

**Advance Policy Questions for Dr. Jo Ann Rooney**  
**Nominee for Under Secretary of the Navy**

**Defense Reforms**

**The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.**

**Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater Nichols Act provisions?**

**Answer:** I do not see the need to modify any provision of the Goldwater Nichols Act.

**If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

**Answer:** I do not see the need to modify any provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act.

**Qualifications**

**What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will bring over twenty-five years of senior leadership experience to this position along with education credentials in finance, law, taxation, and education. In my most recent role in DOD, I had the honor and privilege to serve as Acting Under Secretary/Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. In this role, I was responsible for Total Force Management as it relates to Health Affairs, National Guard and Reserve Affairs and Readiness and Force management including: military personnel policies, civilian personnel policies, readiness, military, community and family programs, equal opportunity, morale, welfare, recreation and quality of life matters. I had direct responsibility and accountability for over 30,000 employees and a budget of \$73 billion including: the oversight and administration of the \$50 billion Defense Health Program (including all military treatment facilities (59 hospitals and 360 clinics), the Graduate Medical University and Tricare Management Activities); Defense Commissaries and Exchanges with \$14.5 billion in annual sales; the Defense Education Activity which supports over 100,000 students worldwide; and the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute. In addition, as acting USD/ PDUSD and a member of the Secretary's senior leadership team, I actively participated alongside uniformed service leaders in the development of the Defense Strategy and defense budget for fiscal years 2013-2017. During my tenure, we worked closely with senior military and civilian

leaders across all services on the implementing the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” and the review of benefits post-repeal; completion of the Women In the Service Report; development of the initial rollout of enhanced sexual assault prevention programs and policies; directing the Dover Port Mortuary task force and response (including direct meetings with family members); ongoing improvements to the Disability Evaluation System for wounded, ill and injured service members across each of the uniformed services including enhancement of programs for treatment and diagnoses for PTSD and TBI; reviewing military compensation including retirement reform; developing a new policy and program resulting in a fundamental re-design of the manner in which service members are transitioned to veterans status (TAP); and developing the risk mitigation plan for the Secretary of Defense in response to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s risk assessment. Along with the DepSecVA, I co-chaired the DOD/VA Joint Executive Council (JEC) bringing together military and civilian leadership from both departments to make decisions addressing key issues involving both agencies.

During eight years as president of a doctoral level university, we successfully addressed serious financial challenges enabling the institution to realize significant operating surpluses after years of deficits. In addition, we developed an innovative educational model that directly impacted retention, graduation rates and student success. Various corporate and civic engagements have enabled me to lead organizations through dynamic structural and financial challenges allowing them to better serve their constituents. In particular, my work on the JHSMH health care system board of trustees as vice-chair, allowed me to be directly involved in developing policies and procedures impacting patient care, safety, operating efficiencies and human resource policies across a system of approximately \$1 billion encompassing ambulatory, community hospital and tertiary care facilities, an inpatient psychiatric hospital, comprehensive rehabilitation facility, and clinical research.

## **Duties**

**Section 5015 of Title 10, United States Code, states the Under Secretary of the Navy shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe.**

**What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy?**

**Answer:** The statutory duties and functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy are broadly defined to “perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe.” By statute, the Under Secretary is first in succession in the event of the Secretary of the Navy dies, resigns, is removed from office, is absent or is disabled. By regulation, The Under Secretary is designated as the deputy and principal assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and acts with full authority of the Secretary in managing the Department of the Navy. The Under Secretary serves as the Chief of Staff of the Secretariat and the Chief Operating Officer of the Department. In accordance with

section 904(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the Under Secretary is also the Department's Chief Management Officer.

**What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy, as set forth in section 5015 of title 10, United States Code, or in Department of Defense regulations pertaining to functions of the Under Secretary of the Navy?**

**Answer:** I have reviewed the statutory and regulatory functions of the Secretary of the Navy and presently do not recommend any modification. If confirmed and I identify areas that I believe merit changes, I will propose those changes through the appropriate established processes.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if any, do you expect will be prescribed for you?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary of the Navy to further his vision and goals for the Navy and Marine Corps. I expect the Secretary will assign me duties consistent with my background, my strengths, and the present needs of the Department of the Navy.

**Section 904(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, directs the Secretary of a military department to designate the Under Secretary of such military department to assume the primary management responsibility for business operations.**

**What is your understanding of the business operations responsibilities of the Under Secretary of the Navy?**

**Answer:** The Under Secretary of the Navy is responsible for overseeing all business operations of the Department. More specifically, the Under Secretary of the Navy directs the shaping of a leaner, more integrated, and simplified business environment and guides opportunities to streamline processes.

### **Relationships**

**Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Under Secretary of the Navy to the following officials:**

**A. The Secretary of Defense.**

**Answer:** The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. The Secretary of the Navy reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and ensures that his priorities are implemented in the Department of the Navy. When acting as the Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary would do the same.

**B. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.**

**Answer:** The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on occasion, serves as acting Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of Defense also serves as the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on a range of matters to include supporting the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his role as Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense.

**C. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense.**

**Answer:** The Deputy Chief Management Officer is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for matters relating to the management and improvement of integrated DoD business operations. If confirmed, I will work directly with the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DoD CMO) and the DoD DCMO on the full range of matters involving the management of the DoD. If confirmed, I will assist in the development of a comprehensive Departmental transformation plan and business systems architecture and oversee the identification and implementation of potential business process improvements.

**D. The Director of the Business Transformation Agency.**

**Answer:** I understand that this agency was disestablished by the Secretary of Defense in 2011 and transferred functions to the Department of Defense Deputy Chief Management Officer.

**E. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

**Answer:** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman through the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps on appropriate matters affecting the Navy and Marine Corps.

**F. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

**Answer:** The Vice Chairman has the same statutory authorities and obligations as other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When performing duties as the Acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman's relationship with the combatant commanders is exactly the same as that of the Chairman. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Vice Chairman through the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps on appropriate matters affecting the Navy and Marine Corps.

**G. The Secretary of the Navy.**

**Answer:** Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Navy. The Under Secretary of the Navy is the deputy and principal assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and acts with full authority of the Secretary in managing the Department of the Navy.

**H. The Chief of Naval Operations.**

**Answer:** The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) performs his duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Navy and is directly responsible to the Secretary according to Title 10. The Under Secretary deals directly with the CNO in all Department leadership meetings and when acting in the Secretary's stead. The Under Secretary works most closely with the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO). If confirmed, I would foster a close working relationship with the CNO and the VCNO to ensure that policies and resources are appropriate to meet the needs of the Navy and respect the CNO's additional responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**I. The Commandant of the Marine Corps.**

**Answer:** The Commandant of the Marine Corps performs his duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Navy and is directly responsible to the Secretary according to Title 10. The Under Secretary deals directly with the Commandant of the Marine Corps in all Department leadership meetings and when acting in the Secretary's stead. The Under Secretary works most closely with the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. If confirmed, I would foster a close working relationship with the Commandant and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure that policies and resources are appropriate to meet the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps, and respect the Commandant's additional responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**J. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.**

**Answer:** There are four Assistant Secretaries of the Navy performing statutory functions and such duties as the Secretary prescribes. If confirmed, I will work with each of the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy to achieve the Secretary's goals.

**K. The General Counsel of the Navy.**

**Answer:** The General Counsel of the Navy serves as the senior civilian legal advisor to the Department of the Navy, the Secretary's chief ethics official and performs such functions as the Secretary of the Navy shall direct. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel to achieve the Secretary's goals.

**L. The Inspector General of the Navy.**

**Answer:** The Navy Inspector General is in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. When directed, the Navy Inspector General inquires into and reports upon any matter that affects the discipline or military efficiency of the Department of the Navy. He shall make such inspections, investigations, and reports as the Secretary of the Navy directs. He also proposes programs of inspections and investigations as appropriate. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Inspector General to achieve the Secretary's goals.

**M. The Surgeon General of the Navy.**

**Answer:** The Surgeon General provides direction, guidance and management of Navy medical personnel worldwide. The Surgeon General advises the Secretary of the Navy as well as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs on matters pertaining to

Navy and Marine Corps force and the health of personnel. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Surgeon General to achieve the Secretary's goals.

**N. The Director of the Navy's Business Transformation Office.**

**Answer:** The Director of the Navy's Office of Business Transformation is currently designated as the DoN DCMO. If confirmed, I would work closely with the DCMO to determine needed changes to Departmental transformation plans, business systems architecture, and to identify needed business process improvements.

**O. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.**

**Answer:** The Judge Advocate General of the Navy is the senior uniformed legal advisor to the Secretary of the Navy, provides independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations and performs duties relating to any and all Department of the Navy legal matters assigned to her by the Secretary. If confirmed, I look forward to developing a good working relationship with the Judge Advocate General and her staff.

**P. The Under Secretaries of the military services**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will work diligently to develop close working relationships with the Under Secretaries of the Army and Air Force, particularly in our capacities as Chief Management Officers for our respective services.

**Major Challenges and Problems**

**In your view, what are the major challenges, if any, that you would confront if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Navy?**

**Answer:** The Department of Defense and all of the services are facing numerous challenges brought on by over ten years of war and fiscal uncertainty. These factors directly impact decisions on current programs, support for the warfighter and investment in future capabilities and requirements. The Navy and Marine Corps are deployed around the world engaged in the full spectrum of military missions, from direct combat operations to providing security in the maritime domain to humanitarian assistance. Determining the best balance between meeting current challenges, building a relevant and capable future force, enabling and supporting Sailors, Marines, their families and the civilian workforce will pose the most significant challenges in the years ahead. It is also critical to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars, being accountable for ensuring these resources are invested wisely and efficiently. In the role as Chief Management Officer, continued improvement to program and budget development and the cost effectiveness of the acquisition program, will remain major challenges and priorities.

If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to address these issues and would work closely with DoD, Navy and Marine Corps leadership, and this committee to develop and execute strategies to address these challenges.

**If confirmed, how would you prioritize and what plans would you have, if any, for addressing these challenges?**

**Answer:** In response to the strategic guidance from the President, the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corp have articulated clear priorities focused on people, platforms, power and partnerships. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary of the Navy, senior Military and DOD leadership, and this committee to meet these challenges and priorities including but not limited to:

- Ensuring the readiness of our force to meet current and future missions around the world by recruiting, training and retaining highly skilled Sailors and Marines, and supporting the families of the service members;
- supporting a diverse and well-trained civilian workforce;
- continuing to address the critical issues of sexual assault and suicides among our Sailors and Marines;
- maintaining a long-term ship building program that supports the needs for modernization and future capabilities, supports a robust industrial base, and is both achievable and fiscally sustainable;
- promoting acquisition excellence, stewardship, accountability and innovation; and,
- supporting the enhancement of enterprise-wide business systems to improve core business operations, performance metrics and accountability.

### **Duties and Responsibilities as Chief Management Officer**

**Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 designates the Under Secretary of the Navy as the Navy's Chief Management Officer (CMO). Section 908 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires the CMO of each of the military departments to carry out a comprehensive business transformation initiative, with the support of a new Business Transformation Office.**

**What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Under Secretary in his capacity as CMO of the Department of the Navy?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, my most important duty as CMO will be to ensure that the Department of the Navy has a pragmatic and well-thought out comprehensive business transformation plan with measureable performance goals and objectives. In addition, I will continue to support a well-defined enterprise-wide business systems architecture. I would work with the DCMO to:

- Fully analyze the budget, finance, accounting, and human resource operations of the Department of the Navy in an effort to identify, streamline, and ultimately transform these related processes;

- Eliminate or replace systems whose business case analyses are determined not to be cost effective or otherwise inconsistent with business enterprise architecture transition plans;
- Monitor the implementation of the Department of the Navy's Business Transformation Plan.

**What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?**

**Answer:** The Under/CMO must have a thorough knowledge of the Department of the Navy; to include the culture of both services, the government employees that support them and the industrial base. The Under/CM should also have or develop knowledge on the way programs and budgets are developed and be a strong leader and manager. I have served as the Acting Under Secretary/Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, as well as the deputy senior policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on recruitment, career development, pay and benefits for 1.4 million active duty military personnel, 1.3 million Guard and Reserve personnel, nearly 700,000 DoD civilians, and was responsible for overseeing the overall state of military readiness. In years past, I have served as chief counsel, chief operating officer, and chief financial officer in the private sector. I have taken a struggling university to financial success while simultaneously implementing major programmatic changes, IT transformation and infrastructure upgrades and have also served in a leadership role on the board of a major hospital system undergoing significant operational and organizational change. I believe that my background along with formal education, particularly in law and finance, provides a solid foundation for the position as CMO but I accept that I must continue to learn, and will rely greatly on the knowledge and advice of the team in the Departments of Defense and Navy.

**Do you believe that the CMO and the Business Transformation Office have the resources and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of the Department of the Navy?**

**Answer:** I believe the CMO and the Business Transformation Office have the resources and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of the Department. If confirmed, I would consult with the Secretary of the Navy, DoD DCMO, and DoD CMO if I discover that those resources and authorities were insufficient.

**What role do you believe the CMO and the Business Transformation Office should play in the planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems by the military departments?**

**Answer:** I believe the CMO and DCMO/BTO should serve as guides and enablers for implementing sound best practices regarding planning, development, and implementation of business systems, and verify those policies are being followed appropriately in accordance with DoD guidelines. If confirmed, I would work with the DCMO/BTO to

institute rigorous investment management and business process reengineering (BPR) procedures for their managed business systems.

**What changes, if any, would you recommend to the statutory provisions establishing the position of CMO and creating the Business Transformation Office?**

**Answer:** At this time, I do not believe that any changes are necessary, but if confirmed, I would consult with the Secretary of the Navy, DoD DCMO, and DoD CMO if my experience led me to believe that changes were warranted.

**Section 2222 of Title 10, United States Code, requires that the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide the development of its business systems and processes. The Department has chosen to implement the requirement for an enterprise architecture and transition plan through a “federated” approach in which the Business Transformation Agency has developed the top level architecture while leaving it to the military departments to fill in most of the detail. The Navy’s business systems, like those of the other military departments, remain incapable of providing timely, reliable financial data to support management decisions.**

**If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the Navy develops the business systems and processes it needs to appropriately manage funds in the best interest of the taxpayer and the national defense?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will ensure that the proper business case analyses and appropriate establishment and application of business enterprise architectures support the capability of providing timely, reliable data to support management decisions. I will approach this responsibility mindful of our role as public servants to be guardians of the public fiscal resources.

**Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful transformation of the Navy’s business systems?**

**Answer:** I am skeptical that a single architecture for an organization as large and complex as the Department of the Navy is practical or efficient. This does not mean that all standards, policies, and processes should not be established to rival the best of those in the private sector. It does mean that, if confirmed, I am accountable to ensure the appropriate analysis and process development occur to transform outdated and inefficient business operations into those that are streamlined, cost effective, and well-planned.

**What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy’s enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements of section 2222?**

**Answer:** I understand that much progress was made last year to ensure conditions for FY14 obligation of funds for covered defense business system programs met the

requirements of section 2222. The FY14 Department of the Navy Organizational Execution Plans and Precertification memo was completed on time and met or exceeded requirements. If confirmed, I will continue that work with the Business Transformation Council, Investment Review Board, and DoD DCMO to fully meet the requirements specified in law.

**What are your views on the importance and role of timely and accurate financial and business information in managing operations and holding managers accountable?**

**Answer:** Timely and accurate financial and business information is essential in managing the Department's business operations. In order to make informed decisions, the Department's senior leaders must have credible, reliable, authoritative information at the right time.

**How would you address a situation in which you found that reliable, useful, and timely financial and business information was not routinely available for these purposes?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I would prioritize their requirement to have processes in place and appropriate systems subsequently needed to produce the data.

**What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial and business information available to Navy managers?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department of the Navy DCMO and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Financial Manager/Comptroller to confirm the establishment of specific requirements and execute measures required to improve the quality of financial information used for decision-making.

### **Auditable Financial Statements**

**Section 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense to establish a plan to ensure that DOD's financial statements are validated as ready for audit by not later than September 30, 2017. The Secretary of Defense has established the additional goal of ensuring that the statement of DOD's budgetary resources is validated as ready for audit by not later than September 30, 2014.**

**In your opinion, is the Department of the Navy on track to achieve these objectives, particularly with regard to data quality, internal controls and business process re-engineering?**

**Answer:** I do not yet have enough information to form an opinion on this matter; however, I understand that the Department has a Financial Improvement Plan and is making progress toward achieving auditable financial statements. I am aware that difficult issues must be addressed, including the valuation of major weapon systems and equipment. I have not had the opportunity to review the plan and at this time could not inform you of my confidence level that the September 30, 2014 goal is achievable.

**If not, what impediments may hinder the Navy's ability to achieve this goal and how would you address them?**

**Answer:** I do not yet have enough information to form an opinion on this matter; however, I expect that the impacts of past, present and any future furlough of Government civilian personnel could serve as an impediment. Likewise, the budget uncertainty for FY14 and beyond is a likely impediment. If confirmed, I will maintain a steady focus and commitment on all Department efforts to enable audit readiness consistent with the statutory requirement and to ensure they are built on a foundation that results in sustainable audit environments well into the future.

**In your view, are the steps that the Navy needs to take to meet the 2014 goal consistent with the steps that DOD needs to take to achieve full auditability?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I am committed to maintaining a steady focus on all Department efforts towards audit readiness and achieving clean audit opinions. This consistent focus is critical to the success of the 2014 goal. If confirmed, I will review the objectives that have been prepared and determine whether they appear to be reasonable and effective.

**What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy moves to achieve these objectives without an unaffordable or unsustainable level of one-time fixes and manual work-arounds?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will maintain a steady focus and commitment on all Department efforts to enable audit readiness and to ensure they are built on a foundation that results in sustainable audit environments well into the future. This includes documentation and standardization of business processes across DON to ensure they are traceable, sustainable and auditable.

### **Navy Policies Regarding Drug and Alcohol Abuse**

**What is your understanding of the Navy's policy with respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of Navy and Marine Corps personnel who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you agree with this policy?**

**Answer:** The Department of the Navy has a zero tolerance policy regarding illegal drug use and that this policy is clearly understood by all Sailors and Marines from the moment they enter the Service. Zero tolerance, in this context, means that Sailors and Marines

that use illegal drugs, which includes unauthorized use or abuse of prescription drugs, will be held accountable, as appropriate, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and unless discharged by a court-martial, subjected to mandatory administrative processing for separation from the Service. I agree with this policy.

**What is your understanding of the Navy's policy with respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of members of the Navy and Marine Corps who have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?**

**Answer:** I agree with the Department's drug and alcohol policy. I understand that while Navy and Marine Corps personnel who violate the Department of the Navy's drug policy will be appropriately punished and processed for separation, they will also be screened for counseling prior to administrative processing, and they will be given the opportunity to benefit from whatever treatment is deemed necessary.

As for alcohol abuse, I understand that the Department of the Navy's policy is to de-glamorize use, and to treat and track alcohol abuse. I further understand that there is a zero tolerance policy for driving while under the influence and that all alcohol-related vehicle incidents are reviewed prior to an officer's promotion to determine whether that officer is suitable for advancement to the next higher pay grade. Irrespective of how alcohol abuse is identified, I understand that Navy and Marine Corps personnel will be screened and provided an opportunity to participate in treatment, up to and including inpatient care.

I believe there is a duty to ensure Sailors and Marines receive the care they need. However, failure to obey the rules results in consequences and I fully support the Department of the Navy's policy.

**Do you believe that the Navy has devoted sufficient resources for implementation of its rehabilitation policies and objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways have resources been insufficient?**

**Answer:** Based on the information I have, I believe the Navy has devoted sufficient resources for implementation of its rehabilitation policies and objectives. If confirmed, I commit to developing a more thorough understanding of the resources the Navy has devoted to these policies and objectives.

### **Religious Guidelines**

**In your view, do Department of the Navy policies concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?**

**Answer:** Based on the information I have, I am aware that all requests for religious accommodation are evaluated and given due consideration. I do believe that current Defense Department policies appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs but are balanced against the interest in avoiding adverse impact on good order and discipline as well as mission accomplishment.

**Under current law and policy, are individual expressions of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact good order and discipline?**

**Answer:** Consistent with the law, every religious accommodation request requires individualized analysis. I believe that under current law and policy, religious accommodation is appropriately balanced against the interest in avoiding adverse impacts on good order and discipline.

**In your view, do existing policies and practices regarding public prayers offered by Navy and Marine Corps chaplains in a variety of formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the rights of other service members with different beliefs, including no religious beliefs?**

**Answer:** Current law protects chaplains from being required to perform any rite, ritual, or ceremony that is contrary to the conscience, moral principles, or religious beliefs of the chaplain. I believe that current policies strike an appropriate balance for military chaplains acting in a pluralistic environment while simultaneously protecting their religious freedoms.

**What is your assessment of measures taken at the Naval Academy to ensure religious tolerance and respect?**

**Answer:** I understand that the same policies implemented throughout the Navy are also instituted at the Naval Academy and that religious tolerance and respect is afforded to all midshipmen, faculty and other assigned personnel.

**Sexual Assault Prevention and Response . In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more than 3000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including 2558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports. Moreover, DOD's most recent survey indicates that the actual number of sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1 percent of active duty women and 1.2 percent of active duty men surveyed reported having experienced an incident of unwanted sexual contact in the previous 12 months. This survey has been criticized by some because its conclusions are extrapolated from an unscientific sample set and the questions asked in the survey were too imprecise. Both former Secretary of Defense Panetta and Secretary Hagel have implemented new initiatives for addressing sexual assault in the military.**

**What is your assessment of the Navy's implementation of the new policies for addressing sexual assault offenses?**

**Answer:** By their new policies, some of which are unique among the services, the Navy has demonstrated that sexual assault prevention and response is a priority. It is apparent to me that the Navy is constantly looking for ways to confront this criminal activity and create an environment that facilitates prompt reporting and enables victim care. There have been a series of focused changes in place dealing directly with sexual assault prevention and response, such as: raising the disposition authority for a sexual assault case to an O-6 with special court-martial convening authority; ensuring a judge advocate is the investigating officer in an Article 32 hearing; implementing a Victims' Legal Counsel program; hiring additional Sexual Assault Resource Counselors and victim advocates; and in the case of the Navy service, hiring resiliency counselors to deploy with larger platforms, among others. However, the Navy is also addressing some of the other risk factors to include alcohol abuse. I am not yet in a position to assess the efficacy of these programs. If confirmed, I expect this assessment will be among my top priorities.

**What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?**

**Answer:** My view is that commanders set the tone of their command. They are responsible and should be accountable for the health, safety, and morale of their units – to include the command climate with regard to gender issues and sexual assault. Their daily actions and comments, as transmitted through the chain of command, are visible models that inform subordinates of our true standards and expectations. Local commanders and chains of command are also the most effective way to ensure compassionate support individuals in need – something hard to do from afar. While Commanders do indeed need consistent and effective policy guidance and resource support from senior leadership, no strategy to combat sexual assault, no matter how well-founded, could ever succeed without the active engagement of commanding officers and their chains of command.

**In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?**

**Answer:** A judge advocate outside the chain of command will be looking at a case through a different lens than a military commander. I believe the impact would be decisions based on evidence rather than the interest in preserving good order and discipline. I believe this will result in fewer prosecutions and therefore defeat the very problem that I understand it seeks to address. I understand that the Response Systems Panel directed by the FY13 NDAA is looking at this very issue and I would appreciate the opportunity to review data and recommendations they have before considering a change of this magnitude.

**What is your view of the protections afforded to victims who are required to testify at Article 32, Uniform Code of Military Justice, investigations that are required before charges can be referred to a General Court-Martial?**

**Answer:** The Rape Shield Law applies to victims at an Article 32 investigation hearing. This protects the victims from intrusive questioning about their sexual history unless there is a specific exemption. While I'm not opposed to considering changes in the Article 32 process to afford greater protections, I am concerned that as victims and witnesses receive enhanced statutory and regulatory protection there is a risk of eroding the Constitutional protections of a criminal accused. I strongly believe we must work through any substantive changes deliberately so that we are fully informed, and I believe that the panels established in section 576 of the FY13 NDAA were wise and welcome requirements of Congress that will, if given the opportunity, better inform us all.

**What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Navy has in place to provide victims of sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?**

**Answer:** The Navy service is adding a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) officer at the rank of Commander or higher to major naval commands, has completed the hiring of Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Victim Advocates and took the additional step of hiring Deployed Resiliency Counselors (DRC) to serve on larger warships. Additionally, the Navy service is in the process of implementing a Victims' Legal Counsel (VLC) Program wherein Judge Advocates will help protect a victim's rights through the investigative and adjudicative stages of the military justice process.

**What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to prevent additional sexual assaults? In your view, are these steps adequate?**

**Answer:** Sexual assaults involving Sailors and Marines are completely unacceptable. Unfortunately, there are no simple answers. I am encouraged by the focused, persistent effort of the Department of the Navy.

Since 2009, the Department and each Service has worked to structure its sexual assault organizations. The Department of the Navy Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (DON-SAPRO) provides independent visibility and reports directly to the Secretary.

Each Service has implemented strategic plans to combat sexual assault and developed new training tools. All Sailors and Marines have received state-of-the-art sexual assault prevention training – most of them more than once. Both Services have adopted more aggressive campaigns against alcohol and everywhere emphasized the importance of bystander intervention to break up sexual assault situations. In doing so, they've

underscored the importance of core values and the responsibility of every Sailor and Marine for both their own behavior and also to actively protect each other from harm.

**What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources the Navy has in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?**

**Answer:** I am aware that the Department has undertaken a number of initiatives to improve training, investigate and respond to sexual assault including: special training for NCIS agents and lawyers. Over the past 1-2 years, a cadre of approximately 18 criminal investigators has been hired – in most cases, individuals with extensive civilian experience in sexual assault investigations. The Department is now supplementing that commitment with the hiring of an additional 54 new NCIS agents to focus on sexual assault investigations – specifically in response to the increased NCIS workload resulting both from policy requirements to investigate all allegations of sexual assault of any nature, and from the success of Department-wide efforts to make Sailors and Marines more comfortable in reporting sexual assaults in the first place. If confirmed, I would continue to monitor the effectiveness of these initiatives and seek opportunities to advance additional training and resources to address the needs in this area.

**Do you consider the Navy's current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?**

**Answer:** I do. Substantial increases in both restricted and unrestricted reporting during FY-12 and FY-13 in both the Navy and Marine Corps demonstrate the emphasis the Department has placed on sexual assault victim support and the intensity of training initiatives to address the problem of under-reporting. Additionally, there are reporting procedures in place that require a commanding officer to report a complaint of sexual assault to the first Flag officer in the chain of command. They also must immediately initiate a situational report that is sent to JAG and NCIS channels as well as to all echelons of leadership. This increases visibility and accountability.

I understand the concept behind restricted reporting, but I also understand the criticism. We want to hold perpetrators of sexual assault responsible, but we cannot do that unless we know who they are. I believe that with the implementation of the Victims' Legal Counsel Program and with Victim Advocates in place, the rate of unrestricted over restricted reporting will improve.

**What is your view of the adequacy of resources in the Navy to investigate allegations of sexual misconduct and to hold perpetrators accountable for their actions?**

**What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?**

**Answer:** NCIS investigates all allegations of sexual assault. This requires resources. The Secretary has authorized the hiring of 54 additional NCIS agents to focus on sexual assault questions. In order for a report of sexual assault to remain a restricted report, a

victim can only notify certain individuals. Once NCIS is notified of a sexual assault complaint, they must investigate whether or not the victim wants to cooperate; however, an investigation without a cooperating victim is very difficult.

**What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat, the Navy staff and the Marine Corps staff in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?**

**Answer:** Sexual assault prevention and response is a responsibility of leadership up and down the organization. In 2009, the Secretary of the Navy was the first to establish a Secretariat level office to oversee sexual assault prevention and response in the Department. The office is led by an SES who reports directly to the Secretary. This Secretariat-level SAPR strategy focuses on consistent top-down leadership message. Each Service also has their own program offices, led by a one-star Flag or General Officer who is responsible for overseeing the implementation of Service-specific programs.

**Do you believe that sexual assault continues to be an underreported crime within the Department for the Navy?**

**Answer:** Yes – I believe it is the most under-reported crime. However, as the Navy implements new programs and policies, I would expect to see an increase in reporting as victims feel more comfortable coming forward to report these crimes.

**If so, what are the barriers that discourage or prevent victims from coming forward?**

**Answer:** I believe the biggest challenges relate to the personal concerns of victims about embarrassment, self-blaming, and how victims feel they will be viewed by their friends and peers. These are tougher matters to overcome, and they ultimately depend on developing a culture that is simultaneously intolerant of sexual assault and focused on compassionate support of sexual assault victims.

**If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to remove barriers to reporting sexual assaults?**

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would continue to focus on victim care. Victims of sexual assault need to feel safe and cared for and that their needs are being met. As more victims feel comfortable coming forward and reporting sexual assault, we will see the barriers to reporting begin to dissolve.

**In response to the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies for Academic Program Year 2011-2012, the Secretary of Defense wrote to the Service Secretaries and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness stating: “Despite our considerable and ongoing efforts, this**

**year's Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies demonstrates that we have a persistent problem. I am concerned that we have not achieved greater progress in preventing sexual assault and sexual harassment among academy cadets and midshipmen. These crimes and abhorrent behavior are incompatible with the core values we require of our Armed Forces' future officers. A strong and immediate response is needed."**

**What has the Navy done to respond the Secretary of Defense's requirement for a strong and immediate response?**

**Answer:** I understand that the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations both place a personal high priority on issues at the Naval Academy. Earlier this year there was an extensive review of SAPR program structure and staffing. As a result, the Academy has assigned 2 civilian full-time Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) and 2 civilian full-time Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Victim Advocates (VAs). The SARCs now report directly to the Superintendent and no military personnel are assigned SARC responsibilities. The VAs report directly to the SARCs. Additionally, an experienced Judge Advocate and trial attorney was recently put in place as the first Victim's Legal Counsel in the Navy.

In addition, a survey was conducted of all Midshipmen to explore perspectives on sexual assault circumstances, the command climate, and barriers to reporting. Those results helped inform the Academy's own efforts to engage local stakeholders in confronting key issues.

**If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to address the findings contained in this report?**

**Answer:** Senior military and civilian leaders at all levels from the Secretariat down must continue to focus on promoting environments at the Naval Academy and all commands that prevent sexual assault. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and service leaders to maintain a focused and persistent commitment on these issues.

### **Annual Increase in Rates of Basic Pay below the Employment Cost Index**

**The Department has requested an across-the-board pay raise for 2014 for military personnel of 1 percent, versus a 1.8 percent rise in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) benchmark, and has indicated that in order to restrain the growth of personnel costs, similar below-ECI pay raises may be necessary over the next several years.**

**What is your assessment of the impact a 1 percent pay raise would have on Navy and Marine Corps recruiting and retention for 2014?**

**Answer:** Military compensation is highly competitive today, and the President's proposed slowdown in base pay growth is not likely to cause recruiting or retention

problems in the near term provided recruiting bonuses and retention pays are preserved. With the modest increases in the pay table as proposed in the President's budget, service members will still realize sizable pay increases through promotions and longevity. In the current fiscal environment, there is room to slow down base pay growth, thereby helping to mitigate further cuts to force structure, readiness and modernization.

**What would be the impact of a 1 percent pay raise in 2015 through 2017 on recruiting and retention? What level of savings would you anticipate achieving relative to pay raises equal to ECI for those years?**

**Answer:** Total military compensation has to be sufficient to attract and retain the numbers and quality the services need in uniform to fulfill our missions. Military compensation has gained ground relative to comparable civilian compensation in recent years. In my view, military pay raises below ECI for a few years would not cause major recruiting or retention problems for the Department of the Navy.

Assuming a comparison between a 1.8% ECI increase and a 1% proposed increase from 2015 to 2017 and that service end strengths remain at FY14 requested levels, I would expect the Department of the Navy to save \$900 million in active duty basic pay and \$130 million in reserve component pay for those three years.

### **End Strength Reductions**

**The Department last year laid out a defense strategy that proposes an eventual end strength of 182,000 for the Marine Corps over the next five years.**

**What is your understanding of the Marine Corps' ability to meet these goals without forcing out marines who have served in combat over the past 10 years with the implicit promise that they could compete for career service and retirement?**

**Answer:** The promise of a military retirement is one of the solemn pledges made to compensate our service members when they volunteer for a full career. However, it is time for a review of this system. I fully support Congress's establishment of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of military compensation and retirement systems. Keeping faith with those currently serving is a high priority, and in my view the Commission and Congress should ensure that any resulting reforms protect our current service members through grandfathering those who prefer the current retirement structure.

That said, I understand that the Marine Corps desires and intends to keep the faith with Marines and only use voluntary separation tools. Whether these voluntary force shaping tools result in the necessary end strength will determine the need for any involuntary force shaping methods.

**To what extent will the Marine Corps have to rely on involuntary separations in**

**2014 through 2018? How will sequestration affect this?**

**Answer:** It is not yet clear to me to what extent the Marine Corps will rely on involuntary separations during this time period. Sequestration, continuing resolutions and government shutdowns exacerbate all problems.

**What programs are in place to ensure that separating and retiring sailors and marines are as prepared as they can be as they enter a struggling economy?**

**Answer:** The newly redesigned Transition Assistance Program (TAP) is intended to prepare Sailors and Marines to make a successful transition from military to civilian life and help shorten their time to post-service employment. Transition GPS includes a five day common core curriculum, an option of participating in additional tailored curriculum depending on the members' follow-on interest and a "warm-handover" to government agencies and organizations that provide transitioning members with continued benefits, services and support as veterans.

The Department of the Navy's new transition program will also incorporate career readiness and transition preparation into the entire span of a service member's career. In the past, transition and preparation for the civilian workforce occurred late in a service member's lifecycle – near the point of separation. Under this new program, these concepts will be incorporated earlier as a way to ensure that the counseling, assessments, and access to resources to build skills or credentials occur at earlier stages.

**How fast can the Marine Corps responsibly and fairly reduce end strength while maintaining the integrity and readiness of combat units?**

**Answer:** I am not equipped with sufficient information to effectively respond to this question at this time, but the Marine Corps will almost certainly need a balanced program of reduced accessions and lower retention to achieve the proposed strength reductions while maintaining readiness.

**If sequestration continues through 2018, what will be the impact on the active duty and reserve end strengths of the Navy and Marine Corps, and how would the mix between the active and reserve forces be affected?**

**Answer:** In the case of the Marine Corps, I understand that the Commandant's adjusted end strength goal of 182,100 Marines by the end of FY16 assumes risk. If sequestration continues, I expect the Marine Corps will be required to further reduce end strength and will put the nation's ability to respond to crisis at risk. In the case of the Navy, active and reserve end strength is linked to force structure and would almost certainly decrease as force structure changes are made. As to the planned mix of active and reserve forces, I am not yet equipped with the information necessary to respond to this question but as the Department of Defense looks to slow the growth of personnel costs this will be an area that I expect would be evaluate carefully.

**What is your understanding of the need for additional force shaping tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has provided the past two years?**

**Answer:** I am unaware of a need for additional force shaping tools beyond what Congress has provided over the past two years.

### **Navy and Marine Corps Recruiting and Retention**

**The retention of quality sailors and Marines, officer and enlisted, active-duty and reserve, is vital to the Department of the Navy.**

**How would you evaluate the status of the Navy and Marine Corps in successfully recruiting and retaining high caliber personnel?**

**Answer:** I understand that both services have met their recruiting goals in recent years and have brought in exceptionally high quality cohorts of new Sailors and Marines. I understand that recruit quality has been so high that attrition of new recruits has been at record lows.

**How would you evaluate the recruiting and retention of uniformed and civilian health care professionals?**

**Answer:** Healthcare professionals are always challenging to recruit, but I understand that the active component Navy has met both recruiting and retention goals this year.

**What initiatives would you take, if confirmed, to further improve Navy and Marine Corps recruiting and retention, in both the active and reserve components, including health care professionals?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I will be mindful of the effects of sequestration on efforts to recruit and retain the high-quality Sailors and Marines in our all-volunteer force and will recommend any necessary improvements after consultation with the Service Chiefs or their designees, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the Surgeon General.

### **Sequestration**

**What would be the impact on the Navy and Marine Corps if another round of sequestration were to take effect during fiscal year 2014?**

**Answer:** Sequestration in FY14, particularly when combined with the absence of an appropriation and the restrictions associated with a potential continuing resolution, will reduce service readiness in the near-term and continue to negatively impact programs in the long term. I would expect reductions to operations and maintenance funding to

impact the Navy's near-term forward presence and depot maintenance and training, which will in turn, affect future operational rotations. In investment accounts, I expect tradeoffs and reduced quantities of ships, aircraft, and weapon systems will likely be required.

**What would be the specific impact on Navy and Marine Corps civilian and military personnel; on family programs; on morale, welfare and recreation programs; and on the delivery of health care to service personnel, retirees, and their families?**

**Answer:** Even though military personnel accounts are exempt from sequestration many of these programs are funded from the Operations and Maintenance Accounts. I am not aware of specific impacts at this time but I would expect there will be negative impacts.

### **Suicide Prevention**

**The number of suicides in the total Navy and Marine Corps continues to be of concern to the Committee.**

**If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide prevention programs and policies for the Department of the Navy to prevent suicides and increase the resiliency of service personnel and their families?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I would commit to leading on this issue and to advance the Department's goal to reduce the number of Navy and Marine Corps suicides by accelerating reviews of successful initiatives both inside and outside the Services to incorporate evidence-based best practices.

### **Morale, Welfare, and Recreation**

**Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and sometimes lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including active duty and reserve personnel, retirees, and families.**

**What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Navy MWR programs, particularly in view of the current fiscal environment, and if confirmed, are there any improvements you would seek to achieve?**

**Answer:** Sustaining Navy and Marine Corps MWR programs will be challenged by reductions in appropriated fund support to those MWR programs not funded fully by non-appropriated funding, and the changing needs of Sailors, Marines, and their families based on the fluctuating fiscal environment and any future reductions in end-strength. If confirmed, I will assess whether there are ways to improve the sustainment of our most important MWR programs.

## **Family Readiness and Support**

**Military members and their families in both the active and reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them.**

**What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues for Navy and Marine Corps personnel and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?**

**Answer:** I recognize our Sailors and Marines can achieve and maintain their peak readiness only when their families are also prepared to handle the mental and emotional rigors of military service.

In my view, continuing to prepare and support our Sailors, Marines, and their families before, during, and after deployment to promote positive adjustment to deployment, family separation, and family reunion remains one of our most important family readiness issues. By continuing to emphasize the importance of this subset of family readiness programs, the Department can assist commanding officers, Sailors, Marines, and their families to manage the demands of the naval service lifestyle of ongoing deployments and increasing operational tempo.

**How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end strength?**

**Answer:** Global rebasing, increasing operational tempo, and future reductions in end strength will necessitate continuous assessment of the needed level and nature of services to ensure the health and well-being of our Sailors, Marines, and their families. Annual assessments of family support programs conducted by the Services allow the identification of changing needs and adjustment and re-alignment of services as necessary.

**If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment and family readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside near a military installation?**

**Answer:** A number of information and referral services such as Military One Source and Military and Family Life Counseling Services are available to both active duty and reserve Sailors, Marines, and family members and should continue to be resources for service members and family members.

**If confirmed, what steps will you take to sustain Navy and Marine Corps family support, given current fiscal constraints?**

**Answer:** If confirmed I would evaluate the balance of appropriated and non-appropriated funding levels for different programs and ensure the services have identified improved effectiveness, efficiency, and economy in the delivery of programs to include exploration of shared services or similar models for common support with the other military departments as opportunities to provide family readiness programs at needed service levels.

### **Systems and Support for Wounded Warriors**

**Service members who are wounded or injured in combat operation deserve the highest priority from the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis over the past several years, many challenges remain.**

**What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Department of the Navy to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured sailors and marines and their families?**

**Answer:** I understand that the Department of the Navy is currently meeting the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) goal of 295 days, but the Department should continue to improve system performance by leveraging available IT systems that increase process visibility and active leadership to better manage workflow.

**What are the strengths upon which continued progress should be based?**

**Answer:** For the serious wounded, ill, and injured, a smooth transition from the Department of the Navy to the Department of Veterans Affairs remains the most important goal. The Department of the Navy is presently coordinating with the DoD-VA interagency task force to better prepare Sailors and Marines to make a successful transition from military to civilian life and Veteran status and progress here should continue.

**What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?**

**Answer:** As fiscal resources become increasingly limited it will become more difficult to maintain education, training, and certification for Physical Evaluation Board Liaison Officers, physicians and IDES staff-each of which are critical components to maintaining timeliness and program quality. Challenges remain to improve/develop viable IT solutions that minimize staff workload while delivering the data needed to avoid process delays and post-service benefit gaps.

**If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Navy's and Marine Corps' support for wounded personnel and their**

**families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?**

**Answer:** To meet the presidential directive to develop a comprehensive plan for a "career ready military", and to comply with the Veterans Opportunity to Work to Hire Heroes Act of 2011 ("VOW Act"), which requires mandatory participation in all elements of the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), the Navy and Marine Corps are fully engaged in implementation of a redesigned TAP.

DON is coordinating with the DoD-VA interagency task force to better prepare Sailors and Marines to make a successful transition from military to civilian life and Veteran status. All eligible separating Service members are required to participate in the TAP program; however, Wounded, Ill, and Injured recovering Service members may be exempt from the Department of Labor (DOL) Employment Workshop, provided they are enrolled in the Education and Employment Initiative (E2I) or a similar transition program intended to improve career readiness.

### **Navy and Marine Corps Civilian Personnel Workforce**

**Section 955 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 required the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to reduce the size of the civilian personnel workforce by 5 percent over the next five years. The plan developed by the Secretary does not meet this objective. Since the time that Section 955 was enacted, the Department has implemented hiring freezes and furloughs due to sequestration. As a result, the DOD civilian personnel workforce is substantially smaller than it was when Section 955 was enacted or at the time the plan was submitted.**

**Do you agree that the Navy and Marine Corps civilian employee workforce plays a vital role in the functioning of the Department of the Navy?**

**Answer:** I have made a deliberate effort to understand the critical roles the civilian workforce plays in the Department of the Navy.

Among the Department's 198,000 civilian employees, more than half are engineers, scientists, logisticians, information technology specialists, and acquisition specialists many with critical certifications and advanced degrees. 7000 are in the medical community, and 35,000 are blue collar artisans. Over 57% of the Navy's civilian workforce are veterans and 15-20% of new hires are Wounded Warriors and disabled veterans.

There are civilian career employees in every single state in more than 558 different occupational series across the country helping to solve fleet issues— whether a malfunction in a ship's main propulsion or a combat system out of alignment. Simultaneously, you have hundreds more developing and manufacturing the critical specialty ordnance items and men and women carefully repairing and maintaining our

nuclear submarines and ships. They answer the call, 24/7, providing a rapid response to ensure that our warfighters get what they need, when they need it.

**Do you agree that if sequestration continues through Fiscal Year 2014 and beyond, the Navy and Marine Corps will need to further reduce the size of its civilian workforce?**

**Answer:** I expect that will be the case, but I am not equipped with information to respond to that question at this time. At the very least, I would expect continued hiring freezes and potential furloughs to occur.

**In your view, would it be preferable for the Navy and Marine Corps to make planned, prioritized reductions to the civilian workforce, or to downsize using arbitrary reductions based on hiring freezes and workforce attrition?**

**Answer:** Given the ever-changing demands on mission, there must be careful consideration of the analysis of the workload with a strategic approach to ultimately create an affordable workforce which still meets the critical demands placed on the workforce.

### **Tactical Aviation**

**Several years ago, the Navy and Marine Corps began to integrate their tactical aviation units.**

**What is your assessment of this initiative?**

**Answer:** I understand that Naval Aviation force projection is accomplished by the balanced integration of Marine Corps TACAIR squadrons into Carrier Air Wings and, when required, Navy squadrons into Marine Aircraft Wings. I believe that the continued integration of Naval Aviation provides the framework for the Navy and Marine Corps to further enhance core combat capabilities to provide a more potent, cohesive fighting force that is sustainable.

**The Department of the Navy is facing a potential shortfall of strike fighter aircraft in the next decade even if the Navy continues to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft at the rate projected in this year's budget.**

**What is your assessment of this situation and what actions should the Department of the Navy take to address this potential shortfall?**

**Answer:** I understand that the Strike Fighter Shortfall is projected to fluctuate throughout the next 20 years.

To date, the Department of the Navy has been able to mitigate its shortfall with the

successful execution of its Legacy F/A-18A-D high flight hour inspection and repair program, and a reduced utilization rates across the F/A-18A-F fleet. The continued efforts of the Navy/Marine Corps team will further define necessary actions required to manage aging F/A-18 A-D aircraft, address discovery of potentially greater than expected fatigue and corrosion, and ensure required availability of aircraft until JSF Fleet Introduction.

The USN and USMC continue to adjust transition plans as F-35 procurement ramps are flattened. The Marine Corps is taking advantage of higher service life remaining in its AV-8B inventory by delaying the majority of their transitions to the end of the transition plan. This is expected to reduce the demand for F/A-18A-D in the later years. I believe that sustainment and relevancy funding will be imperative to maintain the requisite operational capability of the AV-8B throughout the 2020's.

**What other potential alternatives do you see for maintaining sufficient strike assets if there were any additional slippage in the initial operating capability date for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter?**

**Answer:** Future delays in the JSF program will make strike fighter inventory management more difficult.

Without additional investments in other strike fighter production lines, the delay of the F-35C or F-35B would make the strike fighter shortfall more difficult to manage potentially resulting in a significant loss of capability that a multi-role mix of fourth and fifth-generation aircraft provides across the full spectrum of combat operations.

The timely delivery of the JSF is critical to the Department of the Navy's ability to meet operational demands for sea control, expeditionary strike and to establish and maintain a complementary mix of strike fighter aircraft.

### **Shipbuilding Plan**

**The Navy annually submits a thirty-year shipbuilding plan.**

**Do you agree that the 30-year shipbuilding plan should, in fact, reflect realistic cost estimates and include all important shipbuilding efforts for that document to be useful for decision makers?**

**Answer:** Yes, the 30- year shipbuilding plan should reflect the Navy's best estimate of costs to procure the balanced fleet to meet the nation's security requirements. The Navy has placed a great emphasis on improving cost performance in shipbuilding through the use of expanded competition, fixed price contracts, and multi-year procurements and block buys. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I would continue to emphasize achieving our affordability goals and providing transparency to Congress on the Navy's progress in achieving those goals.

**What level of funding do you think the Navy will need to execute this plan, and considering competing priorities, do you believe this level of funding is realistic?**

**Answer:** I think that the level of funding needed to execute the plan varies each year but averages approximately \$16.8 billion per year in FY2013 constant dollars. I understand that this level of funding is higher than recent historical averages but must be provided to ensure the Navy can procure the vessels to meet the nation's maritime security requirements. The Defense Strategic Guidance called for a rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific regions, and there has been a renewed focus on naval assets. Secretary Mabus and service leadership have prioritized shipbuilding and those positive trends can be seen in ship procurement and budget requests. I expect that sequestration continues to pose a significant risk to the Navy's ability to purchase the ships needed to execute the strategy. If sequestration or other competing priorities cause the funding levels called for in the shipbuilding plan to not be met, then adjustments to force structure will necessarily have to be evaluated.

**Cost growth continues to be a prevalent problem in Navy shipbuilding programs, particularly for the first ships in new classes. Some experts have taken the position that DOD could improve the performance of its acquisition plans by adopting commercial practices, such as: retiring all major risk prior to signing a procurement contract; fixing the cost and delivery date at contract signing; competing all basic and functional design prior to starting construction; and having a disciplined construction process that delivers ships on cost and on schedule.**

**To what extent should such commercial shipbuilding best practices, and any others you may be aware of, be incorporated into Navy shipbuilding programs?**

**Answer:** Over the past four years, I understand that the fleet numbers have stabilized and the primary causes of cost growth have been addressed in the shipbuilding programs. As part of this, commercial shipbuilding's best practices should be exercised to the maximum extent feasible to achieve cost savings in shipbuilding while still meeting military requirements. I understand that the Navy has expanded use of commercial standards in shipbuilding contracts and has aggressively pursued competition wherever possible.

### **Aircraft Carriers**

**We are now in a two-year gap between the decommissioning of the USS *Enterprise* and the availability of a new aircraft carrier, CVN-78 (USS *Gerald R. Ford*). During this period only 10 aircraft carriers will be operational.**

**What is your view of the Secretary Gate's plan to permanently change the aircraft carrier force structure to 10 from the current number of 11? Is this still the plan?**

**Answer:** In his recommendations for the Fiscal Year 2010 budget, Secretary Gates directed a shift in the time between construction starts for *Ford*-class carriers to five years. I believe that rebasing the build rate on five-year centers provides a more stable and predictable funding plan for carriers, as well as for the other platforms in the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. This restructured procurement plan also enables a steady state force structure of 11 carriers through 2040 by more closely aligning delivery of *Ford*-class carriers with the notional 50-year service life of the *Nimitz*-class ship each will replace. I understand that the adjustment to five-year centers does results in a reduction of the aircraft carrier force structure from 11 to 10 CVNs in 2040 and beyond.

**How would the aircraft carrier presence requirements of combatant commanders be met with only 10 operational aircraft carriers?**

**Answer:** Navy would look to balance presence requirements with projected operations and maintenance schedules, similar to what the service has been doing since the inactivation of USS *Enterprise* (CVN 65) in December 2012. I understand that the Navy has determined the risk to be acceptable, although moderate, during the relatively short period of operating with a 10-carrier fleet between the inactivation of CVN 65 and the commissioning of *Gerald R. Ford* (CVN 78).

When the force structure is permanently reduced to 10 carriers in 2040, Navy will have to determine how best to mitigate the risks at that time associated with a reduced force and to properly prioritize world-wide presence requirements. While the inherent flexibility provided by the current Fleet Response Plan will enable the Navy's carrier force to meet some emergent demands, it may not be able to meet all of them.

**Marine Corps Ground Combat Vehicles**

**Over the two years the Marine Corps has been working on a ground combat vehicle fleet mix study to refine and link its combat vehicle requirements to sea-lift and ship-to-shore capabilities, and estimate the life-cycle costs of various alternatives in light of the fiscal challenges of the future.**

**What is your understanding and assessment of the Marine Corps' current and future ground combat vehicle fleet and mix of capabilities?**

**Answer:** I understand that the Marine Corps combat vehicles are at the front end of much needed recapitalization. The Corps' ground combat tactical vehicle strategy includes developing and procuring the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, or JLTV; developing a modern Amphibious Combat Vehicle, or ACV; sustaining a portion of the Humvee fleet through 2030; initiating an upgrade program for the legacy assault amphibious vehicle as a bridge to the ACV; and managing procurement of vehicles to reduce acquisition objectives, a net reduction of about 20 percent based on the more recent force structure reviews.

I understand that the JLTV program remains on track with the 2014 budget request continuing development in support of procurement commencing in 2015 though there may be impacts from FY14 sequestration.

The Amphibious Combat Vehicle is, as the Commandant stated in testimony earlier this year, a top Marine Corps priority. The execution of amphibious operations requires a self-deploying amphibious vehicle to seamlessly project ready-to-fight Marine units from sea to land in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. This capability enables the Corps to maximize available amphibious lift and accelerate the buildup of power ashore, which is key to overcoming access challenges posed by either the lack of improved infrastructure or the threat of an adversary.

The Marines are conducting a combined requirements definition feasibility study assembling the best of Government and industry requirements, systems engineering design, and cost experts. The intent is to bring the best talent and best information together to build on the tremendous body of knowledge possessed across all vehicle programs to determine how to deliver the capability needed by the Marine Corps with high confidence in the affordability of the defined requirements.

**What, in your view, are the greatest risks, if any, to the readiness of the current fleet and the realization of a modernized fleet sometime in the future?**

**Answer:** Reductions to operations and maintenance funding is directly impacting the Marine Corps near-term forward presence and depot maintenance and training, which will affect future operational rotations, as well as reducing the readiness of non-deployed forces.

In investment accounts, the biggest risk is to future readiness. I understand that the Marine Corps is weighing alternatives to mitigate this through legacy equipment sustainment and bridging efforts, quantity reductions, scheduled delays and the cost impacts to each of its programs.

**If confirmed, what would be your role in the oversight of the Marine Corps' combat vehicle modernization program to ensure that requirements are relevant, up-to-date, and stable, and that technologies are achievable and affordable?**

**Answer:** If confirmed, I would continue to emphasize the key lessons the services have learned, which begin with getting requirements appropriately defined and scoped. Affordability targets must be established with an understanding of both opportunity costs and service impacts and must endeavor to hold those targets in a dynamic and uncertain fiscal environment.

### **Risk in the Ground Vehicle Industrial Base**

**Since the cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle in 2011, the USMC's ground equipment modernization program has been restructured to orient on developing a technologically achievable and affordable amphibious combat vehicle, continued development of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, while at the same time upgrading or extending the life of current combat and tactical vehicles.**

**Given the general slowdown of ground vehicle development, procurement, and maintenance programs across the Marine Corps and the Army, what, in your view, are the risks to the combat and tactical vehicle industrial base that could undermine Marine Corps readiness and, if confirmed, what actions, if any, are you taking to manage these risks?**

**Answer:** I understand that the Marine Corps went line by line through their programs to mitigate the effects of the slowdown and sequestration in 2013 recognizing some of the bow wave effects into the out-years.

Delays in the JLTV and the ACV programs are concerning and bear close scrutiny as affordability is a major factor in both of those programs.

The ACV is the Commandant of the Marine Corps number one priority for ground modernization. Of course, this does impact other Marine Corps lift requirements, and that too bears close scrutiny.

The Marines have also developed a bridging strategy until the ACV is able to be fielded, and that is to selectively sustain a number of AAVs, which are in the fleet right now. I understand that these efforts will focus on increasing survivability of the vehicles.

**If confirmed, what criteria or indications in the industrial base, if any, will you monitor to alert you to potential or imminent loss of capability or capacity to meet the Marine Corps' needs into the future? How would you propose to respond to evidence of an unacceptable increase in this risk or the imminent loss of capability or capacity?**

**Answer:** Preserving the Ground Vehicle market is very important to ensuring current and future capability for the Marine Corps, but I understand that the Marine Corps is only a small piece of the total Ground Vehicle customer base, with the U.S. Army being the larger part. Because of the cross-service demand for Ground Vehicles, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy (DASD(MIBP)) closely monitors the industrial base.

Maintaining close collaboration with DASD(MIBP) and the other services will be crucial to monitoring and addressing the issues of the supplier base. Many of the critical suppliers are lower tier vendors--in depth monitoring of the supply chain is required to ensure overall health of the market. In the event of imminent loss of essential capability,

it may be necessary to employ strategies to preserve key suppliers such as fostering greater Foreign Military Sales volume to partner nations.

### **Navy Force Structure**

**The Chief of Naval Operations has publicly stated that the Navy has a requirement for 306 ships.**

**Do you agree with this requirement?**

**Answer:** The Navy's plan for a fleet of 306 ships maintains a flexible, balanced force that will prevail in a wide range of combat situations. The fleet is designed to support the current Defense Strategic Guidance and Combatant Commanders' presence requirements and reflects a reduced number of vessels from the 313 ship plan due to increased forward basing of ships and an increase use of rotating civilian and military crews.

### **Science and Technology Program**

**Do you believe that the current balance between short- and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Department of the Navy needs?**

**Answer:** I have not yet been briefed on the specific long and short-term balance. In principle, however, I believe a robust R&D effort that makes the right investments - and not merely investments in science for the sake of science - is vital to the future capability of the Navy and Marine Corps team. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Navy to evaluate the Navy's Science and Technology Program and find the right balance of long and short-term investments for the Departmental R&D program.

**If confirmed, what direction would you provide regarding the importance of innovative defense science in meeting Navy and Marine Corps missions?**

**Answer:** The Navy and Marine Corps rely upon the technical superiority of our forces to discourage or destroy our enemies. Our challenge is that the rate of technology change continues to accelerate across the world. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary of the Navy and the RDT&E Corporate Board to ensure the Department of the Navy adequately addresses this critical area. I would also work closely with the Director of DARPA, the Office of Naval Research, industry, and academia to leverage their technology investments.

**If confirmed, what guidance would you give to ensure research priorities that will meet the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps in 2020?**

**Answer:** The Department of the Navy RDT&E Corporate Board was established specifically for this purpose. If confirmed, I would use this board to actively engage the Department of the Navy's leadership in defining and setting priorities essential to success.

## **Military Space**

**Do you believe that the current Department of Defense management structure for space programs sufficiently protects Navy space equities?**

**Answer:** My understanding is that the 2003 designation of the Secretary of the Air Force as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space created an overarching DoD space oversight function, allowing the Navy access to critical DoD decisions on major space systems and capabilities. The Defense Space Council, which represents this body, affords the Navy the opportunity to review and participate in a variety of cross-cutting space issues in areas from acquisition oversight to requirements generation to studies and analysis. The Navy also participates in most Major Defense Acquisition Program milestones and Joint Requirements Oversight Council opportunities, providing avenues of influence for all space programs, regardless of service or interagency ownership.

**In your view, how actively should the Navy be engaged in the management of space programs?**

**Answer:** Space is increasingly becoming constrained, congested, and contested. I expect the Navy's involvement in the definition, management, and execution of space programs is especially important for a Navy increasingly constrained fiscally while at the same time very much reliant on the global distribution of Positioning, Navigation & Timing, Communications, Missile Warning, Environmental and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance information provided through space-based systems. Active Navy engagement in space should continue as DoD finds better ways to manage, access, distribute and utilize information derived from space-based systems and seek to mitigate the challenges to the use of space our adversaries present both now and in the future.

**In your view, is the Navy adequately involved in the requirements process for space programs?**

**Answer:** Yes. I understand that the Navy evaluates all capability gaps through internal requirements process as well as existing DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) formal requirements processes.

**What is the Navy's appropriate long-term role in space systems, other than as a user of space information and products?**

**Answer:** Space systems are essential to modern warfare and integral to Navy's plans for achieving Information Dominance (ID) through Assured Command and Control, Battlespace Awareness, and Integrated Fires. I understand that Navy is a major user of satellite services and a key consumer of space-derived data within DoD, but most space systems today are acquired and operated by non-Navy organizations, including the U.S. Air Force, the Intelligence Community (IC), the National Oceanographic and

Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), and various U.S. and foreign commercial space providers. This unique arrangement requires a continuous and proactive Navy approach to ensure that space systems under development are optimized for maritime operations and able to support current and future Fleet operations. I expect Navy to continue to develop, acquire, and operate narrowband communication satellites for DoD, and maintain a nationally-recognized center for space technology at the Naval Research Lab, supporting Navy, DoD, and IC needs.

### **Investment in Infrastructure**

**Witnesses appearing before the Committee in recent years have testified that the military services under-invest in their facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-investment in installations has led to increasing backlogs of facility maintenance needs, substandard living and working conditions, and has made it harder for the Services to take advantage of new technologies that could increase productivity.**

**Do you believe the Department of the Navy is investing enough in its infrastructure? Please explain.**

**Answer:** I believe our supporting systems, including shore infrastructure, are key enablers to executing the Department's war fighting missions. I'm also aware of the fiscal challenges facing the Department. If confirmed, I will look forward to meeting the challenge of balancing the Department's investments across a broad array of requirements to include shore infrastructure.

### **Acquisition Issues**

**What are your views regarding the need to reform the process by which the Department of the Navy acquires major weapons systems? If confirmed, what steps would you recommend to improve that process?**

**Answer:** The DON has implemented several initiatives to improve the acquisition process. The DON has improved oversight and reporting with;

- Continuing refinement of Naval 2-Pass / 6-Gate Review process for early and continuous leadership awareness of requirements and affordability in terms of Total Ownership Costs (TOC) throughout the Acquisition process.
- Implement Better Buying 2.0 Initiatives and improved oversight
- Implemented Policy for Should Cost initiatives to be integral to program planning and execution
- Systems Engineering improvement to bring more mature/complete designs prior to MS B which can then be integrated into better requirements for Industry to give better estimate and proposals.
- Developing partnerships with Industry to support the industrial base and secure investment

- Budgeting and Contracting activities to stabilize funding and maximize multi-year procurements where beneficial.

I fully support these efforts and other efforts to ensure a predictable funding profile for programs. This visibility is particularly important with the current strains on budgets.

**Department-wide, nearly half of the Department of Defense’s 95 largest acquisition programs have exceeded the so-called “Nunn-McCurdy” cost growth standards established in section 2433 of title 10, United States Code. Many of those programs are being executed by the Department of the Navy.**

**What steps, if any and if confirmed, would you take to address the out-of-control cost growth on the Department of the Navy’s major defense acquisition programs?**

**Answer:** Many of the oversight and acquisition reform efforts have already bent the curve on the overall performance of our acquisition portfolio. I believe better requirements definition, early design maturity, stable funding are critical. I would continue working with the Warfighter on requirements generation. Navy-Industry teamwork throughout the process is essential.

**What principles will guide your thinking on whether to recommend terminating a program that has experienced “critical” cost growth under Nunn-McCurdy?**

**Answer:** A key principle for me is an assessment of whether the existing program is still the best approach to meet the requirement and why we have confidence that the adverse cost growth can be contained? One must cast a critical eye at programs that have not delivered on their promises to the warfighter. I believe in the re-certification requirements within Nunn-McCurdy: the program is essential to national security, that no suitable alternative of lesser cost is available, new estimates of total program costs are reasonable, and management structure is (or has been made) adequate to control costs.

**Many experts have acknowledged that the Department of Defense may have gone too far in reducing its acquisition work force, resulting in undermining of its ability to provide needed oversight in the acquisition process.**

**Do you agree with this assessment?**

**Answer:** Yes.

**If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the Navy should take to address this problem?**

**Answer:** The DON needs to look at how it recruits, incentivizes and retains our acquisition workforce. For example, the Navy needs to protect and expand the use of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF). OPM rules governing

recruitment and retention incentives are not flexible enough to maximize the use of Section 852 Incentive funds. Other examples include:

- Lifting the hiring freeze
- Provide entry level hiring flexibility through multiple means of recruitment
- Retired annuitants and Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) programs
- Incorporate changes to expand applicant pool for acquisition workforce personnel opportunities
- Retention incentives in the form of bonuses, post-graduate education opportunities, paying off student loans etc.
- Recruitment bonuses for interns
- Fund developmental opportunities for mid- or senior-level staff

The vast majority of the contracting commands are seeing an increase in seasoned, experienced personnel retiring. I would expect this to create a tremendous amount of corporate knowledge drain from DoN.

**The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA) was intended to ensure that future weapon systems move forward on a sound footing by addressing unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, the absence of clearly defined and stable requirements, the inclusion of immature technologies that unnecessarily raise program costs and delay development and production, and the failure to solidify design and manufacturing processes at appropriate junctures in the development process.**

**Do you support the approach taken by WSARA?**

**Answer:** Yes.

**What additional steps, if any, do you believe the Department of the Navy should take to address these problems?**

**Answer:** In response to WSARA, I understand that it has been beneficial for spurring acquisition reform. The DON has been engaged in an aggressive review of the acquisition process and overview. Specifically;

I understand that the DON has improved oversight and reporting with;

- Continuing refinement of Naval 2-Pass / 6-Gate Review process for early and continuous leadership awareness of requirements and affordability in terms of Total Ownership Costs (TOC) throughout the Acquisition process.
- Implement Better Buying 2.0 Initiatives and improved oversight
- Implemented Policy for Should Cost initiatives to be integral to program planning and execution.

These are not static initiatives and I would agree with their continuation and expansion.

**By some estimates, the Department of Defense now spends more money every year**

**for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of products, including major weapon systems. Yet, the Department places far less emphasis on staffing, training, and managing the acquisition of services than it does on the acquisition of products.**

**What steps, if any, do you believe the Navy should take to improve the staffing, training, and management of its acquisition of services?**

**Answer:** The Navy recognizes services contracts are a significant portion of the Navy's acquisition budget. To that end, I understand that the Department is working to reduce its services spending by up to \$4 billion in FY14, building on the decrease achieved in FY13. I consider service contracting to be "Commander's Business" and we must hold all stakeholder's accountable. I expect the Navy will continue its use of Services Requirement Review Boards (also called Services Courts) and accompanying "Tripwires" to better understand our existing efforts, improve future requirements, and help ensure these activities receive appropriate oversight.

**Do you think the Navy should develop processes and systems to provide managers with access to information needed to conduct comprehensive spending analyses of services contracts on an ongoing basis?**

**Answer:** Yes. I expect the Navy will continue to support Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy's efforts to deploy a Services Spend Analysis tool based on FPDS-NG data.

### **United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea**

**The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is currently pending in the Senate.**

**What are your views on U.S. accession to UNCLOS?**

**Answer:** Nearly every maritime power and all the permanent members of the UN Security Council except the United States have ratified the convention. In my view, our absence as a Party weakens our position and impacts our military, diplomatic, and economic efforts worldwide. Only as a Party to the Convention can the United States fully secure its sovereign rights to the vast resources of our continental shelf beyond 200 miles from shore. I strongly support accession to the LOS Convention.

**From a national security standpoint, what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages to being a party to UNCLOS?**

**Answer:** I do not see any disadvantages to becoming a Party from a national security standpoint. As a non-party to the Convention, the United States must assert our navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms on the basis of customary international law which is more subject to dispute and change than norms established by treaty. Becoming a party to the treaty would give an immediate boost to U.S. credibility as we push back against excessive maritime claims and illegal restrictions on our warships or commercial vessels.

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

**Answer:** Yes.

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of the Navy?**

**Answer:** Yes.

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

**Answer:** Yes

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

**Answer:** Yes.