "on budget", and continued professionalization of the TNI officer corps. It also worth noting the TNI's professional conduct during recently completed parliamentary elections.

If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?

If confirmed, I would sustain efforts of encouraging professionalism within the military in terms of both human rights respect and accountability, through bilateral security discussions, joint training, military assistance and military training programs. U.S. security assistance and security cooperation programs are the most effective channels to encourage professionalism in the Indonesian military.

War on Drugs

The DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs flowing toward the United States. In recent years, DOD has sought to expand the list of countries eligible for counternarcotics train and equip assistance authority (e.g. Section 1033) to combat drug trafficking in the Asia-Pacific.

What is your assessment of the drug trafficking threat emanating from the Asia-Pacific region?

South and Southeast Asia have become increasingly more attractive as bases for drug trafficking organizations' production and smuggling operations. Several Asian and Pacific nations have experienced a significant increase in the production, transshipment, trafficking, and consumption of narcotics in recent years. Methamphetamine produced using diverted precursor chemicals, heroin transshipment through Asia, poppy

cultivation, and potential narco-terrorist funding remain the primary drug threats to the United States from the Asia Pacific region.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR)

You have been quoted as saying that “[h]umanitarian assistance and disaster-relief (HA/DR) operations contribute directly to the [Asia-Pacific] region’s common stability and security” and that “[m]ilitary involvement is often essential”.

What is your assessment of the U.S. military contributions to HA/DR in the Asia-Pacific region?

The Asia-Pacific region has experienced some of the worst natural disasters in recent history and threatens to give the world an even greater calamity - an avian influenza pandemic. In support of USAID and the US government's broader relief efforts, DoD has played an instrumental role in the international response to recent Asian disasters (in Burma, Philippines, Bangladesh, China) and is deeply involved in interagency disaster preparedness/mitigation planning efforts.

DoD's HA/DR efforts have provided unique military capabilities (strategic airlift, logistics, transportation, communication) and have made significant contributions to security in the region by saving lives, reducing human suffering, helping to build partner capacities, and preventing crisis from becoming conflicts thereby increasing security and stability in the region.

In your view, what should the U.S. do to enhance HA/DR efforts in the region?

In my view, DoD's HA/DR efforts in the region could be enhanced through improved civilian-military cooperation and collaboration. Successful civilian-military collaboration reduces duplication of efforts, facilitates communication and information sharing, and increases the military's effectiveness in providing urgent, life-saving capabilities in the immediate aftermath of a disaster abroad.

POW/MIA Accounting Efforts

The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of missing military members. Recovery of remains of U. S. service members from World War II, the Korean War, and the Viet Nam war continue to be a very high priority. In 2005, the Department of Defense suspended U.S. cooperation with North Korea on recovery and identification of the remains of U.S. personnel, citing concern for the security of U.S. personnel in North Korea.

In your view is there any reason why we should not now resume cooperation with North Korea to recover the remains of U.S. personnel?

I believe these efforts should resume once appropriate conditions exist that both enable the United States to carry out this important mission and to take all possible precautions to ensure the safety of U.S. personnel.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the PACOM area of responsibility?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs to ensure that APSA continues its strong support for this mission and provides all necessary assistance to enhance cooperation with the relevant countries.

If confirmed, what steps would you take, if any, specifically with regard to recovery efforts in North Korea?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, U.S. Pacific Command, the State Department, and all other organizations involved to provide advice and support whenever necessary.

Foreign Language Policy

In 2005, the Department of Defense approved the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap to improve the Department's foreign language capability and regional area expertise. Since then, the Department has been working toward implementing that roadmap.

How many Mandarin and/or Cantonese speakers does the Department of Defense have in intelligence analyst positions?

I have not had an opportunity to examine this issue in detail. If confirmed, I will research this issue and look forward to working with Congress to ensure the Department of Defense builds sufficient foreign language capability and regional area expertise.

Is this number sufficient to ensure good intelligence assessments for use by the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

I have not had an opportunity to examine this issue in detail. If confirmed, I will research this issue and look forward to working with Congress to ensure the Department of Defense builds sufficient foreign language capability and regional area expertise.

In your view, how should the Federal Government expand the foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel in order to improve the quality of intelligence input to, and policy output by, the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

I have not had an opportunity to examine this issue in detail. If confirmed, I will research this issue and look forward to working with Congress to ensure the Department of Defense builds sufficient foreign language capability and regional area expertise..

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.