

Advance Policy Questions for David B. Shear
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian & Pacific Security Affairs

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

- 1. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

I do not believe that modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions are necessary at this time. However, if confirmed, I would consider this question as it relates to my area of responsibility as I perform my duties as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (APSA).

Duties

Department of Defense Directive 5111.17 assigns the responsibilities, functions, relationships and authorities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (ASD (APSA)). The directive establishes ASD (APSA) as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on various matters relating to the Asian and Pacific regions, their governments, and defense establishments.

- 2. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD (APSA)? Will they differ in any way from those described in DOD Directive 5111.17?**

As I understand it, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs is the primary advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on defense matters related to the Asia and Pacific region. The ASD (APSA) is responsible for developing regional security and defense strategy; formulating and coordinating regional defense policies in support of the Secretary's objectives; overseeing operational execution of the Secretary's approved policies for the region; and fostering bilateral and multilateral security relationships in the region. This position is the focal point for Asia policy within the Department of Defense for the Department of Defense Components, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the U.S. Central

Command. The ASD (APSA) also represents the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in interagency policy deliberations and defense-related international negotiations in the Asia and Pacific region.

3. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I have worked closely and effectively with the Military Services and the Department of Defense Components in the Asia and Pacific throughout my career.

As a Political Officer in the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, I worked with U.S. Forces to strengthen our alliance while adjusting our presence in Japan. As the Deputy Director of the Office of Korean Affairs, I coordinated U.S.-ROK alliance issues with the Joint Staff, and most recently, as Ambassador to Vietnam, I helped build a new partnership that includes a growing military-to-military component. Assignments as a Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuala Lumpur and as Ambassador to Vietnam have allowed me to hone my skills as a leader and manager of large groups of people in a constrained fiscal environment. Finally, as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the State Department, I worked closely with the Department of Defense (DoD) and interagency partners to develop national policy for the Asia-Pacific region.

I believe that my background and experience demonstrate that close coordination between the diplomatic and military arms of government is essential for a successful security policy. If confirmed, I look forward to serving my country in a new capacity by representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and carrying forward our national security objectives in the region.

Relationships

If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

- The Secretary of Defense**
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense**
- The Under Secretaries**
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**
- Commander, U.S. Pacific Command**
- Commander, U.S. Central Command**
- Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command**
- Other Combatant Commanders**
- The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs**
- The Regional and Functional Assistant Secretaries**
- Commander, U.S. Forces Korea**
- Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan/Commander, International Security Assistance Force**
- Director of the National Guard Bureau**

If confirmed, I would report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I would also work closely with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I expect to develop and maintain close working relationships with Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands, particularly U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command and, as appropriate, with the Commanders of U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Afghanistan on policy and strategy issues involving Korea and Afghanistan.

If confirmed, I would also work closely with and coordinate with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Many policy challenges in the Asia-Pacific region involve resources and expertise that are distributed across the regional and functional portfolios of OSD. Examples of this coordination include working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on the role of NATO in Afghanistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict on counterterrorism; and the Director of the National Guard Bureau on disaster relief efforts.

Challenges and Priorities

4. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next ASD (APSA)?

I believe that the most significant challenge is managing a changing and dynamic security environment in one of the most critical parts of the world. The President has rightly acknowledged the importance of Asia to U.S. prosperity and security interests.

Toward that end, the major challenges the next ASD (APSA) will face include: managing an effective drawdown in Afghanistan; continuing to work with partners in Afghanistan and Pakistan to combat the threat of al Qaeda; continuing to monitor closely the evolving North Korean threat; continuing to work with China to encourage greater transparency about how it will use its growing military capabilities; negotiating the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance with international law; and ensuring that the countries in the region adhere to key norms and principles that benefit all nations.

Meeting these challenges requires continued implementation of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region as well as modernizing and enhancing U.S. regional security Alliances and partnerships to address both traditional and non-traditional threats.

5. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

I believe that the Administration and DoD have sound strategies in place for dealing with the challenges that the ASD (APSA) will face, particularly through the continued implementation of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.

If confirmed, I would work closely with others in the Department, interagency partners, Congress, and our international Allies and partners to understand more fully ways to address these challenges more effectively. This would include, among other things, analysis of current strategies and assessments, involvement in ongoing policy reviews, and continued senior-level engagement with Allies and partners in the region. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating closely with Congress on the range of challenges and opportunities in the region.

6. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD (APSA)?

If confirmed, I would be carefully evaluating the current strategies to determine if a reordering of priorities, applicable to ASD (APSA), is in order. That said, the key priorities to focus on would include ensuring the successful drawdown and transition of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to a train-advise-assist role and continuing to make progress against al-Qa'ida and its affiliates with our partners in Afghanistan and Pakistan; continuing implementation of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region – modernizing existing Alliances, enhancing our relationships with emerging regional frameworks and partners, working on a constructive relationship with China, advancing key norms and principles – to address shared regional challenges; and ensuring that the U.S. military is postured to protect and advance U.S. interests.

Engagement Policy

One of the central pillars of our national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, joint combined exchange training exercises, combatant commander exercises, humanitarian assistance operations, and similar activities are used to achieve this goal.

7. If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military? If yes, would you advocate for expanding U.S. military-to-military engagement? If not, why not?

If confirmed, I will support continued U.S. military-to-military engagement with nations in Asia. Throughout my career, including during my recent time serving as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, I have seen firsthand the importance of DoD engagement with the militaries of our Allies and partners in the region. I also believe the current and emerging security environment presents important opportunities to build productive relationships with many countries with whom our past military-to-military engagements have been limited or entirely absent. U.S. military engagement helps professionalize and improve standards of conduct

and capabilities of partner nation militaries, and is vital to advancing U.S. national security interests in the region.

8. Do you believe that these activities contribute to U.S. national security?

Yes, I do believe that these important activities directly contribute to U.S. national security.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided a number of authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”) and the Global Security Contingency Fund.

9. In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations in the Asia and Pacific region?

My understanding is that these temporary DoD authorities are intended to address emerging threats. That being the case, I believe that our strategic objective should be to help our partners develop effective and legitimate defense and security institutions. If our partners each can provide for their own country's security, this will help reduce the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States and promote interoperability between U.S. forces and allied and partner forces. If confirmed, my goal would be to ensure that DoD building partner capacity programs can fulfill defined strategic requirements and address vitally important capability gaps and ensure that these objectives are directly in line with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.

10. In a resource-constrained fiscal environment, how would you prioritize the types of programs or activities that should receive support under these security assistance authorities?

In a resource-constrained fiscal environment, I believe it would be important to continue to improve military-to-military and defense-civilian relations, while continuing to evaluate and re-calibrate the nature and substance of our relationships to ensure they are consistent with U.S. values and advance U.S. national interests.

If confirmed, it would be my aim to ensure our assistance programs supporting partner nations can fulfill defined strategic requirements and close important capability gaps; these objectives are directly in line with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.

11. In your view, what should be the role of the Department of Defense, vis-à-vis other civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of instruments of soft power (civilian expertise in reconstruction, development, and governance)?

As I experienced firsthand during my time as an Ambassador in Southeast Asia, building the capacity of foreign security forces is a shared responsibility within the executive branch, particularly between the Departments of State and Defense. Close collaboration between the Departments is a key characteristic of the Section 1206 authority, and one of its greatest strengths. I believe the Global Security Contingency Fund epitomizes this shared responsibility and provides an opportunity for the Departments of State and Defense to establish a new business model for interagency planning of security sector assistance.

Force Posture in the USPACOM AOR

Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region are planned over the next several years, including movement of Marines from Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea. There are also plans to increase presence in southern parts of the Asia-Pacific, including in Australia and Singapore, and to develop comprehensive engagement strategies with a number of other countries in the region. These initiatives will likely compete with other global commitments for increasingly constrained funding.

12. In your opinion, what should be the national security priorities in the Asia-Pacific?

I believe that U.S. national security priorities in the Asia-Pacific region, as outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy and 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, include protecting U.S. territory, citizens, and allies and partners; deterring aggression and maintaining regional stability; maintaining free and open access to the maritime, air, and space domains; deterring and defeating violent extremism; and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated materials.

13. In your view, what strategic criteria, should guide the posture of U.S. military forces in that region to best address those priorities at acceptable risk?

It is my understanding that the Department of Defense's strategic criteria include the development of a defense posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. The continuing U.S. Marine Corps rotations in Australia and the Littoral Combat Ship rotations in Singapore are examples of initiatives that support a more geographically dispersed posture in the Asia-Pacific region. Increasing the resiliency of U.S. forces in the region will require long-term investments in key capabilities. Reducing the U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa will result in a more politically sustainable force posture in Japan.

14. How, if at all, do the methods of forward basing, rotational forces, and agreements with allies for training and logistics activities support our national security priorities throughout the region?

As I saw firsthand during my time as Ambassador to Vietnam, bilateral and multilateral defense engagements with allies and partners in the region strengthen these relationships

and support broader regional objectives. Pursuing agreements (e.g., such as access arrangements) can increase the ability of U.S. forces to operate out of strategic locations and support the U.S. commitment to long-term engagement in the region. These forward operating forces engage in regular training events and exercises with allies, such as Japan and Korea, and contribute to regional stability and security.

15. In your view, is the right mix of these forward presence methods necessary to achieve an affordable theater posture at acceptable levels of risk? If so, how would you propose broadly assessing each method relative to its cost and benefit?

Yes, I believe it is important to evaluate the best way to leverage DoD's forward presence in the region and balance the demands on the force globally. I understand that DoD has established processes for deciding how U.S. forces are assigned and allocated globally, based on strategic priorities outlined in the guidance documents. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) also develops regional plans that prioritize the type and frequency of military engagements with allies and partners in the region.

16. How important is a forward basing strategy to the ability of USPACOM to execute its day-to-day mission? Its operational contingency plans?

I believe that forward-stationing U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region is vitally important to our national security interests, as it increases contingency responsiveness; deters adversaries and assures allies and partners; and contributes to security cooperation activities as well as day-to-day joint training events and exercises. In the event of a crisis, these forces can provide Commander, USPACOM additional response options due to their proximity in the region.

17. What do you see as the implications, if any, of the force posture changes in Korea, Japan, and Guam on the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in general? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and other locations in the Pacific improve U.S. security in the region? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula improve security?

It is my understanding that ongoing force posture changes will serve to strengthen U.S. presence in the region in line with the key principles of being geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. For instance, the reduction of the U.S. Marine Corps presence on Okinawa supports all three of these principles, most notably by developing a long-term U.S. posture in Japan that both sides agree is politically viable. In the Republic of Korea, U.S. forces will continue to work closely with the South Korean military to maintain a robust presence and provide unique capabilities to sustain security and stability on the Peninsula.

18. What is your understanding of the plans for the U.S. military presence in Australia and how, in your view, does the presence advance U.S. security interests?

In 2011, President Obama and then-Prime Minister Gillard announced two force posture initiatives designed to expand the cooperation between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps with the Australian Defence Force. In the first initiative, DoD would rotate up to a 2,500 Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) through Australia, and I understand that DoD has concluded two company-sized rotations of approximately 250 Marines each at Darwin. It is my understanding that in April 2014, DoD will increase the rotation to approximately 1,100 Marines.

The second initiative decided upon by the United States and Australia was for greater access for U.S. military aircraft to the Royal Australian Air Force facilities in northern Australia. These posture initiatives strengthen the Alliance and increase opportunities for U.S. forces to engage throughout the region. I support a more distributed presence in Southeast Asia that will better prepare the United States for the types of missions its forces are likely to face in the future, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).

19. In your view, are the levels of funding, manning and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region appropriate to the management of current and future risk to U.S. strategic interests in the region? Do you foresee a requirement to increase or to decrease those funding levels in the coming years?

If confirmed, I would work with others in DoD to assess the levels of investment and engagement that is required and sustainable to achieve U.S. strategic interests in the region. As the United States continues to execute defense initiatives, including developing advanced capabilities with direct applicability in the region, continued investment will be critical to demonstrating the U.S. commitment to the strategy.

China

China is viewed by some in the United States as an emerging adversary that poses a potential threat to security in the region, and by others as a constructive international partner that should be welcomed and integrated into the international economic and political community. Others yet believe we are at a crossroads somewhere between those two scenarios.

20. How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China?

As the President said when hosting President Xi Jinping last summer, the United States welcomes the continuing peaceful rise of China as a world power and that, in fact, it is in the U.S. interest that China continues on the path of success, because we believe that a peaceful and stable and prosperous China is not only good for the Chinese people but also good for the world and for the United States. I would describe the U.S. relationship with China as having elements of cooperation and competition. The United States

continues to pursue opportunities to engage where there is mutual benefit, while constructively managing those areas where we may have differences. Moreover, I believe that getting this relationship right will be critical to the future of U.S. national security as well as international security for decades to come.

21. To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of the United States and other major regional and international actors will affect the direction in which the U.S. relationship with China develops?

I believe that U.S. policies and actions can influence the direction of China's development. The United States has done more than any other country to assist, facilitate, and encourage China's national development and integration into the international system. However, U.S. policy and actions alone will not determine China's future, which will ultimately be based upon the choices that China's leaders make. I do think that there are opportunities for the United States to help shape the environment in which China makes its strategic choices and, in so doing, encourage China to adhere to international norms and standards of behavior in the region and globally.

22. What do you see as the impact of current global economic challenges on stability and security in China specifically, and in the Asia-Pacific region generally?

The full impact of the global economic crisis on stability and security in China and in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly will continue to play out over time. I believe that those who manage defense and security issues must be attentive to the connections between security and economic issues. If confirmed, I would actively work with colleagues in economic and diplomatic fields, both to guard against negative outcomes and also to seek positive ways forward where they may exist.

China's defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of military growth is to be expected for a country experiencing the kind of economic growth that China has had over about that same period, the types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China's intentions in the region.

23. What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program?

As documented in the Department of Defense's annual Reports to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, China appears to be conducting a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program which is focused on enabling the People's Liberation Army to fight and win high-intensity, but short duration, military operations in the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan appears to be the driver of much of China's military modernization, but China's leaders, under the rubric

of the “New Historic Missions,” have tasked the military to also be prepared for missions and contingencies beyond China’s periphery. If confirmed, I will continue to press for greater transparency from China in its military and security affairs.

24. How should the United States respond to this Chinese military growth and modernization?

I believe that the United States should continue to monitor China’s military modernization program while encouraging China to increase transparency in the military and security domains. The U.S. response to China’s military modernization should be flexible and supported by our sustained presence in the Asia-Pacific region, through continued evolution of our force posture; maintenance of our global presence and access; modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial; and strengthening of our alliances and partnerships. The United States has been and should remain the preeminent military power in the Asia-Pacific region. If confirmed, ensuring that DoD maintains an effective and flexible approach to China’s military growth and modernization will be one of my top priorities.

25. What do you believe are the Chinese political-military goals in the Asia-Pacific region? Globally?

In my view, the overriding objectives of China’s leaders appear to be the following: ensuring the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party; continuing China’s economic development; maintaining the country’s domestic political stability; defending China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and securing China’s status as a great power. Within this context, preventing any moves by Taiwan toward de jure independence remains a key part of China’s strategy. Within each of these dimensions there lies a mix of important challenges and opportunities for the United States that will continue to deserve priority attention.

26. What effect is China’s military growth having on other countries in the region?

The scale and character of China’s military modernization program are increasingly becoming a source of concern. Other countries in the region are closely watching the growth of China’s military, and how its military acts. China’s annual defense budget is growing faster than its economy – with average annual increases in defense spending topping ten percent over the past decade. In certain respects, China’s growing military capabilities create opportunities to partner and cooperate where U.S. interests, regional states’ interests, and China’s interests converge.

However, China’s rapid rise and the relative lack of transparency surrounding its intentions creates uncertainty, especially as maritime tensions between China and its neighbors in the East and South China Seas increase. Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have contributed to a greater focus on regional forums, where issues may be addressed multilaterally and the need to adhere to international law and

norms can be amplified. Such security concerns have also led to stronger demand signals from regional countries to the United States as a security partner of choice.

27. How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship between China and Taiwan, and how can we help prevent miscalculation on either side?

Since Taiwan President Ma took office in 2008, Taiwan has made considerable progress to reduce tension across the Taiwan Strait. In February of this year, representatives from Taipei and Beijing held their first official talks in mainland China since 1949. The meeting marked a symbolic development in the continued easing of cross-strait tensions. I believe the United States consistent policies, based on the three joint U.S.-China Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act - which include making available to Taiwan “such defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” - have provided the security and confidence necessary for an easing of cross-Strait tensions.

28. How do China’s efforts to establish a strategic presence in the Indian Ocean by securing and maintaining access to various seaports in South and Southeast Asian countries affect its political-military posture and influence in the region?

China looks to South and Southeast Asia as an area of strategic importance, which includes political objectives, access to resources, trade, and investment. With regard to South and Southeast Asian seaports, the important question is how China intends to use its presence. The United States retains strong relationships in South and Southeast Asia, and we do not view each of our respective activities in those areas in zero-sum terms.

29. What are your views of China’s deployment of warships to counter piracy in the western Indian Ocean and how does this deployment contribute to China’s ability to project power?

Generally speaking, I see China’s participation in counter-piracy operations as a positive development: it contributes to addressing a global security challenge; demonstrates China’s ability to use its military in a positive, constructive, and responsible manner; and increases opportunities for contact between our navies. To your second question, from this experience China could begin to develop capabilities to enhance its ability to sustain a deployed force over an extended period of time.

30. What is the role of DOD in helping to ensure that China’s nuclear power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region?

The Administration has reiterated that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, along with related technologies and materials, is a key goal for the United States. I believe that DoD should continue to work with interagency partners and through existing processes to ensure that any proliferation concerns relating to China, including its nuclear power industry, are expressed to the Chinese Government

clearly, consistently, and directly in appropriate forums, and should similarly support the development of appropriate interagency responses in the event that China takes steps that do contribute to nuclear proliferation.

Our military-to-military relations with the Chinese military can be characterized as modest at best and the Chinese approach to these relations can be accurately described as “on again, off again.”

31. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

The U.S.-China military-to-military relationship appears to have experienced modest improvements in recent years, highlighted by a series of senior-level visits and exchanges, and cooperative activities such as counter-piracy exercises. If confirmed, I would look for ways to strengthen the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship consistent with U.S. interests and values – and within the context of our overarching strategy in the Asia-Pacific region – to improve our ability to cooperate with China while managing our differences.

32. Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

I believe that military exchanges with China can be an important mechanism to improve mutual understanding, enhance communications, and reduce the risk of miscalculation between the United States and China. If confirmed, I would look for ways to strengthen our program of defense contacts and exchanges with China, consistent with our interests and with relevant laws, to explore areas of cooperation, encourage China to act responsibly in world affairs, and to manage our differences constructively.

33. What is your view regarding the longstanding U.S. policy of selling defense articles and services to Taiwan despite objections and criticism from China?

U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Act also provides that the President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. That policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30 years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I believe our arms sales have been carried out in a responsible manner.

34. In your view, to what extent, if at all, should China’s possible reaction to such sales be considered by the United States when making decisions about the provision of defense articles and services to Taiwan?

We should continue U.S. policy under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with “such defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” without considering China’s potential reaction.

By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air and space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, including China’s increased aggressiveness in asserting its maritime claims in the South China Sea and the recent declaration of its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).

35. What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime dispute in the South China Sea?

The United States is a Pacific nation that has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.

I agree with the assessments of the Departments of State and Defense that the United States should not take a position on the competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea. I also believe all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with customary international law, without resorting to the threat or use of force. The United States should sustain its presence in the South China Sea and uphold its commitments to its allies and partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region.

36. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation?

The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the East and South China Seas. Although the United States does not take a position on the territorial and maritime disputes, I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain a visible presence and assert its freedom of navigation and overflight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary international law.

If confirmed, I would work with our military commanders to evaluate the appropriate level of naval activities in the South China Sea to maintain regional peace and stability as well as unimpeded access for lawful commerce and economic development.

37. What should the United States do to help prevent dangerous encounters in the South China Sea?

To reduce the risk of conflict in the South China Sea, I believe that the United States should use its position in several regional organizations, including the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, to facilitate initiatives and confidence-building measures that will help generate momentum for claimant states to reach agreement on a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

How should the United States view China's recent declaration of an ADIZ zone that includes the area over the Senkaku Islands and does the declaration increase the risk for instability in the region?

38. As Secretary Hagel has made clear, the United States does not recognize and does not accept China's ADIZ. The announcement was provocative and raised tensions. If confirmed, I would support the DoD position that China's announced ADIZ will not change how the United States conducts military operations in the region.

Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential conflict situation.

39. What is your understanding of China's efforts to develop and deploy cyber warfare capabilities?

I understand that in recent years, numerous computer systems around the world, including some owned by the U.S. Government, have been the target of intrusions, some of which appear to have originated within China. Increasingly, U.S. businesses are calling attention to sophisticated, targeted theft of confidential business information and proprietary technologies through cyber intrusions emanating from China on an unprecedented scale. The international community cannot tolerate such activity from any country. Government-sponsored cyber-enabled theft for commercial gain is outside the bounds of acceptable international behavior.

40. If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack?

The United States, like many other nations, has been the target of innumerable malicious activities via cyberspace. I understand that numerous steps have been taken to increase network defense and monitoring capabilities. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, the current lead for cyber policy, to take action to protect our economy and national security against cyber-threats so that we are better able to protect our networks, critical infrastructure, and value private and public sector property.

Since 2009, DOD has been funding, under the Minerva Initiative, academic research focusing on the evolving relationship between technology and national security in China. The goal of this research is to create a better understanding of China's dynamic science, technology and innovation enterprise and its impact on its military.

41. Are you aware of this research and in your view, should DOD continue to fund activities like this to increase the breadth and depth of its understanding of the Chinese military-industrial enterprise?

I am aware of this research, and believe that DoD would benefit from similar investments in the future. China's military growth concerns us, and we are paying particular attention to Chinese investments in technology development as well as what they are fielding. We must do more than watch and analyze actions. To help understand future developments, it is also important to understand what is shaping those investments. As I understand it, Minerva Initiative research efforts in China help DoD understand the social, cultural, and historical factors that define China's strategic priorities in science and technology, drive its approaches to international engagement, and shape state-internal balances of power between political, military, and industrial forces.

In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community. Since then, China has continued its active pursuit of ballistic missile and anti-satellite technology.

42. What is your view of China's purposes for its pursuit of these capabilities?

In my view, this test was just one element of China's military modernization effort to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare.

43. What do you see as the long term implications of such developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

The question highlights the importance to U.S. national security and strategic stability of increasing the resilience of national security systems against threats to space-based architectures and developing space control capabilities. If confirmed, I would continue to pursue partnerships with commercial suppliers, collaboration with international partners, and changes in our own architectures and operational tactics that can improve the resiliency of our systems and strengthen strategic stability in space. I would also work closely with Congress in implementing Presidential and DoD guidance that directs DoD to retain counter space capabilities to address the growing space capabilities of potential adversaries, including anti-satellite capabilities.

44. What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space and the international agreements and efforts to prevent space weaponization?

I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, including that all nations have a right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, and that all nations should act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.

Space is vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies and partners. I support our long-standing national policies of affirming the right of all nations to use outer space for peaceful purposes, the right of free passage through space, and the right to protect our forces and our nation from those that would use space for hostile purposes.

Taiwan

Much of the recent discourse regarding Taiwan has involved the state of Taiwan’s defensive military capabilities and the U.S. commitment to do what is “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” as required by the Taiwan Relations Act. In particular, much of the debate about how best to enhance Taiwan’s current defensive capabilities has revolved around fighter aircraft and what air defense capabilities are most prudent and appropriate under the circumstances.

45. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-Taiwan security relations?

I believe that U.S.-Taiwan security relations have never been stronger. DoD works closely with Taiwan to ensure it maintains the defensive capabilities to deter and, if necessary, resist coercion from China. Since 2010, the United States has made available to Taiwan defense equipment and services of more than \$12.5 billion. If confirmed, I would ensure that the DoD continues to make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to maintain its self-defense capability.

46. What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

Our priority should be to assist Taiwan in implementing an asymmetric and innovative defense strategy to deter aggression from China. Taiwan’s military must develop a defense force that can challenge a larger adversary and undermine China’s ability to coerce Taiwan.

47. What is your opinion of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)? Enacted 30 years ago this year, do you see any need to modify the TRA to reflect the current state of affairs in the region? If so, how?

In my view, the Taiwan Relations Act has helped maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia for 35 years, and it continues to serve the United States well. Consistent with the Act, the United States will continue to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services necessary to maintain its self-defense capability, and at the same time maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms

of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

48. Given the increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait, do you think Taiwan is making appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities? If not, what is the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more appropriately in its military?

I believe that Taiwan should increase its defense budget to 3 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) and use these funds to implement an innovative defense strategy and adequately man, train, and equip its military, particularly as it transitions to an all-volunteer force. Low defense expenditures send the wrong message to China; and, it sends the wrong signal to the U.S. Congress and the U.S. public, who could be asked to come to Taiwan's defense in the future.

49. What military capabilities do you believe would be most effective in improving Taiwan's self-defense capability over the next 5 to 10 years?

Taiwan should implement a defense strategy with asymmetric capabilities that undermine the offensive capabilities by potential adversaries. To be effective, Taiwan's military needs to be resilient, which can be accomplished through increasing mobility, redundancy, camouflage, concealment, deception, decoys, hardening, and joint operations.

50. What do you believe should be appropriate criteria for the consideration of potential United States sales of military aircraft to Taiwan?

I understand that DoD is mindful of Taiwan's air defense needs and remains committed to supporting Taiwan Air Force's efforts to address the challenge posed by China's growing quantity and quality of fighter aircraft. If confirmed, I would continue to work closely with Taiwan counterparts to address Taiwan's air defense capabilities to ensure it is able to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

North Korea

North Korea still represents one of the greatest near term challenges to security and stability in Asia and deterring conflict on the Korean peninsula remains a top U.S. priority.

51. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and of the diplomatic efforts to date to persuade North Korea to comply with international mandates regarding its ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programs?

The security situation on the Korean Peninsula remains serious and warrants our constant vigilance. North Korea's December 2012 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test

demonstrate that the country has both the capabilities and the will to undermine regional stability in pursuit of its national interests.

Although a year has passed since the last cycle of provocation, North Korea's provocative behavior, large conventional military, pursuit of ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and proliferation activities continue to be serious concerns for the United States and our allies and partners in the region. Also, the murky nature of the North Korean regime and the unpredictability of the young leader Kim Jong Un add to our concerns.

If confirmed, I would support the longstanding U.S. effort to ensure that North Korea meets its international obligations. If confirmed, I would ensure that our military deterrence of North Korean aggression continues to support our diplomatic efforts to end North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

52. What is your understanding of the threat posed to the United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities, and the possible export of those capabilities?

As documented in the Department of Defense Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's continued pursuit of ballistic missile and WMD capabilities, and its proliferation of these capabilities to others, poses a serious threat to U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region as well as our regional allies and partners. Moreover, these capabilities, although largely untested at longer ranges, could also pose a direct threat to U.S. territory.

If confirmed, I would do my best to ensure that DoD uses the full range of our resources and capabilities to defend against these threats.

53. How has the new government of Kim Jong-Un changed the Department's risk assessments of North Korea?

If confirmed, I would actively review DoD's risk assessments of North Korea to ensure that we are prepared for all contingencies. This being said, my sense is that the Kim Jong Un regime has demonstrated some unpredictability, particularly with the purge and execution of Jang Song-thaek. We must remain vigilant against North Korean provocations given Kim Jong Un's continuing efforts to consolidate power, North Korea's tactic of escalating tension to draw parties to the negotiating table, and the onset of the spring military training cycle.

Republic of Korea

The long-standing alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region. This relationship, while strong, is undergoing substantial changes in terms of command and control and force laydown over the next several years.

54. What is your understanding of the current status of the U. S. security relationship with South Korea?

My sense is that the U.S.- ROK Alliance is very strong and is a linchpin of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States and the ROK are making shared investments in the security of the Korean Peninsula in order to enhance our combined ability to deter North Korean aggression. At the same time, our security relationship represents one part of a comprehensive, strategic Alliance and plays an important role in contributing to stability not only on the Peninsula but also throughout Northeast Asia and globally.

55. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?

The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea stands as a linchpin for peace and stability in the Northeast Asia and, increasingly, in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. I understand that the Department of Defense and the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense have been focused in recent years on improving the ability of the alliance to deter and if necessary, respond to, North Korean aggression or provocation, including by enhancing combined planning, increasing interoperability, strengthening capabilities for missile defense, command and control, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and realigning our forces on the Korean Peninsula. If confirmed, I would work to continue to make progress in these areas, as well as our combined efforts to assess and prepare the alliance for the transition of wartime operational control to the Republic of Korea.

56. Do you believe South Korea is providing sufficient financial contributions to U.S. Forces Korea under the current Special Measures Agreement (SMA) and the recently negotiated SMA for future years?

Based on the press reports I have seen, the recently negotiated SMA provides for a tangible increase in the ROK's support to offset the costs associated with stationing U.S. forces on the Peninsula and also promotes a more stable stationing environment by improving various aspects of the cost-sharing programs. It is critical that the ROK shares in the investments the Alliance makes to defend South Korea, and my impression is that the SMA sends an important signal in that regard. Additionally, the support provided through the SMA represents only one aspect of the ROK's investment in the Alliance and, if confirmed, I would work hard to advocate for continued shared investments in the combined defense.

57. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this transition takes place by the end of 2015?

I understand that the United States and the ROK remain committed to the transfer of wartime operational control on the timeline identified in the Strategic Alliance 2015 (SA2015) plan. Wartime operational control and transition have always been conditions-based. If confirmed, I would support the continued assessment and review of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula in the context of implementing SA2015.

58. How do we ensure that we continue to protect our vital regional interests, while continuing meaningful progress toward the transfer of command and control to the Republic of Korea and the relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula?

As Secretary Hagel and ROK Minister of Defense Kim noted at the last Security Consultative Meeting on October 2, 2013, the transition of wartime operational control should sustain and enhance the Alliance's combined defense posture and capabilities. Also at that meeting, I understand that Secretary Hagel reaffirmed the continuing U.S. commitment to provide specific capabilities until the ROK obtains full self-defense capabilities. Similarly, Minister Kim reaffirmed that the ROK is committed to developing or acquiring the critical military capabilities necessary to assume the lead of the combined defense. I support all of these positions.

59. Do you believe that the security relationship with South Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or should U.S. forces stationed in Korea be available for regional or global deployments?

U.S. military forces on the Korean Peninsula play a critical role in deterring conflict and supporting the defense of the Republic of Korea consistent with U.S. treaty obligations, and I believe that this should remain our principal focus. At the same time, the U.S. military forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula – as well as the armed forces of the Republic of Korea – have played important roles both regionally and globally in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and, I believe, they should be available to continue to do so in future.

60. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?

Both of these plans are predicated on the security benefits of being outside the tactical effective range of North Korean artillery. By being outside the range of North Korean artillery, U.S. forces gain operational advantages regarding force protection, survivability, and consolidation of personnel and equipment. If confirmed, I would look into potential costs savings to be found in this consolidation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula that include efficiencies, reduced costs, and contribution to the political sustainability of our forward presence on the Korean Peninsula.

61. What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe U.S. armed forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?

Under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953, when the political independence or security of the Republic of Korea or the United States is threatened by an external armed attack, both of our countries will maintain and develop appropriate measures to deter and defeat armed attack. Patterns of North Korean rhetoric and provocations necessitate that the two sides continue to consult closely so that Alliance responses are effective.

The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report established a policy and program priority for defending against near-term regional ballistic missile threats, and elaborated on the Phased Adaptive Approach to regional missile defense, including to defend against North Korean ballistic missile threats.

62. Do you support the missile defense policies and priorities established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region to defend against North Korean regional ballistic missile threats?

Yes. Development of our regional missile defenses is an important element of our deterrence and defense strategies as it provides essential capabilities for defending U.S. forces abroad as well as our allies and partners.

Japan

63. How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security relationship?

I understand that U.S.-Japan security relationship is very strong and remains the cornerstone of our security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan relationship has underwritten the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region for more than a half century. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in the region. The Joint Statement that followed the October 3, 2013, Security Consultative Committee meeting in Tokyo captures our full range of cooperative activities, which I fully support.

64. How does Japan's relationship with its regional neighbors, mainly China, North Korea and South Korea influence the U.S.-Japan relationship?

I understand that DoD encourages, to the fullest extent possible, a healthy and open trilateral relationship between Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States, in order to facilitate better relations with our two closest allies in Northeast Asia. A strong trilateral relationship is an important element of deterrence against North Korean challenges. We also continue to encourage both China and Japan to increase the level of

communication between the two sides in order to reduce the possibility of mistakes or miscalculation in contested areas.

65. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

As described in the October 3, 2013 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee in Tokyo, the United States would welcome any steps that Japan chooses to take that will enable it to play a larger role in the Alliance, and to increase its contributions to regional and global security. If confirmed, I would work with my Japanese counterparts to identify ways in which Japan could partner with the United States and others in contributing to peace and stability, including by examining the potential future roles, missions, and capabilities needed to meet the challenges of the 21st century. for the .

66. What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense?

I understand that Japan is one of the United States' closest ballistic missile defense partners. The significance of this partnership is reflected in the U.S.-Japan cooperation on development of the SM-3 Block IIA to which Japan has already committed over \$1 billion, Japan's hosting of one ballistic missile defense radar and plans to host a second by the end of 2014, Japan's co-production of the PATRIOT PAC-3 missile, as well as hosting a number of the U.S. Navy's ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis ships. This cooperation is significant in enhancing the ability of the United States to defend the homeland, U.S. forces deployed forward, and U.S. allies and partners from regional missile threats. .

The current plan is for the closure of the Marine Corps Air Station on Okinawa after the construction of a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab on Okinawa. While the Governor of Okinawa has signed the landfill permit to allow construction of the FRF to go forward, local opposition and a long construction timeline make the completion of the FRF uncertain.

67. What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?

In short, I am encouraged by the prospects for successful construction.

Following the approval by the Governor of Okinawa [Nakaima] on December 27, 2013, we are continuing to work closely with Japan to implement our realignment plans, including the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). As I understand it, for the FRF, the plan is simple – once it is fully operationally capable, we can leave

Marine Corps Air Station(MCAS) Futenma and begin the process for return. The Government of Japan is motivated to move quickly on this project, and we will work hand-in-glove to see it through. Until that time, my understanding is that we will continue to work with the Japan on sustaining MCAS Futenma so that it supports our operational needs.

68. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?

A revision to the Guam International Agreement signed last year by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State with their Government of Japan counterparts reaffirmed Japan's commitment to provide \$3.1 billion (in Fiscal Year 2012 U.S. dollars) in cash toward the construction of Marine Corps facilities on Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). I believe that this level of support is appropriate as it helps to ensure a strong U.S. military presence in the region while improving the political sustainability of the U.S. presence in Okinawa.

The Japanese funds will not only assist in the construction of operational and administrative facilities for the U.S. Marines, but also contribute to the construction of training areas in Guam and the CNMI to ensure the operational readiness of our regional forces. If confirmed, I would also support opportunities for Japan to train at these facilities.

69. How, in your view, does building an unpopular new airfield on Okinawa, one that could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of approximately \$3-4 billion, serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular?

Since at least 1996, the United States and Japan have shared the view that there is a need to relocate the existing Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma, around which a significant population has grown over the years. Since 1999, we identified a replacement site in the vicinity of Camp Schwab.. This was confirmed most recently in the Joint Statement issued by the October 3, 2013 Security Consultative Committee meeting in Tokyo.

I understand that once this facility is completed and operational, there will be substantial benefits to the areas of Okinawa south of Kadena Air Base, where the vast majority of the Okinawa population resides. At the same time, this facility will allow the Marine forces on Okinawa to maintain their operational readiness and be able to respond quickly as the regional emergency force. The Marines will be able to continue to train as they fight, as a combined arms team.

70. Is Japan carrying a fair share of the burden of the cost of the U.S. presence in Japan under the current Special Measures Agreement?

My understanding is that Japan is meeting its obligations as negotiated under the 2011 Special Measures Agreement. If confirmed, I would monitor implementation to ensure that Japan continues to do its part to sustain the U.S. presence.

Afghanistan

71. If confirmed, what would your role be with respect to U.S. activities in Afghanistan?

As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, I would be the principal advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on security strategy and policy related to Afghanistan, including defense relations with the Government of Afghanistan and coalition partners. I would also be responsible for the oversight of security cooperation programs in Afghanistan.

72. What are the key objectives of the campaign in Afghanistan and in your view are we on track to successfully achieve those objectives?

I have not received a full briefing on the current status of the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, but understand that the Coalition and Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) are meeting campaign objectives. The Government of Afghanistan is in control of all of Afghanistan's major cities and provincial capitals. The Coalition and the ANSF successfully blunted the insurgency's 2012 and 2013 summer offensive, and I understand we continue to make progress on our counterterrorism objectives.

73. What is your assessment of the performance of the ANSF in assuming the lead for security throughout Afghanistan?

I understand that Afghan security forces conduct the vast majority of operations unilaterally, and are in the lead for security across their country. I understand they performed well in the 2013 fighting season and held ground against the Taliban. This is a fundamental shift in the conflict. I am mindful that the ANSF has made progress but they are not yet fully self-sustainable, and they require continued support.

74. Do you support the transition of full responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from coalition forces to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by the end of 2014?

Yes. The only sustainable and long-term solution to the security challenge facing Afghanistan is an ANSF that is capable of providing security for a legitimate Afghan government. ISAF and the ANSF have been working towards this goal for years, and I believe that they will succeed.

75. Do you support the retention of a limited U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after 2014?

The President has described two missions for post-2014 Afghanistan; a narrowly focused counterterrorism mission against al Qaeda and its affiliates; and a NATO-led train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission to support the ANSF. The President has also made it clear that the United States must conclude an agreement with Afghanistan in order to remain in Afghanistan; this agreement would secure the necessary privileges and protections for our forces. I support the U.S. commitment to a long-term relationship with Afghanistan, as outlined by the Strategic Partnership Agreement concluded in May 2012.

76. If so, what in your view should be the size, mission, objectives, and duration of such a residual U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014?

Any post-2014 forces should be tailored to support the counterterrorism mission and the train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission described by the President. As the President outlined in his State of the Union Address, a small U.S. force could remain in Afghanistan with NATO allies to train and assist Afghan forces, as well as conduct counterterrorism operations, if the Afghan government signs the bilateral security agreement that has been negotiated.

The exact size and duration of that commitment remain at the discretion of our national leaders.

77. If the United States and Afghanistan are unable to conclude a Bilateral Security Agreement that ensures legal protections for such residual U.S. forces, should the United States withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan?

My understanding is that the Administration continues to seek to conclude the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) promptly.

As the President outlined in his State of the Union Address, a small U.S. force could remain in Afghanistan with NATO allies to train and assist Afghan forces, as well as conduct counterterrorism operations, if the Afghan government signs the BSA that has been negotiated.

The President will make the decision regarding the post-2014 U.S. force presence. My understanding is that he continues to weigh options, with input from military officials, the intelligence community, diplomats, and development experts.

The longer it takes to conclude the BSA, options for a post-2014 force presence become more costly and may become more narrow for the United States and our NATO partners.

The United States is prepared to sign the agreement and to support the long-term security and stability of Afghanistan through a continuing partnership.

78. In your view, what would be the consequences for Afghanistan's security and stability if the United States were to reduce its post-2014 military presence in Afghanistan to a "normal" Office of Defense Cooperation under chief of mission authority?

If confirmed, I would work with DoD and State Department counterparts to understand what we could accomplish through an Office of Defense Cooperation.

79. What is your understanding, as a legal matter, of when the current agreements that provide legal protections for the U.S. military between the Afghan Government and the U.S. Government expire? If a residual U.S. military force were to remain in 2015, would it have the same legal protections as the current U.S. military force does now even without the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement?

It is my understanding that the current Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan does not expire. However, the President has made clear that for a small U.S. force to remain in Afghanistan after 2014, the United States must have an invitation from the Afghan government.

If the Afghan government signs the security agreement that has been negotiated, the President could decide that a small U.S. force would remain in Afghanistan to train and assist Afghan forces and conduct counterterrorism operations.

The current end strength of the ANSF is around 350,000 personnel. At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Chicago in May 2012, coalition participants discussed a proposal to reduce the future size of the ANSF to around 230,000, with an annual cost of \$4.1 billion.

80. Do you agree that any future reductions in the ANSF from the 352,000 troop level should be based on the security conditions in Afghanistan at the time the reductions would occur?

It is my understanding that the Department conducts a review every six months to evaluate the size of the ANSF. The Department considers both the operational and security conditions to ensure that the ANSF force level is appropriate for the environment. If confirmed, I would participate in this review process and any decision concerning the final size and structure of the ANSF, including force reduction.

81. Would you support reinvesting a portion of the savings from the drawdown of U.S. forces into sustaining the Afghanistan security forces at an end strength at

or near their current level of 350,000 if necessary to maintain security in Afghanistan?

If confirmed, I would discuss these issues with our military commanders to develop recommendations for the Secretary.

82. What would be your priorities for building the capabilities of the ANSF after 2014?

If confirmed, my priorities for building the capabilities of the ANSF after 2014 would depend on the President's decision on a U.S. force presence and mission, as well as on the level of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund resourcing. Depending on these variables, priorities could include ministerial institutional development, ministerial logistics and sustainment capacity, and moving Afghanistan to traditional security assistance.

83. What do you see as the United States' long-term strategic interests in Afghanistan after 2014?

The United States has committed to a long-term partnership with Afghanistan. Beyond the primary goal of defeating al Qaeda and disrupting other extremists who present a serious threat to the United States, overseas interests, and allies and partners, the United States has pledged to support the development and stability of the government of Afghanistan as it takes responsibility for its own future. Once the Afghan government signs the BSA, a contingent of U.S. personnel could remain in Afghanistan with our NATO Allies to conduct two specified missions: training and assisting Afghan forces, and counterterrorism operations.

Pakistan

84. What is your assessment of the current relationship between the United States and Pakistan?

Since Pakistan reopened the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC) to Afghanistan in July 2012, the bilateral relationship has improved significantly, although there is still room for improvement. If confirmed, I would support focusing the defense relationship on defeating al-Qaeda, promoting peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, and supporting Pakistan's fight against militant and terrorist networks that threaten both the United States and Pakistan. Although there is room for improvement in the relationship, it is stronger today than it has been in recent years. However, Pakistan must take greater action to combat militant groups operating from its territory—like the Haqqani network—who do not openly target the Pakistani state. These militant groups undermine regional stability and threaten U.S. and coalition personnel.

85. Do you see opportunities for expanded U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on security issues? If so, how would you prioritize these areas of cooperation?

We should continue to work with Pakistan to promote regional security and counter the threat of al Qaeda. If confirmed, I would work to maintain cooperation in areas where our strategic interests align, while pressing Pakistan to take more direct action against all terrorist groups operating in its country.

86. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to combat the threat of international terrorism?

Pakistan has invested its military in fighting terrorism and has suffered enormous military and civilian casualties. The Pakistan military has deployed more than 140,000 personnel to the western border to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) operations. If confirmed, I would engage Pakistani defense officials to expand their COIN and CT efforts to target militant groups operating in Pakistan more directly.

87. What additional steps, if any, do you believe Pakistan should take to address the threat posed by violent extremist groups such as the Haqqani Network and the Taliban Quetta Shura that currently use their safe haven in Pakistan to launch cross-border attacks on U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces?

I believe that Pakistan must prevent these terrorist networks from planning and executing attacks against U.S. and Afghan targets. This should involve a stronger effort to target militant groups and prevent them from acquiring the necessary material to execute attacks. Pakistan also needs to restrict more effectively these groups' ability to move across the border and throughout the region.

88. What conditions, if any, should the United States place on its security assistance to Pakistan?

If confirmed, I would work the Department of State and other interagency partners to assess the level of our assistance to Pakistan, the return on that investment, and whether there is value in attaching conditions.

89. What impact do you believe the end of coalition combat operations in Afghanistan will have on (1) U.S.-Pakistan relations after 2014; and (2) U.S. strategic interests in the South Asia region? After 2014, assuming safe havens for international terrorists in Afghanistan don't grow, will Pakistan's relative importance to U.S. interests eclipse that of Afghanistan due to the presence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan?

I do not believe that the end of the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) combat operations in Afghanistan is a signal of U.S. disengagement from South Asia or a weakening of the bilateral relationship with either Afghanistan or Pakistan. In fact, U.S. engagement with both countries will remain important to support regional stability and secure our interests in the region. Vibrant defense relationships across South Asia will deter international terrorists from using South Asia as a safe haven to strike the U.S. homeland or attempting to acquire a nuclear weapon.

Burma

There has been a lot of discussion recently about increasing military to military engagements between the U.S. and Burmese military, which has a long history of human rights abuses.

90. What is the strategic importance of Burma to PACOM and how does it fit within PACOM's overall Southeast Asia strategy?

Burma's openness after decades of self-imposed isolation – its size, its strategic location between South and Southeast Asia as well as India and China, and its wealth of natural resources — has the potential to alter the geopolitics of the region. A strong, prosperous, and ideally democratic Burma could become a major player within ASEAN and in the region. Additionally, a successful transition to democracy could serve as a powerful model for many other countries around the world struggling to become more responsive to its people and a testament to U.S. willingness to assist with such transitions.

More immediately, Burma is the current chair of ASEAN, one of the cornerstones of U.S. engagement in the region. As ASEAN chair, Burma sets the ASEAN agenda for the year—including on such issues as the South China Sea—and is the host for all its meetings. It is my understanding that DoD is seeking to craft limited and calibrated reengagement with the Burmese military in support of reforms.

91. How would you characterize current military to military engagement with Burma and how do you assess its effectiveness?

I would characterize engagement with the Burmese military as crucial to the overall success of the ongoing reform movement in Burma. The military remains a key constituency in Burma, and without military support, the reform movement and transition to democracy will likely falter. I understand that the current limited military-to-military engagement is designed to incentivize support for reforms and improve the military's ability to institute greater respect for human rights, adhere to international standards of behavior, and submit to civilian control. I believe DoD should move forward with the calibrated and conditional engagement and continue to be clear-eyed about the Burmese military's poor human rights record and history of dominating Burmese politics and the economy.

In terms of effectiveness, I believe that the institutional changes the U.S. Government is seeking to promote in Burma will take time to implement and will thus require some patience. However, I agree with the current policy approach that makes any expansion of bilateral defense engagement contingent upon further progress by Burma on democratization, improving its human rights record, national reconciliation, and ending its military trade with North Korea.

Vietnam

92. What are the greatest challenges for greater engagement with Vietnam?

Vietnam's human rights record remains a major concern and, as U.S. Ambassador, I have supported the current policy of withholding lethal assistance until we see further progress in this area. Meanwhile, Vietnamese leaders will continue to attempt to balance its relationships with the United States and with China. We should continue to respect this reality and the pace of engagement with which Vietnam is comfortable.

We have come a long way in building a bilateral relationship based on mutual trust, respect, and understanding. I am confident that our two countries will continue to find ways to deepen engagement and promote our mutual interest in peace and stability in the region.

93. What is the strategic importance of Vietnam to PACOM and how does it fit within PACOM's overall Southeast Asia strategy?

As Ambassador, I have seen first-hand what an important role Vietnam plays in South East Asia, and have been pleased to support our strengthened bilateral security relationship. It's been an honor to serve as Ambassador during a time in which we have expanded defense relations. As you know, Vietnam occupies a geo-strategically crucial location along the South China Sea and its busy sea lanes. As a South China Sea claimant, it is also a key player in one of the world's most sensitive and important political issues. Its large population and dynamic economy make it a growing economic force in the region.

Vietnam often acts as one of ASEAN's most strategic thinkers on regional geo-politics. It founded the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+) forum in 2010, has developed new Experts Working Groups under ADMM+, and has been keen to develop ASEAN as a leading multilateral institution in many other ways.

India

94. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security relations?

The United States is investing in a long-term relationship with India – what the President has called one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century – and our bilateral defense relations play a key role in advancing this strategic partnership. I know that the Secretary of Defense is committed to continuing to build a relationship where close cooperation with India is normal, expected, and routine in areas such as joint military exercises, defense trade, as well as co-production and co-development of defense articles. If confirmed, I would work to support this commitment and to build upon the progress made by former Deputy Secretary Carter in taking our already strong defense relationship to the next level.

95. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

If confirmed, I would continue to strengthen our military-to-military cooperation, work together on broader regional stability, and expand cooperation in areas such as maritime security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), defense trade, collaborative science and technology, and co-production and co-development of defense articles.

96. What, in your view, is the effect on DOD interests, if any, of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India?

It is my understanding that DoD does not have direct equities in the civil nuclear agreement. That said, it shows us that big leaps forward are often possible with India – which extends to security cooperation. Of note, the 2005/2006 defense cooperation agreement that set the course for the bilateral defense relationship was signed the same year as the civil nuclear agreement, and the past decade has seen an incredible increase in military-to-military engagement, senior-level interactions, and defense trade.

97. What is your assessment of the relationship between India and China and how does that relationship impact the security and stability of the region?

As with the United States, China’s military modernization presents both challenges and opportunities for India. The relationship between these two rising powers – both engaged in serious military modernization efforts – has broad influence on greater regional security. We are pleased to see high-level visits over the last year as well as increased economic and commercial engagement, and we will continue our engagement with both countries to encourage positive contributions to Asian stability and security.

98. What do you believe the United States should do to assist the Indian government in the prevention of and response to terrorist events in India?

The United States and India have a shared interest in working together on counter-terrorism. Current U.S. counterterrorism efforts with India are led predominantly by the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security, with support from DoD. If confirmed, I would continue support for these initiatives.

99. What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and Pakistan?

The United States does not view the security situation in South Asia as a “zero sum” game between India and Pakistan, and we value our relationship with each country. We believe that peaceful cooperation between India and Pakistan benefits the entire region, and are hopeful that the two countries can focus on confidence-building measures that help resolve tensions peacefully.

100. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?

Regional security cannot be achieved in isolation, and we believe that Afghanistan must build positive relationships with all of its neighbors. India and Afghanistan have their own bilateral relationship; we do not view this partnership as any kind of threat to Pakistan, and we have continued to encourage India to be transparent with Pakistan on this relationship. As for lasting security in Afghanistan, if confirmed, I would encourage Indian leadership to provide continued support to Afghanistan through trade and investment, reconstruction, and assistance to the Afghan Security Forces.

Republic of the Philippines

101. What is your view of the current state of U. S.-Philippine military-to-military relations?

U.S.-Philippine Alliance relations are strong. In recent years, both countries have worked to hone bilateral defense activities to improve cooperation on mutual security challenges and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines' long-term military modernization.

102. What do you believe the U. S. goals should be in the Republic of the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?

With respect to security-related issues, I believe we should cooperate with the Government of the Philippines to ensure that the Philippines is secure internally; has a modern, professional, and externally focused military; and is an active contributor to addressing mutual security challenges in the region and globally.

103. What is your assessment of recent U. S. military efforts in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U. S. assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against insurgent groups?

For more than a decade, DoD has cooperated closely with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to strengthen its counterterrorism capabilities in the southern Philippines. I think that the ongoing effort to transition responsibility for internal security to the Philippine National Police is a testament to the impressive security gains made by the AFP and enabled by U.S. military support. I understand that DoD continues to assess the requirements for the counterterrorism mission in the southern Philippines as security in that region improves.

104. Has Super Typhoon Haiyan affected U.S. plans to increase partner capacity in the Philippines, especially with regard to maritime awareness?

Bolstering Philippine maritime domain awareness capabilities is an important goal, which predates the storm; however, I understand that identifying lessons learned from the typhoon response could be valuable and incorporated into future Alliance activities.

105. What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if confirmed, to ensure that U. S. personnel do not become involved in combat or law enforcement in the Republic of the Philippines?

Philippine security forces are already capably responding to internal security threats and reducing instability in that country. Through security cooperation and assistance, DoD aims to bolster the capabilities of Philippine forces.

106. In your opinion, how important is the Global Security Contingency Fund to U.S. security assistance efforts in the Philippines?

The Global Security Contingency Fund is an important tool in our capacity-building efforts, which will help to reinforce Government of the Philippines successes in the south and strengthen that country's maritime security and maritime domain awareness capabilities.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a key Asian power and is the largest Muslim country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and expand U. S. relations with Indonesia where possible.

107. What is your view of the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia?

U.S.- Indonesia military-to-military relations are very strong and focused around the four focus areas of HA/DR, peacekeeping operations (PKO), military reform, and extensive security assistance or cooperation engagements. This growing relationship is apparent in the increased complexity within exercises and the recent Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases between the United States and Indonesia.

108. What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian government is cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism?

It is my understanding that Indonesia has taken steps to improve its ability to respond to indigenous terrorist activities according to the rule of law and has been concentrating its institutional efforts on an active campaign to counter violent extremism.

109. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

We encourage increased military-to-military contacts as the U.S.-Indonesia relationship continues to strengthen. Our interactions have grown in complexity and frequency over the last decade, and we look forward to building on this momentum. This enhancement is contingent to Indonesia's continued progress in the area of preventing human rights violations and appropriately addressing violations when they occur.

110. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

I commend Indonesia for the strides it has made to institutionalize respect for human rights and accountability for abuses.

It is my understanding that, over the last few years, the U.S.-Indonesia military-to-military relationship has continued to deepen and expand. Support from the U.S. Congress is critical for ensuring that we can continue to deepen our cooperation with a key regional actor. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on the next steps.

111. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?

We would continue to enhance our institutional linkages with the Indonesian Ministry of Defense through increased engagement, subject matter exchanges, and professional military education. We would also continue to emphasize recent progress in addressing human rights violations, including: suspending from active duty military officials credibly accused of human-rights abuses; removing from military service any member convicted of such abuses; and cooperating with the prosecution of accused military members.

Central Asia

112. What in your view are the U.S. strategic interests in the Central Asian region?

As long as the United States has forces in Afghanistan or is supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), it is in the U.S. strategic interests that we maintain alternative supply lines through Central Asia so that we do not remain dependent solely on supply lines through Pakistan.

It is important that we continue to support the independence and territorial integrity of these nations, and ensure that they are capable of defending their own territory against extremists and narco-traffickers.

Beyond that, it is in our strategic interest to help ensure that these nations develop defense institutions similar to our own and with which we can work together to address future security challenges.

113. What opportunities, if any, do you see for expanding security cooperation with the countries of Central Asia?

I understand that the countries of Central Asia are interested in modernizing their militaries and learning from U.S. counterinsurgency experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is in the interest of the United States to assist them in this effort, within the limitations of increasingly tight budgets.

114. What is your assessment of the New Silk Road Initiative? Do you believe that increased economic integration among the Central Asian countries contributes to improved security and stability in the region?

I understand that the Department of Defense's Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and Local Procurement initiatives have helped to develop habits of trade and transit within Central Asia and Afghanistan. Increased economic integration of the Central and South Asian region could enhance stability, and the State Department's New Silk Road Initiative has the potential to build on these habits and promote greater economic integration within the region.

Combatting Terrorism

The Administration's National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups "that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia."

115. If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to counter terrorism?

I understand there is still a great need to maintain focus on pressuring al Qaeda's core while building foreign partnerships and capacity to strengthen our resilience against this threat. If confirmed, I would work closely with the countries in Asia to build enduring partnerships and capabilities, eliminate safe havens, and degrade links between al Qaeda and its affiliates and followers.

116. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated groups in the Asia-Pacific region?

There has been significant success in the last few years in the fight against al Qaeda, but al Qaeda continues to pose a persistent and evolving threat to the United States. Al Qaeda is still adapting to losses in its command structure, utilizing its safe havens for

attack planning, communicating guidance to its operational cells in the region, soliciting logistical and financial support, and providing training and indoctrination to new recruits.

117. Is there a nexus between terrorist groups and criminal networks in the Asia-Pacific?

During my time as a U.S. Ambassador in Southeast Asia, it was clear that the nexus between illicit non-state actors and criminal networks is strong. It can be found throughout the globe. Terrorist organizations are using criminal networks, including narcotics trafficking and arms smuggling, as pathways to move people and resources across the region. Criminal networks can provide financial support to terrorists, insurgents, and other adversaries, and contribute to global instability by undermining legitimate government institutions, fostering corruption, and distorting legitimate economic activity, including in the Asia-Pacific region.

In Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippines and Indonesia, U.S. engagement with these partner nations has helped combat violent extremist ideology and activities. The integration of operations by host nation security forces with U.S. capacity building, development, and information support operations has dramatically reduced the ability of violent extremist organizations to operate.

118. What more can the United States do in Southeast Asia to help combat the threat of terrorism perpetrated by violent extremists?

Our partners in Southeast Asia have successfully maintained pressure on the region's most lethal terrorist organizations, but the region still remains fertile ground for local terrorists who share al Qaeda's ideology and motivations. I support efforts to continue to build the capacity of governments that demonstrate their commitment against al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents. If confirmed, I would work with others in the Department, other U.S. departments and agencies, Congress, and partners in the region to continue to make progress on this issue.

119. Which Southeast Asian countries are most important in the fight against terrorism in that region and what should the United States do to enhance relations with those countries?

Consistent with the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the United States has developed a robust network of bilateral counterterrorism relationships with key countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Australia. It is my understanding that Indonesia and the Philippines continue to be top priorities for counterterrorism capacity-building assistance. I support continued efforts to work closely to enhance relationships with the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines through continued policy dialogues, security cooperation, security cooperation, and support to action-oriented regional frameworks that address CT issues.

Section 1208 Operations

Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

120. What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this authority?

My understanding is that Section 1208 provides the Secretary of Defense with the authority to combat terrorism in a wide range of operational environments where U.S. Special Operations Forces are often operating under austere conditions and require specialized support from indigenous forces. Although I have not been briefed on the particulars of these activities, from my time as a U.S. Ambassador, I am aware that Combatant Commanders and Chiefs of Mission place a high value on this program.

Department of Defense Counternarcotics Activities

On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1 billion to support CN operations, build the capacity of certain foreign governments in Asia and around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.

121. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?

From my time in Asia, I am aware that the Department of Defense's role in U.S. counternarcotic efforts is to employ militarily unique knowledge, skills, and capabilities to confront the range of national security threats associated with drug trafficking and related forms of transnational crime. I believe that DoD's CN programs are a cost-effective tool to build the capacity of our partners and Allies' security forces but also serve to deter broader conflicts that could require more costly military involvement. Given the networked nature of threats we face today, it is evident that the expertise, authorities, and skill of our law enforcement partners are essential enablers in efforts to achieve national security objectives.

122. What is your understanding of the illegal narcotics industry in Asia?

From my time as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, I am aware that Asia-Pacific criminal enterprise activities, including drug-trafficking, are organized on a business model of networked criminal service providers. There are a number of drug trafficking organizations that see the Asia-Pacific region as a lucrative market for the illicit products and attempt to buy influence and subvert governmental institutions. In addition to trafficking drugs, these organizations exploit their global network to traffic precursor chemicals globally. This can create instability, put civilian populations at risk, and undermine democratic processes.

123. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering – either directly or by, through, and with our Asian partners – the illegal narcotics industry in Asia?

I believe that DoD plays a critical role in countering the illegal narcotics industry in Asia. I understand that the Joint Interagency Task Force – West (JIATF-W) is USPACOM’s executive agent for countering narcotics, and works by, with, and through the U.S. embassy country teams to identify our Asian partners’ needs in-country. JIATF-W works with foreign and domestic law enforcement partners to provide training and support. Capacity-building efforts are the hallmark of JIATF-W engagement with Asian partners and contribute to a whole-of-government effort to hinder the growth of transnational criminal organizations, thereby reducing the risk to the U.S. homeland. I believe DoD should continue efforts to address the threats posed by narcotics and narcotics trafficking in the Asia-Pacific region.

On an annual basis, DOD spends approximately \$400 million building the capacity of the Afghanistan Government to counter the illegal narcotics trade. Despite this sizable annual investment, Afghanistan remains the “wellspring of the global opium trade, accounting for 93 percent of all opium poppy cultivation” according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). UNODC has also found that about 80 percent of the drugs derived from Afghan opium poppies are smuggled out by transnational organized criminal groups through the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan; the rest flow through Central Asia.

124. What is your assessment of DOD’s CN program in Afghanistan?

It is my understanding that the CN programs in Afghanistan developed an Afghan capacity to conduct CN investigations and interdiction operations with little U.S. support. This capacity was developed by building vetted Afghan CN police units and the Special Mission Wing. Afghan border units were trained and equipped to interdict drug trafficking and other illicit goods crossing the Afghan border and at Afghan ports of entry, including airports. Prosecutions of drug traffickers in Afghanistan have put narco-traffickers supporting the insurgency in jail and removed them from the battle space. The narcotics trade has been a key resource for the insurgency. CN efforts have been able to reduce that resource flow.

DoD has also established CN capacity-building programs in Pakistan and Central Asia to interdict drugs and networks trafficking Afghan-origin narcotics. A regional approach is required to ensure a greater impact on transnational criminal organizations and to disrupt the narcotics flow.

125. Do you think the DOD CN program in Afghanistan has been successful to date?

My understanding is that DoD’s CN programs in Afghanistan have been successful. DoD, in coordination with the Departments of State and Justice, has been able to build the CN capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. These forces are now capable of planning and executing

law enforcement CN operations with minimal help from the United States, and Afghan-only CN operations are occurring more frequently and with greater success. If confirmed, I would work with others in the DoD and in other departments and agencies to assess whether we should provide continued support to these forces post-2014 to ensure they remain capable in the future.

Law of the Sea

126. Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea? If so, why?

I believe accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea would send a clear signal that the United States remains committed to advancing rule of law, in the world's oceans. The United States is at the forefront of promoting rule of law and under the Convention the United States would have the legal foundation for navigational rights needed to project power, respond to crises, reassure our allies and partners, sustain deployed forces, and secure sea and air lines of communication. Supporting the Convention would further sustain our economic prosperity and trade worldwide.

127. Would U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention benefit the U.S. military's mission in the Asia-Pacific region? If so, how?

It is my belief that U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would be of great benefit to the U.S. military's mission in the Asia-Pacific region. Accession would enhance the United States' exercise of the Convention's freedom of navigation and overflight rights. Accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention would also support combined operations with Asia-Pacific partners and the Proliferation Security Initiative, strengthen the U.S. position in discussions with China, substantiate undisputed title to our extended continental shelf area, and further establish the United States as a leader in future developments in the law of the sea. Additionally, accession would further add to U.S. credibility in a myriad of Asia-focused multilateral venues where Law of the Sea issues are debated.

POW/MIA Accounting Efforts

Recovery of remains of U. S. service members from World War II, the Korean War, and the Viet Nam war continues to be a high priority.

128. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the PACOM area of responsibility?

As I can personally attest to from my time as the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, POW/MIA recovery is a whole-of-government effort. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs, the State Department, and U.S. Pacific Command to provide the utmost support.

Foreign Language Policy

In 2005, the Department of Defense approved the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap to improve the Department's foreign language capability and regional area expertise. Since then, the Department has been working toward implementing that roadmap.

129. How many Mandarin and/or Cantonese speakers does the Department of Defense have in intelligence analyst positions?

Unfortunately, I have not yet examined this issue in detail. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress and the Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness to assess DoD requirements for capabilities in foreign languages and regional areas of expertise.

130. Is this number sufficient to ensure good intelligence assessments for use by the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

See previous answer.

131. In your view, how should the United States expand the foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel in order to improve the quality of intelligence input to, and policy output by, the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

See previous answer.

Counter Threat Finance

A number of officials in DOD and the intelligence community (IC) have called for investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

132. What are your views on the role of DOD in counter-threat finance activities?

Our nation's adversaries require access to financial networks to conduct their operations. To counter these activities, U.S. Government departments and agencies must cooperate together, using their respective capabilities, to trace and stop the flow of money to our adversaries, and to interdict adversaries' funding sources in non-kinetic ways. Although DoD is not the lead U.S. agency for conducting counter-threat finance (CTF) actions, DoD does have unique capabilities that can assist other U.S. departments and agencies and partner nations in accomplishing the CTF mission. I believe that DoD should continue to support U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Department of the Treasury, the Intelligence Community, and others with these unique DoD capabilities, which include planning, intelligence analysis and tools, and the integration of intelligence into operations.

133. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?

I believe DoD should continue to support U.S. Government efforts and international partners with CTF assistance, within existing DoD resources, while ensuring that DoD CTF support reflects U.S. defense priorities. Through this support, DoD can enhance the U.S. Government's ability to target our adversaries successfully through financial and law enforcement actions.

The Haqqani Network in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region poses a major threat to the security of U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces in Afghanistan, both by conducting direct attacks on those forces and by providing sanctuary to other militant extremists.

134. In your view, should additional steps be taken to track and counter the financial activities of the Haqqani Network, and if so, what role – if any – should DOD play?

The Haqqani network poses a grave threat to U.S. persons and to U.S. interests. This threat requires a whole-of-government response. I believe that DoD should continue to provide support in order to assist U. S. Government efforts to target the financial activities of terrorist networks such as the Haqqani Network.

Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people.

135. Do you think expanding counter threat finance activities in the Asia-Pacific region would be beneficial? If so, what role – if any – should DOD play in those activities?

I believe that counter-threat finance cooperation with Allies and partners in Asia and the Pacific benefits our nations' security. If we are to succeed in stopping transnational criminal organizations, we must pursue transnational cooperation. If confirmed, I would recommend that DoD continue to provide support, within available authorities and resources, to other departments and agencies and to foreign partners, so that we can strengthen our collective capabilities to interdict the flow of financial resources to Asia-Pacific region transnational criminal organizations.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

136. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

137. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

Yes.

138. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

139. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.