

Advance Questions for Mary Beth Long
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

ANSWER: No. I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

ANSWER: I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs?

ANSWER: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy issues of Defense Department interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the Middle East, and Africa, their governments and defense establishments, and for oversight of security cooperation programs and foreign military sales programs in these regions.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you anticipate that Secretary Gates would prescribe for you?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I believe that the Secretary would ask me to manage the day-to-day, multilateral, regional, and bilateral defense relations with the governments in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. He also would ask me to develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of policy related to NATO and other institutions with a security dimension. He would likely ask that I represent the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense in interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations dealing with these assigned areas of responsibility, when appropriate. Finally, I would likely be asked to monitor and provide policy recommendations related to the conduct of U.S. military operations in the countries and regions under the areas of my responsibility, as well as on the participation of those countries and organizations in security or defense operations elsewhere that have an impact on U.S. defense considerations.

What impact has the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy had on the functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs?

ANSWER: Prior to the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) had responsibility for bilateral and regional policy issues globally, except for in Europe and Eurasia. International Security Affairs also had responsibility for the conduct of Prisoners of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) affairs, coalition management, activities related to support to public diplomacy, and oversight of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

The reorganization of Policy aligned the Policy regional offices more closely to the Combatant Commands. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) retained responsibility for Africa and the Middle East. European, Eurasian, and NATO matters were added to the ISA portfolio. The Office of Asian affairs, including matters pertaining to Afghanistan (except for NATO operations in Afghanistan), now falls under the new Office of the Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. The Western Hemisphere Office also moved; it now falls under the

responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

The new Policy organization gathers functional responsibilities under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs. Coalition management issues, POW/MIA affairs and oversight of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency are now housed under the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs. Personnel working public diplomacy issues now report to the Support for Public Diplomacy Directorate.

What challenges has the reorganization created for carrying out those functions and duties, and what steps would you take to address those challenges?

ANSWER: The reorganization of policy created a more effectively balanced organization with a greater ability to address post-Cold War, cross-cutting issues. It also made the Policy organization more flexible and adaptive to evolving policy challenges and leadership priorities. This resulted in offices with a broader expertise in the different facets of a single issue. This is a benefit rather than a challenge, but it does require close coordination across the portfolios of the various Assistant Secretaries. The Office of the Under Secretary must continue to ensure that it remains true to the spirit of the reorganization -- to remain flexible and adaptive as the security challenges we face constantly change, and to adjust priorities and allocation of resources accordingly.

How do you see the civilian role, as opposed to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

ANSWER: From the briefings I have received, I understand that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's office initiates the biennial contingency planning cycle on behalf of the Secretary through the Contingency Planning Guidance. Following the guidance in this document, which the President approves, combatant commanders develop operation plans for prescribed scenarios. As they are being developed, the Secretary of Defense periodically reviews the most important of these plans with the responsible combatant commander. The USD(P) follows the development of this body of plans and assists the Secretary in a formal review of the plans, which are then submitted for his approval.

Will the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs include responsibility for dealing with NATO nuclear matters?

ANSWER: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs serves as the Chair of the NATO High Level Group, the advisory body to NATO's Nuclear Planning Group. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs performs this duty in very close coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, who has responsibility for strategic capabilities, including nuclear forces.

Will the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs include any responsibility for formulating strategic nuclear policy?

ANSWER: No. These duties belong to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities.

Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

ANSWER: I believe I am qualified for this position by a combination of the over fifteen years of government experience in the intelligence and policy arenas, my experience dealing with international issues and foreign officials, and by the skills I have developed as an attorney and manager.

I have served in the Department of Defense since 2004 and have held the position as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) since August 2005. In this capacity, I have been called upon to perform many of the duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, particularly since the departure of Assistant Secretary Peter Rodman in March 2007. In the twenty-seven months as the Principal Deputy in ISA, I have become steeped in the issues that the Assistant Secretary must confront and have represented ISA within the interagency and with senior foreign defense counterparts. In addition, I have testified before, and have regular interaction with, the Congress on

ISA issues. I also have established effective working relationships with my DOD counterparts, as well as with my interagency and foreign colleagues.

Prior to my current assignment in the Department, I served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics (CN) for over a year, beginning that appointment in May 2004. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for CN, I worked extensively with ISA and related Department, interagency and foreign colleagues, as well as with the Congress. Much of my work in that office focused on building capacity in Afghanistan and transnational threats.

Before coming to the Department of Defense, I served as with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1986-1999. While there, I developed experience working with many issues related to the ISA portfolio and gained significant experience dealing with the interagency and foreign government officials. In particular, I worked closely with the Departments of State and Defense on terrorism, nuclear issues, and other transnational threats, even serving as the Embassy “Principal (Anti-) Money Laundering Officer” and representative to multilateral organizations, including those on conventional weapons and weapons transfer issues.

From 1999 to May 2004, I practiced law with Williams & Connolly LLP. In that capacity, I developed many of the skills necessary to successful performance as an Assistant Secretary, including critical thinking, creative problem- solving and the conduct of complex negotiations.

Relationships

Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Chiefs of Staff of the Services

The Combatant Commanders, in particular CENTCOM, EUCOM, and AFRICOM

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities

If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I will work closely with the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. I also expect to develop and maintain close working relationships with the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with Combatant Commanders.

The position requires close coordination with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within OSD Policy, as appropriate. Examples of this coordination would include working with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs on the role of NATO in Afghanistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities on counterterrorism, particularly in Iraq, and on nuclear matters; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in my area of responsibility; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs on counternarcotics, and coalition affairs, proliferation and security assistance matters.

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for International

Security Affairs? Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

ANSWER: A number of the major challenges that the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs will confront are related to how best to support the U.S. warfighter deployed in the regions under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs (ISA). In the areas under ISA responsibility, there are currently significant numbers of U.S. forces deployed – many of them in combat or combat support roles – including over 150,000 in Iraq. In the next year, there will be many political and other transitions that significantly impact these forces as governments of Coalition partners face elections and mandate renewals, as the Iraqi and Afghan governments mature, and as U.S. forces adjust in number and mandate. Should I be confirmed, I will commit myself to working in close partnership with the Congress, the military Departments and other agencies, our coalition partners, and the Iraqi and Afghan governments, to properly support our deployed warfighters.

Iraq

The President has said that the purpose of the “surge” over the last year was to give Iraqi politicians the “breathing space” to effect reconciliation.

Would you agree that reconciliation has not been achieved and, consequently, the “surge” has not met its stated purpose?

ANSWER: The President’s New Way Forward, announced in January 2007, increased the number of U.S. troops in Iraq in order to facilitate political progress and to give Iraq the time and assistance needed to build the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces and government capacity.

As General Petraeus has indicated, the increase in troop strength combined with a tactical focus on counterinsurgency have been successful in bringing violence down to levels comparable to the spring of 2005 – thus allowing political progress to take place, particularly at a local level. While this political progress has taken place, it has not been in the way we originally expected. “Bottom-up” reconciliation has occurred at the local and provincial level with

Iraqi citizens rejecting al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and forming "Concerned Local Citizen" groups. Provincial governments are also functioning more effectively. At the national level, political developments have been less encouraging. National reconciliation is still a work in progress, but economic development is occurring and efforts to advance significant legislation, such as the de-Ba'athification legislation, are underway.

A significant challenge for the next months will be supporting, in consultation with Congress, the government of Iraq's ability to capitalize on local gains, to pass key legislation, and to promote national reconciliation, including by capitalizing on the momentum of "bottom-up" progress to meet enhanced "top-down" efforts.

What leverage do you believe the United States has to induce Iraqi politicians to effect reconciliation?

ANSWER: Surely our presence in Iraq, our active involvement with the Iraqi government leaders, our relationships with Iraq's neighbors and our engagement in support of Iraq in multinational fora provide us with significant leverage. As Ambassador Crocker stated, a crucial question is whether Iraq's collective national leadership is ready to prioritize the interests of the Government of Iraq over sectarian and community interests. Ambassador Crocker believes Iraq's leaders have the will to tackle these problems.

An important aspect of U.S. leverage is our ability to serve as a "facilitator" for enabling the Iraqis to make the hard decisions necessary in order to determine their own destiny. We appeal to Iraqi national interest and observe that Iraq will prosper if the interests of all elements of society are accommodated.

Finally, we have significant leverage through our relationships with allies neighboring Iraq. For example, the Neighbors Ministerial meetings have been helpful in addressing issues such as border security, refugees, and energy, and we have worked hard to support Iraq as it leads this process.

How quickly do you believe U.S. troop levels could and should be reduced in Iraq? On what do you base this?

ANSWER: In close and continuing dialogue with Congress, I believe the assessment should be based on the recommendation of

the Commander on the ground. When General Petraeus testified before Congress in September, he stated that he believed we would be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by the summer of 2008 without jeopardizing hard-fought security gains. Thus far, the trend looks favorable.

This coming Spring, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will return to report to Congress and the American people on the status of developments in Iraq. At that time, he will address how quickly he believes U.S. troop levels can be reduced. It is our hope that he will report that the reductions currently contemplated can be executed and will provide his advice on further reductions.

What level of U.S. force presence do you foresee in Iraq over the long term? What missions do you see those forces performing? How long do you believe that period will be?

ANSWER: We are working closely with our Iraqi partners to determine what our presence will look like beyond the summer of 2008; however, as General Petraeus stated in his testimony last September, “our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous.” Determining the final nature and level of that presence depends upon what the Iraqis desire as well as what we believe we should provide, and should be determined in close coordination with Congress.

Most likely, the relationship will build upon the Declaration of Principles signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki on November 26th. This declaration commits the governments of the United States and Iraq to agree to a long-term security agreement to regulate our security relationship by July 31, 2008.

As the President stated, the U.S. envisions the creation of an enduring relationship that is in the best interest of both the United States and Iraq, which would include security cooperation to help provide for Iraqi stability and to prosecute the War on Terror. Troop levels would be governed by the conditions on the ground. Specifically, it is envisioned that U.S. troops might be required to deter external aggression, support Iraq in its effort to combat terrorist groups, and to train and equip the Iraqi Security Forces.

The United States does not seek permanent bases in Iraq. In the next

months, it will be engaging the Iraqis in discussion on the nature of our continued presence, including the protection of our forces (to include Status of Forces-like protections) and the support required for our long-term relationship with them. It is likely that we may seek agreements with the Iraqis to provide access to facilities to support our activities.

Iraq Lessons Learned

What do you believe to be the major lessons learned from the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?

ANSWER: As Secretary Gates' recently said to an audience at Kansas State University, "One of the most important lessons from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has been the decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, long-term success." Essential ingredients for stabilization include economic development, institution building, internal reconciliation, governance, basic services, the training and equipping the indigenous military and police forces, and strategic communications.

Our experience in Iraq has also taught us the importance of deploying civilian expertise. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are designed to employ civilians experienced in agriculture, governance, and other aspects of development – to work with and alongside the military to improve the lives of the local population, a key tenet of any counterinsurgency effort. Where they are on the ground – even in small numbers – we see tangible and often dramatic improvements.

Another lesson deserving of highlighting is the importance of enabling and empowering our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police – once the province of Special Forces – is now a key mission for the military as a whole and a key to our success in Iraq.

Iraq Refugees

The United Nations estimates that over 4 million Iraqis have been displaced by violence, and over 2.3 million have vacated their homes for safer areas within Iraq. Further, 1.5 million are now living in Syria, and over 1 million refugees inhabit Jordan, Iran, Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, and Turkey. Most of these Iraqis are determined to be resettled to North America or Europe, and few consider return to Iraq a viable option.

What do you believe should be the role of the DOD with regard to managing the return of refugees to Iraq?

ANSWER: DoD's role is to support the State Department and other U.S. agencies that work with international organizations responsible for assisting refugees, or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and promoting their safe return.

Another key role is to help the government of Iraq to provide its citizens with a secure environment in which to resume their lives.

Middle East Arms Package

The Administration's recently proposed \$30 billion arms package was presented to Congress as a critical means by which U.S. allies in the Middle East could deter Iranian influence in the region.

In light of the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, do you believe the scope of this arms package should or should not be reconsidered?

ANSWER: As Secretary Gates said recently in Manama (on December 8, 2007), the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) is a joint State Department-Defense Department initiative oriented toward developing a strategic framework to enhance and strengthen regional security. The proposed sales associated with the GSD should help maintain the balance of power in the region by assisting countries to counter conventional as well as unconventional, asymmetric and terrorist threats, including threats posed by ballistic missiles. The weapons systems associated with the GSD are primarily defensive in nature and are designed to help our friends deter and defend against such threats, including those from Iran.

Iran

Do you support a diplomatic approach for engaging directly with Iran regarding stability and security in Iraq?

ANSWER: Yes. The Department supports the effort led by Ambassador Crocker in dialogue with the Iranians regarding all of our concerns related to Iraqi stability and security. We are seeking to convince Iran that it is to its benefit that Iraq becomes a neighbor that is stable, secure, and prosperous.

From a policy perspective, what impact does the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran have on the Department's thinking about Iran as a regional threat and a threat to the United States?

ANSWER: As the President has stated, our thinking on Iran has not changed. Further, as Secretary Gates emphasized in Manama, the report expresses with greater confidence than ever that Iran did have a nuclear weapons program – developed secretly, kept hidden for years, and in violation of its international obligations. As the Secretary said in his Manama speech, the Iranians do have the mechanisms still in place to restart their program at any time. Importantly, the estimate did not identify impediments to Iran re-starting the program.

Libya

Over the past few years, the United States' relationship with Libya has changed dramatically.

From a policy perspective, in your assessment, what should be the nature of our military-to-military cooperation with Libya?

ANSWER: Any military-to-military relationship with Libya needs to be developed and conducted within the overall context of a coordinated USG policy framework and in close consultation with Congress. Such a relationship should be supportive of Libya's continuing transformation to a responsible form of government and sustained normalization of its relationship with the international community.

How should DOD engage with other countries removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?

ANSWER: DoD should proceed deliberately, on a case by case basis, and in close consultation with Congress. It would be important to develop military to military relations and conduct DoD activities within a well-coordinated USG policy framework and in a way that reinforces respect for human rights and international law.

Syria

Do you believe it is in the United States' interest to engage Syria in a direct dialogue regarding stability and security in Iraq?

ANSWER: There are opportunities for Syria to engage in constructive dialogue on this issue, and I welcome Syria to take advantage of these opportunities -- through our Embassy in Damascus, opportunities such as the recent Annapolis dialogue, through multinational fora to include the UN, or indirectly, perhaps through the Iraqis or others. But for engagement to be productive, Syria must stop its destabilizing behavior in the region, including permitting terrorist networks to move suicide bombs into Iraq, harboring former Iraqi Baathist regime leaders and regional terrorist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Governing Command, enabling the flow of weapons to Hizballah in Lebanon, and working against Lebanon's democratic institutions.

NATO Forces in Afghanistan

General John Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has said that the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan is short on maneuver battalions; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; helicopters; lift; and operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLTs) for training the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF).

What do you believe can and should be done to persuade NATO members to provide the additional troops and equipment to meet the Afghanistan mission requirements?

ANSWER: We should continue to engage NATO at all levels and at all opportunities. We also should continue to engage NATO members bilaterally to encourage their support in filling NATO shortfalls. In addition, Secretary Gates and others should continue to engage NATO members and others in meetings like the UK-hosted

meeting of the eight Allied Defense Ministers contributing forces and capabilities to ISAF Regional Command-South held earlier this month. As Secretary Gates mentioned recently before Congress, our goal is for Allies to agree a strategic concept that outlines where we want to be in three to five years in Afghanistan, where we hope the Afghan government will be, the ways in which we intend to get there and ways in which we can measure progress. It is our belief that such a strategy will help increase support among Allied legislatures and electorates for the Afghan mission and therefore assist in generating the force, resources and flexibility required for ISAF to succeed.

Should NATO put more emphasis on training the ANSF to take on a greater role in providing security throughout Afghanistan, including by providing more OMLTs? What do you believe are the benefits and risks of such an approach?

ANSWER: Yes; NATO should put more emphasis on training the ANSF, particularly by providing more, and more capable, OMLTs. Although NATO is not in a position to take over the ANSF training mission, Allies can contribute significantly by overcoming the existing and projected shortfall in the number and capabilities of OMLTs.

What do you believe should be done to induce NATO members to remove national restrictions on the use of their troops in Afghanistan?

ANSWER: As indicated above, we will engage at all opportunities to stress the need for Allies to lift national caveats that hamper employment of their forces by the ISAF commander. Additionally, by developing and implementing a strategic concept with benchmarks and agreed-upon goals, we may increase support among legislatures and electorates so Allied governments are willing to lift national caveats on how their forces are used.

Missile Defense in Europe

The United States has proposed deploying a long-range missile defense system in Europe that is intended to provide protection for the United States

and most, but not all, of NATO Europe against ballistic missiles. Since this proposed system would not cover all of NATO Europe, it has caused concern within NATO because of the critical principle of the indivisibility of security of all of NATO's nations.

Do you support the principle of the indivisibility of security of all NATO nations and, if confirmed, would you work to ensure that any missile defense system (or system-of-systems) to protect NATO Europe is consistent with this critical principle?

ANSWER: Yes. If confirmed, I will reinforce the message conveyed by the Under Secretary of Defense and others before the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the NATO-Russia Council, partner nations and others to assure them that we will work to ensure that any missile defense system to protect NATO is consistent with the important principle of indivisibility of Alliance security.

The United States is proposing to pay for the deployment of a missile defense system to provide protection for the United States and most of NATO Europe, but is not proposing to pay for missile defense protection of the rest of NATO Europe, nor to seek NATO funding for the proposed deployment.

What is your view on how the costs of missile defense of Europe should be paid, and what responsibility the various NATO nations should have in paying for such defense?

ANSWER: In Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities has primary responsibility for much of the deployment and functional aspects of the missile defense system we propose. That said, the U.S. elements we are proposing to field in Europe would represent a substantial U.S. contribution to the defense of NATO territory. It would be premature to discuss possible funding arrangements for any defenses in addition to those the U.S. is proposing. I note, however, that NATO is already funding the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program to defend deployed NATO forces. It is possible that this existing program could be expanded so that, in concert with short-range missile defenses being developed and acquired by several NATO Allies, these elements might provide an integrated defense for those Allies not covered by the U.S. system.

Do you believe the United States should be willing to pay for missile defense protection of the portions of NATO Europe not

covered by the proposed European deployment, or that other NATO nations should be willing to pay for portions of the proposed deployment?

ANSWER: My previous answer applies equally well to this question. The proposed U.S. system would represent a substantial U.S. contribution to the defense of Allied territory. Since the architecture of the complementary short-to-medium-range system has not been determined, it is premature to discuss possible funding arrangements. However, the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense NATO is already acquiring could be used as the command and control backbone for missile defenses being developed and acquired by several NATO Allies that could be employed to cover the remainder of NATO territory. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure appropriate transparency and coordination as we move forward on this effort.

The Commander of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is the combatant commander responsible for the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), including defense against ballistic missile attack. It is unclear what role EUCOM will play in missile defense in Europe, since the long-range system proposed for deployment in Europe is expected to be controlled by U.S. Northern Command from the United States.

What role do you believe would be appropriate for EUCOM in missile defense of its AOR, and what role do you believe EUCOM should have in coordinating and operating missile defenses with NATO for defense of Europe?

ANSWER: In Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities is the lead for the technical and implementation considerations of the proposed deployment. That said, development of the command and control arrangements for missile defenses in Europe, which will ultimately include both short - and long -range defenses, is undoubtedly a complex matter. If confirmed, as we develop the appropriate command and control and other arrangements, I will consult closely with Allies, the relevant combatant commanders and the Congress on this issue.

Kosovo

Nearly 16,000 NATO troops currently participate in the Kosovo Force

(KFOR) providing security and stabilization assistance.

What changes, if any, do you anticipate in the role or requirements of KFOR, and for U. S. forces in particular, after the “troika” – the European Union, Russia and the United States – report to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon later this month regarding Kosovo’s future status?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will endeavor to support the Department’s position that, at least in the short term, KFOR’s role should remain the same – to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, providing assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo and monitoring, verifying, and when necessary enforcing compliance with the conditions of related to the cessation of hostilities in 1999. I do not foresee KFOR taking on additional tasks normally performed by police forces or customs officials.

Now that the troika has reported to U.N. Secretary General Ban that the talks were not successful, the next step is for the International Community to decide whether the comprehensive settlement package put forward by UN Special Representative Ahtisaari should serve as a basis for a new political framework in Kosovo. If that decision is made, I would expect KFOR to continue its current mission through a transition period to a new supervisory regime.

Future of NATO

What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for NATO over the next five years?

ANSWER: NATO has the opportunity to complete its transformation from a static military Alliance, focused on territorial defense, to an Alliance that can deliver security wherever Allies’ common security interests are threatened around the globe. As a part of this, NATO has the opportunity to professionalize, transform, and develop the forces of its new members. NATO also has the opportunity to enhance interoperability and NATO’s overall capabilities – through initiatives such as enhancing Alliance strategic airlift, improving Alliance Special Operations forces capabilities, and adapting the NATO Command Structure.

The primary and continuing challenge is to get Allies to devote the resources needed to continue transforming their military forces to succeed

in expeditionary operations such as Afghanistan. In that operation, generating the needed forces and capabilities has been difficult due to budget shortfalls and a shortage of capable and interoperable expeditionary forces.

Do you support further enlargement of NATO within the next five years?

ANSWER: I believe that NATO's door should be open to new members as long as they meet NATO's performance-based standards. It is my belief that Enlargement will promote a Europe free, whole and at peace, and I support NATO's efforts to prepare aspirants for the responsibilities and obligations of membership.

What more can the United States do to encourage NATO member nations to spend more on defense, transform their militaries, acquire advanced capabilities, and enhance their interoperability with the United States and other NATO member nations?

ANSWER: The U.S. can help by demonstrating its political commitment to the Alliance, working through NATO to address today's complex global security challenges, and by making it clear to Allies that we expect them to bear an equitable share of the burden of Alliance security.

The U.S. must also lead by example, continuing to field expeditionary and state-of-the-art forces and capabilities, and employing them in a NATO context, so Allied Nations can see first-hand the benefits of military transformation and the requirements for Allied interoperability.

European Security and Defense Policy

The European Union's (EU) European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) reflects the EU's intention to create a capability to conduct military operations in response to international crises in cases where "NATO as a whole is not engaged." Concerns have been raised that the ESDP could compete with, rather than complement, the NATO Alliance.

Do you believe that the United States and its European allies have taken sufficient steps to ensure that ESDP is implemented in a way that complements and strengthens NATO?

ANSWER: The administration supports ESDP on the understanding it would increase our Allies' and partners' military capabilities, would conduct

missions where NATO was not engaged, and would do so in a manner cooperative with NATO. The U.S. and most Allies have worked hard to strengthen NATO-EU cooperation. Much has been accomplished, in policy consultations and on real-world missions like in Bosnia. Still, we expect continuing U.S. and Allied efforts to maintain and bolster this cooperation. If confirmed, I will work with Allies in consultation with Congress to ensure that the ESDP is implemented in a manner that ensures it complements, and does not duplicate or detract from, NATO.

Engagement Policy

One of the central pillars of our recent national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises, combatant commander exercises, and humanitarian de-mining operations, have been used to achieve this goal.

Do you believe that these activities contribute positively to U.S. national security?

ANSWER: Yes. The challenges we face today – defeating terrorist networks, defending the Homelands of ourselves and our allies, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile states from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction – cannot be accomplished by one country alone, no matter how powerful. Military engagement helps build the capacity of friendly and allied militaries, enabling them to contribute to our mutual security, including to the fight against terrorism. These activities also facilitate international cooperation and interoperability.

If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military?

ANSWER: Yes, for the reasons noted above.

What improvements, if any, would you suggest to the interagency process for implementing these authorities?

ANSWER: The Department of Defense works closely with the State Department to plan and implement security cooperation globally. As the Secretary of Defense said recently in his Landon Lecture series remarks at

Kansas State University, new threats require our government to operate differently – to act with unity, agility and creativity. And, as the Secretary stated, these new threats will require that we devote considerably more resources to America’s non-military instruments of power. I believe these instruments of power include regular military engagement.

Russia

U.S.-Russian relations have experienced increased tensions over the past several months, including as a result of Russian reactions to the U.S. proposal for a missile defense site in Europe.

What is your vision for U.S.-Russia relations in promoting security in Europe and globally?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will seek constructive cooperation with Russia to promote European and global security – of course, while remaining true to our principles. We have a robust bilateral annual work plan with the Russians, consisting of over 100 planned events that are mainly focused on exchanges and developing interoperability. These include numerous exercises, both sea-based and on the ground. Moreover, we are engaged in discussions with Russia to try to find how we can cooperate in the area of missile defense to counter the growing ballistic missile threat, as well as to assuage Russian concerns about the proposed missile defense program. For example, over the last months, we have had numerous exchanges with the Russians on the “expert level” concerning the proposed missile defense sites, as well as high-level engagements, including by Secretary Gates, with Russian interlocutors.

At the same time, we must defend our interests and advance our values. The Cold War is long over and the U.S. and Russia are no longer strategic competitors, but we are concerned about the apparent “enemy image” many Russians have of the U.S. and NATO, their suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, their opposition to missile defense plans which are not a threat to their security, and Russian arms sales to countries of concern.

Does support for ratification of the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) remain in the interest of the United States and its NATO Allies?

ANSWER: I believe that the CFE regime remains in our interest, and that if outstanding problems can be solved, the present Treaty can and should be replaced by the Adapted Treaty to reflect post-Cold war realities (for example, by eliminating the current Treaty's bloc-to-bloc structure).

What do you believe would be the impact of Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty on security in Europe?

ANSWER: The impact on security will depend on future Russian actions. Russian officials have said they will not be bound by CFE equipment limitations, but that they have no plans to build-up their forces as long as other states do not do so.

The transparency provided by CFE notifications and inspections have contributed greatly to where we are today, including the increased confidence of the states in the region. It appears that those notifications and inspections will not occur during suspension and this may decrease the confidence among the states in the Treaty over time.

Is it in the U.S. interest to engage with Russia to persuade them to adhere to their obligations under the CFE Treaty?

ANSWER: The CFE Treaty and other treaties have contributed greatly to where we are today – for example, by leading to reductions in over 69,000 items of military equipment and establishing current limits that contribute to stability in Europe. The Under Secretary for Policy and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) has been fully engaged in support of efforts led by the Department of State Assistant Secretary Dan Fried and others in encouraging the Russians to reverse their decision to suspend. Indeed, we have participated in meetings and co-chaired exchanges with the Russians in an attempt to resolve Russian concerns related to the treaty. If confirmed, I will continue our activities to encourage Russia to reverse its decision on suspension and to engage with us to resolve outstanding problems.

The START treaty will expire in December 2009. In your view, what elements of this treaty should be extended or modified?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I would be responsible for the Department's overall relationship with Russia. Specific issues related to strategic nuclear arms, however, fall under the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special

Operations Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, Mr. Vickers. That said, I recognize that START was invaluable in reducing strategic forces at the end of the Cold War and providing us with the security posture we now enjoy. The context of our strategic relationship with Russia has changed since the Cold War, however, and discussions on this and related issues should reflect the current security contexts in which we now find ourselves. While we are not allies with Russia, we do need to cooperate with it on a range of issues, including counter-WMD and counterterrorism. If confirmed, I will work closely with Assistant Secretary Vickers and the Department of State to further our national security interests, including in this area. It is my understanding that efforts are underway in the interagency to address this issue and that those efforts include limited dialogue with the Russians on post-START.

Do you believe that the international arms control legal framework with Russia and other former Soviet states, including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), continue to promote security and stability in Europe and globally?

ANSWER: As I noted in my previous answer, I recognize that START was invaluable in reducing strategic forces at the end of the Cold War and providing us with the security posture we now enjoy. They also contributed significantly to the confidence of many of our Allies. The context of our strategic relationship with Russia has changed since the Cold War, however, and discussions with the Russians should reflect the current security contexts in which we now find ourselves. While we are not allies with Russia, we do need to cooperate with it on a range of issues. If confirmed, I would continue the senior-level engagement, as well as the transparency and confidence building measures, for building trust with the Russians, as well as for providing insight and understanding of their concerns.

In your view does continuing the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe serve any national security purpose, and if so, what is that purpose?

ANSWER: Yes; the U.S. nuclear forces committed to NATO and based in Europe are one of the most tangible signs of our commitment to the indivisibility of security to all NATO nations, as

well as to extended deterrence. In addition, they are a critical political and military link between the U.S. and its European Allies. By maintaining our commitment to extended deterrence and sizing our force posture at the appropriate level, we support our allies and reduce the incentive for others to develop independent nuclear capabilities. Moreover, the weapons provide a very real capability to respond to aggression and, as such, serve as an important deterrent to such aggression.

If these tactical nuclear weapons were to be removed from Europe, could there be any political or other benefits as a result?

ANSWER: Removal of those weapons would undermine a visible aspect of Alliance solidarity and eliminate a capability that, by its very existence, helps reduce the incentive for others to develop independent nuclear capabilities, and helps deter emerging threats.

In general, what are your views on continuing to maintain U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? Is there a point in time or a set of circumstances at which or under which you would support removing these tactical nuclear weapons?

ANSWER: NATO's nuclear forces are of critical political-military importance. These forces: provide unique capabilities that cannot be met by conventional weapons; support the basic NATO precepts of shared risks and responsibilities and widespread participation; and strengthen the link between North American and European members of the Alliance. It is my view, as well as that of the current administration and of the NATO Alliance, that U.S. nuclear weapons should remain in Europe as tangible evidence of our commitment to the indivisibility of security to all NATO nations.

If confirmed, what responsibilities would you have with respect to nonproliferation programs, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, in Russia and the States of the former Soviet Union and in making any decisions about where and when geographic expansion of the CTR programs should occur?

ANSWER: If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs, who is responsible for the management of nonproliferation programs for the Department of Defense, to ensure that policy decisions regarding the direction of CTR programs take into account regional and political-military

implications.

Africa Command (AFRICOM)

Full Operational Capability (FOC) for AFRICOM is scheduled for October 1, 2009, and there remains a significant amount of work to be completed, including standing up a staff, an adequate headquarters, and a forward deployed capability.

In your assessment, is the Department of Defense moving too quickly to make fully operational a major geographic combatant command or is the current schedule manageable?

ANSWER: The timelines we have developed for AFRICOM's establishment as a fully operational unified command are aggressive; however, I believe we can achieve them through continued concerted efforts within the Department, with our interagency partners, and with the support of Congress. AFRICOM reached initial operational capacity this past October and is progressing steadily toward FOC in October 2008. Although FOC is a significant milestone, the Command will continue to evolve and improve as we incorporate lessons learned and best practices. If confirmed, I will continue to dialogue with Congress in establishing the Command.

AFRICOM is contemplated as playing a larger role in development activities than have other combatant commands. On the African continent, the U.S. Agency for International Development currently has more than 20 bilateral field missions and three regional missions.

What is your understanding of the role AFRICOM will play in the area of development activities?

ANSWER: I fully recognize the unique role and significant capabilities of USAID as the primary U.S. agency providing development and disaster relief assistance abroad. AFRICOM will play a supporting role in development activities when necessary and appropriate. USAID staff within the command will help ensure that such responses when appropriate and necessary are well-planned, well-coordinated and well-executed, to include their integration with other USAID efforts in the region.

From a policy perspective, what do you believe to be the appropriate role of the DoD in delivering development and humanitarian services?

ANSWER: The Department of Defense, and therefore the command, plays a supporting role in delivering development and humanitarian services, as required. The U.S. military is not an instrument of first resort in providing to humanitarian assistance but supports civilian relief agencies. I recognize that USAID is the principal agency extending assistance to countries recovering from disaster or authorized to receive development assistance.

U.S. Military Basing in Europe

On August 16, 2004, the President announced an Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) touted as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. As part of force transformation efforts which also included a domestic base realignment and closure round, hundreds of military bases and facilities at overseas locations would be closed and roughly 70,000 personnel would return from Europe and Asia to bases in the United States. Recently the Secretary of Defense has indicated that the number of U.S. military personnel to be returned from Europe may potentially be reduced, and some bases originally scheduled for closure might remain open for an unspecified period of time.

Do you support the goals of the IGPBS which would reduce the number of installations and the force posture of U.S. forces stationed overseas, specifically in Germany?

ANSWER: Yes. While I defer to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operation and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, if confirmed, I will support the decisions supporting the current posture plan for Europe to transform Cold War legacy forces and bases into a more relevant and flexible network of capabilities for dealing with post 9-11 security challenges. It is my understanding that since the IGPBS was signed in 2004, for various reasons, General Craddock has requested that the Secretary reconsider the number of forces that will remain in Germany, at least for the short term. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Congress on this issue.

What is your understanding of the reasons for the Secretary of Defense to reassess the original goals of the IGPBS?

ANSWER: As stated above, the Department is considering retaining some force posture in theater longer than originally anticipated to address a number of issues, including the near-term security cooperation needs with European partners. This potential change may also help ensure the quality of life for soldiers and families as part of the Army's plans for stationing new "Grow the Force" units. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress on this issue.

In your assessment, does the Department of Defense need to propose to the President an update to the IGPBS strategy due to new trends or emerging threats?

ANSWER: The Department continually reassesses and refines its posture plans to address changes in the strategic environment.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

ANSWER: Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of Defense?

ANSWER: Yes

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

ANSWER: Yes

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when

requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

ANSWER: Yes