

Advance Policy Questions for Robert O. Work
Nominee to be Deputy Secretary of Defense

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

1. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

I do not believe that modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions are necessary at this time. However, if confirmed and appointed, I will consider this question as I perform my duties as Deputy Secretary of Defense. If I come to believe that modifications are necessary, I will recommend appropriate amendments to the Act.

2. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

I do not believe that modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions are necessary at this time.

Relationships

3. What is your understanding of the relationship between the Deputy Secretary of Defense and each of the following?

The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense assigns the duties performed by the Deputy Secretary and is the Deputy Secretary's immediate superior. The Deputy Secretary performs the duties of the Secretary of Defense when the Secretary is unable to do so. The Deputy Secretary serves as the Department's Chief Operating and Management Officer (COO/CMO) and focuses primarily on the daily activities of the Department, including financial management, acquisition, civilian and military personnel policy and the implementation of policy and strategy decisions. As a result, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary must have a close working relationship and the Secretary must be able to rely completely on the Deputy Secretary.

The Under Secretaries of Defense

The five Under Secretaries establish policy and provide oversight over major Departmental functions, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary oversees the Under Secretaries and coordinates their activities. The Deputy Secretary must work closely with the Under Secretaries, ensuring that they understand the Secretary's guidance and implement that guidance faithfully. The Deputy Secretary must also resolve differences of opinion between or among the Under Secretaries, referring to the Secretary those important issues that require his decision.

The Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense

The Deputy Secretary, who is the Chief Management Officer, supervises the Deputy Chief Management Officer, assigning tasks, providing oversight, and ensuring accountability. The Deputy Secretary must be able to rely on the Deputy Chief Management Officer to monitor the Department's performance in attaining management goals and keep the Deputy Secretary informed. The two must keep in constant communication to ensure seamless oversight of the Department's management program, and immediate intervention when required.

The Assistant Secretaries of Defense

There are two categories of Assistant Secretaries. Most of the Assistant Secretaries fall under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretaries. For those Assistant Secretaries, the Deputy Secretary exercises oversight through the Under Secretaries. For Assistant Secretaries who report directly to the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary should exercise a broader and more direct oversight, working closely together to ensure the Secretary's guidance is accomplished efficiently and effectively.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Secretary and Deputy Secretary must have complete confidence in the professional military advice of the Chairman and Vice Chairman, work closely with them, and communicate direction to the Combatant Commanders through them. The Deputy Secretary works most closely with the Vice Chairman, particularly on matters regarding budgeting, programming, and requirements.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

The Secretaries of the Military Departments are under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary assists the Secretary in providing direction to and oversight of the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Deputy Secretary also helps resolve differences of opinion between the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Under Secretaries of Defense.

The Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments

The Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments are the Under Secretaries of the Army, Air Force and Navy. They report to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Deputy Secretary and Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense work closely with the Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments to ensure that the management program of the Department of Defense, as implemented in the respective Military Departments, is carried out consistently with the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

The Service Acquisition Executives

The Deputy Secretary and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics perform essential roles in the Department's acquisition program, including providing guidance to, and oversight of, the Service Acquisition Executives. The Deputy Secretary works primarily through the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics when dealing with the Service Acquisition Executives.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services

The Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services perform two vital roles for the Department. In their roles as Service Chiefs, they normally work with the Deputy Secretary through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. In their roles as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they normally work with the Deputy Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy Secretary seeks to ensure that the Chiefs of Staff in both of their roles have the resources necessary to accomplish their assigned missions and that they have ample opportunity to provide their professional military advice on significant matters.

The Chief of the National Guard Bureau

The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on important issues regarding the States and the National Guard. The Deputy Secretary relies on the Chief of the National Guard to be a clear and persuasive channel of communication between the Department and the States on all National Guard matters.

The Judge Advocates General of the Services

The Deputy Secretary normally works through the General Counsel of the Department of Defense in dealing with the Judge Advocates General and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Because the Judge

Advocates General have an important role in providing legal advice to senior officials, military and civilian, in the Military Departments, the Deputy Secretary ensures that the Judge Advocates General are able to perform that vital function.

The Inspector General of the Department of Defense

The Deputy Secretary relies on the Inspector General to provide candid information on significant issues addressed by the auditors, inspectors, and investigators in the Inspector General's office. The Deputy Secretary plays a direct role in ensuring the independence of the Inspector General.

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense

The Deputy Secretary receives legal advice on all issues from the General Counsel, so he or she must have a close and candid relationship with the General Counsel. The General Counsel must feel that he or she may approach the Deputy Secretary with legal advice at any time, on any issue.

The Director of National Intelligence

When addressing matters of significance affecting both the Department and the Intelligence Community, the Deputy Secretary works with the Director of National Intelligence. The Under Secretary for Intelligence assists the Deputy Secretary in maintaining a close relationship with the Director of National Intelligence.

Duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense

Section 132 of title 10, United States Code, provides that the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

- 4. Assuming that you are confirmed, what duties do you expect the Secretary to prescribe for you?**

I expect the Secretary to assign me the primary duties of being prepared to perform his duties in his absence, assisting him in leading the Department, providing him my best professional and candid advice, and performing the statutory duties of Chief Management Officer. In addition, I expect that the Secretary will assign me additional duties in areas that will assist him in accomplishing his many missions.

- 5. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?**

I have either been a part of or analyzed and studied the Department of Defense and the armed services my entire life.

My first 17 years were spent as military dependent in a Marine Corps family. I learned first-hand what it was like moving every two to four years, sometimes unexpectedly. I lived on bases, off bases, and in foreign countries. I changed neighborhoods and schools, lost track of old friends and made new ones, and watched my Mom cope with my Dad's long absences.

After four years of preparing for a commission in the U.S. Marine Corps through the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, I spent 27 years as a Marine artillery officer, retiring at the rank of colonel. I commanded at the platoon, battery, battalion, and training base level. At different times I served as the personnel, intelligence, and assistant operations officer in an artillery battalion, assistant operations and logistics officer in an infantry regiment, and operations officer in an artillery regiment. I also spent time on the Headquarters Marine Corps staff as the Enlisted Force Planner and director of Marine Corps space plans and operations. As the head of the Strategic Initiatives Group, I provided analytical support to the Commandant of the Marine Corps on a variety of issues, including during the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). My time in the Marine Corps taught me much about leadership, strategy, operations, tactics, programming and budgeting.

I was married for 23 of my 27 years in the Marine Corps, and was a father for 11. I watched my wife cope with frequent moves and the stresses of me being away. I missed some of her birthdays and our anniversaries. Then, I missed some of my daughter's birthdays, school plays, and dance recitals. As a former member of a military family, I knew how hard it was to be constantly on the move and not having my Dad around. But now it was me often leaving my wife and daughter to take care of themselves.

My last two years on active duty was spent as the Military Assistant and Senior Aide to Richard Danzig, 71st Secretary of the Navy. During this time I observed what it was like to lead a Military Department, where strategy, service culture, politics, programming and budgeting come into play. I observed the 2001 QDR from the Department of Navy level, recognizing the Navy-Marine Corps Team was very much more than the sum of its two parts. In the process, I became an ardent Departmentalist, seeking cooperation and understanding across institutional boundaries.

After retiring, I spent most of the next eight years at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a national security Think Tank, first as a Senior Fellow and later as Vice President for Strategic Studies. I studied, wrote, and spoke extensively on strategy, global posture, revolutions in war, and maritime affairs. I assisted the Red Team for the 2006 QDR, testing key assumptions and challenging major objectives.

This body of experience prepared me well to be Undersecretary of the Navy. The Department of the Navy is a microcosm of the Department of Defense, with two services (the Navy and Marine Corps) and a \$140-160 billion annual budget. As Undersecretary, I was the principal deputy and advisor to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief Operating/Management Officer of the Department, and Chief of Staff for the Navy Secretariat. As such, I assisted the Secretary in pursuing his priorities and agenda, supervising the organize, train, and equip function of both the Navy and Marine Corps; developing Departmental policy, capabilities, and capacities; and fashioning a balanced program. I worked extensively with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Undersecretaries of Defense, the Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, the Chief and Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, and Undersecretaries of the Army and the Air Force, and the senior military leadership of the Army and Air Force. I learned the rhythm and processes of the Pentagon, and how to make things happen. I led the Department's efforts on the 2010 QDR, and participated in the 2011 Strategic Review. Throughout this time, I gained a great appreciation for Department of Defense civilians, who are a vital part of the Total Force.

For the last year, I have been the Chief Executive Officer for the Center for a New American Security, where I have tried to build a series of programs that view the entire range of national security issues, including strategy and statecraft; responsible defense; technology and national security; energy, environment and security; military, veterans and society; and Middle East and Asian studies.

Throughout my career, I have valued and sought out opportunities to better educate myself. I have a Masters in Science in Systems Management, a Masters of Systems Technology (Space Systems Operations); and a Masters in International Public Policy.

Although no job will ever prepare someone for the expansive responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I believe this body of experience qualifies and prepares me to tackle the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

6. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Yes. If confirmed and appointed, I would begin immediately to establish close working relationships with those whom I will work daily on national security issues, including:

- Secretary Hagel and his personal staff;
- The Undersecretaries of Defense, Director of Cost Evaluation and Program Evaluation (CAPE), the Deputy Chief Management and Information Officers, and other senior officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense;

- The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior leadership in the four armed services;
- The three Service Secretaries and Undersecretaries;
- Senior leadership at the Office of Management and Budget and the Cabinet departments who work national security issues;
- Senior leadership in the White House and on the National Security Council staff; and
- Leadership in Congress, particularly those who sit on the congressional defense committees.

I would review the analysis and conclusions of the Strategic Choices and Management review (SCMR) and the 2013 QDR in order to understand what had happened and the OSD decisions made since I left my job as Undersecretary of the Navy in March 2013.

I would also begin detailed study of the fiscal, administrative, and operational issues that the Secretary assigns to me. I would spend time analyzing the business processes of the Department so that I could evaluate whether any changes may be appropriate and so advise the Secretary.

7. What changes to section 132, if any, would you recommend?

I would not recommend any changes to section 132 at this time; I believe section 132 adequately provides for the duties of the Deputy Secretary. If I am confirmed and appointed, I will consider this issue while performing my duties, and if I determine that changes may be necessary, I will suggest them to the Secretary for consideration as a legislative proposal.

National Security Budget Reductions

Section 132 was amended by section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, to provide that the Deputy Secretary serves as the Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the Department of Defense. The Deputy Secretary is to be assisted in this capacity by a Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO).

8. What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO of the Department of Defense?

The primary duty of the Chief Management Officer is to provide leadership and to ensure accountability for the business operations of the Department of Defense. These operations involve all of the Department's components and cut across the responsibilities of the Under Secretaries of Defense. As such, they require leadership and accountability at a high level. In this role, the CMO should ensure that the business functions of the Department are optimally aligned to support the warfighter,

that they form a simplified, efficient, and effective business environment, and that DoD maintains a strategic perspective and has the capacity to carry out its plans.

In addition, the CMO's role is to lead, oversee, and support the roles of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and agency heads in managing their business operations, as well as provide direction to DoD's Deputy CMO and the CMOs of the Military Departments.

9. What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?

As the former Under Secretary and CMO of the Navy, I am very familiar with the array of management and business challenges that continue to confront DoD. Additionally, I spent my previous career, first as a military officer and then as a member of a number of think-tanks and academia, analyzing defense issues such as transformation, strategy, and programs. This experience has provided me with the background and expertise to serve as the Department's CMO.

10. Do you believe that the CMO and DCMO have the resources and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of the Department of Defense?

My understanding is that the Secretary of Defense has recently announced a series of reforms following his Organizational Review to further strengthen the Deputy CMO to provide full spectrum oversight of OSD and DoD management, administration, and compliance. I am not currently in a position to determine if the CMO and Deputy CMO have the appropriate authority and resources to carry out their roles in light of these changes. If confirmed, I will examine the authorities and resources available to both functions to determine if they fully address the need.

11. What role do you believe the DCMO of the Department of Defense should play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems by the military departments?

The most important role the Deputy CMO can play regarding specific business systems is to ensure that the Department's overarching and functional business strategies and standards are clearly articulated at all levels and the Military Department's systems implementation plans will achieve these strategies. On occasion, there may be specific business systems that require the attention of the Deputy CMO to ensure alignment and resource prioritization across the budget horizon.

Beyond defense business systems, however, there is a significant role the Office of the Deputy CMO can play in helping the Deputy Secretary lead efforts across the Department to increase its efficiency and effectiveness. I have read the Secretary's December 4th public statement that strengthens the role of the Office. This is an

important step in gaining better control and oversight of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense agencies and activities, and the Department as a whole. If confirmed, I will review the decisions made and make new ones, if necessary, to strengthen to the role of the Deputy CMO.

12. Do you believe that the DCMO should have clearly defined decisionmaking authorities, or should the DCMO serve exclusively as an advisor to the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO?

I believe that the Deputy CMO should meet the statutory responsibilities currently in law, as well as have the responsibilities assigned by the CMO and the Secretary of Defense. There may be areas or circumstances where it would be appropriate for the Deputy CMO's duties to include independent decision making authority and others where it would not be appropriate. This should be determined by the CMO or the Secretary.

13. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the statutory provisions establishing the positions of CMO and DCMO?

At this time, I believe the statutory authorities for the positions of the Chief Management Officer and the Deputy Chief Management Officer are sufficient. If confirmed, I would inform the Congress if I determined that any changes in statute were necessary to more effectively perform the duties of this office.

14. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Clearly, the first challenge and responsibility is to get the entire Department working behind the Secretary's priorities. While doing so, the Deputy Secretary must be cognizant that the Department confronts a broadening range of missions within a complex strategic environment while it must carefully manage its diminished resources. Indeed, the dynamic fiscal environment is a major challenge since it relates to the principal function of the Deputy and CMO roles. Continued fiscal uncertainty generates potentially cascading effects across all elements of the Department enterprise. Having a stable fiscal picture will help the Department avoid inefficiencies and maximize the resources allocated to it. Another challenge will be the implementation of our National Security Strategy, consciously and deliberately managing risk and applying resources in accordance with the priorities of that strategy. This includes successful implementation of our plans in Afghanistan and adapting our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region.

I also foresee the need to carefully manage our Science & Technology investments. I agree with recent comments from the Under Secretary for AT&L about not taking our technological dominance for granted. We should deliberately prioritize our long-term needs and carefully allocate funding to key programs and potential game-changing technologies that meet our strategic requirements.

Another major challenge is the need to assess and define our force structure design in accordance with our strategy and to make resource-informed decisions about our force levels. A force sizing construct will be a key aspect of the upcoming QDR to help define those force levels, against various levels of risk. Finally, as we go forward with force level cuts and management overhead reductions. We must keep faith with our Total Force. We cannot overlook the contributions that have been made by our service members, civilians and their families over the last decade of conflict.

15. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary and the senior leadership of the Department and the components in addressing these myriad challenges. I would anticipate that the deliberations of the QDR, and the insights offered by Congress and the National Defense Panel, will help generate solutions to them.

16. What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, with respect to issues which must be addressed by DOD?

Secretary Hagel has defined a set of broad priorities that establish the essential framework for resolving the Department's critical challenges.

The first involves a focus on institutional reform. We can set an example here for the Components by scaling back our headquarters and adopting better business practices. We need to direct more resources to invest in concrete military capabilities and readiness, as well as make Defense organizations flatter and more responsive to today's threats and priorities.

Next we must re-evaluate our force planning and force-sizing construct. We need to ensure our strategy is aligned with how the Military Departments are organizing, training and equipping the force. The QDR will provide direction for that, with a force planning construct reflecting priorities and modern threats.

The Secretary's third priority is avoiding a long-term readiness challenge. This mandates finding a balance between force size, investment accounts, and readiness levels. Sequestration fell hard on the Department's future readiness accounts. The parameters for force planning in the QDR should assist the Department in precluding a readiness crisis and identifying the implications for Congress.

Fourth, the Department must protect investments in critical military capabilities. This challenge requires us to preserve and extend emerging priority capabilities—especially space, cyber, special operations and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). A critical aspect of this challenge is the ability to maintain access in traditional and emergent domains. Our access is being increasingly contested. We must recognize that future adversaries will learn much from the last decade of war and avoid our traditional advantages. Maintaining a technological edge will be key to our ability to maintain access and secure our interests.

Fifth, we must achieve a balanced strategic posture. This will include a capability/capacity balance for the military. In particular, defining the right balance of active and reserve components is necessary. We should leverage the potential of our reserve component, ensuring that we define the training readiness, responsiveness and mobilization timelines required for their deployment. Balancing the military properly will also include an examination of forward-stationed and home-based forces. The force must also be balanced between its readiness for conventional, irregular, and unconventional warfare. The QDR will help define the balance required for general purpose and special operations forces.

Finally, personnel and compensation policy is a priority. We must find the proper balance between compensation and other defense priorities in a time of scarce resources. The Department and Congress will need to work together to find comprehensive solutions that allow us to recruit and retain the quality of today's force, while also providing the resources to train and equip that force for their missions.

The Budget Control Act, as amended by the recent Murray-Ryan budget agreement, calls for reductions in defense spending in excess of \$900 billion.

17. Do you believe that a national security spending reduction of this magnitude can be accomplished without significant adverse impact on our national security?

Based on my experience as Navy Under Secretary, and as an outside analyst, my answer would be "no." I believe the Department has expressed similar views. The BCA-level of funding will require significant force structure reductions, undermine readiness and delay modernization. My understanding is that the Department believes these actions will leave it unable to meet fully the current Defense Strategy.

18. If confirmed, will you report to the committee on the impact of these reductions personnel, readiness, infrastructure, and modernization?

Yes, if confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress to define the impacts of potential reductions to the Defense budget and its impact on all the inter-related pillars of our security.

Streamlining Headquarters

Last December, Secretary Hagel began implementation of his plan to reduce Department of Defense staff by 20 percent. He expects this effort to save \$1.0 billion over a five-year period by eliminating contract and civilian workers while reorganizing certain offices, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Policy.

The FY14 NDAA contains a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for streamlining Department of Defense management headquarters by reducing the size of staffs, eliminating tiers of management, cutting functions that provide little or no addition value, and consolidating overlapping and duplicative program offices. The

objective is to reduce aggregate spending for management headquarters by not less than \$40.0 billion beginning in fiscal year 2015.

19. What is your view on reductions to the size and composition of Department of Defense management headquarters?

I understand Secretary Hagel said he expected to save at least \$1 billion over the next five years. Given the fiscal challenges the Department faces, I fully support his efforts to reduce the size of headquarters. I am not familiar with the specifics of headquarters reduction plans, but, if confirmed, I believe it would be prudent to review these reductions to determine if additional savings can be achieved, and also to ensure these reductions do not create unacceptable risks to our national security interests.

20. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in ensuring that the expected savings are achieved?

Again, I am not familiar with the specifics of headquarters reduction plans. However, if confirmed, it will be my responsibility to make sure these savings are realized.

21. Do you believe that the Department of Defense can achieve significant additional savings in this area?

I do believe the Department can achieve savings by reducing headquarters. If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that happens. Until given the opportunity to review those plans and the associated risk, however, I think it would be unwise to speculate on a specific savings number without understanding the functions involved and potential downsides in acquisition, cyber-security, intelligence, etc.

Management Issues

GAO recently reported that “the DOD systems environment that supports [its] business functions is overly complex and error prone, and is characterized by (1) little standardization across the department, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the same data stored in multiple systems, and (4) the need for data to be entered manually into multiple systems. . . . According to the department’s systems inventory, this environment is composed of 2,258 business systems and includes 335 financial management, 709 human resource management, 645 logistics, 243 real property and installation, and 281 weapon acquisition management systems.”

22. If confirmed, what key management performance goals would you want to accomplish, and what standards or metrics would you use to judge whether you have accomplished them?

If confirmed, I would strive to achieve the four key goals and five guiding principles that are identified in the Department's Strategic Management Plan. Each goal has associated performance measures to track progress. If confirmed, I would use the plan's upcoming development cycle to carefully review the strategic goals, initiatives, and performance measures included in the plan. I will ensure that future plans demonstrate clear alignment with the Department's strategic objectives and that initiatives and measures are clear, consistent, relevant and outcome-based.

23. Would you agree that the Department will not be able to put its financial house in order until it effectively addresses this problem?

While I would agree that a simpler DoD systems environment will make it easier to achieve financial objectives such as audit readiness, it is only part of the holistic approach to financial management that is needed to achieve the Department's goals. The Department has reported that it is making better business management a priority with a simpler business system environment as a component of the broader agenda for improvement.

24. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful transformation of DOD's business systems?

Yes, I believe these are elements of what is required for overseeing such a large and complex organization. However, I would caution anyone from underestimating the challenges of changing DoD's business practices and processes by just looking at technical systems. The Department is far more complicated and requires far more than these technical tools for simplifying, strengthening, and leaning out the business environment.

25. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that DOD's enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements of section 2222?

It is my understanding that strengthening DoD's business processes and tools is a goal of the OSD transition plan. If confirmed, I will review those plans and ensure we are meeting the full intent of section 2222 in our revised organization structure and processes.

26. What are your views on the importance and role of timely and accurate financial and business information in managing operations and holding managers accountable?

Timely and accurate financial and business information is very important to the overall management of DoD's business operations. It allows senior leaders to make fact-based decisions about the most effective and efficient allocation of resources, while ensuring good stewardship of the taxpayers' dollars. If confirmed, I will

continue to emphasize the Department's on-going efforts to improve our business processes and systems which will better enable effective leadership and management.

27. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial and business information available to DOD managers?

If confirmed, I would take my role as Chief Management Officer/Chief Operating Officer and chair of the Deputy's Management Action Group seriously. In these roles, I would hold the Department's senior leaders accountable for meeting DoD's objectives, including those identified in the Strategic Management Plan and Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan that are directly linked to improving financial and business information.

Audit Readiness

Former Secretary Panetta stated: "While we have reasonable controls over much of our budgetary information, it is unacceptable to me that the Department of Defense cannot produce a financial statement that passes all financial audit standards. That will change. I have directed that this requirement be put in place as soon as possible. America deserves nothing less."

28. What is your understanding of the efforts and progress that have been made in DOD toward the goal of being able to produce a clean audit?

My understanding is that DoD, as an agency, has made significant progress, particularly in the last 4 years. Secretary Hale worked with the services and agencies to provide a coherent set of priorities and Secretary Hagel is fully engaging the entire leadership team. In my former position as the Department of Navy CMO, I saw how challenging this effort can be, and am gratified to see the Marine Corps recently achieve an important initial milestone (an unqualified opinion on the current-year of their budget statement). If confirmed, I intend to sustain the leadership emphasis in this area.

29. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory goal to achieve an auditable Statement of Budgetary Resources by the end of fiscal year 2014 or are additional steps necessary? If so, what are those steps?

I understand that the Department has told Congress that, while it is too soon to know for sure because remediation efforts are ongoing, they expect most budget statements to be ready for audit by September 2014. Because of years of budget turmoil and other problems, some may not be ready. Once the audit begins, I understand that the Department plans to conduct the audit in a cost-effective manner by starting with the current year. I also know that this whole project will be extremely challenging.

30. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory goal and achieve an auditable financial statement by the end of fiscal year 2017 or are additional steps needed? If so, what are those steps?

I know from my time as Navy Under Secretary that the Department is fully committed to this goal and has a plan to meet the target. I understand that the Department believes it is on track to meet this target despite the technical complexity of the problem and the scale of the Department's resources. However, I am not currently in a position to make a specific prediction about timing.

31. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory goal "to ensure a full audit is performed on the financial statements of the Department of Defense..." for Fiscal Year 2018 and that audit will be completed by September 30, 2018 or are additional steps needed? If so what are those steps?

My understanding is that the Department is fully committed to this goal and timing and believes it is on track to meet the goal. However, I am not currently in a position to make a specific prediction about timing.

32. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory goal and submit to Congress the results of the audit to be completed by September 30, 2018 or are additional steps needed? If so, what are those steps?

My understanding is that the Department is fully committed to this goal and timing and believes it is on track to meet the targets. However, I am not currently in a position to make a specific prediction about timing.

33. Do you believe in order to meet its statutory goal to conduct a full audit that the Department will have to place a monetary value on all of its property?

Yes. My understanding is that the Department will need to follow the government accounting and auditing rules, as well as its own policies. Those rules require property valuation. I know that the policies also provide some flexibility to make sure that the cost of accomplishing this valuation does not exceed the value of the information.

34. Do you believe that the Department can achieve a clean audit opinion through better accounting and auditing, or is the systematic improvement of the Department's business systems and processes a pre-requisite?

I believe that the Defense Department will need to do both. Over the past 5 years, the Department has made significant progress in audit readiness, despite the fact that it doesn't have modern business systems across the enterprise. However, the Department needs to continue efforts to improve and streamline the systems

environment for operational efficiency, as well as to sustain cost effective annual financial audits.

35. When do you believe the Department can achieve a clean audit?

The Department is fully committed to the goal of having audit ready statements by September 2017. After achieving audit readiness, experience in other federal agencies suggests that it usually takes several years to secure a clean audit opinion.

36. If confirmed, what steps would you take to sustain the commitment of the Department's top leadership to the long-term goal of transforming the Department's financial management?

I understand the Department has made substantial progress in transforming business operations, to include financial management. This progress is most visible in the audit readiness area, but I understand progress has also been made in reducing improper payments and the number of Anti-Deficiency Act violations reported. However, there is still a long way to go. Sustaining gains will continue to demand the attention and commitment of senior leadership. When I served as CMO in the Department of the Navy, I knew how difficult the problem appeared at the beginning, but we pressed forward and made solid progress. If confirmed, I intend to continue to make this a priority, not only for the Comptroller, but for all DoD leaders.

37. Do you think that having the Deputy Secretary of Defense "dual-hatted" as the CMO is consistent with the prioritization and sustained day-to-day focus needed for the success of the Department's financial improvement efforts?

Yes, based on my four years as Under Secretary of the Navy where I had both "hats" in a \$140 billion enterprise. While demanding in terms of management time, this "dual-hat" approach provides the high-level attention necessary to make progress on important but difficult initiatives such as financial improvement. Progress on financial initiatives also requires a close working relationship between the Comptroller and the CMO/DCMO leadership. I believe that relationship is working today and if confirmed, I will work to sustain it into the future.

Business Transformation

Since 2005, the General Accountability Office (GAO) has designated the Department of Defense's approach to business transformation as "high risk" due to its vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement. However, GAO has recently found that the Department's senior leadership has shown commitment to transforming business system operations and has made progress in establishing management oversight and developing a strategic plan to guide transformation efforts. Nonetheless, in GAO's view, the Department needs to take additional action to further define management roles and responsibilities and to strengthen strategic planning.

38. Do you believe that the Department needs to more clearly define roles and responsibilities, as well as relationships among key positions and governance entities?

The Department has clearly defined roles and responsibilities among key positions and governance entities; however, I understand that Secretary Hagel recently announced a plan to realign certain reporting relationships and functions to the Deputy CMO to provide full spectrum oversight of OSD and DoD management, administration, and compliance. He further seeks to strengthen the role of the CIO in the Department. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary to implement those changes so that the Department can best meet the challenges that lie ahead.

39. If so, what steps do you believe the Department should take to achieve this objective?

I believe that Secretary Hagel's plan will improve the Department's ability to transform its business operations and its systems. My understanding is that the plan is intended to strengthen both the Deputy CMO's role in full spectrum management and the DoD Chief Information Officer's role in overarching IT oversight. If confirmed, I look forward to driving implementation of the Secretary's announced realignments so that management improves not only for business systems, but also across the Department.

40. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to further refine strategic goals, performance measures and other elements of the Department's strategic management plan?

The Department's Strategic Management Plan is updated on a regular basis. If confirmed, I would use the plan's upcoming development cycle to carefully review the strategic goals, initiatives, and performance measures included in the plan. I will make sure that future plans demonstrate clear alignment with the Department's strategic objectives and that initiatives and measures are clear, consistent, relevant and outcome-based.

41. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to more clearly define the Department's strategic planning process, including mechanisms to guide and synchronize efforts to develop strategic plans; monitor the implementation of reform initiatives; and report progress, on a periodic basis, towards achieving established goals?

If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that initiatives and measures are clearly linked to the overall strategic objectives of the Department. I believe establishing clear and

meaningful outcome-based performance measures, periodic reporting, and use of these measures to inform management decisions is critical to success. Achieving these goals requires coordination among all of the Department's senior leaders.

42. Do you believe that the Deputy Chief Management Officer should have control over funds for the components' business systems programs to ensure that the components follow guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Department's business transformation efforts?

I believe the components should maintain control over their funds for business systems programs; however, the Deputy Chief Management Officer needs to be able to confirm that components are following Department processes and guidance. As the Navy Chief Management Officer, it was my experience that the Deputy Chief Management Officer had sufficient ability to ensure components followed guidance on business transformation through the Defense Business Council. However, if confirmed, I would notify the Congress if I assess that further controls over funds were necessary.

Acquisition of Business Systems

Most of the Department's business transformation programs are substantially over budget and behind schedule. At the request of the Armed Services Committee, GAO reviewed DOD's nine largest Enterprise Resource Programs (ERP), which are intended to replace more than 500 outdated business systems, and reported that six of the nine had experienced schedule delays ranging from 2 to 12 years and incurred cost increases ranging from \$530.0 million to \$2.4 billion. GAO reported that DOD has failed to follow good management practices for developing schedules and cost estimates for many of these programs.

43. If confirmed, how would you work with the Deputy Chief Management Officer, the Chief Management Officers of the military departments, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition , Technology and Logistics (AT&L), the Chief Information Officer (CIO), and the Under Secretaries of Defense to address these problems?

If confirmed, I would work directly with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), the Deputy Chief Management Officer, the Chief Management Officers of the military departments, the Under Secretaries of Defense, and the DoD Chief Information Officer to implement better management practices and lessons learned. Successful ERP implementations require integrated, end-to-end thinking and therefore must consider policy, business process and acquisition equities. Each of these officials has an important role to play in addressing the planning, implementation, and change management challenges that historically have hamstrung the Department's ability to deliver programs such as ERPs in accordance with established cost and schedule baselines.

44. What lessons can be learned from acquisition management of the Air Force's now cancelled Expeditionary Combat Support System?

I am not familiar with the details as to what happened regarding the Expeditionary Combat Support System. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department implements a full range of management controls to our business systems modernization efforts and will ensure that the lessons learned from Expeditionary Combat Support System are incorporated into our processes.

The Department of Defense must implement a full range of business systems modernization management controls to ensure that its business system investments are the right solutions for addressing its business needs; that these investments are being managed to produce expected capabilities efficiently and cost-effectively; and that, ultimately, its business stakeholders are satisfied.

45. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that both the corporate and component investment management processes are appropriately defined and institutionalized?

If confirmed, I will work with the Department's senior leadership to ensure our collective investment processes are balanced and focused on achieving the enterprise needs of the Department. I will review the Department's investment review process for business systems and ensure it provides the necessary framework so that component investments are aligned with the Department's strategy.

46. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that business system investments are managed with the kind of acquisition management rigor and discipline that is embodied in relevant guidance and best practices, so that each investment will deliver expected benefits and capabilities on time and within budget?

I am not aware of any additional steps being necessary at this time. If confirmed, I will work with the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Deputy Chief Management Officer, the Chief Information Officer, and the military departments to identify opportunities to strengthen business system development acquisition processes and practices to improve our investment outcomes.

47. Do you believe that unique challenges to acquiring services related to information-technology (IT) systems may require an acquisition strategy or approach different from those used for acquiring property or services unrelated to IT systems?

I believe the Department of Defense should ensure acquisition strategies or approaches are structured and tailored to best suit the required product, including information technology systems. If confirmed, I will ensure that we appropriately manage business system requirements development and acquisition.

48. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure that requirements management, systems testing, and data quality are improved and to help resolve other problems that have continued to hinder the Department's efforts to implement its automated systems on schedule, within cost and with the intended capabilities?

I believe the Department must place appropriate management emphasis on the entire business system process, from requirements development to fielding. If confirmed, I will work with the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the Deputy Chief Management Officer, the Chief Information Officer, and the military departments to strengthen our efforts in this area.

Defense Acquisition Reform

Congress enacted the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), without a dissenting vote in either House. WSARA is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the acquisition process.

49. What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements in the Defense acquisition process?

When I first took office as the Under Secretary of the Navy in 2009, Congress had just passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, which has become a valuable tool for the Department. I supported the implementation of WSARA at that time, and I continue to support the improvements in the area of Defense acquisition organization and policy. If confirmed, I would continue to support the efforts to improve the defense acquisition system consistent with the direction provided in WSARA.

50. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of the acquisition process – requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?

My time as the Under Secretary of the Navy taught me the value of strong communications and interactions between the requirements, acquisition, and financial communities. Given the complex nature of the acquisition process, it is important to review all three aspects of the process holistically and not independently. If confirmed, I will work to effectively synchronize these processes to balance warfighters needs with budget and acquisition realities.

51. If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition accountability?

Short, clear lines of authority and accountability for acquisition were established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I emphasized this chain as Under Secretary of the Navy and would continue to do so, if confirmed. Further I will hold those responsible for establishing requirements, budgets, and acquisition programs accountable for meeting the needs of the warfighter. I also believe our industry partners must be held accountable for their performance as well, and that incentives and rewards should align with actual performance and outcomes.

52. Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?

I believe it is critical that we ensure major systems are affordable. The constrained budget environment facing the Department for the foreseeable future increases the pressure on the Department to maintain affordability. If confirmed, I will examine the cost balance between current operations, readiness and weapon system acquisition and assess our risks in those areas. I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics to manage weapon system cost growth.

53. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?

If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics to manage weapon system cost growth. We must spend the Department's resources prudently given our projected top line. That is why I support steps, such as those included in the Department's Better Buying Power initiatives, to manage requirements, improve affordability, and ensure completion where possible.

54. Do you believe that the Department has adequately addressed its shortfalls in systems engineering and developmental testing capabilities, or does more remain to be done in these areas?

Systems engineering and developmental test and evaluation are essential to weapon system program success. Based on my experience in the Navy, I believe the Department has strengthened its system engineering and developmental test capabilities. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and other stakeholders in the Department to evaluate what more needs to be done to ensure that the Department has adequate systems engineering and developmental testing capabilities.

55. Do you believe that additional steps are needed to ensure that WSARA principles are implemented on current major programs like the Joint Strike Fighter program?

Maintaining major acquisition programs on schedule and within budget is a high priority for me and the Department. If confirmed, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, I will review major programs, to include the Joint Strike Fighter program, to assess whether WSARA principles have been implemented, and will determine if additional steps are required.

Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) Frank Kendall recently released an updated Defense Department Instruction 5000.02. He has stated that the rewrite had “to do with the need for a requirements decision point during what is the risk-reduction phase, the technology demonstration phase.” The latest version of 5000.02 is to put a “place to finalize requirements...we added a new decision point, which I’ll participate in for major programs, but it’s largely a Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Joint Staff, service, requirements community decision” between Milestone A and Milestone B.

56. Are you familiar with Undersecretary Kendall’s rewrite of DODI 5000.02?

I am generally familiar with Undersecretary Kendall’s focus on strengthening our acquisition process, but I am not familiar with the recent rewrite of DoDI 5000.02.

57. Do you believe a new decision point is necessary to finalize requirements between Milestone A and Milestone B?

I believe that we need to fully assess requirements and cost trades before finalizing requirements and committing to full scale development. If confirmed, I will review the new decision point with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics.

58. Does having a new decision point between Milestone A and Milestone B risk creating a new bureaucratic hurdle in the acquisition process that will slow the process?

I believe it is important that major cost and performance trades have been completed and we have appropriately reduced risk before committing to full scale development. If confirmed, I will review the new decision point with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics to ensure it does not unnecessarily add bureaucracy and slow the acquisition process.

Recently, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (“JROC”) issued guidance which “encourages Program Managers, Program Executive Officers and Component Acquisition Executives, in coordination with the requirements sponsor, to officially request requirements relief, through the appropriate requirements validation authority, where Key Performance Parameters appear out of line with an appropriate cost-benefit analysis.”

59. Do you agree with this reform?

Yes. It is important to ensure that major cost and performance trades are made in order to control costs of our weapon systems.

60. Do you support the JROC's review of the analysis of alternatives prior to Milestone A as was called for in the Government Accountability Office's June 2011 report titled DoD Weapon Systems: Missed Trade-off Opportunities During Requirements Reviews?

I am not familiar with this report, but if confirmed, I will review it and consider the recommendation.

Role of Service Secretaries and Chiefs in the Acquisition Process

Some have suggested that the Service Secretaries and Chiefs should be given a different or expanded role in the acquisition of major systems. Others have expressed concern that such a change would reverse efforts in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation to reduce the layers between the Under Secretary and the program managers, and ensure that there was a dynamic tension between those who defined requirements (Service Chiefs) and those who filled the requirements (Service Acquisition Executives).

61. What do you believe is the appropriate role for Service Chiefs in the acquisition of major systems?

Service Chiefs must play a major role in acquisition through their deep involvement in the requirements, manpower, and budget processes. I believe that the Service Chiefs profoundly affect the acquisition process through the way they and their organizations generate, prioritize, and review requirements, program budgets, manage workforce, and interact with the Acquisition Enterprise.

62. Do you believe there is value in having greater participation of the Service Secretaries and Chiefs involved in the acquisition process?

I believe that the Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries must play a role in the acquisition process since they ensure the requirements development process, the manpower process, and the budget processes are properly managed and integrated with the acquisition process. If confirmed, I intend to work with the Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries to ensure effective interactions between the requirements, budgeting, staffing, and acquisition systems.

Contracting for Services

Over the last decade, DOD's spending on contract services has more than doubled. As a result, the Department now spends more for the purchase of services than it does for products (including major weapon systems). When he was USD (AT&L), former Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter testified that "the low-hanging fruit really is [in contract services]. There's a lot of money. There has been a very, very high rate of growth over the last decade, in services. They have grown faster than everything else So, there's a lot we can do. I think great savings can be had there, across the Services' spend. It's essential that we look there, because that's half the money."

63. Do you believe that the cuts made to contract services have fully addressed the issues of waste and inefficiency in this area, or are further reductions possible?

While the Department has made progress, I believe more can be done. With the current fiscal realities facing the Department, we need to look for efficiencies in our service contracts. The Department needs to strengthen oversight of the requirements for services contracts, improve both competition and small business utilization, and strengthen the professionalism of those outside the acquisition workforce that are principally engaged in buying services. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics and the Military Departments to improve the processes and procedures to manage contracted services.

64. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to control the Department's spending on contract services?

If confirmed, I will review the current efforts in the Department to improve our visibility into, and accountability for, contracted services and focus on improving our insight into the appropriate utilization, cost effectiveness, and alignment of contracted services in support of the Department's mission. If confirmed, I will also support additional steps to ensure the Department's acquisition of services is more efficient and effective.

Contractor Performance of Critical Governmental Functions

Over the last decade, the Department has become progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result, contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions as DOD employees.

65. In your view, is DOD still too reliant on contractors to support the basic functions of the Department?

The Department uses a Total Force approach to manage its workload. Contractors are an important element of the Total Force and provide flexibility and technical competence.

However, we must be careful to ensure work is appropriately assigned to military personnel (active/reserve), civilian employees, and contract support.

If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department continues efforts to implement a Total Force strategy that aligns functions and work to military, civilian, and contract support in a cost effective and balanced manner consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, laws, and regulations.

66. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to reduce the Department's reliance on contractors to perform critical functions?

If confirmed, I will work with the acquisition and personnel communities to review our current use of contractor support and reduce such use where appropriate.

Base Realignment and Closure

The Department of Defense has requested another Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round.

67. Do you believe another BRAC round is necessary? If so, why?

With declining budgets and shrinking force structure, I believe the Department's supporting infrastructure must be examined; both for alignment with strategic needs, and opportunities to reduce unneeded capacity. BRAC provides a fair and comprehensive way to do that.

68. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round resulted in major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far less money than originally estimated.

69. What is your understanding of why such cost growth and lower realized savings have occurred?

I did not participate in the BRAC 2005 process. However, it is my understanding that the 2005 BRAC round was not designed specifically to save money. A good portion of the recommendations were focused on transformation, jointness, and relocating forces from overseas to the United States. These recommendations increased the costs of that BRAC round.

70. How do you believe such issues could be addressed in a future BRAC round?

Given the Department's limited resources, I expect that a future BRAC round would be similar to the '93/'95 rounds in which DoD cut excess capacity and achieved a relatively quick payback. That should be the focus of a future round should the Congress provide that authority.

Strategic Reviews

71. What is your understanding and evaluation of DOD's processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decision making, and reporting for each of the following strategic reviews?

The processes for these reviews are important tools to help the Department's senior leaders provide strategic guidance across the Department in keeping with defense objectives in the broader National Security Strategy. They help the Military Department and other Components prioritize efforts and resources to achieve the Department's objectives effectively and efficiently in light of the changing security and fiscal environment.

I have been involved directly and indirectly in many of these reviews at different points throughout my career. The Secretary of Defense determines how best to oversee these review processes. I have seen various approaches used over the years – each differs based on strategic changes, timing, and leadership preferences. However, each Defense review should be based on candid deliberations and advice from across the military and civilian leadership, supported by rigorous data and analysis. This analytical rigor and intense engagement are critical for the Department and the country's national security.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (section 118 of title 10, United States Code);

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) articulates the nation's defense strategy in support of the President's national security strategy. Specifically, 10 U.S.C. Section 118 requires the Department to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. In my experience, effective QDRs include a wide range of stakeholders and help to ensure the defense strategy guides U.S. military force structure, plans, and programs.

The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10, United States Code);

The Chairman prepares the National Military Strategy as a means to delineate how the armed services support the National Defense Strategy, and to convey the military's views on strategic priorities and associated risks.

Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10, United States Code);

In my previous role as Under Secretary of the Navy, I participated in the Department's continuous review process for global defense posture. I have witnessed how this process is informed by the strategy and the Department's operational needs. The annual report to Congress encapsulates the Department's current overseas defense posture and the collaborative process by which the Department makes posture decisions.

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (section 118b of title 10, United States Code).

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) describes how the Department intends to align organizational responsibilities and military capabilities to carry out assigned missions. Specifically, 10 U.S.C. Section 118b requires the Department to complete a comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions of the Armed Forces and the core competencies and capabilities of the Department to perform and support such roles and missions. In the past, conclusions reached during the QDR significantly influenced the Department's assessment of its military roles and missions.

72. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to change title 10, United States Code, that would update, improve, or make these reviews more useful to the Department and to Congress?

The QDR and associated reviews serve a useful function for the Department by helping make sure that at least every four years the Department deliberately reassesses and, if necessary, adjusts the nation's defense strategy, defense capabilities, and force structure in line with national security interests, the future security environment, and available resources. If confirmed, I look forward to working with members of Congress to help make the specific requirements and information the Department provides in these reviews as relevant and useful as possible.

73. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if any, to improve DOD's processes for strategic assessment, analysis, policy formulation, and decision making relative to each review above?

From previous experience, I find that the following factors contribute to successful strategic reviews:

- The Secretary or Deputy Secretary provide clear initial guidance and maintain "hands-on" oversight of the review from start to finish.
- All relevant DoD stakeholders are a part of the formal review and decision-making fora. These stakeholders generally include senior leaders within the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, military and civilian leadership from the Military Department and Services and the Combatant Commands.

- Working groups and review groups are co-led by the offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, allowing for the most relevant expertise and involvement in the issue areas being examined.
- The working groups' deliberations and findings are transparent and vetted with the key stakeholders.

If confirmed, I would recommend that insights gained from previous reviews, along the lines of those outlined above, be applied to additional reviews that the Department undertakes.

The law requires the QDR to identify the budget plan that would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk, and any additional resources (beyond those programmed in the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a level of risk. The law also requires the QDR to make recommendations that are not constrained to comply with and are fully independent of the budget submitted to Congress by the President.

74. What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's QDR analysis and decision making processes to address these two requirements?

The QDR assessment should be strategy-driven and resource-informed to determine the best mix of capabilities and investment portfolios for the Department to pursue in these complex and uncertain times. However, the Department should not be so constrained by this approach as to overlook gaps and risks in resource allocation or changes to the strategy.

75. In your view, is there analytical and/or practical value in a defense strategy that is unconstrained by or independent of the current budget request or fiscal environment?

No. One of the first rules of strategy is that all resources are scarce. An effective defense strategy should take a comprehensive view of the future security environment to assess and prepare the Department prudently for a range of missions and associated risks to U.S. national interests. By definition, a strategy seeks to identify ways to meet policy goals, and allocate projected resources and means in response to perceived risks. As such, the QDR process ensures a broad review of the trends, threats, challenges, and opportunities that shape that environment. Although this assessment is strategy-driven, particularly in this fiscal environment, the defense strategy should also be resource-informed to ensure the Department sufficiently prioritizes its efforts and addresses trade-offs in the needed capabilities, activities, and posture of the future force.

Iraq

76. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to Iraq?

I have not been given a thorough update on developments in Iraq. However, I believe it is imperative that the United States maintain a long-term security partnership with Iraq as part of a broader enduring commitment to regional peace and security. The United States has invested and sacrificed heavily in Iraq. Iraq's strategic location, oil production capacity, and work to counter violent extremism make Iraq an important regional partner. As such, the United States has a strategic interest in ensuring that Iraq remains stable, sovereign, and secure. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the Department's relationship with Iraq, by maintaining consultation on security issues, continuing to develop Iraq's military capabilities through foreign military sales (FMS), and deepening Iraq's integration into the region.

77. What do you see as the major areas, if any, of common security interest between the United States and Iraq?

I see areas of mutual strategic interest in partnership with a sovereign, stable, and democratic Iraq in several areas, including: countering Iran's aggression and pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, mitigating destabilizing effects on the region from violence in Syria, cooperating with regional allies and partners to reduce the capacity of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), maintaining stable production of petroleum exports, and actively participating in regional multilateral exercises.

78. In what areas, if any, do you see U.S. and Iraqi security interests diverging?

Both Iraq and the United States have an interest in fighting terrorism, securing borders, combating undesirable external influence, and routing extremist militias to ensure the peace and security of Iraq and the stability of the Middle East region. The United States has an interest in Iraq remaining a close partner, and although our approaches may sometimes differ, our interests tend to be aligned.

79. What do you see as the greatest challenges for the U.S.-Iraq security relationship over the coming years?

The greatest challenge facing the U.S.-Iraq security relationship is the successful transition to a more traditional security cooperation relationship – with a robust bilateral and multilateral training and exercise program – despite the complicated history we share, persistent sectarian violence, and tensions over Iranian support to Syria and proxy forces in the region. If confirmed, I will support efforts to work with the Iraqis to make sure that we maintain and expand our bilateral security

relationship and will seek to bolster the U.S.-Iraq defense partnership on a wide array of security matters.

Iraq faces a resurgent violent extremist threat that has sought to exploit popular discontent with the current Maliki Government, particularly within Sunni communities in western Iraq.

80. What role, if any, should the United States play in assisting the Government of Iraq in confronting the threat of violent extremism?

Iraq is the lead in providing for its own security, but the United States plays an important role in providing Iraq with security assistance to counter violent extremism. Information sharing, non-operational training and advice to the Iraqi Counterterrorism Services, and provision of key defense systems through the foreign military sales program play an important role in improving the capability of the Iraqi military in its campaign against extremists.

81. In your view, what conditions, if any, should the United States place on the provision of equipment or assistance to the Government of Iraq in its fight against violent extremism?

I believe we already have sufficient conditions in place. All countries receiving defense equipment and assistance through the foreign military sales program are required to abide by stringent end-use monitoring (EUM) protocols that govern the use and application of military equipment. I understand that the United States holds Iraq to the same EUM standards of accountability and proper use of equipment as with other U.S. defense partners, and the Department makes it clear that cooperation is contingent on the proper use of these systems.

Afghanistan

82. In your view, has the military campaign in Afghanistan been successful in achieving its objectives?

Although I have not received a full briefing on the current situation in Afghanistan, I believe the campaign has made significant progress. Coalition and Afghan partners were successful against the insurgency's summer offensive for the second consecutive year. The progress made by ISAF and the ANSF over the past three years has put the Government of Afghanistan in control of all of Afghanistan's major cities and 34 provincial capitals, and has driven the insurgency into the countryside. I understand that the Department continues to pursue counterterrorism objectives. Afghanistan continues to face many challenges, but has made positive strides.

83. What is your assessment of the performance of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in assuming the lead for security throughout Afghanistan?

I understand that Afghan security forces are now providing security for their own people, fighting their own battles, and holding their own against the Taliban. This is a fundamental shift in the course of the conflict. The ANSF now conduct the vast majority of operations in Afghanistan. However, ANSF capabilities are not yet fully self-sustainable, and they require continued support to make lasting progress.

84. Do you support the retention of a limited U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after 2014?

I understand that the United States and coalition partners are on track to bring the ISAF mission to a close by the end of 2014 and transition to a new, post-2014 NATO train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission. Beyond the TAA mission, I understand that the United States also plans to conduct a narrowly focused counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda and its affiliates.

As the President has made clear, however, the United States must secure an agreement that protects U.S. forces and must have an invitation from the Afghan government in order to remain in Afghanistan.

My view is that the United States is, and should remain, committed to a long-term relationship with Afghanistan. The United States' fundamental goal in Afghanistan remains to defeat al Qaeda and disrupt other extremists who present a serious threat to the United States, its overseas interests, and its allies and partners.

85. If the United States and Afghanistan are unable to conclude a Bilateral Security Agreement that ensures legal protections for such residual U.S. forces after 2014, should the United States withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan?

The President has made clear that the United States must have an invitation from the Afghan government and must secure an agreement that protects U.S. personnel.

It is my understanding that the current Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan does not have an expiration date. However, further consultation would be necessary if the United States were to rely on it after 2014.

My understanding is that the Administration's position continues to be that if we cannot conclude a BSA promptly, we will initiate planning for a post-2014 future with no U.S. or NATO forces in Afghanistan. It continues to be up to the Afghans to determine what is in their interests.

That is not a future I will seek, and it is not in Afghanistan's interests. However, the further this slips into 2014 without a signed agreement, the more likely this outcome becomes.

On Thursday, January 27, 2014, the Karzai government announced it will release 37 Bagram detainees whom the United States has classified as "...legitimate threats to security".

86. How will you ensure that detainees held in Afghanistan which are thought to be threats to our security will continue to be held by the Afghan government?

I understand that the Department is working through the mechanisms established by the Detention-related Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Afghanistan to resolve the matter. The MOU provides a process for the United States to object to releases that it deems inappropriate. Ultimately, however, the decision to release detainees is with the Government of Afghanistan.

The current end strength of the ANSF is around 350,000 personnel. At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Chicago in May 2012, coalition participants discussed a proposal to reduce the future size of the ANSF to around 230,000, with an annual cost of \$4.1 billion.

87. Do you agree that any future reductions in the ANSF from the 352,000 troop level should be based on the security conditions in Afghanistan at the time the reductions would occur?

It is my understanding that the ANSF force structure is regularly evaluated to ensure the ANSF is right-sized based on operational and security conditions. If confirmed, I would review any plans for the final size and structure of the ANSF, including an appropriate force reduction.

88. Would you support reinvesting a portion of the savings from the drawdown of U.S. forces into sustaining the Afghanistan security forces at an end strength at or near their current level of 350,000 if necessary to maintain security in Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I would review the recommendations of the military commanders on the ground regarding the force structure and requisite funding of the Afghan National Security Forces.

89. What do you see as the United States' long-term strategic interests in Afghanistan after 2014?

My view is that the United States should remain committed to a long-term relationship with Afghanistan. The United States' fundamental goal in Afghanistan

remains to defeat al-Qaeda and disrupt other extremists who present a serious threat to the United States, its overseas interests, and its allies and partners. As the President said in the January 2014 State of the Union address, after 2014, the United States will support a unified Afghanistan as it takes responsibility for its own future. If the Afghan government signs the Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States, a small force of U.S. personnel could remain in Afghanistan with NATO allies to carry out two narrow missions: training and assisting Afghan forces, and counterterrorism operations to pursue any remnants of al-Qaeda.

Pakistan

90. What is your assessment of the current relationship between the United States and Pakistan?

My understanding is that since Pakistan reopened the Ground Lines of Communication to Afghanistan, the defense relationship with Pakistan has improved significantly. The United States has refocused the bilateral defense relationship on shared security interests, including promoting peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, finishing the job of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and supporting Pakistan's fight against the militant and terrorist networks that threaten both the United States and Pakistan. However, if confirmed, I would ensure that the Department continues to engage on issues where there is discord, particularly the need for stronger and more effective action against insurgent groups – especially the Haqqani Network – that threaten U.S. personnel and their Afghan counterparts.

91. Do you see opportunities for expanded U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on security issues? If so, how would you prioritize these areas of cooperation?

I believe the United States should continue to shape the defense relationship by taking a pragmatic approach, focused on cooperation in areas of shared interests, such as the fight against al-Qaeda and other militant and terrorist networks. Doing so would involve supporting Pakistan military efforts to counter the threat of militant and insurgent groups along the border with Afghanistan. It may also mean working with Pakistan to develop longer-term solutions to Pakistan's militant challenge.

If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department engages with Pakistan where strategic interests diverge, such as the direction of the Pakistani nuclear program and support for proxy militant organizations.

92. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to combat the threat of international terrorism?

Pakistan continues to make a major contribution to the fight against terrorism. I understand that thousands of Pakistani troops are engaged in counterinsurgency

operations along the border with Afghanistan. The enormous casualties Pakistan has suffered in the fight against terrorism demonstrate Pakistan's strong commitment.

However, I believe Pakistan also needs to counter militant and terrorist groups operating within its territory that do not directly threaten the Pakistani state, especially the Haqqani Network. These networks pose a direct threat to U.S. personnel, threaten regional security, endanger the prospects for a settlement in Afghanistan, and undermine Pakistan's own stability.

93. What additional steps, if any, do you believe Pakistan should take to address the threat posed by violent extremist groups such as the Haqqani Network and the Taliban Quetta Shura that currently use their safe haven in Pakistan to launch cross-border attacks on U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces?

I believe Pakistan needs to curtail the ability of these violent extremist groups to plan and execute attacks against U.S. servicemen and women, Coalition forces, and Afghan National Security Forces. Pakistan should take additional steps to target these groups with military and law enforcement assets, improve its efforts to interdict improvised explosive device precursor materials, and prevent these groups from moving freely throughout the country and across the Afghan border. At the same time, Pakistan needs to continue to support reconciliation efforts to promote a political settlement that bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.

94. What conditions, if any, should the United States place on its security assistance to Pakistan?

It is difficult to make a comprehensive statement about the impact of conditions on security assistance to Pakistan. The United States and Pakistan do work together on areas of common interest, but it is important to be cautious about explicit conditions on assistance to encourage or require Pakistani cooperation. Any prospective conditions on U.S. assistance should be carefully examined to ensure they advance U.S. strategic interests.

95. In your view, what impact will the conclusion of the International Security Assistance Force mission at the end of 2014 have on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship?

Following the conclusion of the ISAF mission at the end of 2014, the United States and Pakistan will still need to work to promote peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, cooperate in the fight to defeat al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other militant groups, and improve regional security. U.S. force reductions in Afghanistan will amplify the importance of Pakistani support for these efforts. It is, therefore, critical that the United States sustain its defense relationship with Pakistan, through 2014 and beyond.

China

96. From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how is that growth influencing the U.S. security posture in Asia and the Pacific?

China's rapid economic growth is welcomed by many neighboring states as a driving force of economic dynamism and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the scale and character of China's military growth is increasingly becoming a source of concern. China's annual defense budget is growing faster than its economy – with average annual increases in defense spending topping ten percent over the past decade. In certain respects, China's growing military capabilities create opportunities to partner and cooperate where our interests and those of China converge. However, China's rapid rise and the relative lack of transparency surrounding its intentions are increasingly perceived as threatening in the region, especially as its modernization efforts emphasize advanced anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. I understand the Department has been making investments focused on countering A2/AD environments around the world, including in the Asia-Pacific region. If confirmed, I would evaluate the impact of these developments – as well as the impact of other security trends – on requirements for the U.S. defense posture in the region.

97. What do you believe are the objectives of China's military modernization program?

As I understand it, China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery, and to counter third party intervention. China's near-term focus appears to be preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, and deterring or denying effective third party intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery. This broader focus includes military missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military medicine, peacekeeping, and counter-piracy. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear forces, and is improving other strategic capabilities, such as in space, counter-space, and computer network operations.

98. How do you believe the United States should respond to China's military modernization program?

I believe the scope and pace of China's military modernization and China's relative lack of transparency with respect to its military plans and programs require that the United States closely monitor the evolution of China's armed forces. It is my understanding that the President's strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region seeks, in part, to ensure that the United States remains the preeminent military power in the Asia-Pacific region so that we can continue to help preserve peace and prosperity. I believe the U.S. response to China's military modernization should be

comprehensive and encompass changes to U.S. force posture in the region, the strengthening of Alliances and partnerships, the maintenance of global presence and access for U.S. forces, and the modernization of key capabilities in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial capabilities.

U.S-China military-to-military dialogue has been strained over the past several years and efforts to establish and maintain mutually beneficial military relations has been hampered by China's propensity for not responding to requests for military engagements, although there are signs that China has been more inclined to engage in the past two year.

99. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations and what would be your intention, if confirmed, regarding these relations?

I understand that the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship has experienced positive momentum over the past year. If confirmed, I would look for ways to strengthen the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship consistent with U.S. interests and values, in pursuit of sustained, substantive dialogue; concrete, practical cooperation; and enhanced risk reduction measures to manage our differences responsibly. At the same time, I would seek to ensure that we balance these exchanges with continued, robust interactions with Allies and partners across the region.

100. What is your view of the relative importance of sustained military-to-military relations with China?

I believe there is value in sustained and substantive military dialogue with China as a way to improve mutual understanding and reduce the risk of miscommunication and miscalculation. I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region, to discuss the peacetime interaction of our respective military forces with a view to minimizing the risk of accidents, and to urge China to partner with the United States and our Allies and partners in addressing common security challenges.

101. Do you believe that we should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly move the relationship forward if China is equally committed to open and regular exchanges. If confirmed, I would support deepening and enhancing our military-to-military relationship with China. I would also continue to encourage China to act responsibly, both regionally and globally.

North Korea

102. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

Nearly a year has passed since the last period of heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula, but North Korea continues to be a serious concern for the United States and our Allies and partners in the region.

North Korea's December 2012 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test were highly provocative acts that undermined regional stability, violated North Korea's obligations under numerous UN Security Council resolutions, and contravened its commitments under the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.

My understanding is that Kim Jong Un remains in full control and is consolidating his power. There is a strong possibility of more North Korean provocations, as Kim Jong Un continues to consolidate his power and Pyongyang attempts to coerce us back into negotiations on its own terms.

If confirmed, I would continue to monitor the situation closely and work with our Allies and partners to maintain peace and stability in the region.

103. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

North Korea's missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and its proliferation activities, continue to pose a direct and serious threat to U.S. forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific region as well as our regional Allies and partners. Although these programs are largely untested at longer ranges, they could pose a direct threat to U.S. territory.

If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department draws upon the full range of our capabilities to protect against, and, if necessary, to respond to, these threats.

104. In your view are there additional steps that DOD could take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and weapons technology to Syria, Iran, and others?

I understand that DoD, with its interagency partners, has taken several steps to prevent North Korea's proliferation of weapons-related technology. These steps include strengthening proliferation control regimes, advancing international nonproliferation norms, and promoting cooperation with partners to interdict vessels and aircraft suspected of transporting items of proliferation concern. Despite these efforts, I believe North Korea will continue to attempt weapons-related shipments via new and increasingly complex proliferation networks. If confirmed, I would work to

enhance DoD's countering WMD, partner capacity-building programs and the Department's ability to discover and disrupt these illicit networks.

Law of the Sea Convention

105. What is your view on whether or not the United States should join the Law of the Sea convention?

I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. I believe that accession to the Convention would demonstrate a U.S. commitment to upholding the established legal order that codifies the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace, including those that are critical to the global mobility of U.S. military forces.

106. How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention help or hinder the United States' security posture in the Asia-Pacific region?

I believe that becoming a party to the Law of the Sea Convention would enhance the U.S. security posture around the globe, including in the Asia-Pacific region, in several ways. First, it would enable the United States to reinforce all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea codified in the Convention, including those that are critical to the global mobility of U.S. forces. A significant portion of the world's oceans are located in the Asia-Pacific region, and the ability for U.S. forces to respond to situations depends upon the freedom of the seas. Second, it would help the United States promote a common, rules-based approach among other nations to resolve their territorial and maritime disputes peacefully, including those in the Asia-Pacific region. Third, it would reassure some nations that have expressed concerns about the legal basis of cooperative security efforts that the United States supports, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Department of Defense Counternarcotics

On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1.5 billion to support the Department's CN operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that DOD "does not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities." This is the second such finding relating to DOD CN in the last decade.

107. What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?

I am not familiar with all aspects of the DOD CN program. However, I know that the CN program should provide policy guidance and fiscal resources to perform this important mission, and it has been successful in identifying networks and preventing

illicit drugs from entering this country. I understand the Department concurred in the 2010 GAO study that cited a need to improve performance measurement, and that DoD continues to work closely with the Office of National Drug Control Policy to refine these processes. If confirmed, I would ensure that the CN program continues to take concrete steps to improve its evaluation system.

108. In your view, should DOD continue to play a role in attempting to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?

Yes. In my view, DoD should continue to play a role in detecting and monitoring drug trafficking. Because of its links to terrorism and other forms of transnational organized crime, drug trafficking has become a major national security challenge. The Department's efforts to build the counternarcotics capacity of partner nation security forces have helped them prevent and deter global trafficking of illegal narcotics.

109. In your view, should DOD continue to fund the National Guard Counterdrug Program for Youth Intervention and local law enforcement education programs that may be duplicative of the efforts of other agencies, using CN funds?

I am aware that, in light of the fiscal environment, the National Guard has had to limit its Counterdrug youth outreach program in recent years. If confirmed, I would work with the National Guard Bureau to assess CN programs and to ensure they remain effective and efficient.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”) and the Global Security Contingency Fund.

110. In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?

My understanding is that these temporary DoD authorities are intended to address emerging threats, and as such the Department’s primary objective should be to develop near-term capacity for partners to take effective actions against these threats. From a strategic perspective, the Department’s objective should be to help partner countries develop effective and legitimate defense and security institutions that can provide for their countries' internal security. Doing so reduces the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States and promotes interoperability between U.S. forces and Allied and partner forces. If confirmed, it

would be my aim to ensure that DoD security assistance programs will fulfill defined strategic requirements and close vitally important capability gaps.

Special Operations Forces

The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces and enablers that directly support their operations.

111. Do you believe QDR-directed growth in the size of special operations forces can and should be maintained in light of current fiscal challenges?

The United States has grown Special Operations Forces substantially since 2001 – doubling the size of the force and tripling the budget. As U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, where Special Operations Forces have been heavily committed, the Department has an opportunity to rebalance the force to align it better with our overall strategy and declining resources. If confirmed, I would work with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM to understand more fully the issues associated with developing, employing, and resourcing our Special Operations Forces.

Special operations forces heavily rely on enabling capabilities provided by the general purpose forces to be successful in their missions.

112. In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient enabling capabilities can be maintained within the general purpose forces and that such capabilities will remain available to special operations forces when needed?

It is my experience that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) receive excellent support from the Services. As the Department reshapes and resizes overall force structure, it needs to ensure proper balance, including the right density of enabling capabilities such as intelligence, explosive ordnance disposal, communications, and medical support that are essential to both SOF and General Purpose Forces. If confirmed, I would work closely with our Service Chiefs and the Commander, USSOCOM to ensure the Department has the right balance across the entire force.

113. Do you believe special operations forces should develop additional organic enabling capabilities in addition or in place of those currently provided by the general purpose forces?

I believe organic enablers assigned to USSOCOM should be purposely designed for “SOF-specific” requirements. Service-common capabilities should fill the rest of SOF’s enabler requirements. This arrangement allows the Department to focus its Special Operations-funding on SOF-specific requirements and avoids duplication with the Services.

The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has sought more control over the deployment and utilization of special operations forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense modified policy guidance for the combatant commands earlier this year that gave USSOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the Geographic Combatant Commands and special operations forces assigned to them. It has been reported that the Commander of USSOCOM is also seeking new authorities that would allow him to more rapidly move special operations forces between Geographic Combatant Commands.

114. Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the Geographic Combatant Commands, or raising concerns with the State Department.

It's appropriate always to look for ways to manage the force more efficiently and effectively, and in this time of transition and declining resources this is increasingly important. At the same time, I believe the Department should maintain a proper degree of oversight and control of force deployments, as it does with conventional forces. I understand the Department will continue to rely on our Geographic Combatant Commands to oversee activities in their respective areas of responsibility, similar to how they oversee Service-led activities overseas. If confirmed, I would work closely with interagency colleagues to ensure deployments of Special Operations Forces are fully coordinated and synchronized with the Geographic Combatant Commands and the Chiefs of Mission and Chiefs of Station in the affected countries.

115. Do you believe USSOCOM is appropriately resourced to adequately support the Theater Special Operations Commands and special operations forces assigned to them?

I have not been briefed on any gap between USSOCOM requests and available resources. I believe USSOCOM is appropriately resourced to support the forces assigned to them. I understand a recent change gave USSOCOM increased responsibility for the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), which also receive funding and support from the Geographic Combatant Commands through their respective Service support activities. If confirmed, I would ensure the division of responsibility for TSOC resourcing is properly divided between USSOCOM and the Services.

Section 1208 Operations

Section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended, authorizes the provision of support (including training,

funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

116. What is your assessment of this authority?

Section 1208 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to combat terrorism in a wide range of operational environments - often where Special Operations Forces are operating under austere conditions and require specialized support from indigenous forces or persons. Although I have not been briefed on the particulars of these activities, I understand that Combatant Commanders and Chiefs of Mission place a high value on this program, and if confirmed, I would make it a priority to gain a deeper understanding of the costs, benefits, and risks associated with activities conducted under Section 1208 authority.

DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

The CTR program was historically focused primarily on eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the states of the former Soviet Union and Russia. The bilateral agreement with Russia has now ended.

117. What are the principal issues remaining to be addressed in this program with the former Soviet states?

I believe the principal issue that the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program needs to address in the former Soviet States is the threat posed by WMD terrorism. It is my understanding that the CTR Program has made significant progress to reduce the dangerous legacy of the Cold War-era weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition, I understand there is important work that could be done to assist partners within the former Soviet States to achieve the biosecurity measures referenced in the newly released Global Health Security Agenda.

118. What are the principal issues with this program in the Middle East and North Africa?

I believe that reducing the threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction should be the principal driver for the program in the Middle East and North Africa. One great example of this work that I am aware of is the Libyan Government's recent announcement that it had completed destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile with the help from the U.S. Government through the CTR Program and from the German Government.

119. Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S. government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the State Department?

My understanding is that the CTR Program and other non-proliferation programs executed by Federal agencies are coordinated well through the National Security Council staff. If confirmed, one of my priorities would be to ensure that all of the Department's activities in this area are well-coordinated with interagency partners.

120. As the CTR program expands to geographic regions beyond the states of the former Soviet Union, in your view what proliferation and threat reduction goals should the DOD establish?

My understanding is that the President has highlighted nuclear and biological terrorism as key threats, and that the CTR Program strongly supports these priorities with particular emphasis on biological threats. I agree with these priorities and, if confirmed, I would work to make countering these threats a DoD priority. I understand that in the near term, one of the high-priority efforts of the CTR Program is the destruction of the Syrian Chemical weapons and production materiel.

Prompt Global Strike

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the United States will continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the effort is early in the technology and testing phase.

121. In your view, is there a role for a conventional prompt global strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national security in the near future?

Yes, I believe there is a role. Prompt global strike weapons can provide a means for striking high value, time sensitive and defended targets from ranges beyond the capabilities of existing weapons or in situations where other forces are unavailable. The DoD technology development program is designed to determine whether the Department can achieve that desired capability at an affordable cost.

122. What approach to implementation of this capability would you expect to pursue if confirmed?

I have not had the opportunity to review the status of current technology efforts that support this capability. If confirmed, I will monitor progress, and evaluate costs and options for implementation.

123. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike capability?

Discussion of intelligence capabilities and their limitations is classified. If confirmed, I will seek to understand and identify what improvement in intelligence capabilities would be needed in the context of a prompt global strike capability.

Nuclear Weapons and Stockpile Stewardship

Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy are statutorily required to certify annually to the Congress the continued safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.

124.As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest challenges with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and security of the stockpile?

I believe the greatest challenge for an aging stockpile in today's fiscal environment is maintaining a balanced program to ensure that the current stockpile can be maintained and the infrastructure modernized, and that the science and technology program that underpins the program is adequate to meet current and future tasks. It is my understanding that the most recent stockpile assessment reports from our Nation's Weapons Laboratory Directors and the Commander of USSTRATCOM indicate that the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. However, the average age of U.S. nuclear weapons is 27 years, and the nuclear weapons complex includes facilities that date back to the Manhattan project. As the stockpile continues to age, efforts to sustain and certify the deterrent through warhead surveillance activities will become even more challenging.

I understand that DoD and the Department of Energy have made significant investments in the nuclear complex since the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. If confirmed, I would continue to work with Congress and the Department of Energy to update and execute a long-term modernization strategy that will continue to ensure the safety, reliability, security and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile.

125.If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing?

My understanding is that the Administration's investments in the nuclear enterprise, including the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program, continue to provide us confidence in the nuclear stockpile. If confirmed, I will look into this

issue and take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that our nuclear stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable.

126. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?

Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile is a critical national security priority. If confirmed, I would advocate for the required funding to do so. The Section 1043 report, which I understand has superseded the Section 1251 report, describes the Administration's plan for sustainment and modernization of nuclear deterrent capability, including how the plan will be funded. It is my understanding that DoD works closely with the Department of Energy, and other relevant agencies, to prioritize modernization efforts and align them with funding realities. If confirmed, I would continue that cooperation.

127. Can DOD afford the plan set out in the report?

Modernizing the nuclear weapons complex is imperative to our nation's security, and, if confirmed, I would work to ensure adequate funding for this critical national security priority. The current plan includes extending the life of nuclear weapons and investing in weapons infrastructure through refurbishment of existing facilities and construction of new facilities. I understand that DoD and the National Nuclear Security Administration are funding the B61 gravity bomb, the W76 warhead for Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, and the W88 warhead for Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. In the near future, cruise missile warheads and ICBM warheads must also be refurbished. The Nation's nuclear weapons complex also requires investment in new plutonium and uranium processing facilities to guarantee that critical nuclear components are available for warhead modernization programs. Even in a constrained budget environment, DoD and the Department of Energy, acting through the Nuclear Weapons Council, must work to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile.

128. Do you support the nuclear employment strategy released in June of 2013?

Yes, based on what I've seen in unclassified forms, I support the President's new guidance that aligns U.S. nuclear policies to the 21st century security environment. If confirmed, I would make sure that DoD takes the steps necessary to implement this policy. Consistent with the President's new guidance, I would support maintaining a credible deterrent, capable of convincing potential adversaries that the adverse consequences of attacking the United States or our Allies and partners far outweigh any potential benefit they may seek to gain through an attack.

129. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START Treaty limits for the

deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons? If so, what are the potential risks and benefits associated with further reductions?

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review concludes: "The United States will retain the smallest possible nuclear stockpile consistent with our need to deter adversaries, reassure our Allies, and hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise." The President has stated his willingness to next reduce U.S. nuclear forces by up to one-third over New Start Treaty limits. I believe such reductions below the New START Treaty limits should only be done on a mutually negotiated basis, subject to the trajectory of other potential threats.

130.If confirmed will you commit to participating in exercises involved with the nuclear command, communications and control system (NC3) in facilities and platforms outside the Pentagon?

Yes.

Tactical Fighter Programs

Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will face over the next several years is the set of programs to modernize our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology, to include the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

131.Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the requirements for and timing of these programs?

I believe the Department needs to transition to a 5th generation capability. We need the F-35 capability to address advanced threats world-wide, especially in the stressing electronic warfare environments of the future. If confirmed, I will review the Departments tactical aviation modernization programs.

132.What is your view on the affordability of these programs?

I believe affordability is critical to these programs, as well as with all of our acquisition programs and services. If confirmed, this is an area I will be reviewing closely to assess these programs in the context of the overall DoD program, and make appropriate adjustments in consultation with the Secretary and other Department leadership.

Even if all of the current aircraft modernization programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical, strategic, and tanker fleet will increase. Aging aircraft require ever-increasing maintenance, but even with these increasing maintenance costs, readiness levels continue to decline.

133.Can both the maintenance of the legacy force and the modernization efforts be affordable at anywhere near the expected budget levels?

Given expected budget levels, balancing the costs of maintaining an aging aircraft fleet while recapitalizing and modernizing that fleet is an area I would examine closely, if confirmed. I expect risk-informed tradeoffs to be necessary. The Department will have to continue to assess where trades are required to meet those readiness and modernization needs.

Some critics believe that there is still too much service parochial duplication in procuring new systems.

134.Do you agree with these critics?

I believe that the Department has improved in this area, but it is an area that requires continued vigilance and oversight to ensure the Department is not wasting scarce resources on duplicative systems. Service investments should be complementary to benefit the entire department

135.What steps will you take as Deputy Secretary to reduce such duplication?

If confirmed, I will ensure Service investments are complementary, and that any duplication I find is reduced appropriately.

136.What additional steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take in the future?

If confirmed, I will investigate what levels of readiness exist and any reasons why readiness does not match investments in maintenance. I will then determine what additional actions to take.

Unmanned Systems

Congress has established a goal that by 2015, one-third of the aircraft in the operational deep strike force aircraft fleet and one-third of operational ground combat vehicles will be unmanned.

137.Do you support this goal?

I support the goal of fielding unmanned systems with greater capability for the future, especially as our National Defense Strategy shifts to one focused on the Pacific Region and more sophisticated operating environments than what we have experienced over the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan.

138.What is your assessment of DOD's ability to achieve this goal?

Based on what I know, I think the 2015 goal is overly optimistic. If confirmed, I will assess the ability of DoD to achieve this goal.

139.What steps do you believe the Department should take to achieve this goal?

The Department should continue to focus on research and development efforts related to UAS and ground robotics technology, as well as on the development of concepts of operations and requirements for unmanned systems. This is vital to realizing increased unmanned capabilities that are properly aligned with evolving warfighter needs, at affordable cost. At the same time, if confirmed I will ensure the Department remains focused on being responsive in fielding urgently needed capabilities to meet the needs of today's warfighter.

Shipbuilding Budget

With about half of the Navy's construction and development dollars being needed to build nuclear submarines, the Navy's commitment to building new submarines could crowd out funding needed to modernize the surface fleet.

140.In your view, will the level of funding in the shipbuilding budget and certain high-cost programs force the Department to make requirement decisions in a constrained budget environment that may not be in the best interest for our national security?

There are multiple options to make the shipbuilding budget support our national security including new procurements, modernizing legacy systems and security cooperation with other navies. It will take a balanced approach to sustain a maritime force structure adequate for national defense with acceptable risk. If confirmed, I will assess the shipbuilding budgets and programs and the potential consequences to operational capabilities over time, to include the industrial base.

141.What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take to address this concern and ensure adequate funding for the ballistic missile submarine replacement program?

I believe the strategic deterrence value of the Ohio Replacement Program remains valid. If confirmed, I will evaluate the need for, and level of, funding. I understand the Navy is working to manage the affordability of the Ohio Replacement by managing requirements and leveraging advantages of the Virginia submarine program.

142.Do you believe that certain high cost "national assets" should be funded outside the services' budgets where they do not have to compete with other critical weapon systems modernization needs of the services?

At this time, I do not believe that moving programs outside of the Service budgets will protect programs or reduce pressure on the Department's topline. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to properly fund prioritized programs within the overall defense budget.

Cyber Security

Deputy Secretary Lynn and Deputy Secretary Carter were heavily involved in developing the DOD cyber strategy.

143. If confirmed will you also play a major role in DOD cyber issues?

In 2013, for the second year in a row, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper named cyber as a top-tier threat to the nation. If confirmed, I would invest significant time and attention to cybersecurity and to DoD's ability to operate effectively in cyberspace. I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense and others to make certain that DoD can accomplish its three principal cyber missions: to defend the nation from strategic cyber-attack; conduct effective cyber operations in support of combatant commanders, when directed; and defend DoD networks.

Test and Evaluation

144. What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between the desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to perform adequate testing?

Testing is needed to validate system performance, and I believe it is a necessary part of the acquisition process. The optimal balance of cycle time and testing is likely unique to each system, and, if confirmed, I would seek to examine opportunities to achieve this goal.

145. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we should procure weapon systems and equipment that has not been demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective, suitable, and survivable?

Systems should demonstrate their effectiveness, suitability and survivability through operational testing prior to a full rate production decision. In specific cases, based on the nature and seriousness of the deficiencies found in testing, it may be acceptable to continue production while the deficiencies are corrected. There can be circumstances when it might also be necessary to field a system prior to operational testing in order to address an urgent need in a critical capability, especially in those circumstances when the system is better than anything already in the field. Even then, operational evaluation should still be done at the earliest opportunity to assess the system's capabilities and limitations and identify any deficiencies that might need to be corrected.

Funding for Science and Technology Investments

In the past, the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Department's leaders have endorsed the statutory goal of investing 3% of the Department's budget into science and technology programs.

146. Do you support that investment goal?

Yes. I recognize the critical importance of a robust science and technology program that can develop and deliver near-term capabilities and maintain long-term options for the Department. As we consider the Department's future budget situation, every part of the budget must be assessed to identify the appropriate level of investment consistent with the Departments' needs and long-term strategy.

147. How will you assess whether the science and technology investment portfolio is adequate to meet the current and future needs of the Department?

If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Services and others to establish guidelines for investment priorities. Based on these priorities, I would work through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to assess the adequacy of the current science and technology investment portfolio and to identify any changes required in the planned program to address the Department's priorities.

Congress established the position of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to serve as an independent voice on matters relating to operational testing of weapons systems. As established, the Director has a unique and direct relationship with Congress which allows him to preserve his independence.

148. What is your view on the responsibility of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide oversight of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation?

If confirmed, I will rely on the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to provide both me and the Secretary independent and objective evaluations of system key performance parameters and their effectiveness and suitability for the Department's systems. This function is critical to advancing our acquisition priorities and ensuring the effective stewardship of our resources. I will meet regularly with the Director to review the scope, content, and findings of the operational and live-fire testing being conducted by the Department.

149. Do you support the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's ability to speak freely and independently with Congress?

Yes.

Ballistic Missile Defense

150. Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth in the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you implement them?

Yes, I support the conclusions of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The policy priorities laid out in the BMDR are still valid, and, if confirmed, I would continue U.S. efforts already underway to implement them.

151. Do you agree that operationally effective and cost-effective ballistic missile defenses are essential for both Homeland defense and regional defense and security?

Yes, even in these days of tight budgets, it is important that we invest in effective, affordable missile defense systems. If confirmed, I would support the U.S. commitment, described in the 2010 BMDR, to deploying capabilities that have been proven through extensive testing and assessment and that are affordable over the long term.

Ballistic Missile Defense

The two most recent attempted intercept flight tests of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets, one in December 2010, using a Capability Enhancement-2 (CE-2) kill vehicle, and one in July 2013, using the older CE-1 kill vehicle. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has indicated that MDA's highest priority is correcting the problems that caused these flight test failures, and that such corrections need to be demonstrated through successful intercept flight testing.

152. Do you agree that it is essential to demonstrate through successful and operationally realistic intercept flight testing that the problems that caused these flight test failures have been corrected, and that the GMD system will work as intended, with both the CE-1 and CE-2 kill vehicles?

Yes, I agree.

On March 15, 2013, Secretary Hagel announced plans to improve our Homeland ballistic missile defense capability to stay ahead of ballistic missile threats from North Korea and Iran, including the deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) at Fort Greely, Alaska, by 2017. Secretary Hagel stated that, prior to deploying

these 14 additional GBIs, there would need to be confidence that the system would work as intended, through successful testing of the GMD system with the CE-2 kill vehicle.

153. Do you agree with Secretary Hagel's "fly before you buy" approach that the GMD system needs to demonstrate successful operationally realistic intercept flight test results before we deploy any additional GBIs?

Yes, I agree.

In a recent report, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation said that the GMD flight test failures had raised questions about the robustness of the EKV design and recommended that the Department consider re-designing the EKV to be more robust. The Department is already planning a re-designed EKV, and Congress supported the funding requested for fiscal year 2014 to develop Common Kill Vehicle Technology.

154. Do you agree there is a need to improve the GMD system, including through development and testing of a re-designed EKV and improvements to sensor and discrimination capabilities, to increase the reliability and performance of the system against evolving homeland missile threats from North Korea and Iran?

Yes, I agree.

The Department of Defense has successfully completed deployment of Phase 1 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense and is proceeding toward planned deployment of Phases 2 and 3 in 2015 and 2018, respectively, to protect all of NATO European territory against Iranian missiles.

155. Do you support the EPAA and other similar United States regional missile defense efforts and, if confirmed, will you work to implement them?

Yes. Our regional missile defenses are an important element of our deterrence and defense strategies, and provide an essential capability for defending U.S. forces and presence abroad, and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I would continue to support the European Phased Adaptive Approach as well as other regional missile defense efforts.

Readiness Funding

After almost a decade of combat operations, each of the military services faces a rising bill for maintenance and repair. The Army has stated that reset funding will be needed for at least two to three years beyond the end of overseas contingency operations. The Marine Corps leadership has acknowledged that a \$10 billion bill awaits at the end of combat operations, but has requested only \$250 million for reset this year. The Navy has identified a one-year backlog of deferred ship and aircraft depot

maintenance. The Air Force has requested funding for only 84% of needed aircraft repairs this year.

156. What level of priority do you place on reset and reconstitution funding for the military services?

Reset and reconstitution are important to the Services as they transition from a counterinsurgency-focused force to a force ready and capable of operating across a full range of operations across the globe. Reset activities are funded out of the Overseas Contingency Operations budget. The Department needs these funds, and I understand that OCO funding, or some similar funding mechanism, will need to continue for several years. Some equipment can be repaired and some will have to be replaced if required for future contingencies. Reset and reconstitution requirements must be carefully managed to ensure these funds contribute to future readiness. If confirmed, I will work to ensure this happens.

Other maintenance needs are funded out of the base budget. Given the magnitude of sequestration reductions and despite some relief as a result of the BBA of 2013, the Military Services will have to make tough choices to balance their budgets to maintain the all-volunteer force, maintain readiness, and sustain infrastructure and modernization investments in equipment while continuing to give priority support to troops deployed in combat. If confirmed, I will make every effort to ensure adequate funding for these initiatives, consistent with the budget limitations that Congress places on the Department.

157. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address maintenance backlogs and ensure that the military departments request adequate funding for reset, reconstitution, and other maintenance requirements?

If confirmed, I would continue to monitor readiness reporting and work with the service secretaries and other components to ensure the Department of Defense is prepared to achieve the National Security Strategy goals.

Protection Against Internal Threats

The Department of Defense has fallen victim to numerous internal threats, leading both to physical attacks and loss of life, and the theft and exposure of huge amounts of sensitive and classified information. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included legislation mandating reforms of the personnel security system and integration of that reformed system with other elements of a coordinated insider threat program. Prior National Defense Authorization Acts mandated comprehensive insider threat protection programs coordinated with cybersecurity systems. The President issued a memorandum in late 2012 directing all departments and agencies to build and maintain an insider threat analytic capability that is integrated across many different domains and

functions, including personnel security, personnel records, counterintelligence, law enforcement, information assurance, and computer network auditing. These requirements present a daunting information technology acquisition and integration challenge.

158. What type of management structure, resources, and authorities do you believe is necessary to succeed in this endeavor?

I believe the Department must take a very deliberative approach to understanding and evaluating potential threats posed by insiders while simultaneously ensuring that privacy and civil liberties are preserved. As I understand it, DoD is working both internally and with OMB, OPM, and other agencies to develop better approaches to guard against insider threats. I believe this challenge, and the associated challenges of information technology acquisition and integration, require the sustained attention of the Department's leadership. If I am confirmed, I will utilize the tools and procedures available to me as the Department's Chief Management Officer to ensure that the Department meets these critical challenges

Annual Increase in Rates of Basic Pay below the Employment Cost Index

The Department requested an across-the-board pay raise for 2014 for military personnel of 1 percent, versus a 1.8 percent rise in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) benchmark, and has indicated that in order to restrain the growth of personnel costs, similar below-ECI pay raises may be necessary over the next several years.

159. What is your assessment of the impact on recruiting and retention of pay raises below the increase in ECI in 2015 through 2018?

From my time as Under Secretary of the Navy, I know our military compensation package is and must remain highly competitive in order to recruit and retain the high quality men and women who make up our Nation's military.

I understand that even under the Department's plan to slow the growth of military compensation, military members continue to receive a robust package of pay and benefits that compares favorably with private-sector compensation. Thus, I do not assess the below-ECI level pay raise as materially impacting our recruiting or retention efforts.

If confirmed, I will monitor this issue and remain vigilant to ensure our military pay levels remain appropriate and ensure the Department remains good stewards of the funds provided by the Congress and the American taxpayers.

Religious Accommodation in the Armed Forces

160. In your view, do Department of Defense policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of

religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?

Yes. From my previous experience as a Marine Corps Officer and Under Secretary of the Navy, I believe the Department is fully committed to the free exercise of religion.

161. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact good order and discipline?

Yes. That is my understanding of the current law and policy.

162. In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other service members with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?

Yes. I have had numerous opportunities during my decades of service in the Department to observe firsthand how chaplains strike this balance by considering their audience and the tenets of their faith before addressing groups in formal and informal settings.

DoD Instruction 1300.17, "Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military Services" provides that service members submitting requests for waiver of religious practices will comply with the policy, practice or duty from which they are requesting accommodation, including refraining from unauthorized grooming and appearance practices unless and until the request is approved.

163. In your view, does the requirement to comply with the policy from which the servicemember is seeking a waiver unless and until it is approved interfere with the accommodation of religious faith of a person, such as a male of the Sikh faith whose faith requires an unshorn beard, if that servicemember must comply with grooming standards that require that he shave his beard pending a determination of the waiver?

Servicemembers accept the standards of service upon entry into the military.

My understanding is the Department has recently updated its policy in this area to provide more latitude for members in favor of accommodation which can be approved on a case-by-case basis as long as those waivers do not affect mission accomplishment, military readiness, unit cohesion, good order, discipline, health and safety.

If confirmed, I look forward to receiving an update on the Department's revised policy.

Section 774 of title 10, United States Code, authorizes members of the armed forces to wear items of religious apparel, such as the Jewish yarmulke, while wearing their uniform so long as the items are neat and conservative and do not interfere with the performance of military duties.

- 164. Does DOD policy presumptively allow the wear of religious apparel or do service members have to request approval in every instance, even for the wear of apparel that is neat and conservative and that does not interfere with the performance of military duties?**

My understanding is that servicemembers must comply with the uniform policies of their individual Service.

- 165. Do you believe that requests to waive grooming and appearance standards and to wear of items of religious apparel are more appropriately addressed prior to the member's entry into military service?**

My understanding of the Department policy is that it does allow members to request waivers at any time during their service.

- 166. Under what circumstances would you consider it appropriate to grant waivers for grooming and appearance standards and for wear of religious apparel for all members of a specific faith group?**

Given my concern for the safety and well-being of our personnel and the often dangerous and austere conditions in which they operate, I cannot envision a set of circumstances that would make for a blanket waiver from military standards advisable. I believe the best approach is a case-by-case examination for each servicemember and duty station or service specialty.

- 167. Under what circumstances would you consider it appropriate to grant waivers for grooming and appearance standards and for wear of religious apparel for a member of a faith group that could remain in place regardless of new assignment, transfer of duty stations, or other significant change in circumstances, including deployment?**

Given my concern for the safety and well-being of our personnel and the often dangerous and austere conditions in which they operate, I cannot envision a set of circumstances that would make a blanket waiver from military standards for an entire career advisable. I believe the best approach is a case-by-case examination for each servicemember and duty station.

- 168. In your view, what is the appropriate role in assisting the Department to develop policy for religious accommodation for the following:**

The Armed Forces Chaplains Board?

To inform and advise Department policies.

Ecclesiastical Endorsing Agents?

To provide advice on specific religious practices.

Civil organizations?

I understand the Department often receives information from various private organizations and this information helps inform us regarding the views of the public.

Section 533 of the FY13 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) protects rights of conscience of members of the armed forces and chaplains of such members, and prohibits, so far as possible, use of such beliefs as the basis of any adverse personnel action, discrimination, or denial of promotion, schooling, training, or assignment. Members of some religious denominations have sincerely held beliefs in opposition to same-sex marriage.

- 169. In your view, may a member of the armed forces who has a sincerely held belief in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse personnel action or similar other adverse action, if he or she shares those personal views on the subject in an official capacity?**

It is my understanding that the Department has a longstanding practice of generally not supporting the expression of personal views in one's official capacity because of the likelihood of confusion between the two.

- 170. Can he or she be subject to adverse personnel action if they express personal views on same sex marriage in their personal capacity?**

My understanding is the Department does not inhibit the rights of members to talk about their beliefs, as long as such speech is free of compulsion or coercion and does not encroach upon the dignity and respect of others who do not hold the same moral or religious views.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

On December 20, 2013, the President commended the Pentagon leadership for moving ahead with a broad range of initiatives to address sexual assault in the military, including reforms to the military justice system, improving and expanding prevention programs, and enhancing support for victims. The President directed the Secretary of

Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to continue their efforts and to report back to him by December 1, 2014, with a full-scale review of their progress.

171. What is the Department's plan for complying with the President's directive?

It is my understanding that the Department is working collaboratively with the White House to ensure the report reflects its progress toward satisfying the President's goal of detailing major improvements in the prevention and response to sexual assault, demonstrates the Department's efforts and leadership on the issue, and shows clear measures of progress - both quantitative and qualitative.

172. If confirmed, do you expect to participate in the progress review directed by the President?

Yes. If confirmed, I will actively, and vigorously, participate in and support this review process.

173. If confirmed, what will be your role in the Department's effort to prevent and respond to sexual assault in the military?

The Secretary has made it very clear that eliminating sexual assault from the armed forces is a priority. I share his commitment. Sexual assault is a crime and since it erodes the trust and cohesion that is central to our values and our operational mission effectiveness, it has no place in our Nation's military.

If confirmed, I intend to be an active participant in the Secretary's comprehensive efforts to prevent this crime from occurring, and if it does occur, ensuring we protect victims' privacy, provide responsive care, professionally investigate these crimes, and hold offenders appropriately accountable.

The Department must sustain its focus and current level of emphasis on this issue and continue fielding solutions that inspire victim confidence. If confirmed, I will support these efforts wholeheartedly.

174. What is your view of the role of the chain of command in addressing sexual assault in the military?

I support the Department's position on the importance of retaining the Chain of Command as an integral part of an effective response to sexual assault.

Commanders make countless important decisions every day, both in and out of combat that impact the lives and careers of Service members and their families. They are accountable for mission accomplishment as well as the health, welfare, and readiness

of those under their command. Having a defined role in the administration of justice helps commanders carry out these critical responsibilities.

End Strength Reductions

175. What is your understanding of the Army and Marine Corps' ability to meet their end strength reduction goals without forcing out soldiers and marines who want an opportunity to compete for career service and retirement?

I understand that the Army will continue to use lowered accessions and natural voluntary attrition as the primary levers to reduce end strength. Involuntary measures, however, are necessary to achieve lowered end strength goals. The Army has taken a proactive and transparent approach to communicating the drawdown to the force. The Army is committed to a fair board process and will work to ensure an equitable process for transitioning Soldiers and Families by affording them the maximum amount of time to transition while connecting them with opportunities for continued service in the reserve component, civilian employment, education and healthcare prior to separation.

Similarly, I understand the Marine Corps is maximizing voluntary incentives to meet its end-strength goals. The Commandant of the Marine Corps provided testimony in November that he intended to work with Congress to “map out a resource strategy that protects our global interests as a nation, keeps faith with our service-members, and provides the greatest value to the American people.” The FY14 NDAA increased the allowable rate of drawdown for the Marine Corps to 7,500 per year.

If confirmed, I will be committed to achieving the highest quality force within our allocated end strength.

End Strength Reductions

176. What programs are in place to ensure that separating and retiring service members are as prepared as they can be as they enter a struggling economy?

It is my understanding that the Department's current Transition Assistance Program (TAP) provides information and training to ensure servicemembers leaving military service are prepared for their next step - whether pursuing additional education, finding a job in the public or private sector, or starting their own business.

177. What impact, if any, will the additional budget authority for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act have on the end strengths of the Services?

If the Budget Control Act's sequestration-level cuts remain the law of the land, not only would they force deep reductions in force structure, they would also starve the Department of funds for readiness and maintaining our technological edge. I understand that Budget Control Act spending caps remain in place for FY 2016 and beyond and there is significant lead-time involved in adjusting military end strength levels. This may inhibit the Military Services from using any of the additional FY 2014 and FY 2015 budget authority provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act for this purpose.

178. What is your understanding of the need for additional force shaping tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has provided the past two years?

Based on my experience as the Under Secretary of the Navy, I believe the Department has been granted the necessary force shaping tools to meet the drawdown in its current plan.

However, continued budget reductions may make it necessary to review the size of all components of the Total Force—the Active and Reserve Components, DoD civilians and contractors.

If confirmed, I am committed to studying this issue in detail.

Recruiting Standards

Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents unique challenges.

179. What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?

I believe our qualification standards are appropriate with respect to aptitude, medical fitness, and adaptability. Today, our measures of quality are at some of the highest rates over the history of the All-Volunteer Force.

In my experience, the All-Volunteer force continues to perform exceptionally well. Over the past 12 years of protracted conflict, the military has proven its ability to accomplish the mission when tasked. These standards have helped to ensure we have the strongest and most respected military in the world.

180. In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?

If confirmed, I will engage the Military Departments to make certain our policies are not overly restrictive and allow us to recruit a diverse force drawn from the best and the brightest of our youth.

- 181. In your view, are there any enlistment requirements or standards that are overly restrictive or which do not directly correlate to successful military service?**

I am not aware that the Department's military enlistment standards are overly restrictive. The Services employ medical fitness, adaptability, and aptitude standards that correlate to the physical, disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to succeed in the Armed Forces. We continually assess and modify our policies based on empirical data or changes in law.

Assignment Policies for Women in the Military

The Department in January rescinded the policy restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has given the military services until January 1, 2016, to open all positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The services are working now to develop gender-free physical and mental standards for all military occupations, presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender, to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards.

- 182. If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these standards?**

The Services and Special Operations Command are conducting the review and validation of their occupational standards.

If confirmed, along with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will monitor their progress toward integration of female servicemembers into previously closed positions, in accordance with each of their implementation plans.

- 183. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission capability?**

Yes. If confirmed I will ensure I will monitor the progress of the Military Departments in terms of reviewing and validating their occupational standards to ensure the standards are current, definitively tied to an operational requirement, and gender-neutral.

- 184. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be based on bona fide military requirements? If so, what steps would you take to ensure that such decisions are made on this basis?**

Yes, it is in the best interest of the Department to allow both men and women who meet the validated standards for military positions and units to compete for them on the merits.

If confirmed, I will ensure I monitor the progress of the Military Departments.

Systems and Support for Wounded Warriors

Service members who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their Service and the Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.

Rising Costs of Medical Care

The President's Budget Request for the Department's Unified Medical Program has grown from \$19 billion in fiscal year 2001 to \$49.4 billion in fiscal year 2014. In recent years, the Department has attempted to address this growth through fee increases for military retirees, while also attempting to identify and implement other means to ensure the viability of the military health system in the future.

185. Do you agree with the health care efficiencies proposed by the Department over the past few years?

If confirmed, I am committed to keeping faith with our troops and will continue to review military health care and be transparent about any proposed changes.

Efficiencies that preserve care and resources should be our first move. Given today's budget environment, we must continue to look for savings opportunities, and given the dramatic cost increases, this should include military health care.

186. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control the costs of military health care?

I understand the Department included proposals in the FY 2014 President's Budget that would slow the growth of healthcare costs while preserving and enhancing the quality and range of health care. If confirmed, I will continue this comprehensive review of all initiatives that would help control the costs of military health care.

187. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical costs on future Department of Defense plans?

As I understand the situation, health care consumes nearly 10% of the Department's budget and could grow considerably over the next decade taking an ever larger bite of our ability to invest in our people or in enhanced war fighting capability. I realize the healthcare benefit is a key component of retention for our men and women so I will

work closely with the healthcare leadership in DoD to find reasonable and responsible ways to stem this growth without breaking faith with our troops and their families.

Systems and Support for Wounded Warriors

Service members who are wounded or injured in combat operations deserve the highest priority from their Service and the Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis over the past several years, many challenges remain.

188. What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Department of Defense and the Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured service members and their families?

The Walter Reed revelations in 2007 were a sobering moment for the Department. I believe we have made significant progress in how we support our recovering servicemembers. However, there is still more to learn, and more to be done. As the military continues to draw down forces in Afghanistan and moves to a new readiness posture, the focus will be to ensure current practices are maintained and updated to prevent us having to relearn the lessons of the last decade.

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department's healthcare professionals to better understand both the visible and invisible wounds of war, and continue to support advancements in how we support servicemembers and their families through treatment, recovery, rehabilitation, and possibly transition out of service.

189. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded service members and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

If confirmed, I will be a proactive participant in making certain the necessary resources are in place to properly take care of our recovering wounded, ill and injured service members and their families. I am particularly interested in understanding the research initiatives we have in place to evaluate the effects of PTSD and TBI, making certain we are addressing these signature injuries of our most recent conflicts in a meaningful way.

190. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs achieve the Administration's objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?

I understand and support the Department's commitment to continually improve DoD-VA collaboration and ensure our support to servicemembers and veterans. Secretary

Hagel has made it clear that he intends to strengthen efforts with Secretary Shinseki to accelerate improvements to our interoperable systems and processes. I understand the Department has cooperated with VA and assisted in reducing VA's disability claims backlog from nearly 611,000 to 400,000 during the course of 2013 and the hope is it will continue to be reduced in 2014. If confirmed, I will support efforts to improve cooperation on joint initiatives such as the electronic health record, care coordination, medical care and transition issues. I look forward to working with the veterans community as well in identifying ways of reducing our claims backlog and outreach.

Suicide Prevention

The numbers of suicides in each of the services continue to be of great concern to the Committee.

191. If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping Department of Defense policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency of all service members and their families?

Suicide is influenced by many factors: stressed relationships, mental health, substance misuse, legal and financial issues, exposure to trauma, social isolation, and many other influences from the broader social, cultural, economic, and physical environments.

Suicide is a serious problem that causes immeasurable pain, suffering, and loss to individuals, families, survivors, military formations, and to military communities. The health and resilience of the force, our Military members, and our Family members increase our combat effectiveness, and our overall readiness.

I know the Department has placed a significant amount of emphasis on implementing a wide variety of resilience programs in place to help our servicemembers.

Suicide prevention requires our best efforts, and the attention of leaders at all levels. Thus, if confirmed, I look forward to learning more about these efforts and it would be my intent to become engaged in, and supportive of, these important programs.

Military Quality of Life

The Committee is concerned about the sustainment of key quality of life programs for military families, such as family support, child care, education, employment support, health care, and morale, welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD's budget declines.

192. How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment and retention and quality of life programs and your own top priorities for the armed forces?

Quality of life programs improve the well-being and resilience of our servicemembers and military families and enhance the Department's ability to recruit and an all-volunteer force. We cannot sustain the quality and readiness of today's AVF without also supporting their family adequately. It is part of an overall holistic approach to both readiness and personnel compensation.

Taking care of our servicemembers and their families is one of the Department's top priorities. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize those quality of life programs that effectively meet our servicemembers' needs and that of their families.

193. If confirmed, what military quality of life programs would you consider a priority, and how do you envision working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to sustain them?

If confirmed, I will work with the Services to sustain key quality of life programs that support mission and family readiness. The benefits of core programs such as family support, child and youth programs, spouse employment and education, and Morale, Welfare and Recreation programs are invaluable to the well-being and readiness of military families and deserve the support of the Department and Congress.

I will strive to enhance cooperative relationships with advocacy groups to leverage resources that optimize support for the military community.

Family Readiness and Support

Service members and their families in both the active and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them.

194. What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for service members and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced, especially in light of current fiscal constraints?

I believe the Department has a responsibility to help prepare families to face the challenges inherent with military service and deployments. Focusing on the social, financial, educational, and psychological well-being of military families will help to build and sustain resilient families.

If confirmed, I will prioritize sustainment of family resilience programs in the current fiscally constrained environment, while continuing to review and adapt them to improve efficiency and to maximize support from non-government sources.

195. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end strength?

Family readiness services including health care, non-medical counseling, education, and employment support must be available to families wherever they reside. Innovative solutions, such as web-based delivery systems, allow the Department to be more flexible and responsive to the diverse needs of the population.

The Department should continue to engage with federal agencies, as well as local governments, businesses, and non-profit stakeholders to address the myriad aspects of military life, and work together to provide the necessary resources.

If confirmed, I will consider these impacts on our military families to ensure their needs are met.

Medical Marijuana

196. What is your assessment on the need for legitimate scientific study of the efficacy of medical marijuana in alleviating the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder experienced by service members and veterans?

This is not something I have studied in detail. I would look to our medical leadership for an assessment. I understand that the Federal government's position is that marijuana does not have a valid medical purpose, but some research efforts have been undertaken.

Human Capital Planning

Section 115b of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and annually update a strategic human capital plan that specifically identifies gaps in the Department's civilian workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. The Department of Defense has not yet produced a strategic human capital plan that meets the requirements of these provisions.

197. Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies gaps in the workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key step toward ensuring that the Department has the skills and capabilities needed to meet future challenges?

I believe this type of plan, and the workforce skill assessments required to develop it, would be of significant assistance to the Department's efforts relative to acquiring

developing, and retaining the workforce needed to meet current and future mission challenges.

198. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements of section 115b regarding the requirement for a strategic human capital plan?

I will, if confirmed, ensure that the Department strives to meet the human capital plan under section 115b and assess the need for any changes.

199. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Department of Defense fully complies with these requirements?

Yes, if confirmed, I will continue to work toward ensuring the Department fully complies with statutory strategic workforce planning requirements.

Detainee Treatment Policy

200. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes. I believe the proper treatment of detainees is of paramount importance to ensuring the Department has principled, credible, and sustainable detention policies and procedures.

201. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes. The Department must ensure that it holds its personnel to the highest standards of treatment while detaining individuals in the context of armed conflict. Gaining intelligence from captured enemy forces is paramount to the war effort, and it must be done in a manner consistent with our values. Early in his first term, President Obama established the Army Field Manual on Interrogation as the "standard" for all U.S. Government agencies to adhere to. It is my understanding that this has been strictly adhered to throughout all DoD agencies, services, and commands.

202. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

Yes. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department continues to implement policies that are consistent with its current humane treatment standards.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

203. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes without reservation.

204. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Yes, if confirmed I am committed to provide information relating to my position and the performance of the Department.

205. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes and I look forward to working with the Committee and staff on advancing the Nation's security.

206. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes