

Advance Questions for LTG Raymond T. Odierno, USA
Nominee for Vice Chief of Staff of the Army

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders in the strategic planning process, in the development of requirements, in joint training and education, and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

ANSWER:

Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved our ability to conduct joint operations. I believe it is important to review and update based on the changing environment. There should be a requirement to constantly review and adjust to ensure it continues to meet the desired intent.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

ANSWER:

There is good reason to consider the development of Goldwater-Nichols Act-like legislation to delineate roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in support of contingency operations.

Duties

Section 3034 of title 10, United States Code, states that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army has such authority and duties with respect to the Department of the Army as the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, may delegate to or prescribe for him.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and powers do you expect to be assigned?

ANSWER:

Oversee day to day operations of the Army involving a wide variety of activities from serving as a principal advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army on recommendations and plans of the Army Staff, to ensuring the care of Soldiers and their Families and ensuring

the Army continues to be sensitive to their needs. Maintain our relevance to future contingencies and ensure we incorporate lessons learned throughout the institution. Establish priorities to meet demands and synchronize and focus the Army Staff to ensure strategic relevance.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

ANSWER:

During my nearly 32 years of commissioned service, I have served the Army and the nation from the tactical thru the strategic level. I have been assigned in tactical and operational units for 22 years and have commanded Soldiers from company to Corps level while participating in numerous training and operational deployments. I have served in a variety of command and staff positions to include joint and multinational staffs, where I gained experience in strategic and combined operations, including a tour as a Military Advisor for Arms Control in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, a tour of duty as the Director of Force Management in the Headquarters, Department of the Army. I also served as the Chief of Staff of V Corps during Bosnia operations and served as Deputy Commander Task Force Hawk in Albania during the Kosovo Conflict. I also commanded the 4th Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, then served as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which entailed being an advisor to the Secretary of State, and most recently as Commander of III Corps/Multinational Corps Iraq for the last 23 months. My professional military education, deployment experience, and assignment history have provided me broad knowledge, experience, and insight into the business of running the Army in support of the requirements of the national security strategy. In particular, my tours of duty in Iraq have provided me with unique insights into the leadership, training, manning and equipping requirements that will make our Army successful on the battlefields of today and tomorrow.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?

ANSWER:

If confirmed for this position, I intend to:

- Stay connected to the field commands
- Stay attuned to the ever changing needs of our Soldiers and their Families,
- Ensure we incorporate the lessons learned over the last five years,
- Maintain focus on the warrior ethos,
- Demand high moral and ethical behavior.
- Be aggressive – tackle challenges as they arise.

Relationships

If confirmed, what would your working relationship be with:

The Secretary of the Army

ANSWER:

If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary of the Army in his duties to communicate the Army Staff's plans to the Secretary of the Army and to supervise the implementation of the Secretary and Chief's decisions through the Army Staff and Army commands and agencies. In this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of the Army. In my capacity as a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, I would also be responsible for appropriately informing the Secretary of the Army about conclusions reached by the JROC about significant requirements. I anticipate that I would at all times work closely and in concert with the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the Army in light of national interests.

The Chief of Staff of the Army

ANSWER:

The Chief of Staff performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Chief of Staff of the Army presides over the Army Staff, transmit the plans and recommendations of the Army Staff to the Secretary, advises the Secretary with regard to such plans and recommendations; and acts as the agent of the Secretary in executing them. The Chief of Staff shall also perform the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I enjoy a close working relationship with the Chief of Staff of the Army and if confirmed, I will assist him as required in the execution of his duties.

The Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

ANSWER:

If confirmed, it would be my duty, as a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), to review and validate all Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System documents for Acquisition Category I and IA programs, and other high-interest programs. I look forward to a collaborative and frank relationship with the other service vice chiefs in this role, and on all actions of national interest.

The Under Secretary of the Army

ANSWER:

The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. His responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of the Army, and to the Under Secretary through the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary of the Army to ensure that the policies established by the Office of the Secretary of the Army are properly implemented. I will communicate openly and directly with the Under Secretary of the Army in articulating the views of the Army Staff, Army commands, and Army agencies.

The Assistant Secretaries of the Army

ANSWER:

The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army.

The General Counsel of the Army

ANSWER:

The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and other Secretariat officials. His duties include coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Army regarding matters of interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the Army on any legal questions or procedures. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the General Counsel.

The Judge Advocate General of the Army

ANSWER:

The Judge Advocate General is the legal advisor of the Chief of Staff of the Army, member of the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General serves as military legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also directs the members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of their duties and, by law, is

primarily responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the administration of military discipline. Therefore, I will establish and maintain a professional and inclusive relationship with The Judge Advocate General and always welcome his expression of independent views about any legal matter under consideration.

Major Challenges

In your view, what are the major challenges that will face the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?

We must maintain a balance between our ability to meet our requirements and the resources available. Soldiers and units in the Active and Reserve components have been hard at work serving the Nation in the War on Terror. Despite our Army's remarkable performance, this has had an undeniable effect on equipment, training, and overall preparedness – not to mention the impact on families and the men and women of the All-Volunteer Force themselves. Maintaining a high-quality force able to excel in the current campaigns is a tough, multi-faceted challenge made more formidable by the imperative to be ready for other contingencies or conflicts the Army may undertake in support of our national security. This tension between meeting the priorities of the present while preparing for the future – in light of existing and emerging threats along a broad spectrum of conflict; the extent to which we do one at the expense of the other; and managing the associated costs and risks are fundamental to the decisions the Nation's military and civilian leaders will shape and make.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

ANSWER:

If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army to restore balance through the Army's four imperatives. I will work to Sustain our Soldiers and their Families to insure that they have the quality of life they deserve and that we recruit and sustain a high quality force. To Prepare our Soldiers, units, and equipment we must maintain a high level of readiness for the current operational environments, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. To Reset our force we must prepare our Soldiers, units, and equipment for future deployments and other contingencies. Finally, to Transform our force, we must continuously improve our ability to meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders in a changing security environment. I intend to work closely with the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, and appropriate agencies in both Executive and Legislative branches to develop and execute these plans.

Army Budget Share

Last year's Army Posture Statement points out that the defense budget allocation by service has changed little over time with the Air Force and Navy around 30% and

the Army around 25%. Moreover, since the Army is manpower intensive, and personnel costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25% of the Army's budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, as compared to 38% in the Navy and 43% in the Air Force. And further, the Army's overall share of the DOD investment dollars is only 17% , as compared to 33% for the Navy and 35% for the Air Force. The result, according to the posture statement, is that "the Army has been unable to invest in the capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats."

What is your understanding of the effects of this funding discrepancy on the Army?

ANSWER:

The effect is the Army is out of balance as demand has out paced our ability to provide trained and ready Soldiers to the combatant commanders. Through supplemental funding for the Global War on Terror, we've been able to meet the immediate demands, but our Soldiers are stressed and our equipment has been used hard. We must restore the necessary breadth and depth of Army capabilities to support and sustain essential capacity for the future demands on our Expeditionary Force. The solution lies not just in the Army's share of the defense budget but, more importantly, in the size of the overall defense budget.

What is your understanding about what, if anything, the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Secretary of Defense intend to do to address this discrepancy?

ANSWER:

I saw first hand the results of the hard work and personal commitment of the Army and DoD leadership as well as the Congress to immediately address any shortfall. We received the equipment we needed along with trained, ready and capable Soldiers in Iraq. They've taken a step toward correcting this discrepancy by increasing the strength of the Army funded from the base budget in the FY 2009 President's Budget rather than relying on supplemental appropriations. I understand the Secretary of Defense is working with the Army to achieve readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources necessary to support the National Military Strategy.

Posture for the Future

Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems adequately posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of the next two or three decades?

ANSWER:

The Army's future threats are defined in the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems will help posture the Army to meet those threats. As we cannot predict threats with any certainty, we must build readiness and strategic depth that can respond to a broad range of possible situations. Our goal must be to build an Army versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military operations, across the major operational environments, in support of our National Security Strategy. The Army Initiatives are designed to give the Army required capabilities and adequate capacity providing maximum flexibility to respond to continual and asymmetrical threats over the next 30 years.

What other initiatives would you recommend the Army pursue in this regard if confirmed as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?

ANSWER:

As our Nation's Army, we must always stay focused on our Soldiers and their Families. They are the centerpiece of our capacity to meet our future requirements.

Lessons Learned

What do you believe are the major lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), in particular concerning manning, training, and equipping the Army, which you intend to address if confirmed?

ANSWER:

First, the importance of environmental analysis which encompasses the entire geo-political, socio-economic, and global communications spectrums as they relate to the current conflict. Next, we must remember that it takes a network to defeat a network. Integration of conventional forces and special operations forces must continue to improve. We must also continue to integrate asymmetric warfare capabilities into our full spectrum operations. Finally, our leader training programs must emphasize the key tenets of adaptability, ingenuity, warrior ethos, and moral-ethical conduct.

Iraq and Afghanistan Deployments

Many soldiers are on their third or fourth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Last year, unit deployments were extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases is less than 12 months.

What is your assessment of the impact multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed?

ANSWER:

The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse impact on retention to date. Fiscal Year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average. The recently instituted Captains' retention program, which offers a number of incentives, to include attendance at graduate school or a retention bonus, has enhanced retention of officers at historic rates through Fiscal Year 2010.

The retention rates of initial term and mid-career Soldiers in deploying units has remained between 120-140% since Fiscal Year 2005. For example, nearly 600 troops reenlisted in Baghdad on Independence Day this past year. In addition, more than 100 Army Reserve Soldiers gathered at the Al Faw palace at Camp Victory, Iraq, on January 18, 2008, to reenlist during a ceremony marking the 100th Anniversary of the Army Reserve. Recently deployed units and units currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates averaging 110-120% of their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks, the fact that Soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that Soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation.

What are the key indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently?

ANSWER:

Our Soldiers and Families are strained and stretched, but they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes to address negative trends. As an example, rates of substantiated Spouse Abuse have declined steadily since Fiscal Year 2001 and Child Abuse since Fiscal Year 2004. In addition to programs like "Strong Bonds," the Army is committed to providing programs and services that support Soldiers and their Families. The overall health of the Force reflects a resilient Army, strained by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a solid foundation.

In addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and rates of indiscipline.

ANSWER:

Our Soldiers and Families are strained and stretched, but they are also remarkably resilient. The Army monitors key indicators of individual behaviors and aggressively pursues policy or program changes to address negative trends.

We see the following trends:

The suicide rates are trending upward. Applying a multi-disciplinary approach, we are continuously reviewing and adapting our awareness, intervention, and treatment resources in support of Soldiers and commanders.

Overall Officer divorce rates are declining. Enlisted divorce rates trended upward from Fiscal Years 2006 to 2007, but remain below or equal to rates since 2004. Divorce rates have increased among enlisted female Soldiers, and deployed Soldiers divorce at a higher rate than those who have not deployed. The Army offers a robust chaplain-sponsored "Strong Bonds" training program to help Soldiers and Families build and maintain stronger relationships.

Drug abuse rates overall show a slight increase, but rates in deployed areas are declining. The Army has continued its aggressive drug education, awareness, and testing programs.

Enrollments for alcohol abuse treatment are continuing in an upward trend. The Army provides comprehensive education packages directed at the reduction of alcohol abuse, to include post deployment training. Alcohol abuse rates are monitored continuously via the Army's Risk Reduction Program. We are also developing and implementing preventative intervention programs for Soldiers at the first sign of trouble. "Prevention of Alcohol Abuse" messages are incorporated in Army-wide prevention of substance abuse campaigns like "Warrior Pride."

Rates for Absence without Leave (AWOL) show an upward trend. Rates are monitored closely and commanders adjudicate each instance of AWOL based on the facts and circumstances of the Soldier's individual case.

In Fiscal Year 2007, the number of General and Special Courts-Martial increased, but rates remain below the highest post-Fiscal Year 2001 rates.

Substantiated rates of Spouse and Child Abuse have declined steadily since Fiscal Year 2001. In addition to programs like "Strong Bonds," the Army continues to focus resources on programs and services that support Soldiers and their Families.

The overall health of the Force reflects a resilient Army, strained by persistent conflict, but still maintaining a solid foundation.

For how long do you believe these levels of commitments, in particular the 15 month deployments for combat units, can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?

ANSWER:

Over the past few years we have seen definitive indications that the force is strained. Stress on Soldiers and Units resulting from increased time deployed and decreased time at home are visible in several different areas including training, readiness and

recruitment. However, we have a plan that will, with Congressional assistance, restore balance to our force. We have identified four imperatives that we must accomplish to place ourselves back into balance: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform.

We have and will continue to make significant progress in these areas to bring the Army back into balance. We assess that we will continue to recruit and retain enough Soldiers to meet our endstrength requirements. We also have received authorization to accelerate our growth plan to 2011, which will assist the Army in restoring balance to preserve our all volunteer force, restoring the necessary strategic depth and capacity for the future while sustaining a provision of forces to Combatant Commanders at pre-surge levels.

While the Army is continually working to reduce the deployment times of its Soldiers, it is capable of meeting the current level of global commitments as long as they remain at or below pre-surge levels for the foreseeable future. In doing so, we will continue to deploy only the best led, manned, equipped, and trained Soldiers into combat to meet the national strategy.

Post-Deployment Health Concerns

The health-related problems experienced after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the undertaking of extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces based on pre- and post-deployment health surveys.

If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that the Army uses available data - and generates additional data — on the health of returning soldiers to ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of deployment-related illnesses or potential illnesses are identified?

ANSWER:

If confirmed, I will work to ensure that Soldiers are referred to appropriate care when their survey responses indicate that additional evaluation and treatment are needed. This will require improving the process to track referrals and treatment plans.

The addition of the Post Deployment Health Reassessment and the new annual Periodic Health Assessment provides us with the ability to monitor the ongoing health, readiness, and wellness of our Soldiers after initial redeployment, and long before they start preparing for their next deployment.

The Army has recognized that building Soldier and Family resiliency is key to maintaining their health and welfare. We developed “Battlemind” training products to increase this resiliency and have several different training programs available for pre, during and post-deployment.

Last summer the Army initiated a leader chain teaching program to educate all Soldiers and leaders about post-traumatic stress and signs and symptoms of concussive brain

injury. This was intended to help us all recognize symptoms and encourage seeking treatment for these conditions. We are now institutionalizing this training within our Army education and training system to share the information with our new Soldiers and Leaders and to continue to emphasize that these signs and symptoms are normal reactions to stressful situations and it is absolutely acceptable to seek assistance to cope with these issues.

Mental Health Advisory Team V

The Army's mental health assessment studies in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in OIF and OEF.

Based on the findings of MHAT V that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple and lengthened deployments, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate kinds and amounts of mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?

ANSWER:

If confirmed, I fully support continuation of MHAT assessments in theater to ensure that the correct ratio and distribution of deployed behavioral health providers are maintained to meet the psychological needs of the deployed force. Last summer the Army Medical Command initiated action to hire 275 behavioral health providers to care for Soldiers and Families in the United States. To date, we have hired 162 providers who are already making a difference in our military communities. If confirmed, it is my plan to ensure the Army Medical Command has the resources and flexibility required to fill all of our behavioral health care requirements.

What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army's mental health advisory teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied to future deployments?

ANSWER:

MHAT findings have been used as the basis to reshape existing Combat and Operational Stress Control units to create more flexible and capable units. MHAT information has also been used to predict better the quantity of behavioral health assets required for current and future conflicts. Finally, MHAT information has been utilized to create a training program known as "Battlemind," which changes the way the Army prepares Soldiers, leaders, and Families for high stress deployments.

TRICARE Fee Increases for Military Retirees

In its FY09 budget request, the Department of Defense assumed \$1.2B in cost savings based on its proposal to implement increases in TRICARE costs for certain

beneficiaries, including higher enrollment fees for military retirees and their families.

If these fee increases are implemented, what do you see as the likely impact of these changes on the Department of the Army?

ANSWER:

The proposed plan would charge both higher enrollment fees and civilian visit co-payments for TRICARE Prime and initiate enrollment fees and higher deductibles for TRICARE Standard “working age” retirees under 65 and their Families. For these beneficiaries, some cost increases would be based on a three-tiered system of annual military retired pay. Last, the proposed budget would raise co-payments for all beneficiaries on prescriptions filled at retail pharmacies. While the budgetary impacts of these changes would be recognized in OSD accounts, reductions in expense for medical benefits for retirees would lessen pressure on the total Defense budget and begin to address benefit inequities between military retirees and other Federal retirees.

What is your personal view of the DOD justification provided for increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees and are there alternatives to such increases you would recommend if confirmed?

ANSWER:

We must maintain world class medical support for our retirees, but must be realistic in establishing costs and planning for the future.

Stop Loss Authority

How many soldiers do you expect to be on active duty, retained under stop loss authority at the end of Fiscal Year 2008?

ANSWER:

The Army expects to have 8,046 Active Component Soldiers retained under Stop Loss authority serving in the Army at the end of Fiscal Year 2008. The Stop Loss forecast for the Reserve Components for September 2008 is approximately 6,000.

What is the Army's plan for reducing stop loss as it increases its end strength through 2012?

ANSWER:

Department of Defense guidance directs the Services to discontinue Stop Loss policies as soon as operationally feasible. The plan to reduce, and eventually eliminate, Stop Loss will be based on a reduction in demand and a return to a cycle of “one year deployed with

two years at home.” The growth of Army end strength supports the growth of additional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), which supports a return to a cycle of “one year deployed with two years at home.”

Reserve Deployment and Mobilization

In recent years, reserve force management policies and systems have been characterized as "inefficient and rigid," and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve Component forces in meeting combat missions?

ANSWER:

To respond to Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders’ requests for forces and capabilities, the Army considers all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in developing sourcing solutions. Each component plays a critical role in meeting our operational requirements. Transformation continues from a strategic to an operational reserve. It is an operational, expeditionary and domestic force that is an essential piece of our Army. The Army will continue to select the best units, capable of meeting Joint Staff and Combatant Command requirements, with full confidence in each unit’s ability to carry out its assigned mission.

What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve force management policies?

ANSWER:

The Army has made considerable progress in “total force” management in the last few years. Our Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process will, as it matures, enable us to balance the demands of known operations across all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) and reduce the stress on the force. Our Secretary and our Chief of Staff continue the practice set by their predecessors of fully engaging Reserve Component leaders and staffs in programming, equipping and readiness decisions. Over the past few years, the Army has made considerable funding commitments to the Reserve Components for re-set and re-equipping actions, and our Chief’s initiatives and imperatives include the Total Army. Together, these efforts will set the stage for effectively transforming, manning, training, equipping, and sustaining America’s Army, while fully meeting our commitments at home and overseas.

Do you support assigning any combat, combat support, or combat service support missions exclusively to the Reserve?

ANSWER:

Both the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are organized and arrayed to perform missions across the full spectrum of combat, combat support, and combat service support operations. In today's operational environment, it is prudent to assign missions and capabilities across all components of the Army. There are opportunities to balance our force to meet current contingencies and to prepare for future operations, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff are fully engaged in such an effort with the aim of arraying capabilities across the Army so that operational demands are fully met.

What is the appropriate role for the Army Reserve and National Guard in homeland defense and homeland security missions?

ANSWER:

The National Guard forces respond to a natural disaster or provide assistance to civil authorities under control of the Governor in Title 32 status or under Federal control in a Title 10 status. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) supports the channel of communications between the State and Federal forces.

The Army Reserve plays a unique role since it commands a highly-skilled, flexible force that provides 50-100% of the entire Army's force structure for 21 specialized capabilities such as water supply, medical, transportation, signal, and chemical units.

When a domestic emergency occurs, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attack, the affected Governor(s) shall first employ their Air and or Army National Guard with state authority, as the State response forces, if required. In the event of a catastrophic event, the States will likely request federal military assistance. The Army will provide the majority of that assistance with capabilities allocated to Northern Command from Active, Guard, and Reserve components in a Title 10 status, both to support Homeland Defense, and provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities.

Individual Ready Reserve Recall Policy

A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on IRR members who may be recalled to serve.

What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?

ANSWER:

The Army has programmed for and has developed plans to optimize the operational and strategic value of the IRR by improving individual deployment readiness levels to ensure

timely availability; maintaining a reliable database of mobilization assets; and promoting continuum of service by managing expectations throughout a Soldier's career life-cycle. Human Resource Command (HRC) is accomplishing by implementing the following:

Select Soldiers attend Readiness and Personnel Accountability Musters at local Reserve Centers and execute personnel updates, medical readiness evaluations, and training briefings. Executing musters each year will ensure that individual expectations are being established, Soldiers are aware of their annual requirements and potential for mobilization, as well as educated on how to build upon a military career while assigned to the IRR. In Fiscal Year 2007 over 8.4 thousand IRR Soldiers were mustered and over 720 IRR Soldiers transferred to the Selected Reserves (SELRES). HRC is planning on mustering 10 thousand IRR Soldiers in Fiscal Year 2008 and anticipates similar number of transfers to the SELRES.

Educate and raise awareness at time of transition. Soldiers are counseled and provided information regarding their assignment to the IRR. The IRR Orientation Handbook has been developed and is provided to newly assigned IRR Soldiers in order to establish expectations, provide key information regarding their assignment and annual requirements, promotions, training opportunities, as well as continued service in the Selective Reserves.

What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization database?

ANSWER:

In the last 3 years the IRR has decreased in size by 33%. HRC has conducted a systematic screening of the IRR database to reconcile existing records (blank and erroneous data fields, obsolete military occupational skills, bad addresses); identify non-mobilization assets (passed over for promotion, security violation, physically disqualified, determined hardship, adverse character of service); and separated those Soldiers who no longer have further potential for useful military service if mobilized. Incorrect IRR addresses have been the single largest mobilization exclusion, but are at a 10-year low overall. Approximately 9% of those ineligible for mobilization are excluded for an incorrect address.

The DoD established a policy in July 2005 mandating the discharge of officers in the IRR who are beyond their Military Service Obligation (MSO) unless the officer specifically requests retention in the IRR. Officers who have fulfilled their MSO and have not taken action to elect to remain in the IRR shall be transferred to the Standby Reserve and discharged within 2 years of transfer. To date approximately 14,000 IRR Officers have been affected by this policy: 2.8K officers elected to transfer to the Standby Reserve and 2.9K have been honorably discharged.

HRC has developed the Individual Warrior Virtual Screening Portal (IW-VSP) for IRR Soldiers to update their contact information and verify their readiness level without having to report to a physical location. HRC screens all information submitted through

the website, reconciles deficiencies, and contacts Soldiers that require additional assistance.

What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All Volunteer Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the IRR should play in the future?

ANSWER:

Retaining required skills and maintaining the population in the IRR is important to managing our operational and strategic capability. The Army recognizes the value of keeping trained and motivated members in the service and we continue to offer opportunities for continued service. The IRR is an important and critical source of personnel resources to fill deploying units and individual requirements.

Officer Shortages

A report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in July 2006 concluded that the Army projected an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in FY 2007, with the most acute shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages will persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves.

What is your understanding of the reasons for the shortfall, and what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career officer shortfall?

ANSWER:

Our current officer shortages are not caused by increased attrition. Attrition rates are at or below the 10-year average rates. The officer shortfalls are due to the growth of officer requirements of 10,000 ACC officers from Fiscal Year 2004 to Fiscal Year 2012. Nearly 6,200 of these requirements are in the grades of Captain and Major. To address this shortfall, we have increased accessions and will have produced nearly 5,000 additional officers by Fiscal Year 2009.

The Army instituted a pre-commissioning retention incentives program that is projected to increase by nearly 30% our retention of high performing USMA and ROTC scholarship officers by offering them graduate school, branch choice, or assignment choice in exchange for additional active duty service. The Army has sought officers aggressively from outside the Active Army and has accessed nearly 1,500 officers from the inactive reserve and from the other services through the "Blue to Green Program."

The Army's biggest success has been the institution of an unprecedented Captains' retention program that offers a number of incentives, including attendance at graduate school or a retention bonus, to encourage our best and brightest officers to remain on active duty. This program has guaranteed the retention, already within a few hundred

officers of historic rates, of our valuable force of heavily combat-experienced officers through Fiscal Year 2010 and beyond.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate numbers of highly qualified captains and majors are serving on active duty over the next ten years?

ANSWER:

The Army has developed policies to retain our "best and brightest," combat-experienced officers and NCO's. We will not allow the Army to drift into a post-conflict setting or mindset. This will require refocusing the Army and a commitment to leveraging combat-experienced Soldiers in key and critical assignments, such as in the schools and battlelabs of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

The Army will continue to monitor and analyze officer attrition and develop additional measures to retain our highly performing officers. To aid our retention efforts we also must continue resourcing programs to support Families in an expeditionary Army during a period of persistent conflict.

Officer Retention Following Redeployment

After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in force which some believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the best and brightest junior officers from active duty who, after serving in very responsible positions at a relatively young age in combat, had difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan - small unit actions where junior officers are not only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where they have even greater authority to act on their own initiatives - may produce similar behavior and consequent difficulty in retaining highly trained and experienced junior officers.

Do you fear a similar syndrome once the current deployment cycle slows? If so, what do you believe should be done to preclude that from happening?

ANSWER:

It is something that we must constantly monitor. We have established several programs to retain our combat experienced NCO's and Officers and allow for their continued growth.

Medical Personnel Recruiting and Retention

The Army is facing significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both active and reserve components. Growing medical support requirements, caused by the stand-up of Brigade Combat Teams, growth Army endstrength, surge requirements in theater, and other factors may compound the already serious

challenges faced in recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel.

Do you think a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army is needed?

ANSWER:

Yes, I believe it is important to review medical support requirements on a regular, recurring basis; the Army already reviews medical support requirements as a part of its ongoing internal processes. For example, in Total Army Analysis (TAA), the Army validated over 3,000 new military medical requirements for the operational force. In the Institutional Army TAA, the Army identified over 2,500 new military medical requirements and over 2,400 new civilian medical requirements for the institutional Army. There are other reviews looking at important specific issues like military to civilian conversion, behavioral health, and traumatic brain injury, to name just a few.

Does the Army have sufficient mental health resources to handle the redeployment of large combat units?

ANSWER:

The Army is committed to ensuring all redeploying Soldiers receive the behavioral health care they need. We anticipate that repeated and extended deployments will lead to increased distress and anxiety, and a higher demand for behavioral health services, and are planning to respond to that demand. An extensive array of behavioral health services has long been available to address the strain on our Soldiers and Families who have experienced multiple deployments. However, especially at our larger power projection platforms, the mental health resources are strained. The TRICARE purchased care network is also variable in its ability to support the mental health needs of our Soldiers and their Families. Currently we are focused on the needs at Ft. Drum and Ft. Bragg, but all installations with large numbers of returning Soldiers will need resources.

We have a variety of initiatives in place to garner additional behavioral health resources. Most significantly, last year we identified a gap between behavioral health staffing and the increased needs of our patient population. As a result, we initiated an effort to hire 265 behavioral health providers to meet this gap in the U.S. The number of requirements has increased to about 330 providers, both in the U.S. and at our overseas locations. As of March 28, 2008, we have 162 new behavioral health contract providers working in our treatment facilities.

What plans does the Army have in place to ensure that a surge capability of mental health professionals is available to returning soldiers and their families?

ANSWER:

Through our Regional Medical Commands we shift our assets to fill needs. For example, the North Atlantic Regional Medical Command has been providing behavioral health staff from Walter Reed to support needs at Fort Drum and Fort Bragg. However, our behavioral health resources are strained across the Army, so we have only limited flexibility to shift resources. Our strategy is to enhance our behavioral health infrastructure throughout the system rather than providing surge teams, which can be inefficient and cumbersome. We also use tele-psychiatry to augment our outreach capacity. Walter Reed has long supported the Northeast with tele-psychiatry and recently has begun to support Ft. Hood. Madigan Army Medical Center is currently supporting Ft. Irwin and Alaska through tele-psychiatry. Finally, in coordination with the TRICARE Management Activity, we are encouraging civilian providers to join the TRICARE network.

What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill medical support requirements as its mission and endstrength grow?

ANSWER:

Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, we are optimistic that further policy and legislative changes will not be needed. We will monitor these important resources closely to ensure our goals are realized.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Department of the Army has implemented changes in policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of sexual assault.

What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Department of the Army in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?

ANSWER:

Sexual assault is a crime that has no place in our ranks. The role of senior Army leadership is to ensure an organizational climate where such behavior is not tolerated, and where victims feel free to report incidents without fear of reprisal. The Secretariat and Army Staff oversee and implement the Army's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program, which is now more than three years old. The Secretary, in fact, has taken a personal interest in this issue and has directed the expansion and implementation of new strategies to increase emphasis on sexual assault prevention measures. If confirmed, I will assist him in this vitally important effort.

As part of senior leader involvement, senior Army leaders review the Army Sexual Assault Report quarterly and submit statistical data to DoD on both a quarterly and an annual basis. Senior leaders also submit an annual Army report and program assessment to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with statutory requirements and Department of Defense policy. Finally, Senior Army leaders require their Inspector Generals periodically to assess the program for compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements.

Management and Development of the Senior Executive Service (SES)

The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of senior executives.

What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields?

ANSWER:

The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and direct approach to SES management. If confirmed, I intend to continue this initiative. The Army looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for military leaders in critically important areas, such as acquisition, financial management, science, engineering, and human resource management. As the Army has sent its flag officers into joint billets to support the war, it has replaced them with SES members. The Army is reallocating positions to ensure senior executives are aligned with evolving business strategy. My vision for the management and development of senior executives is a senior civilian workforce that possesses a broad background of experiences to prepare them to move between positions in order to meet the continually changing mission needs of the Army. I am committed to providing for the professional development and management of our civilian executives in ways consistent with what the Army has done for its General Officer Corps for many years. As the Army moves forward with its transformation, if confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps.

Army Family Action Plan

The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.

What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?

ANSWER:

The pace of operations has placed great stress on Army Families. Secretary Geren and General Casey have responded to that challenge by making the commitments set forth in the Army Family Covenant, a promise to provide Soldiers and Families a quality of life commensurate with their voluntary service and daily sacrifices. The Army Family Covenant is focused on five areas: Family programs and services; health care; Soldier and Family housing; excellent schools, youth services and child care; and expanded employment and education opportunities for Family members. I will also work to help further standardize the support being provided to Soldiers and Families and to obtain predictable funding to these important programs. One area of particular concern that has already been addressed is the fatigue and burnout of Family Readiness Group leaders and support staff as they support our Families in a time of persistent conflict. We are improving our ability to address Soldier-Family reintegration and reunion issues. The Family Readiness Support Assistant (FRSA) program supports Army spouses who volunteer as Family Readiness Group Leaders, unit Commanders, and Rear Detachment Commanders. The FRSA helps mitigate volunteer stress and ensures an effective interface between Families and support programs.

How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the planned growth of the Army?

ANSWER:

The Installation Management Command works extensively with garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and programming requirements. Our BRAC plans address the needs of Families as their numbers change on our installations. Our global rebasing plans include maintaining support to our Soldiers and Families throughout the process. At the installations that are expected to grow, we have programmed new child development centers, youth centers, and fitness facilities. Likewise, we have plans to support our Soldiers and Families in isolated locations. If confirmed, I will closely monitor these efforts to ensure that our Families' needs are met as the Army undergoes this dramatic era of growth, restationing, realignment, deployment.

If confirmed, how would you ensure support of reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness?

ANSWER:

The Army Integrated Family Support Network (AIFSN) will provide a comprehensive, multi-agency approach for community support and services to meet the needs of the Army's geographically dispersed population. This effort is crucial in supporting Army National Guard and Army Reserve Families. The baseline services are: information, referral, and follow-up services; child care services; youth services; school transition services; employer support to the guard and reserve services; wounded warrior program

services; survivor support services; transition assistance services; employment; home and family life management services; financial services; medical care services; and legal services. AIFSN provides additional manning for 249 Army National Guard Family Assistance Centers spread across the country. AIFSN will provide a network consisting of virtual programs, brick-and-mortar facilities, and access to public and private programs and services. AIFSN will ensure services and support are available throughout the full spectrum of the mobilization process. Additionally, the FY08 NDAA requires the Office of the Secretary of Defense to establish a reintegration program for the Army National Guard. This program, called the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, is a key aspect of AIFSN and provides programs and services that specifically address the needs of our Guardsmen and their Families. If confirmed I will work to ensure that these programs are implemented fully and assessed properly to insure we attain expected outcomes.

Morale, Welfare and Recreation

Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.

What are the challenges in sustaining Army MWR programs that you foresee, and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

ANSWER:

Army MWR programs contribute immensely to the quality of life of our military Families. Their continued vitality depends on consistent appropriated and non-appropriated funding to support all of our MWR activities. The Army increased funding for Family and MWR programs by \$739 million with supplemental funds in FY08 and is moving a significant amount of base funding to the care of Soldiers and Families. The Army's MWR funds are currently in sound financial condition. All MWR activities report a high degree of solvency through the use of best business practices and enterprise purchasing. This allows us to increase the value of our programs by eliminating inefficiencies, which would otherwise have to be passed on in the form of higher prices.

The road ahead is challenging. The Army is fighting a war while transforming to a more consolidated, expeditionary, and joint force. However, the needs of individual Service members and their Families must still be met, particularly as Soldiers return from combat. We are developing programs like Adventure Quest, which allows a means of adjusting from the adrenalin rush prevalent in the combat environment and redirecting that energy into recreational pursuits. The Army will continue to explore the most effective means of supporting MWR programs to ensure we are meeting the needs of Soldiers and Families and contributing positively to recruiting, retention, and readiness. We will also use the efficiencies in our MWR business activities as the basis for investment capital development to fund an \$85 million Capital Program annually for the next 10 years to build Travel Camps, Bowling Centers, Water Parks, Youth Centers,

Single Soldier Entertainment Centers, and other facilities for our highly deserving Soldiers and Families. We will begin privatizing our lodging programs this summer by transferring our lodging facilities on 11 U.S. installations to a highly successful national hotel operating company, which will invest \$450 million to upgrade and modernize these facilities. This will insure the quality of the lodging we provide our Soldiers and Families is equal to the quality available in the communities from which we recruit America's sons and daughters. We appreciate your support of these important programs, and will continue to consult with you as we implement these far-reaching and enduring changes.

Reserve and National Guard Service

Heavy demand on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve since the attacks of 9/11 have significantly changed the expectation of Reserve and Guard Soldiers about their participation in an operational Army reserve. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserve recently submitted its final report calling for formal recognition of this new and developing role for the reserve components and recommending changes in career patterns to facilitate development of the operational reserve.

In your view, how should the Army's reserve component forces best be managed to provide essential support for operational deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq?

ANSWER:

The Army endeavors to respond to Joint Staff and Combatant Commanders' requests for forces and capabilities by considering all three components (Active, Guard, and Reserve) in our sourcing solution. The Guard and the Reserve have combat arms units (e.g., Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Aviation) which are regarded as fully capable for combat service, and have demonstrated their abilities in a superb manner over the past few years. The same applies to the broad spectrum of Combat Support and Combat Service Support units and Soldiers in our Reserve Components. The Army will continue to select the best units capable of meeting Joint Staff and Combatant Command requirements, with full confidence in each unit's ability to carry out its assigned mission.

What is your understanding of the Army's plans to avoid excessive demands on personnel and units in low density, high demand specialties whose skills are found primarily in the reserve, such as civil affairs, military police, and logistics?

ANSWER:

The Army is meeting the demands of persistent conflict by taking initiatives in force structure growth and by rebalancing capabilities across all three components to minimize excessive demand on low density, high demand specialties. The Grow the Army Plan approved in FY 2007 increases the Army end strength by 74.2K, a growth of 65K in the Active Component (AC), 8.2K in the Army National Guard (ARNG), and 1K in the

United States Army Reserve (USAR). With associated redistribution of Reserve Component (RC) Generating Force structure to build Operating Force capabilities, the Plan will increase Army Operating Force capabilities by over 80K. Since FY 2003, the Army has undertaken rebalance initiatives to achieve the proper mix of capabilities across all three components, eliminate involuntary mobilization of the RC, eliminate manning shortfalls in the AC, eliminate over-structure in the RC and minimize high demand/low density shortfalls. By the close of FY 2007, the Army had completed rebalance of 53.6K structure spaces and will rebalance an additional 88.7K spaces by FY 2013, bringing the Army rebalance total, since FY2003, to 142.3K spaces. The combination of the Grow the Army Plan and on-going rebalance initiatives has addressed persistent shortfall capabilities increasing logistics by 24.7K; Military Police by 16.7K, Engineers by 11.4K, Military Intelligence by 9.1K, and adds 11.2K of structure to SOF (to include growth in PSYOP by 2.2K, Special Forces by 1.6K and Civil Affairs by .4K) . The combined impact of rebalance and growth will build strategic and operational depth across all three components to meet Combatant Commander requirements, mitigate high demand, low density persistent shortfalls, and enable strategy.

Recruiting and Retention

What is your assessment of the Army's ability to reach its recruiting goals for the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard in FY08 and FY09?

ANSWER:

Recruiting America's All-Volunteer force will continue to be a challenge because of the growing percentage of youth ineligible for military services (disqualified for medical, fitness, aptitude, etc.), the increased competition with private industry and other governmental agencies, and the decreasing propensity to serve the Nation through military service. Despite these challenges, we remain confident that all Army components will attain the accession targets necessary to sustain or grow endstrength.

What is your assessment of the impact multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq is having on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed?

ANSWER:

The pace of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has not had an adverse impact on retention to date. As mentioned above, Fiscal Year 2007 retention of officers was slightly better than the overall 10-year average.

The retention rates of initial term and mid-career Soldiers in deploying units has remained between 120-140% since Fiscal Year 2005. Recently deployed units or units currently deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq have reenlistment rates at 110-120% of their yearly goals. This is a significant indicator of the quality of leadership within our ranks,

the fact that Soldiers believe in what they are doing, and the fact that Soldiers value the tradition of service to the Nation.

The Administration has requested that Congress authorize an active-duty end strength of 532,400 for fiscal year 2009 and intends to grow the active-duty Army to 547,400 Soldiers over the next several years.

Has the Army increased its recruiting goal from fiscal year 2008?

ANSWER:

The Army has not increased its recruiting goals from Fiscal Year 2008. Based on current analysis, an increase in recruiting goals is not necessary to meet our planned growth in Army end-strength.

If not, how does the Army plan to grow the force an additional 7,000 soldiers with no increase in recruiting?

ANSWER:

In addition to recruiting, the Army uses retention and loss management tools as levers to manage end-strength. Throughout Fiscal Year 2007 and the first half of Fiscal Year 2008, the Army has focused on retaining more initial term Soldiers and has seen attrition drop to record lows. The combination of these tools has enabled the Army to grow strength without increasing recruiting goals.

When will the Army achieve an active endstrength of 547,400, and once it does, do you foresee requesting additional endstrength increases based on current and anticipated operational requirements?

ANSWER:

The Army will achieve a strength of 547,400 by 30 Sep 2010. While we grow the Army, we will continue to work the transformation, move Soldiers into high demand specialties, and examine how effectively we can operationalize the Guard and Reserve. Then we will make a decision regarding whether the Army can meet the needs of the future.

According to Army data, retention of U.S. Military Academy graduates is lower than historical norms. The West Point class of 2000, for example, saw 34.2% leave the service as soon as they were able, and according to press accounts, 54% of that class had left active service by the 5 year point. The Class of 2001 saw 35.3% of its graduates leave active service as soon as they reached their 5 year point, and within the next year, a total of 46% of that class had left the service.

How can the Army reverse this trend?

ANSWER:

The West Point Class of 2000 saw 35.5% leave the service by the 5 year point. The Class of 2001 saw 38.3% leave by the 5 year point. A year later (the 6 year point) 48.9% of Class of 2000 and 49.5% of Class of 2001 had separated. These trends are not statistically different than previous Classes 1991-1999. In fact, there is not currently a statistically significant difference in the Army Competitive Category (ACC) Company Grade loss rates for any source of commission. The losses through the first five months of Fiscal Year 2008 are lower than previous years except for 2003, where losses were lower than normal due to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In fact, the success of recent captain and pre-commissioning retention incentives has already guaranteed the retention above historic rates of our valuable force of heavily combat-experienced junior officers through Fiscal Year 2010 and beyond.

What resources, if any, does the Army need to better manage the early- and mid-career officer population?

ANSWER:

The Army has been given the authority through September 2009 to conduct an unprecedented Captains' retention program that offers a number of incentives, including attendance at graduate school or a retention bonus, to encourage our best and brightest officers to remain on active duty. Though it may be too early to directly tie the program to recent retention trends, the Army has recently experienced increased retention among our Captains over past years, with loss rates over the first 5 months of Fiscal Year 2008 lower than all but 1 of the previous 9 years for the same time period. Analysis of our initial phase of execution of the retention program compared to recent Defense Military Data Center surveys indicates that our incentive program has made a significant impact on the retention behavior of our captains. Prior surveys indicated that 52% of captains polled intended to separate or were undecided about continuing in a military career. Of those officers, 54% took a menu incentive and will now retain to Fiscal Year 2011. The Army will continue to monitor and analyze officer attrition and develop additional measures to retain our highly performing officers.

Army data also shows a large increase over the past 4 years of new recruits lacking a high school diploma. In fiscal year 2003, 94% of all new recruits graduated from high school; in fiscal year 2007, that number dropped to 79%.

In your opinion, has the Army sacrificed quality for quantity?

ANSWER:

No, the Army has not lowered recruiting standards, but they have become more difficult to meet because of declining high school graduation rates and the toughest recruiting

environment in the 34+ year history of the all-volunteer force. We remain focused on attaining Department of Defense Quality Benchmarks as our recruiting standards. Without exception, Soldiers who enlist into the Army are qualified for their skill/job.

How does the Army intend to reverse this trend?

ANSWER:

The Army has and will continue to implement measures to reduce this challenge through programs and policies that increase the potential market. The Army is also utilizing enlistment bonuses and other incentives, such as the Army College Fund, Loan Repayment, and Army Advantage Fund to attract quality recruits. However, the Army will only enlist Soldiers who are qualified and volunteer to serve this Nation.

How many Category IV soldiers did the Army recruit for the active-duty force and Army Reserve in FY 2007, and what percentage of the total number of 2008 recruits is made up of Category IV soldiers?

ANSWER:

In Fiscal Year 2007 the Active Component accessed 2,738 (3.97%) Category IV Soldiers. The Army Reserve accessed 782 (3.94%) Category IV Soldiers. Year to date Fiscal Year 2008 (thru Feb 08) the Active Component has accessed 1,953 Category IV Soldiers (5.5%) and the Army Reserve has accessed 431 Category IV Soldiers (4.61%). Quality Marks are measured on an annual basis. The number of Category IV recruits is closely monitored throughout the year. As Non-Prior Service volume increases, the Category IV percent will decrease. The Active Army and the Army Reserve will be within the Category IV benchmark of 4% by the end of Fiscal Year 2008.

According to the Army Times, a new Army assessment has concluded that recruits who receive moral, medical, or other waivers are less likely to drop out of basic training, have lower rates of personality disorder, and re-enlist in higher numbers than other recruits. The assessment also noted, however, that recruits who receive waivers are more likely to desert, experience more drug and alcohol issues, and have higher rates of misconduct, including an increased likelihood of receiving a bad conduct discharge.

Please describe the Army's current use of waivers, and how these rates compare historically.

ANSWER:

The Army utilizes the recruit waiver process to extend the opportunity to serve the Nation to applicants who fall outside the medical, conduct, drug/alcohol, or administrative screening parameters established for Army recruits. Army leaders and physicians review the files of disqualified applicants to determine if an applicant's previous medical,

conduct, or drug/alcohol history will adversely affect his/her likelihood of serving successfully as a Soldier. This comprehensive process allows the Army (and the other military services) to expand the pool of applicants willing to answer the Nation's call to service. The percentage of recruits enlisting with waivers has increased over the past several years. Year to date Fiscal Year 2008 (thru Feb 08) overall percentage of personnel who enlisted with a waiver for the Regular Army (RA) and Army Reserve (AR) combined is 19.8%. In Fiscal Year 2007, the overall percentage of personnel who enlisted with a waiver for the Regular Army (RA) and Army Reserve (AR) combined is 18.8%, In Fiscal Year 2005 and Fiscal Year 2004, the overall percentage of personnel who enlisted with a waiver for the Regular Army (RA) and Army Reserve (AR) combined was 13.7% and 11.2% respectively. The Army will only enlist Soldiers who are qualified and volunteer to serve this Nation.

What changes, if any, have been made in tracking and documenting the performance and impact, positive or negative, of recruiting more individuals requiring waivers for enlistment?

ANSWER:

The Army--through the Center for Accessions Research, the RAND Corporation and the Army G-1--is conducting on-going longitudinal analyses of recent Fiscal Year Recruiting Cohorts to determine any significant trends and differences of those Soldiers accessed with a waiver (i.e., medical, conduct, etc.) and those Soldiers accessed not requiring a waiver. To date, results indicate Soldiers with waivers perform comparable or better in most areas observed (e.g., promotions, awards, reenlistment). These studies, the comments of leaders in the field, and the overall performance of young Soldiers during this protracted conflict indicate that the Army waiver process is functioning properly in its role of screening in willing applicants to join America's All-Volunteer Force.

Have the increased use of waivers for criminal offenses had any impact to date on the good order and discipline in the units to which these soldiers have been assigned?

ANSWER:

The number of recruits requiring enlistment waivers has increased over the last few years, in an era of persistent conflict and growth of the Army. However, Commanders consistently tell us how proud they are of the young volunteer, combat proven Soldiers who are serving under them. Army mechanisms for screening these individuals are designed to mitigate risk and have proven very effective in the past and today. A recent study comparing trends of waived Soldiers and non-waived Soldiers who entered the Army from Fiscal Year 2003 through Fiscal Year 2006 indicates that they perform comparably in most areas. At this time there is no indication to suggest that waived Soldiers are a detriment to the force. We will continue to conduct studies and analyze the trends.

Support for Army Families in the Rebasing Initiative

Plans for the relocation of numerous Army units under the Department's rebasing initiative will present significant challenges to CONUS installations and their surrounding local communities in order to ensure adequate resources, including housing and schools, are made available.

What is your understanding of the steps being taken by the Army to ensure the successful implementation of rebasing for both soldiers and receiving communities?

ANSWER:

The Army is partnering with local communities to deal with increased community needs, such as schools, housing, and community activities, associated with Army stationing and growth. Garrison commanders and staff regularly engage with community leaders and have school liaison officers who facilitate communication with local education agencies to help communities deal with stationing and growth. Although Impact Aid is a Department of Education responsibility, the Army provides quarterly updates to the Department of Education on projected school-age dependent growth.

The Army will rely on local communities as its primary supplier of family housing and will privatize or build family housing at U.S. locations only where necessary. To support Army Growth, Congress approved \$266M in FY08 for government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Bragg, Carson, and Lewis. Additionally, the Army is requesting \$334M in FY09 for government equity contributions for additional housing at Forts Bliss, Carson, and Stewart. We will program additional funds in FY10 after updated Housing Market Analyses are completed at other gaining installations.

What actions will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the challenges associated with rebasing are met?

ANSWER:

The Army has an aggressive, carefully synchronized stationing plan that links Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005, Global Defense Posture Realignment, Army Modular Force Transformation, and Grow the Force. The Army's BRAC plan supports these major stationing initiatives, while supporting ongoing missions and national security priorities, and is designed to meet the September 2011 statutory BRAC implementation deadline.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 contained a significant decrease in BRAC funding, of which \$560 million was reduced from the Army's BRAC budget. I cannot overstate the difficulties that cuts or delays in BRAC funding pose to the Army as we implement BRAC and restationing plans. If the \$560 million decrement

is not restored, the Army will find it very difficult to comply with all aspects of the BRAC Law.

If confirmed, I will ensure Army stationing requirements are fully vetted and work with the Congress to garner the resources to implement our BRAC and stationing requirements in a timely and efficient manner.

Support for Wounded Soldiers

Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Army for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of Army programs now in place to care for the wounded, including the Wounded Warrior Program, and programs for soldiers in Warrior Transition Units?

ANSWER:

The Army has made and continues to make significant improvements in the areas of infrastructure, leadership, and processes as part of our Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Over the past twelve months, execution of the AMAP has seen the creation of thirty-five Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) at installations across the Army. These WTUs are staffed by 2,655 personnel who provide care and support to over 9,339 Soldiers and their Families. Although I believe these programs are a significant improvement over past practices, we need to continue tracking and monitoring the programs through a variety of internal and external feedback mechanisms. If confirmed, I will continue this transformational effort to care for and support our wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers and their Families.

How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service?

ANSWER:

The Army has a number of programs to assist wounded personnel who have separated from active service. In close coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Army has added 16 Veterans Affairs advisors at major medical treatment facilities to facilitate the process of applying for benefits and finalizing arrangements for follow-on care and services, all with the view to ensuring that everything is in place when Soldiers transition to civilian status.

The Army recently created the Wounded Warrior Education Initiative, which will allow participants to complete an advanced degree and then return to the Army to work in assignments in the Institutional Army where their education and personal experiences can

be put to the best use. In addition, the Army is currently piloting the Warrior Transition Employment Reintegration and Training Program at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This program enables Wounded Warriors, working with the staff of the Soldier Family Assistance Centers—which support Warrior Transition Units and are operated by the Army Installation Management Command—to receive education and training in the development of a resume, networking, and job seeking skills. Through this program, Warriors in Transition are assisted by counselors from the Army Wounded Warrior Program, Veterans Affairs advisors, and the staff of the Army Career and Alumni Program to develop a winning approach to obtaining employment when they leave the Army.

I also want to highlight the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program, or AW2, which assists and advocates for severely wounded, ill, or injured Soldiers and their Families throughout their lifetimes, wherever they are located. AW2 currently serves more than 2,300 Soldiers, 600 on active duty and 1,700 veterans. AW2 Program caseworkers work with Soldiers and their Families to address and mitigate proactively any issues they may encounter in their recovery. If confirmed, it will be my honor to do all I can to ensure that those who have given so much for their country know that the Army will always be there for them.

How is the Army seeking to measure and ensure the effectiveness of these programs?

ANSWER:

Tracking performance is critical to managing, adjusting, and resourcing WTU operations. The Army is using Unit Status Reports and other measures to track short, near, and long-term objectives. These measures show specific details, to include day-to-day operations, but also provide aggregate trending information to ensure the organization is on the correct path to success. If confirmed, I would continue to use this dashboard approach to monitoring performance on all standards.

If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for wounded soldiers, and to monitor their progress in returning to civilian life?

ANSWER:

I think we have some terrific programs in place to support our wounded, ill, and injured Soldiers, including some recent pilot programs. If confirmed, I intend to monitor the success of these pilot programs to assess their potential for expansion. I would like to continue to partner with academic institutions, industry, and Congress to find innovative ways to return all of our Warriors to productive civilian lives as proud veterans.

Joint Acquisition Programs

What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs, such as the Joint Tactical Radio System?

ANSWER:

There are great efficiencies to be gained by joint programs as opposed to individual Service procurements. Joint programs have the advantages of economies of scale, reduction in Service spares inventories, and Service sharing of training costs. However, the critical start-point for a joint program is a "joint" requirement. Without a solid joint requirement, it is doubtful that a joint acquisition program will be cost effective.

Do you see utility in encouraging the services to conduct more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and unmanned systems?

ANSWER:

Yes, a joint development approach has utility in this area. Key national strategic guidance and well defined joint capability voids provide incentives for the Services to collaborate to define and produce weapon systems that best meet our national security needs. At the same time, it is very important for the Services to maintain separate resourcing and the ability to manage to Service priorities within a jointly-enabled construct without adversely constraining or increasing program costs.

If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend to implement more joint program acquisition?

ANSWER:

The DoD has an established process for the development and approval of joint capability documents. This process includes oversight at the Joint Service level through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As these capabilities are evaluated, a joint service designation is assigned. In response to these capabilities documents, DODI 5000.2 stipulates that joint service programs must be approved, and any changes therein must be approved, by the USD(AT&L). Further, as the Services and DoD prepare their budget submissions, resourcing decisions can be made by the Service or OSD. Lastly, with the creation of Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) at the OSD level, a CPM can recommend a host of possible decisions to the OSD leadership.

Requirements and Planning Processes

As rising personnel and operation and maintenance costs expend an increasing portion of the Army's budget authority, and as competing demands for federal

dollars increase in the future years, it is likely that the Army will have to address the challenges of reset, modernization, and transformation with fewer and fewer resources.

What changes, if any, would you recommend to the way the Army prioritizes resources to maintain the momentum of Army transformation?

ANSWER:

Army personnel and operations and maintenance costs are accounting for a larger proportion of our base budget and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. This growth naturally increases the tension between these costs and our investments, which we use to transform the Army. Since 2002, the strategic environment has changed dramatically, requiring our nation's Army to reorganize, grow, re-station, and transform while fighting the War on Terrorism. These demands have caused the Army to become more dependent on supplementals. While increases in our base budget provide for growth of the Army, they have not kept pace with operational demands that the Army must respond to and request support for, largely through requests for supplemental appropriations.

I believe the Army has, and will continue to implement, a sound resourcing scheme that produces a force that meets the needs of the nation. However, without a reduction in expected missions or increased resources to match increased missions, the Army will eventually lose the ability to modernize and sustain current capabilities. We have experienced this situation in the past. During the 1990's, Army investment was reduced sharply, which created significant equipment shortages in our forces that we have been scrambling to correct with new procurement, just-in-time fieldings and retention of theater-provided equipment. Another approach to sustaining transformation would be to concentrate our modernization efforts on a reduced force structure, but that would be inconsistent with current demand. Using the lessons from today's fight, we are transforming to a future force with even more robust protection capabilities. The Army is committed to providing the best protection to our Soldiers today and in the future.

Base Closures and Realignments

The military services are in the process of developing business plans for the implementation of the 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) decisions.

What do you see as the responsibilities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?

ANSWER:

The Army is responsible for executing both the Army's BRAC recommendations and a portion of the joint cross service group recommendations, as assigned by the Under

Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics). The Army has developed business plans and budget justification materials, and is executing the program in accordance with those plans and the BRAC appropriations.

What do you see as the priorities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?

ANSWER:

The Army's priority is to complete the construction projects required to enable unit and organizational moves from closing and realigning installations to meet the timeframe directed by the law. The bulk of construction funds (\$13B) will be used in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. This is a carefully integrated plan. If the Army program is not fully funded in a timely manner each year, we will be significantly challenged to execute BRAC as intended.

The DOD installation closure process resulting from BRAC decisions has historically included close cooperation with the affected local community in order to allow these communities an active role in the reuse of property. In rare cases, the goals of the local community may not be compatible with proposals considered by the Department of Defense. For example, the recent closure of the Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, D.C., will present opportunities for both the local community and the federal government to re-use the land based on potentially competing plans.

If confirmed, what goals and policies would you propose to assist affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process?

ANSWER:

If confirmed, and with the guidance of the Secretary, I will work closely with the Office of Economic Adjustment, Local Redevelopment Authorities, the Governors, and other appropriate State and Local officials to accelerate the property disposal process whenever possible. The Army has completed the Federal screening and has made the determination of surplus for all of the closure installations except for the Chemical Demilitarization facilities. The Local Redevelopment Authorities are submitting their redevelopment plans, and they will be integrated into the Army property disposal process.

What lessons did the Army learn during the BRAC process that you would recommend be included in future BRAC legislation?

ANSWER:

I believe the Army is generally satisfied with the current BRAC authorities, and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with the Congress to execute BRAC 2005.

Technology Transition

The Department's efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain in institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.

What challenges to transition do you see within the Army?

ANSWER:

The Army carefully coordinates between acquisition programs of record and the laboratories and Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDECs) which are developing and evaluating technology options for these programs. The Army's key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. However, because of the demands of the ongoing Global War on Terror, the Army has not been able to fund some acquisition programs to receive the technology that has been matured.

The Army also fields technologies rapidly through the Rapid Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. Technologies transitioned to the field via these programs typically have not been through a formal acquisition development, and the Army must deal with the challenges of ensuring that this equipment is safe, effective, and logistically supportable in the operational environment. Further, even for those technologies that have been effective in the theatres of operation, the Army has procedures to assess the military utility of those technologies for full spectrum Army-wide applications.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies are rapidly transitioned from the laboratory into the hands of the warfighter?

ANSWER:

The Army laboratories and RDECs work closely with industry, academia, and the other Services and Defense Agencies to explore technology options for the Soldier. As discussed above, the Army's key advanced technology demonstration efforts are required to have a technology transition agreement with the receiving acquisition program. These agreements document what products the Science and Technology (S&T) program will deliver, at what time, and with what level of performance and maturity, as well as the transition path forward for that technology. The Army will continue to focus on obtaining validated needs and continue to synchronize work between S&T and program evaluation offices and program managers.

We must guard against pressures for technology solutions from the non-technical community that reads the popular press and thinks that they are "discovering" technology

opportunities. This may lead to unrealistic expectations about technology capabilities and the temptation to redirect disciplined technology development and technology maturity assessments towards work of less technical merit which is typically unable to withstand rigorous evaluation.

What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?

ANSWER:

The Army is rapidly fielding the best new equipment to the current force through several initiatives, including the Rapid Equipping Force and the Rapid Fielding Initiative. The Army's number one priority is force protection of our Soldiers with individual weapons and protective equipment. I would plan to upgrade and modernize existing systems to ensure all Soldiers have the equipment they need. I would incorporate new technologies derived from the Army Science and Technology program, and from Future Combat Systems (FCS) development. I would field the FCS Brigade Combat Teams. FCS is the core of the Army's modernization effort and will provide our Soldiers an unparalleled understanding of their operational environment, increased precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability. My objective will be to have our Soldiers equipped with world-class weapon systems and equipment, keeping the Army the most dominant land power in the world with full-spectrum capabilities.

Army Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories

Among the roles the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories are supposed to play is the development of innovative systems and technologies, supporting their transition to the warfighter, and supporting the Army in making technically sound acquisition decisions.

In your opinion, are the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories sufficiently resourced in funding, personnel and equipment to perform these missions?

ANSWER:

Despite the demands of the ongoing global war on terrorism the Army has been able to maintain its Science and Technology (S&T) investment at over \$1.7 billion for each of the past three budget requests and has actually increased its proposed fiscal year 2009 S&T investment to \$1.8 billion. We believe this level of investment is sufficient to support our S&T personnel, projects, and equipment consistent with our broad resource demands.

In your view, do the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate personnel systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their needed highly qualified technical workforce?

ANSWER:

Under congressionally authorized laboratory demonstration program authorities, the Army has the appropriate personnel systems and authorities to support the recruiting and retaining of their highly qualified technical workforce. The laboratories and centers have already taken significant advantage of the authorities provided by Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and development programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army.

Do the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories have the appropriate flexibility for technology transfer and authority to support in-house laboratory research in order to help them best support their missions?

ANSWER:

Yes the Army has sufficient authority for the technology transfer and authority to support in-house laboratory research.

What in your view are the biggest deficiencies in the performance of the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories?

ANSWER:

The biggest deficiency in the performance of the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories is their inability to effectively modernize their laboratory infrastructure.

If confirmed, what would you plan to do to address those deficiencies?

ANSWER:

To the maximum extent possible, the Army's Research, Development and Engineering Centers and Laboratories will utilize the flexibility provided in 10 United States Code, section 2805, to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure. We are also seeking to reauthorize the Laboratory Revitalization Demonstration Program and increase the associated minor construction limit to \$2.5 million, with a \$3 million limit for unspecified minor construction. The renewal will provide laboratory/center directors the ability to recapitalize critical mission infrastructure and reduce reliance on Military Construction to meet critical mission needs and corrects construction approval limits to account for major increase in the cost of laboratory construction over more common forms of construction.

Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations

The Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations concluded that "the Army sent a skeleton contracting force into theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support our warfighters." According to the Commission, "Contracting, from requirements definition to contract management, is not an Army Core Competence. The Army has excellent, dedicated people; but they are understaffed, overworked, under-trained, under-supported and, most important, under-valued."

Do you agree with the conclusions reached by the Commission?

ANSWER:

The Army greatly appreciates the work of the Commission and is in full agreement with the Commission's general recommendations for improvement. Many of the Commission's recommendations are consistent with the issues identified by the Army Contracting Study completed in 2005 and the Army Contracting Task Force, which was Co-Chaired by Ms. Kathryn Condon and LTG Ross Thompson. The Army is currently addressing structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified in the reports with a view to improving both current and future expeditionary contracting operations. The Army is conducting in-depth analysis of all areas. Significant action has already been taken against most of the 22 findings of the Gansler Commission recommendations specific to the Army. The Army is aggressively addressing the structural weaknesses and shortcomings identified to improve current and future Army contracting activities. Our actions stretch across the Army and include an ongoing, comprehensive review of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities

If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in addressing these concerns?

ANSWER:

Secretary of the Army Geren recently announced the establishment of the Army Contracting Campaign Plan, which is a focused commitment to implement changes across the Army to ensure that our doctrine, manning, training, and support structure for contracting are comprehensive, consistent and fully implemented. Mr. Geren directed Hon. Ford to implement specific recommendations of both the Gansler Commission and the Army Contracting Task Force as expeditiously as possible. The Army is committed to finishing the development and then implementing an Army-wide contracting campaign plan to improve doctrine, organization, training, leadership, materiel, personnel, and facilities. Achieving this objective will require resources, time, and sustained leadership focus. The contracting campaign plan will continue the initiatives already underway in the Army. The VCSA is the conduit for ensuring the consistency in coordination necessary to implement and institutionalize changes across the Army as related to doctrine, manning, training and support structure changes.

The Commission report states that "The Army's difficulty in adjusting to the singular problems of Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan is in large part due to the fact that there are no Generals assigned to contracting responsibilities." The commission recommends that the Congress authorize "a core set of ten additional General Officers for contracting positions."

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?

ANSWER:

I support the Army's plans to continue to grow additional military contracting structure in the Active force and civilian contracting workforce in line with the Gansler Commission recommendations. Specifically, Secretary Geren directed the realignment of the U.S. Army Contracting Agency (ACA) to the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the establishment of the U.S. Army Contracting Command (ACC) (Provisional) under AMC. The ACC (Provisional) stand-up ceremony on March 13, 2008 is in keeping with the Gansler Commission's second recommendation – to restructure Army contracting organizations and restore responsibility to better facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary and U.S.-based operations. The ACC is a two-star level command with two one-star level subordinate commands – an Expeditionary Contracting Command and an Installation Contracting Command. The Army is seeking five additional general officer authorizations to lead these commands and to fill additional contracting leadership needs outside of AMC. This recommendation will restore Uniformed Contracting GO positions cut as part of Acquisition drawdowns in the 1990's.

In your view, is legislation required to implement this recommendation, or can the Army assign new General Officers to contracting functions without legislation?

ANSWER:

There is flexibility to assign General Officers to contracting functions within the Army's current General Officer allocations. Given the current optempo and the stress on Army leadership, both military and civilian, the Army's current allotment of General Officers cannot support the new contracting requirements. Therefore, the Army is working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to obtain authority for five additional Army General Officer billets for contracting.

The Commission report states that "The number and expertise of the military contracting professionals must be significantly increased" to address the problems we have experienced in theater. The Commission recommends that the Army hire 2,000 new contracting personnel.

Do you support the recommendation of the Commission?

ANSWER:

The acquisition workforce has declined significantly in the last decade (25% Cut Mandated by Congress in DOD Authorization Act for FY96) while the number of dollars we are executing in the Army has increased more than 4-fold (\$23.3B-1992 vs. \$100.6B-2006). The Army has never fought an extended conflict that required such reliance on contractor support. We are currently addressing the need to expand, train, structure, and empower our contracting personnel to support the full range of military operations. To date, the Army has identified the need to increase Army contracting and support personnel by 906 military positions and 1,327 civilian positions. These numbers are organizational assessments and may go up or down as our Army Contracting Campaign Planning analysis continues.

What is your understanding of the steps being taken to implement this recommendation?

ANSWER:

Contingency Contracting force structure increases were being incorporated in the Army's modular force design even prior to the establishment of the Army Contracting Task Force. While the Army did not have the force structure necessary to support expeditionary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have now established a contingency contracting structure that consists of Contracting Support Brigades (commanded by a Colonel), Contingency Contracting Battalions, and Contingency Contracting Teams. Recommended increases of 906 Military and 1,327 Civilians are now under review as part of Army Contracting Campaign Plan process to fill the new Army contracting structure.

The Commission report states that most civilians working on contracting issues in Iraq were "volunteers, often with inadequate or wrong skill sets for the job at hand, and often getting their required contracting experience on-the-job as part of their deployment." The Commission recommends that qualified civilians who agree to deploy be provided enhanced career and job incentives. These include the elimination of an existing pay cap, tax free status, and long-term medical care for injuries incurred in-theater.

Do you support the recommendations of the Commission?

ANSWER:

The Army agrees with the Commission that civilians who agree to deploy deserve the benefits and professional opportunities commensurate with their skills, hardships and contributions. We are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to examine the entitlements, compensation, and benefits currently afforded to deployed civilian employees. As we identify areas in need of improvement or enhancement, we will work

with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Administration to seek legislative changes.

What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or plans to take, to implement these recommendations?

ANSWER:

The Army has conducted a review of the pay and benefits that are afforded to deployed civilians. We have also partnered with a team led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Several legislative and regulatory reforms have been identified to improve the benefits for deployed civilians and we have initiated the staffing process in these areas. To enhance incentives for civilian contracting personnel to “pre-volunteer” for expeditionary operations, OSD has taken the lead to request a legislative change to waive the annual limitation on premium pay and the aggregate limitation on pay for Federal civilian employees. In addition, OSD is working with the U.S. Department of Labor to ensure there are no conflicts with Workers’ Compensation Laws. The Office of Management and Budget disapproved a proposal to provide combat zone tax benefits for civilian employees; OSD is considering an appeal of this decision.

The Commission report states that some DOD and Army policies actively discourage the deployment of civilians. For example, the report states that volunteers are required to be sent on ‘detail’ so that the providing office has to pay salary and expenses of deploying civilians out of their existing budgets without any reimbursement or backfilling. As a result, the Commission reports, managers in the U.S. have actively discouraged civilians from volunteering.

Do you agree with the Commission's findings on this issue?

ANSWER:

The Army does not have evidence suggesting that employees have been discouraged from deploying. In some instances, however, organizations have been required to continue paying salary and other expenses of deployed employees. With the current tight budget situation, commands are often unable to backfill a deployed civilian. We are working with OSD to clarify the policy in this area to reduce the organizational disruptions caused by deployment of civilian personnel. The Army Contracting Campaign Plan Task Force is also studying options to assist CONUS organizations that lose deployed civilian volunteers, by activating Reserve Component Soldiers, enabling them to get much needed contracting experience prior to an overseas deployment.

What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?

ANSWER:

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) issued a memo on February 12, 2008, with the subject "Building Increased Civilian Deployment Capacity." In the memo and attached policy guidance, Dr. Chu reiterated the need to support the deployment of DoD civilians for contingency contracting operations. The Department of the Army fully supports the requirement to deploy civilians and lift the burden from losing organizations, and will continue to review recommendations for resolving the issue.

The report states that Contracting Officer's Representatives (CORs) are an "essential part of contract management", because they are responsible for ensuring contract performance. According to the report, however, "CORs are assigned as an 'extra duty,' requiring no experience The COR assignment is often used to send a young soldier to the other side of the base when a commander does not want to have to deal with the person. Additionally, little, if any training is provided Despite this, there are still too few CORs. Moreover, COR turnover is high, frequently leaving many gaps in contract coverage."

Do you agree with the Commission's assessment of the CORs assigned in Iraq and Afghanistan?

ANSWER:

Yes, a Contracting Officer Representative (COR) town hall in Kuwait led by ACTF leadership in October 2007 identified both individual COR training and execution shortcomings. CORs stated that they lacked the appropriate level of training and expertise to oversee complex theater contracts. While CORs are not contracting personnel, they are the "eyes and ears" of the contracting officer and the customer, and must be viewed with the appropriate level of authority across the Army. The customer in most cases is also a Commander. The COR is also the "eyes and ears" of the Commander. Today's commanders get much of their warfighting support from contractors. As we train and educate our leaders to understand the implications of predominantly contracted-support to operations vs. traditional military support they will fully understand and acknowledge the importance of the COR.

What is your understanding of the steps that the Army has taken, or plans to take, to address this problem?

ANSWER:

A standard, minimum training requirement has already been established for Army CORs. CORs must complete the Defense Acquisition University on-line continuous learning module, "*COR with a Mission Focus*," prior to appointment. As of November 1, 2007, over 4500 Army personnel have completed this course. Since October 1, 2007, 190 CORs

have been trained in Kuwait. All contracts awarded now by the Kuwait Contracting Office have a trained COR performing surveillance.

Military Role in Domestic Emergencies

Shortfalls in the Nation's ability to respond to national and man-made disasters, including terrorist attacks, as discussed in the final report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, have resulted in debate about the appropriate role of the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces in responding to domestic emergencies.

In your view, should the Army have a larger role in responding to domestic emergencies that require military support?

ANSWER:

Our Nation has been at war for over six years. Our Army—Active, Guard and Reserve—has been a leader in this war and has been fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and defending the homeland. The Army has always supported requests for military assistance and will continue to do so. However, the “role” of the Army in domestic emergencies should continue to remain within prescribed law and in support of the Department of Homeland Security or other lead federal agency.

What do you believe the Army's role should be in supporting U.S. Northern Command in homeland defense and civil support missions, including consequence management of a domestic WMD attack?

ANSWER:

The Department of Defense and United States Northern Command have worked in concert with the Department of Homeland Security to plan and prepare for response to domestic emergencies. United States Army North is the dedicated Army Service Component Command to the United States Northern Command for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities for the continental United States and Alaska.

Northern Command is the Department of Defense’s conduit to each Federal Emergency Management Agency Region for Defense Support to Civil Authorities. The Command collocates within the Federal Emergency Management Agency Headquarters and builds synergy and habitual relationships with Federal Emergency Management Agency staff, other Government Agencies, state emergency responders, state Adjutant Generals, and potential base support installations.

When a domestic emergency occurs, including chemical, biological, or nuclear attack, the affected Governor or Governors shall first employ their Air and/or Army National Guard with state authority, if required. Each State and Territory has its own Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team (for detection and identification). Moreover, seventeen

States have created federally funded National Guard Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Enhanced Response Force Packages (commonly known as CERFP) for search and rescue, decontamination, emergency medical care, and force protection. These force packages are designed to support all States within their FEMA region and also may deploy throughout the country.

In an event of a catastrophic impact, the States will likely request federal military assistance. The Army provides the majority of assets to Northern Command for the Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and high yield Explosive Consequence Management Response Force (commonly known as CCMRF). This force provides assessment teams and enhances the civil authority's ability to provide command and control, medical, logistics, extraction and decontamination, transportation, security, public affairs and mortuary affairs.

What is your assessment of the Army National Guard's ability to meet its state contingency and homeland defense missions, given its operational commitments overseas and current personnel and equipment shortfalls?

ANSWER:

The Army National Guard continues to demonstrate its ability to respond to state contingency and homeland missions as well as to its operational commitments.

The States use their Army National Guard assets cooperatively through participation in the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. As you know, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid. Through the Compact, a disaster impacted state can request and receive assistance from other member states quickly and efficiently; the Compact resolves two key issues upfront: liability and reimbursement.

Current Army planning, programming, and budgeting process has been effective in examining, assessing, prioritizing and allocating resources to the Total Army – the Active Component and the Reserve Components. The Army is currently executing and programming unprecedented resource levels to the Reserve Components. The Director of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau are fully represented in Army planning and programming deliberations. Their respective staffs have been integrated directly into the HQDA staff so that we fully understand Reserve Component requirements resulting in an improved total force.

Since September 11, 2001, the Army has resourced over \$49 billion in Army National Guard procurement (for Fiscal Years 2001-2013). Funding and equipment distributions are fire-walled: promises made are promises kept. For Fiscal Years 2001-2007, the Army resourced \$15.3 billion in Army National Guard procurement. Over the next 24 months, the Army will distribute over 400,000 items of equipment to the Army National Guard, valued at \$17.5 billion – 36 percent of Total Army distributions. This includes 16,000 trucks, 31,000 radios, 74,000 night vision devices, and 86,000 weapons.

Transition of THAAD to the Army

The Army currently produces and operates the Patriot air and missile defense system, including the PAC-3 system. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is being developed and initially fielded by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), with the plan that it will be transitioned and transferred to the Army at some point.

What is your view of the best approach to transitioning the THAAD system to the Army?

ANSWER:

The Army and MDA have been working plans to transition and transfer those Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements including the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system for which the Army is the lead Service. We have collaborated on the past two annual Transition and Transfer Plans and participate in Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) for each element to work the specific details associated with transition and transfer. Transition and transfer was the main topic of a recent Army/MDA Board of Directors meeting where it was decided that the best approach for transitioning the THAAD system was to develop and sign an overarching memorandum of agreement (MOA) that incorporates individual, event-driven element annexes to further guide the transition and transfer process.

When do you believe it should happen, and where should the initial funding come from?

ANSWER:

The Army and MDA will be collaborating on defining a series of event driven milestones which are designed to minimize cost and reduce risk, while transitioning an operational capability to the Army. This operational capability will be verified through participation in Force Development Experimentation (FDE) and Limited User Test (LUT). At that point I believe an informed decision to transition can be made.

Initial funding should come from a Defense Wide account. The funding would stay within the DOD Agency. MDA would use the account to fund R&D, Procurement and sustainment activities. The services will program for military pay, and specific O&M costs. Detailed funding responsibilities will be specified in the MOA and the annexes.

Do you have any concerns, including resource concerns, about transitioning THAAD to the Army?

ANSWER:

Our primary concern with the transition and transfer of BMDS elements to the Army is long term affordability. Element transitions must only occur when full funding is secured. The procurement and operations and support costs anticipated at transfer are beyond the Army's ability to program and fund without a total obligation authority (TOA) increase.

Force Protection Programs

Over the past several years, the Army, with the support of Congress, has concentrated on the procurement of force protection measures (e.g., Interceptor Body Armor, up-armored high mobility multipurpose vehicles, counter-improvised explosive device measures) primarily relying on supplemental appropriations.

If confirmed, what problems do you foresee and what priority would you place on continuing to expand and fund force protection programs, even in the absence of supplemental appropriations legislation?

ANSWER:

I appreciate the assistance of the Congress in protecting our Soldiers by supporting Army critical Force Protection programs. I can assure you that equipment necessary to protect the lives of Soldiers will always be my highest priority for funding. The Army has become increasingly dependent upon supplemental funds to meet war-related requirements and many programs funded through supplemental appropriations, like force protection, have persisted – a symptom of finding ourselves in an era of persistent conflict. As your question implies, we must continue critical enduring programs even if supplemental appropriations go away. Finally, the Army must be prepared for full spectrum operations globally in an era of persistent conflict. While doing so it is important to balance current force needs against modernizing so our Soldiers are never in a fair fight.

Equipment Reset

The ongoing requirements of the Global War on Terror have significantly increased usage rates on the Army's equipment. As a result, we know there will be a requirement to "reset" the force not only as the current operations continue but also for some time after they conclude. Given the ongoing nature of both the war in Iraq and the larger war on terror, we need to ensure that our force remains ready to respond to whatever contingencies arise.

Do you think that the Army's equipment reset program meets the requirements of the Global War on Terror, as well as the requirements for transition to a modular force?

ANSWER:

The Army's reset program has kept pace with the requirements for deployed forces by maintaining equipment readiness with rates at more than 90% for ground equipment and more than 75% for aviation equipment. As you know, our reset efforts are a significant element of our efforts to maintain readiness across the force. Timely and predictable funding is key to ensuring that these reset requirements are met.

In your view, what is the greatest source of risk in the Army reset program and, if confirmed, how would you eliminate or mitigate that risk?

ANSWER:

Timely and accurate funding is the greatest source of risk to the Army's reset program. Full funding received at the beginning of the fiscal year allows for the early purchase of long lead parts which reduce reset timelines, minimizes delays in replacing battle losses, and ensures the retention of the skilled labor force at the depots. To mitigate this risk, it is imperative for the Army to maintain constant and open communication to ensure that our requirements and the reasoning behind them are understood.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that sufficient resources are programmed and requested in the Army's budget to meet reset requirements and provide trained and ready forces across the spectrum of military operations?

ANSWER:

The development of the Army's reset requirements is driven by current wartime commitments: size of force structure; operational tempo; equipment stress; battle losses; lessons learned; and the need to reconstitute equipment readiness for the next contingency, which could be any mission across the full spectrum of conflict from low intensity to full spectrum operations. Current operations have greatly increased the wear and tear on our equipment and the associated reset requirements must be funded to ensure Army readiness.

What is your understanding regarding the capacity at which our repair depots are operating to meet recapitalization, modernization, rebuild, and repair requirements for reset?

ANSWER:

Depots are not operating at full / maximum capacity but are operating at a level that theater equipment retrograde will support. In peace time our depots expend approximately 12 million direct labor hours annually. They are currently executing 27 million and have the capacity to expand up to 40 million. Each depot's production capacity is being optimized by equipment type / commodity. Our depots have enabled deployed forces to maintain equipment readiness for the last 5 years at 90% or better for

ground equipment and 75% or better for aviation and are repairing enough equipment to meet the requirements of the next deploying force. Should Army requirements change, depots could do more and increase their capacity with predictable funding, available spare parts, increased work force and more retrograded equipment.

What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?

ANSWER:

Timely and adequately funding is essential. It enables depots to procure long lead time parts, maintain a skilled workforce, replace and repair maintenance equipment and set the conditions for resetting our redeploying forces. In addition, we are putting in place several logistic initiatives that will speed retrograde, improve asset visibility, reduce transportation time and target certain equipment for direct return to depots. These initiatives are being tested in the CSA Reset Pilot Program and are already beginning to show results. Depots are implementing Lean Six Sigma programs and are showing tremendous success in improving production rates and reducing turn around times.

Army Pre-Positioned Equipment

The Army has long included as a critical element of its strategic readiness sufficient prepositioned equipment and stocks around the world and afloat to accelerate the deployment and employment of forces in response to crises. However, Army pre-positioned stocks are nearly completely committed in support of operations in Iraq leaving the Army and the Nation little strategic flexibility or options.

What changes, if any, to policies regarding use of pre-positioned equipment stocks would you recommend if confirmed?

ANSWER:

No changes are recommended to the current policy for the use of APS at this time. The last four years demonstrated that the APS program was flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army's ability to deploy forces in support of COCOM requirements and adapt to changing strategic requirements. The Army carefully monitors the use of APS assets and closely coordinates their use with the Combatant Commanders. Whenever use of APS equipment is required, the Army evaluates the strategic risk and implements mitigation factors. We must continue to replenish our APS stocks with "modernized" equipment that meets the needs of the modular force.

What is your understanding and assessment of the current plan for reconstituting Army pre-positioned equipment to re-establish this strategic capability?

ANSWER:

APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the maximum level of strategic flexibility and operational agility. The Army has an APS Strategy 2015 which articulates the afloat and ashore equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the Combatant Commanders. Reconstitution of APS is already underway and the Army has an executable timeline to reset its APS sets according to the APS Strategy 2015, contingent on available resources and operational requirements.

Equipment Availability

Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to fully support the pre-deployment training and operations for the next rotation to OIF/OEF?

ANSWER:

The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are adequately prepared for and can successfully conduct operations in OIF/OEF. No Soldier will go into combat without the proper training and equipment. There are, however, some equipment shortages in CONUS that require sharing equipment among pre-deployed units to ensure they are fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing is generally managed at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment among units to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the mission they must perform when deployed. As part of each synchronization cycle, a Department-level Force Validation Committee works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all the personnel and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have all the training support tools they need to train for their mission and are scheduled for a mission rehearsal exercise.

What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for training and operations?

ANSWER:

All Soldiers receive the required training and equipment before going into combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified as ready before they are put in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to compensate for equipment shortfalls among non-deployed units. The most common Active and Reserve component high-demand pre-deployment training equipment shortfalls occur with some types of mission-specific organizational equipment, where equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theater requirements. Most of the production of these items goes straight into theater to meet the force protection demand. These items include up armored light, medium, and heavy tactical trucks; special route clearance vehicles (to include the RG-31, Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar); and counter remote-controlled improvised explosive device warfare (CREW) devices. We retain a limited number of these systems for home station training and at our Combat

Training Centers so Soldiers will gain experience with these systems before they deploy. Additionally, a large number of our Soldiers already have one or more rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have direct experience with these systems.

Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station training include kits designed to increase the survivability of standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban Survivability Kits, and uparmored HMMWV fragmentation kits. These kits are provided in theater. Finally, there are some additional training equipment gaps in specific areas which are driven by the Army's desire to get the most modern and capable systems immediately into the hands of our Soldiers in combat operations. These items include the most recent version of the Army Battle Command System, the Command Post of the Future, some advanced intelligence 12 systems, and biometric systems. The Army is working to get appropriate levels of systems to support training the force into the training base and at unit home stations, as well as in our Combat Training Centers.

Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and the associated costs, in transporting equipment to and from these missions. The result is that units at home station have less than full sets of authorized equipment. Although rotating equipment between training units allows us to achieve the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited in their ability to support other contingencies around the world should the need arise.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need in time to train before deploying and as well as for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

ANSWER:

The Army is prioritizing and tracking the use of inventory and procurement dollars to repair equipment used and damaged in the Global War on Terrorism, and to replace critical equipment destroyed in battle. The Army is also prioritizing and managing procurements and distributions to fill other critical shortages to ensure our forces are organized and equipped for required capabilities, with standard quantities and qualities of equipment across all components. While the use of training sets, theater provided equipment and cross-leveling of equipment to meet training and operational requirements are not the optimal solution, units have and will continue to meet all required training and readiness standards prior to commitment into combat.

Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles

In September 2007, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) capped MRAP procurement at 15,374 vehicles, with about 3,700 going to the Marine Corps and approximately 10,000 to the Army. In November 2007, the Marines decreased their requirement from 3,700 to approximately 2,300 vehicles - citing, in part, an improved security situation in Iraq and the MRAP's unsuitability in some off-road

and urban situations. Reports suggest that the Army may follow suit and reduce its overall MRAP requirement.

Are you aware of a revised Army requirement for MRAPs?

ANSWER:

Yes.

If the Army has decreased its requirement for MRAPs, is this the Army's final requirement or can we expect the requirement to change again?

ANSWER:

The new JROC approved interim requirement to support Army units is 12,000. In January 2007, the Army requirement, based on requests from U.S. Central Command commanders was identified to be 17,770. To ensure this assessment met our emerging requirements, the Army worked closely with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to continuously re-assess and raise the procurement quantity in a stair-step fashion to ensure a continuous and rapid flow of vehicles to Theater while remaining good stewards of our nation's resources. Recently, based on input from Theater, the Army was able to reduce its estimate from 17,770 down to a range of between 15,500 and 11,500, a reduction of nearly 2,000 to 5,000 vehicles. To ensure we do not overstate our requirement, we raised our interim requirement from 10,000 to almost 12,000 and are actively working with OSD, the Joint Staff and the Joint Program Office to place appropriate production orders that meet warfighters needs for protected mobility; preserve options for commanders in the field to make adjustments as force levels and situations change; and to manage fiscal resources appropriately.

Do you see a role for MRAPs beyond the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts?

ANSWER:

The MRAP has addressed the Army's most critical current battlefield deficiency (force protection of our forces against improvised explosive devices) with a capable, survivable and sustainable vehicle for the current Theater of Operation. However, with the exception of a limited number of vehicles going to Route Clearance and EOD teams, it is premature to describe where MRAP may fit into tomorrow's force structure. Training and Doctrine Command is conducting a tactical wheeled vehicle analysis of mission, roles, profiles, threats, and capabilities of the various fleets. This analysis includes the MRAP, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the HMMWV. The initial results will influence POM decisions, the Force Mix Brief to Congress, and the Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy due to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in July 2008. The Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle strategy is an ongoing effort to ensure our Soldiers receive the best capabilities available in ground wheeled vehicles to meet current and emerging threats.

Special Units for Stabilization and Training/Advisory Missions

On October 10,2007, the Secretary of Defense emphasized the role that "unconventional warfare" will play in the Army's future as well as the need to organize and prepare for a training and advisory role. Some, both inside and outside of the Army, have suggested that special units or organizations should be established to address these mission areas, while others maintain that these missions are best handled by the Army's full-spectrum brigade combat teams (BCTs) and their supporting forces.

Do you believe special units -- such as a Training and Advisory Corps -- should be established? Please explain.

ANSWER:

No, I believe future requirements to train and advise foreign security forces should be addressed with a combination of special operations forces, small scale specialized forces, embassy military groups, and Army full spectrum modular forces. Pre-conflict security cooperation activities will emphasize special operations forces, small scale specialized forces, and small deployments of full spectrum modular forces working under U.S. embassy control, while post conflict efforts will rely heavily on full spectrum modular forces.

The key consideration for training and advising is expertise in your core function. For example, US Army infantry, medical, or engineer companies are experts at conducting their wartime function and can therefore train and advise foreign infantry, medical, or engineer companies. With some additional training and minor task organization changes, Army modular forces can be ideally suited to train and advise.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)

The US Special Operations Command, pursuant to QDR guidelines, is currently expanding the size of its Army component. It is also working to raise the language proficiency of its Army special operators.

If confirmed, how would you support USASOC's endstrength growth?

ANSWER:

If confirmed, I will support USASOC's end strength growth as currently planned. QDR 2006 directed that Special Forces battalions be increased by one-third and that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations be increased by 33%. The Army has already programmed and is executing these important decisions. By fiscal year 2013, the Army will have completed this growth. If confirmed, I will monitor this growth and ensure it meets operational requirements.

Special Operations Forces are performing extremely demanding and specialized tasks in combating terrorism. This increase in end strength will mitigate the extremely high operational tempo now experienced by these specially selected and trained forces. Growth of Special Operations forces is within programmed endstrength of 547.4K (active), 358.2K (National Guard), and 206.0K (Reserve). The growth in Special Operations forces will greatly contribute to the Army's ability to confront irregular challenges and to conduct stability operations.

What do you see as the best way to enhance language skills among Army special operators?

ANSWER:

The Army supports the Defense Language Program goal to increase language capability across the force, to include Special Operations. The Army trains our language cadre to the minimum Interagency Language Roundtable level of 2 for language proficiency, with a goal to reach a proficiency of 3. Currently Active Component and Reserve Component Soldiers may earn up to \$400 per month per language depending on their level of proficiency, up to a maximum rate of \$1000 per month. Soldiers who are in language dependent military operation specialties, such as special operators, are paid the highest rate based on their proficiency for their primary language. This is true even for languages such as Spanish, which has been identified as "dominant in the force" and is not usually authorized for language pay for other Army Soldiers. This will provide an added incentive to Soldiers to maintain their proficiency.

Future Combat Systems (FCS)

FCS is the largest modernization program in the Army. Total cost of the program is expected to be \$162 billion. The Army's FCS includes both manned and robot-controlled weapons linked together by a communications network. Army leaders have strongly advocated for continued funding and support for FCS, but, in February 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates told this committee: "It is hard for me to see how that program can be completed in its entirety. I think that in light of what are inevitably going to be pressures on the defense budget in the future, I think that that one is one we will have to look at carefully."

How would you respond to those who question the feasibility and affordability of FCS, and who call it ill-defined and technologically risky?

ANSWER:

Future Combat Systems (FCS) precursor technologies have already made a difference today in combat. FCS precursor Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) and robotics show the promise of these emerging capabilities in vital IED defeat and route clearance missions. The Army currently is fielding FCS Spin-out 1 to the Army Evaluation Task Force

(AETF) at Fort Bliss, Texas. The Army established the AETF so that combat-tested Soldiers can test and evaluate FCS technologies. Through rigorous testing and phased software development the Army is mitigating risk to this ambitious plan to deliver needed capabilities.

FCS is currently less than 3% of the Army's base budget. At its peak (FY15) FCS is projected to be less than a third of the Army's investment (RDA) account. That would be less than 8% of the overall Army budget, assuming that budget stays constant. The FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT) is designed to be an integrated combat formation that delivers the full spectrum. As an adaptive force, we will rigorously apply the lessons of combat to the development of the FCS BCT.

Risk is being carefully managed. The standup of the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) at a cost of 900 Soldiers during a time of war is an example of the Army's commitment to bring FCS technologies to Soldiers for rigorous evaluation prior to program decisions.

Can you explain how FCS addresses the imbalance in the Army to which Army leaders have spoken in defending the requirement for the capabilities the FCS offers?

ANSWER:

The current imbalance in the Army is caused by our inability to meet the demands placed on the Army to generate the ready forces we need to meet global demand.

The Army is addressing the imbalance by completing its capabilities transformation into modular formations, while simultaneously growing the size of deployable formations. These actions will increase the global force pool, enable sustainable periods of dwell for training, and reduce stress on the current operational force.

In parallel with these efforts, FCS is our core effort to complete the transformation of the Army by providing modular formations vastly increased capabilities to meet the needs of the 21st century. FCS achieves these goals by providing the Army increased abilities to Project our forces, Connect Soldiers to the network, and Protect Soldiers in this century's complex operating environments. Spin outs ensure that we speed these improvements to the Army to meet the needs of war fighters who can't wait for needed capabilities.

Joint Cargo Aircraft

In June 2006, the Army and Air Force signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding merging two separate small cargo aircraft programs into the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA).

In your opinion, is there a roles-and-missions redundancy between the Army and the Air Force in the JCA program?

ANSWER:

No. The primary mission of the Army JCA is to transport Army time-sensitive mission-critical (TSMC) cargo and personnel to forward deployed units, often in remote and austere locations, commonly referred to as “the last tactical mile”. Because of the critical nature of this cargo to the success of the tactical ground commander’s mission and the short-notice of its need (usually less than 24 hours), lift assets must be in a direct support relationship to provide the necessary responsiveness.

For sustainment operations, Army fixed wing aviation performs those missions which lie between the strategic and intra-theater missions performed by the USAF and the tactical maneuver and movement performed by Army rotary wing or ground assets. The JCA will provide point to point distribution where effectiveness vice efficiency is critical to meeting the ground tactical mission needs, while simultaneously continuing to push the majority of supplies forward, maintaining the potential synergistic affect between efficiency and effectiveness. The JCA, Army and Air Force, is meant to be a complimentary asset.

The Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Air Force have agreed to examine Intra-theater Air Lift Roles and Missions as part of the QDR. In the most recent Air Force-Army Warfighter talks, we recommitted our Services to the success of the C-27 program in its current format, on the current fielding timeline, and in accordance with the current beddown plan. Together, both services will work any roles and missions issues that may arise.

Medium and High Altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

In a March 5,2007 memorandum, the Air Force Chief of Staff spelled out the case for the Air Force to become the Executive Agent (EA) for all medium and high altitude UAVs. General Moseley stated his desire to follow up with a comprehensive plan to optimize the Nation's Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets.

What is your understanding of the Army's position regarding the Air Force proposal that it be assigned as the EA for medium and high altitude UAVs?

ANSWER:

The Army does not support a single Service as executive agent for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The Army supports the Joint Staff’s 2005 and 2007 decisions to not establish an executive agent for UAS (Joint Requirements Oversight Council memorandums 043-08 and 136-05), as well as, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 13 September 2007 decision that, in lieu of a single Service designation as executive agent for UAS, directs a UAS Task (TF) led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) to coordinate critical UAS interoperability issues and develop a common acquisition path forward.

Army Medical Action Plan

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2008 (Public Law 110-181) requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress bi-annually on implementation of the Army Medical Action Plan to correct deficiencies identified in the condition of facilities and patient administration for wounded and ill soldiers.

If confirmed, what would be your responsibilities with respect to the implementation of the Army Medical Action Plan and compliance with the requirements included in the (NDAA)?

ANSWER:

If confirmed, I will ensure the smooth transition of the highly effective Army Medical Action Plan Cell to the new Warrior Care and Transition Office under the supervision of the Director of the Army Staff. The Warrior Care and Transition Office will provide Headquarters, Department of the Army oversight, policy, and direction to synchronize and integrate the array of Army warrior care initiatives and related programs dedicated to the support, care, and healing of wounded, injured, and ill Soldiers and their Families. Through numerous monitoring and oversight mechanisms, including the Medical Strategic Review Group, I will ensure Army complies with all requirements of the NDAA. The Army has prepared an initial report to Congress, which details the extraordinary effort and accomplishments made in the first year of the Army Medical Action Plan. I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress on behalf of our wounded, ill, and injured warriors.

In September 2007 the GAO reported that over half of the Warrior Transition Units had significant personnel/staffing shortfalls.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that Warrior Transition Units are adequately resourced to meet the medical and mental health needs of wounded and ill soldiers returning from deployments now and in the coming years?

ANSWER:

In follow-up testimony February 2008, the GAO reported on the significant progress the Army has made staffing the 35 Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) established as part of the Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP). Currently 2,655 WTU staff members are caring for 9,339 Warriors in Transition and their Families. If confirmed, I will continue to demand the right level of support for our brave men and women whose sacrifice demands no less. I also look forward to working with the Congress to fund the rapid construction, furnishing, and ongoing support of Warrior Transition complexes. These healing complexes will co-locate fully accessible housing, administrative facilities, and Soldier

Family Assistance Centers near our Military Treatment Facilities to provide better support for our Warriors in Transition and their Families.

Rise in Suicide Rates in the Army

In your view, what are the strengths and weaknesses of the Army's current suicide prevention program?

ANSWER:

We are continuously strengthening and revitalizing our suicide prevention efforts. This has never been more important, given the higher than normal suicide rates we are experiencing. While engaged leadership is key to our efforts, just as important is informing Soldiers and family members about the risk factors associated with suicide, how to identify suicidal behavior, and what actions are needed to help at-risk Soldiers.

Our multifaceted approach includes increasing awareness about suicide, reducing the stigma associated with seeking care, and providing leaders with relevant information they can use to improve their suicide prevention efforts at the unit level.

We recently formed a suicide prevention steering committee composed of general officers from across the Army that includes those with expertise in the personnel, healthcare, spiritual, and legal communities to provide senior-level oversight of our suicide prevention efforts. This group will ensure we have a program that provides robust, evidence and research-based resources, programs, and services for all aspects of the program.

The bottom-line is that we must constantly renew our focus on leadership and battle buddy involvement both in prevention and intervention. It is crucial for all leaders to have access to lessons learned from suicide cases (both completions and attempts) to effect new programs, services, and policies. We are in the process of creating an analysis cell to collect suicide data, analyze trends, develop lessons learned, and provide that information up and down the chain on a continuous basis.

We are keenly aware that, despite our efforts, the suicide rate has continued to climb. We know that we have to change the culture in the Army to reshape attitudes toward those with behavioral health issues.

If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to reduce the incidence of suicide in the Army?

ANSWER:

If confirmed, I will fully support the newly-formed suicide prevention flag officer panel. The first priority of this multidisciplinary group is to reduce the perceived stigma of Soldiers seeking help for mental health issues. It is also focused on building in our leaders at every level the understanding of the need to carefully monitor the welfare of

their Soldiers and then ensure they have the necessary skills to knowledgeably question and intervene when they see a Soldier who may be at-risk. This involves training that begins when Soldiers enter the Army and continues through every leadership course. Leaders know that it is within their responsibility to check on a Soldier's living conditions, ask about his/her family, and, when he senses that something is not right, to professionally, but caringly determine what is going on. I would reemphasize the importance of leadership involvement.

We must also increase our research into the factors that will reduce suicide risk in the Army. I'm not convinced that what we know about civilian suicides can be translated directly into an actionable plan for our population and research in the Army on this issue is incomplete. I would task the General Officer Steering Committee to do a bottom-up study of the factors related to suicide to ensure that our strategy is complete and sufficient.

We must also help our Soldiers and their families to build great lives. I am told that four out of five Soldiers who commit suicide do so because of relationship issues or because of a poor personal decision that led to legal problems in his or her life. We must expand life skills and relationship training so that Soldiers make good decisions and avoid the cascade of negative events that is so often the precursor to suicide. It is also important to enforce the battle buddy in the total Army, emphasizing in interpersonal relationships, mentorship, and counseling at first line leader level.

If confirmed, how would you seek to ensure that senior Army leaders take steps to eliminate the stigma associated by soldiers with seeking mental health care?

ANSWER:

We must continue to change our culture that does not place a shame on those Soldiers who seek mental health assistance. If confirmed, I would look at a number of ways in which to continue to address this issue. Again, it starts with informed and engaged leadership. Leaders who are aware of the impact of uninformed, judgmental attitudes on those at risk for suicide are in the best position of shifting the culture toward one that better supports those in crisis.

We must increase the number of health care professionals to ensure they are present and available to Soldiers in units. This includes behavioral health professionals and chaplains.

We have to do better at ensuring that Soldiers are completely aware of the process, risks, and limits when they access behavioral health care. I'm convinced that Soldiers don't really understand how low their risk is when they seek help and we need to change that paradigm.

Full Resourcing of Walter Reed Army Medical Center

Under the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) adequate funding must be provided for the operation and sustainment of the current Walter Reed Army Medical Center until new facilities are completed and operational at both National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, and Fort Belvoir in northern Virginia.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that all support requirements are identified and supported, to include facilities, personnel, installation support and medical operations and maintenance?

ANSWER:

The Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) has a very effective budgeting system that allocates resources based on workload and population health. The MEDCOM will continue to resource WRAMC as a fully operational medical center until the fiscal year of closure. The budget will not be decremented for any closure-related actions. In addition, through the Army Medical Action Plan, we have identified and remedied the circumstances that led to problems highlighted at Walter Reed Army Medical Center last year. All support requirements are routinely monitored by the MEDCOM, the Army's Installation Management Command, and the Office of Warrior Care and Transition.

Army Family Covenant

In the fall of 2007, senior military and civilian leaders and installation commanders throughout the Army agreed to the Army Family Covenant, a pledge to provide soldiers and their families with the level of support that they need and which their level of service deserves. The Chief of Staff of the Army has stated that the covenant represents a \$1.4 billion commitment in 2008 and that Army leadership is working to include a similar level in the budget for the next five years.

What do you view as the most essential quality of life needs addressed by the Army Family Covenant?

ANSWER:

The most essential aspect of the Army Family Covenant is its unprecedented level of commitment. Last year, Secretary Geren and GEN Casey asked our Soldiers and Families to tell us how well the Army's systems were supporting them. Soldiers and their Families asked for more consistent standards and better access throughout the Army to Family programs and services, physical and mental healthcare, better housing, education, child and youth services and employment opportunities for spouses. The needs addressed in the Army Family Covenant represent the voices of Soldiers and their Families. Each facet of the Covenant is interwoven in our Army communities and that is what creates a supportive environment in which Soldiers and their families can live and thrive. We will continue to ask our Soldiers and Families to identify their needs.

What are the greatest challenges which the Army faces in making good on the promises made by the Army Family Covenant, and what would you do, if confirmed, to overcome them?

ANSWER:

The greatest challenges associated with fulfilling the promises made in the Army Family Covenant are maintaining a predictable level of funding after the next four years and at the same time, managing the expectations created by our commitment to address the needs of Army Families. To preserve the All Volunteer Force, the Army is committed to providing Soldiers and Families a full range of essential services to support readiness and retention and enhance Family resiliency. The Family Covenant is our promise to provide a strong supportive environment and our Families want to trust and believe in the Family Covenant and Army Leadership's commitment. As we enter year seven of the war, we must also maintain our ability to respond to the unpredictable Family requirements the changing environment will present. To overcome these challenges, we will balance our requirements within the Army to provide for our Soldiers and their Families and we will continue to focus on their specific needs. Taking care of our Soldiers and their Families is essential if we are to sustain our Army throughout this era of persistent conflict.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

ANSWER:

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?

ANSWER:

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

ANSWER:

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

ANSWER:

Yes.