

Advance Questions for Christine E. Wormuth
Nominee for the Position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

1. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

I believe there is no need to modify the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time. The Act was a very significant piece of legislation that, over the course of more than two decades, has led to dramatic improvements in the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. Based on my experience since 2009, there is not a need for changes in the near term.

2. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Please see my response above.

Duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Section 134 of Title 10, United States Code, provides that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans, and in reviewing such plans. Additionally, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary shall have responsibility for supervising and directing activities of the Department of Defense relating to export controls. Further, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation and use of resources for the activities of the Department of Defense for combating terrorism.

Department of Defense Directive 5111.1 reiterates these duties and specifically notes that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

3. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under current regulations and practices?

If confirmed, I would perform the duties set forth in Title 10 and the Department of Defense Directive. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy as well as the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. Specifically, the USD(P) directly supports the Secretary of Defense in the interagency process, dealings with foreign counterparts, developing strategy and planning guidance for the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, providing policy oversight of current operations, and guiding the development and review of contingency plans. He or she is the Secretary's principal policy advisor on the use of the U.S. military and its adaptation for future missions.

4. What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in combating terrorism, in particular as differentiated from those of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict?

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) functions under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P) in combating terrorism. More broadly, the ASD SO/LIC is defined in Title 10 as the principal civilian advise to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters.

5. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

If confirmed, I will discuss with Secretary Hagel how the OSD Policy organization and I can best support him, including whether there are any duties and functions he would prescribe beyond those set forth in Section 134(b) of Title 10, and the Department of Defense Directive for USD(P). At this time, I have not identified any such additional duties and functions.

Relationships

6. What is your understanding of the relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. The USD(P) provides policy support to the Secretary in interagency fora (such as National Security Council deliberations), in engagement with international interlocutors, and in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes inside the Department, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and annual program and budget reviews.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Under Secretary for Policy provides similar support to the Deputy Secretary as described above.

The other Under Secretaries of Defense

The Under Secretary for Policy works closely with the other Under Secretaries of Defense to achieve the Secretary's objectives. This includes providing policy input, as appropriate, to each of them in their respective areas of responsibility. In addition, the Under Secretary for Policy works closely with the Under Secretary for Intelligence and other intelligence officials to ensure that policy formulation and execution are well informed and supported by intelligence.

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

The Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy (PDUSD(P)) is the principal assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and is responsible for assisting the USD(P) in carrying out all responsibilities, fulfilling functions, managing relationships, and exercising authorities provided for in law to the USD(P). The PDUSD(P) advises on and supports the USD(P) in regard to all responsibilities in providing advice to the Secretary of Defense in interagency fora (such as National Security Council deliberations), engagement with international interlocutors, and in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes inside the Department, including the Quadrennial Defense Review and annual program and budget reviews.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy exercises authority, direction, and control over the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), Asian and Pacific Affairs (APSA), Global Strategic Affairs (GSA), Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), and Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (HD/ASA). This team works together to provide the Secretary with advice and recommendations on the full range of policy issues under consideration in the Department and provides policy oversight to ensure that the Secretary's guidance and decisions are implemented properly.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments on a broad range of issues, including defense strategy and policy development, force planning, and other areas in which the Military Departments are critical stakeholders.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the principal military advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the National Security Council, the Chairman has a unique and critical military role. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman to support the efforts of

the Secretary and Deputy Secretary in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, and to ensure that military advice is taken into account in an appropriate manner.

The Service Chiefs

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the Service Chiefs on a broad range of issues, including defense strategy and policy development, force planning, and other areas in which the Military Departments and Services are critical stakeholders.

The Commanders of the Regional and Functional Combatant Commands

The USD(P) works closely with the Regional and Functional Combatant Commanders to support the efforts of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, particularly in the areas of regional and functional strategy and policy, contingency planning, and policy oversight of operations.

The Director of the National Guard Bureau

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely, through the Chairman and Vice Chairman, with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is a member of the Joint Chiefs, and has a specific responsibility to provide information on the non-Federalized National Guard.

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy works closely with the General Counsel on all policy issues that involve a legal dimension. In practice, this means significant and regular coordination on a broad range of issues.

The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy exercises authority, direction, and control over the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Policy organization works closely with DSCA to provide the Secretary with advice and recommendations on the full range of security cooperation issues facing the Department

Qualifications

7. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Since joining the Administration in March 2009, I have served in three senior defense-related positions that have enabled me to work on a very broad array of challenges facing the Department of Defense, and to understand how to work effectively in the interagency process to address difficult national security policy issues. As Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, I had the opportunity to work on

a wide range of homeland security, homeland defense, and defense support of civil authorities issues. In that role, I managed a staff of more than 300 people and worked closely with the National Security Council staff, as well as the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice and other key Federal departments and agencies. Then, as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy at the National Security Council, I had the opportunity to work on many of the most challenging defense policy issues in recent years, from helping to formulate the Defense Strategic Guidance to addressing a range of regional security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. For the last year and one-half, I have served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces. In this capacity, I have collaborated closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Department Secretaries, and Combatant Commanders on issues including strategy development, the global force management process, contingency planning, force structure analysis and development, and regional posture. I have frequently represented OSD Policy in the annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process on behalf of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In each of these three positions, I have had the opportunity to work directly with the current and two previous Secretaries of Defense.

Prior to joining the Administration, I focused professionally on defense and security policy issues both in and out of government for many years. As a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) for five years, I worked on a host of national security issues, and was privileged during that time to serve as the Executive Director for the Independent Commission on Iraqi Security Forces, also known as the “Jones Commission.” Before coming to CSIS, I was a senior manager in a small defense consulting firm for almost three years, which gave me valuable insight into defense industry concerns and provided me an opportunity to hone my management skills.

I also believe that my early years as a Presidential Management Intern and career civilian action officer in OSD Policy are an important part of what will enable me to be effective as Under Secretary, if I am confirmed. I grew up professionally in OSD Policy. I have seen how it works, in good times and in bad, from the ground up. I care deeply about the talented people who work there, and the important work we do to provide the Secretary and the President with the best possible policy advice on matters of national security. Drawing on that deep knowledge and commitment to the organization, if confirmed, I would work with the Policy staff to ensure we serve the Secretary as effectively as possible.

Major Challenges and Priorities

8. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

If confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I would expect to confront a large number of very significant and difficult policy issues. Among the most important in the near term will be working with other U.S. departments and agencies to transition security responsibility effectively in Afghanistan and prevent that country from once again becoming a safe haven for groups like al Qaeda. Looking ahead, I think that we will continue to face a changing and increasingly complex security environment. I believe it will be essential to

continue to demonstrate our strong commitment to our partners in the Middle East, while working to advance U.S. interests in the context of the sweeping changes that are unfolding in that region, and in North Africa. If confirmed, I would continue to prioritize defending the homeland and seek to ensure we effectively address emerging threats like cyber and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I would work closely with the rest of the Department and other U.S. departments and agencies to continue our efforts to defeat al Qaeda, counter the threat of violent extremism across the globe, and protect the United States and our vital interests from an attack. Addressing each of these challenges, and many others, will be made more difficult in the context of the significant fiscal pressures and uncertainty the Department is facing. If confirmed as Under Secretary, a major challenge I anticipate will be working to ensure that the Department allocates its more limited resources in ways that align to the needs of our defense strategy, and in ways that enable us to prepare as effectively as possible for future challenges and opportunities.

9. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary and the senior leadership of the Department, as well as interagency colleagues to develop and oversee implementation of effective strategies, policies, and plans that address these challenges. I would also work closely with Congress, U.S. allies and partners, and, where appropriate, non-governmental organizations and the private sector. In working to address difficult policy issues, I would anticipate drawing on the deliberations of the QDR, gaining insights from the upcoming National Defense Panel report and other outside organizations and commissions, and using the range of annual planning and programming processes within the Department to generate potential policy solutions.

10. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

At the outset of the QDR process, Secretary Hagel outlined a number of priorities that guide his thinking in how to lead the Department. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure the Policy organization is focused on how we contribute to making progress in those areas, particularly those with significant policy implications. The forthcoming QDR report will outline our approach to some of those priorities, including re-evaluating our force planning and sizing construct, ensuring we avoid a long-term readiness challenge, and protecting investment in critical military capabilities most needed to implement our defense strategy. A key priority for me, if confirmed, would be to ensure that the Department executes our defense strategy through a disciplined and rigorous process that effectively matches resources to strategy.

If confirmed, I also would make it a priority to continue and deepen the Department's efforts to implement the President's guidance to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Since the publication of the Defense Strategic Guidance in January 2012, the Department's senior leadership has made implementation of the rebalance a priority. If confirmed, I would work closely with other components of the Department, and with my interagency colleagues, to develop additional creative approaches to implement the military component of the rebalance, and continue to ensure that the rebalance is prioritized in the resource allocation process.

Secretary Hagel recently approved, as part of his efforts to streamline the Department further, a reorganization of the Policy organization. I support this reorganization, and if confirmed as Under Secretary, I will make it a priority to ensure that we successfully implement the reorganization plan. Ultimately, the strength of the Policy organization is its workforce, so I would continue to invest in developing, recruiting, and retaining a dynamic workforce. If confirmed, I would make it a priority to ensure that we make this transition in an effective, transparent, and well-organized way that enables us to continue to provide excellent advice to the Secretary, and function as a strong, effective part of the overall Office of the Secretary of Defense.

If confirmed as Under Secretary, I also would make it a priority to set aside time, both personally and at the organizational level, to think strategically about over-the-horizon challenges and opportunities the United States may face in the future. It can be very challenging in government to find time to address emergent, long-term issues, but having worked in a think tank for a lengthy period, I am convinced that decision-makers benefit when we are able to “give the future a seat at the table.” If confirmed, I would push myself and the Policy organization to devote sufficient time to strategic thinking and planning, even as we work to address more immediate threats and opportunities.

Reorganization of Office of the Under Secretary for Policy

The Secretary of Defense has announced a plan to reorganize the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The reorganization has begun and is expected to be completed by 2015.

11. What is your understanding of the major changes planned for the organization that you have been nominated to lead, and what do you believe will be the primary benefits of the reorganization plan?

By 2015, the Policy reorganization will eliminate seven senior leader positions, including a DUSD, the Policy Chief of Staff, four DASDs, and a USDP senior advisor. The changes should increase efficiency by aligning similar functions and reducing the total number of offices overall. The reductions also ensure that Policy will be in compliance with pending DoD headquarters budget reductions and the requirement to eliminate the DUSD position itself.

12. How do you plan to ensure that the reorganization leads to improvements and efficiencies in the formulation and execution of policy within the Department?

If confirmed, I would work with the PDUSDP and Assistant Secretaries to ensure that synergies created by the reorganization lead to development of more comprehensive and cohesive policy options. For example, defending the nation from cyber attacks is an important element of protecting the U.S. homeland. By placing responsibility for development of cyber policy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense, that Assistant Secretary will be better able to leverage the tools in the Cyber Policy office to ensure the homeland is defended against cyber threats. Implementation of the reorganization will also enable the Policy organization to

recognize some efficiencies in terms of reducing and streamlining front office staffs due to the consolidation of a number of offices.

13. What is your understanding of the Department's rationale for combining the functional experts in Cyber and Space under one Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense?

The reality of modern telecommunications is that there's a strong nexus between policy issues related to cyber and space. During its comprehensive reorganization review, Policy recognized that the two offices worked together frequently and that improved synergy could be achieved by unifying the office under a single leader. Programs in both offices have matured significantly over the last few years, allowing the efficiency of single office management.

14. How do you intend, if confirmed, to achieve unity of effort within the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action accounting community given its fragmented command and control and budgetary processes?

As the Committee is aware, the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action accounting community has been the subject of several organizational studies over the past 18 months. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) completed a study in 2013, and it is my understanding that the Department is implementing recommendations from the GAO report.

Additionally, the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) is reviewing DoD's organizational structure in this area. If confirmed, I would consider the results of these reviews, and seek the views of family and veterans' groups to determine how we can better achieve unity of effort.

Afghanistan Strategy

15. What are our key strategic objectives in Afghanistan and in your view are we on track to achieve those objectives?

I understand that Coalition and Afghan Forces are meeting campaign objectives. The Afghan government is able to exert control over all of Afghanistan's major cities and provincial capitals. Afghan forces have assumed the lead for security and, with the Coalition, have successfully countered the insurgency's efforts in the 2012 and 2013 summer fighting seasons. I understand that we continue to make progress in our counterterrorism efforts.

16. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?

I believe the U.S. strategy is succeeding and would recommend that we follow through on our commitments made in Chicago and Tokyo. Our core goal in Afghanistan remains disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qa'ida and preventing its return to Afghanistan. To achieve this, we should maintain our commitment to Afghanistan after 2014 and continue to transition security responsibility to the Afghans.

17. What do you see as the United States' long-term strategic interests in Afghanistan after 2014?

The United States has made a commitment to an enduring partnership with Afghanistan, and it will continue to be in the U.S. interest to work towards defeating al-Qa'ida and disrupting other extremists who present a serious threat to the U.S. homeland, allies, partners, and interests. We have also pledged at Chicago and Tokyo to support the government of Afghanistan's development as it takes responsibility for its own future.

18. Do you support the retention of a limited U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after 2014?

I support a long-term partnership with Afghanistan, including a limited U.S. presence after 2014 to support the two missions the President discussed in the State of the Union address – a narrowly focused counterterrorism mission against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates; and a NATO-led train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission to support the Afghan forces. To accomplish these missions, we must conclude an agreement with the Afghan government in order to remain in Afghanistan and to secure privileges and protections for our forces.

19. If so, what in your view should be the size, mission, and duration of such a residual U.S. military force?

If confirmed, I would engage our military commanders to assess the appropriate size, mission, and duration of such a residual force.

20. In your view, what would be the consequences for Afghanistan's security and stability if the United States were to reduce its post-2014 military presence in Afghanistan to a "normal" Office of Defense Cooperation under chief of mission authority?

At this time I am unable to assess the impact of reducing our presence to an Office of Defense Cooperation. My understanding is that the Afghans are leading the majority of security operations, but that they require additional support and assistance at ministerial levels.

21. If the United States and Afghanistan are unable to conclude a Bilateral Security Agreement that ensures legal protections for such a residual U.S. military force, should the United States withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I would support a U.S. military presence in Afghanistan if our forces have the requisite legal protections that a status of forces agreement, such as the Bilateral Security Agreement, would provide.

22. What is your understanding, as a legal matter, of when the current agreements that provide legal protections for the U.S. military between the Afghan Government and the U.S. Government expire? If a residual U.S. military force were to remain in 2015, would it have the same legal protections as the current U.S. military force does now even without the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement?

I understand that the current bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Afghanistan does not have an expiration date. The President has made clear that for the United States to remain in Afghanistan post-2014, it must be at the request of the Afghan government and under a Bilateral Security Agreement concluded with Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Transition

23. Do you support the transition of full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by 2014?

Yes. My understanding is that the ANSF has shown over the last year that it is up to the task of providing security across Afghanistan. The ANSF is now conducting virtually all operations independently and has prevented the insurgents from making any significant gains. I realize that the ANSF will require continued international assistance to sustain these gains, and, if confirmed, I would support such efforts in line with whatever decision the President makes about our post-2014 force level, mission, and resourcing.

24. In your view, what are the main challenges to the success of such a transition?

In my view, the main challenge will be ensuring that the ANSF has adequate financial resources to sustain the gains they have made. This will require continued international assistance; if confirmed, I would support such efforts in line with whatever decision the President makes about our post-2014 force level, mission, and resourcing. Another challenge is that the Afghans now have limited combat enabler support from the coalition, so we will have to monitor closely how this affects their readiness and morale when the fighting becomes more intense later this year.

Afghanistan National Security Forces

25. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a professional and effective ANSF?

My understanding is that the Afghan military and police forces have a competent cadre of officers and leaders, but the rapid growth in the size of the ANSF over the last few years has created a requirement to produce even more leaders--a task that cannot be accomplished quickly. The international assistance effort has expanded the institutional training base for all levels of ANSF leaders. If confirmed, I would support continuing this focus, consistent with the President's decision about our post-2014 force level and mission.

26. What do you see as the main challenges to building the capacity of the ANSF, including after 2014?

My understanding is that building this capacity at the ministerial and institutional level will be the focus of the NATO-led train/advise/assist mission. One of the main challenges I see will be ensuring that the Afghans have the right leaders in place and that we have the right advisors with the right skillsets in place. Another challenge I foresee is ensuring the ANSF has the financial resources needed to sustain a force structure that is adequate to maintain the security gains it has made over the past year while continuing to develop their ability to improve their functional

skills, such as in the areas of resource management, contracting, and logistics.

27. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing those challenges?

If confirmed, I would work closely with our Afghan and coalition partners to ensure we are working toward the same objectives. The key will be to ensure the focus is on building Afghan capacity--not doing tasks for them. If confirmed, I would reinforce this focus and ensure the DoD contributions are aligned with this approach.

28. What do you see as the main challenges to sustaining the ANSF beyond 2014, and if confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you make for addressing these challenges?

The ANSF is leading nearly all security missions in Afghanistan. I understand the main challenges to sustaining the ANSF beyond 2014 are ensuring that those forces have the training and equipment necessary to plan for and carry out their missions. This entails financial and personnel support for the NATO-led train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission at the ministerial and institutional levels to enable the planning, contracting, and logistics functions needed to sustain the ANSF forces. It also means engaging regularly with the U.S. civilian leadership to gauge progress in the Afghan missions.

29. Do you agree that any future reductions from the current ANSF troop level should be based on the security conditions in Afghanistan at the time the reductions would occur?

If confirmed, I would participate in what I understand to be a biannual DoD review of the appropriate size of the ANSF, which considers operational and security issues, among other factors.

U.S. Relationship with Pakistan

30. What is your assessment of the current relationship between the United States and Pakistan?

The bilateral relationship with Pakistan continues to improve through cooperation to defeat al-Qa'ida, promote peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, and support Pakistan's fight against militant and terrorist networks. There is still room for progress, however. If confirmed, I would focus on strengthening areas of common interest and continue engagement where we disagree, especially to spur greater action against the Haqqani Terrorist Network and other terrorist groups that operate on Pakistani soil.

31. Do you see opportunities for expanded U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on security issues? If so, how would you prioritize these areas of cooperation?

I believe we should continue to focus our defense relationship with Pakistan on areas of mutual interest; specifically, the fight against al-Qa'ida and other terrorist networks. This will involve

supporting Pakistan's military efforts to counter the threat of militant and insurgent groups along the border with Afghanistan.

32. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to combat the threat of international terrorism?

Pakistan plays a major role in the fight against terrorism, as demonstrated by the large number of forces Pakistan has deployed in counterinsurgency operations. Pakistan also has suffered significant military and civilian casualties combating terrorism in their country, which underscores the breadth of Pakistan's commitment to the fight against terrorism.

33. What conditions, if any, should the United States place on its security assistance to Pakistan?

If confirmed, I would work to assess the level of our assistance, the return on that investment, and whether there is value in attaching conditions.

34. What impact do you believe the end of coalition combat operations in Afghanistan will have on (1) U.S.-Pakistan relations after 2014; and (2) U.S. strategic interests in the South Asia region?

Militants and terrorist groups may attempt to exploit perceived security gaps as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) play an increased role in maintaining security after International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) combat operations end. Despite the drawdown, the United States will continue to have a strategic interest in promoting stability and countering the threat of terrorist groups in South Asia. As the coalition footprint decreases, the importance of cooperating with Pakistan and other partners to promote our strategic interests in the region will increase.

The Haqqani Network

The Haqqani network, which has been linked to a number of deadly attacks on Afghan, U.S., and other coalition forces in Afghanistan, operates from safe havens in Pakistan.

35. In your view, should additional steps be taken to track and counter the illicit financial activities of the Haqqani Network, and if so, what role – if any – should DOD play?

The Haqqani Network continues to pose a threat to U.S., coalition, and Afghan personnel, threaten regional security, and undermine Pakistan's stability. I understand that the Department of Defense and the broader U.S. Government are taking steps to counter this network. The Department of State's designation of the group as a global terrorist network and the Department of Treasury's move on February 6, 2014, to freeze the assets of three suspected militants linked to the network are steps in the right direction. If confirmed, I would support DoD and other agencies' efforts to counter the Haqqani Network.

Iraq

36. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to Iraq?

I believe we have a key interest in making sure Iraq remains stable and secure. If confirmed, I would work to deepen the strategic partnership to make sure we continue collaboration on security challenges and work to deepen Iraq's military capabilities to repel the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and further integrate Iraq with regional partners.

37. What in your view are the major areas, if any, for security cooperation between the United States and Iraq?

I believe we share many security interests with Iraq. We have cooperated and need to continue to cooperate in areas such as countering threats from Iran and terrorist organizations, including ISIL. We also have similar interests in making sure the region is peaceful and secure, including stemming instability emanating from the violence in Syria.

38. In what areas, if any, do you see U.S. and Iraqi security interests diverging?

I don't see the United States and Iraq having divergent security interests. Both the United States and Iraq are working to ensure that Iraq remains stable, sovereign, and secure; is able to protect its borders from external aggression; and develops capabilities to fight terrorism and extremism inside its borders.

39. What do you see as the greatest challenges for the U.S.-Iraq security relationship over the coming years?

Despite numerous security problems in the region, if I am confirmed, I would work to help Iraq integrate into the region, ensure it has the resources it requires to counter violent extremism, and move our relationship with Iraq to a more traditional security partnership like ones we have with other global and regional allies and partners.

40. In your view, what steps, if any, should the United States take to engage with Iraq to promote greater security and stability across the Middle East region?

I believe by maintaining and increasing robust foreign military sales, information sharing, and additional training and exercises, the United States will help Iraq remain stable and secure and promote broader stability across the region.

Iraq faces a resurgent violent extremist threat that seeks to exploit popular discontentment with the current Maliki Government, particularly within Sunni communities in western Iraq.

41. What role, if any, should the United States play in assisting the Government of Iraq in confronting the threat of violent extremism?

Despite the many challenges the Iraqis are facing, they are demonstrating to us that they are in

the lead for their security, but are also asking the United States for help in the form of training and expedited weapons deliveries. I believe that with these tools, coupled with information sharing and non-operational training for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Counter Terrorism Services, we can assist the Iraqis in deepening their capabilities and dealing with violent extremists across Iraq.

42. In your view, what conditions, if any, should the United States place on the provision of equipment or assistance to the Government of Iraq in its fight against violent extremism?

I believe that we should follow the end-use monitoring protocols that are already in place for all countries that we sell weapons to, including Iraq. The United States has made clear to Iraq that U.S. assistance is dependent on the Iraqis adhering to proper use of U.S.-origin systems. If confirmed, I would ensure that appropriate end-use monitoring is part of the discussion on negotiations for U.S. security assistance.

43. What steps can be taken to ensure that the Maliki Government uses any equipment, training or advice provided by the United States to fight extremists and not to suppress the political opposition from the Sunni minority in Anbar?

In addition to the end-use monitoring protocols, I believe that deep and sustained U.S. diplomatic engagement to encourage the Government of Iraq to integrate all Iraqi citizens more fully into the political process offers the only way to achieve a lasting and durable peace and stability. We have seen vigorous engagement from officials across the U.S. Government as the security situation in Iraq has worsened and, if confirmed, on behalf of the Department I would continue to communicate the message that Iraq will be secure and free from extremists when all the people of Iraq are given a voice.

The death toll in Iraq has risen to levels not seen since 2007-2008. The deteriorating security conditions in Iraq have been blamed on the growth of extremists in Syria and on Prime Minister Maliki's inability or unwillingness to address Sunni concerns.

44. What is your view on the cause of the increased violence?

The spillover of instability from Syria has clearly affected Iraq's security and aggravated Iraqi sectarian tensions. The Government of Iraq has taken notable steps to address these twin challenges. First, Iraqi Security Forces have deployed to western Iraq and are working with local governmental and tribal authorities to dislodge and expel terrorist elements that have taken refuge in the undergoverned spaces of Anbar. Second, the Iraqi Government announced plans to better integrate Sunni tribal forces more effectively into the national military and has publicly affirmed its intent to proceed with national elections in April despite the violence.

Iran

45. What is your assessment of the military and political threat posed by Iran?

In my view, some of the policies and activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran constitute a

significant and direct threat to our regional allies and partners, to some of our core interests in the region, and to broader international norms. This is most evident in Iran's pursuit of capabilities that, if left uncontested, would enable it to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. Iran also has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, and some of these missiles are inherently capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Last, Iran is the most active state-sponsor of terrorism in the world.

46. What is your assessment of U.S. policy with respect to Iran?

I believe that the comprehensive approach of tough-minded diplomacy and unrelenting pressure has sharpened considerably the strategic choices for Iran. This policy has mobilized and unified the international community against the Iranian regime, resulting in Iran's unprecedented regional and global isolation. It has inflicted a heavy economic toll on Iran through a comprehensive set of smart and robust sanctions. It has sent a powerful message that unless Iran changes course, all options are on the table. Ultimately, the U.S. policy forced Iran to the negotiating table and to agree to the Joint Plan of Action. I believe that sustained application of our policy gives us the best chance of reaching a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran, while holding Iran accountable for a range of destabilizing activities in the region and its dismal human rights record.

47. In your opinion, what impact, if any, do ongoing P5+1 negotiations with Iran on Iran's nuclear program have on our ability to counter Iranian ambitions in Syria and Iran's support of international terrorism?

In my opinion, the ongoing P5+1 negotiations on Iran's nuclear program do not limit our ability or weaken our resolve to counter Iranian ambitions in Syria and Iran's support of international terrorism. I believe that we should not and will not relax our efforts to hold Iran accountable for its support of terrorism, interference across the region, and human rights violations.

48. In your view, what are the risks associated with reducing U.S. presence in the Middle East with respect to the threat posed by Iran?

I believe that a substantial reduction of our military presence in the Middle East at this time could have a significant, adverse impact on the effectiveness of our policy vis-à-vis Iran and our credibility with our partners in the region. Therefore, if confirmed, I would support the Department's position, as stated by Secretary Hagel in Manama last December, that the Department of Defense will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region.

49. In your view, what role should DOD play in countering Iran's support of international terrorism?

In my view, the Department has an important role to play in supporting broader U.S. Government efforts to counter Iran's support for international terrorism. If confirmed, I would work with interagency and international partners to continue holding Iran accountable for a range of destabilizing activities in the region and elsewhere as necessary.

50. In your view, is there a trust deficit with Saudi Arabia and our other Gulf partners

based in part on negotiations with Iran?

I believe that the United States and our partners in the region share the same assessment of the threat and policy objective vis-à-vis Iran's nuclear pursuits. Although there may be occasional tactical differences, our extensive bilateral relations and especially our strong defense relationships serve to reassure our partners of our commitment to regional security and to building their capacity to deal with common threats, including those posed by Iran. This includes not just a strong U.S. military presence, which itself is clear evidence of continued U.S. commitment, but a robust schedule of combined exercises, routine key leader engagement, and a significant foreign military sales program. If confirmed, I would work to maintain and build on those strong relationships.

Israel

With regard to our relationship with Israel, President Obama has stated: "Our military and intelligence cooperation has never been closer. Our joint exercises and training have never been more robust. Despite a tough budget environment, our security assistance has increased every year. We are investing in new capabilities. We're providing Israel with more advanced technology – the type of products and systems that only go to our closest friends and allies. And make no mistake: we will do what it takes to preserve Israel's Qualitative Military Edge – because Israel must always have the ability to defend itself, by itself, against any threat."

51. Do you agree with President Obama's position and views with regard to the U.S. security relationship with Israel?

Yes, I agree with the President's views, which Secretary Hagel has reaffirmed on several occasions. Under the leadership of Secretary Hagel, the Department has worked diligently to strengthen the U.S.-Israeli relationship, which includes the largest amount of Foreign Military Financing in history and the approval to release advanced military capabilities, including the F-35 and the V-22 aircraft, to Israel. If confirmed, I would work to continue DoD's substantial cooperation with Israel and maintain the strength of our security relationship.

Post-Arab Uprising Military-to-Military Engagement

The past few years have brought great change to the Middle East and North Africa. These changes may require adjustments to our military-to-military engagement efforts throughout the region.

52. What is your understanding of U.S. military-to-military engagement in the Middle East and North Africa (e.g. Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, and other countries in the region), and what changes – if any – would you advocate for in light of the Arab Uprising?

The Department of Defense's military-to-military and defense civilian relations with our partners in the Middle East and North Africa constitute a variety of tailored programs and efforts. Our military engagement includes working with key partners' defense ministries and militaries,

having a forward presence to enable operations and deter threats, building partner capacity to meet common challenges, and being prepared for future contingencies. These programs are matched to partners' perspectives, capabilities, and needs, and play a critical role in advancing U.S. strategic interests, which include: securing and protecting Israel, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, defeating extremists, countering terrorist organizations, ensuring the free flow of commerce, and supporting operations in Afghanistan.

During this time of continuing change and uncertainty in the region, it is imperative that the Department sustains and improves military-to-military and defense civilian relations, while continuing to evaluate and re-calibrate the nature and substance of each of our relationships to ensure they are consistent with U.S. values and advance U.S. vital national interests.

Egypt

53. What is your assessment of the security situation in Egypt?

I am troubled by the government's crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, opposition groups, and journalists. I know that the Department has repeatedly voiced concerns about the crackdown to the Government of Egypt and urged that the interim government protect the rights provided in the new constitution.

I am also concerned with the recent increase in violence perpetrated by Sinai-based terrorist organizations. I understand that the Department has continued to provide maintenance support for platforms that support CT operations, and that the Secretary has personally offered our assistance. If confirmed, I would continue the Department's work to support Egypt's efforts to combat terrorist threats.

54. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Egypt security relationship?

The U.S.-Egypt relationship is one of our most significant and enduring security relationships in the Middle East. Egypt is an important regional actor, and for more than 30 years our relationship has served to further our countries' joint security interests. Our security relationship with Egypt helps us facilitate expedited U.S. military access to the Suez Canal and critical over-flight privileges, ensure the security of Israel, cooperate on counter-terrorism efforts, and maintain the security of our embassy and consulate. Supporting Egypt's transition while encouraging a non-violent, transparent, and inclusive process ensures our security relationship is maintained and our interests protected.

55. What is your assessment of the role Egypt plays with respect to regional stability?

Egypt remains an important partner for regional security. Egypt's upholding of the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel, the security support that it provides to military and commercial ships transiting the Suez Canal, and its efforts to combat terrorist elements in the Sinai all advance critical regional security objectives. In addition, Egypt's work to prevent illicit trafficking across its shared borders with Libya, Sudan, and Israel demonstrate its commitment to promoting stability in the region.

56. In your view, should the U.S. Government continue to provide defense articles and services purchased by the Egyptian military using U.S. Foreign Military Financing funds?

Our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds have been an important part of our overall relationship with Egypt for more than 30 years. I understand the Department's position to be that we want to maintain our security assistance relationship with Egypt, and if confirmed I would continue the Department's efforts, working with other U.S. departments and agencies, to exercise the authorities granted in the FY 2014 omnibus appropriations act to continue providing assistance to Egypt.

57. If current Defense Minister Field Marshal el-Sisi were elected president of Egypt based on free and fair elections, what impact do you believe that might have on our military relationship with Egypt?

Egypt is an important partner of the United States and is critical to stability and security in the region, but Egypt's path forward is for the Egyptians to decide. The military and security aspect of the U.S.-Egypt relationship remains important to the United States and for our interests in the region, but the overall relationship is far broader than military assistance.

Regardless of who Egypt's president is, our shared interests in upholding the Camp David Peace Accords, counter-terrorism and Sinai security, maritime security, and border security will remain, and I understand that the Department will continue to work with Egypt to advance those interests.

Syria

The civil war in Syria continues and President Assad's commitment to continuing his regime's ongoing operations appear unwavering despite international condemnation. To date, the United States has limited its support to opposition forces to non-lethal assistance to forces on the ground, as well as technical assistance to elements of the opposition working to build a cohesive political entity.

58. In your view, what is the proper role on the United States military in this conflict?

A political solution to the Syria conflict would be the best outcome. DoD continues to be involved in interagency discussions that explore potential military roles, to support the important U.S. national interest in stopping atrocities in Syria. The U.S. military stands ready to support these goals, as determined by the President.

59. In your view, should the United States provide support to opposition groups on the ground in Syria, including lethal support?

Yes, the United States should provide assistance to the moderate Syrian opposition. In fact, in addition to diplomatic support, the U.S. Government is providing nonlethal support—nearly \$260 million—to the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) and the Supreme Military Council (SMC).

DoD also has been supporting the State Department in this endeavor. Since April 2013, DoD has delivered additional assistance directly to the SMC as well as the SOC in the form of meals ready to eat (MREs) and medical supplies.

The provision of lethal assistance by DoD to the opposition would be a serious undertaking and would require a change in U.S. policy. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely through the U.S. interagency process to address such difficult policy questions.

60. In your view, would the removal of the Assad regime be a strategic defeat of Iran in the region?

I believe the removal of the Assad regime would be a setback for Iran's destabilizing efforts in the region. The extent of that setback, however, would depend on what follows the downfall of Assad's regime.

As the President has said, there can only be a political resolution to the conflict in Syria. That is why the Administration is focused on a negotiated transition that does not include Bashar al-Assad.

National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen said "As the conflict in Syria rages on, we are concerned about the flow of fighters to the country and the likelihood that they will pose a threat when they return from Syria to their home countries," and that dealing with this threat "will be the primary focus of our counterterrorism efforts in 2014."

61. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have for a counterterrorism strategy to blunt the rising tide of extremists in Syria?

Any counterterrorism strategy will need to involve active engagement with partner nations and allies, who have legitimate concerns about the growing extremist problem emanating from Syria. We must approach this issue regionally in order to combat these groups effectively, since this terrorist activity is not limited to Syria alone. Further, the Department must work closely with our interagency partners to develop options reflecting a whole-of-government approach to addressing the terrorist threat and disrupting terrorist efforts to attack the U.S. homeland, our allies and partners, and our interests abroad.

After the United States threatened the use of military force in response to Syria's use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians in August of 2013, Syria agreed to an international plan to eliminate its chemical weapons program by the end of June 2014. Although Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention and has eliminated its capacity to mix and fill chemical agents and munitions, it has failed to meet recent deadlines to transport its chemical agents and precursors to Latakia for removal and destruction.

62. Given Syria's apparent unwillingness to meet all its internationally mandated

deadlines, what are your views on the prospects for eliminating Syria's chemical weapons program by June 30, 2014?

I understand that the international community is poised to complete destruction of Syria's chemical materials once Syria fulfills its obligations. The United States is engaging bilaterally and multilaterally with key international partners to increase pressure on the Syrian Government in order to achieve complete elimination of Syria's chemical weapons program.

63. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the Department of Defense could take as part of the international effort to ensure the successful elimination of Syria's chemical weapons program in 2014?

I understand the Department is playing a critical role in the international effort. If confirmed, I would continue the robust coordination within DoD, other U.S. departments and agencies, and with international partners necessary to ensure successful completion of our mission.

Gulf Security Cooperation

The Administration has been working with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments to enhance regional cooperation and security against ballistic missile threats, particularly from Iran.

64. What is your view of the potential for missile defense cooperation within the GCC to enhance regional security, and how do you see this potential cooperation fitting into the United States missile defense and security efforts in the Middle East?

I understand that our efforts concerning missile defense cooperation with our Gulf partners are progressing. The plans that many GCC States have developed, including acquisition of advanced ballistic missile defense capabilities and participation in ballistic missile defense training and exercises, put us on a path to building stronger bilateral security partnerships, which could in turn provide a solid foundation for future progress in the multilateral arena.

65. What role do you see for the sale to the United Arab Emirates of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot missile defense systems, and similar sales to other GCC partners, in regional security against Iranian missile threats?

I understand that the United States is working with a number of GCC States regarding regional missile defense initiatives, including supporting their consideration of ballistic missile defense capabilities through the Foreign Military Sales program. As a result, many GCC partners are becoming increasingly interested, and active, in acquiring and fielding substantial ballistic missile defense capabilities. When complemented by the deployment of U.S. capabilities, these systems could make a significant contribution to deterrence of, and defense against, the Iranian ballistic missile threat.

66. To your knowledge, have there been any requests by the GCC to purchase military equipment or services as a bloc, as Secretary Hagel announced in December 2013?

No, to my knowledge the GCC has not yet initiated any Foreign Military Sales requests following the recent Presidential Determination.

67. Given the relative wealth of GCC states and their ability to buy complete systems independently (e.g., UAE's purchase of THAAD), what dynamics do you believe could lead to purchasing military capabilities as a GCC bloc?

I believe that a GCC decision to purchase military capabilities as a bloc would largely be a function of a shared view that the deployment of a collective capability would enhance the national, sovereign defenses of member States.

68. Do you believe that, after the rotation of an aircraft carrier presence from the Gulf, the U.S. military should take any steps to reassure our GCC partners of U.S. willingness and capability to defend against the threat of Iranian aggression?

The United States has deep and enduring interests in the Middle East and maintains a robust regional military posture able to deter aggression and respond to potential security contingencies. This is a message that Secretary Hagel firmly delivered in his public remarks during the Manama Dialogue in Bahrain in December, and a theme he has repeatedly conveyed in consultations with our GCC partners.

Regional Ballistic Missile Threats and Response

Iran and North Korea each have hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles today that are capable of reaching forward-deployed U.S. forces, allies, and other friendly nations in the EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM AORs. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report of February 2010 stated that the United States intends to pursue regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches to ballistic missile defense against such missile threats in various regions.

69. Do you believe that such regionally tailored phased adaptive approaches will provide our regional combatant commanders with the missile defense capabilities needed to defend our forward deployed forces and our allies and partners in the region?

Yes. I believe our tailored missile defense approaches will contribute to the defense of our forward-deployed forces and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that U.S. missile defenses are tailored to address the threat to each region using the capabilities that are most suited for deployment.

70. What role do you see for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system with Standard Missile-3 interceptors in U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs?

Ships equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense weapons system are a good example of the mobile systems that allow for the tailored defense of key regions and the capacity to surge missile defenses to a particular region in a crisis.

71. In addition to U.S. missile defense capabilities in these AORs, what role do you see for other nations to contribute to regional missile defense capabilities?

The missile defense contributions from our allies and partners help to strengthen regional deterrence and defense by increasing defense cooperation ties with the United States while making themselves and our forward deployed forces less vulnerable to coercion and ballistic missile attack. If confirmed, I would encourage even closer cooperation with allies and partners in this area.

Libya

72. What role do you envision the United States playing in helping Libya build capable security institutions?

Libya remains a country in a difficult democratic transition. I understand that building Libyan security capacity is a priority for the Department of Defense, and I would support this effort if confirmed. In response to a request from Libyan Prime Minister Zeidan, the United States will train a 5,000-8,000-member general purpose force (GPF), which will be a foundational element of Libya's future security. The United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey are also committed to training Libyan GPF personnel, and we are working with them closely to ensure our efforts are coordinated. To underwrite the development of, and to sustain, this force, DoD also contributes to international efforts to provide defense advisor and defense institution reform programs to help the Libyan Ministry of Defense develop the capabilities necessary to manage the country's security forces.

73. What is your assessment of the risks associated with the paramilitary forces that continue to have control of large swaths of Libya?

It is my assessment that paramilitary forces disrupt Libya's democratic transition and undermine the basic peace and stability of the state.

74. In your view, what role, if any, should DOD play in assisting the Libyans with addressing the threat to stability posed by paramilitary forces?

I understand that the United States is committed to working with the Libyan government as it addresses the risks paramilitary forces pose to Libyan stability, and the Department of Defense plays an important role in those efforts. In addition to the GPF program, I understand the Department of Defense provides training and equipment to increase Libya's border security and counterterrorism capacity. The Department also contributed to weapons abatement efforts and defense institution reform programs.

75. What do you view as the most significant challenges to the Libyan government in building capable and sustainable security institutions?

Libya was left without a deep bench of experienced technocrats and civil servants, and its ability to administer governing institutions is nascent. This poses challenges to Libya's capacity to absorb and coordinate international assistance efforts. For this reason, the Administration is

focused on ensuring that the United States and our international partners coordinate among ourselves to provide Libya with the assistance it needs.

76. In what ways can the United States be most effective in assisting the Libyan government in building capable and sustainable security institutions?

To complement our GPF, border-security, and counterterrorism training, the Department of Defense seeks to assist the Libyan Ministry of Defense with institution-building programs to facilitate the recruiting, retention, and integration of trained personnel into the Libyan military. In my view, a capable Libyan Ministry of Defense is essential to the consolidation of Libya's security capacity.

77. What security assistance programs do you consider most vital to providing security assistance to Libya and to help Libya build its security capacity?

Once implemented, I understand that the Libyan-funded General Purpose Force training will be our largest effort to help build Libya's security capacity. With Congress's support, we funded programs to develop counter-terrorism forces as well as a border security company in Libya. I understand that DoD's defense advisor and defense institution reform programs also benefit Libyan Ministry of Defense development.

78. In your opinion, how important is the Global Security Contingency Fund to U.S. security assistance efforts in Libya?

I understand that the United States has the strategic goals of supporting Libyan government efforts to develop a basic capability to secure its own borders and maintain stability in the face of internal and regional challenges, and to create the space for a peaceful, successful democratic transition. By developing Libyan special operations and border security capacity, the Global Security Contingency Fund could play a critical role in advancing these objectives.

Africa-related Security Matters

The new DoD strategic guidance, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," announced by President Obama on January 5, 2012, sets out the defense priorities for the 21st century and the key military missions for which DoD will prepare. The primary emphasis of the strategy relates to the Middle East and Asia. The strategy makes little reference to Africa and its myriad security challenges.

79. In light of the emphasis on areas outside of the African continent, if confirmed, how would you draw attention to the myriad security challenges confronting African nations?

We must protect U.S. lives and interests from al Qaeda and its affiliates and those who intend to do us harm. Building the capability of African security forces, defense institutions, and regional organizations to combat transnational threats will continue to be a cornerstone of our defense efforts in Africa. As part of these efforts, if confirmed, I would support ongoing programs and policies that instill in African militaries a commitment to operate under civilian authority, respect

the rule of law, abide international human rights norms, and support international peacekeeping operations. Over the long run, it will be Africans who will best be able to address African security challenges, and the Department of Defense will be positioned to advance U.S. security interests most effectively through focused security engagement with our African partners.

In the last few years, there has been a growth of terrorist networks, capabilities, and operations in North and East Africa, including groups that reportedly intending to target Western nations, including the United States. Some have characterized the U.S. counterterrorism effort in North and East Africa as an “economy of force” effort.

80. Do you agree with that characterization of the U.S. counterterrorism effort in North and East Africa?

The growing terrorist threats in North-West and East Africa present a complex security challenge to U.S. security interests. The vast under-governed areas in North and East Africa have contributed to a permissive environment for extremist networks. Working closely with international and regional partners, I understand that DoD focuses its efforts on disrupting and dismantling al Qaeda, its affiliates, and adherents. U.S. support of France’s operations in Mali and support of United Nations peacekeeping forces have resulted in significant progress in addressing the terrorist threat in the Sahel. Our support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been critical to reducing al-Shabaab’s freedom of movement in south and central Somalia.

81. In your view, should these U.S. counterterrorism efforts be expanded, contracted, or remain the same?

In my view, U.S. counterterrorism efforts should align with the threat to the United States, our allies and partners, and our interests. If confirmed, I would support counterterrorism efforts to disrupt and over time defeat violent extremist organizations that pose a direct threat to U.S. and allied interests, and threaten regional security.

U.S. Military Operations Against the Lord’s Resistance Army

Despite pressure by the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) – including Joseph Kony – continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian populations. Some observers have identified operational concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and intelligence community continues to be inadequate; (3) limitations continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide; and (4) logistics and operational enablers for U.S. forces.

82. In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?

The mission of U.S. Operation Observant Compass (OOC) forces is to enhance African capacity to end the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). It is my understanding that U.S. military advisors are working with these forces to strengthen information-sharing and synchronization, enhance their operational planning, and increase the effectiveness of African security forces. If confirmed, I would support the current U.S. policy of pursuing a comprehensive, multi-faceted strategy to help the governments and people of this region in their efforts to end the threat posed by the LRA and to address the impacts of the LRA's atrocities.

83. In your view, what is the appropriate level of priority to be accorded to efforts to counter the Lord's Resistance Army?

OOC balances the operational needs of our African partners with our desire to ensure those partners remain in the lead as they confront their security challenges, and contributes to a whole-of-government effort to support local resistance to and eventual defeat of the LRA. I understand that this approach has yielded dividends. Since 2012, there have been more than 100 defections from the LRA, including LRA fighters, with many citing U.S.-supported defections messaging as influential in their decisions to defect. In December 2013, 19 individuals defected from the LRA, the largest LRA defection since 2008.

84. If confirmed, will you work to review the four concerns outlined above and report back to the committee?

Yes.

Transatlantic Relationship and NATO

85. In your view, how important to U.S. national security interests is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S. transatlantic relationship with our Alliance partners?

Europe is and remains the United States' partner of first resort. The transatlantic community has never been more closely aligned in confronting the challenges of a complex, dangerous, and fast-changing world. The breadth and depth of our cooperation are remarkable. For example, in Libya, NATO Allies came together with Arab and other partners to prevent a catastrophe and to support the Libyan people. In Afghanistan, with nearly 40,000 Allied and partner personnel alongside our own, we built and sustained NATO's largest-ever overseas deployment. As President Obama has said, "Europe remains the cornerstone of our engagement with the world," and NATO is "the most capable Alliance in history."

86. If the United States were to have to take military action against Iran in the future, do you believe that could occur without strategic basing in Europe, and if so how difficult would that be?

I cannot address the basing requirements for specific operations in an unclassified setting. I understand that, traditionally, U.S. basing in or transit through Europe has been essential to a

broad range of contingency plans and global operations. For example, European bases provided critical support to Operation Desert Shield in Iraq and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in the 1990s, and more recently to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Unified Protector in Libya.

87. Do you believe that any moderate to major military operation (e.g. Operation Odyssey Dawn, Operation Unified Protector) that the United States might undertake in Africa or the Middle East is likely to involve U.S. forces from Europe and/or with Europe?

Yes, I expect that U.S. forces and facilities in Europe would likely be involved in any moderate or major military operation the United States might undertake in Africa or the Middle East. Additionally, as recent and ongoing operations in the Middle East and Africa show, I expect that a moderate to major military operation in Africa or the Middle East would include European Allies and partners.

88. What changes, if any, would you recommend to strengthen that transatlantic relationship, if confirmed?

The strength of the transatlantic relationship has always been based on shared values of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty. However, shared security interests and U.S. leadership are the glue that binds the Alliance. Making the transatlantic relationship stronger requires sustained U.S. support and leadership of the Alliance, a re-dedication on the part of the next generation of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to the founding principles and values of the Alliance, and sharing the responsibility among Allies for supporting the Alliance so that future leaders continue to believe that investments in the Alliance are in their national interest. If confirmed, I would work to ensure U.S. support for these principles.

89. As the United States pursues a pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region, do you believe there should be a reduction in the U.S. security commitment to Europe?

No. Even as we add focus on the Asia-Pacific, we must sustain our commitments to Europe. Europe is home to many of our most committed and capable Allies and partners, many of whom who have sacrificed – and continue to sacrifice – alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. In fact, economic austerity, the transnational nature of today's threats, and the rise of other centers of power in a multipolar world, make a strong transatlantic alliance all the more important to retaining our influence and defending our common interests.

90. As the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan nears completion, do you foresee a need for NATO to re-evaluate its purpose, missions and objectives going forward?

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has continually re-evaluated its purpose, missions, and objectives. The end of the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan should be no different. The purpose of the Alliance as stated in the 2010 Strategic Concept is still valid, but the end of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan at the end of this year

provides an opportunity for the Alliance to reassess the balance between various missions and to review objectives. I understand that NATO's transition in Afghanistan will provide an opportunity to reinvest in areas that received less focus during the ISAF operation, and Allies will face the challenge of maintaining the level of interoperability that we achieved after years of operating together in Afghanistan.

91. Do you believe NATO should reduce the number of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe at this time? If so why and, if not, what conditions could lead to such a reduction?

The President stated in Berlin last June that we will work with our NATO allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian tactical weapons in Europe. The 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) reflects the consensus position of NATO members, and it commits NATO to remaining a nuclear Alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. The DDPR concluded that the "Alliance's nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture." The DDPR also notes, however, that, NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.

92. What is your assessment of the participation of NATO partners other than the U.S. in the European Phased Adaptive Approach program and other NATO missile defense efforts?

It is my understanding that our Allies contribute to NATO missile defense through common funding to the command and control network, hosting U.S. missile defense assets in the region, and contributing their own missile defense capabilities. If confirmed, I would work to ensure robust Allied participation in NATO missile defense.

93. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you have for maintaining the unprecedented level of interoperability between the U.S. and NATO partners after the draw down in Afghanistan?

NATO political leaders recognize that as ISAF ends, Alliance forces will need to maintain the interoperability we have developed during the last 20 years of continuous deployments. I understand that those leaders tasked NATO's military planners to work on several training-related Summit deliverables, including an updated Education, Training, Exercise, and Evaluation Policy; a new NATO Training Concept looking at the 2015 to 2020 timeframe; and a new Major Exercise Program for 2016 and onwards. If confirmed, I would recommend following through on the work already undertaken by our NATO military planners.

94. Two Brigade Combat Teams have been inactivated in Europe. What is your understanding of the status of a rotational brigade designed to provide regular training with NATO forces to help maintain engagement and interoperability?

I understand that the Department of Defense will continue to allocate a U.S. Brigade Combat Team to the Response Forces Pool of the NATO Response Force (NRF). We have also

requested funding to support the deployment of a U.S.-based battalion to Europe twice per year for up to two months at a time, so that our U.S.-based Army units can exercise with the NRF and train with Allies and partners in the same way that units stationed in Europe do. The U.S. European Command has already developed a plan to integrate the rotational battalion into several U.S. Army Europe-led multinational exercises, as well as several NATO-led exercises.

Russia

95. What in your view are the major security issues in the U.S.-Russian relationship?

There are a number of areas where the United States and Russia can and do cooperate in order to build common ground and increase shared security. These include, but are not limited to, strategic arms reductions, counter-terrorism and counter-extremism, Afghanistan, preventing proliferation of dangerous technologies, military relations, and dissuading Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed nation.

In the last four years, we have achieved significant results by cooperating in areas of mutual interest, and produced real benefits for the American and Russian people. We negotiated, ratified, and are successfully implementing the New START Treaty; supported the conclusion of Russia's WTO negotiations; adopted tough multilateral sanctions on Iran and North Korea to prevent them from pursuing nuclear weapons programs; and worked together on stabilizing Afghanistan.

Right now we have differences on a number of important issues – including Georgia's security and territorial integrity, NATO's role in European security, missile defense in Europe, and conventional arms control in Europe. If confirmed, I would continue to engage the Russian government to try to find common ground, and when appropriate, to speak out about our concerns. I would also continue to work with Russia in areas where our interests overlap because it is in the long-term strategic interests of the United States and our Allies and partners to do so.

96. Where do you see U.S. and Russian security interests aligning and where are they diverging?

Although points of friction exist in many areas of our relationship, the United States and Russia should be able to cooperate effectively in the many areas in which we share common interests, communicate effectively in areas where we have competing interests, and negotiate reasonably in areas where we have overlapping interests.

Among the most important areas where the United States and Russia have common interests is in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. We have had significant cooperation with Russia on Iran. The Russians supported UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed international sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear programs. Similarly, Russia is a key player in reversing North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, and shares common interests in this regard. As a third key example, Russia shares our concerns, and those of the international community, regarding what it views as the

potential for regional instability should the conflict in Syria remain unresolved and should Syria retain its chemical weapons program. The United States and Russia have agreed on a framework to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons program. This framework represents an important step toward degrading the Assad regime's ability to use chemical weapons. Finally, the United States and Russia share strong interests in reducing the likelihood of nuclear war, as reflected in the New START Treaty and in prior arms control treaties.

97. In your view what policy steps should DOD take to improve relations with Russia? For instance, would you support increased military to military relations and exchanges with Russia?

DoD has been a proponent and a beneficiary of the "reset" with Russia.

I understand that DoD is constantly looking for ways to improve military-to-military relations by ensuring that our cooperation with Russia serves U.S. and Russian interests and contributes to greater security in the Euro-Atlantic space. Over time, cooperation on a wide range of issues may help to build a foundation for more concrete and substantive cooperation with Russia.

98. Would you support any joint development or other programs with Russia?

If confirmed, I would be interested in supporting joint programs that would benefit the United States. I understand that DoD recently proposed a project with Russia on Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (CIED) through the U.S.-Russia Defense Relations Working Group. If confirmed, I would support moving forward on CIED issues in both bilateral security cooperation and defense technology cooperation.

99. Would you support joint U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense as a way to send a signal to Iran against Iran's developing long-range missiles or having nuclear weapons?

If confirmed, I would support U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense because it could improve the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, thereby improving our capability to protect the United States, our forces overseas, and our Allies. Missile defense cooperation with Russia could strengthen capabilities across Europe to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles.

100. Do you support efforts mandated by the New START Treaty Resolution of Ratification to seek reductions in the stockpiles of Russian and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons?

Yes.

101. If so, what steps would you recommend for pursuing such reductions, if confirmed?

If confirmed, I would recommend that our focus for the next stage of arms control consist of

bilateral negotiated efforts to increase transparency and pursue further reductions that could potentially include all nuclear weapons – deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic – while ensuring that we maintain our commitments to stability with other nuclear powers, deterrence of potential adversaries, and assurance of our Allies and partners.

102. What role, if any, should the DOD play in responding to Russian attempts to exert influence over other countries on its border, including Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic countries?

I believe that stable democracies on Russia's borders contribute not only to Europe's security, but to Russia's as well. In that vein, if confirmed, I would stand by DoD's commitment to continue building partner capacity and establishing robust security cooperation programs with our partners throughout Europe and Eurasia.

103. In your view, does Russia want Iran to have a nuclear weapon?

In my view, I do not believe Russia seeks a nuclear armed Iran. Russia is an active participant in the P5+1 dialogue. Russia also supported UNSCR 1929, which imposed international sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear programs. I hope that we will continue to find ways to cooperate with Russia in dissuading Iran from a nuclear weapons path.

104. After the Sochi Olympics are over, do you expect any change in Russia's pursuit of its interests in the international environment?

Russia has consistently pursued what it perceives as its national interests, and I believe that it will continue to do so after the Sochi Olympics.

105. In your view, what additional risk does the presence of Russian Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad pose to NATO allies and military facilities in Europe?

President Putin recently dismissed reports that his country has deployed missiles in its Kaliningrad region. That said, any potential deployment of state-of-the-art missiles near the Alliance's eastern borders is destabilizing to the region, is cause for concern, and would underscore the need for regular communications between Russian and NATO military leaders.

China

China's defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of military growth is to be expected for a country experiencing the kind of economic growth that China has had over about that same period, the types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit access and freedom of movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China's intentions in the region.

106. How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China?

The U.S.-China relationship is characterized by elements of both cooperation and competition. In November 2013, National Security Advisor Ambassador Susan Rice stated that the United States seeks manage inevitable competition while forging deeper cooperation on issues where our interests converge—in Asia and beyond. The United States continues to seek to manage those areas where we may have differences and pursue opportunities to engage where there is mutual benefit.

107. To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of the United States and other major regional and international actors will affect the direction in which China develops?

The policies and actions of the United States and other actors can and do influence the direction of China's development. By that same token, U.S. policy and actions, or the policies and actions of any country or group of countries, cannot alone determine China's future. The choices of China's leaders play the central role in charting China's future. However, no country has done more to assist, facilitate, and encourage China's national development and integration into the international system than the United States. More fundamentally, the United States can also help to shape the environment in which China makes its strategic choices, and in so doing, encourage China to "do the right thing."

108. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program?

China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces. Taiwan contingencies remain the principal focus of much of this modernization, which seeks to enable China to fight and win high-intensity regional military operations of short duration. One can also see growing indications that China's expanding regional and global influence is prompting it to develop capabilities for missions that go beyond China's immediate territorial concerns.

109. How do you believe the United States should respond to this Chinese military growth and modernization?

The United States has been and should remain the foremost military power in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States must continue to monitor developments in China's military modernization and continue encouraging China to be more transparent about its military and security affairs. This lack of transparency breeds suspicion and the potential for misperception of intentions. The U.S. response to China's military modernization should be flexible and supported by two efforts: First, the continued evolution of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region and the maintenance of our global presence and access, including through the strengthening of our alliances and partnerships; second, the transformation of our own capabilities in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial challenges.

110. What effect is China's military growth having on other countries in the region?

China's rapid rise and the relative lack of transparency surrounding its intentions are increasingly

creating uncertainty in the region. Other countries in the region are closely watching the growth of China's military, and how its military acts. Tensions between China and its neighbors in the East and South China Seas have increased, spurring regional actors to modernize their forces.

Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have contributed to a greater focus on regional forums where issues may be addressed multilaterally and the need to adhere to international law and norms can be amplified. Such security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have also led to stronger demand signals from regional countries and the United States as a security partner of choice.

China's annual defense budget is growing faster than its economy – with average annual increases in defense spending topping ten percent over the past decade. In certain respects, China's growing military capabilities create opportunities to partner and cooperate where U.S. interests, regional states' interests, and China's interests converge.

111. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

If confirmed, I would look for ways to strengthen the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship. I understand that the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship has experienced positive momentum over the past year. Our approach should continue to pursue this positive development, consistent with U.S. interests and values, in pursuit of sustained, substantive dialogue; concrete, practical cooperation; and enhanced risk reduction measures to manage our differences responsibly. At the same time, I would seek to ensure that we balance these exchanges with continued, robust interactions with Allies and partners across the region.

112. Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

Military exchanges are an important mechanism to build trust and mutual understanding, reducing the risk for miscalculation. I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly move the relationship forward if China is equally committed to open and regular exchanges. If confirmed, I would continue to encourage China to act responsibly, both regionally and globally. I would also support deepening and enhancing our military-to-military relationship with China.

By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air and space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in particular is China's increased aggressiveness in asserting its excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea.

113. What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea?

that

The United States is a Pacific nation that has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open

access to Asia's maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. The United States should sustain its presence in the South China Sea and uphold its commitments to its allies and partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. I believe all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with customary international law, without resorting to the threat or use of force.

114. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation?

Although the United States does not take a position on the territorial and maritime disputes, I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain a visible presence and assert its freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the East and South China Seas in accordance with customary international law. The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the Asia-Pacific region.

If confirmed, I would work with our military commanders to evaluate the appropriate level of naval activities in the region to maintain peace and stability as well as unimpeded access for lawful commerce and economic development.

Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively pursuing cyber espionage and warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential conflict situation.

115. If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend itself against a cyber attack?

The protection of U.S. military networks from cyber attack is one of DoD's core missions. If confirmed, I would continue to support DoD's on-going efforts to develop new capabilities to defend military networks, support the development of our cyber workforce, and develop partnerships with other government agencies, the private sector, and our allies and international partners to strengthen our collective defenses. DoD must also continue to ensure that we are able to conduct operations in degraded information environments.

In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community. Since then, China has continued its active pursuit of ballistic missile and anti-satellite technology.

116. What is your view of China's purposes for its pursuit of these capabilities?

In my view, this test was a troubling incident. It was yet another element of China's comprehensive, long-term military modernization effort to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber

warfare.

117. What do you see as the long term implications of such developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

The United States should seek ways to protect our interests in space; space systems are vital to our national security and our economy. I believe we need to enhance our deterrence and ability to operate in a degraded environment by increasing the resilience of national security systems against threats to space-based architectures and developing space control capabilities. If confirmed, I would continue to pursue partnerships with commercial suppliers, collaboration with international partners, and changes in our own architectures and operational tactics that can improve the resiliency of our systems and strengthen strategic stability in space.

North Korea

118. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

I believe that the security situation on the Korean Peninsula is serious and deserves our constant vigilance. North Korea has demonstrated – through its December 2012 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test – that it has the capabilities and the will to undermine regional stability in pursuit of its national interests.

North Korea's provocative behavior, large conventional military, pursuit of ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs, and proliferation activities continue to be serious concerns for the United States and our allies and partners in the region. Kim Jong Un's unpredictability adds to our concerns.

If confirmed, I would ensure that our military deterrence of North Korean aggression continues to support our diplomatic efforts to end North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

119. What is your understanding of the threats posed to the United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities?

North Korea's ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, and its proliferation of these capabilities, pose a serious threat to U.S. forces in the region as well as to our regional allies and partners. Although largely untested at longer ranges, these capabilities could pose a direct threat to U.S. territory. If confirmed, I would do my best to ensure that DoD uses its full range of resources and capabilities to defend against these threats.

120. What concerns you most about North Korea and, if confirmed, what would you do to address those concerns?

Although under Kim Jong Un the North Korean regime has demonstrated unpredictability, my understanding is that Kim Jong Un remains in full control and is consolidating his power. We must remain vigilant against North Korean provocations given Kim Jong Un's continuing efforts to consolidate power, North Korea's tactic of escalating tension to draw parties to the negotiating

table, and the onset of the spring military training cycle. If confirmed, I would work to ensure the Department is prepared for any potential provocations by North Korea.

Republic of Korea

121. What is your understanding of the current status of the U. S.-South Korean security relationship?

The U.S.-ROK Alliance is a linchpin of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are making shared investments in the security of the Korean Peninsula to enhance our combined ability to deter North Korean aggression. Our security relationship represents part of a comprehensive, strategic Alliance and plays an important role in contributing to stability not only on the Peninsula but also throughout Northeast Asia and globally.

122. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve this security relationship?

My understanding is that DoD and the ROK are focused on developing the strategies, interoperable capabilities, and processes needed to deter and, if necessary, respond to North Korean provocations. If confirmed, I would support a continued emphasis on these areas.

The United States and the ROK continue to work closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and to assess the conditions for the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK.

If confirmed, I would also prioritize supporting the ROK as it plays a greater role in regional and global security befitting its economic status and influence. I would work diligently to maintain strong, cooperative relationships with my ROK and interagency counterparts to ensure that we all work together to strengthen the Alliance.

123. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this transition takes place as planned?

The United States and the ROK remain committed to the transfer of wartime operational control on the timeline identified in the Strategic Alliance 2015 (SA2015) plan. Wartime OPCON transition has always been conditions-based, and, if confirmed, I would support the continued assessment and review of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula in the context of implementing SA2015.

124. Do you believe that the security relationship with South Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or should U.S. forces stationed in Korea be available for regional or global deployments?

I believe it is essential that the United States remains committed to the combined defense of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with our mutual defense treaty obligations. U.S. force posture

on the Peninsula contributes to the stability of the Northeast Asia region. Our ROK allies are a linchpin for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region, and we expect that they will remain so into the foreseeable future.

125. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?

I understand that both of these plans are based on the security benefits of being outside the tactical effective range of North Korean artillery. By being outside the range of North Korean artillery, U.S. forces gain operational advantages regarding force protection, survivability, and consolidation of personnel and equipment. There are also other potential benefits of the force repositioning, including efficiencies, reduced costs, and contribution to the political sustainability of our forward presence on the Korean Peninsula.

126. What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe the U.S. armed forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?

It is my understanding that under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, when the political independence or security of the Republic of Korea (ROK) or the United States are threatened by an external armed attack, the United States and the ROK will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack. Patterns of North Korean rhetoric and provocations necessitate that the two sides continue to consult closely so that Alliance responses are effective.

127. Does the new Counter-Provocation Plan affect U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea?

My understanding is that the new Counter-Provocation Plan is a ROK-led, U.S.-supported contingency plan developed by mutual understanding between the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both countries after a November 2010 North Korean artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. The plan improves the Alliance readiness posture to allow for a strong and decisive combined South Korean and U.S. response to North Korean provocations and threats.

128. How has the new Counter-Provocation Plan changed the consultation process between the ROK military and USFK after a provocation by North Korea?

The Counter-Provocation Plan includes procedures for consultation and ensures a well-coordinated combined action in response to North Korean provocations and threats. I understand that U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and the ROK military closely consult to ensure the proper response and control escalation.

129. Does the ROK military have the obligation to consult with USFK before it engages in a response to a provocation by North Korea?

The ROK military has the inherent right of self-defense to respond to a provocation by North

Korea. However, USFK and the ROK military closely consult on a daily basis to deter North Korea and maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Japan

130. How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship?

The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship is very strong and remains the cornerstone of our security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan relationship has underwritten the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region for more than a half century. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in the region. The Joint Statement following the October 3, 2013, Security Consultative Committee meeting in Tokyo captures our full range of cooperative activities, which I would fully support, if confirmed.

131. How does Japan's relationship with its regional neighbors, mainly China, North Korea and South Korea influence the U.S.-Japan relationship?

We encourage a healthy and open trilateral relationship among Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States, to facilitate better relations between our two closest allies in northeast Asia. A strong trilateral relationship is an important element of deterrence against North Korean challenges. We also continue to encourage both China and Japan to increase the level of communication between the two sides in order to reduce the possibility of mistakes or miscalculation in contested areas.

132. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

We welcome any steps Japan chooses to take that will enable it to play a larger role in the Alliance, and to increase its contributions to regional and global security. In my view, the steps Japan is considering represent a natural evolution in policy that reflects its stature on the global stage.

133. What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense?

Japan is one of our most significant ballistic missile defense partners. Our cooperation on development of the SM-3 Block IIA and Japan's commitment of more than \$1 billion Japan to the program serve as excellent examples of that partnership. Japan also hosts the U.S. Navy SEVENTH fleet, which includes multiple ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis ships; is licensed to co-produce the PATRIOT PAC-3 missile; and hosts a U.S. AN/TPY-2 missile defense radar with plans to host a second such radar by the end of 2014.

The current plan is for the closure of the Marine Corps Air Station on Okinawa after the construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab on

Okinawa. While the Governor of Okinawa has signed the landfill permit to allow construction of the FRF to go forward, local opposition and a long construction timeline make the completion of the FRF uncertain.

134. What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?

In short, DoD is optimistic about the prospect for successful construction.

In December of last year, the Governor of Okinawa signed the land reclamation, or landfill, permit. This had been a significant political hurdle. This year, DoD expects to work closely with Japan on concrete steps to move forward with the landfill and the eventual construction of airfield facilities at the current Marine Corps Camp Schwab. Many of the necessary relocations within Camp Schwab required for the landfill are already underway, and we have every confidence that Japan will continue to make progress on this very significant forces realignment effort.

135. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?

I understand that a revision to the Guam International Agreement signed last year by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State with their Government of Japan counterparts reaffirmed Japan's commitment to provide \$3.1 billion (in Fiscal Year 2012 U.S. dollars) in cash toward the construction of Marine Corps facilities on Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). For Japan, this unprecedented commitment of funds for U.S. military facilities on U.S. territory makes perfect sense, preserving a strong U.S. military presence in the region while simultaneously reducing the pressure associated with the U.S. presence in Okinawa. It is also consistent with our policy to have a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force presence in the region.

The Japanese funds will not only assist in the construction of operational and administrative facilities for the U.S. Marines, but also contribute to the construction of training areas in Guam and the CNMI to ensure the operational readiness of our regional forces. I understand that we will also support opportunities for Japan to train at these facilities.

136. How, in your view, does building an unpopular new airfield on Okinawa, one that could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of at least \$3.6 billion, serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular?

Since at least 1996, the United States and Japan have shared the view that there is a need to relocate the existing Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma, around which a significant population had grown over the years. Since 1999, we identified a replacement site in the vicinity of Camp Schwab near the village of Henoko. This was confirmed most recently in the October 2013 2+2 meeting Joint Statement.

I understand that the Department is confident that once this facility is completed and operational, the resulting benefit to the areas of Okinawa south of Kadena Air Base, where the vast majority of the Okinawa population resides, will be apparent to all. At the same time, this facility will allow the Marine Forces on Okinawa to maintain their operational readiness and be able to respond quickly as the regional emergency force. The Marines will be able to continue to train as they fight, as a combined arms team.

137. Is Japan carrying a fair share of the burden of the cost of the U.S. presence in Japan under the current Special Measures Agreement?

My understanding is that Japan is meeting its obligations as negotiated under the 2011 Special Measures Agreement. If confirmed, I would monitor implementation to ensure that Japan continues to do its part to sustain the U.S. presence.

India

138. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security relations?

In my view, the United States and India have built a strong strategic partnership, in which defense cooperation plays a major role, and the Secretary is strongly committed to this partnership. Over the past decade in particular, we have built a bilateral defense relationship that includes a robust number of military exercises, a strong track record on defense trade, and increasingly close consultations on regional security issues. As India continues its military modernization efforts, we look to India to be a net provider of security in the region, and a partner on issues ranging from maritime security to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) to broader regional stability.

139. How has the recent diplomatic crisis regarding the Indian diplomat who was arrested for failing to pay her domestic servant the minimum wage affected the U.S.-India security relationship?

This was an unfortunate incident, but it does not change the important bilateral defense agenda we are pursuing with India. I understand that we are putting this incident behind us and moving forward.

140. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

If confirmed, there are several key priorities with India that I would pursue. First, I would continue to build on the significant progress we have made in our military-to-military relationship, working to increase the scope and complexity of exercises, encouraging exchanges, and continuing to prioritize senior-level engagements. We should continue to consult closely on issues affecting broader regional stability and look to expand in other areas of cooperation. For example, I would continue the work over the past several years on maritime security and HA/DR, and I would continue to work toward increasingly sophisticated defense trade and technology, among other areas.

141. What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and Pakistan?

Long-term stability in South Asia will depend upon progress in the India-Pakistan relationship, and I was encouraged by the meeting last year between Prime Minister Singh and Prime Minister Sharif on the margins of the UN General Assembly. DoD hopes to see more similar high-level engagements, and a greater degree of trust built up between India and Pakistan to ease longstanding tensions, particularly along the line of control. In the meantime, we continue to build our own bilateral relationships with both countries and to urge them to be transparent with each other on their activities in the region.

142. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?

Central and South Asian stability will require India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to achieve some level of sustained, mutual cooperation and trust, as well as productive relationships between Afghanistan and all of its neighbors, including those in Central Asia. We also need to recognize the need for separate bilateral relationships in the region, including the strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan, which is not, in my view, directed at any other country nor is it a threat to Pakistan. If confirmed, I would encourage all parties to be transparent with each other regarding their activities and relationships in the region.

Republic of the Philippines

143. What is your view of the current state of U. S.-Philippine military-to-military relations?

We have a very strong U.S.-Philippine defense partnership and a strong alliance. We have made progress in several key areas and continue to work with the Armed Forces of the Philippines as they pursue long-term military modernization and to increase cooperation on shared security challenges.

144. What do you believe the U. S. goals should be in the Republic of the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?

If confirmed, I would support ongoing efforts to build Philippine capacity with respect to internal security, military modernization, and a role as a positive contributor to regional and global security challenges, such as counterterrorism and maritime security; and I would continue to support the negotiations now underway to enhance our defense cooperation and facilitate an increased rotational presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines.

145. Do you believe Operation Damayan was a successful disaster relief effort? What were the lessons learned from the operation? What are the needed areas of improvement for U.S. disaster relief operations and joint task force operations in this area?

Operation Damayan was a very successful disaster relief effort, which saw a rapid international response and closed cooperation within the U.S. Government and between the U.S. Government, the Government of the Philippines, and other responders. The process of examining and incorporating lessons learned is ongoing, and if confirmed I would work to ensure we build on this experience to keep improving our own disaster response capabilities and those of our partners.

146. Do you anticipate a reduced or increased U. S. military footprint or change in mission for U. S. military forces in the Philippines in the near to mid-term?

The United States and the Government of the Philippines are discussing ways to facilitate an enhanced rotational presence in the Philippines. I do not want to prejudge the outcome those discussions. With regard to operations in the Southern Philippines, if confirmed, I would ensure that DoD continues to assess the requirements for the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines mission as security improves in that region.

147. In your opinion, how important is the Global Security Contingency Fund to U.S. security assistance efforts in the Philippines?

If confirmed, I would support the employment of the Global Security Contingency Fund as an important mechanism to help build partner capacity in the Philippines, particularly in the areas of maritime security and maritime domain awareness. This will help us support the Philippines' efforts to bolster important capabilities in these key areas.

Indonesia

148. What is your view of the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?

As the U.S.-Indonesia defense relationship continues to expand, we view Indonesia as a regional leader and a strong defense partner. Bilateral defense cooperation focuses on enhancing the Indonesian military's (TNI) capability to conduct the external missions of maritime security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. Bilateral defense trade is becoming an important part of our relationship as well.

With respect to the Kopassus military unit, we see Indonesian progress on human rights issues and continue to work with Indonesia to improve human rights and accountability.

149. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

If confirmed, I would favor increased U.S.-Indonesia military-to-military engagement to build on the progress in our defense relationship over the last decade. I would also advocate for continued DoD support to Indonesian defense reform efforts, including continued progress towards prevention of, and accountability for, human rights violations.

150. What is your understanding of the factors that informed the decision to re-

engage with Kopassus members?

I understand that in recent years we have seen a great deal of progress with respect to human rights and accountability. I believe that then-Secretary Gates' decision to resume limited engagement in 2010 was a recognition of this progress and a way to encourage continued improvement. Since then, I believe we have seen gradual improvement and, if confirmed, I would work to support Indonesia's continued progress.

151. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

I believe that Indonesia has made significant progress in institutionalizing respect for human rights and in ensuring accountability when abuses do occur. If confirmed, I would continue to maintain an open dialogue between DoD and Congress on how best to keep this trend moving in the right direction, and, would support continued emphasis on necessary further reforms in our military engagement with Indonesia.

152. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?

If confirmed, I look forward to working with Indonesian leadership on this important issue through increased engagement with senior Ministry of Defense officials, personnel exchanges, and support for professional military education. We would also continue to encourage positive actions taken by the Indonesian Government when violations do occur, including: suspensions and removals of military officials accused and convicted of abuses, and cooperation with the prosecution of accused military members.

Colombia

Plan Colombia has enabled the Colombian government to make significant gains against the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and other paramilitary forces in Colombia, as well as enabled the government to secure many previously ungoverned areas. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided more than \$7 billion to support Colombia's efforts to counter the threat of transnational criminal organizations and various terrorist groups.

153. What are your views regarding the current situation in Colombia focusing upon: (1) the current military and political situation in Colombia; (2) the ability of the Colombian military to control its territory; and (3) ongoing DoD programs?

It is clear to me that as one of our strongest defense partners in the region, Colombia has taken tremendous steps, with important U.S. support, to improve its own internal stability and citizen security. Colombia has dramatically improved its security throughout the country against several threats, including insurgents (such as the FARC), paramilitaries, criminal bands, and drug trafficking organizations. However, Colombia's efforts against such groups are not finished, nor

is stability in Colombia assured. Colombia's Ministry of Defense, with U.S. support, continues to apply pressure on organizations like the FARC, while also working to address citizen security and external defense issues.

We also see Colombia as an increasingly capable and willing partner in addressing common security challenges and contributing to efforts to improve stability more widely in the Western Hemisphere. While providing training and engagement on its own to many countries in the Hemisphere, Colombia has also partnered with us directly in Central America, an area of common security interest. We are confident that Colombia will continue to grow as a stable, interoperable partner in supporting security in the region.

154. In your view, is the Colombian government capable of sustaining the last decade's gains during this economic downturn and the scheduled decline in U.S. security assistance?

Yes, Colombia is capable of maintaining its gains, if it continues to build on the strengthened institutional, operational, and technical capacity that it has developed, with U.S. support, over the past decade. DoD is working closely with Colombia to prioritize and streamline our mutual security cooperation programs, understanding that resources are declining, while also acknowledging that certain U.S. support, such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), will remain critical to Colombia's success for the foreseeable future. Colombia has been a good partner in acknowledging the new realities of more limited resources, and DoD remains committed to working with our Colombian partners to address their emerging needs while sustaining their hard-won security gains.

155. In light of budget conditions, do you believe continued U.S. security assistance to Colombia at the current levels is sustainable?

Security assistance to Colombia has been slowly decreasing, and given budget realities across the U.S. Government, it will likely continue to decrease in the future. We have made hard decisions about where to focus our cooperation with Colombia, and also identified some areas where continued U.S. support remains critical into the foreseeable future (institutional reform efforts, for example). Although we acknowledge that fewer resources are available for security assistance in Colombia, we will stand by Colombia as it continues to move toward improved stability and a greater strategic partnership with the United States, and this type of commitment will continue to require U.S. resources.

156. In your view, what are the remaining U.S. supported programs that will need to be continued to "lock in" the progress that has been made?

I believe that the United States should continue to support programs that strengthen Colombian defense institutions, providing them the capacity to plan, forecast, and sustain their enhanced abilities. The United States should also continue to provide support to programs that provide the Colombian Government the technical and tactical edge, including critical capabilities it needs to defeat internal threats and guarantee stability over the long term.

Central America and Mexico

During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in 2011, General Douglas Fraser – the Commander of SOUTHCOM – and Admiral Winnefeld – the former Commander of U.S. Northern Command – discussed the increasingly dangerous region between Colombia and Mexico, and the devastating impact transnational criminal organizations are having on the people and security in this region. The U.S. has increased its assistance in this region, but – to date – the Department of Defense has had only a small role.

157. What is your assessment of the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations in this region?

I understand that the level of threat posed by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) to the Governments of Mexico and in Central America varies. While the Government of Mexico continues to deal significant blows to TCOs, Honduras and other Central American governments struggle. The governments in Central America continue to build nascent democratic institutions, but are often susceptible to the corrupting influences of TCOs. DoD believes that the Governments of Mexico and in Central America will continue to require varying levels of support to address the TCO threat. Although Mexico is a more mature partner and has developed better capabilities to face TCOs, Central American governments lack the means to confront the challenge successfully.

158. What is your understanding and assessment of DoD's current activities in Mexico and Central America?

I understand that the Department conducts security assistance and security cooperation programs to advance the capacity of Mexico and Central American countries to maintain host nation security, and to advance regional and hemispheric defense cooperation and coordination. To support Mexican and Central American efforts against TCOs, DoD security assistance and security cooperation activities focus on professionalization and capacity building of regional armed forces. Within Central America, much of DoD's efforts are focused on maritime capacities to help curb illicit trafficking and training programs emphasizing respect for human rights and being responsive to civil authority. Although these efforts are important, and have significantly improved the capacity of our partners to meet the TCO threat, defense cooperation alone will not be sufficient to defeat the TCOs.

Cuba

159. What is your view of the need to review and, potentially, revise U. S. policies regarding Cuba?

DoD stands in support of the overall U.S. Government policy towards Cuba. When the Administration periodically reviews our Cuba foreign policy, DoD has the opportunity to contribute to the interagency process. Current policy is that the United States is open to forging a new relationship with Cuba when the Cuban people enjoy fundamental human rights and the ability to determine their own political future freely. The policy also emphasizes targeted

bilateral engagement that advances U.S. national interests and the enactment of measures that help reduce the dependence of Cuban citizens on the state.

160. What is your opinion about the need for, and the pros and cons of, military-to-military contact with Cuba?

The Department views military-to-military engagements as a valuable tool for building confidence. I understand that we currently conduct limited military-to-military engagement, including at monthly fence line talks at the Guantanamo Naval Base, which focus on ensuring there are no misunderstandings on either side of the fence.

161. In your view, is Cuba currently supporting or sponsoring international terrorism?

Cuba remains designated by the Secretary of State as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. I am not aware that the Cuban government has provided weapons or paramilitary training to terrorist groups in recent years. However, if confirmed, I would work with the Department of State on all State Sponsorship of Terrorism designations, and advise the Secretary of Defense on the Department's appropriate response to complement those designations.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

162. Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)? If so, please explain why?

I strongly support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. I believe that accession to the Convention would show a U.S. strategic commitment to upholding the established legal order that codifies the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace, including those that are critical to the global mobility of U.S. military forces.

163. From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?

I see many advantages to being a Party to the Convention. The primary national security advantage of U.S. accession would be strengthening U.S. credibility to promote the robust set of rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea reflected in the Convention. These rights are vital to the mobility of U.S. military forces around the world. As a non-Party, we are impeded in our ability to encourage other States to respect the rules of law contained in the Convention.

I do not see any disadvantages to the United States joining the Law of the Sea Convention. If confirmed, I would work with Members of the Senate to address any concerns that may be raised.

164. What is your understanding of the principal arguments against ratifying UNCLOS, and what is your response to those arguments?

One of the arguments I have heard Convention opponents make is that U.S. accession may erode

U.S. sovereignty. I believe that U.S. accession to the Convention would strengthen U.S. sovereignty and sovereign rights. The Convention recognizes that a State Party may claim 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, may establish an exclusive economic zone, and may assert resource-related sovereign rights on its extended continental shelf. Other nations may question whether they are obligated to respect a U.S. assertion of these coastal State rights as a non-Party to the Convention.

Peacekeeping Operations

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., stated that the U.S. “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.”

- 165. What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute additional military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?**

Successful U.N. peacekeeping operations are in the national security interest of the United States, as they generally cost less than U.S. operations, reduce the burden on U.S. forces, and in many cases directly advance U.S. security interests. In principle, I support additional contributions of U.S. military personnel to key staff officer positions that provide an opportunity to add significant value to mission effectiveness, and where the mission is a strategic priority for the Department and the United States.

- 166. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD request for forces system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral peacekeeping missions, like the U.N.?**

We should explore more effective ways to contribute U.S. personnel in support of the United Nations and overcome barriers to U.S. military personnel serving in U.N. headquarters. If confirmed, I would support seeking ways where the Department could identify desired positions and turnover dates, and work to fill those positions.

Mass Atrocities Prevention

President Obama identified the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core U.S. national security interest, as well as a core moral interest, in August 2011 under Presidential Study Directive 10.

- 167. What is DOD’s role in addressing atrocity threats, and what tools does DOD have for preventing or responding to atrocities?**

DoD is a member of the Atrocities Prevention Board, which has strengthened our efforts and given us more tools with which to work. DoD plays an important role in early warning and providing support to enable international partners to prevent mass atrocities. If confirmed, I

would continue to ensure that the Department contributes to U.S. efforts to prevent mass atrocities.

Authority for Use of Military Force/Law of Armed Conflict

On September 18, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40), which provides that “the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” This AUMF remains in effect and provides the legal authority for certain U.S. military actions.

168. What is your understanding of the role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in interpreting the AUMF and in the application of the AUMF to military activities?

The AUMF is the domestic legal basis for use of force against al Qai'da and associated forces. If confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, my role would be to advise the Secretary of Defense on the policy dimensions of proposed operations, working closely with interagency colleagues, to ensure our operations and activities are aligned to our policy and strategy objectives.

169. In your view, does the Department of Defense have the legal authorities it needs to conduct military operations against entities responsible for 9/11 and against those who plan further attacks against the United States?

Yes, I believe the 2001 AUMF is appropriate for such military operations.

170. In your view, do existing authorities provide the U.S. military the flexibility it needs to respond to new and emerging terrorism threats?

Yes. The President's authority as Commander in Chief provides sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging terrorism threats posed by organizations not covered by the 2001 AUMF. If confirmed, I would provide my best advice to the Secretary and the Congress to ensure we're doing everything we can to protect our nation from terrorist attacks.

171. Without the AUMF, would the U.S. military have the authority to use force, including deadly force against members of al Qaeda and associated forces? If so, under what circumstances?

Yes. The President's authority as Commander in Chief empowers him to order military operations necessary to protect an important national interest, subject to Constitutional and statutory limitations on the scope and duration of military operations the President may order without the express authorization of Congress.

172. What is the impact of the President's Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism on the application of the AUMF with respect to counterterrorism operations?

The President's Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism provides rigorous processes for reviewing and approving counterterrorism direct action operations. The President's Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism is not limited to operations conducted solely under authority of the 2001 AUMF. If confirmed, I intend to ensure we remain committed to conducting counterterrorism operations lawfully, and in accordance with this policy.

173. In your view, would it be appropriate for the United States to use military force against terrorist groups that have not engaged in hostilities directly against the United States, but merely shown an intent to do so? If so, under what circumstances?

The decisions to use military force are made based on careful, fact-intensive assessments to identify the individuals and groups that pose a threat to the United States. The most important policy consideration is the protection of U.S. lives.

Unmanned Systems

Over the last four years, the Administration has worked to establish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists – insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in Presidential Policy Guidance the President signed on May 22, 2013. As a part of that effort, the President has indicated a preference that the U.S. military should carry out the use of force in active warzones, and beyond.

174. What are your views on whether the Department of Defense should assume greater responsibility for lethal strikes by remotely-piloted aircraft (drones)?

I believe that DoD is the part of government where expertise in the use of force abroad should reside. Our best efforts come when we are working in concert with our interagency partners to collect intelligence, collaborate with the host nation, and synchronize our actions. If confirmed, I would remain committed to ensuring the Department of Defense is capable and ready to fulfill its under the President's Policy Guidance.

175. What benefits or risks to national security would be implicated if the Department were to take the lead role in operating unmanned systems?

The application of force abroad in a disciplined and accountable manner is a core strength of the Department of Defense. I understand that countering terrorist threats must be a collaborative effort that involves experts from across our government, and if confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I would join my counterparts to ensure we are executing counterterrorism operations in a manner that takes advantage of current capabilities and provides a solid foundation to protect our nation from terrorist attack.

Contingency Planning

One of the purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to increase military and civilian attention on the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is specifically directed to assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and in reviewing such plans.

176. What is your view of the civilian role, as compared to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

The role of the civilian leadership is not only statutorily mandated, but is critical to translating broad national security policies and principles into a defense strategy and strategic priorities that ultimately drive military planning and resource allocation. Civilian and military perspectives are both important to successful defense planning. The Civilian leadership plays the principal role in providing policy guidance to shape military planning and then has the responsibility to review that planning to ensure it fits within the policy guidelines outlined. The role of military leaders and planners is to provide their best military advice on how to achieve objectives within the parameters outlined by the President and Secretary of Defense.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is responsible for developing the guidance issued by the Secretary for the preparation of contingency plans and for reviewing DoD plans to ensure that they support strategic objectives. The USD(P) is also uniquely responsible for facilitating interagency coordination on contingency planning efforts, as necessary.

177. In your opinion, does the civilian leadership currently have an appropriate level of oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning?

Yes, I believe that the current level of civilian oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning is appropriate. If confirmed, I would sustain the strong and healthy dialogue that is already ongoing between civilian and military leaders.

178. What steps do you believe are necessary to ensure effective civilian control and oversight of strategy formulation and contingency planning?

Based on my experience, I believe that current oversight processes work well. Active and forthright dialogue between the Secretary, the senior civilian leadership, and the senior military leadership is essential for effective oversight of strategy and planning. Although all parties may not agree on a specific issue, in my experience we currently have a very healthy dialogue on strategy and planning issues.

If confirmed, I would be committed to reflecting civilian and military perspectives in my recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to provide him the best possible advice in fulfilling his statutory responsibilities and meeting the intent of Goldwater-Nichols.

Strategic Reviews

179. What is your understanding and evaluation of the DOD's processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decision making, and reporting for each of the

following strategic reviews?

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (section 118 of title 10, United States Code);

The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10, United States Code);

Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10, United States Code);

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (section 118b of title 10, United States Code).

These strategic reviews are important opportunities for substantive dialogue with Congress, and to provide guidance to the entire defense enterprise. Senior DoD leaders use these reviews to guide the Department in meeting the defense objectives described in the broader National Security Strategy. They are valuable processes for managing and guiding the defense enterprise. These documents set priorities across the Military Departments and Services, Combatant Commands, and Components and are especially useful as the Department seeks to achieve its objectives more effectively and efficiently in light of the changing security and fiscal environment. The end products are also used to inform a variety of other audiences, including the U.S. public and the international community.

I have been involved in several of these reviews throughout my career and have seen a wide variety of review processes. Each review is different based on strategic circumstances, timing, and preferences of the senior defense leadership at the time. The Secretary of Defense determines how best to oversee these review processes. Candid deliberations, significant collaboration, and analytic rigor are important hallmarks of each of these reviews.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (10 U.S.C. Section 118) requires the Department to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. The QDR is designed to articulate a defense strategy in support of the President's National Security Strategy. Based on my experience, effective QDRs involve a wide range of stakeholders and ensure the defense strategy sets priorities for U.S. military force structure, plans, and programs. The Department has strengthened its dialogue on QDRs with both interagency and international partners in recent years, which has been beneficial.

As directed in 10 U.S.C Section 153, the National Military Strategy is prepared by the Chairman as a means to convey the military's views on strategic priorities and associated risks.

The Department employs a continuous review process to determine the best mix of continental U.S.- and overseas-based forces, and reports annually to Congress on the status of these

assessments in the Global Defense Posture Review. This report, authored primarily by the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides a comprehensive review of DoD's overseas posture, new initiatives, defense agreements, and negotiations; the report also plays an important role in supporting future resource decisions.

10 U.S.C. Section 118b requires the Department to complete a comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions of the Armed Forces and the core competencies and capabilities of the Department to perform and support such roles and missions. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) describes how the Department will align organizational responsibilities and military capabilities to carry out its missions. The QDR should have a strong influence on the Department's assessment of its military roles and missions.

180. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to change title 10, United States Code, that would update, improve, or make these reviews more useful to the Department and to Congress?

These reviews serve a useful function for the Department. They provide deliberate processes for DoD to reexamine and, if necessary, adjust the defense strategy and the capabilities, capacity, and posture of the armed forces. The security environment and resources available for the Defense Department are not static, and periodic reviews are useful ways to ensure the Department refreshes, as required, the strategic approach it takes to defend the Nation. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Members of Congress to ensure these reviews are relevant, timely, and valuable to both defense leaders and the U.S. Congress.

181. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve DOD's processes for strategic assessment, analysis, policy formulation, and decision making relative to each review above?

First, I note that from my experience, successful strategic reviews feature the following:

- Strong participation from the senior defense leadership, including the Secretary, throughout the process.
- Transparent and inclusive processes and decision fora. Civilian and military leadership from each DoD Component is essential, including: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments and Services, and the Combatant Commands.
- A structured process that is co-led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, which allows the appropriate subject matter expertise to be brought into the discussion. Such a structure allows analysis to be vetted with the key experts and stakeholders before being presented to the Department's senior leaders.

Strategic reviews also require robust analytical efforts to assess the sufficiency and proficiency of current, programmed, and projected forces. This is important to ensure that the appropriate

information, data, and analysis are available for each QDR so that key questions can be formulated and informed decisions made. If confirmed, I would seek to apply insights gained from previous reviews to ensure future reviews are efficient and effective.

The law requires the QDR to identify the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, and any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk. The law also requires the QDR to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with and are fully independent of the budget submitted to Congress by the President.

182. What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's QDR analysis and decision making processes to address these two requirements?

In my view, the Department's QDR process is strategy-driven and resource-informed. This is appropriate and ensures that the QDR usefully sets priorities for the Department. A strategy-driven approach allows the Department to take a comprehensive view of the strategic environment and identify the full range of missions that the Department would need to undertake to meet potential challenges to U.S. national interests. A resource-informed process motivates the Department to pursue innovation and reach difficult decisions in determining the best mix of investments in capabilities, capacity, and readiness to execute the strategy.

If, in the process of shaping the overall defense program, the Department's leaders were to determine that available resources were not sufficient to execute a defense strategy necessary to achieve the larger national security objectives set forth by the President, it would be incumbent upon them to say so.

183. In your view, is there analytical and/or practical value in a defense strategy that is unconstrained by or independent of the current budget request or fiscal environment?

A defense strategy completely unconstrained by fiscal realities would not be very useful, in my view. An effective defense strategy should examine the future security environment to assess and prepare the Department for the range of missions needed to meet potential challenges to U.S. national interests. Although the QDR is strategy-driven, the defense strategy should also be resource-informed, particularly in this fiscal environment, because a defense strategy is effective only if it is executable. Because it is not possible to eliminate all risk from the nation's security, devising a resource-unconstrained strategy and accompanying force structure is not practical, given that it is impossible to eliminate risk completely in such a complex strategic environment.

A resource-informed process ensures that the Department sets priorities among its investments and activities – a central function of an effective strategy – and considers risks explicitly.

184. In your view, what would be the indications that the line between a budget-informed strategy and a budget-driven strategy has been crossed?

A budget-driven strategy defines ends, ways, and means based on available resources. A budget-driven strategy would contain little to no risk because, by definition, the strategy is designed to do only what can be done with available resources, regardless of what might be needed in terms of advancing national interests. A budget-informed strategy first considers national interests and objectives, then assesses how to achieve those objectives given the strategic environment, and then develops specific ways and means to try to meet desired ends, informed by the likely available resource levels. A budget-informed strategy would explicitly consider risks to the strategy that may result from the reality that resource levels are finite. A strategy that failed to describe any inherent risks would be an indication, in my view, that the line between a budget-informed and a budget-driven strategy has been crossed.

Global Force Posture

As the Defense Department continues its assessment of projected budget cuts on its end strength, force structure, and other programs, it must also consider the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the permanent stationing of military forces in countries around the world. Based on a series of reports by the Government Accountability Office, evidence indicates that the Department is challenged in its ability to comprehensively and reliably estimate the cost of our global defense posture.

185. What is your understanding and assessment of the cost and benefits of the U.S. global defense posture and the stationing of U.S. military forces overseas?

The financial cost of overseas stationing must be balanced against U.S. national interests and national security imperatives. DoD's global defense posture enables military operations overseas and is a visible expression of U.S. national security interests and priorities abroad. In many cases, our posture is essential to interoperability with partners and encourages other nations to work alongside with us to address common interests. As with any defense investment, global defense posture decisions should be strategy-driven and carefully examine risk and trade-offs.

186. In light of the force structure reductions associated with the Department's planned end strength cuts, and potentially even deeper future end strength cuts, if confirmed, how would you propose to allocate those reductions between forces based within the United States and forces stationed outside the United States?

If confirmed, I would allocate available forces consistent with our defense strategy, selectively tailoring U.S. defense presence overseas to advance and protect our interests most effectively. Any force allocation, whether permanent or rotationally deployed, would need to contribute measurably to a strategic priority, such as protecting the homeland, sustaining defense contributions to the Asia-Pacific rebalance, maintaining U.S. assurances of security in the Middle East, sustaining NATO Article V commitments, and retaining the ability to engage actively in building partnerships globally.

187. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD methodology and assumptions used to evaluate the relative cost of overseas posture compared to stationing forces in the United States?

Although forward stationing can, in many cases, meet the required presence for a specific mission with less total force structure – a consideration in an austere budgetary environment – there are also significant costs associated with forward stationing that merit careful review. When considering the relative costs and benefits of overseas stationing, the Department employs a rigorous process to evaluate the “business case” of each forward stationing decision, taking into consideration our national strategy, U.S. costs, host nation contributions, and political-military and operational considerations.

188. If confirmed, what actions would you take or changes would you recommend, if any, to DOD’s methodology and assumptions in determining the cost of overseas force posture compared to forces stationed in the United States?

At this time, in my view, the Department’s methodology and assumptions for determining overseas force posture are appropriate and useful, given the complexity of the issues, and assist in our posture decision-making processes.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”), targeted authorities in Yemen and East Africa, and the Global Security Contingency Fund.

189. In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

The Department’s principal capacity-building objective should be to develop partner nation forces and their supporting defense and security institutions so that they can provide for their own internal security, and, when necessary, take effective action against those that pose an external threat.

190. What improvements, if any, would you recommend, if confirmed, to the strategic direction, oversight, and management of the Department’s programs for building partner capacity to ensure that these programs are executed consistent with our national security goals and objectives?

If confirmed, I would ensure that DoD capacity-building programs fulfill defined strategic requirements, close important capability gaps, and adhere to the Department’s strategic guidance. As part of the Policy reorganization, we are creating a new DASD for Security Cooperation, which will help us ensure even better alignment between the BPC programs and our larger defense strategy.

191. In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis the State Department and other civilian departments and agencies in efforts to build the capacity of foreign security forces?

Building the capacity of foreign security forces can best be achieved when the expertise and

resources of the entire U.S. Government are brought together in a synchronized and coordinated manner. If confirmed, I would seek strong relationships with DoD's interagency partners, in particular the State Department, to support and inform our combined efforts.

Combating Terrorism

192. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and its associated forces to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more broadly?

Al Qaeda's intent and capability to attack the United States varies by affiliate, but striking the homeland is a common theme in al Qaeda's propaganda and planning. We take these threats seriously and, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the Department remains capable and ready to take appropriate action to counter them.

193. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated groups in each of the Geographic Combatant Commands? And, of these threats, what do you consider the highest counterterrorism priorities?

Al Qaeda's core has been relatively isolated by pressure from the United States. However, core al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region are a persistent and serious threat and remain a priority. New groups of geographically dispersed, diverse, and loosely affiliated extremists have also emerged, which pose localized threats to U.S. personnel overseas.

Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has the intent and the capability to conduct attacks against the United States, and is among our highest counterterrorism priorities. The Department collaborates extensively with Yemeni forces to capture or kill key AQAP leadership and operatives, and our programs to train, advise, and equip Yemeni forces are critical to long-term efforts against AQAP.

In the Levant, thousands of foreign fighters are traveling to support the Syrian insurgency against the Assad regime. Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria are becoming a growing regional threat and a potential threat to the U.S. homeland. If confirmed, I would support improving coordination and information sharing on foreign extremist flows from Syria, and would continue working with Jordan and Israel to support their stability.

In Africa, Somalia-based al-Shabaab is a threat to U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa, and potentially to the homeland through its links to al-Qaeda and Somali diaspora communities. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated the capability to stage complex, high-profile attacks against Western targets outside Somalia and to harm U.S. citizens abroad.

Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its regionally based associates threaten U.S. persons and interests in North and West Africa. These threats have flourished from instability in Libya and Mali, leading to hostage situations and high-profile attacks in Mali and Niger. However, my understanding is that there is no current, credible evidence that AQIM is a

direct threat to the U.S. homeland.

194. What is your understanding of the Department's role in the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism?

The U.S. Government is engaged in a multi-departmental, multi-national effort guided by the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The Department of Defense supports this strategy principally by building the capacity of partner security forces, collecting intelligence, conducting information operations, and, when appropriate, conducting operations to capture or kill terrorists who pose a continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons.

195. Are you aware of any nexus between non-state actors and criminal networks?

It is my understanding that there is a strong nexus between illicit non-state actors and criminal networks worldwide. I am aware of a few examples that pose threats to our national security interests and to those of our allies and partners. The Taliban continues to finance their insurgency activities through regional trade in illicit drugs. Additionally, the transnational drug cartels in Mexico rely on global criminal networks to sell their product and expand into new markets, and pirates off the coast of Somalia depend on land-based illicit networks to finance their operations.

196. Given your current knowledge of DOD's programs, do you believe resources are aligned in a manner consistent with these counterterrorism priorities?

Yes. I believe the Department's counterterrorism resources are currently aligned consistent with the priorities outlined in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. If confirmed, I would continue working with the Secretary, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, and interagency partners to ensure that alignment of the Department's resources evolves with the nature – and geography – of the threat.

Section 1208 Operations

Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

197. What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this authority?

Section 1208 remains critical to our counterterrorism efforts across a wide range of operational environments. If confirmed, I would make it a priority to gain a deeper understanding of the costs, benefits, and risks associated with activities conducted under Section 1208 authority.

The FY 2014 appropriations bill makes a number of changes to the prohibitions and vetting process required for training and equipping foreign security forces that have

committed gross violations of human rights.

198. What is your understanding of the impact of these changes on the 1208 program?

I fully support ensuring that foreign security forces who have committed gross violations of human rights are prohibited from receiving U.S. training or equipment. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Congress is fully informed of any required changes to our programs as a result of this provision in the DoD Appropriations Act, 2014.

Department of Defense Counternarcotics Activities

On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program expends more than \$1.0 billion to support CN operations, build the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.

199. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?

It is my understanding that the Department's role in U.S. counterdrug efforts is to employ knowledge, skills, and capabilities to confront a range of national security threats associated with drug trafficking and related forms of transnational crime. As the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug traffic bound for the United States, DoD has provided critical counterdrug support to State, local, Federal, and foreign law enforcement partners to combat the flow of illicit drugs into our country. DoD counterdrug efforts support the National Security Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.

200. What is your understanding of the Department's CN authorities?

In my experience, the Department's counternarcotics authorities are important tools to confront the threat of narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and transnational organized crime that increasingly pose a threat to our national security interests. Under its CN authorities, the Department serves as the lead U.S. Government agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug traffic bound for the United States, supporting State, local, tribal, Federal, and international law enforcement partners' activities to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. The CN authorities also provide for the National Guard's counterdrug activities in 50 States and three Territories and support the theater campaign plans of all six Geographic Combatant Commands.

201. Should the Department continue to play a role in countering illegal narcotics trafficking?

Yes. The global flow of illicit narcotics and other contraband commodities provides resources that finance transnational terrorism and insurgencies and that undermine legitimate government institutions, foster corruption, and distort legitimate economic activity. The Department's CN programs focus on building the capacity of our foreign partners to confront these issues, serving to prevent and deter conflicts that could require a much more costly U.S. military intervention in

the future.

Counter Threat Finance

A number of officials in DOD and the intelligence community (IC) have called for investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

202. What are your views on the role of DOD in counter-threat finance activities?

I believe it is essential to engage all U.S. government tools to track and halt the illicit flow of money and to fight our adversaries' ability to access and use global financial networks. While DoD is not the lead U.S. agency for Counter Threat Finance (CTF), the Department works with and supports other departments, agencies, and partner nations through a unique set of capabilities, including long-term planning, network analysis, and intelligence analysis.

203. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?

I believe DoD should continue to support U.S. Government departments, agencies, and partner nations with CTF assistance, within existing DoD resources. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department remains fully engaged in the interagency process on counter threat finance and is postured to provide additional support if necessary.

National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime

Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people. The Department of Defense is by no means the U.S. Government's law enforcement agency, but it does bring unique enabling capabilities to our nation's Federal law enforcement agencies.

204. What role, if any, should the Department play in combatting transnational criminal organizations?

The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) declares TOC a threat to national security. Although DoD does not serve as the lead U.S. Government agency for TOC, it has provided and can provide unique, important support to U.S. efforts. These DoD-specific capabilities primarily include military intelligence support and counter-threat finance support to U.S. law enforcement.

Nuclear Weapons Council

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

205. In your view, what are the significant issues that the Nuclear Weapons Council should take up in the coming years?

The significant issues facing the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) in the coming years involve the need to sustain and modernize our weapons and our infrastructure in a time of limited budgets. Key decisions will have to be made on the scope and sequencing of both weapon and facility modernization. Additionally, in the wake of recent incidents involving personnel in our nuclear forces, I believe the NWC should examine any relevant implications of the Secretary's ongoing internal and external reviews of the nuclear enterprise.

206. If confirmed would you commit to active personal participation in Nuclear Weapons Council matters?

Yes. If confirmed, I would commit to active personal participation in Nuclear Weapons Council matters. I have participated in Council meetings previously and would welcome the opportunity to do so again.

Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization

Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84) required a report (the "1251 report") on plans for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and strategic delivery systems. Prior to the Budget Control Act of 2011, the 1251 report that accompanied the New START Treaty set forth a robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles.

207. Do you support the modernization plan set forth in the 1251 report?

I do support the modernization plan set forth in the report by the Administration.

208. Do you agree that modernizing the nuclear triad and replacing critical infrastructure, such as the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) at Los Alamos and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12, should be national security priorities that should be addressed in a timely manner?

I agree that modernizing both the nuclear Triad and the critical infrastructure should be priorities that are addressed in a timely manner. DoD has reviewed how best to replace critical nuclear infrastructure like the UPF, and has identified a more cost-effective way forward. If confirmed, I would support efforts to modernize both the weapons and facilities in a cost effective manner.

DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program

209. Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, e.g., DOD, the State Department and the Department of Energy?

My understanding is that the CTR Program and other threat reduction programs executed by Federal agencies are effectively coordinated by the National Security Council staff. If

confirmed, I would work to ensure that the CTR Program's activities continue to be well-coordinated within the Department and with interagency and international partners.

The CTR program has been expanded to geographic areas outside the former Soviet Union, for example including Syrian chemical weapons destruction.

210. What in your view are the key proliferation concerns that CTR should address outside the former Soviet Union? Please explain.

In my view, the key proliferation concerns the CTR Program should address outside the FSU are preventing the proliferation of WMD technology, materials, and expertise, as well as delivery systems. The President has highlighted nuclear and biological materials proliferation as key threats, and if confirmed, I would ensure that the CTR Program strongly supports efforts to reduce these threats.

211. Which countries outside the former Soviet Union should be the focus of this expansion of the CTR program?

The threat of WMD proliferation is a global concern. I understand that the CTR Program uses a threat-based approach to identify potential partners to allow for flexibility in responding to rapidly evolving situations. If confirmed, I would continue to use a threat-based approach as a principal driver of future CTR activities.

CTR has completed its scheduled work with Russia.

212. What in your view is the next step, if any, in the U.S.-Russia CTR program?

I understand that although the CTR Program has concluded most of its work with Russia, there are still important nuclear security activities underway with Russia as part of the CTR Program, which now will occur under a new bilateral framework agreement (Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR)) and a related bilateral Protocol. I also understand that Russia is interested in cooperating with the United States and other nations to address the threat posed by WMD terrorism. If confirmed, I would work with members of Congress to ensure current efforts are completed and would explore additional cooperative opportunities with Russia to reduce the threat posed by WMD.

Illicit Arms Trafficking

213. What is your understanding of the problem of illicit arms trafficking and the role of the United States to deal with the problem?

Illicit arms trafficking, unfortunately, continues to be a pervasive, worldwide problem. Because it has a robust arms export control system, the United States can help partner countries, through dialogue, to develop best practices and methods of controlling the transfer of arms.

214. In your view, to what extent, if at all, does the lack of national controls and

enforcement on arms flows contribute to the illicit trafficking problem, and could efforts to respond to illicit trafficking be improved if other countries adopted and enforced national regulations on arms import, export, and transit similar to those of the United States?

Where illicit arms trafficking is widespread, partner countries should indeed seek to improve their export, import, and transit controls for the transfer of arms. It is important for other countries to advance these controls, to a standard closer to that of the United States, so the international community can make significant progress in combatting this problem.

215. Do you think the arms trade treaty would enhance U.S. national security interests?

Yes. My understanding is that the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) would help establish higher standards for the international transfer of arms. This would help in preventing them from reaching the illicit market. The treaty would also establish international norms so that countries can better regulate, on a national basis, the transfer of arms and thus prevent them from getting into the hands of terrorists or other criminals. In this regard, the ATT would enhance U.S. national security interests.

Arms Control

216. What role do you see for arms control as a means of improving U.S. national security?

Arms control can contribute to U.S. national security by providing predictability, stabilizing the strategic or military balance between the United States and other nations at lower levels of weapons, constraining arms competition, and reducing the number of weapons other States possess. Such agreements, and their attendant verification provisions, make the United States safer, more secure, and provide mutual transparency and predictability regarding military forces that builds confidence and assists in force modernization planning.

217. What are your views on the possible next steps to address nuclear weapons issues between the United States and Russia?

The New START Treaty strengthens strategic stability with Russia at reduced nuclear force levels and limits the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads. After a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear forces, the President concluded that we can ensure the security of the United States and our Allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible nuclear deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third reduction in deployed nuclear weapons below the limits established in the New START Treaty. The Administration is seeking to pursue such reductions through negotiations with the Russian Federation. To date, Russia has shown little interest in pursuing such negotiations, though discussions can and should continue.

218. What conditions, if any, do you believe need to be met to further reduce strategic and non-strategic nuclear stockpiles through arms control?

The United States has publicly and privately conveyed to Russia its desire to seek additional negotiated reductions. However, Russia has so far shown no interest in negotiating further reductions. The Administration will continue to engage with Russia in appropriate bilateral and multi-lateral venues to gauge interest in pursuing opportunities for arms control relating to both strategic and non-strategic nuclear stockpiles.

219. What might be the risks and benefits of pursuing reductions below New START force levels?

Further nuclear reductions would reduce the number of weapons that can be targeted against the United States, promote our nuclear non-proliferation objectives, and support strategic stability and predictability at lower numbers of nuclear weapons. Such a posture, if supported by modernization programs to maintain the effectiveness and credibility of our nuclear forces and by close consultation and strategic cooperation with Allies and partner nations in Europe and Northeast Asia, poses few if any risks as the United States will have a sufficient stockpile to deter and/or respond to 21st century threats.

Ballistic Missile Defense

220. Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you implement them?

Yes, I support the conclusions of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). If confirmed, I would continue ongoing U.S. implementation efforts.

221. Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we deploy operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat?

Yes, it is important that we invest in effective, affordable missile defense systems that counter credible threats.

222. Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and Evaluation, in order to assess operational capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to deploying such systems?

Yes, I agree. Realistic testing is an essential element on the path to deployment.

The two most recent attempted intercept flight tests of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets, one in December 2010, using a Capability Enhancement-2 (CE-2) kill vehicle, and one in July 2013, using the older CE-1 kill vehicle. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has indicated that MDA's highest priority is correcting the problems that caused these flight test failures, and that such corrections need to be demonstrated through successful intercept flight testing.

223. Do you agree that it is essential to demonstrate through successful and

operationally realistic intercept flight testing that the problems that caused these flight test failures have been corrected, and that the GMD system will work as intended, with both the CE-1 and CE-2 kill vehicles?

Yes, I fully support rigorous and realistic testing as an essential element to improving the reliability of the GMD system.

On March 15, 2013, Secretary Hagel announced plans to improve our Homeland ballistic missile defense capability to stay ahead of ballistic missile threats from North Korea and Iran, including the deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) at Fort Greely, Alaska, by 2017. Secretary Hagel stated that, prior to deploying these 14 additional GBIs, there would need to be confidence that the system would work as intended, through successful testing of the GMD system with the CE-2 kill vehicle.

224. Do you agree with Secretary Hagel’s “fly before you buy” approach that the GMD system needs to demonstrate successful operationally realistic intercept flight test results before we deploy any additional GBIs?

Yes, I agree. “Fly before you buy” is a fiscally responsible approach that will ensure the best use of defense funds.

In a recent report, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation said that the GMD flight test failures had raised questions about the robustness of the EKV design and recommended that the Department consider re-designing the EKV to be more robust. The Department is already planning a re-designed EKV, and Congress supported the funding requested for fiscal year 2014 to develop Common Kill Vehicle Technology.

225. Do you agree there is a need to improve the GMD system, including through development and testing of a re-designed EKV and improvements to sensor and discrimination capabilities, to increase the reliability and performance of the system against evolving homeland missile threats from North Korea and Iran?

Yes, I agree. GMD improvements will increase the reliability and performance of the system against evolving missile threats to the homeland from North Korea and Iran.

The Department of Defense has successfully completed deployment of Phase 1 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense and is proceeding toward planned deployment of Phases 2 and 3 in 2015 and 2018, respectively, to protect all of NATO European territory against Iranian missiles.

226. Do you support the EPAA and other similar United States regional missile defense efforts and, if confirmed, will you work to implement them?

Yes. Our regional missile defenses provide an essential capability for defending U.S. forces abroad, and our Allies and partners. If confirmed I would continue to support the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as well as other regional missile defense efforts.

Space Management and Organization

227. What role, if any, do you believe the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should play in the establishment of a national security space policy?

The role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is to oversee implementation of existing national security space policy in coordination with other departments and agencies and with Congress. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy also oversees development of new policy when circumstances warrant. If I am confirmed, I look forward to working with my Departmental and interagency colleagues, and the Members of this Committee, on implementing our existing national security space policies and on continually assessing developments in the international security environment that could affect our national security interests in space.

228. Do you support the policy of having an operationally responsive space (ORS) capability as a means to lower the cost and time for the development of national security space payloads?

I support the objectives of ORS to meet warfighter requirements at a lower cost and in a more timely way. DoD remains committed to achieving those goals. To that end, DoD is working to ensure that resilience, survivability, flexibility, and responsiveness are considered in all future space programs.

The launch of the ORS-1 satellite demonstrated that giving combatant commanders such as CENTCOM the ability to control a small operationally responsive satellite can be successful.

229. Would you support extending this capability to other COCOMS through the development of additional small tactically responsive satellites?

DoD is committed to satisfying validated and prioritized Combatant Commander requirements to the extent that resources allow. ORS-1 was an appropriate solution to the urgent need to support U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) with increased intelligence during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, given the options available. As we move forward, we need to exhibit flexibility and look to both government solutions and increasingly capable and available commercial options for meeting urgent warfighter requirements.

Space systems, like other military systems, rely on the availability of sufficient frequency spectrum. However, frequency spectrum is becoming scarce, and its sale has been used as a source of revenue for the government.

230. If confirmed, how will you work with the Services, the Joint Staff and other elements of the Department of Defense to ensure that the Department's frequency spectrum requirements are accounted for in interagency discussions about potential spectrum auctions?

The Department of Defense's Chief Information Officer (CIO) has the lead responsibility for DoD interests regarding spectrum requirements, including representing DoD in interagency

discussions about spectrum auctions. If confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, I would ensure continued close cooperation between OSD Policy and the CIO organization, as well as with the Services and Joint Staff, to address the interests of all DoD and non-DoD spectrum users.

Special Operations Forces

The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces and enablers that directly support their operations.

231. Do you believe QDR-directed growth in the size of special operations forces can and should be maintained in light of current fiscal challenges?

Since 2001, the United States has doubled the size of U.S. Special Operations Command and tripled its budget. As forces withdraw from Afghanistan, we have opportunities to redistribute special operations forces (SOF) to engage with partner nations, build capabilities, and remain vigilant for future threats. If confirmed, I would work closely with my interagency counterparts to develop options for the best use of these capabilities and, with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM, to examine this issue further.

Special operations forces heavily rely on enabling capabilities provided by the general purpose forces to be successful in their missions.

232. In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient enabling capabilities can be maintained within the general purpose forces and that such capabilities will remain available to special operations forces when needed?

I believe that, as the Department reshapes overall force structure, it will ensure that the excellent intelligence, medical, communications, and other support provided by the Services to both SOF and the general purpose forces continue. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Service Chiefs, the ASD(SO/LIC), and the Commander, USSOCOM to ensure the Department achieves the appropriate balance.

233. Do you believe special operations forces should develop additional organic enabling capabilities in addition or in place of those currently provided by the general purpose forces?

I believe SOF's enabling requirements can likely be met by both internally reexamining the SOF force structure for "SOF-particular" requirements, and by establishing common Service capabilities to fill the remaining SOF enabler requirements. This arrangement allows for more focused application of SOF-specific funds and avoids duplication of capabilities with those of the Services.

The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has sought more control over the deployment and utilization of special operations forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense modified policy guidance for the combatant commands earlier this year that gave USSOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing,

organizing, and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the Geographic Combatant Commanders and special operations forces assigned to them. It has been reported that the Commander of USSOCOM is also seeking new authorities that would allow him to more rapidly move special operations forces between Geographic Combatant Commands.

- 234. Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.**

The Secretary of Defense continues to rely on the Geographic Combatant Commanders to oversee all military activities in their respective areas of responsibility, including deployments of SOF personnel resourced by USSOCOM. If confirmed, I would work closely with interagency colleagues to ensure deployments of SOF are fully coordinated and synchronized with the Geographic Combatant Commanders, interagency partners, and the relevant Chiefs of Mission.

- 235. Do you believe USSOCOM is appropriately resourced to adequately support the Theater Special Operations Commands and special operations forces assigned to them?**

Yes, I believe we have the right resources in place today. If confirmed, I would work with the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM to understand more fully future requirements to support the Theater Special Operations Commands and special operations forces assigned to them.

Private Security Contractors

- 236. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?**

I am aware that over the years and based on lessons learned, Department of Defense has published formal policy and procedures for the use of private security contractors (PSCs) as both a department instruction and as part of the Code of Federal Regulations (32 CFR 159). The Department has also contributed to the development and publication of U.S. national standards from the American National Standards Institute for PSCs. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to continue to ensure that private security contractors act in a responsible manner.

Detainee Treatment Policy

- 237. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common**

Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes. The humane treatment of detainees is fundamental to the Department's detention operations in armed conflict. If confirmed, I would ensure that all our policies continue to be consistent with all applicable law, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

238. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes. It is vital to the war effort for the Department to continue gaining intelligence from captured enemy forces, in a manner consistent with our values. The Department must hold its personnel to the highest treatment standards for detention in armed conflict.

239. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

Yes. If confirmed, I would ensure that all of the Department's policies and plans continue to be implemented consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations.

240. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Yes. I believe that the manner in which the Department treats detainees in the current conflict reflects our character and sets the standards by which we should expect our own personnel to be treated in future conflicts.

Training and Equipping Foreign Security Forces

The FY 2014 appropriations bill makes a number of changes to the prohibitions and vetting process required for training and equipping foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights.

241. What is your assessment of these changes and their possible effect on the Department's ability to provide needed training, especially in countries such as Mexico, Afghanistan and Myanmar?

The Secretary of Defense and I strongly support both the letter and spirit of the Leahy law. As I understand it, OSD Policy, the Office of the General Counsel, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands are working closely with the State Department to assess the impact of the changes to

the Leahy law in the FY 2014 DoD Appropriations Act.

242. What concerns, if any, do you have regarding the changes to the law?

Overall, I fully support the Leahy law and human rights vetting. As with any changes in law, if confirmed, I would ensure that we work to develop clear implementation guidance for our commanders. I do not have any specific concerns at this point.

243. Would it be beneficial to have an exception to the prohibitions on training and providing assistance to allow the Department to provide limited training on human rights, rule of law, the English language, and the law of armed conflict?

It is my understanding that, at this point, the Department is not recommending any changes to the Leahy law.

Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Community

In the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed that the POW/MIA accounting community be resourced sufficiently to realize significant increases in identifications, with the goal of 200 per year by 2015. Despite increasing resources, the Department continues to identify less than half that number annually. Last year, the GAO found that the Department’s response to that accounting-for goal has revealed and brought to the fore: “longstanding disputes [within the community] that have not been addressed by top-level leaders, and have been exacerbated by the accounting community’s fragmented organizational structure. . . . Leadership from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Pacific Command have been unable to resolve disputes between community members in areas such as roles and responsibilities and developing a community-wide plan to meet the statutory accounting-for goal. Further, the accounting community is fragmented in that the community members belong to diverse parent organizations under several different chains of command. With accounting community organizations reporting under different lines of authority, no single entity has overarching responsibility for community-wide personnel and other resources.”

244. What is your reaction to this finding?

I support the GAO’s findings, and understand that the Department began implementing these recommendations in 2013. If confirmed, I would continue implementation of GAO’s remaining recommendations.

245. What is your view of the organization, management, and budget structure of the POW/MIA community?

I support the recent findings of the GAO’s review of the accounting community. The accounting community suffers from a fragmented organizational structure. The community is currently the subject of reviews by CAPE and the DoD IG, and should I be confirmed, I would be committed to making the community more efficient and effective.

246. If confirmed, what changes would you propose to address these organizational, management, and budgetary issues that appear to be hampering the recovery mission of the POW/MIA community?

The accounting community suffers from a fragmented organizational structure, and command and control functions should be streamlined as much as possible. If confirmed, I would be committed to reforms to make it more efficient and effective, including examining all options and recommendations for streamlining the community.

The committee has historically maintained that recovery operations in North Korea are a humanitarian effort, and should not be tied to the larger political and strategic issues surrounding North Korea. Since its inception in 1996 until its suspension in 2005, this program was seen by both parties as humanitarian in nature. The program is very important to the families of these missing service members.

247. What is the status of resumption of recovery operations in North Korea?

In October 2011, the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK) agreed to resume joint remains recovery operations in the DPRK. As I understand it, in March 2012, the United States suspended operations because the DPRK took actions that violated the arrangement to recover remains. I am committed to achieving the fullest possible accounting for all our missing, including the more than 7,900 U.S. servicemen from the Korean War of which we estimate that 5,300 are missing in the DPRK.

248. Does the Department intend to wait until political and strategic issues are resolved before approaching North Korea?

Engagement with the DPRK on remains recovery issues is a national-level issue. As I understand it, the United States will engage with the DPRK when conditions permit.

Minerva Initiative

The Minerva Initiative is a DoD-sponsored, university-based social science research initiative established in 2008 focusing on areas of strategic importance to U.S. national security policy. The goal of the Minerva Initiative is to improve DoD's basic understanding of the social, cultural, behavioral, and political forces that shape regions of the world of strategic importance to the United States for better awareness for Phase 0 operations. OSD Policy and the ASD (Research & Engineering) co-lead this initiative. Since its inception, examples of research funded by the Minerva Initiative include insights into China's technology and innovation sector and counter narratives to help countering violent extremism. The Initiative has also established research and teaching chairs at the professional military education colleges.

249. What is your understanding and assessment of the Minerva Initiative?

Over the past six years, the Minerva Initiative has been a useful vehicle for enabling DoD to encourage and invigorate basic social science research in the academic community that supports

better understanding of emerging national security issues. As a result of Minerva-funded research, the Department has strengthened its ability to draw on relevant and critical research in the social sciences and improved its understanding of emerging features in the global security environment. These insights have informed the development of the Department's defense strategy and policy.

250. If confirmed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, what guidance, if any, would you provide to the Minerva Initiative, including incorporating the results from the research produced thus far and utilizing the expertise affiliated with this initiative?

The Minerva Initiative is a unique channel in that it enables Defense Department personnel to draw on the deep body of relevant knowledge that resides in academia. Most importantly, it facilitates a productive dialogue between decision makers and academic experts that shapes the direction of future academic research. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that as the Department shapes the Minerva Initiative in the future, it strengthens this dialogue so that academic research sponsored by the Initiative is fully informed by policy priorities.

251. What are your thoughts on the usefulness of the Conflict Records Research Center at the National Defense University and how can it support the Minerva Initiative?

The Conflict Records Research Center performs a useful function, facilitating academic research by providing access to primary source materials captured in past conflicts and helps us learn the lessons of past wars. This support to academic research is very much aligned with the Minerva Initiative's mission to encourage social science research in support of national security.

The passage of the FY14 NDAA has authorized funding for the CRRC to become independent from government for the first time. I understand the Department is working with the Joint Staff, NDU, and other interested parties to find a mechanism to facilitate that transition.

As directed by the legislation, the Department will report back to Congress on that effort later this year.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

252. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

253. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and

necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

Yes.

254. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

255. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.