DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

THURSDAY, MARCH 7, 2013

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Manchin, Blumenthal, Donnelly, King, Inhofe, McCain, Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, and Blunt.

Committee staff members present: Peter K. Levine, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: John A. Bonsell, minority staff director; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Anthony J. Lazarski, professional staff member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, and Lauren M. Gillis.

Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Jeff Fatora, assistant to Senator Nelson; Mara Boggs, assistant to Senator Manchin; Marta McLellan Ross, assistant to Senator Donnelly; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Hirono; Karen Courington, assistant to Senator Kaine; Christian Brose, assistant to Senator McCain; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Todd Harmer, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Peter Schirtzinger, assistant to Senator Fischer; Craig Abele, assistant to Senator Graham; Joshua Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter; and Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Blunt.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. I want to welcome our witnesses, General William M. Fraser III, USAF, Commander of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and General

Carter F. Ham, USA, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), to testify this morning on the programs and the budget that's needed to meet the current and the future requirements within their respective commands. Please extend on behalf of our committee our gratitude to the men and women of your commands and their families for the many sacrifices that they've made on behalf of our Nation. Thanks to both of you for your long careers of leadership and service.

General Ham, this is likely to be your final posture hearing. So on behalf of the committee, let me say that we've enjoyed working with you in various positions. We wish you and your family all the best as you embark upon another adventure in your life. Your job as Commander of AFRICOM has been truly challenging, coordinating and conducting a major multinational effort, and in building relationships throughout the continent of Africa. You and your staff at AFRICOM are to be commended for your performance in this effort. We thank you, sir.

The multitude of security and military-related challenges across your area of responsibility (AOR) have been well-known to the committee since the inception of AFRICOM. The issues associated with postwar Libya, ongoing conflict in Somalia, evolving threats in Northwest Africa, Sudan's support to Iran and its proxies, and enduring regional conflicts in Central Africa continue and in some cases have gained momentum since the command was stood up.

Given the Department of Defense's (DOD) economy of force effort in the AFRICOM AOR, this committee has sought to provide AFRICOM greater flexibility and broader authorities to respond to the unique threats faced by your command, General Ham. We look forward to learning more about the challenges that you face today and how we could enhance your command's ability to conduct operations.

There are three areas I want to call out for special attention. First, the attack in Benghazi last September was a poignant and powerful reminder of our need and the public's expectation for a capability to respond in real time to crises around the world. This committee recently heard from the Secretary of Defense and from General Dempsey on the Department's response to the Benghazi attack. It is clear that AFRICOM continues to struggle to secure basing rights and access which would allow for such a response or allowing us to conduct day-to-day certain military operations with partners in the region. Moreover, AFRICOM has received less in the way of resources and support than other geographic commands, and this problem indeed may grow in a resource-constrained environment.

So we look forward to learning of the action that the Department has taken to ensure AFRICOM is equipped in the future to respond to or, more importantly, secure the intelligence to warn of such an impending attack.

Second, AFRICOM's efforts to combat the threat posed by al Qaeda, its associated forces, and other violent extremists have seen some success, but new challenges to sustaining progress seem to emerge daily. In Somalia, AFRICOM's investments are showing promise as the African Union forces continue to expand their territorial control and the nascent Somalia Government is provided ad-

ditional time and space to build its capacity and its capabilities. The committee looks forward to learning of Africa's plan to consider building a more traditional military-to-military relationship with the Somali military.

The military operations led by General Ham which helped bring about the fall of the Qadafi regime and the resulting outflow of small arms and other advanced munitions has drastically changed the security dynamics in North Africa. Over the past few months, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has used its kidnapping ransoms to destabilize the nation of Mali and to threaten nations across the region.

While successful French military action enabled by intelligence and aerial refueling support from AFRICOM has forced AQIM out of the population centers in northern Mali, the threat of terrorism emanating from Northwest Africa remains potent and the region is likely to be a source of instability for years to come. That instability is complicated further by key smuggling routes that move drugs, weapons, terrorists, and money which finance terrorist and other transnational criminal activity around the world. This committee looks forward to hearing your views, General Ham, on this dynamic situation as well.

Lastly, Operation Observant Compass, AFRICOM's named operation to assist the multinational military effort to remove Joseph Kony and his top lieutenants from the battlefield, remains of great interest to this committee. This is something where Senator Inhofe has been particularly involved and taken a leadership role. This committee has sought to ensure that this mission is adequately resourced, with additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as well as flexible logistics authorities to better support the nontraditional composure of this operation.

General Ham, we look forward again to your assessment of those operations and a report of hopefully any progress that's been made during the last year.

General Fraser, we know that things have been busy for you as well ever since you assumed your command at TRANSCOM. TRANSCOM has played a critical role in supporting our war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. TRANSCOM now faces the daunting task of returning thousands upon thousands of items of equipment and containers of material as we withdraw our forces from Afghanistan.

Less well known, but no less important, has been TRANSCOM's role in supporting various humanitarian and relief efforts around the world. We applaud those efforts as well.

TRANSCOM is also facing threats to its infrastructure on a day-to-day basis. At TRANSCOM you communicate over the unclassified Internet with many private sector entities that are central to DOD's ability to support deployment operations in the transportation and the shipping industries, in particular. Much of the other critical communications and operations of DOD can be conducted over the classified DOD Internet service, which is not connected to the public Internet and therefore is much more protected against eavesdropping and disruption by computer network attacks.

You've been quoted in the press, General, as stating that TRANSCOM is the most attacked command in DOD, and we'd like

to hear today about what those challenges are and any progress that you've made in dealing with the problems.

TRANSCOM is facing many other challenges. The Ready Reserve Force, a group of cargo ships held in readiness by the Maritime Administration, is aging and will need to be modernized with newer ships over the next 10 years. Sealift support is critical to our capabilities. We have relied on sealift to deliver more than 90 percent of the cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Another challenging area is the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. I'm going to put my remarks about that program in the record.

Finally, this committee has sought to ensure that combatant commanders have what they need to succeed in their missions and we will continue to support the requirements of our warfighters in these conflicts. However, this year's posture hearings with our combatant commanders are being held under the specter of budget sequestration, which threatens to impose arbitrary cuts on our military forces unrelated to our national security requirements. As the committee heard last Tuesday, sequestration is already having an operational impact in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area, for instance.

So, General Ham and General Fraser, please address the impacts and the risks associated with sequestration and the expiration of the Continuing Resolution (CR), which is also looming, as it applies to your commands.

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

I want to welcome our witnesses, General William Frazer, Commander of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to testify this morning on the programs and budget needed to meet the current and future requirements within their respective commands.

Please extend, on behalf of the committee, our gratitude to the men and women of your commands and their families for the many sacrifices that they have made on behalf of our Nation. And thanks to both of you for your long careers of leadership and service.

General Ham—this is likely to be your final posture hearing. On behalf of the committee, let me say that we have enjoyed working with you in various positions, and we wish you and your family all the best as you embark upon another adventure in your life. Your job as Commander of AFRICOM has been truly challenging in conducting and coordinating a major multinational efforts and in building relationships throughout the continent. You and your staff at AFRICOM are to be commended for your performance in this effort.

The multitude of security and military-related challenges across your area of responsibility (AOR) have been well known to this committee since your command's inception. The issues associated with post-war Libya, ongoing conflict in Somalia, evolving threats in northwest Africa, Sudan's support to Iran and its proxies, and enduring regional conflicts in central Africa continue, and—in some cases—have gained momentum since that time. Given the Department of Defense's (DOD) economy of force effort in the AFRICOM AOR, this committee has sought to provide the AFRICOM greater flexibility and broader authorities to respond to the unique threats faced by your command. General Ham, we look forward to learning more about your challenges today and are prepared to further enhance your command's ability to conduct operations.

There are three areas I want to call out for special attention. First, the attack in Benghazi last September was a poignant and powerful reminder of our need—and the public's expectation—for a capability to respond in real-time to crises around the world. This committee recently heard from the Secretary of Defense and General Dempsey on the Department's response to that attack. It is clear that AFRICOM continues to struggle to secure basing rights and access allowing for such

a response, or allowing us to conduct day-to-day certain military operations with partners in the region. Moreover, AFRICOM has received less in the way of resources and support than other geographic commands, and this problem indeed may grow in a resource-constrained environment. We look forward to learning of the action the Department has taken to ensure AFRICOM is equipped in the future to respond or—more importantly—to secure the intelligence to warn of such an impending attack.

Second, AFRICOM's efforts to combat the threat posed by al Qaeda, its associated forces, and other violent extremists have seen some success, but new challenges to sustained progress emerge daily. In Somalia, AFRICOM's investments are showing promise as the African Union forces continue to expand its territorial control and the nascent Somali Government is provided additional time and space to build its capacity and capabilities. The committee looks forward to learning of AFRICOM's plan to consider building a more traditional military-to-military relationship with Somali military.

The military operations led by General Ham, which helped bring about the fall of the Qadhafi regime and the resulting outflow of small arms and other advanced munitions, has drastically changed the security dynamics in North Africa. Over the past few months, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has used its kidnapping ransoms to destabilize the Nation of Mali and to threaten nations across the region. While successful French military action—enabled by intelligence and aerial refueling support from AFRICOM—has forced AQIM out of the population centers in northern Mali, the threat of terrorism emanating from Northwest Africa remains potent and the region is likely to be a source of instability for years to come. That instability is complicated further by key smuggling routes that move drugs, weapons, terrorists, and money, which finance terrorist and other transnational criminal activity around the world. General Ham, this committee looks forward to hearing your views on this dynamic situation.

Lastly, Operation Observant Compass—AFRICOM's named operation to assist the multinational military effort to remove Joseph Kony and his top lieutenants from the battlefield remains of great interest to the committee. This committee has sought to ensure this mission is adequately resourced with additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as flexible logistics authorities to better support the nontraditional composure of this operation. General Ham, we look forward to your assessment of these operations and a report on any progress during the past year.

General Fraser, we know that things have been busy for you as well ever since you assumed your job at TRANSCOM. TRANSCOM has played a critical role in supporting our war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. TRANSCOM now faces the daunting task of returning thousands upon thousands of items of equipment and containers of materiel as we withdraw our forces from Afghanistan. Less well known, but no less important, has been TRANSCOM's role in supporting various humanitarian and relief efforts around the world. We applaud those efforts as well.

TRANSCOM is also facing threats to its infrastructure on a day-to-day basis. At TRANSCOM, you communicate over the unclassified Internet with many private-sector entities that are central to DOD's ability to support deployment operations—in the transportation and shipping industries in particular. Much of the other critical communications and operations of the Defense Department can be conducted over the classified DOD internet service, which is not connected to the public Internet and is therefore much more protected against eavesdropping and disruption by computer network attacks. You have been quoted in the press as stating that TRANSCOM is the most attacked command in the Department. We would like to hear today about any progress you have made in dealing with these problems.

TRANSCOM is facing many other challenges. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF), a group of cargo ships held in readiness by the Maritime Administration, is aging and will need to be modernized with newer ships over the next 10 years. Sealift support is critical to our capabilities. We have relied on sealift to deliver more than 90 percent of the cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan, which is similar to previous contingencies.

Another challenging area is the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. DOD relies heavily on the CRAF program to provide wartime capability, depending upon CRAF to provide as much as 40 percent of wartime needs. TRANSCOM and DOD need to ensure that the CRAF participants can continue to provide that surge capacity in the future.

This committee has sought to ensure that our combatant commanders have what they need to succeed in their missions and will continue to support the requirements of our warfighters in these conflicts.

However, this year's posture hearings with the combatant commanders are being held under the specter of budget sequestration, which threatens to impose arbitrary cuts on our military forces unrelated to our national security requirements. As the committee heard on Tuesday, sequestration is having an operational impact in the CENTCOM area. General Ham and General Fraser, please address the impacts and risks associated with sequestration and the expiration of the Continuing Resolution as it applies to your commands.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think your opening comments covered pretty much all of it and I do agree with your concerns.

I know, General Ham, it's hard for me to believe that it's been 2 years now that you've been at that helm. We talked about some of the problems that were coming up when you came on the job and some of those problems are still there. We'll have a chance to talk about that and I appreciate it.

General Fraser, thanks to both of you for your service.

Six weeks ago, back when we were talking about the sequestration, I made the comment that if it becomes inevitable, which I didn't think was the case at the time, several of us had legislation that would have changed that, including some individuals at this table. However, I said, in the event that it becomes a reality, and we have to live with the top line that has been dictated, wouldn't it be better if the decisions that were made to reach that were made by the Service Chiefs?

I spoke to all Service Chiefs and they all agreed. Number one, that that would be less devastating; and number two, that it would be something that they would have time to do and put it together. I think that's happened. We know that the House has a program that's primarily the CR. It doesn't really address sequestration quite as much.

I would like to get a response from you, if you think that's a good idea. Hopefully, that still might be a possibility, that we can get the expertise of the Service Chiefs making these decisions as opposed to the President with his formula of across-the-board.

The AFRICOM AOR has 54 countries and 12 million square miles. I felt pleased when we were able to establish AFRICOM as a separate command. However, I still believe it's under-resourced, and I've talked to you about that in the past. As the squeeze takes place in the Middle East, we have terrorism going down through Djibouti and the Horn of Africa. We know what's happening down there. It's not just in North Africa, it's spreading.

The chairman spoke about Joseph Kony, I know that's a tough thing to deal with. But this isn't just one madman who's mutilating kids. This is a part of a terrorist organization and it has to be treated that way. It's been tough, heavy lifting for you. So I know you've done a great job and I look forward to asking more specific questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

General Ham.

STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

General HAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and members of the committee. Thank you especially for this opportunity to discuss the contributions of the women and men of AFRICOM. I'm honored to be here today with my friend and colleague, General Will Fraser, whose support has been so essential to our activities in Africa.

This year marks the fifth anniversary of the formation of AFRICOM. We've evolved considerably since 2008, driven in part by events on the ground and in part by our own rethinking about the mission. Our operational capabilities and capacities have markedly increased and our security cooperation engagements have matured both in focus and effectiveness.

Our approach seeks to address the near-term threats to our national security while simultaneously building partnerships and fostering regional cooperation which contribute to achieving longer-term U.S. objectives in Africa.

This past year has seen significant positive developments in Africa as well as some sobering reminders of the threats inherent in the continent's security challenges. Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, in East Africa, Al-Shabaab has been weakened by the sustained operations of African forces with the support and enabling assistance from the United States and others. Somalia still faces significant political, economic, and security challenges, but the Somali people now have something they haven't had for a very long time: hope for a better future. I'm proud that we've played a role in that.

In Central Africa, African troops, advised and assisted by U.S. Special Forces, have achieved some significant tactical gains against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and its leader, Joseph Kony. Today, we are seeing increased levels of LRA defections, fewer LRA attacks, and enhanced cooperation between the military forces in the region.

In the Gulf of Guinea, maritime forces of the many nations in the region are increasingly cooperating to counter piracy, oil bunkering, and illicit trafficking. Most notably, two of the African Union's regional economic communities, the Economic Communities of West African States and Central Africa States, have for the very first time crafted rules and procedures that facilitate maritime security cooperation. I'm very proud that AFRICOM has helped bring these nations and these regional organizations together.

I highlight these three, Somalia, counter-LRA, and Gulf of Guinea security, because they, at least to me, offer great examples of what can be achieved through an African-led endeavor to which we provide support and enabling capabilities. The next area where such an approach may be useful is Mali. We've supported France's request for assistance and are actively supporting African nations deploying to operate in Mali.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, while the increasing willingness of many African partners to actively address shared threats is encouraging, other trends in the region are deeply concerning. Terrorist organizations in West and North Africa are increasing their connectivity. The loss of four Americans in Libya and three more

in Algeria underscores the threat presented by this growing network. Although each terrorist organization individually poses a threat to regional stability, the increasing collaboration amongst these organizations increases the danger that they collectively present. I'm convinced that if left unchecked, this network will develop into one that poses a greater and more imminent threat to U.S. interests.

Countering the spread of violent extremist organizations has been our top priority. At the same time, we're tasked to focus on prevention through a very active partnership strategy. It remains clear that Africans must solve Africa's problems.

The fiscal challenges that you mention now place AFRICOM's strategy to strengthen the capabilities of our partners at increased risk. I'm concerned about the impacts resulting from the combined effects of sequestration and the CR. We've already had to make difficult decisions based on the availability of funds, such as reducing reconnaissance flights. The budget reductions we face will cut theater security cooperation engagements and will reduce important joint and combined exercises. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey, has made clear, we will, in fact, be doing less with less.

We at AFRICOM, with the engaged support of the Service Chiefs, though, are not idly sitting on our hands. We're looking for new and innovative ways to address the many challenges in Africa. The Army's regionally aligned force, Navy's Africa Partnership Station, and the Air Force counterpart, Africa Partnership Flight, are programs the Services have purposely designed to help us achieve our objectives. We look forward to the capabilities of the Marine Corps' new Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, which will bring improvements in our crisis response capabilities.

Let me conclude by simply stating that it's been my great honor to serve with the dedicated soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, civilians, and colleagues from across the U.S. Government who serve so unselfishly every day to advance our Nation's interests in Africa. I depart in about a month, knowing that AFRICOM is in the best of hands. General Dave Rodriguez is an exemplary leader and an old friend. It'll be my privilege to see him lead the women and men of AFRICOM well into the future.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, members, I thank this committee for its unfailing support of our troops, their families, and of AFRICOM. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Ham follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA

MISSION STATEMENT

U.S. Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.

INTRODUCTION

This year marks the fifth anniversary of the formation of the command. Since our standup in 2008, our operational capabilities and capacities have markedly increased. In parallel, our relationships with African partners and our security co-

operation engagements have matured in both focus and effectiveness. Our integrated approach seeks to address the greatest near-term threats to our national security while simultaneously building long-term partnerships and fostering regional cooperation.

The past year has witnessed both positive developments and sobering reminders of the threats in the U.S. Africa Command Area of Responsibility. Many African partners are more capable of addressing national and regional security challenges today than they were a year ago, and we have strengthened both new and enduring partnerships. In Somalia, sustained operations by African forces, with enabling assistance from the United States and the international community, significantly weakened al-Shabaab, providing space for Somalia's transition to a constitutionally-based government. We are deepening our relationship with the Tanzanian military, a professional force whose capabilities and influence increasingly bear on regional security issues in eastern and southern Africa and the Great Lakes region. Senegal and Ghana, anchors of regional stability in West Africa, held peaceful, democratic elections last year and remain important U.S. partners in efforts to counter transnational threats. Similarly, in Botswana, a highly capable partner and positive influence throughout southern Africa, we are strengthening an enduring partnership grounded in shared commitments to democracy and the rule of law. Liberia is progressing toward the establishment of a professional, capable military that is a force for good, as demonstrated by its border deployment in response to Cote d' Ivoirian rebel activities last fall. In Libya, a nation that witnessed its first election of the General National Congress since the overthrow of Qadhafi, we are developing a strong partnership with the new military.

Despite these positive trends, the regional security environment continues to challenge U.S. interests and increase the operational demands on U.S. Africa Command. In the past year, the United States lost four Americans in deadly attacks in Benghazi and three more in the terrorist attack on a British Petroleum facility in Algeria; al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged stronger and better armed following the coup d'état in Mali; and Boko Haram continued its campaign of violence in Nigeria.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Emerging Terrorist Networks

As al Qaeda has syndicated its ideology and violence, its affiliates and adherents in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have become increasingly networked and adaptable in their recruiting, training, financing, and operations. Violent extremist organizations, insurgents, and criminal organizations are exploiting weak governance and under-governed spaces, and remain determined to harm the United States, our partners and Allies, and innocent civilians. The need to put pressure on al Qaeda affiliates and adherents in East, North, and West Africa has never been greater. The September 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound and Annex in Benghazi and the January 2013 attack on the British Petroleum oil facility in Algeria illustrate the growing threat posed by violent extremist organizations in Africa to U.S. citizens and interests. This network of al Qaeda affiliates has already developed into a threat to U.S. regional interests and if left unchecked, could pose a threat to Europe and the U.S. Homeland. Coordinated approaches that integrate diplomatic, development, and military efforts are needed to achieve both short- and long-term counterterrorism objectives, including the disruption of terrorist financing and undermining of recruitment efforts by violent extremist organizations.

Arab Awakening

The Arab Awakening redefined the North African political landscape and continues to impact countries across the region. Two years ago, the actions of a single Tunisian citizen catalyzed a wave of change that continues to reverberate throughout North Africa and the Middle East. The post-revolutionary transitions currently underway in Tunisia and Libya are extraordinarily important to the future of these countries and to the region and have had significant consequences for regional security. The flow of fighters and weapons from Libya to violent extremist organizations in northern Mali serves as one example of how political instability in one nation can have a profound effect across a broad region. The United States has a stake in the success of these transitions, not least of all for their potential to serve as a powerful repudiation of al Qaeda's false narrative that only violent extremism can drive change. U.S. Africa Command's relationships with the Tunisian and Libyan militaries have important roles in supporting these transitions as new governments in Tunisia and Libya work to develop accountable and effective institutions, strengthen civil society, and improve security.

Increased Regional and International Integration

The rising political and economic influence of emerging powers is transforming the international system, and this change is evident in Africa. Asian economic expansion is inflating global commodities prices, a major driver of strong economic growth in some African nations. Increased Chinese engagement in pursuit of economic development is deepening China's political and economic influence and increasing its access in the region. Other rapidly growing economies, including Brazil and India, are similarly increasing their engagement and investment in Africa. As Africa becomes more fully integrated into the global economy, African maritime security is growing in importance to the free flow of global commerce. In parallel with Africa's continuing integration into global political and economic systems, African nations are strengthening their regional economic and political integration. African nations and regional organizations are increasingly taking a lead role in multilateral responses to regional security threats, both within and outside the structure of the African Union and the regional standby forces that comprise its continental security architecture.

COMMAND APPROACH

U.S. Africa Command's approach reflects strategic guidance provided in the National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategic Guidance, the National Military Strategy, the Presidential Policy Directive for Political and Economic Reform in the Middle East and North Africa (PPD 13) and the United States Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Based on this strategic guidance, U.S. Africa Command protects and advances vital U.S. national security interests in Africa, including protecting the security of the global economic system, preventing catastrophic attacks on the homeland, developing secure and reliable partners, protecting American citizens abroad, and protecting and advancing universal values. These universal values include the respect for and protection of human rights, the prevention of mass atrocities, and the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In Africa, military-to-military engagement plays a limited but important role in sustaining progress in countries undergoing democratic transitions, as well as those emerging from conflict.

In support of advancing regional peace and security, U.S. Africa Command focuses on priority countries, regional organizations, and programs and initiatives that build defense institutional and operational capabilities and strengthen strategic partnerships. Cooperative security arrangements are key to addressing transnational threats, and U.S. Africa Command utilizes operations, exercises, and security cooperation engagements to foster multilateral cooperation and build the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations. U.S. assistance, including focused military support, has contributed to significant progress by African forces in the past year in both peacekeeping and combat operations.

U.S. Africa Command's strategic approach addresses both threats and opportunities. We simultaneously address the greatest near-term threats to our national security while building long-term partnerships that support and enable the objectives outlined in the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa: strengthening democratic institutions; spurring economic growth, advancing trade and investment; advancing peace and security; and promoting opportunity and development. Countering terrorism is the Department of Defense's (DOD) highest priority mission in Africa and will remain so for the foreseeable future. While prioritizing addressing emerging security challenges through both direct and indirect responses, U.S. Africa Command views these challenges also as opportunities to deepen enduring relationships, strengthen partner capabilities, and foster regional cooperation.

Our theater strategy and four subordinate regional campaign plans guide our operations, exercises and engagements, which focus on five functional areas: countering violent extremist organizations; strengthening maritime security and countering illicit trafficking; strengthening defense capabilities; maintaining strategic posture; and preparing for and responding to crises. These activities are primarily executed by U.S. Africa Command's components: Army Forces Africa, Air Forces Africa, Naval Forces Africa, Marine Forces Africa, Special Operations Command Africa, and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. Our headquarters interagency representatives from nine Federal agencies and liaison officers from eight countries are integral to the success of U.S. Africa Command's efforts.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND PRIORITIES

Countering Violent Extremist Organizations

The September 2012 attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound and Annex in Benghazi and the January 2013 attack on the British Petroleum oil facility in Alge-

ria are evidence of the growing threat posed to Americans and U.S. interests by African violent extremist organizations (VEO) and the global VEO network. In the past year, U.S. Africa Command worked closely with regional and interagency partners to strengthen counterterrorism partnerships grounded in shared security interests, assisted partner military forces and U.S. interagency partners in discrediting and defeating the appeal of violent extremism, and strengthened partner capabilities to provide security as an element of responsive governance.

Three violent extremist organizations are of particular concern in Africa: al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), active in northern and western Africa; Boko Haram in Nigeria; and al-Shabaab in Somalia. Although each organization individually poses a threat to U.S. interests and regional stability, the growing collaboration of these organizations heightens the danger they collectively represent. Of the three organizations, AQIM, which exploited the instability that followed the coup d'état in Mali and seeks to establish an Islamic state in northern Mali, is currently the most likely to directly threaten U.S. national security interests in the near-term.



To counter AQIM and support the restoration of governance in Mali, U.S. Africa Command is providing support to French and African military operations in northern Mali, which are achieving gains against AQIM and other terrorist organizations. We are supporting French efforts with information, airlift, and refueling, and are working with the Department of State (DoS) to support the deployment of west African forces to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Recently, we began unarmed, remotely piloted aircraft operations from Niger in support of intelligence gathering efforts in the region. Although French, Malian, and AFISMA forces are achieving success in removing AQIM fighters from population centers, eliminating the long-term threat posed by AQIM will require the restoration of Malian governance and territorial integrity, political reconciliation with northern indigenous groups, the establishment of security, and the sustained engagement of the international community.



While international focus is currently on Mali, AQIM is not solely a Malian challenge. The organization is spread across the Sahel region and requires a regional approach to effectively address the threat. U.S. Africa Command continues to work closely with the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to support regional counter-terrorism efforts under the umbrella of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). A partnership between 10 northern and western African nations and the United States, TSCTP is designed to support the development of partner nation military counterterrorism skills and capabilities and foster regional cooperation among participating nations to address the evolving threat of AQIM and related extremist groups. One aspect of TSCTP's impact can be seen in the troop contributions of five participating countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal) to AFISMA. Although Mali has historically been a TSCTP partner, U.S. Africa Command is not currently engaged in capacity-building with the armed forces of Mali, consistent with U.S. legal prohibitions on the provision of security assistance to any military force that has been involved in a military overthrow of a democratically-elected government.



In Nigeria, where Boko Haram is conducting a destabilizing campaign of violent attacks focused on the northern part of the country, U.S. Africa Command engages with the Nigerian Armed Forces to improve their military capabilities. We seek to support the development of a professional military that will support a coordinated Nigerian Government effort to address Boko Haram and provide the citizens of Nigeria with responsive governance and improved economic opportunity. Boko Haram is in contact with al Qaeda and recently kidnapped a French family in retaliation for French actions against AQIM in Mali. If pressure on Boko Haram decreases, they could expand their capabilities and reach to pose a more significant threat to U.S. interests.



In Somalia, al-Shabaab has been greatly weakened by the operations of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Ethiopian, and Somali forces. While al-Shabaab is less effective, the group is still dangerous and capable of conducting unconventional attacks to disrupt AMISOM operations and the newly formed Somali Government.

The significant gains achieved by AMISOM forces over the past year were critical in providing space for the political process that resulted in Somalia's transition to a government now formally recognized by the United States. While Somalia faces many challenges ahead, it is on a positive path. As military-to-military relations are normalized with Somalia, U.S. Africa Command will work with the DoS to develop security cooperation activities to assist with the development of a unified Somali security force. For the foreseeable future, focus must be maintained on Somalia to sustain security progress made to date.

Overall, we believe that our efforts to counter violent extremist organizations are having a positive impact. Our African partners are demonstrating strengthened capabilities and are increasingly cooperating with other nations to address shared security challenges, including supporting African Union and United Nations operations and programs. The leadership of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States in addressing the security challenges in Mali is indicative of the growing willingness and capability of Africans to address African security challenges.

Maritime Security and Counter Illicit Trafficking

Multilateral cooperation in addressing regional maritime security challenges continued to improve over the past year. Maritime security is not only vital to countering terrorism and illicit trafficking, but is also a critical enabler of trade and economic development. Coastal nations contend with a range of challenges off their coasts including trafficking in narcotics and arms, human trafficking; piracy and armed robbery at sea; oil bunkering; and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). Piracy and armed robbery at sea in the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea elevated insurance rates and shipping costs, resulting in increased costs to consumers. IUU fishing devastates African fisheries, which play a vital role in African economic growth and food security. Criminal organizations leverage ungoverned maritime space that could also be exploited by violent extremist organizations.

African partners are making progress in addressing challenges in the maritime domain through cooperative regional approaches supported by the international

community. U.S. Africa Command and our Naval and Marine components work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard in the execution of our two primary maritime security programs, the African Partnership Station program (APS) and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP), which are contributing to strengthening regional maritime capabilities and interoperability. African maritime forces used skills gained through participation in AMLEP and APS to conduct operations that resulted in the seizure of over $100 million worth of cocaine and the levying of over $3 million in fines. Benin and Nigeria now conduct joint maritime patrols while South Africa, Tanzania, and Mozambique signed a counter-piracy agreement codifying their efforts and reflective of the trend of increasing regional cooperation in addressing maritime security challenges.

Countering illicit trafficking is linked to the challenge of increasing African maritime security. Illicit trafficking in the maritime, air, and land domains provides income to international criminal networks, has a destabilizing influence on governance, and is increasingly exploited by violent extremist organizations as a source of financing. U.S. Africa Command coordinates closely with U.S. Government agencies and embassy law enforcement teams to conduct programs to counter illicit trafficking. Our efforts focus on increasing partner nation capacities to detect and interdict illicit trafficking throughout the African continent. Counter-trafficking skills are applicable to combating a wide range of criminal activity, including poaching.

As part of our enduring partnership with Liberia, we are supporting the development of the Liberian Coast Guard and recently renovated the coast guard's pier to enable operations. U.S. Africa Command constructed a new Senegalese maritime operation center with follow on training and assistance to the new center's staff and advanced training to the Cape Verde Counter Narcotics and Maritime Operations Center. The U.S. Africa Command also assisted Cape Verde and Senegal in developing maritime operations centers that have facilitated the interdiction of suspect vessels.

Strengthening Defense Capabilities

Strengthening partner defense capabilities enables African nations to provide for their own security and helps U.S. Africa Command to develop enduring relationships that support freedom of movement and assured access for U.S. forces. We assist African nations in developing capable, accountable, self-sustaining military forces and defense institutions. Our capacity-building activities complement DoS programs and are planned in close coordination with embassy country teams and partner nations. Our engagements, which span the range of essential military capabilities, include combined humanitarian and medical assistance programs conducted in coordination with the USAID.

The success of AMISOM forces against al-Shabaab illustrates the positive impact of U.S. defense capacity-building efforts in the region. AMISOM forces receive predeployment training through the DoS Global Peace Operations Initiative's Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. U.S. forces support and complement ACOTA activities with specialized training in skills that have played a critical role in enhancing the operational success of AMISOM forces, including intelligence analysis and countering improvised explosive devices. To date, the forces of five AMISOM troop contributing countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Uganda) were trained through the ACOTA program.



Advice and assistance from U.S. forces enhanced the capabilities and cooperation of military forces of Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of the Congo currently engaged in operations to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Operational gains made by regional forces over the past year, combined with civilian efforts, resulted in increased LRA defections, the capture of key LRA leaders, and decreased LRA attacks on civilian populations. The formation of an African Union Regional Task Force will facilitate further cooperation among counter-LRA forces.

U.S. Africa Command is broadly supporting U.S. commitments to countries undergoing democratic transitions by assisting in the development of professional militaries that respect civilian authority, are respectful of the rule of law, and are increasingly capable of securing their borders and combating mutual threats, including transnational terrorism. We continue to develop our and strengthen partnerships with the armed forces of Libya and South Sudan. In South Sudan we have developed a comprehensive program that supports the ongoing DoS security assistance program. Our current focus is on education of key institutional-level personnel and small-scale civil action projects with the South Sudanese military. Our engagement with the Libyan Armed Forces similarly focuses on education and also emphasizes the strengthening of Libyan counterterrorism capabilities. As these relationships continue to develop, we look forward to deepening our partnership with both militaries.

U.S. Africa Command's engagements with African land forces will be enhanced as the command becomes the first combatant command to be supported by a brigade through the Army's Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept. Beginning in March 2013, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division will support U.S. Africa Command in developing enduring relationships and cooperation with partner nation land forces. RAF engagements will likely range from small travelling contact teams to support to major exercises. Initial planning for the RAF includes support to State Department-led ACOTA training for African forces deploying in support of United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations.

An area of emerging focus is strengthening partner defense capabilities in air security and safety. Last year, our dual-hatted Air Force component, USAFE–AFAFRICA, launched the African Partnership Flight (APF) program, which promotes regional cooperation and strengthens the capabilities of partner nation air forces to provide airlift support to United Nations and African Union peacekeeping operations. 150 airmen from five African nations participated in APF's initial event last year, which addressed air mobility and logistics for peacekeeping operations,

priority areas in which African air forces have very limited capabilities. APF will expand this year to include 175 students from eight nations.

The State Partnership Program (SPP) provides unique capabilities that augment our ability to build enduring relationships with strategic partners in the region. SPP engagements build mutual U.S. and partner nation capacity to address shared security challenges. SPP activities currently contribute to our security cooperation with eight partner nations; Botswana, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia. SPP engagements account for over 40 percent of military-to-military engagements each year. Expansion of the State Partnership Program, particularly in East and North Africa, would assist in developing stable and enduring relationships with additional strategic partners, providing a foundation for capacity-building efforts by rotational forces.

Over the past year, U.S. Africa Command increased activities in support of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, including integrating gender training, which is tailored to partner nation socio-cultural dynamics, into our security sector reform activities. Liberia has established a goal of 20 percent female representation in its armed forces, a development that reflects the increasing regional interest in expanding opportunities for women in the armed forces. We are also working with the Botswana Defence Forces to assist in its efforts to expand the integration of women into their forces.

Preparing and Responding to Crisis

U.S. Africa Command stands ready to respond to crises across the continent. Several incidents in the last year caused the Command to act to ensure the safety and security of American citizens including the January 2012 rescue of American citizen Jessica Buchanan and Danish citizen Poul Thisted from captors in Somalia. In November 2012, when rebel activities in the Central African Republic required the suspension of U.S. Embassy operations, we assisted the DoS in evacuating U.S. Embassy personnel and American citizens.

The dynamic security environments that followed the Arab Awakening have increased requirements for crisis response capabilities. U.S. Africa Command capabilities to respond to crisis have matured over the past year, including the establishment of a headquarters Command Center and the allocation of a Commander's In-extremis Force in October 2012. The Commander's in-Extremis Force is currently based in Colorado, with a rotational element forward in Europe. Forward basing in Europe would increase the capability of the command to rapidly respond to incidents on the continent. Our Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force, which previously focused on supporting security cooperation activities, will be expanded to allow support to crisis response, further increasing our capabilities in this regard.

HOW CONGRESS CAN HELP

Sequestration and potentially, a year-long extension of the current Continuing Resolution, will have a negative impact on the command. The combined effects may force significant reductions in theater security cooperation activities and joint and combined exercises, potentially endangering progress in strengthening partner defense capabilities, gaining access to strategic locations, and supporting U.S. bilateral policy objectives. Meeting Africa's many challenges requires the collaboration and support of all agencies of the U.S. Government and the support of Congress. Enactment of full year appropriations for defense, military construction, DoS, and USAID programs is critical to effective program planning and mission execution. Because U.S. Government efforts are interconnected and often mutually dependent, fully resourcing one of these pillars without the others compounds the difficulties of planning and execution, and hinders mission completion.

Many of our programs use a mix of DoS and DOD authorities and funding. For example, DoS peacekeeping operation authority provides for training our African partner nation forces, while DOD section 1206 authority provides for equipping those forces. The use of dual authorities requires close coordination between departments, and full funding of the DoS's security assistance programs is critical to success. We work with our interagency partners to ensure the resources provided by Congress are appropriately tied to our defense and foreign policy priorities.

We are keenly aware of the current fiscal environment and support all ongoing DOD efforts to decrease spending and ensure funds are wisely utilized. Our efforts under the Campaign to Cut Waste resulted in budget plans which reflect a savings of $1 million in both monetary and process efficiencies. We have also taken a hard look at our staffing levels, contracts, and conferences to determine where savings can be realized. We applied a self-imposed 5 percent personnel reduction for both fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 and are on a path to all but eliminate temporary hires and overhires. But sequestration and a possible year-long extension of

the current Continuing Resolution will have serious negative consequences for our efforts.

I thank this committee and Congress for its support of our team and our mission. You have provided key authorities at appropriate times, as in extending through fiscal year 2014 the temporary authority to build the counter-terrorism capacities of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and countries engaged in AMISOM. Pursuant to this authority, we have worked with the DoS to plan and execute our support to counter-terrorism capacity-building at a critical time. We are currently providing logistical equipment to Djiboutian and Kenyan forces participating in AMISOM. We appreciate this authority and believe it will enable AMISOM forces to continue their progress against al-Shabaab.

We also appreciate the enhanced train and equip authority under section 1206 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, to permit small scale military construction among the authorized elements.

Your annual reauthorization of the temporary, limited authority to use operation and maintenance funding for military construction in support of contingency operations in our area of responsibility has permitted us to meet critical operational support needs in a timely fashion, and we appreciate your recognition of its importance.

The recent volatility in North and West Africa demonstrates the importance of sufficient Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to cover multiple crises simultaneously. ISR capabilities are required to protect American interests and to assist our close allies and partners. We appreciate the authorization in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 of an additional $50 million for ISR in support of our counter-LRA efforts.

We appreciate your continued support for the Combatant Commander Exercise and Engagement Program. This program is the foundation of our exercises in Africa and funds strategic lift requirements as well as providing Service Incremental Funds to our components, ensuring we can provide the forces to work and exercise alongside our African partners.

Finally, we welcome visits by congressional members and their staffs. The members and staff who have had the opportunity to travel in Africa gain a deeper appreciation for the challenges and the many opportunities that are presented in this large and diverse continent.

CONCLUSION

The African continent will continue to present a complex and fluid set of challenges and opportunities. African nations, the African Union, and regional economic communities are increasingly demonstrating their willingness to address African security challenges. At U.S. Africa Command, we will continue to engage with our African partner militaries to strengthen their skills and capabilities, so they are better able to address shared security concerns and are able to contribute to regional stability and security. We also look forward to strengthening our existing partnerships and developing new partnerships, such as we have with the Libyan military.

Our contributions to protecting and advancing our national interests would not be possible without our interagency partners across the government, including the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, the incredibly dedicated women and men of the U.S. intelligence community and others. Our team of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coastguardsmen—and our DOD and interagency civilian teammates—is dedicated to our mission and their achievements would not be possible without the strong support of their families.

Thank you for your enduring support to our men and women in uniform and for your interest in this increasingly important region of the world.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General Ham.

General Fraser.

STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

General FRASER. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee: It's an honor and a privilege to be with you here today representing the men and women of TRANSCOM. Our total force team of over 150,000 men and women, military and civilian, is dedicated to providing reliable and seamless logistical support to our warfighters and their families around the globe.

It's also an honor to be here today appearing before you with my good friend and colleague, General Carter Ham. Over the past 2 years I've had the opportunity to work with General Ham as he and his team made significant progress on the African continent and continued to meet the challenges of that expansive, diverse AOR.

Carter and I go way back. We go much further back than just the last couple years of his service in AFRICOM. I've always admired his commitment to his people, his dedication to solving the toughest problems, and his selfless service. Carter, on behalf of all the men and women of TRANSCOM, we wish you and your family all the best in retirement. God bless.

Distinguished members of this committee: Our Active Duty members, National Guard, Reserve, civil servants, merchant mariners, and commercial partners must meet the challenges of the future. They met the challenges of the past while maintaining a high operations tempo of combat operations which they are supporting through sustainment efforts, humanitarian relief, and crisis action responses. These efforts, from support following Super Storm Sandy to developing innovative ways to maximize the throughput into and out of Afghanistan to meet the directed 68,000 troop reduction level by September 30, 2012, were made possible by the TRANSCOM team of dedicated professionals committed to ensuring our joint force maintains global logistics superiority.

Our component and subordinate command team, comprised of the Air Mobility Command led by General Paul Selva, Military Sealift Command led by Rear Admiral Mark Busby, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command led by Major General Tom Richardson, the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command led by Rear Admiral Scott Stearney, and the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit led by Major General Dave Post, continue their flawless execution of our command's mission.

I have had the opportunity to observe firsthand during my travels in Europe, Central Asia, the Pacific, and all around the globe the support these world-class professionals provide. I can tell you they are doing the Nation's business magnificently, without fanfare and often in stressful conditions. I could not be prouder of this total force team.

As we continue to sustain our forces abroad, we're also working towards our goal of becoming the government's transportation and enabling capabilities provider of choice. To meet that goal, we embarked on a comprehensive and collaborative 5-year strategic plan, which will tackle the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities for continuing to project national power and influence. This strategic plan positions us to respond effectively and efficiently to our rapidly changing operating environment, while accounting for the dynamic fiscal landscape that we now face.

We continue to work with our customers and our lift providers to pursue smart transportation solutions to reduce the cost of operations. Strategic guidance requires a military that is smaller and leaner, while at the same time, more agile, flexible, and ready. As the global distribution synchronizer and distribution process owner, TRANSCOM is committed to working with the Military Services, the other combatant commands, government agencies, our allies,

and commercial partners to synchronize distribution planning and synergize our distribution initiatives. This collaborative effort will ensure that we deliver a scaleable and resilient global distribution network from point of origin to point of employment, meeting needs in all operating environments.

As we look towards the future, we're also assessing the mission impact of funding reductions for this year and potentially beyond. Since TRANSCOM requirements are driven by our customer workload and readiness needs, as their demand signals decline, our workload will be reduced. While the impacts of these reductions will not occur immediately, the long-term results will likely affect the business base of our commercial partners and our ability to support other combatant commands in the same manner as we do today. In the coming months, we'll continue to work closely with the Military Services and our commercial partners to mitigate the second- and third-order effects of these reductions on our airlift, sealift, and surface capabilities. We'll keep you informed of our progress.

Preserving our readiness remains critical to maintaining our capability to project power and provide support to our joint forces around the world.

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members of this committee, I want to thank you for your continued support of TRANSCOM, of all of our men and women both military and civilian. I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you today. I ask that my written statement be submitted for the record and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Your statement, of course, will be made part of the record, and we thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Fraser follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF

INTRODUCING THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

MISSION/ORGANIZATION

It is an honor to represent the men and women of the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Our Total Force team of Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian, commercial partners, and contractors leads a world-class Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) providing reliable and seamless logistical support to our warfighters and their families around the globe. Our service component commands the Army's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC); our functional component command the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU); and our subordinate command the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) provide tremendous capabilities that we merge into transportation solutions to deliver effective support to the combatant commanders at the best value to the Nation. Together, we deliver global transportation services and enabling capabilities to our warfighters that no other nation can match.

Preserving our readiness remains critical to maintaining the Nation's capability to project power and influence anywhere, anytime. As the Distribution Process Owner (DPO), TRANSCOM focuses on end-to-end performance and on providing the most value by targeting process improvements and enterprise performance measurements. Our mission as Global Distribution Synchronizer (GDS) complements the DPO role by integrating transportation solutions into theater posture plans in the earliest planning phase possible. We are working with all combatant commands (COCOMs), interagency, nongovernmental organizations, supporting nations, and industry partners to develop regional distribution campaign plans, with an eye toward process, global touch-points, and measureable delivery. Additionally, we are hard at work on a series of measures to reduce the cost of operations and maintain

effectiveness to those who depend on us—while encouraging continued and expanded use of the Defense Transportation System (DTS).

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

Our goal is to be the U.S. Government's transportation and enabling capabilities provider of choice. To meet the numerous challenges and take advantage of the enormous opportunities for continuing to rapidly project national power and influence well into the future, TRANSCOM has proactively embarked on a comprehensive and collaborative 5-year strategic plan. This strategic plan is positioning us to effectively and efficiently respond to our rapidly changing operating environment while accounting for the dynamic fiscal landscape we now face.

First, we will preserve enterprise readiness by ensuring unfettered access to organic and commercial transportation resources. Our Readiness Roadmap will better leverage our organic assets, as well as the unique strengths and contributions of our commercial partners, and identifies the steps we must take to wisely transition from a decade of conflict to become a leaner, more efficient and more collaborative manager of the defense transportation enterprise.

Second, we will achieve excellence in information technology (IT) management, by promoting increased knowledge-sharing and transparency across the enterprise. In our unique roles as Distribution Process Owner and Global Distribution Synchronizer, we recognize we must develop and sustain a secure information environment that ensures effective knowledge-sharing and decisionmaking even while operating in a contested cyber domain. We have already begun building a functionally-managed IT framework to identify and align resources to our most critical needs.

Third, we are rebaselining our internal roles, functions and responsibilities in order to match human and capital resources for projected future mission activities. This realignment enhances collaboration, matches skills to processes and creates a more disciplined, transparent resourcing process in order to achieve sound resource stewardship while remaining responsive to those who depend on us to effectively execute in an increasingly dynamic operational environment.

Finally, but most importantly, we are better equipping our people with the knowledge, skills, and training to maintain our world-class, customer-focused professionals. The enhancements we are achieving in our diverse workforce of Active, Guard, and Reserve military components, civilian employees, and contractors will further enhance support for global mobility across the transportation enterprise.

SUPPORTING GLOBAL OPERATIONS

Current fiscal realities have resulted in funding reductions for all Services. TRANSCOM requirements are driven by our customer workload and readiness requirements. If COCOM demands are reduced, our workload will also be reduced. While these impacts will not occur immediately, the long-term results may directly impact our ability to execute critical missions of our supported COCOMs.

The capacity to project national power, presence, and influence worldwide is unique to the United States. To support this vital national capability, we lead a team of dedicated professionals in providing global mobility and strategic enablers. TRANSCOM provides the ideal blend of operational expertise and distribution know-how to move and sustain the force worldwide. Together, we deliver unparalleled service to multiple COCOMs in support of their theater campaign plans and contingency operations. Our team has an unrelenting passion to meet a vision of coordinated, synchronized, and responsive end-to-end logistics which ensures that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) civilians always have the support they require.

TRANSCOM oversees the global mobility enterprise; our component commands execute the mission. In 2012, AMC and its Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard partners maintained a high operations tempo supporting requirements around the world. AMC deployed, to multiple locations, a rotational force of over 30 C–130 Hercules tactical airlift aircraft and 60 KC–135 Stratotanker and KC–10 Extender aerial refueling aircraft. The strategic airlift fleet flew over 1,400 C–5 missions and 13,000 C–17 missions supporting the full range of national interests. In total, AMC moved 584,000 tons of cargo, offloaded 194 million gallons of fuel, and moved 1.7 million passengers while flying 127,000 sorties. On the surface, MSC and SDDC transported over 7.4 million tons of cargo worldwide. In addition, MSC's point-to-point tankers delivered 1.4 billion gallons of fuel in support of global DOD requirements.

During 2012, more than 900 JECC personnel performed 27 operational deployments and participated in 39 joint exercises in support of COCOM requirements. JECC's highly skilled Active and Reserve component personnel rapidly deployed as

mission-tailored planning teams to assist combatant commanders in establishing, organizing, and operating joint force headquarters during numerous operations, and provided unmatched deployable joint communications and public affairs expertise, whenever and wherever needed.

Our functional command, the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit, provided necessary augmenting capability to a wide array of functions across the command. This augmentation has been particularly important during numerous surge and contingency operations when our most critical operational and planning functions required the highest level of activity.

SUPPORT TO GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS (GCCS)

The President directed the reduction of Afghanistan's Force Management Level to 68,000 troops by 30 September 2012. Achieving this force reduction on schedule was possible through close coordination between headquarters, TRANSCOM, our component commands, and our commercial partners. Innovative ways to maximize throughput included expanding options for transiting forces into and out of the CENTCOM Theater. Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield, Romania, provided an additional transit location for deploying and redeploying forces in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, resulting in the movement of approximately 10,000 troops during the height of the surge recovery of forces from Afghanistan.

Working with our regional and commercial partners, we executed multiple proofs of principle to validate processes and capabilities. As we develop more efficient transportation routes around the globe, we continue witnessing the great effects of maturing routes. We continue to seek new air, ground, and multi-modal routes, adding flexibility and responsiveness to the DTS.

In addition to validating two-way passenger flow through Romania, we are reaping the benefits of last year's initiative to flow air-direct traffic over an Arctic route. This Arctic routing, allowing both commercial and military aircraft to support Afghanistan from the west coast, resulted in 2 million gallons of jet fuel saved last year. This is a savings of $26 million.

Our ground lines of communication continue to mature as well. The success of the distribution network's flexibility was demonstrated by the lack of operational impact resulting from the closure of the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC). The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) absorbed a 46 percent increase in containers, moving over 30,000 containers in total. That capability, coupled with our multi-modal capacity, allowed us to continue uninterrupted support to our warfighters. Additionally, we have successfully reversed our Kazakhstan—Kyrgyzstan—Tajikistan and Uzbekistan routes, allowing the movement of retrograde cargo over the NDN. We are also executing a reverse Trans-Siberia route, which establishes another option for the movement of retrograde cargo. Despite the enterprise's ability to weather the unexpected, the PAKGLOC, when fully operational, remains the quickest and most cost-effective route for supporting operations in theater.

Multi-modal operations continue to provide a middle-ground option between the speed of air direct and the lower cost of surface movement. TRANSCOM, working with industry and partner nations, continues to expand the capabilities of existing locations and add new sites where necessary. For example, following the recent success of air direct shipments through Baku, Azerbaijan, we developed processes and procedures for multi-modal operations. This effort is expected to increase volume while reducing transit time and costs. Hybrid multi-modal operations, leverage a blend of military and commercial airlift, and provide another opportunity to reduce cost without sacrificing effectiveness.

In the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) area of operations (AOR), TRANSCOM continued its support of the National Science Foundation's (NSF's) mission. As part of Operation Deep Freeze, we coordinated for the delivery of over 4,000 passengers and 2,150 short tons (STONs) of cargo via C–17 and more than 6 million gallons of fuel and 3,400 STONs of cargo via sealift to McMurdo Station, Antarctica. In February 2012, the NSF discovered the ice pier used in previous years to offload cargo was not capable of supporting ship off-loading operations. TRANSCOM rapidly coordinated the delivery and setup of an Army modular causeway system, which permitted the off-load of nearly 7 million pounds of cargo in 322 containers and the backload of more than 8.7 million pounds of retrograde cargo in 391 containers. This off-load operation, the first of its kind in this environment, spanned 8 days, during subfreezing temperatures and sustained Antarctic winds.

In addition to ODF, TRANSCOM supported numerous operations that enhanced the security and preparedness of U.S. and allied forces in the PACOM AOR. TRANSCOM supported multiple deployments and redeployments in support of Op-

eration Enduring Freedom–Phillipines (OEF–P). We also provided strategic airlift and sealift to military Security Forces and Special Warfare Units to the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Guam in support of PACOM's Theater Security Cooperation program engagement strategies and objectives. TRANSCOM supported U.S. Special Operations Forces Joint Command Exercise Training (JCET) throughout the Asia-Pacific region at the invitation of regional governments, with strategic airlift and sealift of PACOM assets. Support for PACOM's JCS Exercises Terminal Fury in Hawaii, Cobra Gold in the Kingdom of Thailand, Commando Sling in the Republic of Singapore, Balikatan in the Republic of the Philippines, and Key Resolve, and Ulchi Freedom Guardian in the Republic of Korea entailed the movement of 10,452 passengers, 1,298 STONS moved by strategic airlift, and 406,270 square feet (or 22,114 STONS) via sealift.

Additionally, TRANSCOM moved 1,574 STONS of food, water, construction materials, and vehicles to support the PACOM Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) team from Pusan, Republic of Korea, to Nampo, Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In the U.S. Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) AOR, TRANSCOM continued to support the secure transport of personnel for detainee movement operations. In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of State, Joint Staff, and supported COCOMs, we successfully completed 100 percent of these sensitive missions without incident.

In the U.S. European Command's (EUCOM) AOR, TRANSCOM deployed and redeployed more than 2,233 troops and 1,169 STONs of cargo in support of the Kosovo Balkan force. During December 2012, we conducted the movement planning for 326 personnel and 1,022 STONS of cargo in support of the Patriot Missile Battery deployment into Turkey in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense. Support to EUCOM also included numerous strategic lift missions in support of exercises in several countries to include: Estonia, Georgia, Israel, Latvia, Norway, and Poland. These exercises entailed moving more than 2,732 personnel and over 8,000 STONs of cargo for training events aimed at exercising the ability to deploy, employ, and sustain forces in response to a crisis affecting the EUCOM AOR.

In the U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) AOR, TRANSCOM deployed and redeployed 3,187 troops and 1,297 STONs of cargo in support of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. We also coordinated and tracked 40 airlift missions moving nearly 300 personnel and over 490 STONs of cargo while supporting contingency operations in northern Africa.

Finally, in the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) AOR, the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System equipped C–130 aircraft, provided by our component, AMC, flew 922 sorties and released more than 22.2 million pounds of fire-retardant, combating wildfires in direct support of U.S. Forestry Service operations. The WC–130 Hurricane Hunter aircraft flew over 120 sorties into 32 storms collecting valuable hurricane data for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In support of relief efforts in the wake of Super Storm Sandy, TRANSCOM coordinated for nearly 100 C–17 and C–5 missions moving 749 passengers and 3,762 STONs of cargo. Critical supplies delivered included electric utility restoration vehicles, medical personnel, search and rescue teams, blankets, dewatering pumps, and support equipment. Support to NORTHCOM also included lift for training exercises providing realistic homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities training for joint and interagency partners. This entailed moving more than 3,700 personnel and over 1,363 STONs of cargo in support of Exercise Vibrant Response 13, a training event exercising the ability to deploy, employ, and sustain specialized military response forces upon the request of civilian authorities following a catastrophic incident.

SUPPORT FOR THE WARFIGHTER

Global patient movement remains one of our most demanding missions requiring 100-percent accuracy. Last year, in partnership with the medics of AMC, Air Force Reserve Command, and the Air National Guard, we efficiently and effectively provided en route medical care to more than 14,000 patients. Patients requiring critical care support were moved by Critical Care Air Transport Teams, including six patients who were moved by the new Acute Lung Rescue Teams, one from PACOM and five from CENTCOM.

Our partnership with the Military Health System is vital to the success of patient movement. In particular, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center is vital to the support of four COCOMs: EUCOM, CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and U.S. Special Operations Command. The planned Military Construction (MILCON) replacement of this out-

standing hospital will further aid the en route medical care needs of ill and injured servicemembers and their families.

We are working to improve the quality of life for servicemembers and their families by providing convenient and user-friendly online services for scheduling the shipment of household goods. Last year, the Defense Personal Property Program (DP3) through the Defense Personal Property System (DPS) managed approximately 600,000 DOD household goods shipments. DP3 provides the procedures necessary to build the many online resources provided by DPS. These services include Web-enabled counseling, the ability for a DOD customer to score their Transportation Service Provider (TSP) via the customer satisfaction survey, as well as the ability to file an online claim while in direct communication with the TSP.

Finally, the ability to support the warfighter in Afghanistan's mountainous terrain requires reliance on vertical resupply via airdrop operations. Although airdrop cargo amounts decreased from 2011 to 2012, AMC airdropped over 40 million pounds of fuel and combat supplies, significantly reducing exposure to troops on surface roads. With the High Speed Container Delivery System, we are able to support forward deployed warfighters, increasing delivery tonnage to point of need and providing enhanced threat avoidance and tactical maneuverability to airlift aircraft and crews. Civilian causality concerns led to the development of new capabilities such as an extracted container delivery system to improve aerial delivery accuracy. Additionally, enhancements in existing capabilities, such as the low-cost, low-altitude airdrop system and Joint Precision Airdrop System, enhance our delivery capability to warfighters operating at ever increasing, smaller and more austere locations or in proximity to civilian populations.

INTERAGENCY AND OTHER SUPPORT

Cyber threats posed to TRANSCOM, our components, commercial partners, national critical infrastructure, and key resources are a direct challenge to DOD global operations. Among TRANSCOM's top priorities is ensuring freedom of action and protection of mission data throughout the cyberspace domain to plan and execute our global mission. To that end, we continue to strengthen our partnerships with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) as well as the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and other interagency and industry partners. It is critical that we protect our essential command and control systems and information from cyber attack or exploitation. TRANSCOM continues efforts to improve readiness and strengthen ties with both our commercial and U.S. Government partners through improved information sharing.

Our role as GDS facilitates enhanced opportunities to support the COCOMs and the Department of State by means of engagement events focused on distribution, transportation, and logistics. Fostering critical relationship-building opportunities based on universal logistics interests is our unique and innovative approach to traditional security cooperation activities. Our GDS responsibilities provide the basis and means for successful strategic engagements as we continue to expand our reach and become more agile. The NDN is a prime example of coordinated and synchronized activities that have maximized strategic distribution flexibility and reduced operational risk. The NDN has minimized reliance on any one nation by offering fair and open competition that facilitates economic development and diplomatic engagement. The strategic impact has improved international relations and expanded commodity resourcing through the development of an integrated and synchronized distribution enterprise.

MOBILITY CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT-18 (MCA–18)

MCA–18 is an assessment being conducted by TRANSCOM in conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. We are assessing DOD's capability to project and sustain forces in support of the defense strategy, through 2018, by examining a range of strategic and operational mobility challenges that include current operations plans, defense scenarios, seminars presented in Chairman Joint Chief of Staff senior leader seminars, and historical operations. MCA–18 will identify and evaluate our capabilities, the constraints associated with projecting and sustaining forces in support of the strategy, and options to mitigate system constraints. We will leverage this assessment as we move forward to complete the congressionally-mandated Mobility Requirements Capabilities Study 2018.

AIR MOBILITY READINESS

With the delivery of the last U.S. Air Force C–17, we will have the planned air mobility force structure to meet the strategic airlift requirements for a single large-

scale operation, while maintaining the flexibility and adaptability to support the Joint Force in another region.

Our other strategic airlifter, the C–5, is critical to our oversized and outsized air cargo capability. Management of this fleet focuses on retirement of the C–5A, the oldest and least reliable aircraft while improving reliability for the remaining C–5s. The Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) increases the C–5 fleet mission capable rate from 55 to 75 percent while vastly increasing aircraft performance, range, and fuel efficiency.

Together our C–17 and C–5 fleets continue to improve availability through the replacement of aging components, obsolete components and the Air Force's new programmed phase inspection maintenance process. This change from a "failure of major components" process to a preventive replacement process, along with the retirement of maintenance intensive jets and RERP modifications, will significantly improve strategic airlift aircraft availability, velocity, and capacity to the warfighters.

The KC–46A is critical to the entire Joint and coalition team's ability to project combat power around the world, and provides America and our allies with unparalleled rapid response to combat and humanitarian relief operations alike. The KC–46A offers more refueling capacity and increased capacity for cargo and aero-medical evacuation. The KC–46A will provide outstanding aircraft availability, highly adaptable technology, flexible employment options, and superb overall capability.

The legacy air-refueling fleet includes the KC–10 and KC–135 aircraft providing the backbone for Air Mobility support to our warfighters. The KC–10 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS)/Air Traffic Management (ATM) Program addresses airspace access and near-term critical obsolescence issues for the 59 KC–10 aircraft fleet. CNS/ATM capabilities are necessary to ensure worldwide flight operations in civil and military air space and meet current Federal Aviation Administration and International Civil Aviation Organization standards.

C–130s continue to be the intra-theater workhorse for airlift operations around the globe, providing critical lift and airdrop capability wherever needed. This versatile aircraft will continue to play an integral role for airlift long into the future.

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a voluntary commercial segment of our mobility force, providing additional capability to rapidly deploy forces and equipment globally. Over the past few years, TRANSCOM has encouraged program improvements by way of contracting day-to-day business with preference to those commercial carriers who have modernized their fleet. This approach has provided increased reliability and greater fuel efficiency, through economy of scale and continues to be of value as we adjust to changes in global economic situation and anticipated changes in our future force deployments. We continue to examine the CRAF program for viability and cost effectiveness for future mission needs.

SEALIFT READINESS

During large-scale operations, roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels are the prime movers of unit equipment for Army and Marine Corps forces. We rely primarily on commercial industry for sealift and complement it with our U.S. Government-owned vessels from the MSC's surge fleet and Maritime Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force (RRF) when necessary. Our partnership with commercial industry is formalized through agreements such as the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). This agreement and others ensure the availability of a viable U.S. flag maritime industry and the required U.S. citizen mariner pool needed in times of national emergency. We also leverage significant capacity through the Maritime Security Program (MSP). MSP has been an extremely successful program since its inception in the mid 1990's; over 70 percent of the VISA capacity needed for a national emergency would come from our partners in MSP. Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 has ensured the continued presence of the U.S. flag fleet in international commerce while providing DOD critical continued access to militarily useful RO/RO and other cargo vessels. Preserving these programs preserves the U.S. merchant mariner base, a vital national asset that provides the manpower needed for surge operations.

The National Defense Sealift Fund provides funding for 9 Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off vessels, 5 Roll-On/Roll-Off-Container vessels, and the 46 RRF vessels of our U.S. Government-owned surge fleets. All vessels are critical for the DOD's ability to surge to meet future global requirements. TRANSCOM is working with our commercial and U.S. Government sealift partners to find the most cost effective means to fund these fleets and the critical capacity they provide. Finally, with the average age of the RRF exceeding 36 years, and nearly 1.6 million square

feet of RO/RO capacity retiring over the next 10 years, it is important to begin the process of recapitalizing our organic fleets.

SURFACE READINESS

Successful execution of our mission and the daily support we provide to the warfighter rely on a complex global enterprise of interdependent critical infrastructure. Our Critical Infrastructure Program aligns resources in managing both a COCOM program and a Defense Infrastructure Transportation Sector program, the latter focusing on building relationships and trust among non-DOD critical infrastructure stakeholders, sharing information and collaborating where appropriate. Our critical infrastructure stakeholders range from other Federal agencies to State and local entities, foreign countries, and the private sector.

We continuously monitor the infrastructure network based on threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities. We augment teams who assess risks to infrastructure, advocate initiatives to economically reduce risk, and help develop solutions to preserve our readiness. These efforts are aimed at ensuring that infrastructure is available when required. Through coordination and cooperation with the commercial sector, the National Port Readiness Network delivers an important link between commercial port operations and military readiness at 17 strategic ports. These ports provide the critical services and intermodal links needed to ensure rapid, secure, and effective military mobilization. Improving the resiliency and modernizing our seaports, air nodes, and critical rail and road networks is a TRANSCOM focus area that ensures our ability to support all geographic combatant commanders and respond to emergencies within the homeland, now and far into the future.

Infrastructure improvement projects at the U.S. Army Military Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO), in Concord, CA, are essential to TRANSCOM's support of PACOM's operational plans and DOD's military capability in the Pacific Theater. Due to the nature and size of this military mission, no suitable alternatives to MOTCO exist on the West Coast. We continue to work within DOD to find resources to reduce or eliminate any capability gaps and risk at MOTCO to alleviate throughput issues to the Pacific Theater. DOD's current efforts are centered on preserving existing throughput capability at MOTCO's only operational pier configured for movement of containerized ammunition through comprehensive structural engineering assessments. Although the requisite resourcing processes have not yet run their full course, we are working with the U.S. Army to address the deteriorating infrastructure at MOTCO to allow for sufficient and uninterrupted delivery of supplies to the Pacific Theater.

Recently completed and ongoing infrastructure improvement projects at the U.S. Army Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU), in Sunny Point, NC, are essential to TRANSCOM's support of CENTCOM's operational plans and DOD's military capability in multiple theaters. Specifically, MOTSU's Center Wharf was recently upgraded to support the installation of two new container gantry cranes, which became operational in 2012. These improvements enhance MOTSU's ability to conduct missions and allow the terminal to meet documented throughput requirements, contributing to a resilient capability.

In addition to improving critical infrastructure, DOD must maintain railcar capacity to meet military transportation requirements. TRANSCOM through our Army component, SDDC, is executing an Army program established to preserve and assure access to commercial railcars needed to augment U.S. Government-owned capabilities and meet contingency deployment requirements.

JOINT ENABLING CAPABILITIES

TRANSCOM ensures the readiness and timely deployment of mission-tailored joint capability packages to assist all COCOMs across seven unique functional areas–joint planning, operations, logistics, knowledge management, intelligence support, communications, and public affairs—within hours of notification. JECC forces provide these enabling capabilities and are designated as part of the Secretary of Defense's Global Response Force. As a result of a changing, complex operational environment, the geographic combatant commanders have relied on and will increasingly depend upon TRANSCOM's low density-high demand JECC forces to accelerate the formation and the effectiveness of joint force headquarters and assist joint force commanders in the planning and execution of joint operations. We recognize that JECC's ability to effectively assist COCOMs on short notice depends on the development and maintenance of strong, close relationships with our mission partners and stakeholders.

ENHANCEMENTS TO TRANSCOM READINESS AND DOD SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT

As the GDS and DPO, TRANSCOM is committed to working with the military Services, COCOMs, governmental agencies, allied, and commercial partners to synchronize distribution planning and synergize distribution initiatives. This collaborative effort will ensure we deliver a scalable and resilient Global Distribution Network from point of origin to point of employment, meeting needs dictated by the operating environment.

A robust global infrastructure network is essential to our Nation's ability to project and sustain its power and influence; therefore, a commitment to obtain the access and agreements necessary to maintain this capability and adequately resource it is imperative. Using strategic-level analysis and subsequent modeling, we have identified requirements in the En Route Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) as both current and anticipated capability gaps and requirements. We will continue to utilize the ERIMP process to identify access requirements and construction projects that will improve our ability to support COCOM global routes.

At TRANSCOM we are constantly focused on reducing costs within the DOD supply chain while simultaneously sustaining or improving service levels to the warfighter. Last year, in collaboration with mission partners from Defense Logistics Agency, General Services Administration, COCOMs, and the Services, we achieved over $500 million in cumulative cost avoidance due to better surface container utilization and better pallet and planeload utilization. This simply better optimized business practices. We have set another target this year to continue finding savings opportunities and will seek to identify an additional $500 million in cost avoidance by the end of fiscal year 2015; to date, we have reached $721 million in cumulative cost avoidance. Our collective efforts earned the prestigious Defense Logistics 2012 Cost Savings and Performance Improvement Award.

To enhance readiness we are identifying new ways to leverage the existing DTS infrastructure and industry resources in support of our global demands, as well as formulating better solutions to improve DTS capabilities. This will not only benefit military aircrew proficiency but will contribute to our organic and commercial viability. In order to accomplish these objectives, the command stood up the Enterprise Readiness Center (ERC) to help capitalize on opportunities to increase DTS volume. The ERC will also seek to improve transportation services to existing customers and drive responsiveness to improved levels by applying enterprise-proven methods. We understand multiple transportation providers exist in today's global distribution network. To that point and with the ERC in place, TRANSCOM will endeavor to become the transportation provider of choice.

We continue to partner with CYBERCOM, DISA, industry, and academia to improve and harden our information technology resources, strengthen cyber defense, and improve our capability to operate effectively in cyberspace. Because of our strong reliance on commercial partners, over 90 percent of DOD deployment and distribution information transactions are handled on unclassified systems, leaving us vulnerable to possible cyber attacks. We are defining standards for processing and handling data that will improve the security of our information through our continued collaboration forums, including our cyber summit, industry day, and an exercise involving the Department of Homeland Security that improved our information sharing processes and relationships.

In order to fully support the needs of the warfighter, we are working with our joint enterprise partners to measure distribution performance. Our focus is to measure the right events at a sufficient level of detail to pursue supply chain optimization opportunities. For example, we are leveraging technology such as electronic data transmitted from commercial partners and system of record database incorporation to capture appropriate time-stamps. This data facilitates performance measurements and root-cause analysis as requisitions flow from suppliers to the warfighter. Through continual collaboration across the DOD, we are developing common and meaningful performance metrics that incorporate best-practices from the commercial and U.S. Government sectors.

BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION—EFFICIENCIES

We continue seeking methods to achieve cost avoidance and improve processes for container management. We have implemented several initiatives to include container detention fee reductions through increased use of U.S. Government-owned containers where cost effective, improving contract provisions with carriers through the recently awarded Universal Services Contract (USC)-7 and accomplishing container buyouts earlier when carrier owned containers are required to meet mission objectives. USC–7 is also enabling us to transform other business areas. This multiple award program, with 22 contracted ocean carriers, supports our worldwide sur-

face shipments. Some changes of significance from USC–6 to USC–7 include measuring carrier performance regionally by COCOM versus global basis; this allows for more relevant "best-value" booking decisions and provides leadership visibility on carriers' performance in each COCOM. We added four electronic data interchange codes, assisting in more accurate measurement of carriers' performance, ensures carriers are appropriately compensated for validated and compensable delays by providing more detailed visibility into the status of shipments.

Our operations focus foremost on effective support to the warfighter; we constantly search for the best, most efficient methods to provide seamless and responsive support. Many times, these transparent efficiencies also result in increased effectiveness. Deployment and Distribution Cost Based Decision Support (D2 CBDS) practice ensures TRANSCOM and COCOM operational decisionmaking incorporates cost consciousness with mission effectiveness through vetted, standardized, and codified operational cost methodologies. D2 CBDS methodologies encompass end-to-end nodes and transportation legs. To ensure second- and third-order effects are adequately considered, all required stakeholders are engaged throughout the D2 CBDS process. D2 CBDS has already produced significant cost avoidance, included under our DPO Strategic Opportunities umbrella, through a number of emerging efforts, including the Tankering Decision Matrix, monitored by the AMC Fuel Efficiency Office, that informs the Tanker Airlift Control Center when it is cost effective to carry fuel to downrange locations due to the prohibitively high costs to deliver fuel in theater.

Going forward, the D2 CBDS Working Group composed of TRANSCOM directorates, COCOMs, and network partners will provide rapid response and subject matter expertise for emerging complex operational costing opportunities.

TRAINING, EDUCATION, AND EXERCISES

TRANSCOM's participation in the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program directly supports U.S. national security interests by ensuring joint force readiness, increasing military capabilities, strengthening alliances and partnerships, and retaining strategic access around the globe. Maintaining freedom of action and global access is as much a requirement for the functioning of our JDDE as it is for the conduct of military operations and requires continuous engagement worldwide. CE2T2 enables this critical engagement; contributes to strategic and logistical access for the U.S. Government; increases readiness across combatant commands; and sustains partnerships with commercial industry and our global core partners in order to provide reliable and seamless logistical support at time of need. As we move forward with a refocus on the Pacific and our forces become more contiguous United States-based, we will see an even greater reliance on the CE2T2 program to maintain our freedom of action and the readiness to project that force to meet national security objectives. Maintaining the CE2T2 Program is critical to TRANSCOM's readiness.

PLATFORM ENHANCEMENTS

Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) provides the capability to load and discharge vessels in austere environments into Army and Navy watercraft or lighterage, where ports are damaged, unavailable, or inadequate or access is denied. Among the improvements JLOTS provides is a telescopic crane system that has stabilization technology to permit the selective retrieval of containers to be transferred between vessels or lighterage even under heavy sea states. The second is an interface module that will enhance Army Modular Causeway and the Navy Improved Lighterage Systems, which have differing freeboards.

JLOTS operations are extremely complex and require a detailed working knowledge of requirements, capabilities, and limitations among the Services to successfully plan and execute. As part of our oversight authority for JLOTS, this year we established the JLOTS Working Group with the primary mission to facilitate and streamline the coordination between Services and COCOMs and within the JLOTS community of interest. This group will lead the review of JLOTS initiatives, doctrine, and training as well as advocate for sustained JLOTS capabilities in support of COCOM requirements. JLOTS and Service Logistics Over the Shore capabilities continue to provide a necessary capability to support combatant commanders.

Hybrid airships represent a transformational capability, bridging the longstanding gap between high-speed, lower-capacity airlift, and low-speed, higher-capacity sealift. Across the range of military operations, this capability can be leveraged from strategic to tactical distances. From swift crisis action support to enduring logistical sustainment operations, hybrid airship technology has the potential to fulfill "fac-

tory to foxhole" cargo delivery. We encourage development of commercial technologies that may lead to enhanced mobility capabilities in the future.

FINAL THOUGHTS

We are entrusted with the authority to lead and transform the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise and the incredible responsibility of serving the geographic combatant commanders as they execute our Nation's most demanding military missions. To ensure that we can repeat our successes of the past as we move into a dynamic, resource-constrained future, we must transform the way that we manage the enterprise and make significant cultural changes in the way that we think, train, and execute our missions. Our strategic plan is guiding us in this transformation so that we are postured to support our forces worldwide with all available resources within the U.S. Government and offered by our commercial partners. We will continue to challenge ourselves to be ready for any contingency, peacetime or during conflict, and to meet the needs of our warfighters across the globe. I am extremely proud of the TRANSCOM team and our enterprise partners and the fantastic work they do to support our national security objectives. They know, better than anyone, that "Together, we deliver!"

Chairman LEVIN. We'll start with an 8-minute first round.

General Ham, you made reference to a reduction in flight hours, I believe, that have already been reduced as a result of sequestration. Can you expand a bit on that?

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, most of our operations are funded by the Services through the Service components, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Special Operations, for AFRICOM. In two of those components, Navy and Air Force, we have had to constrain our flight operations because of the Service component's funding challenges. Two specific examples: I have asked my Air Force commander to maintain a heightened alert posture with transport aircraft to be postured to move crisis response forces more readily. That requires him to sustain flight crews on a short leash, if you will, heightened alert posture. That eats into their normal training and sustainment flights and that's where the Air Force component is having difficulty having sufficient money to do both of those requirements.

On the Navy side, it's similar. I'd prefer, Mr. Chairman, to give you the operational details in a classified setting. But suffice to say that I've had to decrease the frequency of some operational reconnaissance flights, again because of the inability to fund the normal flight operations.

Chairman LEVIN. That's already taken place?

General HAM. It has, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General Ham, there's been some adjustments to the AFRICOM Commander's In-Extremis Force (CIF) and other contingency response forces which hopefully will put you in a stronger position to respond to a contingency. Have those changes already been made and can you tell us what improvements might be the result?

General HAM. The most notable change, Mr. Chairman, was on the 1st of October a dedicated CIF was established for AFRICOM. This was long in the planning, supported by Admiral McRaven and those in U.S. Special Operations Command. The unit actually is based in Colorado as part of the Tenth Special Forces Group. They always have an element, the immediate response element, forward deployed in Europe and have since October 1, where we have stationed that force in a number of different places in Europe.

There is still some work to be done. That force does not yet have all of its enablers in terms of intelligence, aviation support, and some other capabilities that we would like that force to have. But it is a significant improvement from where we were prior to the 1st of October, where the arrangement was that I shared the CIF with Admiral Stavridis and U.S. European Command (EUCOM).

The other Services have made similar improvements. The Army's regionally aligned force, should there be an operational requirement, I can go to the Secretary of Defense and ask to use that force operationally, should that be necessary. General Amos and the Marine Corps have proposed a new Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force specifically tailored for crisis response in Africa, not yet formally approved, but we think that that will be available in the relatively near future. I'm most appreciative to General Amos for making that force available.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Now, the forward element that you've made reference to which is deployed in Europe, in your judgment is it able to get to Africa more quickly actually from where it's deployed in Europe than it would be if it were somehow deployed in Africa? I know it sounds a little bit counterintuitive, but is it actually not the case that you can actually get from, particularly if it's in Italy or Southern Europe, to Africa more quickly because of the capabilities and the infrastructure than would be the case if you could find a location in Africa?

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, what we're seeking to do is use the CIF along with two other forces to build a theater response capability, with one element based in Djibouti where we do have an enduring presence—that force is now stood up—one in Southern Europe that could respond across Northern Africa, and another in a site to be determined, but that would be principally focused on response in West Africa. I think that would give us a significantly improved posture from what we have today.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

On the cybersecurity issue, General Fraser, have you experienced cyber attacks to the degree that I indicated in my opening remarks? If so, with what effect? What are your plans to address this threat?

General FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you've stated in your remarks, we are—and as best as I can tell—continue to be, the most attacked command. In fact, as I testified last year, in 2011 we had nearly 45,000 attacks. This last year, in 2012, it actually had quadrupled. It is an area that we have significant concerns about, but we have taken a lot of actions, and it is not in one area. We're taking a holistic approach as we work this specific issue.

If I might highlight just a couple of things.

Chairman LEVIN. Please.

General FRASER. First off is we had within the command a number of what I would call touch points, by which industry and others can come into the command and they could connect with us. Our objective was to develop more of what we term a secure enclave and collapsing that network so that there were fewer touch points in order to get into the command. This would enhance our abilities

to have a defensive posture, so that if people were trying to get into our network we would be able to see it, and we could defend it. We have been successful in that, as we have collapsed this to fewer touch points and have not had any significant intrusions into our network.

Another area that we're working on very closely is with our commercial partners. We have moved out in a very deliberate manner with commercial partners and have actually held three forums this last year where we brought in other agencies, to include law enforcement and others, with Chief Executive Officers and Chief Information Officers who actually came to TRANSCOM, and we focused on this cyberthreat that is there. These forums were very well-attended, upwards of nearly 100 each time that we held these conferences.

We were able to brief them in, to give them some information that they did not have before, and allowed them to further go back and take a look at their networks and how they are working with us.

From that came an agreement, in working with our partners, that we began to write into our contracts the need for more cyber awareness/cybersecurity. So what we started doing was, last year in the spring time, writing into our contracts the need for us to have an understanding of what their information assurance plan is. We were not directive in this but we wanted to know, "what are you doing to protect your network?"

Also in that contract, we stated that we wanted to have an agreement as a part of a collaborative nature to know when their networks were—in which they had activity that got into their network—either having data that was exfilled from their network or if they had someone in that was playing with their data. So we made sure that we had in the contracts that we would have this reporting that would come back to us.

When we get those types of reports, then we have a process and procedure by which we would ensure that law enforcement is advised, that we would offer any assistance that we have, and then we would stand up a team to determine what impact this might have had to our operations.

The other things that we have continued to do is to reach out to other agencies to ensure that we're not missing anything in the defense of our network. So it's a collaborative nature in working with all of our partners, collapsing the network to a secure enclave, and then writing it into our contracts to better understand what the threat may be.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. If you could furnish to the committee some examples of that contract language, not necessarily with the names of the contractors, just the actual kind of language which you're incorporating relative to cyber attacks in your contracts, we would appreciate it if you would do that.

General FRASER. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 directs the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish procedures requiring cleared defense contractors to report to DOD when a covered network of a contractor is successfully

penetrated. The implicit objective of this section is to provide DOD with greater visibility into adversary cyber activity on cleared defense contractors' networks and information systems. Since U.S. Transportation Command's (TRANSCOM) cyber contract initiative only provides visibility into contractors doing direct business with TRANSCOM, the section 941 initiative may provide the command with additional information in which to understand the adversary's intentions, objectives, and capabilities. The command is awaiting DOD implementation of section 941. At this time, TRANSCOM does not require any additional cyber assistance from the Senate Armed Services Committee.

We have separate cybersecurity language for transportation contracts and nontransportation contracts. The same language goes in all transportation contracts. [See "Transportation Contract Cyber Language" document.]

There are three levels of cybersecurity language for nontransportation contracts: Basic Language, Standard Language, and Advanced Language. TRANSCOM, in conjunction with our customers, determines which level of language is necessary for a particular contract. [See "Non-transportation Contract Cyber Language" document.]

TRANSCOM includes the cyber language in newly issued contracts and notifies the offerors during solicitation. [See "Transportation Solicitations Instructions to Offerors Cyber Language" document.]

TABLE OF CONTENT

Transportation Contract Cyber Language

Requirement for Contractor Information Assurance (IA) Report 2

Cyber Security Incidents 2
- Reporting Requirements 3
- Incident Report Content 3
- Incident Report Submission 3

Vendor Assessment Guidelines for Twenty Critical Security Control 4
- 20 Critical Controls 4
- Procedures for Assessment 4

Information Assurance Report Example 5

Non-Transportation Contract Cyber Language

BASIC LANGUAGE
Security, Handling of Non-Public Information 6

STANDARD LANGUAGE
Requirements for Contractor Provision of Security Plan, Information Assurance Controls 6
Periodic Government Inspections 6
Remote Access 6
Detect, Analyze, Respond 7
- Reporting Requirements 7
- Incident Report Content 7
- Incident Report Submission 8

Incident Response Coordination 8
Law Enforcement/Counterintelligence 8
Information Sharing 8
Confidentiality and Non-Attribution Statement 8
Information Assurance Training 9
Information Assurance Workforce Improvement Program 9

ADVANCED/DEVELOPERS LANGUAGE
Developer Environment 9
System Design, Information System Security Engineering Principles; 10
DOD Information Assurance Certification Accreditation Process Requirements 10
Software Assurance and Security Engineering Practices 10
Non-Secure Software 10
Malicious Code Warranty 11
Source Code Configuration Control (Versioning) 11

Transportation Solicitations Instructions to Offerors Cyber Language 12

TRANSPORTATION CONTRACT CYBER LANGUAGE

Transportation Contracts Cyber Security Performance Work Statement (PWS) Language

1.0 Information Assurance

1.1 Requirement for Contractor Information Assurance (IA) Report

The Contractor shall provide an Information Assurance Report to describe their environment that safeguards DOD non-public information resident on or transiting the contractor's unclassified information systems from unauthorized access and disclosure. Protection measures applied should consider the risks (i.e. consequences and their probability) of loss, misuse, unauthorized access, or modification of information. The report shall address the SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute's Twenty Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense: Consensus Audit Guidelines (http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls) and be provided in accordance with the attached template at Attachment XX to the PWS. The contractor is encouraged to provide additional information above and beyond what is outlined in the SANS guidelines to enhance the government's understanding of their information security posture. The report will be updated 30 days prior to exercise of an option period, if applicable.

1.2 Cyber Security Incidents

1.2.1 Reporting Requirements

The contractor shall report to the following two Government organizations as soon as possible upon discovery of any suspected cyber intrusion events that affect DOD information resident on or transiting the contractor's unclassified information systems.

1. USTRANSCOM Global Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) Coordination Center (GCCC)
   E-mail: ustcJ6-gccc@ustranscom.mil
   Commercial Phone: 618-229-4222

2. USTRANSCOM Deployment and Distribution Operation Center (DDOC)
   E-mail: ustc-ddocchief@ustranscom.mil
   Commercial Phone: 618-220-7700

Initial report shall be provided even if some details are not yet available, with follow-on detailed reporting within 72 hours. Reportable cyber intrusion events include the following:

1. A cyber intrusion event appearing to be an advanced persistent threat
2. A cyber intrusion event involving data exfiltration or manipulation or other loss of any DOD information resident on or transiting the contractor's, or its subcontractors', unclassified information systems
3. Intrusion activities that allow unauthorized access to an unclassified information system on which DOD information is resident or transiting

Definition of advanced persistent threat: An extremely proficient, patient, determined, and capable adversary, including two or more of such adversaries working together.

1.2.2 Incident Report Content

The incident report shall include, at a minimum, the following information:

1. Applicable dates (date of suspected compromise and date of discovery)
2. Threat methodology (all known resources used such as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, domain names, copies malware, etc.)
3. An account of what actions the threat(s) may have taken on the victim system/network and what information may have been accessed
4. A description of the roles and functions of the threat-accessed system
5. An initial list of potentially impacted government programs and each program's classification
6. What information may have been exfiltrated that may impact government programs
7. A list of all employees and subcontracted employees who work or have worked with the victim system/network
8. A point of contact to coordinate damage assessment activities

1.2.3 Incident Report Submission

The contractor will submit unclassified network cyber incident reports to the USTRANSCOM Technical Information Analysis Center (TIAC) and USTRANSCOM designated government personnel via encrypted email or another mutually agreed upon secure communications method. Copies of malware require special handling and pre-coordination must be accomplished prior to submission.

ATTACHMENT:
ATTACHMENT XX , CYBER LANGUAGE FOR TRANSPORTATION CONTRACTS

Vendor Assessment Guidelines for Twenty Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense: Consensus Audit Guidelines (CAG)

General. Organizations should compare all 20 control areas against their current status.

The 20 Critical Controls are:

1. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices
2. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software
3. Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers
4. Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches
5. Boundary Defense
6. Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Security Audit Logs
7. Application Software Security
8. Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
9. Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know
10. Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
11. Account Monitoring and Control
12. Malware Defenses
13. Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services
14. Wireless Device Control
15. Data Loss Prevention
16. Secure Network Engineering
17. Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises
18. Incident Response Capability
19. Data Recovery Capability
20. Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps

The entire text of the 20 Critical Security Controls is available for reference at:

http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/

Procedures:
1. Review each control.
2. Determine what procedures and tools exist within your organization to meet this control.
3. Document the result of 1-2 using the suggested template provided.
4. Provide any additional information about your company's cyber security posture.

Company (Name): Information Assurance Report

Executive Summary: (descriptive self-assessment of the company's overall information security posture)

A. Assessment of Twenty Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense: Consensus Audit Guidelines (CAG)

1. Control 1. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices

   a. Procedures and Tools supporting this control:
      (List the procedures and tools used in your organization for this control)
   b. Method to achieve control metric:

2. (Continue for remaining 19 controls).

If a particular control does not exist or is not used within your organization, please state this.

B. **Assessment of Additional Security Measures for Effective Cyber Defense**

1. Measure. (Title of additional measure/control)

   a. Procedures and Tools supporting this measure/control:
      (List the procedures and tools used in your organization)
   b. Method to achieve measure/control metric:

2. (Continue for remaining measures/controls)

NON-TRANSPORTATION CONTRACT CYBER LANGUAGE

Basic Language

1. Security

1.1. Handling of Non-Public Information

In performance of this contract, the contractor may have access to sensitive, non-public information. The contractor agrees (a) to use and protect such information from unauthorized disclosure IAW Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-027 - Security of Unclassified DOD Information on Non-DOD Information Systems, 31 July 2009; (b) to use and disclose such information only for the purpose of performing this contract and to not use or disclose such information for any personal or commercial purpose; (c) to obtain permission of the Government Program Manager before disclosing/discussing such information with a third party; (d) to return and/or electronically purge, upon Government request, any non-public, sensitive information no longer required for contractor performance; and (e) to advise the CO and/or COR of any unauthorized release of such information. Upon request, the contractor shall have its employees assigned to this contract execute a non-disclosure agreement for delivery to the Government. The Government will require contractor personnel to sign a non-disclosure statement to protect non-public information of other contractors and/or the Government.

Standard Language (Include BASIC LANGUGE and the below language through paragraph 1.10)

1.2. Requirements for Contractor Provision of Security Plan, Information Assurance Controls

The contractor shall establish an Information Assurance Program to implement and sustain appropriate Information Assurance management, operational, and technical controls and processes required to safeguard DOD non-public information resident on or transiting the contractor's unclassified information systems from unauthorized access and disclosure. Protection measures applied must be commensurate with the risks (i.e. consequences and their probability) of loss, misuse, unauthorized access, or modification of information. The contractor shall submit for Government approval an overarching security plan that describes their strategy for implementation of Information Assurance and Industrial Security requirements throughout the life of the contract. The security plan shall address the security controls described in National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-53 (current version), Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations (http://csrc.mist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html), and should be tailored in scope and depth appropriate to the effort and the specific unclassified DOD information.

1.3. Periodic Government Inspections

The contractor shall authorize Government inspections and reviews to assure compliance with DOD Information Assurance requirements throughout the contract performance period. The contractor shall be responsible for taking corrective action based upon the impact and severity of identified weaknesses.

1.4. Remote Access

Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE) employed for remote access to a Government network must meet equivalent Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) Information Assurance computing requirements. The contractor shall ensure that all CFE (hardware and software) employed to access these environments meet the following minimum Government Information Assurance requirements and provide periodic certification of compliance as a pre-requisite to being granted network access.

(a) Use of personal systems is prohibited;
(b) Operating systems and applications must be configured for compliance with the DISA Gold Disk and applicable Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs);
(c) DOD approved anti-virus and anti-spyware software must be installed and signatures must be configured to automatically update on a daily basis;
(d) DOD approved personal firewall must be utilized and configured to permit traffic by exception only, dropping all other traffic. If the personal firewall provides intrusion detection or prevention, the signatures or rules must be updated at the same intervals as the anti-virus software.
(e) Computers must be Information Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) compliant;
(f) Computers must be scanned with the DOD version of E-eye Retina vulnerability scanner (or current approved DOD scanner solution) at a minimum of every 30 days. All vulnerabilities must be remediated and reported to the cognizant Information Assurance Manager;
(g) Contractor employees must possess a current Government issued Common Access Card (CAC) and install Government certified CAC readers; and
(h) Verification of compliance with these requirements must be provided to an appointed government representative on a monthly basis.

1.5 Detect, Analyze, Respond

1.5.1. Reporting Requirements

The contractor shall report to the USTRANSCOM Technical Information Analysis Center (TIAC) and USTRANSCOM designated Government personnel within 4 hours of discovery of any suspected cyber intrusion events that affect DOD information resident on or transiting the contractor's unclassified information systems. Initial report shall be provided even if some details are not yet available, with follow-on detailed reporting within 24 hours. Reportable cyber intrusion events include the following:

(a) A cyber intrusion event appearing to be an advanced persistent threat;
(b) A cyber intrusion event involving data exfiltration or manipulation or other loss of any DOD information resident on or transiting the contractor's, or its subcontractors', unclassified information systems;
(c) Intrusion activities that allow unauthorized access to an unclassified information system on which DOD information is resident or transiting.

Definition of advanced persistent threat: An extremely proficient, patient, determined, and capable adversary, including two or more of such adversaries working together.

1.5.2. Incident Report Content

The incident report shall include, at a minimum, the following information:

(a) Applicable dates (date of suspected compromise and date of discovery);
(b) Threat methodology (all known resources used such as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, domain names, copies malware, etc.);
(c) An account of what actions the threat(s) may have taken on the victim system/network and what information may have been accessed;
(d) A description of the roles and functions of the threat-accessed system;

(e) An initial list of potentially impacted Government programs and each program's classification;
(f) What information may have been exfiltrated that may impact Government programs.
(g) A list of all employees and subcontracted employees who work or have worked with the victim system/network; (h) A point of contact to coordinate damage assessment activities.

1.5.3. Incident Report Submission

The contractor will submit unclassified network cyber incident reports to the USTRANSCOM Technical Information Analysis (TIAC) and USTRANSCOM designated Government personnel via encrypted email or another mutually agreed upon secure communications method. Copies of malware require special handling and pre-coordination must be accomplished prior to submission.

1.5.4. Incident Response Coordination

In the event of a known or potential intrusion, the contractor agrees to allow follow-on actions by the Government to further characterize and evaluate the suspect activity. The contractor acknowledges that damage assessments may be necessary to ascertain intruder methodology and identify systems compromised as a result of the intrusion. Company acknowledges that in certain cases a complete forensic analysis may be necessary to ascertain intruder methodology and identify systems compromised as a result of the intrusion. Once an intrusion is identified, the company agrees to take all reasonable and appropriate steps to preserve any and all evidence, information, data, logs, electronic files and similar type information reference NIST Special Publication 800-61: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, (current version) related to the intrusion for subsequent forensic analysis so that an accurate and complete damage assessment can be accomplished by the Government. The contractor is not required to maintain an organic forensic capability, but must ensure data is preserved until forensic analysis can be performed by the Government (e.g. removing an affected system, while still powered on, from the network meets the intent of this requirement). Any follow-on actions shall be coordinated with the contractor via the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR).

1.6. Law Enforcement/Counterintelligence

In the event of a known or potential intrusion, the contractor shall consent to responding counterintelligence or law enforcement investigative agency requests to apply forensic analysis tools to contractor information systems affected by the intrusion, including monitoring tools, imaging tools, and any other techniques that the agency seeks to apply to effectively analyze the intrusion. The contractor shall allow the responding counterintelligence and/or law enforcement investigative agency to image affected systems, including systems containing proprietary information. Nothing in this contract shall limit the ability to conduct law enforcement or counterintelligence activities, or other activities in the interest of the Government.

1.7. Information Sharing

The Government may use and disclose reported information (e.g., information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, or best practices) that does not include attribution information at its discretion to assist entities in protecting information or information systems (e.g. threat information products, threat assessment reports); provided that such use or disclosure is otherwise authorized in accordance with applicable statutes, regulations, and policies.

1.8. Confidentiality and Non-Attribution Statement

The Government shall take reasonable steps, by controlled access and need-to-know procedures, to protect against public release of attribution information of the contractor. The Government may use and disclose reported information that includes attribution information only on a need-to-know basis to authorized persons for cyber security and related purposes (e.g., in support of forensic analysis, incident response, compromise or damage assessments, law enforcement, counter intelligence, threat reporting, and trend analysis). The Government may disclose attribution information to support contractors that are supporting the Government's cyber security and related activities if the support contractor is subject to legal confidentiality requirements that prevent any further use or disclosure of the attribution information. The Government agrees to consider available exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act to protect against disclosure of attribution information of the contractor to unauthorized persons. Within a reasonable period necessary to perform an analysis after completion of the assessment, all contractor proprietary information or third party proprietary information in the possession of the Government as a result of the assessment will be destroyed unless other disposition is agreed upon in writing by the Parties or is required by law, Executive Order or regulation.

1.9. Information Assurance Training

Contract employees physically assigned to USTRANSCOM at SAFB shall attend/complete security training as prescribed by DOD and USTRANSCOM instructions. At a minimum this includes: Employee Initial Security Training, Annual Security Awareness Training, Operations Security (OPSEC), DOD Antiterrorism Level 1 Training, Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Training and any Security Stand Down Day Training scheduled by the Commander. Contract employees assigned elsewhere shall attend security training established by their respective government security offices and/or installations.

CONTRACTING PERSONNEL: Paragraph 1.10 (below) is the exact language as DFARS 252.239-7001. If you include paragraph 1.10 in your PWS, do not include DFARS 252.239-7001.

1.10. Information Assurance Workforce Improvement Program (IAWIP)

Information Assurance Contractor Training and Certification (JAN 2008)

(a) The Contractor shall ensure that personnel accessing information systems have the proper and current information assurance certification to perform information assurance functions in accordance with DOD 8570.01-M, Information Assurance Workforce Improvement Program. The Contractor shall meet the applicable information assurance certification requirements, including –

(1) DOD-approved information assurance workforce certifications appropriate for each category and level as listed in the current version of DOD 8570.01-M; and

(2) Appropriate operating system certification for information assurance technical positions as required by DOD 8570.01-M.

(b) Upon request by the Government, the Contractor shall provide documentation supporting the information assurance certification status of personnel performing information assurance functions.

(c) Contractor personnel who do not have proper and current certifications shall be denied access to DOD information systems for the purpose of performing information assurance functions.

ADVANCED/DEVELOPERS LANGUAGE (Include BASIC and STANDARD LANGUAGE and below language through paragraph 1.17.)

1.11. Developer Environment

The contractor development environment shall be physically and logically isolated from other networks, to include its enterprise unclassified network. Security guidelines for the environment must be documented and the security program implemented shall address the security controls described in NIST Special Publication 800-53 (current version), Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations (http://csrc.mist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html).

1.12. System Design, Information System Security Engineering Principles; DOD, NIST Directives

The contractor shall ensure that information system security engineering is employed during any/all changes to the system architecture. Such modifications will be made in compliance with all analogous or interfacing Information Assurance component(s) of the Global Information Grid (GIG) Architecture and will be designed to make maximum use of the DOD enterprise Information Assurance capabilities and services. As part of the contractor's change control process, the contractor shall ensure participation by an Information System Security Engineer or a qualified Information Assurance representative to evaluate of the impact of each change on security. The contractor shall document the results of this evaluation.

1.13. DOD Information Assurance Certification Accreditation Process Requirements

The contractor shall be responsible for the development of system security documentation to facilitate the security accreditation of the system according to DODI 8510.01 DIACAP and the associated Mission Assurance Category (MAC) and Confidentiality Level (CL) as defined in DOD Instruction 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) Implementation (current version). The contractor shall update the DOD Enterprise Mission Assurance Support Service (eMASS) system as required and provide supporting IA documentation for upload as artifacts in eMASS. For {SYSTEM}, the MAC will be Level {X} and the CL will be {X}.

1.14. Software Assurance and Security Engineering Practices

In coordination with the Government, the contractor shall design, develop and implement secure applications and configurations through applying applicable DOD STIGs, checklists, vendor security guidance, industry best practices, and applicable vendor product security patches. The contractor shall ensure applications are in compliance with DOD Instruction 8500.2 Information Assurance Implementation (current version) and DODI 8551.1 Ports, Protocols, and Services Management (PPSM) (current version). The contractor shall leverage, to the maximum extent possible, automated tools to identify and remediate vulnerabilities or weaknesses in the application design/coding, such as those described in Common Weakness Enumeration/System Administration, Networking, and Security Institute (CWE/SANS) TOP 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors and Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top Ten, that could be exploited by unauthorized sources.

The Information System Security Engineer shall participate in Government and contractor formal and informal design reviews to identify potential security weaknesses, deficiencies, and/or vulnerabilities in the design. The Information System Security Engineer shall also ensure appropriate security requirements are included as part of the requirements traceability matrix and are evaluated as part of the security test and evaluation (ST&E). As part of the contractor's change control process, the contractor shall ensure participation by the Information System Security Engineer or a qualified Information Assurance representative to evaluate the impact of each change on security. The contractor shall document the results of this evaluation.

1.15 Non-Secure Software

If the Government determines, after a security audit (e.g. ST&E), that software delivered under this task order is non-secure, the Government will provide written notice to the contractor of each non-conformity. Software shall be "non-secure" under this task order if it contains a programming error listed on the current approved version of the CWE/SANS TOP 25 (which can be located at http://www.sans.org/top25-programming-errors) or a web application security flaw listed on the current approved version of the OWASP Top Ten (which can be located at http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project).

The contractor shall have thirty (30) days after receipt of such notice (Remedy Period) to remedy each non-conformity by modifying/replacing and redelivering the software to the Government; or shall notify the Government within 15 days as to why the remedy cannot be implemented in 30 days, and propose a timeline for correction. If the Government determines, after a security audit following a Remedy Period, that the redelivered software is non-secure, and thus non-conforming, the Government may reject the delivery, provide notice of the non-conformance, and document the contractor's performance record. Alternatively, the Government may accept non-conforming software, receive appropriate consideration (equitable price reduction on a fixed price contract, reimbursement for costs of security audit, reimbursement for costs to correct the non-compliances, etc.), and document the contractor's performance record

1.16. Malicious Code Warranty

The contractor represents and warrants that the software shall be free from all computer viruses, worms, time-outs, time bombs, back doors, disabling devices and other harmful or malicious code intended to or which may damage, disrupt, inconvenience or permit access to the software user's or another's software, hardware, networks, data or information.

1.17. Source Code Configuration Control (Versioning)

The contractor shall utilize a strict version control process for software development and provide two copies of source code for all software versions developed under this contract. The source code will be provided on optical removable media (burned for read only) or another mutually agreed type of media.

TRANSPORTATION SOLICITATIONS INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFERORS CYBER LANGUAGE

For commercial contracts, include the following as an addendum to FAR 52.212-1

Information Assurance & Cyber Security. The offeror shall submit an Information Assurance Report that describes their environment for adequately safeguarding DOD non-public information resident on or transiting on the contractor's unclassified information systems from unauthorized access and disclosure. Protection measures applied should consider the risks (i.e. consequences and their probability) of loss, misuse, unauthorized access, or modification of information. The report shall also address the SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute's Twenty Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense: Consensus Audit Guidelines (http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls) and be provided in accordance with the template at Attachment XX to the PWS. Offerors may provide additional information to support their security posture.

For commercial contracts, include the following as an addendum to FAR 52.212-2, to state how the Offeror's Cyber Security submission will be evaluated:

Information Assurance & Cyber Security: To be rated Acceptable, the offeror must submit an Information Assurance Report that describes their environment for adequately safeguarding DOD non-public information resident on or transiting on the contractor's unclassified information systems from unauthorized access and disclosure AND address the SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute's Twenty Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense: Consensus Audit Guidelines (http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls).

Chairman LEVIN. Also, you are aware, I believe, that we included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013—it was section 941, which requires certain contractors to report to DOD about penetrations of covered networks and information systems. If you could, after using that or reviewing that language, if you would let us know if there's anything else that we need to do to be helpful to you in your efforts, please let us know.

General FRASER. Thank you, sir. We will, and we look forward to the Secretary's guidance in accordance with the language as written.

Chairman LEVIN. Very good. Thank you so much.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me start off with something a little unpleasant, but it deserves to be brought up, I think, over and over again, even though the media doesn't care about it, the whole Benghazi thing. It's incontrovertible right now that the second attack, the one on the annex, was one that was premeditated, it's one that was a terrorist-coordinated attack. We knew that the day after. At the very latest it would have been on the 12th (September 2012) that we knew that. Everybody knew that. They've even testified before this committee that they knew.

Yet, this administration sent out Ambassador Susan Rice to lie to the American people and say that this is something that was a response to a video. All that's behind us now. I think it's going to go down in history as one of the really great cover-ups. That's beyond us, and again, the press doesn't care. It's really disturbing to me.

But this thing just doesn't go away. Yesterday, CBS came up with some documents and I'll read just two sentences from this release: "The documents viewed by Intelligence Committee members indicated numerous other changes were made to the talking points, including the removal of certain references on the attacks."

Now, what they're talking about here and why this is different, all this stuff happened before the attack, saying it was going to happen.

"The source who reviewed the documents also flagged several emails prior to Benghazi attacks from the officials in Libya to Washington that supposedly specifically warned of an imminent attack within days before this attack."

I only bring this up to ask you the question—I don't believe them, but I do believe you, General Ham. I've gotten to know you very well. We've worked closer together probably than you have with any other member on your AOR. Let's assume this is right. Did anyone tell you prior to this, as the AFRICOM Commander, that they were predicting this was going to happen?

General HAM. Sir, I've looked at the intelligence over and over and, while clearly the situation in Benghazi was worrying, I do not find intelligence that——

Senator INHOFE. They didn't tell you——

General HAM. No, sir.

Senator INHOFE.—what I'm reading right now? They didn't tell you?

General HAM. No, sir.

Senator INHOFE. I believe you. I believe you.

All right. I'd like to ask both of you this question. In my opening statement I talked about sequestration, and how critical this is because it's on the heels of an expanded budget that would take us down by $487 billion and so we're all concerned about it. So 6 weeks ago, I talked to the commands, all six of them, and asked them the question that in the event it becomes inevitable—and I didn't think it would; at that time we had, in fact, Senator McCain and I and several other of the Senators here, said that we thought there was a way to do this where it could have been less of a threat.

But I said at that time, in the event we're wrong and that they end up having to do this, wouldn't it be better to take that same top line and work within that so that the commanders would be in a position to make those adjustments, as opposed to just a formula that cuts across. They all said yes, it would. Do you two agree with them?

General HAM. I do, Senator.

General FRASER. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you.

General Fraser, I don't quite understand how this works. There's not going to be time for you to explain it, but TRANSCOM and its components are paid for their Services by their customers, the Service components and other agencies. Are they finding themselves strapped to the point where you're not getting the adequate funding through this very unique mechanism that you would really need to do the job to your expectations?

General FRASER. Senator, as of right now, we are a Working Capital Fund, the Transportation Working Capital Fund.

Senator INHOFE. Yes, Working Capital Fund.

General FRASER. We generate revenue. They have the resources and then we accomplish the mission that they task us to do. Then they pay for that service that is provided.

Senator INHOFE. Does that put you in a position where you're not really in the same strapped situation that many of the other Services are?

General FRASER. Sir, I am in a strapped situation because over time the Working Capital Fund has been drawn down. I am directed to have 7 to 10 days of Working Capital Fund available to me in order to be able to respond in a timely manner and, having those resources with all the authorities and responsibilities that I do, I can execute operations and then I go back later and get paid. What has been happening though is coupled with the closure of the Pakistan border and actually having to execute different routes that have been more expensive, those bills have been higher and we've been relying on the Working Capital Fund. This is one example that's been drawing down the fund.

The Services also have other problems in paying their Service-level bills and things of that nature, therefore drawing down the Working Capital Fund. So we are seeing some issues there.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much.

General Ham, you and I have talked about this before. We did something pretty smart on this committee way back on September 11 or shortly after that when we recognized, with the squeeze

that's going on in the Middle East and a lot of the terrorist activity going down through Djibouti and the Horn of Africa, to assist the Africans, not to do something for them, but to assist them in building their five African brigades.

It started off, as was anticipated—at least in my mind it was—and then it seems to have slowed down. I know you have the same commitment to complete those standby brigades, but are you getting there as fast as we ought to get there?

General HAM. We are not, Senator. Each of the five regional economic communities of the African Union has a plan to establish a regional standby force. Those plans have not progressed in some cases in any material way, and today, none of the five regions has, in my military view, the capability that they ought have to be able to respond in short order to regional crises.

Senator INHOFE. I think that's right. I know that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was among the first ones, and a lot of that was under the leadership of President John Kufuor, former President of the Fourth Republic of Ghana. They were a little bit ahead. But it hasn't reach that, and I regret that you're going to be stepping down in April and will be replaced by General Rodriguez, and we're going to be trying to give new attention to that.

The LRA, any update you'd like to give us on that? I'd like to mention—I think I did in my opening statement—that a lot of people think this is just one guy that's mutilating kids and that was true the first time that I saw the product of his labor, where they would cut the ears and the noses off those little kids and force them to kill their parents and all that. That has expanded into a major terrorist group. So I think it's one that has gotten little pockets of followers around now where it's not quite one general unit.

Are you satisfied that we're doing what we should be doing? I think your answer is going to be yes because I know you're working very hard on it. Any comments on that?

General HAM. Senator, the work does continue. Again, as I mentioned in my opening comments, I think it is a pretty good model of a way in which we can provide, for lack of a better term, unique U.S. military capabilities to enable an African force. We do a lot of intelligence. We help them with funding for rotary and fixed wing aircraft, mobility, information-sharing, communications leaflets that have elicited numerous defections and the like.

Just in terms of money, sir, over the last year we've spent $138 million on counter-LRA, expected to be about $157 million this year. It's not an inexpensive proposition, but in terms of achieving the desired state of minimizing the effectiveness of the LRA, bringing Kony to justice, and simultaneously building the capacity of the African forces, I think we're doing okay.

Senator INHOFE. I do, too. I think you're doing a great job there. While you say it's not cheap, it is pretty cheap when you consider the other operations that are going on. You might occasionally have a helicopter or something like that, but it's primarily intelligence, communications, and coordination. I think you're doing a great job.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me thank and commend General Ham for his extraordinary service to the Nation and the Army. You've done a remarkable job, sir, and we thank you. I know foremost in your thoughts has always been the men and women you lead, and it's been evident in your contribution to the Nation. Thank you, sir.

Let me ask a question. First, with the collapse of the Qadafi regime in Libya and turmoil in the Maghreb, there has been the fear that weapons, particularly the Manportable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS), are filtering through and proliferating. Can you give us a sense in open session of your take on that particular issue?

General HAM. I would, Senator. The details probably ought to be in a separate session, but it's very clear that in the collapse of the Qadafi regime, weapons, MANPADS, crew-served weapons, individual weapons, explosives, have gone really in two directions. We thought initially that most would transit into northern Mali and we certainly have seen significant evidence that that has been the case. AQIM, other organizations, are significantly better armed now than they were before.

What we didn't see quite so quickly, but now believe certainly to be the case, is movement of weapons in the other direction, some of which we believe have ended up in Syria. General Mattis is more qualified to speak on that than I am, but certainly that proliferation of weapons, I think, poses a continuing destabilizing effect across the region.

Senator REED. Not just the United States, but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and all of our allies have a proactive program to interdict these systems and to, obviously, prevent their dispersal?

General HAM. Senator, there is a multifaceted approach for the U.S. Government, principally led by the State Department in terms of strengthening border security and helping the host nations deal with this. There's a small component that is a weapons buyback program. We have a small role along with others in the U.S. Government to facilitate that program. I would characterize it as having, frankly, modest success. Still, many thousands, particularly of the MANPADS that we believe existed in Libya prior to the revolution, remain unaccounted for.

Senator REED. This leads to another issue, too, is that in your mission in Africa a great deal depends on local governance, policing borders, interdicting weapons. That role is a shared role, not only with you, with the Department of State, with nongovernmental organizations in certain cases. We frequently talk about the impact of sequester and other budget restrictions on DOD operations. Are you seeing significant impacts on your State Department and those non-DOD assets that you depend upon?

General HAM. Not yet, Senator. We haven't seen it manifest itself. But clearly if sequester continues for the balance of this year, I believe that there will be some very real consequences in what our brethren at State are able to deliver.

Senator REED. That will have an impact on issues like we just talked about?

General HAM. Yes, sir, certainly.

Senator REED. Let me ask just another final question with respect to Mali. We engaged over the course of several years in trying to develop a professional military force in Mali. We did tactical training, we had Special Operations Forces troops there, et cetera. Then there was a coup. We talked with General Rodriguez about this. As we go forward, we're going to have to continue to partner with indigenous forces, but we also have to emphasize the proper role of the military.

Can you comment upon that, since you observed some of the effects of our training and our lack of training when it came to the roles of government?

General HAM. Yes, sir, certainly. In Mali both good and bad, I suspect. The unit with which we were primarily engaged was not a unit that participated in the coup. It was the parachute regiment, which was actually repressed by those who did lead the coup. But we did have interaction with others in the Malian Government, in the Malian military.

My greatest disappointment is the senior leaders in the former Malian military with whom we interacted, while they didn't support the military coup, they took no action to resist it. I think there are some lessons learned in that for us, that in our training, as you mentioned, Senator, we have to focus not only on technical and tactical training, but more on values and the professionalism that is required of a military in a democratic society. We can improve and need to improve in our engagement in that area.

Senator REED. Thank you very much.

General Fraser, Senator Levin and I were in Afghanistan and Pakistan about 6 weeks ago and I got the impression that the retrograde operations are picking up momentum significantly. The Pakistan ground lines of communication (PAKGLOC) was opening up in Pakistan. Can you comment on where we are in terms of that retrograde operation?

General FRASER. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. It is continuing to accelerate. We have multiple lanes that we're able to use out of Afghanistan now because of the agreements that have been struck with a number of different nations. The proofs of principle that we have executed are showing us that we have the right process, we have the right procedures in place. Do we have the level of velocity that we want to have? Not yet. It will continue to improve as time goes on.

I was in Pakistan last month and had very good discussions with them. Shortly after that, with all the agreements in place, and all the processes for getting the right permits, it was not long after that, that we executed our first proof of principle of exporting items from Afghanistan. It was containers initially. The process went very smoothly. The containers arrived down in Karachi. The next level that we're going to work is some wheeled armored vehicles.

So that is continuing to move in the right direction. I am encouraged by what I am seeing. I am also encouraged by what's going in. When the border closed, the Karachi port was full of over 7,000 pieces of equipment, containers, things of this nature. We are at less than 2,000 now. We have been moving that into Afghanistan since last year and it continues to get better.

We also did a new import process by which we moved some containers that were shipped in the local area into Karachi. This is going to open up the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) equipment that has been held in a couple of locations, and just last week we sent a booking notice to our commercial partners that we're going to start booking more cargo for the FMS equipment.

Additionally, in the agreement we agreed that we will not take a pause at the border crossings; we'll continue to ramp up, and we've continued to increase the number of bookings that will come as far as exports go. I'm encouraged by what I'm seeing, especially on this last visit out there, that the capacity is built. We need to now continue to accelerate the velocity.

Senator REED. Thank you much, sir, and thank you, General.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. I want to thank the witnesses. General Ham, I'd like to echo the views of my colleagues and the American people in thanking you for your outstanding service to the country. I'm sure you feel some sense of relief from not having to appear before this committee again.

General Ham and General Fraser, very briefly, we talk about the sequestration effects on our ability and our readiness and our capabilities. What is the effect the you're seeing and foresee that we will see on the morale and eventually retention of the men and women who are serving today of this profound uncertainty that affects their lives?

General HAM. Senator, you captured exactly the right word. It is uncertainty in both the military ranks and in our civilian workforce. They're not sure what to expect of their government. The looming threat of furlough for our civilian employees; for our military members and for their families, the programs that this committee and this Congress have supported, will those be sustained.

I don't think we yet understand what effect this uncertainty may have in the recruiting and retention of our civilian workforce and perhaps even more importantly, on the recruiting and retention of what, I think, is the crown jewel in all of this, and that's the sustainment of the incredibly talented All-Volunteer Force we have. I think there are a lot more unknowns right now, sir, than knowns.

Senator MCCAIN. But there could be some—all of that could be in some jeopardy?

General HAM. I believe it is, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. General Fraser?

General FRASER. I would agree with General Ham. We hear this from our workforce, both the military and the civilians. Most certainly I would highlight our civilian workforce and the significant concerns that they have at this time of a potential furlough.

The loss of potentially 20 percent of their income between April and the end of September is undue burden and undue stress upon them and their family members. It also goes into other areas about security from a perspective of their job. The reason I highlight this is because the workforce has begun talking to us that if they have issues with financial obligations and we understand the fact that

they have security clearances and financial responsibility is a piece of that. This could be an unintended consequence of that.

Now, there are ways to adjudicate that, but I think it shows this uncertainty, the concern and the stress that's upon our family members and the other things that General Ham——

Senator MCCAIN. So over time both you and General Ham agree this could affect morale and retention and over time, recruitment?

General FRASER. Yes, sir, I agree.

General HAM. I do, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. General Ham, prior to the attack in Libya were you aware of the multiple attacks against western interests in Benghazi, including the British ambassador, the Red Cross, the U.S. consulate, and the British pulled their mission out of Benghazi and the Red Cross suspended operations? Were you aware of all of that?

General HAM. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. So what was your assessment of the threat?

General HAM. That the threat in Benghazi and more broadly——

Senator MCCAIN. In Benghazi?

General HAM.—in eastern Libya it was growing, that there was a renewed presence of extremist organizations that posed a threat, not only to western interests, as exhibited by these attacks, but also to the fledgling Libyan Government.

Senator MCCAIN. Did you recommend any changes in force posture or alert status based on this threat picture, particularly on the date of September 11?

General HAM. Sir, as 11 September approached and there were the obvious concerns of the anniversary event, we did posture Marine Corps forces afloat in West Africa, Fleet Antiterrorism Support Teams in Southern Europe, the personnel recovery team with aviation at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, and we ensured that we had access to the shared EUCOM–AFRICOM CIF, which was at that point based in Europe.

Senator MCCAIN. But, General Ham, 7½ hours went by and we were unable to get any forces there. As you are well aware, two of the Americans were killed in the last hour. That doesn't seem to me that you had forces there capable of responding. Certainly they didn't respond.

General HAM. Sir, they didn't. As I replayed the events of that evening over and over in my mind, when the first attack commenced and then essentially ended shortly, about an hour or so after it began, I didn't know at that point that there was going to be a second attack. If I could turn the clock back I'd do it differently.

Senator MCCAIN. I say with respect that if an attack had taken place, that already we didn't know the whereabouts of the Ambassador at that time, it seems to me that would bring some urgency to getting some forces there.

Did you discuss this with Secretary Panetta or General Dempsey or the President during these attacks?

General HAM. We did, sir. I happened to be in Washington that day and did meet personally with General Dempsey and with then-Secretary Panetta shortly after the first attack began.

Senator MCCAIN. Were any of your recommendations, were you told not to execute?

General HAM. No, sir. I requested forces be placed on alert both overseas and in the contiguous United States. The Chairman and the Secretary approved that.

Senator MCCAIN. Did you believe at the time that, given the nature of the weapons used in this attack, that it was a coordinated terrorist attack?

General HAM. In the first attack, I will admit during, as the events were unfolding, it was unclear to me. But it became clear within a matter of a few hours that this was a terrorist attack, at least in my opinion.

Senator MCCAIN. See, this is the conundrum we face here, is that you and General Dempsey and Secretary Panetta all testified that they knew right away that it was a terrorist attack. Yet the American people literally for weeks, at least 2 weeks, were told we don't know. This disconnect between the assessment that you, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then-Secretary of Defense all immediately concluded, as those of us who are not nearly as knowledgeable as you are, because we don't believe that people bring rocket-propelled grenades and mortars to spontaneous demonstrations—for 2 weeks in the height of a presidential campaign, the American people were told by the President of the United States, "We don't know."

Of course we did know. Of course we did know. That's why some people are a little bit offended that some of us continue to pursue this issue. Four people died and four people's families deserve to know exactly what happened and what transpired. Particularly again two of those brave Americans died in the last hour of a 7½ hour attack.

So it seems to me that, given September 11th, given the warnings, given the entire situation, why we were unable with all the forces—you just enumerated so many of them—that we have in the region, we were unable to get forces there in order to save especially the last two individuals' lives, is something that I think the American people deserve to know.

I thank you both.

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Ham, would you want to respond to that? I'd be glad to hear that.

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, if it's okay.

Yes, sir, as I began to say, Senator McCain, that that night stays with me, as I know it does with you and with others. As I said, we didn't know that there was going to be a second attack and we thought, frankly, that after what we felt was the culmination of the attack at the Special Mission Facility, that frankly the effort now shifted to recovery of Ambassador Stevens, who was then the lone unaccounted for American.

Again, in the context of then, not now, with the dispatch of the small team from Tripoli to Benghazi, we thought assurances from the Libyans, which obviously proved to not be fulfilled, that that recovery mission was going to proceed in good order. It did not.

Sir, if I could turn the clock back, I would make different decisions based on what I know now as opposed to what I knew then.

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, General, for that very candid response. Again, I thank you for your service and we're very grateful for it.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Donnelly.

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To General Ham and General Fraser, thank you for your service. General Ham, thank you so much for everything you've done for our country in your career.

General Ham, has the AFRICOM region become as central a center for terrorist activities as the CENTCOM region has been?

General HAM. Sir, I don't think it quite yet rises to that level, but it certainly is trending in that direction.

Senator DONNELLY. As you look at it, do you see it as an increasingly, as you said, growing area, that we may look at this in a few years and see this as equal to or more even than the CENTCOM region at this time?

General HAM. It's hard to predict in the future, Senator. Remember that it is in the CENTCOM region that is the home of al Qaeda. I don't see any indication that al Qaeda main, if you will, or al Qaeda's senior leadership seeks to reposition to Africa. But certainly their associates and affiliates and an increasing number of people who adopt that al Qaeda ideology are present in Africa.

Senator DONNELLY. Now, as we look at lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, is our plan in AFRICOM—you talked about the five regional forces that are developing over there between the countries on the military side—is our plan to have them stand up and be the main force, with us guiding behind the scenes, in the AFRICOM region?

General HAM. Sir, countering the effects of these violent extremist organizations, terrorist organizations, has to be a very broad approach. There is a military component and that's what I am principally engaged with. But I recognize that the military component will not be decisive. There is a military component that has to contribute to security and stability, but it really is the U.S. Government's interaction with African nations and regional organizations to address the underlying causes. Good governance, economic development, health care, education, all of those programs, I think, will have a longer and more lasting effect. But the military component helps set the conditions under which those longer-term operations and activities can take place.

Senator DONNELLY. As we look at this, I know the French have a presence in Mali. Are we primarily on our own other than that, or are other nations in there with us?

General HAM. Senator, there are a number of nations, both African and from outside the region, who are contributing in meaningful ways to the operations in Mali. A number of European countries have pledged training through the European Union and also bilateral relationships. Many of them are already on the ground in Mali and in other West African countries.

I think in principle there is broad agreement that, while the initial reaction and operation by France was necessary, this must

transition to an African-led activity as quickly as the conditions allow. I think that's the next transition point.

Senator DONNELLY. Are we the point of the spear in coordinating all the other nations on these efforts?

General HAM. No, sir, we're not. The ECOWAS is the principal coordinating organization. We and many other nations are supporting ECOWAS in their efforts.

Senator DONNELLY. How do we increase as we look at this the chance for success of those regional armies? You had talked about they are not where we had hoped they would be and we look toward a path forward. How do they stand up quicker, better, more successfully?

General HAM. I think it requires a multi-pronged approach. Part of it is our bilateral efforts and the bilateral efforts of other contributing nations, many of which are in Europe, but increasingly Brazil and India and others, to build the capabilities of individual African states. But there has to be, in my view, a more focused and coordinated effort from the African Union directing the regional economic communities and establishing standards and expectations for the regional standby forces. I think that principally is a diplomatic effort in engaging the African Union.

But I am encouraged because there is for the first time a Memorandum of Understanding between the African Union and the U.S. Government that formalizes our relationship. So I'm hopeful that we can make some progress in the near-term.

Senator DONNELLY. Do we have metrics as we look forward? There's no guarantee you can hit numbers or plans or whatever, but here's where we hope to be next year in Africa, here's where we hope to be the following year, here's where we hope this to have expanded in 5 years, so that we can start to turn the tide back on this.

General HAM. Sir, we at AFRICOM have developed each year and refine each year, in concert with the U.S. ambassadors, what we call a country plan that does, in fact, establish specific programs with measurables, that says where do we want to go. We don't yet have that same kind of arrangement with the regional organizations and I think that's a next step for us.

Senator DONNELLY. General Fraser, you had talked about cybersecurity before in regards to TRANSCOM. Do you know the source of the cyber attacks that are taking place?

General FRASER. Sir, a number of them are scanning the network, they're just hackers trying to come in. So we see a myriad of attacks. There is also some advanced persistent attacks out there that we continue to defend against.

Senator DONNELLY. Are any of these of country of origin elsewhere that you know of?

General FRASER. Sir, we continue to do the analysis on the various threats that we have out there and some of these are passed over actually to another agency to delve deeper into that because of the sophistication that is used.

Senator DONNELLY. In working with our contractors and suppliers, is there or have you detected any effort that these cyber attacks using the contractors and suppliers to be a back door into your systems?

General FRASER. Sir, I've had one report where we are working with a company, but that was principally a download of data and activity that occurred on their network. It was not a back door attack into us.

Senator DONNELLY. General Ham, in regards to Benghazi, one of the great concerns of everyone, including you and everyone else, has been the time it took for response. So as we look forward, are there plans being made with State, with the consuls, with the embassies, to see how we can reduce that time level before you are there?

General HAM. Those discussions are underway, Senator, in a number of different ways. One, is should there be an increased presence of Marine Corps security guards at diplomatic facilities in Africa and other places around the globe. That discussion continues.

But I think the fundamental discussion that's occurring between Department of State and DOD and, in fact, more broadly across the government is the fundamental nature of DOD's security role with regard to diplomatic presence. The primary responsibility has been with the host nation, and if we're going to alter that that has some consequences. If we're going to posture forces that can respond in crisis on very short timelines in a geographic area as large as Africa, then that also has some consequences.

We've taken some initial steps in that, as I outlined, in terms of having an east, west, and north response force. But even that, the distances involved, and the times involved, preclude response within an hour or so. This will take us, I think, some further study and some hard choices, some hard resourcing choices, about how quickly must DOD be postured to respond in response to a State requirement.

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you both very much. General Ham, again, thank you for all the years of service to our men and women.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.

Senator Fischer.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for being here today.

General Ham, I'm concerned about the threats in Africa as we see them growing and they continue to grow. With the reductions in funding that we've talked about here, do you believe that we're going to have to start to rethink our strategy and maybe look for more direct involvement by the United States in that area?

General HAM. Senator, I think with sequestration I do believe we will have to revisit the Defense Strategic Guidance of January 2012. I don't know that that will necessarily shift us to a strategy that gives primacy to U.S. intervention as opposed to building partner capacity and reliance upon other nations. That'll be a difficult choice to make. It's perhaps faster for us to respond, but in the longer-term, I think that increases the demands on U.S. military forces, rather than what we seek to do through building partner capacity is to eventually reduce the demand, the global demand for U.S. forces, by increasing the capabilities of others.

Senator FISCHER. What areas do you think that we need to start to focus on? If we are looking at cuts then, besides the partner-

ships, what areas? I believe that General Rodriguez testified before the committee that he felt we needed to see increases in surveillance, aircraft, satellite imagery. Do you agree with that assessment or where would you look to change the focus then?

General HAM. Senator, I would agree. The most significant shortfall I have at present and projected into the future is ISR, the ability to see, know, and understand the operating environment. So I think that shortfall will continue to have the greatest impact on the command.

Senator FISCHER. Do you see other areas where we need to focus on as well?

General HAM. I think one of the programs I like a lot that this committee and Congress have supported are the so-called dual key authorities that DOD and Department of State, that those two Secretaries can control together in an effort to help build partner capacity in nations. I think that's an area where we can probably operate more efficiently and with greater prioritization.

I think in general, Senator, that's what the budget constraints are going to cause us to do, is to take a much sharper prioritization to our military-to-military engagements in Africa. There are some exercises and other training opportunities that we have been doing in past years that, frankly, will probably fall by the wayside.

Second, I think it will drive us to an increased multinational approach to building partner capacity, as opposed to our exclusively, almost exclusively, bilateral building partner capacity activities, to date.

Senator FISCHER. Senator Inhofe and Senator Donnelly both alluded to this, and you answered in response to their questions about your timing, being able to respond to crisis within your command. As we see terrorist networks overlapping across commands, how do you think the coordination works between the regional commands that we currently have today, and is that going to help us at all in responding quicker to crises?

General HAM. We have some good examples recently in our collaboration with both CENTCOM and EUCOM. The Secretary of Defense has given us in Djibouti and Yemen some authorities to do very rapid sharing of forces between the two combatant commands, though the geographic boundary exists right there. That allows General Mattis and I to very quickly transition a capability, a military capability that was dedicated to me, to operate in support of him in Yemen or someplace else, or vice versa.

I think we will need more of that kind of flexibility because the threats that we face, of course, don't respect our boundaries. They work transnationally and regionally. We have to be increasingly flexible in applying our authorities and our capabilities across those boundaries.

But I'm encouraged, Senator, by the direction in which we're moving.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, General.

General Fraser, thank you for coming to my office to visit with me. I appreciated the information that you provided.

You said that the number of attacks has increased fourfold in the last year, is that correct?

General FRASER. Yes, ma'am, that's correct.

Senator FISCHER. You talked about the collaborative nature that you have with regards to those cyber attacks with private sector partners, correct?

General FRASER. Yes, ma'am.

Senator FISCHER. This interaction with your private sector partners, do you believe that's the most effective way to share information, and is it a good approach to take?

General FRASER. Ma'am, that's not the only thing that we're doing. As I mentioned earlier, in coordination with the newly stood-up cyber center that we have on our operations floor in what we call the fusion center, this neighborhood watch capability that we have, where everyone is working together in a collaborative nature, is actually enhancing us all, from our commercial partners as well as us just in TRANSCOM, in our ability to maintain the connectivity that we need to accomplish our job.

So it's all of that working together that is making us as effective as we are. Why we're able to get together and work this in a collaborative nature is because everybody understands the importance of it. So I am encouraged by what we're doing. We continue to move forward in a partnership with them and sharing this information.

Senator FISCHER. Why are you such a prime target?

General FRASER. I believe it's because 90 percent of what we do is on the unclassified network. We do have a number of things that we can do from sensitive operations or movement of sensitive or classified cargo. We do that on the SIPRNET, on the high side, and through other means. But because of how much business that we do with industry and with our commercial partners, that's done on the unclassified side. So, therefore, I also think that's one reason.

Another reason is, too, because there's no other nation that can do what we do and do it the way we do it in order to deploy, sustain, and then redeploy our troops and respond in a timely manner for support of a humanitarian crisis to save lives, decrease human suffering, or respond to a crisis in another region where we've supported other combatant commands. So I believe there's a learning that others want to know.

As I visit other countries and I talk to them about it, they don't have a transportation command. They don't have the collaborative nature that we have here as we reach across and we are actually developing a global campaign plan for distribution which synchronizes across all the combatant commands, to be able to be agile, flexible, and responsive with our forces. So I think there's a learning that's also going on to get an understanding as well as they try to collect the data.

Senator FISCHER. Just briefly now, without the investment of TRANSCOM, are your private sector partners viable? If not, what happens?

General FRASER. There's significant concern in the industry right now and we are working through both the land, air, and maritime executive working groups to understand what the future's going to look like. Because of the budget uncertainty that we have with a CR, we see that we are not doing the level of work that we had anticipated, programmed, and forecast for the future. So when the 2013 budget was built, rates were built, they expected a certain amount of business, both organically and with respect to all the

Services, but they're under pressure, and so the inability to do things such as exercises that have been changed, revamped, and consolidated.

There's also a further reduction that's going to be taken with sequestration. So this lack of predictability, the lack of flexibility that's there, they are feeling the pinch. They have come to me and they've talked to me, which is why we're bringing this into the executive working groups to make sure that we're all on the same sheet of music and have the same understanding of what the business is going to look like for the future.

That lack of predictability and stability right now creates great uncertainty. We have already had, as a result of the change in operations in Iraq, all very positive, but because the capacity that had been built on the air side of the business, we have had several companies that have actually had to go into bankruptcy and into restructure. There is one that has had to shut their doors. They are no longer in the business.

There is also concern in the maritime industry now as the amount of cargo that we're moving starts to come down. So they're looking to shift their business into different lanes and going into different areas.

The other impact as a second-, third-order effect is potentially, because of the high cost of crews, there has been some discussion about reflagging some of the ships from U.S. flags, and this could result in a change-out of the crews as well. So, there is concern across all the industries.

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir, very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Thanks to Senator King for his courtesies.

Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. I want, ought to thank Senator King, too. We have a markup in Judiciary about the assault weapons ban, which is obviously an important topic to everyone in the country. I'm going to try to get to that. But Senator King, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to go out of order here.

General Ham, thank you for your service to our country. I want to get right into some questions I think are important, at least in my mind.

Do you know a Lieutenant Colonel Wood?

General HAM. Sir, I've met him briefly, and yes, I do know who he is.

Senator GRAHAM. He was assigned to the site security team in Benghazi, Libya. Is that correct General?

General HAM. In Tripoli, yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. In Tripoli, a 16-person team providing additional security to our Ambassador and our State Department officials in Libya. Is that correct?

General HAM. Yes, sir, it is.

Senator GRAHAM. He says that he reported to you three times a week or someone in your command through video teleconferencing about the situation in Libya. Is that an accurate statement?

General HAM. Partially, sir. The special security team, a DOD entity, operated exclusively under what we call Chief of Mission

authority, meaning, they took all of their direction from the Chief of Mission.

Senator GRAHAM. Right. They were under their operational control. But he told you or your command what was going on in Libya; is that correct?

General HAM. Yes, sir. There was frequent communication.

Senator GRAHAM. As a matter of fact, I want to compliment your organization for informing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. My point is that through Lieutenant Colonel Wood's interaction with your command, he was able to know of the August 16 cable from Ambassador Stevens telling the State Department: "We cannot defend the consulate if attacked in a coordinated way." Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey said that they knew of all the communications coming out of Libya to the State Department regarding the threat environment in Benghazi and Libya, in general. I think that has a lot to do with your command, I want to compliment you on that.

Do you have any idea how the Secretary of Defense could have known of the reporting from the State Department about the threat condition in Benghazi and the Secretary of State be unaware?

General HAM. Sir, I don't have any insight into that.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Just for the record, Lieutenant Colonel Wood requested an extension to go past August 2012 to help the Ambassador. The Ambassador wanted his team to stay there. Would you have approved that request if it had come before you?

General HAM. Sir, it would not have been mine to approve, but——

Senator GRAHAM. Would you have supported the request?

General HAM. I would and I did, and I explained that to Ambassador Stevens, that if there were a request to extend the team, we at AFRICOM were prepared to do so.

Senator GRAHAM. He was sent home in August, at the same time these cables were coming from our Ambassador, that we cannot defend the consulate from a coordinated attack.

Lieutenant Colonel Wood said on October 12 to Congress it was only a matter of time until we were attacked. We were the last flag flying. So hats off to Lieutenant Colonel Wood.

Do you know a Representative Jason Chaffetz?

General HAM. I do, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. He visited you on October 5 at your headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Do you recall that visit?

General HAM. I do, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. You went together on October 6 to Tripoli to visit the Embassy Country Team. Do you recall that visit?

General HAM. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you recall him asking you what military assets you ordered deployed to Libya once you learned that the Embassy's Special Mission Compound in Benghazi was under attack? According to Representative Chaffetz, you responded that you could have deployed assets; however, it was not requested. Do you recall saying that?

General HAM. Not in those specific terms, Senator. I recall having a discussion about the forces that were available, the forces I

requested of Secretary of Defense be placed on heightened alert, in some cases——

Senator GRAHAM. Did you ever recommend to Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, the President, or anyone in authority to move assets into Libya?

General HAM. Yes, sir, and they approved that and the teams did move.

Senator GRAHAM. So what was the closest team?

General HAM. The team that was best postured to move was the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team in Rota.

Senator GRAHAM. So when did they begin to move?

General HAM. I don't know precisely when they began to move. They arrived in Tripoli about 24 hours after the attack.

Senator GRAHAM. I guess my point—were fighter aircraft available in Aviano that could have gotten into Libya within 24 hours?

General HAM. They could have been, sir. I did not so request——

Senator GRAHAM. Did you ever suggest that we deploy any military asset quicker than 24 hours?

General HAM. I did not. I considered, but did not request the deployment of fighter aircraft.

Senator GRAHAM. Did anybody ever ask you, General Ham, what do we have to get to the aid of these folks quickly? Did anyone ever suggest that we use an F–15 or F–16 to buzz the compound once the Ambassador was found missing?

General HAM. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Were you ever told to stand down in any of your efforts to move people into Libya because we were concerned about violating Libyan air space?

General HAM. No, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Were you ever tapped on the shoulder by anyone and told, "you're going ahead of yourself here?" No one ever suggested to you to stop what you were doing?

General HAM. No, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Did you know when the attack was going to be over when it started?

General HAM. Certainly not.

Senator GRAHAM. What kind of reaction was there in the system when the Ambassador was found missing?

General HAM. Shock, to be sure; an all-out effort to find him and hence the diversion of the unmanned system to get that overhead as quickly as possible.

Senator GRAHAM. An all-out effort. Did we have air assets within 2 to 3 hours of Libya? Were there any 130s available to go in? Were there any AC–130 gunships?

General HAM. I know for a fact there were no AC–130s in the theater. I would have to check if there were any C–130s.

Senator GRAHAM. Could you do this? Could you give this committee in writing a detailed analysis of the military assets available that could have gotten into the Benghazi area within 12 hours?

General HAM. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Please tell us what you recommended, who you recommended it to, and what to do with those assets.

General HAM. I will, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator GRAHAM. Did you ever talk to the President of the United States?

General HAM. Not on this matter, no, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. When the Secretary of Defense turned to you and said, "there's really nothing we can do within 24 hours to help these people," what was his reaction?

General HAM. Sir, it wasn't that kind of a conversation. The initial discussion was about the initial reports of an attack, trying to gather information, what's happening, what forces are available to respond. That's what precipitated the alert to the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team, and to the CIF.

Senator GRAHAM. Just finally, did it become apparent to everybody in the room, there's nobody can get there within 24 hours?

General HAM. Pretty quickly. Not necessarily the 24 hours, because the Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team and the CIF could have arrived earlier. But then, again, knowing what we knew then, different than what we know now, the attack culminated and seemed——

Senator GRAHAM. Did you stop their deployment?

General HAM. We did not. We timed the deployment, then, in concert with the embassy to say, "when do you want this, when do you need this team to arrive?"

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. My time has run out.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator King.

Senator KING. General Ham, just for the record, you used a term that gave me a start. You said "Al Qaeda-Main." Can we make it clear that there's no "e" on the word "main" in that phrase? [Laughter.]

General HAM. Certainly, Senator, yes. "Al Qaeda senior leaders."

Senator KING. I appreciate that.

The question's been asked and I think Senator Graham's questions were around this. I'm less interested in the details of what happened and more interested in what do we learn from it. I think the question's been asked several different ways. I don't want to prolong it, but it seems to me the strategic challenge—and it's fortuitous that you two fellows are here at the same time—is how do we decrease response time while still maintaining a relatively small footprint? That really, it seems to me, is the ongoing strategic issue. I know you've talked about it. I don't expect a lengthy answer, but I think it has to do with transportation, because we don't want a big base in Africa, I don't think. But on the other hand, as we learned in Benghazi, we want to be able to get people—and not necessarily in the context—the Benghazi case was a State Department emergency. There may be other emergencies where American interests are threatened on a short-term basis.

I just suggest to you, I hope that's something that's in the planning and discussion stages, because I think that's the strategic challenge that we face. Do either one of you want to address that?

General HAM. I'll start, Senator, if that's okay. I do agree with you. The challenge for us, I think, begins—first of all, we're much better at prevention than we are at response. Prevention is a lot cheaper, but that necessitates better understanding of the operating environment, and hence my concern for increased ISR, so that we have that better understanding and we can perhaps, as we have done in some places, a preventive deployment, if you will, a reinforcement to prevent an activity from occurring, rather than responding to crisis.

General FRASER. Sir, if I might add on TRANSCOM's part, one of the things that I find that is good about the command is the flexibility and the agility that we have, so that we have a rather robust intelligence shop. We maintain constant contact with all of our combatant commands, so that when there is an event, whether it's an attack, whether it is a natural disaster, an earthquake, a tsunami, whatever it may be, one of the things that we initially do as part of our process is to start looking at what is in the system and what I have available.

As soon as we know that, then we're able to take action and, dependent upon what it is that we may be responding to, we have authorities, for instance, to start putting aircraft on alert, to put crews into crew rest so that they'll be immediately able to respond. We have different levels of alert postures. Those are some of the things that we start doing right away.

Numerous times they're never called upon. But immediately within the system, the global nature of the mission and the fact that we're around the globe somewhere, we're able to put our hands on assets dependent upon the combatant commander's needs. So there's a lot of flexibility and agility in the system.

If I might add, I do have a concern as we move to the future. Because of the cuts that are occurring, there's going to be an impact, I think, long-term second- and third-order effects of this readiness and this posture level. So will we have that flexibility and agility in the system if the readiness levels begin to lower to lower levels, and what risk will that present to the system and the rapid response that is required in the future? So it is something we're going to have to keep an eye on. It's something that we'll make sure that we continue to work with our combatant commands and our commercial partners.

Senator KING. I appreciate it. I think to me, the Benghazi situation gives us an opportunity to learn. One of my principles in a situation like this is after-action assessment and what could we have done differently. I'm sure you've done that. But to me, the fundamental question is how do we get assets where they're needed in a fairly short time, whether it's 2 hours, 4 hours, 6 hours? It depends on the circumstances. But I'm sure you're working on that, your command is working on that.

General Ham, I certainly appreciate your service to the country and wish you the best of luck. I'll join Senator McCain. I'm sure that one thing you won't miss is appearing before this committee. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator King.

Senator Ayotte.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both of our witnesses that are here today for their distinguished service. I very much want to thank you, General Ham, with your impending retirement, for everything that you've done in AFRICOM.

I want to reiterate what you also heard from some of my colleagues. I was deeply impressed when General Dempsey testified before the committee, certainly the level of briefings that you had provided up the chain of command with regard to the deteriorating security situation in eastern Libya. So I very much appreciate that.

I have a follow-up question to what Senator Graham was asking you about with regard to what happened in Benghazi. When General Dempsey testified before this committee along with Secretary Panetta, he said that essentially you had recommended the extension of the site security team in Libya, in other words, the 16-person team that Senator Graham was asking you about, the security team that was present, that was not extended. It went there until August 5.

When General Dempsey testified before this committee, he said that you personally had recommended the extension of the special security team, you were aware and briefed on the August cable that the Ambassador had indicated that the consulate could not withstand a coordinated attack. According to General Dempsey's testimony, you were told no, that there wouldn't be an extension.

So how did that come about? Who told you no? Who made the call that the site security team should not be extended?

General HAM. Senator, to the best of my knowledge, there was no request from the Department of State to DOD to extend the team. That's how the process began, was a request from State to Defense for this augmentation, Senator, twice extended. But I'm unaware—I do not believe there was a request for a third extension.

My support for the extension was, first, we were postured to do so, that if State so requested we had the people ready—some of them were those who were already deployed that would be extended. Some would be replacement persons. So we were ready to respond to an extension should one be directed.

But there was also, I will admit to a selfish motivation. Though the team operated exclusively under the Ambassador's authority, it was good for us to have military people in Libya who were establishing contacts, building rapport, building relationships, building their understanding of Libya, that we knew would pay off for us in establishing a military-to-military relationship with the Libyans. So I had a selfish motivation in the DOD presence.

Senator AYOTTE. So as General Dempsey told us, he said that you actually called the embassy to ask whether they wanted an extension of it. Do you recall doing that?

General HAM. I do, Senator. I had numerous conversations by phone or by secure video teleconference with Ambassador Cretz and with Ambassador Stevens, and Ambassador Stevens visited the AFRICOM headquarters on August 20 and we had face-to-face discussions then as well.

Senator AYOTTE. So when you had these conversations, what were you told in terms of why they were not asking to keep the security team there?

General HAM. I did not have that discussion with Ambassador Stevens. It was simply my point to him to say: "You know, if State asks and the Secretary of Defense, obviously my boss, approved it, we were postured to support the team."

Senator AYOTTE. Did you think it was a good idea that the team remain longer?

General HAM. In my personal view, yes, ma'am.

Senator AYOTTE. Did you express that to the State Department?

General HAM. Only to Ambassador Stevens, and previously to Ambassador Cretz, and certainly to General Dempsey.

Senator AYOTTE. Just so we understand, when the British Ambassador's convoy was attacked, this team actually helped recover and helped them when they were attacked, as I understand it. So it had provided substantial assistance when there had been other attacks in the area, particularly on our allies.

General HAM. Senator, some members of the team did occasionally travel into Benghazi at the request and direction of the Ambassador and, as you might expect, from U.S. military personnel, if there was a mission to be accomplished they were going to find a way to try to do it.

Senator AYOTTE. Just trying to understand what occurred and also what lessons we can take from this. As I understand it, you have at AFRICOM headquarters, interagency representatives, where you have from nine different Federal agencies that meet together to talk about and coordinate AFRICOM's activities. Could you explain what that is and how does that working group work together, and thinking about it in light of a situation like this, where what we don't want is DOD thinking this is what we should be doing to protect the consulate and this is the best course of action, but Department of State not taking that information in.

Could you tell me, did that working group take up the security? Does it take up security issues? Did it in this instance?

General HAM. Senator, one of the directions given to AFRICOM is a mission set very similar to other geographic combatant commands. But there's a special direction that says that in Africa we will give particular attention to a whole-of-government or interagency approach to achieving the U.S. interests in Africa. That's resulted in a presence within the command, as you mentioned, for multiple different U.S. Government agencies. They don't sit as one body, but rather they are interspersed throughout the command.

What those non-DOD personnel bring to us for the most part is African expertise and experience and the particular experience and expertise of their home organizations, be it the Departments of Homeland Security or Agriculture or Treasury; certainly State and the Foreign Service and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and many other organizations.

They're coordinated by a very senior Foreign Service officer who serves as my deputy commander for civil-military activities, a very senior Foreign Service officer, a three-time ambassador. He coordinates the interagency role in the government.

So what that says is that we have an opportunity because of the presence of those interagency personnel in the command to have a very strong connective relationship with the U.S. country teams, who are also multiagency, but also back to the agency headquarters in Washington. That gives us some great benefits.

Senator AYOTTE. It sounds like a very good working group. In the context of what happened in Benghazi and thinking about the protection of the consulate, the prior course of attacks that, of course, you reported up the chain of command, was that ever discussed in that interagency working group in terms of the deteriorating security situation and what actions we should be taking to ensure protection of personnel and to deal with the situation there?

General HAM. Yes, ma'am. It was a serious point of discussion for a number of months—growing concern over the increasing presence of individual extremists, some of them with strong al Qaeda links, growing concern over an expanding network, particularly in eastern Libya, and this caused us to concentrate our intelligence collection efforts, which were few, frankly, but those that we did have, to coordinate our collection efforts in eastern Libya to better understand the emerging situation.

Senator AYOTTE. I know that my time is up. One of the things that I'm struggling with—I think about that group and I know that, as I understand it, your deputy in that group is a pretty senior ranking official in the State Department—why we wouldn't have thought about having the communication of extending the site security team, in light of all these discussions and the situation as it was unfolding in Benghazi. Was that just not an issue taken up by that group?

General HAM. Ma'am, we did have that discussion. As mentioned, Senator, we were prepared to extend the team. I do not know the decisionmaking process within State that led to an extension not being requested.

Senator AYOTTE. So this was discussed with this team. There was—as I understand it, Chris Dell is your deputy on that team, who is a pretty high-ranking official in the State Department. But when you had these discussions you don't know why they didn't go up and the decision in the State Department wasn't made to extend the team?

General HAM. I do not, Senator.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Now we have finished our first round. Is there anyone who wishes to ask any additional questions at this time? [No response.]

If not, we thank you both. A special thanks again to those who work with you, and a special good luck to you, General Ham.

We'll stand adjourned.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

IN-TRANSIT VISIBILITY OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN

1. Senator NELSON. General Fraser, the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is the Department of Defense (DOD) lead for in-transit visibility (ITV) throughout the supply chain. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that although DOD has taken steps to improve in-transit tracking, no one organization is aware of all such efforts across DOD. GAO further states that there are at

least 34 such individual efforts across DOD, with only informal coordination amongst them. As DOD is projected to spend $455 million on these efforts from 2012 to 2015, are you going to take an active role in these individual efforts?

General FRASER. DOD efforts and projected expenses cited are those of the four Services and defense agencies like the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). TRANSCOM's responsibility as DOD lead proponent for ITV is to collaborate with the Services/agencies to eliminate overlaps and to ensure synergy among their programs.

Yes, TRANSCOM has been actively involved in this mission and will continue to be so. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Supply Chain Integration, is currently drafting DOD Strategy for Improving Asset Visibility (Tracking) and ITV with input from TRANSCOM, the Services, and DLA. Our understanding is this document will further define the centralized roles of TRANSCOM in coordinating the DOD ITV efforts.

JACKSONVILLE PORT AUTHORITY

2. Senator NELSON. General Fraser, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a plan to optimize the use of strategic ports. Despite a 2008 study which ranked Jacksonville as the number one east coast strategic port, Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) saw a decrease in volume of military cargo. We corresponded a year ago on this particular topic, specifically regarding the overall selection process and movement of cargo through strategic seaports, as well as best-value practices and processes for planning, routing, and booking cargo. At the time, the audit of the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command to determine cost effectiveness of cargo movement procedures was ongoing, but the results were not expected in the near-term. Will you provide an update regarding the status of your review?

General FRASER. The GAO audit referred to in our March 2012 correspondence is complete. The review of DOD preparations for the Afghanistan drawdown (GAO–13–185R) was completed December 2012. This audit, however, does not address your concerns regarding the cost effectiveness of cargo movements and the relative impact to seaports such as the JAXPORT.

DOD has 22 designated Strategic Seaports and 17 of them are commercial. Such designation does not guarantee throughput of military cargo or DOD business. However, JAXPORT has been, and remains, one of our busiest seaports. Many factors are considered when selecting seaports for inbound and outbound military cargo. For most missions, port selection is initially recommended by the combatant command at Force Flow conferences and is documented in the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System. The type of cargo and the overland cost to transport the cargo is also considered. Additionally, a significant portion of the surface cargo is often booked with a commercial carrier using the door-to-door method. In such cases, the carrier decides which seaports to use based upon a business analysis taking advantage of their network and infrastructure. This is often the best-value option for the government.

Since March 2012, we have processed 1,928 pieces of redeployment/retrograde cargo through JAXPORT in support of drawdown efforts in Iraq (Kuwait) and Afghanistan. During the same time frame, JAXPORT processed 1,269 pieces of cargo in support of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) missions. The 101st Combat Aviation Brigade from Fort Campbell, KY, deployed through JAXPORT recently, and we forecast increased traffic via Jacksonville for 2,723 pieces of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) bound for Afghanistan. Finally, we are conducting a feasibility analysis using JAXPORT for expanded agricultural inspections of cargo returning from Afghanistan.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

BUILDING SECURITY CAPACITY

3. Senator MCCASKILL. General Ham, one of AFRICOM's central missions is to strengthen the defense capabilities of African states. In January 2013, an International Security Advisory Board report on "Security Capacity Building" found that the United States annually spends more than $25 billion on what is broadly classified as security capacity of the recipient states. The report found that we have a multiplicity of programs spread across different departments and agencies where there may or may not be coordination in resourcing and execution. A lack of coordination could easily lead to duplication of effort and waste of resources that would

be better spent elsewhere. As the combatant commander, what policies are in place to ensure efforts are coordinated with our diplomatic missions and other Federal agencies to ensure duplication is not occurring?

General HAM. AFRICOM coordinates directly with the Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Embassy country teams as we plan our programs. We encourage a transparent approach to capability development to include inviting members from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DOS to the initial stages of proposal development. Our excellent working relationship with DOS and OSD and the growing number of Offices of Security Cooperation in African nations facilitate this dialogue and help ensure that the U.S. Embassy Chief of Mission has all the required information to provide final approval to our programs—a key method for ensuring that all agencies are involved.

4. Senator MCCASKILL. General Ham, while many at the DOS and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) welcome the ability of DOD to leverage resources and to organize complex operations, there also is concern that the military may overestimate its capabilities as well as its diplomatic role, or pursue activities that are not a core part of its mandate. The highly unequal allocation of resources between the DOD, USAID, and DOS could hinder their ability to act as equal partners and could lead to the militarization of development and diplomacy. How are you balancing our military presence in Africa with our diplomatic responsibilities?

General HAM. The U.S. Ambassadors are the lead for U.S. diplomatic, informational, military, and economic development in each African nation. AFRICOM fully supports them and DOS to ensure a balanced and synchronized effort between diplomatic, development, and military presence in African nations. Traditional U.S. military engagement strategy has been grounded in threat-based analysis. To meet our growing responsibilities in Africa, the command will complement this traditional framework with a partnership-based analytical approach to planning. We will develop strategies to use our military capabilities in a supporting role with our interagency team in an effort to assist our partners in building resilient, democratic security institutions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III

EQUIPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

5. Senator MANCHIN. General Fraser, Foreign Policy Magazine's Situation Report reported on Tuesday, March 5 that the Army is planning on leaving about $6 billion worth of equipment in Afghanistan post-2014, after moving about $21 billion of equipment out of the country. I do not want a single soldier to die trying to move equipment out of Afghanistan, but—at the same time—this seems like a tremendous waste of resources at a time of fiscal crisis in this country. What was TRANSCOM's role in determining what equipment was worth returning to DOD's inventories outside of Afghanistan?

General FRASER. The individual Services make the determination of what equipment will be returned to DOD's inventories. TRANSCOM's role is to provide the transportation of equipment back to the United States or other locations via military or commercial means.

6. Senator MANCHIN. General Fraser, how does the Afghanistan retrograde situation compare with that of Iraq?

General FRASER. The retrograde of materiel out of Iraq was significant and challenging. The reduction of troops and equipment out of Afghanistan is much more challenging and is being conducted with deliberate and careful planning. Additionally, Afghanistan's road system is not as developed and there is no neighboring country like Kuwait which allows U.S. Forces to stage vehicles and equipment for processing and onward movement to the United States. Also, Afghanistan, unlike Iraq and Kuwait, does not have access to a seaport.

To mitigate any challenges, TRANSCOM has focused on increasing our strategic flexibility. The past year has seen the successful reversal of the flow on multiple ground routes to include: the Afghanistan to Europe Route, the Trans-Siberian Route, the Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan route, as well as reestablishing bidirectional flow on the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC). Additionally, we are expanding our multi-modal options to include retrograde operations through Baku, Azerbaijan.

7. Senator MANCHIN. General Fraser, what was the value of equipment left in Iraq?

General FRASER. The Services are in the best position to provide an overall cost analysis of equipment in theater. TRANSCOM assists the Services with calculating the transportation cost and readily supports equipment movement once the Services make a determination of what is to be returned to the United States.

8. Senator MANCHIN. General Ham, I recently received an interesting briefing from the Henry Jackson Society on those convicted of planning or perpetrating al Qaeda related terrorist offenses in the United States. Of the 171 individuals convicted of al Qaeda-related offenses studied by the researchers, about half had received terrorist training of some kind. Of these, nearly 70 percent trained in Afghanistan, but 5 percent trained in Somalia. What is the current status of terrorist training in the AFRICOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), particularly in Somalia?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

9. Senator MANCHIN. General Ham, what is AFRICOM doing to manage this challenge?

General HAM. We believe that African nations are best suited to address security challenges in Africa. AFRICOM will continue to work as one element of a total U.S. Government approach to enable our African partners to address security challenges. Our efforts focus on intelligence-sharing and capacity-building so that Africa nations are better able to prevent or defeat terrorist training activities within their borders.

10. Senator MANCHIN. General Ham, under your leadership, the United States has expanded its presence in Africa, including through the establishment of new bases in Niger and Burkina Faso primarily tasked with counterterrorism and surveillance missions. Will these bases continue to serve primarily as platforms for surveillance, or will we begin to see a larger U.S. troop presence and expansion of the mission at these bases?

General HAM. Our presence in Niger and Burkina Faso is served by operating locations rather than by long-term enduring bases. We do not intend to increase U.S. troop presence or expand the mission in Niger or Burkina Faso beyond what is necessary to support our ongoing operations. We maintain a low profile presence while bringing to bear unique U.S. capabilities in accomplishing our mission.

11. Senator MANCHIN. General Ham, over the next year, do you anticipate that the United States will conclude additional status of forces agreements with African nations, as we did with Burkina Faso on February 28?

General HAM. The United States most recently concluded a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Niger on January 28, 2013. The United States currently has status protection agreements with 32 of 54 nations in the AFRICOM AOR. Of those, six are global SOFAs which contain all of the immunity privilege provisions the United States normally seeks to ensure mission accomplishment and status protections for U.S. uniformed and civilian members of DOD.

The United States is currently in the process of negotiating a SOFA (renewal and update of existing agreement) with Morocco, as well as concluding SOFAs with Cape Verde (new) and Uganda (renewal and update). In addition, DOD has coordinated with DOS to deliver our global SOFA text to 10 other nations in the AOR in the past year. We are hopeful that we will be able to successfully negotiate and conclude these agreements.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

BENGHAZI

12. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, terrorist attacks in Benghazi on September 11, 2012, that left four Americans dead—Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty. Deaths that I believe could have been prevented. What has become clear is that the United States was woefully unprepared for what occurred in Benghazi. Warning signs went unheeded—when tragedy struck, forces weren't ready to respond. What is also clear is that following the attack, the administration provided the American people inaccurate information about the true nature of the catastrophic events in Benghazi. Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey admitted before this committee last month what most of us knew all along: it was immediately apparent to the Obama administration that the deadly assault on our

Benghazi annex was unequivocally a coordinated terrorist attack. What was your assessment of the threat in Libya prior to the attack?

General HAM. Due to the presence and activities of al Qaeda operatives and other extremist networks in the region, there was a general agreement in the Intelligence Community that Benghazi and northeastern Libya were high-threat areas. However, there was no specific, credible intelligence that an attack against the U.S. Special Mission Facility or annex was being prepared.

13. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, were you aware of the multiple attacks against Western interests in Benghazi in the months before the events of September 11, 2012, including against the British Ambassador, the Red Cross, and the U.S. Consulate?

General HAM. Yes.

14. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, were you aware that the British pulled their mission out of Benghazi and the Red Cross suspended operations?

General HAM. Yes.

15. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, did you make or recommend any changes in AFRICOM force posture or alert status in the region based on the threat picture? If not, why not?

General HAM. Yes, DOD posture across the world on September 11, 2012, was commensurate with the anticipated threat and force protection conditions across individual regions. Our forces maintained heightened awareness, however; we were not aware of specific threats to U.S. personnel in Libya. We were also unaware of Ambassador Stevens' travel to Benghazi as it is not customary for U.S. Embassies to advise DOD of ambassadors' travel.

16. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, did you talk with Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and/or the President during the attacks, and if so, what was discussed?

General HAM. Yes. I spoke with Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey. Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and I discussed the situation, threats, and forces available.

17. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, when and how did you find out about the attack in Benghazi?

General HAM. I was in Washington, DC, when I received the notification call from my AFRICOM operations center at approximately 1620 EDT.

18. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, what options did you recommend to the President, Secretary of Defense, and/or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

19. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, what forces were available forces and what direction did you give your forces?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

20. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, were you told not to execute any of your recommendations?

General HAM. No.

21. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, do you believe the attack was a coordinated terrorist attack?

General HAM. Yes. It was clear to me soon after the first attack that this was more than a demonstration.

22. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, did the State Department ask for assistance in securing the attack sites after the Americans had been evacuated to facilitate the investigation?

General HAM. No.

23. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, knowing what you know now, would you make any different immediate recommendations or take different actions?

General HAM. Had we known then what we know now, I suspect Ambassador Stevens would not have travelled to Benghazi and the DOS would have sought DOD assistance in evacuating all Americans from Libya.

24. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, does the growing terrorist threat, and lack of warning of this attack, indicate we are under-resourcing our counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel?

General HAM. AFRICOM's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements continue to increase based on the growing terrorist threat in our AOR. ISR assets are low-density/high-demand assets that are in demand across the globe.

We recognize that we are one part of an overall U.S. counterterrorism strategy. We will continue to work with the DOS to enable partners to strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities.

AFGHANISTAN REDEPLOYMENT

25. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, unlike Iraq, Afghanistan presents a much more significant logistical challenge for the movement of people and equipment into and out of the theater. Until last fall, the military used a mix of commercial and military surface transportation along five major ground routes through Pakistan to deliver approximately 40 percent of total cargo into Afghanistan. TRANSCOM also used a series of three northern routes though Central Asian countries called the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to deliver another 40 percent, and Air Mobility Command (AMC) aircraft to move the remaining 20 percent. However, TRANSCOM will remain challenged to move the sheer volume required to meet the President's December 2014 deadline for the withdrawal of the majority of combat forces from Afghanistan. What difficulties do you foresee with getting DOD equipment and personnel out of Afghanistan?

General FRASER. None at the present time; however, floods, renewed strikes/disputes, sectarian violence, and upcoming elections could disrupt future cargo along the PAKGLOC. Afghanistan is a logistically challenging area of operations. Limited surface routes and geopolitical sensitivities have the potential of negatively affecting our ability to support retrograde operations out of Afghanistan. To mitigate these challenges, TRANSCOM has established multiple transportation routes, including airlift between the continental United States and Afghanistan, as well as commercial surface and multi-modal transportation routes. TRANSCOM is providing the strategic flexibility needed to meet U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) redeployment timeline and is ensuring that there are no single points of failure in the transportation enterprise.

The past year has seen the successful reversal of the flow on multiple ground routes to include the Afghanistan to Europe Route, the Trans-Siberian Route, the Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan route; as well as reestablishing bi-directional flow on the PAKGLOC. Additionally, we are expanding our multi-modal routing options to include retrograde operations through Baku, Azerbaijan.

In order to increase operational flexibility, decrease transportation costs, and provide additional geopolitical theater engagement opportunities, we are partnered with DOS, CENTCOM, and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to open new ground and multi-modal routes while continuing to synchronize our efforts with CENTCOM. One example of increasing flexibility is the passenger (PAX) transit option at Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK), Romania. Our efforts to open an additional transit location for PAX movements culminated in the successful bi-directional movement last September and this past February. Nearly 12,600 passengers have transited MK.

26. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, does DOD have sufficient capacity to meet the drawdown timeline through 2014?

General FRASER. TRANSCOM currently has enough capacity to meet the 2014 drawdown timeline. We are in the process of increasing capacity by opening new routes and new modes through several proofs of principle. Once fully realized, these routes will provide additional operational flexibility to the CENTCOM Commander during the Afghanistan drawdown. These efforts will increase cost-effectiveness and provide additional geopolitical engagement opportunities.

27. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, has DOD determined what equipment you will be returning to the United States?

General FRASER. The Services have made decisions on some equipment that will be returning to the United States. TRANSCOM has been transporting this equipment back to the United States for over a year. The Services are still deciding on other equipment that may be declared excess and offered to other countries as Excess Defense Articles (EDA).

28. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, do you have the authorities you need to return all required equipment?

General FRASER. Yes, we have the authorities to return all required equipment to the United States or other U.S. locations.

29. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, why has it taken so long to finally open and use the PAKGLOC?

General FRASER. After the November 26, 2011, friendly fire incident in Pakistan, the initial talks between the United States and the Government of Pakistan to reopen the PAKGLOC began on April 27, 2012. Those talks resulted in a decision to establish a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on principles and procedures for cargo movement through Pakistan. On May 15, 2012, Pakistan's Defense Committee of the Cabinet authorized the Ministries/Departments to conclude the ongoing negotiations and shift the bilateral discussions to a more formal negotiation.

On July 11, 2012, 1 week after Pakistan formally reopened the PAKGLOC, Pakistan indicated that the cargo backlogged in Karachi would move under existing, pre-November 2011 arrangements. The U.S. Embassy and Pakistan counterparts then agreed that no new transit fees would be charged on cargo transiting Pakistan.

Negotiations for the Terms of Reference (ToR) took place from August to November 2012 with formal signing on November 1, 2012. On November 7, the Exchange of Letters between Pakistan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was signed, which brought all of our International Security Assistance Force partners under both the MOU and the ToR.

U.S. Forces Afghanistan developed Proof of Principles (PoPs) to incrementally test the new agreements, processes, and the newly established Universal Service Contract-7. Our PoPs are complete and customers are now starting to shift sustainment and retrograde cargo to the PAKGLOC.

30. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, what difficulties are you encountering with this route?

General FRASER. None at the present time; however, floods, renewed strikes/disputes, sectarian violence, and upcoming elections could disrupt future cargo along the PAKGLOC. TRANSCOM, while balancing requirements and capacity, will continue to ship cargo along other transit routes, as a hedging strategy to ensure flexibility and minimize the effects of any disruption along the PAKGLOC.

31. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, is Pakistan cooperating with us?

General FRASER. Pakistan is cooperating in restoring the flow of the PAKGLOC. We have communicated our expectations and they understand that if the PAKGLOC is not meeting our requirements we will use our other available routes, which would divert business from Pakistan. It is in both our interests to maximize the cargo flow along the PAKGLOC.

32. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, why does TRANSCOM continue to move most of DOD supplies through the NDN when Pakistan is open and less expensive to use?

General FRASER. TRANSCOM supports warfighter and Service priorities by providing a transportation network that maximizes strategic flexibility and reduces operational risk across a variety of routes and modes, both into and out of Afghanistan. Additionally, we are actively engaged with Pakistan to fully realize the potential velocity and cost savings associated with transiting the PAKGLOC; while at the same time, balancing the operational requirement for multiple transportation options.

The PAKGLOC is through the PoP process that was aimed at ensuring the viability of the route under the newly negotiated Terms of Reference. We are now increasing our bookings of new cargo to this route.

33. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, what difficulties are you encountering with the NDN route?

General FRASER. TRANSCOM continues to optimize the use of the NDN route. This is not one singular route, but a network of roads and rail lines throughout Europe, Russia, the Central Asian States, and the Caucasus. Each month thousands of containers of cargo destined for Afghanistan flow across the NDN with few issues or interruptions. We continue to work with the NDN nations to improve the processes and strengthen our relations with these partnering countries. As for retrograde, countries directly adjacent to Afghanistan require new processes and procedures for export of cargo out of Afghanistan. We continue to work closely with these

nations to meet these specific export requirements, and in some cases, improve velocity by replacing manual processes with technology.

34. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, if operations in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AOR do not substantially subside to support the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, which is a major premise of the new Defense Strategic Guidance, what increased risks do you assess will occur for TRANSCOM as it relates to operational tempo and meeting global airlift requirements?

General FRASER. TRANSCOM supports warfighter and Service priorities, as directed by the Joint Chiefs, by providing a transportation network that maximizes strategic flexibility and reduces operational risk across a variety of routes and modes. TRANSCOM continues to execute movements as prioritized by the National Command Authority to ensure the right level of effort is provided to support the national strategy.

35. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, what difficulties do you foresee with getting DOD equipment and personnel out of Afghanistan with a year-long Continuing Resolution (CR) and sequestration?

General FRASER. As a service provider, TRANSCOM operations are funded through a Working Capital Fund. When transportation services are requested, the supported command and Services provide the funding required. Therefore, the availability of funds for TRANSCOM contingency operations will be dependent upon the availability of funds to the combatant commands and the Services to conduct operations. The redeployment of troops and equipment out of Afghanistan is no different from any other TRANSCOM supported movement and is dependent upon availability of the Services' funds to reimburse our Working Capital Fund for transportation services provided. Today, the Afghanistan redeployment is funded through supplemental Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funds provided to the Services. Therefore, the lack of adequate OCO funds and affects of sequestration on these funds have a more significant impact on accomplishing the redeployment mission than a year-long CR.

AFRICOM FORCE REDUCTIONS

36. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, AFRICOM is an economy of force effort—an effort I support but one that raises concerns about adequacy of resources. Its forces are completely shared with EUCOM. Admiral Stavridis said the drawdown of 11,500 troops, most coming from the loss of two Army brigades, will be mitigated by rotating troops through EUCOM from a "dedicated brigade in the United States." With decreasing military resources and increasing threats in Africa, what is the impact on AFRICOM operations given that AFRICOM was created as an economy of force command?

General HAM. We are allocated forces through the Joint Staff process from a variety of sources, including the National Guard and units stationed in the United States and Europe. In a crisis, forces in Europe are often the closest forces and may be the quickest to respond to incidents on the continent. Therefore, I'm concerned about the impact of a drawdown in Europe on the command's ability to respond to developing crises.

37. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, having flown all over Africa, it would take aircraft departing from Germany approximately 8 hours to fly to central Africa with limited to no airfields and installations for use by our military. What is the impact of having a majority of AFRICOM forces in Europe?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

38. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, how can AFRICOM rapidly respond to crisis in central or southern Africa?

General HAM. Based on time/distance factors, AFRICOM's ability to respond rapidly to crises in central and southern Africa is limited. In order to better respond, we require increased intelligence emphasis and resources to gain a better understanding of the environment to posture forces in a location to more quickly respond to a developing crisis.

39. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, what is the status of ISR assets in AFRICOM today and in the future?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

40. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, how will the lack of a 2.0 carrier presence in the Gulf impact AFRICOM?

General HAM. Given current and projected operations, I see no significant impact to AFRICOM.

41. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, the headquarters for AFRICOM is in Stuttgart, Germany. A recent DOD report supports keeping the headquarters at Stuttgart. Do you agree with the report?

General HAM. Yes.

42. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, what are your thoughts of same day moving AFRICOM somewhere on the continent of Africa?

General HAM. Due to the expense of moving the headquarters and potential resistance from some African nations, I believe this is not feasible in the foreseeable future.

43. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, what other basing is AFRICOM currently looking at near- and far-term on the continent of Africa and how will that impact AFRICOM's operations?

General HAM. AFRICOM is not looking for additional basing on the African continent. We continue to maintain a low-cost, small-footprint approach to achieving our security objectives, and have significantly reduced the number of enduring locations on the African continent in favor of non-enduring expeditionary operating locations.

MALI

44. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, the United States has been supporting French military in Mali by providing refueling, airlift, and intelligence support. Last week, the President informed Congress that he was deploying another 40 U.S. military personnel to Niger to help conduct surveillance operations in Africa, particularly in Mali and Algeria. The purpose of the deployment is to provide support for intelligence collection and facilitate intelligence sharing with French forces conducting operations in Mali, and with other partners in the region. What support is the United States providing the French, Mali, and surrounding African countries?

General HAM. We are currently supporting French forces and those of the African-Led International Support Mission to Mali with intelligence sharing, ISR, and refueling. We provided airlift support to France and Chad to move forces and equipment.

AFRICOM is not currently engaged in capacity-building with the armed forces of Mali, consistent with U.S. legal prohibitions on the provision of security assistance to any military force that has been involved in a military overthrow of a democratically-elected government.

45. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, under what legal authority is the United States assisting the French and Mali forces?

General HAM. AFRICOM is executing operations in support of France as directed in the Secretary of Defense-issued execution orders. We are not currently engaged in capacity-building with the armed forces of Mali, consistent with U.S. legal prohibitions on the provision of security assistance to any military force that has been involved in a military overthrow of a democratically-elected government.

46. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, what is the U.S. strategic goal in supporting French operations in Mali?

General HAM. Our mission in Mali is to provide support to French military operations to stabilize the situation and allow for follow-on deployment of designated Economic Community of West African States and other forces forming the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali.

47. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, who defines and what is the end state for U.S. support for French operations in Mali?

General HAM. The end state for DOD support to French operations is established by the Secretary of Defense. The end state is the French military support requirements are met, and the French military can support its own operations in Mali.

48. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, do you foresee U.S. operations expanding in Mali?

General HAM. AFRICOM is not currently engaged in capacity-building with the armed forces of Mali, consistent with U.S. legal prohibitions on the provision of security assistance to any military force that has been involved in a military overthrow of a democratically-elected government. In the future, we look forward to establishing a normal military-to-military relationship with Mali.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

49. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, you have been strong supporters of our security assistance and engagement programs, whether it is foreign military financing (FMF), FMS, international military education and training (IMET), or our train-and-equip programs. Have these programs been successful in AFRICOM? If so, do you have any examples?

General HAM. All of the security cooperation programs that you mentioned have been very successful. We greatly appreciate the opportunity that the authorized train-and-equip programs provide and have seen successes. The Raven Program for Ugandan African Union Mission in Somalia operations provided valuable intelligence leading to increased tactical success on the ground. Counterterrorism unit train-and-equip programs with Chad allowed them to act as an important partner to France in the mountains of Northern Mali and assistance to the Kenyan Ranger Strike Force led to the capture of Kismayo in Somalia. Small boat programs in Kenya and Djibouti have made infiltration into those countries more difficult and forced al Qaeda to invest in slower and less secure means of conducting asymmetrical warfare. The consistent annual appropriation for train-and-equip programs, particularly 1206, is leading to a steady increase in capability of key nations in Africa.

In Morocco, we concluded a $2.4 billion FMS case for 24 F–16 aircraft and are negotiating a case for sale of 108 M1A1 main battle tanks. These assets will ensure interoperability with the United States and assist Morocco with countering transnational threats in a volatile region in our AOR. FMF is supporting vital programs such as Defense Institution Building in Africa's newest country, South Sudan. FMF also supports Africa Union and United Nations peacekeeping operations through maintaining South Africa and Botswana's C–130 transport aircraft, and provides Cameroon with surveillance radar to monitor trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea.

The IMET program provides valuable training and builds enduring relationships with key partners. For example, we currently have a senior officer from Libya attending Naval War College in Newport, RI, and a colonel from the South African Air Force attending Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. We also utilize IMET to reinforce the warrant officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps of our partners' military forces through attendance at our Services' warrant officer and NCO academies. IMET, at all levels, builds enduring relationships and helps shape participants' views toward the United States.

CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI

50. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is our only enduring base on the African continent. The airfield, which we share with our host government, serves as a critical hub of operations for Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and as logistics support for humanitarian and other theater cooperation missions with our allies. Recently, the Government of Djibouti has expressed concern about the impact of our operations at their international airport. In addition, as our interests grow on the continent, the need for more resources may drive a request for additional areas at their airport at the same time we are investing hundreds of millions of dollars in new facilities for our forces at Camp Lemonnier. Are you aware of any operational constraints at Camp Lemonnier that have you concerned over the long-term?

General HAM. Yes. We are working with the host nation to mitigate operational and safety concerns about remotely piloted aircraft operating out of Djibouti's international commercial airport by developing an alternate location for such operations.

51. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, should we continue to grow our presence and invest in new facilities at Camp Lemonnier or should we look for new locations to place forces around the continent?

General HAM. Camp Lemonnier (CLDJ) is strategically important to U.S. interests and provides support for four separate combatant commands, each having a vested interest in its development. CLDJ is our only forward operating site on the

African continent and is a critical platform in the fight against violent extremist organizations.

We appreciate your support for our four highest military construction projects at Camp Lemonnier. Many CLDJ facilities are inadequate to support the amount of personnel currently operating from CLDJ. A conservative, time-phased investment in CLDJ's infrastructure and facilities will enhance strategic and operational readiness and effectiveness, improve force protection, and the quality of life for each of these organizations.

COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY IN AFRICA

52. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, we are seeing that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are developing operational networks that are increasingly complex and global in nature. Over the past decade, we have successfully directed our military and intelligence capabilities at fighting terrorism. Yet, it appears the United States is putting relatively little effort into a long-range or comprehensive plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. Do you believe the United States has adequately focused its intelligence collection capabilities on Africa?

General HAM. Intelligence requirements in Africa continue to increase based on the growing terrorism threat. Over the last year, we have seen an increase in intelligence prioritization for AFRICOM. Despite this, significant shortfalls remain, therefore, AFRICOM requires increased national intelligence emphasis and resources.

53. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, do you believe AFRICOM has enough of the right assets in the right places to execute an effective counterterrorism strategy in the whole of Africa?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

54. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, are you concerned about the potential influence of terrorist groups on large numbers of Western Sahara refugees living in camps in southern Algeria?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

55. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, do you believe that our current counterterrorism strategy has kept pace with the increasingly globalized nature of al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist networks?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

56. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, how are you measuring your effectiveness in AFRICOM?

General HAM. AFRICOM measures effectiveness in its theater campaign plans by assessing progress in the military objectives and effects.

AFRICOM's military objectives are specific, measureable, and achievable within 5 years. They are assessed no less than semi-annually using a comprehensive and integrated process of objective, subjective, and perceptive indicators. The assessment encompasses all theater intelligence, operations, exercises, and security cooperation activities.

C–5/C–17 OVERFLY HOURS

57. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, for the past 2 years, DOD said it had too much strategic airlift, so Congress reduced the strategic airlift requirement from 313 to 301 and now down to 275. Will you have to increase your reliance on commercial carriers as the organic fleet reduces to 275?

General FRASER. No, the change in numbers will not require an increased reliance upon Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) commercial carriers. We have conducted a comparison of the current strategic guidance to those requirements outlined in Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016. The comparison validated 275 aircraft (223 C–17s and 52 C–5Ms) and our CRAF partners' ability to support a large scale operation in one region, with a capability to deny the objectives of an opportunistic aggressor in a second region, while defending the Homeland and providing support to civil authorities.

58. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, what risks do you see at the 275 level to accomplishing your mission?

General FRASER. The TRANSCOM mission is to support the President's strategic guidance. Recent assessments indicated that a fleet with 30.4 million ton miles per day (MTM/D) capacity will support that strategy. A fleet of 223 C–17s and 52 C–5Ms provides at least 30.4 MTM/D capacity and therefore supports the strategic guidance with moderate risk.

59. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, will overflying C–5s and C–17s impact long-term readiness of both fleets?

General FRASER. Yes, overflying the C–5 and the C–17 past their planned service life impacts the programs, but it is possible with Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP) and additional spare parts.

Based on engineering analysis, it is estimated the C–5 can fly 33 percent over the current usage rates without impacting scheduled inspection intervals such as programmed depot maintenance. If the aircraft operates beyond its planned life, the Air Force will start reducing the inspection intervals proportionally to compensate for increased stresses. Based on projected usage rates, the C–5 will have approximately 15,000 flying hours of structural service life remaining at its currently planned 2040 retirement date.

Flying past the planned service life will impact aircraft spares. If the flying hours are increased or extended, then spare parts demands increase commensurately. This will result in an increase in not mission capable for supply rates in later years of the program if spare parts are not funded and procured.

Each C–17 is programmed to fly 30 years at 1,000 hours per aircraft per year. At current usage rates, the first aircraft will reach its life expectancy in 2022. Over the past 12 years the fleet has flown an average of 1,093 hours/tail/year. Flying beyond 2022 will require more frequent structural inspections. The C–17 enterprise is evaluating a plan to extend the service life of the aircraft from 30,000 to 60,000 flying hours provided funding is available to support a SLEP.

In summary, flying past programmed service life is possible, but requires additional funding to assess structural integrity of the aircraft and modernization of both the airframe and spare parts pools.

REGIONALLY-ALIGNED BRIGADES

60. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, the Army has aligned the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, with your command as a test bed for the Army's regionally-aligned brigade concept. Do you believe one brigade is sufficient to support your area of operations?

General HAM. Yes. One brigade is sufficient for our planned engagements when coupled with the forces of the other Service components allocated to the command.

61. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, do you have the resources to support the test bed?

General HAM. Yes. We appreciate the U.S. Army selecting AFRICOM as the first combatant command with a regionally-aligned brigade.

62. Senator INHOFE. General Ham, does AFRICOM have the infrastructure to support the 2nd Brigade Combat Team should the entire brigade be deployed to your area of operations?

General HAM. AFRICOM does not intend to employ the entire brigade at one place or all at the same time. The intention is for the brigade to employ tailored elements to support short duration security cooperation activities which strengthen the defense capabilities of African partners and regional organizations.

63. Senator INHOFE. General Fraser, what risks do you see with TRANSCOM's ability to support the Army's regionally-aligned brigade concept?

General FRASER. I am aware the Army is working on the regionally-aligned brigade concept. The concept creates a relationship between a combatant command and an Army Brigade Combat Team that the combatant command commander can use for theater campaign plan engagements and exercises. I have seen a draft execution order that implements a rotational brigade for EUCOM in fiscal year 2014. The rotational force is limited to a battalion with some brigade level enablers and brigade level command and control. In the case of EUCOM, the Army is creating a prepositioned set of equipment for the rotational force to use. At this point, I do not envision any problems supporting the Army concept. We will continue to assess it for any mobility implications as Army implementation progresses.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

LIBYAN BORDER SECURITY

64. Senator WICKER. General Ham, one area of concern I have regarding the security situation in Libya is the inability of Libyan forces to control border crossings. Without the ability to establish effective control over its borders, it is unlikely the Libyan Government will be able to manage the flow of terrorists and smugglers into and out of the country, threatening Libya's long-term stability and viability. Has the Libyan Government asked for U.S. assistance to enhance their border control capabilities?

General HAM. Yes. In September 2012, representatives from the Libyan Ministry of Defense and Customs Agency visited the U.S./Mexico border in Arizona to observe how the U.S. secures its borders. As a result of that trip, the Government of Libya submitted a FMS request for equipment in support of their Border Security Forces. However, when the new Defense Minister was confirmed in December 2012, the request was cancelled. Our Office of Security Cooperation is currently working with the leadership of the Libyan Border Security Force to coordinate for a new equipment request.

AFRICOM has submitted a proposal to assist Libya with their Border Security via a $7 million Global Security Contingency Fund (1207a) proposal to create, train, and equip two quick-reaction Border Security Companies—one for the east and one for the west. When executed, Marine Corps Forces Africa will train the companies at a location to be determined, but likely at a base in Europe (due to security concerns in Libya).

65. Senator WICKER. General Ham, how would you envision assisting the Libyan Government in establishing control, especially with regards to the sparsely populated regions that compose Libya's inland regions?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

66. Senator WICKER. General Ham, what types of vehicles and equipment would be most useful, given the difficulties inherent to the geography and climate?

General HAM. I believe a holistic approach to Border Security in Libya is the key to future success. Important initiatives would be the construction of a series of national command and control centers, a comprehensive communications system to support all levels in the system from the individual guards on the borders up to the commander, and a national-level ISR system. The sale or provision of vehicles, weapons, and personal gear, such as body armor, night vision goggles, and uniforms, would also be a part of this effort.

Appropriate vehicles would reflect a mixture of civilian trucks and sport utility vehicles, with some tactical vehicles in support of specialized missions. The Libyan Special Operations Forces and the quick-reaction Border Security Forces should use heavier tactical vehicles for use in engagements with violent extremist organizations; and with some lighter and more mobile vehicles (such as the tactical dune buggies used by U.S. Special Operations Forces) when conducting ground-borne ISR.

Appropriate ISR systems would include ground surveillance radars, tower-mounted cameras, and unarmed, unmanned aerial vehicles, although manned aircraft would also be appropriate.

The Border Security Forces also require a networked command and control system that provides the Libyan Border Security Forces with a common operating picture, which would be generated by their ISR assets and daily communications with their border guards.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

BENGHAZI ATTACK AND DOD RESPONSE

67. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, was AFRICOM on a heightened state of alert on September 11, 2012, and if so, what actions did AFRICOM take based on this heightened state of alert?

General HAM. Yes, DOD posture across the world on September 11, 2012, was commensurate with the anticipated threat and force protection conditions across individual regions. Our forces maintained heightened awareness, however, we were not aware of specific threats to U.S. personnel in Libya. We were also unaware of Ambassador Stevens' travel to Benghazi as it is not customary for U.S. Embassies to advise DOD of ambassadors' travel.

68. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, based on the previous attacks in Benghazi and the known deteriorating security situation in eastern Libya, why weren't our forces in Europe and Djibouti better postured to respond?

General HAM. DOD posture across the world on September 11, 2012, was commensurate with the anticipated threat and force protection conditions across individual regions. Our forces maintained heightened awareness, however, we were not aware of specific threats to U.S. personnel in Libya. We were also unaware of Ambassador Stevens' travel to Benghazi as it is not customary for U.S. Embassies to advise DOD of ambassadors' travel.

AFRICOM RESOURCES

69. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, based on the previous attacks on U.S. and other western targets in Benghazi in the months preceding the September 11, 2012, attack that left four Americans dead, do you believe more than 7 percent of AFRICOM's ISR requirements should have been met?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

70. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, in the months preceding the September 11, 2012, attack in Benghazi, did you request additional ISR assets for AFRICOM?

General HAM. Yes. The command was allocated additional ISR assets in response to the increased terrorism threat across Africa.

71. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, who did you make those requests to and what was their response?

General HAM. AFRICOM submits annual ISR requirements to the Joint Staff. ISR is allocated through a formal Global Management Process and reviewed/adjusted bimonthly through a process managed by the Joint Staff.

72. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, last month, General Rodriguez said that the current ISR allocation "does not provide sufficient quantity or sensor mix to achieve the objectives which the Joint Staff directed to AFRICOM." Is that accurate?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

73. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, has Boko Haram conducted terrorist attacks?

General HAM. Yes. Boko Haram conducts terrorist attacks against the Christian populace, Muslim communities, the Nigerian Government, Nigerian infrastructure, and Western interests.

Recent prominent Boko Haram attacks, which I believe are best understood as terrorist acts, include the March 18, 2013, bus bombing targeting the Christian community in Kano. The most notable anti-Western Boko Haram attack was the August 2011 car bomb detonated against the United Nations' Headquarters building in Abuja.

In 2012, Boko Haram and its faction Ansaru, were responsible for up to 170 armed attacks, 46 bombings, and 21 suicide car bomb operations.

74. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, do you believe Boko Haram is a terrorist organization?

General HAM. Yes, my personal opinion is they are a terrorist organization. However, I understand the challenges involved with the policy decisions to formally designate them as a terrorist organization and the different perspectives other policymakers have regarding the nature of Boko Haram.

75. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, how can we increase pressure on Boko Haram?

General HAM. We will continue to work with the Nigerian Government through the U.S. Embassy in Abuja. This ongoing dialogue will focus increasing pressure on Boko Haram and support the Nigerian military as they increase their counterterrorism capabilities to address the threat posed by Boko Haram.

76. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, would it be helpful to U.S. interests or to AFRICOM if we designated Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organization?

General HAM. Yes, my personal opinion is that designating Boko Haram as a terrorist organization will provide additional authorities to act against this organiza-

tion. I recognize there are challenges involved with the policy decisions to formally designate them as a terrorist organization.

77. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, do you believe the United States should designate Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization?

General HAM. Yes, my personal opinion is they are a terrorist organization and should be so designated.

MARINE CORPS SECURITY GUARD DETACHMENTS

78. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, are there U.S. diplomatic facilities in Africa today that do not have a Marine Corps Security Guard Detachment?

General HAM. Yes.

79. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, how many Marine Security Guard Detachments are there?

General HAM. There are 34 Marine Corps Security Guard Detachments supporting U.S. diplomatic facilities in Africa.

80. Senator AYOTTE. General Ham, what is DOD doing to address this and how can Congress help?

General HAM. DOD is supporting DOS's efforts to look at reassessing diplomatic security. As part of this review, DOD considered how the role, mission, and resourcing of the Marine Corps Security Guards could be adapted to respond to this new threat environment. In the near-term, DOD has agreed with DOS to add 35 Marine Corps Security Guard detachments globally over the next 2 to 3 years. DOD is working with DOS now to identify specific locations for the new detachments.

DOD has also initiated coordination with the DOS to expand the Marine Corps' role beyond their primary mission to protect classified information. This could include expanded use of non-lethal weapons, and additional training and equipment, to support the embassy Regional Security Officer's response options when host nations' security force capabilities are at risk of being overwhelmed.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM

LIBYA

81. Senator GRAHAM. General Ham, please provide a detailed analysis of the military assets that could have arrived in Benghazi within 12 hours, and the approximate arrival time for each asset.

General HAM. [Deleted.]

82. Senator GRAHAM. General Ham, what assets did you ask for or recommend deploy to Libya on September 11 and 12, 2012?

General HAM. [Deleted.]

83. Senator GRAHAM. General Ham, who did you speak to when you requested the above assets? Please provide the approximate time of the request.

General HAM. [Deleted.]

84. Senator GRAHAM. General Ham, what military assets did eventually deploy to Libya? Please provide the arrival time and date for each asset's arrival in Libya.

General HAM. On September 11, 2012, the diverted surveillance aircraft arrived on station over the Benghazi facility approximately 2300 (EET) hours after directed to move from its previous position. It was replaced by another asset to maintain continual coverage.

On September 12, 2012, at approximately 0130 EET, a small U.S. element from Tripoli landed in Benghazi.

On September 12, 2012, at approximately 2100 EET, the Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team platoon and associated equipment arrived in Tripoli and at approximately 2130 EET, the Special Operations Forces deployed from the United States, and associated equipment, arrived at an intermediate staging base in southern Europe.

[Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the committee adjourned.]