

**Advance Policy Questions for Mr. Michael D. Lumpkin**  
**Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for**  
**Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict**

**Defense Reforms**

**The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the special operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.**

**Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act or special operations reform provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?**

No. The Goldwater-Nichols Act and current special operations authorities have served the Department and our nation well and enhanced the Department's capabilities to respond when required. If confirmed, I will make proposals for modifications if and when required.

**Duties**

**Section 138(b) (4) of Title 10, United States Code, describes the duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)).**

**What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD (SO/LIC)?**

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters. The ASD (SO/LIC) has overall supervision (to include oversight of policy and resources) of special operations and low-intensity conflict activities which encompass policies pertaining to Department of Defense special operations' capabilities and authorities, counternarcotic efforts and resources, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, strategies for building partner capacity, and stability operations in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's priorities and guidance.

**What Department of Defense (DOD) activities are currently encompassed by the Department's definition of special operations and low-intensity conflict?**

Special operations and low intensity conflict activities, as defined Section 167 of Title 10 USC, include direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other activities as may be specified by the President or Secretary of Defense.

**If confirmed, what changes, if any, in the duties and functions of ASD (SO/LIC) do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?**

At present, I do not expect the Secretary of Defense would make any changes to the duties and functions assigned of ASD (SO/LIC).

**In your view, are the duties set forth in section 138(b)(4) of Title 10, United States Code, up to date, or should changes be considered?**

Yes, I believe the duties of the ASD (SO/LIC) as prescribed in section 138(b)(4) of Title 10 continue to remain relevant and provide the ASD (SO/LIC) appropriate and clear authority to serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters. I do not believe any changes are needed at this time.

**Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASD (SO/LIC)?**

Not at present, but if confirmed I would make an assessment of this and provide recommendations as needed to improve my oversight of Special Operations.

## **Qualifications**

**What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?**

I believe I am uniquely qualified for this position because of my broad background in all aspects of the SO/LIC portfolio.

I have been directly involved in the arena of special operations since the 1980's when I began a career as a naval officer and US Navy SEAL. During my time on active duty, I served throughout the world in places such as Afghanistan, Colombia, El Salvador, the Horn of Africa, and Iraq. As a US Navy SEAL, I held every leadership position from Platoon Commander to Team Commanding Officer. During my time in uniform, I garnered significant experience in counternarcotics, counterterrorism, counter insurgency, and security sector assistance.

After my military service, in addition to serving in other federal departments, I served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Acting ASD (SO/LIC).

Additionally, I have a strong management background and served in the principal leadership positions of Chief Executive Officer and Director in the private sector.

## **Relationships**

**In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following:**

### **The Secretary of Defense**

If confirmed, I will perform my duties as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all special operations, assisting the Secretary in the development and employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to achieve US national security objectives. I will engage the Secretary on US counterterrorism strategy and operations, offer policy guidance and oversight of international efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and transnational organized crime, and inform the Secretary regarding the Department's support to peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and stability operations across the globe.

### **The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

If confirmed, I will keep the Deputy Secretary informed as well as provide advice and support on current and future special operations activities, capabilities, plans, and authorities, ongoing and projected counterterrorism efforts and priorities, and the development and employment of stability operations, counternarcotic programs, and peacekeeping efforts.

### **The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

If confirmed, I will work very closely supporting the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I will keep the Under Secretary informed as well as provide advice and support on current and future special operations activities, capabilities, plans, and authorities, ongoing and projected counterterrorism efforts and priorities, and the development and employment of stability operations, counternarcotics programs, and peacekeeping efforts.

### **The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence**

Special operations and intelligence are mutually supporting, so, if confirmed, I will continue to foster the close working relationship with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

**The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs**  
**The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs**  
**The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Americas' Security Affairs**

If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the regional Assistant Secretaries of Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, providing advice regarding special operations and stability operations that are on-going or in the planning stage. We would also work together on policies to build partner capacity, counternarcotics, and combat global threats. I would also anticipate working very closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs on our counter-proliferation and cyber policy efforts.

### **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

If confirmed, I plan to maintain a close working relationship with the Chairman, the Chiefs, and the Chairman's staff. Effective policy and resource oversight of special operations to include successful implementation of our counterterrorism strategies requires continued close coordination and collaboration with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Chairman's staff.

### **The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs**

If confirmed, I will work with the Military Department Secretaries and Service Chiefs to ensure that the requirements to organize, train, and equip personnel and units that enable or support special operations forces are met and maintained. I would also work with them to ensure adequate resourcing of Service-common requirements and infrastructure for Special Operations Forces.

### **The Geographic Combatant Commanders**

The Geographic Combatant Commands are at the forefront of the global fight against terrorists and violent extremists. They are responsible for maintaining a forward posture to deter and dissuade adversaries and assure and build the capabilities of our allies. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Geographic Combatant Commands in all of these areas.

### **Commander, United States Special Operations Command**

The Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the ASD (SO/LIC) have a close relationship in defining and meeting the needs of our Special Operations Forces. If confirmed, I am committed to maximizing that relationship in order to fulfill my responsibilities in accordance with the ASD (SO/LIC)'s statutory requirement to oversee the policy and resources for special operations activities.

### **The commanders of the service special operations commands**

If confirmed, I will work closely with the service special operations commands to ensure they have the policies and resources needed to develop and provide the capabilities needed by the Commander, USSOCOM and the regional combatant commanders.

### **Chief, National Guard Bureau**

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief, National Guard Bureau to ensure they have the policies and resources needed to develop and provide the capabilities supporting the priorities of our Geographic Combatant Commands.

### **The Director of National Intelligence**

As mentioned above, special operations and intelligence are mutually supporting. If confirmed, I will work closely to support the Director of National Intelligence and his subordinates ensuring both parties are appropriately engaged and informed on items of shared national security interest.

### **The Director of Central Intelligence**

Again, special operations and intelligence are mutually supporting. If confirmed, I will work closely to support the Director of Central Intelligence and his subordinates ensuring close, continuing collaboration on items of shared national security interests.

### **The Director, National Counter Terrorism Center**

SOF activities are central to counterterrorism; the NCTC helps ensure coordination of all US Government counterterrorism activities. If confirmed, I will maintain ASD SO/LIC's role as the primary Office of the Secretary of Defense's interface on SOF and counterterrorism matters.

## **Major Challenges and Priorities**

### **In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the ASD (SO/LIC)?**

With growing fiscal constraints in the Department, it will be a challenge to protect our vital defense capabilities. ASD (SO/LIC) must continue to ensure SOF has the adequate resources, training, and equipment as well as authorities to execute and support US counterterrorism strategies as an essential component of our US national security policies. As the Department rebalances efforts and resources toward the Asia Pacific region coupled with the approaching draw down of forces in Afghanistan, ASD (SO/LIC) must continue to shape policies and provide expertise on all special operations and Department of Defense (DoD) support to peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and stability operations across the globe. Terrorism remains a persistent threat to our national security, and while al-Qaida core has been degraded, the evolving threat of al-Qaida-affiliated networks endures. Many of these terrorist networks that directly threaten

American interests are not confined to the geographic boundaries of any one country; therefore, it is vital that the Department remain focused on denying al-Qa'ida and its affiliate's their transnational safe havens.

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

If confirmed, I will work within the Department and the interagency to ensure that programs key to effective counter terrorism operations are properly supported. While ASD (SO/LIC) will remain the focal point for coordinating the Department's strategic counterterrorism guidance, I would engage my counterparts across the interagency to implement effective programs building our partner's capacity and thereby advancing mutual security interests. I will balance my effort to ensure the Department remains capable of supporting peacekeeping, humanitarian, and stability operations across the globe.

**If confirmed, how would you seek to balance responsibilities for operational issues within your portfolio with the “service secretary-like” responsibilities for special operations forces?**

Balance is very important as we enter into a resource constrained environment. Ensuring that our SOF retains their qualitative advantage into the future and that they and their families are taken care of is a top priority. To achieve this, SOF must be properly resourced to include having the best equipment and training available, and a well-educated force. If confirmed as ASD (SO/LIC), I will make every effort to assert the ASD (SO/LIC) role in the resourcing process. This would include participation in USSOCOM's Commander's Roundtable which is the USSOCOM resource decision forum. Through constant collaboration with the senior leadership at USSOCOM, we would ensure that MFP 11 funds are used to maintain a strong and ready force. I would also work closely with the services to ensure that service common support is identified and provided.

**If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD (SO/LIC)?**

If confirmed, my broad priorities would be to ensure our nation continues to have the world's premier special operations capabilities to win the current fight against al-Qaida and its affiliates, while shaping the force for future operations in a very uncertain global security environment. Drivers of success – namely the operational readiness of the force, the care of our people, and sustainment of resources will be among the key issues I will address.

**Civilian Oversight of the United States Special Operations Command**

**The legislation creating the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) assigned extraordinary authority to the Commander to conduct some of the functions of both a military service and a unified combatant command.**

**Which civilian officials in the DOD exercise civilian oversight of the "service-like" authorities of the Commander, USSOCOM?**

Per Title 10 USC §138 and DoD Directive 5111.10 (in accordance with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy priorities and guidance), the ASD (SO/LIC) is the principal civilian oversight for all special operations activities. Other DoD civilian officials also exercise oversight in some capacity:

- Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence USD(I) coordinates on intelligence issues
- Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD(AT&L) coordinates on acquisition issues
- Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness USD(P&R) coordinates on personnel policies such as SOF-unique incentives and readiness issues
- Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller USD(C) coordinates on SOF budget and year-of-execution program issues
- Military Department Secretaries coordinate on SOF manpower issues
- Director, OSD/Cost Assessment Program Evaluation (CAPE), coordinates on SOF Program development and issues

**In your view, what organizational relationship should exist between the ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM?**

ASD (SO/LIC) provides civilian oversight of all special operations matters as required by Title 10 USC §138. As such, the ASD (SO/LIC) provides Service Secretary-like oversight of special operations policy and resource matters and advice to implement Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy priorities. The relationship with the Commander, USSOCOM should be collaborative and cooperative to develop the best possible special operations forces and employ them effectively. Ultimately, the ASD (SO/LIC) represents the Secretary of Defense and provides recommendations regarding special operations that are in the best interest of the Department.

**What should be the role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in preparation and review of Major Force Program 11 and USSOCOM's Program Objective Memorandum?**

The ASD (SO/LIC) provides policy oversight for the preparation and justification of the special operations forces' program and budget. Ensuring that the SOCOM POM is aligned with National priorities and in support of the national defense strategy is key. The ASD (SO/LIC) currently attends the USSOCOM Commanders' Roundtable - the

USSOCOM resource decision forum - to help ensure the POM is aligned to the Department's guidance. During program reviews, the ASD (SO/LIC) works closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director, CAPE, to resolve issues across the Department. . If confirmed, I will work closely with all parties to ensure our nation sustains a ready, capable Special Operations force, prepared to meet the fiscal, operational, and global challenges we face today and into the future.

**What is the appropriate role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in the research and development and procurement functions of USSOCOM?**

The appropriate role of ASD (SO/LIC) is to provide policy oversight in resolving special operations acquisition issues. As the lead Office of the Secretary of Defense official for SOF acquisition matters, the ASD (SO/LIC) represents SOF acquisition interests within DoD and before the Congress. The responsibilities and relationships between the ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander, USSOCOM are defined and described in a Memorandum of Agreement between the ASD and Commander, USSOCOM. The ASD directs and provides policy oversight to technology development programs that address priority mission areas to meet other Departmental, interagency, and international capability needs.

**What is the appropriate role of the ASD (SO/LIC) in the operational planning of missions that involve special operations forces, whether the supported command is USSOCOM, a Geographic Combatant Command, or another department or agency of the U.S. Government?**

The ASD (SO/LIC) serves as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense for all aspects of employment, deployment, and oversight of special operations and counterterrorism capabilities. The ASD (SO/LIC) provides policy oversight of USSOCOM's mission planning and Geographic Combatant Commanders' employment of SOF to ensure compliance with law and DoD priorities. The ASD (SO/LIC) coordinates deployment authorities and plans involving SOF within DoD and with interagency partners as required.

**Impact of Sequestration**

**The President's budget request and the fiscal year 2014 spending bills for the Department of Defense considered by Congress to date assume an agreement that would avoid sequestration for fiscal year 2014. In the absence of such an agreement, the Department of Defense will face a second year of sequestration and an across-the-board reduction of approximately \$52 billion.**

**What are your views on the impact sequestration is having on the readiness of special operations forces and how would those impacts be exacerbated if sequestration continues in fiscal year 2014 and beyond?**

Sequestration has a negative effect on readiness across the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Congress, the DoD Comptroller, and USSOCOM to assess the particular impact of sequestration on SOF, particularly to ensure we can sustain the right level of capability, capacity, and readiness across the FYDP, aligned to current strategy and available resources.

### **Special Operations Command Acquisition Authorities**

**USSOCOM is unique within the DOD as the only unified command with acquisition authorities and funding. Further, the Commander of USSOCOM is the only uniformed commander with a subordinate senior acquisition executive.**

**If confirmed, how would you ensure USSOCOM requirements are adequately vetted and balanced against available resources before moving forward with an acquisition program?**

The ASD (SO/LIC) is closely involved in all facets of the USSOCOM Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system, providing oversight of these matters. Other forums used by the ASD (SO/LIC) include: the USD (AT&L) Acquisition Review of Department Systems, the USSOCOM Commanders' Roundtable, the USSOCOM Integrated Concept Team Reviews, and USSOCOM Budget and Acquisition Reviews. Additionally, through the annual DoD Program Budget Review process, the ASD (SO/LIC) is able to ensure that USSOCOM's priorities and resource allocation are in alignment with the Department's strategic and policy imperatives.

**What role can USSOCOM's development and acquisition activities play in broader service and DOD efforts?**

USSOCOM can continue to serve as an incubator for developing new equipment and capabilities that initially are for special operations-specific needs but often transition to the General Purpose Force. Noteworthy is USSOCOM's ability to conduct rapid evaluations of technology, systems, and concepts of operations, and the ability to integrate emerging off-the-shelf technologies.

**If confirmed, how would you ensure that special operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall DOD research, development and acquisition programs?**

If confirmed, I would continue to support the regularly-convened USSOCOM-led "Acquisition Summits" with OSD, drawing together USSOCOM, USD (AT&L), and the Service Acquisition Executives where all elements discuss acquisition issues of common interest.

**If confirmed, how would you ensure sufficient resources are dedicated to the development of special operations-unique platforms, when required?**

ASD (SO/LIC) is closely involved and integrated with USSOCOM's planning, resourcing, and execution. Additionally, the ASD (SO/LIC) attends the USSOCOM Commanders' Roundtable quarterly meetings, which allows the ASD to maintain awareness of matters of concern and import to USSOCOM and its subordinate commands. Finally, ASD (SO/LIC) representatives sit on the USSOCOM Special Operations Requirements Board (SOCREB) to ensure SOF requirements are ready for funding. If confirmed, I will advocate for steady and predictable resourcing of USSOCOM and oversee the investment strategy. If confirmed, I will also provide advice and support to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as he sits on critical resource decision-making bodies.

**If confirmed, what metrics will you use to determine the effectiveness of USSOCOM technology development investments and whether USSOCOM is investing sufficient resources in these efforts?**

USSOCOM has created a series of technology roadmaps that are effective in identifying promising solutions to meet operational requirements. These roadmaps have quantifiable metrics (e.g., cost, schedule, performance, and technology readiness) embedded in them and allow the ASD (SO/LIC) to oversee and monitor progress and identify obstacles that may require Department-level involvement.

**If confirmed, how will you ensure that USSOCOM has an acquisition workforce with the skills, qualifications, and experience needed to develop and manage its acquisition and research and development programs?**

If confirmed, I would support USSOCOM's efforts to manage the SOF acquisition workforce, which is similar to the process used by the Service Acquisition Executives. USSOCOM's acquisition workforce experts are professionally trained and certified, and have substantial experience in the SOF-unique processes needed to meet the equipping needs of SOF. I would also support USSOCOM's efforts with USD (AT&L) to expand its organic acquisition workforce, as well as to create a unique identifier for SOF acquisition positions.

### **Special Operations Personnel Management**

**Some have argued that the Commander of USSOCOM should have greater influence on special operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of special operations forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, United States Code, to change the role of the USSOCOM Commander from "monitoring" the readiness of special operations personnel to "coordinating" with the services on personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect special operations forces.**

**What is your view of this proposal?**

Personnel policies and management are arguably the most effective tool for incentivizing characteristics and culture in an organization. Currently, Commander, USSOCOM, provides input to Service personnel policies that effect SOF, but has no direct influence or control over the assignment, promotion, or command selection of SOF personnel. Changing Section 167 of Title 10, United States Code, to reflect the word “coordinating” rather than “monitoring” would give USSOCOM more influence over Service personnel policies that affect SOF accessions, assignments, compensation, promotions, professional development, readiness, retention, and training. However, I believe that additional coordination and study should be done within the Department to fully understand the impact of this proposal.

### **Size of Special Operations Forces**

**The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have mandated significant growth in our special operations forces and enablers that directly support their operations.**

**Do you believe QDR-directed growth in the size of special operations forces can and should be maintained in light of current fiscal challenges?**

**What do you believe would be the impact on the ability of special operations forces to meet global requirements if QDR-directed growth is not realized? What if special operations end-strength is reduced below current levels?**

I believe the uncertain security environment necessitates a review of our SOF force structure, balanced against our strategy and resources, during each QDR and program review. If confirmed, I will work closely with colleagues in DoD and with the USSOCOM Commander to ensure our nation has a ready, capable special operations force to address current and future threats.

### **Special Operations Missions**

**In recent years, special operations forces have taken on an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to USSOCOM’s Title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities special operations forces are carrying out around the world.**

**What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by USSOCOM, and why?**

I fully support the 2010 QDR’s strategic shift toward expanding general purpose forces’ capabilities and capacity for irregular threats. However, I believe that SOF must maintain a very robust capability to train, equip, and advise foreign security forces as part of ensuring SOF capability to conduct operations in politically sensitive environments, ensuring access for other SOF activities, and ensuring the ability to train, equip and

advise either special operations forces or irregular forces. At this time, I do not advocate significant changes to USSOCOM's Title 10 missions. If confirmed, I will make recommendations of any mission divestitures if and when required.

**Are there any additional missions that you believe USSOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?**

No. If confirmed, I will make recommendations of any additional missions for SOF if and when required.

### **Combatting Terrorism**

**The National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights the need to maintain pressure on al-Qa'ida's core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al-Qa'ida-linked threats "that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia." The President signed new Policy Guidance on Counterterrorism on May 22, 2013, that established a framework governing the use of force against terrorists.**

**How do you view the DOD's role under the National Strategy for Counterterrorism?**

The President's National Strategy for Counterterrorism maintains the focus on pressuring al-Qa'ida's core while emphasizing the need to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our resilience. Overarching goals are to protect the American people, Homeland, and interests; disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida; prevent terrorists from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction; eliminate safe havens; build enduring counterterrorism partnerships; degrade links between al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents; counter al-Qa'ida's ideology; and deprive terrorists of their financial support and other enablers.

The U.S. Government remains engaged in a multi-departmental, multinational effort. DoD continues to undertake activities to support this strategy including training, advising, and assisting partner security forces; supporting intelligence collection on al-Qa'ida; conducting information operations against al-Qa'ida; and, when appropriate, capturing or killing al-Qa'ida operatives. However DoD is also committed to enabling its intelligence and law enforcement partners, both in the United States and overseas, in their efforts to counter this threat.

**What is your understanding of the impact of the President's guidance for the use of force in counterterrorism operations outside the US and areas of active hostilities on DOD's role within the U.S. Government's counterterrorism strategy?**

The President's guidance formalizes and strengthens the Administration's rigorous process for reviewing and approving operations to capture or employ lethal force against terrorist targets outside the United States and outside areas of active hostilities. By

establishing a clear set of criteria that must be met before lethal action may be taken, the guidance will help focus DoD's planning and preparation for these operations. If confirmed, I will make a formal assessment of the impact of the new guidance and provide my best advice to the Secretary and the President to ensure we're doing everything we can to protect our nation from terrorist attacks.

**Will DOD see its role increase or decrease as a result of the President's counterterrorism guidance?**

The guidance establishes standards and procedures that are either already in place or will be transitioned over time. As such, I do not anticipate a significant change in the Department's role. If confirmed, I intend to ensure we conduct counterterrorism operations lawfully, and in accordance with this policy.

**If the role increases, what, if any, are the commensurate increases in capabilities or capacities that are required?**

If there is an increase in our role, if confirmed, I will work closely with colleagues to ensure our department has the requisite capabilities to execute our counterterrorism responsibilities in accordance with the policy.

**Will DOD require any new authorities?**

At this time, it is my understanding the Department of Defense does not require any new authorities to carry out our counterterrorism responsibilities.

**Are there steps DOD should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other federal departments and agencies?**

I believe the Department of Defense routine coordination with other federal departments and agencies adequately addresses its efforts to combat terrorist networks and threats to American interests.

**What do you view as the role of the DOD in countering al-Qa'ida and affiliated groups in cyberspace?**

It is important that DoD retain the resources and expertise to counter al-Qa'ida's propaganda and recruitment efforts in cyberspace, in order to effectively complement the State department's primacy of communications outside of combat zones.

**The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force**

**What is your understanding of the scope and duration of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)?**

The AUMF was enacted by Congress on September 18, 2001 (Public Law 107-40), and it provides “that the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” The AUMF remains law; it has not been amended or repealed.

**What factors govern Department of Defense determinations as to where the use of force is authorized, and against whom, pursuant to the AUMF?**

Outside of Afghanistan, without touching on matters that may be classified, I would note that targeting decisions are made based on careful, fact-intensive assessments, and review, in order to identify those individuals and groups that are appropriately targetable. This review continues up the chain of command through the four-star combatant commander and to the Secretary of Defense.

**Do you believe that current legal authorities, including the AUMF, enable the Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at the level that you believe to be necessary and appropriate?**

Yes, I believe that DoD’s current legal authorities, including the AUMF and the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, are necessary and appropriate.

**Special Operations Authorities**

**Reportedly, the Commander of USSOCOM has sought more control over the deployment and utilization of special operations forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense modified policy guidance for the combatant commands earlier this year that gave USSOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing, and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of the Geographic Combatant Commanders and special operations forces assigned to them. It has been reported that the Commander of USSOCOM is also seeking new authorities that would allow him to more rapidly move special operations forces between Geographic Combatant Commands.**

**Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.**

On February 11, 2013, the Secretary of Defense approved an update to the Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum for fiscal year 2013 that assigns all special operations forces to Commander (CDR), USSOCOM. This improved command relationship gives CDRUSSOCOM the flexibility to meet Geographic Combatant Commander requirements with sustained, persistent SOF capabilities and capacities more effectively in order to accomplish regional objectives in support of national strategic end states. GCCs continue

to exercise operational control of Special Operations Forces once deployed into a GCC area of responsibility.

### **Intelligence Operations**

**In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the Intelligence Community?**

In my view, SOF intelligence operations are complementary and mutually supporting to those carried out by the Intelligence Community (IC). These operations comply with the policies and regulations guiding DoD and interagency activities.

**If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are coordinated adequately with other activities carried out by those in the intelligence community?**

I believe that interagency collaboration is the most important contributing factor to many of SOF's achievements. If confirmed, I will oversee, maintain, and build upon the important relationships USSOCOM has developed with the Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

**What is your understanding and assessment of the authorities and agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military personnel to carry out missions under the authorities contained in title 50, United States Code?**

The Secretary of Defense has authority under Title 10 and Title 50, United States Code to conduct operations vital to our national defense. DoD activities conducted under Title 50 support intelligence collection for the Department as well as for the nation. U.S. military personnel are employed across the spectrum of tactical to strategic operations in support of these requirements.

### **Information Operations**

**The Government Accountability Office reports that DOD has “spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year” to support its information operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are in support of operations in Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) from USSOCOM also deploy to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Further, the Geographic Combatant Commands are increasingly moving into this operational space.**

**What are your views on DOD's military information support operations and influence programs and their integration into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?**

I believe the Department of Defense must be able to influence foreign audiences in environments susceptible to the messages of U.S. adversaries. Military Information Support Teams (MIST) are trained in developing culturally appropriate messages to counter hostile information and propaganda, as well as assisting with building the capacity of partner nations to conduct these activities themselves.

**What is the role of DOD versus the intelligence community and the State Department?**

The Department of Defense, like all Departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, takes its lead from the President, and relies heavily on the Department of State, in reinforcing the Nation's message. I understand that Department of Defense influence activities, including those conducted by MISTs, are coordinated closely with the Embassies in the areas where they operate, both inside and outside of areas of conflict, and at times can support common efforts of other agencies. Chiefs of Mission must concur on all MIST deployments. MIST activities are fully coordinated with the U.S. Country team to ensure message consistency and maintain State Department leadership in presenting the face of the U.S. overseas.

**How do you believe the success of these programs should be measured, especially in light of the constrained budget environment?**

I understand the Department has taken significant steps to address Congressional concerns related to policy oversight, budgeting, and effectiveness of information support operations and influence programs. These programs remain a special interest item for Congress, and as such must continue to be carefully managed and overseen. If confirmed, I intend to continue to be responsive to Congress on this matter, as well as to continue the Department's efforts to improve coordination of our information activities across the interagency.

**Civil Affairs Operations**

**Civil Affairs activities carried out by U.S. Special Operations Forces in partnership with host nation personnel play an important role in developing infrastructure, supporting good governance and civil societies, and providing humanitarian assistance, including medical and veterinary services to needy populations.**

**In your view, does USSOCOM have sufficient personnel and resources to conduct the range of Civil Affairs missions required for today's operations?**

If confirmed, I will review the Civil Affairs (CA) force structure and work with the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commands to determine any shortfalls and how best to address them.

**Civil Affairs activities are most effective when coordinated with other U.S. government efforts, most notably those carried out by U.S. Agency for International Development.**

**If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs activities by special operations personnel are integrated into larger U.S. government efforts?**

If confirmed, I will meet regularly with my interagency counterparts in order to harmonize U.S. government CA efforts as required.

**Military Information Support Operations can have an amplifying effect on Civil Affairs activities by actively promoting the efforts of the U.S. military and host nation and by communicating truthful messages to counter the spread of violent extremist ideology among vulnerable populations.**

**If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations are adequately coordinated to achieve a maximum impact?**

If confirmed, I would support USSOCOM in its role as a joint proponent over both CA and MISO. This will enable unity of effort and the coordinated execution of CA and MISO. CA and MISO force representation at the operational and strategic levels will also remain critical in achieving a coordinated impact. At the tactical and operational level, (e.g. country teams at the U.S. Embassies where CA and MISO are working), this is accomplished as a matter of course. CA and MISO personnel receive similar training and understand that their specialties are mutually supporting.

### **Render Safe Proficiency**

**The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a growing and especially concerning threat to our nation. Countering this threat through actions taken to locate, seize, destroy or capture, recover and render such weapons safe is a core activity of USSOCOM.**

**If confirmed, how would you ensure render-safe capabilities are adequately maintained by special operations units who may currently be heavily engaged in Afghanistan and elsewhere?**

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights the danger of nuclear terrorism as being the single greatest threat to global security. If confirmed, I will work closely with USSOCOM and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs on this important issue. I will carefully monitor and assess the impact of our operational tempo on DoD's render safe capabilities and ensure that these capabilities are maintained.

**Do you believe additional render-safe capabilities are needed within USSOCOM?**

Not at this time, I believe USSOCOM has the capabilities now to accomplish its render-safe mission.

### **Supported Combatant Command**

**Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by the President or Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM may operate as a supported combatant command.**

**In your view, under what circumstances should USSOCOM conduct operations as a supported combatant command?**

As authorized by Section 167 of Title 10 USC, the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct USSOCOM Commander to exercise command of selected special operations missions, which may involve highly sensitive targets and circumstances. The Secretary of Defense has also designated USSOCOM as the supported combatant command for planning and synchronizing global operations against terrorist networks.

### **Training Capability**

**What capabilities do you consider most important for effective training of special operations personnel?**

The human component of USSOCOM is where its strength lies and to develop our special operations personnel we must be willing to invest the necessary time and resources in advanced, realistic training. Specialized individual training, including language proficiency and development of technical skills, together with a robust joint and international exercise program, is a proven recipe for building and sustaining our cutting-edge capabilities. These are best achieved through SOF-based authorities, such as the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs, as well as other exercise programs administered by the Combatant Commands and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance training for special operations personnel?**

Despite steady growth in USSOCOM since 2001, operational demands continue to stress the force. As we continue to transition in Afghanistan, we need to establish a sustainable rotation model for SOF that allows for deliberate training cycles for individual and unit level training in between operational deployments.

**What are the most significant challenges in achieving effective training of special operations personnel?**

SOF are deployed at an extremely high rate around the world. Deploying persistently and for long durations results in significant experience for special operations personnel, but in many cases a focused mission may result in the atrophy of other skill sets. For

example, aircrews may conduct repetitive air-land missions on a long deployment, but may not conduct a specific airdrop mission due to deployment constraints. USSOCOM's development of a SOF force generation model is intended to ensure there is enough time to train in the deployment cycles to maintain proficiency in core SOF capabilities. Additionally, since most SOF missions require non-SOF support, time must be added to work closely with Service counterparts supporting SOF.

**What, if any, training benefits accrue to U.S. special operations forces from training foreign military personnel?**

SOF gain significant training benefit from training foreign personnel. These training benefits include: enhanced language proficiency, cultural awareness, real world experience conducting foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. These activities help expose SOF to new tactics, techniques, and procedures while also encouraging the development of communication and intelligence-sharing mechanisms that enable CT operations. Training foreign military units helps build trusting relationships and fosters familiarization that in return enables our SOF to work in foreign countries with greater success and confidence.

**To what extent, in your view, is it appropriate for the U.S. to rely upon contractors for training foreign military personnel? What do you see as the primary risks and advantages in such contractor training?**

SOF cannot be replaced by contractors. However, in some instances utilizing contractors may make sense and could be a viable course of action, particularly if there's a requirement for a certain technical skill not resident in our force. For example, there may not be a SOF aviator trained on a certain aircraft that is essential to a partner nation's mobility fleet. In these cases, a contract solution might be the best option to ensure an important mission is still conducted. Contractors can also fill a gap in cases when US foreign policy restrictions do not permit deployment of US military personnel. Contractors can also help provide logistics, administrative support, and technical/computer expertise which in turn free special operations personnel for more SOF-unique training opportunities and operational missions. DoD is obligated to maintain strong oversight over contractors, and contractors are not permitted to represent the U.S. government.

**Language and Cultural Awareness Capabilities**

**Deployed special operations personnel remain heavily concentrated in the Central Command theater of operations, including many who have been deployed outside of their regional area of expertise.**

**Are you concerned that the language and cultural skills among special operations forces have been degraded because of repeated deployments outside their regional area of expertise?**

Yes. For more than a decade, 80% of all SOF deployments have been to the CENTCOM area of operations. This has taken a toll on the language, regional expertise, and cultural awareness capabilities of those units deployed outside their aligned regions. USSOCOM has made great strides to correct this imbalance, and I expect the trend towards greater regional alignment to continue as we move towards a transition in Afghanistan.

**If so and if confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to ensure these unique skills are adequately maintained?**

I support USSOCOM's initiative to implement higher requirements for language capability as well as to improve the training processes for its components. If confirmed, I would seek to continue to pursue several key policy issues in close coordination with USSOCOM, including: native/heritage recruiting, valuing language and regional capabilities in selections and promotions, and language testing and incentives. I will also strongly encourage the continued alignment of SOF with regional areas of focus, consistent with our national strategies and aligned to the threat.

### **Capabilities of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces**

**The 2010 QDR called for increased counter insurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces. The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) of 2011 did not modify this policy. However, the Strategic Capabilities and Management Review (SCMR) released this year identifies a range of general purpose force reductions that would likely result in little or no significant or consistent capability for these missions.**

**What is your assessment of the QDR, DSG, and SCMR with regard to the mix of responsibilities assigned to general purpose and special operations forces, particularly with respect to security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?**

I understand the Services are increasingly improving their capabilities to conduct these operations, including the Army's development of regionally-aligned forces and the Marine Corps deployment of a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force for Crisis Response (MAGTF-CR). In many cases, SOF and the GPF are working side-by-side to build the military capability and capacities of our partners around the world. I expect this trend to continue, despite budget cutbacks, given the importance our strategy places on helping our partners and allies develop assume greater responsibility for security abroad.

**Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to become more like special operations forces in mission areas that are critical to countering violent extremists?**

The partnership between general purpose and special operations forces is strong. The extensive combat employment of both forces in shared battle spaces has increased the need to coordinate our operations closely. This has resulted in a sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures between SOF and general purpose forces that has helped to

increase the Services' capabilities to execute counterinsurgency and combating terrorism operations. The Services can continue to complement SOF's capabilities by providing those combat enablers that are not organic to SOF units or that are not available in adequate quantities. These combat enablers, including intelligence and combat service support, are vital to the success of SOF, especially in today's complex operating environment.

**Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for special operations forces only?**

Yes. Although the Joint force has evolved significantly since 2001, and SOF and GPF are highly interoperable, they are not interchangeable. Special operations and low intensity conflict activities, as defined in Title 10 USC Section 167, include direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other activities as may be specified by the President or Secretary of Defense. USSOCOM focus should remain in these defined areas of experience and expertise while integrating Service enablers as appropriate.

**Special Operations Enabling Capabilities**

**While USSOCOM maintains organic enabling capabilities to support short duration missions, most special operations missions require supporting capabilities provided by the services to be successful.**

**What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling capabilities facing special operations forces?**

**In your view, how should the responsibility for providing supporting capabilities for special operations missions be divided between USSOCOM and the services?**

**What in your view are the critical supporting capabilities in each of the services that must be preserved to minimize risk to special operations missions today and into the future?**

Shortages of enabling capabilities for SOF are often similar to the shortage of high-demand enablers that challenge the rest of the deployed forces (e.g., intelligence, explosive ordnance disposal, communications, medical, security).

USSOCOM's organic enabling capabilities are those that provide SOF the ability to self-sustain for short durations while maintaining the agility to deploy forces quickly in support of the Combatant Commanders. Longer term support of special operations forces, by doctrine, and except under special circumstances, becomes the responsibility of each Service's theater logistic command and control structure and are critical to the success of SOF.

## **Section 1208 Operations**

**Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.**

### **What is your assessment of this authority?**

Section 1208 authority has been a very effective tool for US special operations forces to leverage and enable willing partners to conduct operations to combat terrorism. Combatant Commanders strongly support 1208 programs. Given the changing global threat environment, I anticipate that the need for these programs will continue to grow.

## **Al-Qa'ida**

### **What is your assessment of the threat posed by al-Qa'ida and its associated forces to the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and Western interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?**

The pressure exerted by the United States and its partners has isolated the core of al-Qa'ida. As the President has said, the remaining operatives in the al-Qa'ida core spend more time thinking about their own safety than plotting against us. But we now confront a less capable, but still lethal threat from geographically diversified groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida. The most well-known of these groups is al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which continues to plot against the United States. Increasingly, however, new groups of loosely affiliated extremists have also emerged, but the threat they pose to the U.S. is more localized.

The upheaval in North Africa and the Middle East has contributed to a permissive environment for such extremist networks to exploit. Unlike the al-Qa'ida core in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or even AQAP, these groups are most focused on the countries and regions where they are based. They work together through existing familial and tribal networks and focus on acting locally, as we saw in Benghazi and the BP oil facility in Algeria attacks. And as we strive to work with our partners in the region, we see the political changes ushered in by the Arab Spring present challenges as well; although many of the governments in the region are friendly to our interests, they struggle to exert a monopoly of force within their own borders.

## **Afghanistan**

### **What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan? What are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current effort to combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan?**

I am cautiously optimistic that we are going to accomplish our objectives in Afghanistan prior to completion of the transition. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its Afghan partners have made important security gains over the past 12 years, reversing violence trends in much of the country, and beginning the process of transition to the Afghan government. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), particularly the Afghan CT Forces such as the Afghan SOF and Special Police Units (who fall under the MOI) have been integral to this success. These units are demonstrating substantial growth in quantity, quality, and operational effectiveness. The Afghan Special Operations Forces and it's the Special Police Units have demonstrated particular competence, and are well regarded within the country.

We must remain cautious, however, as U.S. and allied forces begin to retrograde in 2014. Al-Qa'ida's safe havens in Northeast Afghanistan and the limited capacity of the Afghan government remain the biggest threats to consolidating security gains to enable an enduring, stable Afghanistan that can prevent terrorist groups from using these areas to launch attacks against the U.S. homeland. Additionally, the threat of attacks against U.S. interests within Afghanistan is likely to increase as U.S. and allied direct support to security decreases; this is a threat against which our personnel in-country must remain vigilant. Nevertheless, this partnered campaign has provided increased security and stability for the Afghan population, and the U.S. continues to build upon this success.

**Special operations forces in Afghanistan depend on general purpose forces for many enabling capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; and medical evacuation. Admiral McRaven, Commander of USSOCOM, has said "I have no doubt that special operations will be the last to leave Afghanistan" and has predicted that the requirement for special operations forces may increase as general purpose forces continue to be drawn down.**

**If confirmed, how would you ensure adequate enabling capabilities for special operations forces as general purpose forces continue to draw down in Afghanistan?**

I have not yet reviewed the mission planning and analysis to form a view regarding the appropriate number of U.S., coalition, and Afghan troops necessary to fulfill key missions including force protection. I do believe that sufficient forces should be provided to do the job assigned to them, while protecting themselves. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that all special operations forces are supported by sufficient enablers, informed by military advice from the Joint Staff and the Commander, U.S. Central Command.

**In April 2012, the U.S. and Afghanistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the "Afghanization" of direct action counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan - reflecting the shared intention of having Afghan security forces in the lead in the conduct of such operations with U.S. forces in a support role.**

**What is the status of efforts to put Afghan Special Operations Forces in the lead for such operations and why do you believe such a transition is important?**

In my view, both unilateral and partnered direct actions are an essential and highly effective element of our strategy to defeat al-Qa'ida and those that enable it in Afghanistan. Wherever possible, we should strive to maintain a reasonable degree of freedom of action within our post 2014 force structure that will allow us to achieve our objective of preventing terrorists from using Afghanistan as a sanctuary from which to attack the U.S. Homeland.

I understand that Afghanistan's highly-trained special operations forces are steadily growing, and that Afghans currently play a key role in coordinating and partnering in the vast majority of these operations. Of course, direct action operations must continue to be conducted with due respect for cultural sensitivities and great care for the prevention of civilian casualties. Ultimately, the goal must be to ensure that Afghan and international forces have the capabilities and authorities necessary to achieve the transition to a Post 2014 structure, while also being mindful of the goal to increase Afghan ownership throughout the transition process.

**The Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs – both U.S. Special Operations missions – have been consistently praised by U.S. military leaders as critical elements of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.**

**What are your views on the value of these programs and do you believe they should be part of the long-term strategy in Afghanistan (i.e. post-2014)?**

Village Stability Operations (VSO) are a critical component of the International Security and Assistance Force's (ISAF) campaign plan. VSO uses Afghan and ISAF special operations forces embedded in the community full-time to help improve security, governance, and development in more remote areas of Afghanistan where the Afghan National Security Force and ISAF have a limited presence. I understand that, since its inception, VSO has greatly expanded Afghan government influence in key rural areas and has enabled small-scale infrastructure development. Across Afghanistan, increasing numbers of local communities are requesting to participate in this program.

The Afghan Local Police (ALP), the armed local security program associated with VSO and established by President Karzai, has reportedly expanded to more than 8,000 members. ALP are empowering local communities and have proven to be a significant threat to the Taliban by denying them safe-haven, and ultimately creating the conditions for long-term stability.

## **Pakistan**

**What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests with regard to Pakistan?**

I believe the U.S. and Pakistan share common interests in long-term regional stability; which includes disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qa'ida, a durable political settlement in Afghanistan, and the safety and security of the Indian Ocean.

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is clear in stating that the U.S. will only achieve the strategic defeat of al-Qa'ida through a sustained partnership with Pakistan. In my view, the military-to-military relationship is an important part of this partnership as it facilitates mutually beneficial counterterrorism goals. U.S. military assistance to Pakistan has helped the PAKMIL achieve success in its counterinsurgency efforts. Despite recent setbacks in this relationship, it is important that we continue to engage our PAKMIL counterparts to reestablish and rebuild the relationship and continue achieving these successes.

**Does the United States have a strategic interest in enhancing military-to-military relations with Pakistan? Why or why not?**

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is clear in stating that the U.S. will only achieve the strategic defeat of al-Qa'ida through a sustained partnership with Pakistan. U.S. military assistance to Pakistan has helped the PAKMIL achieve a level success in its counterinsurgency efforts. I support efforts to increase military-to-military relations in support of counterterrorism efforts with Pakistan, as feasible.

**If so, what steps would you recommend, if confirmed, for enhancing the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Pakistan?**

I understand unit-level relationships are strong, and I believe we should be making every attempt to ensure that our tactical and operational level leaders are able to maintain these ties however possible.

**What is your assessment of Pakistan's cooperation with the United States in counterterrorism operations against militant extremist groups located in Pakistan?**

The internal domestic counterterrorism concerns of Pakistan are significant. I understand our current counterterrorism cooperation is good and we continue to improve the level and quality of this cooperation.

**In your view, how will the continued availability of safe haven for various terrorist organizations within the tribal areas of Pakistan impact our long-term strategy in Afghanistan?**

Terrorist sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan will continue to challenge Afghan security. Both unilateral and partnered direct actions are an essential and highly effective element of our strategy to defeat al-Qa'ida and those that enable it in Afghanistan, particularly in northeastern parts of the country.

**What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to counter the threat of improvised explosive devices, including efforts to attack the network, and go after known precursors and explosive materials?**

I recognize the actions of the government of Pakistan to ban the export of products utilized in the production of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The improved border coordination between ISAF, Pakistan and Afghanistan and the ongoing discussions on the development of a comprehensive border security strategy are encouraging. This is a critical area for cooperation that could have had significant impact if it results in action.

## **Syria**

### **What is your assessment of the situation in Syria and its impact on the region?**

Syrian President Bashar al-Asad has lost legitimacy and must step aside to enable a political solution that ends the bloodshed, and meets the aspirations of the Syrian people. I support working closely with allies, partners and multilateral institutions to achieve this goal through diplomatic and economic pressure on the Asad regime.

Hundreds, if not thousands of foreign fighters, predominantly from North Africa and Middle Eastern countries, are traveling to Syria to support the Syrian insurgency against the Asad regime. However, as history demonstrates, relationships and experience gained by these fighters could yield benefits for al-Qa'ida and endanger the stability of surrounding countries.

### **What is your assessment of Jabhat al Nusra and other like-minded groups?**

Al-Qa'ida affiliated groups, Jabhat al Nusrah and al-Qa'ida in Iraq, as well as other extremist groups, are a growing problem inside Syria as the security vacuum caused by the instability has allowed these groups to make modest gains. Jabhat al Nusra has sought to portray itself as a part of the legitimate Syrian opposition, while also attempting to hijack the aspirations and struggles of the Syrian people for its own malicious purposes.

### **In your view, what is the most appropriate role for the United States military in assisting regional friends and allies respond to the situation in Syria?**

The U.S. is working with our allies to achieve a peaceful and orderly political transition in Syria and to end the bloodshed as quickly as possible. Our NATO Allies are closely monitoring the situation in Syria, especially as the conflict touches on NATO's border in Turkey, and like us, are extremely concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian conditions on the ground. NATO's ultimate task is the protection and defense of NATO members. To that end, I support NATO's decision to augment Turkey's air and missile defense capabilities in order to defend the population and territory of Turkey and contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along the Alliance's border. This includes the recent deployment of NATO Patriot batteries to Turkey from the U.S., Germany, and Netherlands. I understand the Administration has also been working with our international partners, including NATO Allies, to ensure that the appropriate humanitarian assistance is reaching those Syrians in need, both inside Syria and in

neighboring countries. If confirmed, I would support improved coordination and information sharing on al-Nusrah Front and foreign extremist flows. I would also continue to work with Syria's neighbors, especially Jordan and Israel, to ensure their stability during this turbulent time in the region.

**In your view, what – if any – role should the United States military, including special operations forces, play with respect to the situation in Syria?**

If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue planning for a variety of contingencies in order to provide the Secretary and the President with options. I will review these plans and, if necessary, I will direct additional planning on this and any other potential contingencies.

**Iraq**

**What is your assessment of the current threat posed by al-Qa'ida in Iraq? How has the threat changed since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq at the end of 2011?**

The increased levels of violence in Iraq in recent months are disturbing, and are a constant reminder of the formidable challenges Iraq continues to face on the security front.

Over the past two years, the operational tempo of al-Qa'ida in Iraq has increased in part due to the destabilizing influence of the crisis in Syria. I consider the Government of Iraq an essential partner in a common fight against al-Qa'ida. We have an ongoing dialogue with the Government of Iraq to help facilitate its capacity to degrade and defeat the al-Qa'ida network and to neutralize its ability to prey on Iraqi citizens of all communities.

**What is your assessment of the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces to respond to the threat posed by al-Qa'ida and other security challenges?**

Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S. forces to maintain its internal stability. While the Iraqi Security Forces are competent at conducting counterterrorism and stability operations, the security situation they face is serious and poses a challenge to their ultimate success. If confirmed, I would remain committed to working with the Iraqi Government to develop its military and security abilities and address regional challenges.

**What are the main "lessons learned" from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn as they pertain to special operations forces?**

I believe that the U.S. has learned many lessons through its past operations in Iraq and its ongoing operations in Afghanistan. Some of these lessons include: the need to maximize combined operations with partner forces, the necessity of culturally attuned forces, the need for a unified U.S. Government approach, and the need for active and integrated interagency coordination.

**What are the lessons learned from the drawdown and post-combat operations in Iraq that should be applied to the drawdown and post-combat operations in Afghanistan?**

We need to continue our relationships and capacity building for the Government of Afghanistan's efforts against al-Qa'ida to succeed. Information sharing, technical assistance, and enabling resources will allow our partners to effectively disrupt al-Qa'ida operations, especially external operations against Western interests. We have productive engagement across the globe, in many different countries that help and support our interest in protecting the homeland and U.S. persons. We should apply all the lessons we are learning to our CT threats that will continue to emanate from Afghanistan in the future.

**Yemen and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula**

**What is your assessment of the current threat posed by Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula?**

I am very concerned about the threat that al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) poses to the Homeland. AQAP has attempted at least three attacks on the United States since December 2009, and in my view fully intends to attack again. AQAP has shown some very sophisticated and innovative techniques, such as the development of concealed explosive devices and printer cartridge bombs. AQAP is also attempting to recruit and radicalize would-be terrorists in the West through its extensive media outreach.

**What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen and what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that strategy?**

The U.S. strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP is a collaborative U.S.-Yemeni effort. I understand the current strategy also includes supporting the Yemeni political transition, marshaling international economic and humanitarian assistance, and building Yemen's counterterrorism capabilities through training and assistance.

As part of this whole-of-government strategy, DoD continues to collaborate extensively with Yemeni forces and remove key AQAP leadership and operatives from the battlefield. The Department's programs to train, advise, and equip Yemeni forces are also critical to long-term efforts against AQAP.

**Given the continuing political instability and slow progress of the national dialogue in Yemen, what are your views on the U.S. continuing to provide security training and assistance to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?**

The Yemeni government has made a number of gains against AQAP over the past two years, including driving AQAP from some of its territory in southern Yemen and enabling operations to capture and kill AQAP operatives. However, Yemeni counterterrorism capabilities remain limited, and Yemeni security forces will require

continued U.S. training and assistance to enable them to effectively combat AQAP. This assistance has been and will continue to be a part of a comprehensive U.S. strategy that includes support for the Yemeni government's reform efforts including the ongoing National Dialogue.

## **Somalia and Al Shabab**

**What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al Shabab?**

**In your view, does al Shabab pose a threat to the United States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational area?**

My understanding is that successful operations by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have reduced al-Shabaab's freedom of movement in south and central Somalia, but al-Shabaab remains a threat to the U.S. Homeland and to U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab leaders have claimed affiliation with al-Qa'ida since 2007 and formally merged with the group in February 2012. Al-Shabaab has demonstrated the intent and capability to conduct terrorist acts throughout eastern Africa, and it presents a threat to the homeland through links into Somali diaspora communities in the U.S. and Europe.

Al-Shabaab continues to stage high profile attacks in Somalia against Western and international targets and has claimed responsibility for the attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. If al-Shabaab did conduct the Westgate attack, it shows al-Shabaab's capability to stage complex, high-profile attacks against Western targets outside of Somalia and its ability to harm U.S. citizens abroad.

**What is your understanding of Al Shabab's activities to recruit foreigners, including Somali-Americans, to join their efforts?**

I understand that al-Shabaab has successfully recruited foreign recruits for training in Somalia, including Somali-Americans. Although the exact numbers and nationalities of foreign fighters in Somalia remain unclear, reports indicate that several hundred foreign recruits have come to Somalia to support al-Shabaab and other extremist groups since 2008. Foreign fighters threaten the Somalia National Government and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and undermine their efforts to build a stable and peaceful Somalia.

**What is your understanding of the current U.S. strategy in Somalia and the role of DOD in that strategy?**

U.S. policies toward Somalia support the Somali National Government and AMISOM's efforts to deliver security and basic services and lay the foundation for an enduring government. However, Somalia's historical lack of governance and sparse population make it an appealing safe haven for al-Shabaab and elements associated with al-Qa'ida.

I understand that DoD's primary missions in the Horn of Africa are to combat terrorism and to build partner capacity to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests. I believe this mission is appropriate. DoD's ultimate goal should be a fully integrated strategy under which security assistance, capacity building, operational collaboration with regional partners, and counterterrorism actions are synchronized to provide the regional security and stability that are in the interest of both the U.S. and our regional partners. If confirmed, I will work to ensure our strategy is developed as part of a coordinated U.S. national security policy towards the Horn of Africa, and to determine how DoD can and should best support this policy.

**Should the United States establish military-to-military relations and consider providing assistance to the Somali national military forces?**

The U.S. can play a guiding and mentoring role in the development of Somalia's security sector. It is in our interest to ensure that Somalia's new government has a competent and professional military to provide security to its citizens and play a constructive role in the region. Formally recognizing the Somalia National Government earlier this year was an important first step to developing military relations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure DoD's relationship with the Somalia National Army progresses appropriately.

**Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)**

**What is your assessment of the threat posed by Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?**

My understanding is that at this time, there is no credible evidence that AQIM is a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland. However, as seen in hostage situations in Algeria and other attacks in the region, AQIM and its associates do threaten U.S. persons and interests abroad, as well as our European Allies.

**In your view, does AQIM pose a threat to the United States and/or western interests outside of its immediate operational area? What capacity has AQIM demonstrated to plan and carry out actions threatening U.S. interests?**

AQIM's immediate operational area includes pockets of ungoverned territory across North and West Africa. Though AQIM has not conducted an attack outside of this area, we must be proactive in denying a terrorist a safe haven throughout the region, from which direct attacks against the United States, our partners, or our interests outside of North and West Africa would be possible.

**In your view, what has been the impact of the recent expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali on the group's capacities and aims?**

The expansion of AQIM's area of operations in northern Mali is not new. It has been a serious concern to the United States and our partners. France's operations in Mali and

the regional and United Nations' peacekeeping forces have made significant progress in stabilizing the situation. We remain concerned about AQIM's freedom of action in Mali and throughout the region and will continue to work with partners, including the newly-inaugurated President of Mali, to address the threat.

### **Operation Observant Compass & the Lord's Resistance Army**

**Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and efforts by U.S. Special Operations personnel to support them, elements of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) – including Joseph Kony – continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian populations in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan. Some observers have identified operational concerns with this mission, including that: (1) supported forces are trying to find an elusive foe in an area roughly the size of California, much of which is covered in thick jungle; (2) technical support to U.S. forces and their UPDF partners from the defense and intelligence community continues to be inadequate; and (3) limitations continue to be placed on the ability of U.S. Special Operations personnel to accompany UPDF partners outside of main basing locations, thereby limiting the level of direct support they can provide.**

#### **In your view, what is the objective of Operation Observant Compass?**

Under Operation Observant Compass (OOC), U.S. SOF seeks to enhance the capacity of local forces to end the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). It is my understanding that U.S. military advisors are working with these forces to strengthen information-sharing and synchronization, enhance their operational planning, and increase overall effectiveness. While OOC is important in the effort to counter the LRA threat, there is not a purely military solution to this problem. The U.S. strategy to counter the LRA outlines four pillars for continuing support: increasing the protection of civilians; apprehending or removing Joseph Kony and senior commanders from the battlefield; promoting the defection, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters; and increasing humanitarian access and providing continued relief to affected communities. If confirmed, I would support the current U.S. policy of pursuing a comprehensive, multi-faceted strategy to help the governments and people of this region in their efforts to end the threat posed by the LRA and to address the impacts of the LRA's atrocities.

#### **Do you support the continuation of DOD's current level of support to this mission?**

DoD's support to regional counter-Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) efforts helps to advance regional security cooperation and security sector reform. If confirmed, I would seek to continue the U.S. commitment to deepen our security partnerships with African countries and regional organizations by expanding efforts to build African military capabilities through low-cost, small-footprint operations.

At the same time, I would work with the Department of State and other U.S. agencies and departments to seek to strengthen the capacity of civilian bodies and institutions to

improve the continent's ability to provide security and respond to emerging conflicts. I would also regularly assess and review DoD's contributions to this mission to ensure our personnel are best supporting U.S. strategic interests.

### **Republic of the Philippines**

**What is your view of the effectiveness of U.S. assistance provided through the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines to the military of the Republic of the Philippines in its fight against terrorist groups?**

**Do you expect the necessity for or mission of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines to change in the coming years? If so, how?**

Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines as executed by our Joint Special Operations Task Force has been very successful and serves as an excellent model for a partnership between the U.S. and a host nation for combatting a terrorism threat. Due to the success of this partnership, the Philippine Military is now transitioning its focus toward external threats and the security issues remaining in the south will be addressed primarily through a combination of civil and police actions.

### **Stability and Peacekeeping Operations**

**In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (U.N.), stated that the United States “is willing to consider directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian police, and other civilian personnel—including more women I should note—to U.N. peacekeeping operations.”**

**What is your view on whether the U.S. should contribute more military personnel to both staff positions and military observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?**

I am supportive of contributing personnel to function in staff positions or as military observers providing the mission aligns with the national security priorities of DoD and the United States. Successful U.N. peacekeeping operations are in the core national security interest of the U.S., as they generally are cost effective, reduce the burden on U.S. forces, and in many cases directly advance U.S. strategy security interests. Additionally, U.S. military personnel can have a significant, positive, impact on UN peacekeeping operations, and provides the U.S. with an opportunity to shape these missions.

**If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the U.N.?**

If confirmed, I would be supportive of exploring ways where the Department could more effectively respond to requests for personnel support, bearing in mind any applicable legal requirements and the current operational tempo of U.S. forces.

### **Interagency Collaboration**

**The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces, general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.**

**What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?**

Our efforts abroad over the past decade have brought much attention to the importance of collaborative interagency efforts. The interagency collectively established procedures and relationships to successfully conduct counter-insurgency and counterterrorism operations. As we transition, the interagency must now look to maintain and improve upon the hallmarks of previous successful interagency efforts -- well-informed, transparent, constant communication and collaboration at multiple levels. The interagency must ensure that all departments and agencies are operating under a common national strategic framework in support of achieving sustainable outcomes overseas and building long-lasting relationships with our global partners. With unity of effort, the interagency can implement broader foreign policies and national security objectives through fostering good governance, restoring public infrastructure, assisting economic activities, and/or enabling a secure environment through a capable, equipped armed force. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to ensure that interagency collaboration is as effective as possible.

**How do you believe these efforts can be improved?**

One area of improvement concerns our government's approach to the immediate requirements of basic public order among foreign civilian populations when the rule of law has broken down. DoD has learned after hard experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that securing and protecting a population is not only an immediate military mission, but one that is essential for preventing insurgencies from growing and for a sustainable transition to host-country control. A whole-of-government approach is vital to assist in training foreign security forces and it takes a robust interagency effort to maintain those capacities and institutions that can educate, equip, and enable them for these missions.

**Should these informal and ad hoc arrangements be made more formal (i.e. through legislation, DOD Directives or Instructions, etc...) or is their ad hoc nature the reason for their success?**

Formality and standardization are perhaps most important at the highest levels, where clearly prioritized objectives – or the lack thereof – can have the most positive or pernicious effects on operations and campaigns requiring the close coordination of multiple instruments of national power. The President signed a Presidential Policy Directive on Security Sector Assistance (SSA) in April to improve the U.S. Government's collective ability to address security sector assistance issues as a shared responsibility. To this end, the PPD prescribes interagency roles, responsibilities, and collaborating principles for developing and implementing SSA activities. On the other hand, organizations and teams operating at the tactical level need maximum flexibility to achieve mission success as current requirements, driving factors, and threats continuously change. Rather than attempting to standardize the roles and relationships of tactical-level operators from different departments and agencies, we should – instead – be working to familiarize them with each other and the responsibilities of their respective departments and agencies. Operational flexibility must be buttressed with the familiarity and education derived from constant interaction, particularly interaction in the forms of joint/interagency training and education.

**Interagency collaboration on an operational or tactical level tends to address issues on a country-by-country basis rather than on a regional basis (e.g. international terrorists departing Mali for safe havens in Libya).**

**How do you believe regional strategies that link efforts in individual countries can best be coordinated in the interagency arena?**

I understand that the recent security sector assistance policy guidance from the President emphasizes a “deliberate and inclusive whole-of-government process that ensures alignment of activities and resources with our national security priorities.” In order to synchronize planning for these activities, I believe the interagency must link efforts in individual countries to the broader regional approach. I also believe the regional strategies developed by the members of the interagency should complement each other. Any security sector assistance strategy is largely impacted by the degree to which the interagency can plan, synchronize, and execute particular activities in a region. With prescribed interagency roles, responsibilities, and collaborating guidelines the interagency is best prepared to share plans, develop and implement programs, and monitor and evaluate the progress of our efforts in individual countries.

### **Special Operations Personnel in Embassies**

**USSOCOM deploys personnel to work with country teams in a number of priority countries where the U.S. is not engaged in direct action operations, but rather trying to counter the spread of violent extremism. Their mission is to support the priorities of the Ambassador and the combatant commander’s theater campaign plan against terrorist networks.**

**If confirmed, how would you seek to ensure the goals of special operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned closely with those of the Ambassadors they are working with?**

**In your view, what is the value of these special operations personnel to their respective Geographic Combatant Commands and the country teams they are supporting.**

The sustained partnership among our Geographic Combatant Commanders, Ambassadors, and deployed special operations forces has been strong throughout the past 12 years. Special operations personnel deployed to embassies help provide a network-based approach to assessing threats, formulating options, and improving the country team's situational awareness. They bring specialized equipment and offer significant expertise in contingency operations that augments the Ambassador's resident capabilities. If confirmed, a priority of mine will be to continue working with USSOCOM, the Geographic Combatant Commanders, and State Department colleagues to further strengthen these trusted partnerships.

### **Detainee Treatment Policy**

**Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?**

Yes. Ensuring individuals in the custody of U.S. forces are treated humanely is consistent with the applicable U.S. laws and the laws governing armed conflicts.

**Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?**

Yes.

**If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?**

Yes. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all U.S. special operations forces continue to receive the necessary education and training in the standards established in the Army Field Manual, relevant DoD Directives, and other applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations.

**Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?**

Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. We hold our forces accountable to treat those we capture and detain with dignity, respect, and humanity. We do this as a matter of principal and following our moral compass. Our hope would be for our enemy to treat our personnel in a similarly humane manner, but regardless of how our captured forces are held, we will continue to maintain the high standard of treatment currently provided to detainees we hold.

### **DOD Counternarcotics Activities**

**On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately \$1.5 billion to support the Department's CN operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that DOD "does not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities." This is the second such finding relating by GAO to DOD CN in the last decade.**

**What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?**

Having recently served as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, I understand and appreciate the importance of DoD counterdrug activities in support of broader U.S. government counternarcotics goals as well as the accomplishment of other key national security objectives. The DoD counterdrug program is providing critical support to our national security objectives in Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, Central America, Northwest Africa and elsewhere. I also recognize how the counternarcotics program supports the broader objectives of the office of the ASD for SO/LIC. If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that these activities continue to be well-integrated into the overall SO/LIC strategy, and to ensure that they are as cost-effective as possible.

**Do you believe DOD's current CN strategy has proven effective in stemming the flow of illegal narcotics?**

In support of The President's National Drug Control Strategy, DoD plays a key role in supporting U.S. and partner-nation counternarcotics efforts that have achieved major and sustained progress against cocaine use and distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, DoD

counternarcotics efforts have helped reduce the amount of cocaine reaching the United States, which has contributed to declines in cocaine overdose deaths, positive workplace drug tests, retail drug purity, and cocaine seizures in the United States. Through efforts such as the establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force – South and support to Plan Colombia, the Department of Defense has played a critical role in this success. Nevertheless, continued high levels of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine trafficking, and the growing threat of synthetic drugs, continues to present an extraordinarily difficult challenge, and DoD brings unique capabilities to bear against these threats.

**In what ways can the effectiveness of DOD CN programs be better evaluated?**

Over the past several years, the DoD CN program has made significant progress in improving its performance evaluation framework and has developed standardized operating procedures to apply across the wide range of Combatant Commands, Armed Services, and Defense Agencies that implement the Department’s CN efforts. The performance data provided is now being used to inform policy and budgetary decisions. However, we continue to work to move beyond measuring performance based on inputs and outputs (e.g. numbers of personnel trained) rather than on the outcomes these programs are seeking to achieve. These types of evaluations can be much more difficult but would ultimately provide a better assessment of the value of these efforts.

**In your personal view, what role should DOD play in U.S. efforts to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?**

The Department of Defense’s role in U.S. counterdrug efforts is, and should continue to be, to employ militarily unique knowledge, skills, and capabilities to confront the wide range of national security threats associated with drug trafficking and related forms of transnational crime. Since the late 1980s, when DoD was designated as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking bound for the United States, DoD has provided critical counterdrug support to State, local, Federal, and foreign law enforcement partners to combat the flow of illicit drugs into our country. Narcotics and other forms of transnational organized crime also provide key financial support to terrorists, insurgents, and other threat forces, and contribute to global instability by undermining legitimate government institutions, fostering corruption, and distorting legitimate economic activity. Accordingly, DOD counterdrug efforts support the National Security Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.

DoD’s efforts to build the counternarcotics capacity of partner-nation security forces serves to prevent and deter broader conflicts that could require a much more costly military intervention in the future. In today’s increasingly austere budgetary environment, these programs can serve as cost-effective tools to accomplishing key national security objectives. Given the interwoven nature of threats we face today, we are increasingly seeing that the expertise, authorities, and experience of our law enforcement partners are essential to accomplishing national security objectives.

## **Counter Threat Finance**

**Identifying and disrupting key individuals, entities, and facilitation routes enabling the flow of money that supports terrorism, production of IEDs, narco-trafficking, proliferation, and other significant national security threats could have an outsized impact on confronting these threats. In August 2010, the Department issued a Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy Directive which recognized the CTF discipline as an essential tool in combating criminal networks and terrorist organizations and called for the integration of CTF capabilities into future force planning and the continued support to interagency partners conducting CTF operations.**

**What is your assessment of DOD efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?**

The DoD CTF Directive, which was updated in November 2012, drives the institutionalization of CTF within the Department. Since our nation's adversaries, from drug traffickers to terrorists, insurgents and rogue nations rely upon the flow of money to enable their activities, upsetting their financial supply lines is a proven means of disrupting threats to national security. CTF is an important capability in the Department as evidenced by our success with the Iraq and Afghanistan Threat Finance Cells. We've also seen increasing success from the CTF units established at each of the Combatant Commands. These CTF units coordinate across the government and work in support of the interagency to counter national security threats. Ultimately, success in CTF will depend on DoD's continued ability to integrate with, support, and complement other USG, multinational, and host nation activities. If confirmed, I will ensure DoD continues to collaborate with and support other U.S. Government departments and agencies to conduct counter threat finance activities.

**What is your assessment of the current ability of the Department to provide support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?**

It is critical to engage all U.S. government tools to track and halt the flow of money and to fight our adversaries' ability to access and use global financial networks. Although DoD is not the lead U.S. agency for CTF, it does work with and support other departments, agencies, and partner nations through a unique set of capabilities, including long term planning, network analysis, and intelligence analysis. The Department's senior leadership recognizes the significance, both strategically and tactically, of a capable and robust CTF posture. I do not anticipate an immediate need to expand the support DoD is providing, but, if confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department remains fully engaged in the interagency process on counter threat finance activities and is postured to provide additional support if necessary.

**What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD’s current counter threat finance efforts?**

I understand the Department is in the process of examining and evaluating its counter threat finance capability, and I believe there are improvements that can be made. Principally, the Department's CTF capability should be better integrated into the policy and strategy of the Department, including COCOM theater campaign plans. I understand that the Department is conducting a capabilities-based assessment for CTF that will help identify and institutionalize these capabilities across the COCOMs, the Armed Services, and Defense Agencies. This assessment should help us to identify the full range of capabilities the Department could bring to bear in support of broader U.S. government efforts.

**What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of USSOCOM in supporting counter threat finance activities?**

USSOCOM is well suited to support and augment interagency efforts to counter threat finance. Experiences since 2001 have led to the development of a robust capability to analyze insurgent, terrorist, and transnational threat networks, and SOF are already integrated at many levels with interagency partners across the intelligence and law enforcement domain. SOF contributions to these agencies enables them to identify sources of insurgent, criminal, and terrorist finances; disrupt front companies; develop actionable financial intelligence; freeze and seize illicit funds; and build criminal cases.

**National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime**

**Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. The Director of National Intelligence recently described transnational organized crime as “an abiding threat to U.S. economic and national security interests,” and stated that “rising drug violence and corruption are undermining stability and the rule of law in some countries” in the Western Hemisphere. In July 2011, the President released his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. One of the priority action areas designated in the strategy is “enhancing Department of Defense support to U.S. law enforcement.”**

**What is your understanding of the President’s strategy to combat transnational criminal organizations?**

The President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime applies to all elements of national power to protect citizens and U.S. national security interests from the convergence of 21st century transnational criminal threats. It declares transnational organized crime a threat to national security and includes a clear call to build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational organized crime, and

urge our foreign partners to do the same. The end-state the USG seeks is to reduce transnational organized crime from a national security threat to a manageable public safety concern.

**What is your understanding of the Department's role within the President's strategy?**

The President's strategy acknowledges DoD's role in providing support to law enforcement. DoD brings many unique supporting capabilities in support of broader U.S. Government efforts to combat transnational organized crime, principally through the employment of the Department's counternarcotics authorities. These capabilities primarily include military intelligence support and counter-threat finance support to U.S. law enforcement. We therefore must ensure that DoD is organized, resourced, and appropriately authorized to provide vital support to law enforcement and foreign partners to confront the national security threats associated with transnational organized crime. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring what additional U.S. support is appropriate under existing authorities.

**In your view, should DOD play a role in providing support to the U.S. law enforcement and the Intelligence Community on matters related to transnational organized crime?**

Yes. Due to the national security implications of drug trafficking and related forms of transnational organized crime, the Department should continue to provide support to our interagency partners, including Federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies. For example, DoD currently supports law enforcement through intelligence analysis at the Narcotics and Transnational Crime Support Center - an action specifically highlighted in the President's strategy. DoD also provides unique supporting capabilities including military intelligence support to law enforcement, counter threat finance, partner nation capacity building, and operational activities against threats to the U.S.

**Building Partner Capacity**

**In the past few years, Congress has provided the DOD a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations.**

**In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations?**

In my view, the department's ability to effectively build the capacities of partner nations is a strategic necessity for the United States. It enables the department to directly provide training, equipment, and other support to partners to encourage and enable them to share security responsibilities. This includes enabling partners to act alongside of, in lieu of, or in support of U.S. forces across the globe. In our fiscal climate, we should continue these capacity building activities so that we can achieve our defense objectives while reducing risks of sending U.S. forces into harm's way.

**In light of demands for defense budget cuts, how would you assess the trade-offs between providing funding for U.S. military forces and providing assistance to build the capacity of partner nations' security forces?**

I believe one goal of building the capacity of a partner nation is to transform them from a security consumer to a security provider. The decision on where the trade-off lies is in the prioritization of U.S. strategic interests. We must continue to ensure U.S. military forces receive the appropriate resources, equipment, and training in order to serve effectively and be prepared to respond at any given notice. At the same time it is still important to sustain engagement with key partners and building partner capacity to meet shared challenges provides a forward presence to enable operations and deter threats and, if and when necessary, to conduct future contingencies. During these uncertain times, we should continue to improve military-to-military and defense-civilian relations, while continuing to evaluate and re-calibrate the nature and substance of our relationships to ensure they are consistent with U.S. values and advance U.S. vital national interests. If confirmed, it is my aim to ensure our assistance programs to partner nations will fulfill defined strategic requirements and vitally important capability gaps that are directly in line with the President's and the Defense Secretary's strategic guidance.

**What is your assessment of the sufficiency of existing security assistance authorities to address the evolving nature of global security threats?**

Developing partner capacity through security sector assistance is important because every one of our primary missions involves collaborating with partners to some extent. These investments buy down risk and ease the burden of U.S. forces by improving our partners' ability to provide for their own security, to contribute to larger regional and combined security efforts, or to enable U.S. operations consistent with our national objectives. In some cases, partners are better positioned than U.S. forces to conduct security operations due to cultural affinity or political sensitivities. I understand that Congress has provided the Department of Defense security sector assistance authorities that have improved our partners' capabilities and capacity to contribute to security around the globe. There may be requirements where additional or more agile authority is needed to address emerging security challenges. If confirmed, I will look forward to working with the Congress to develop appropriate legislative remedies where appropriate.

**What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 train and equip authority? What is your assessment of the implementation of the global train and equip program?**

The Section 1206 authority builds capacity for counterterrorism operations and stability operations where U.S. forces are a participant. The program has been successful in responding to annual requests by the Combatant Commanders and Chiefs of Mission for near term assistance to overcome critical shortfalls in partner capabilities. This includes providing training and equipment to nations deploying forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Although the 1206 program has done a great job delivering equipment, we need to do more work on assessing the effects this has on

improving partner capacity over the long term. If confirmed, I will continue development of assessment metrics and work closely with Department of State colleagues to integrate 1206 capabilities into our overall foreign assistance programs for partner nations.

**The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) was established in the Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA to create a joint Department of Defense – Department of State administered program to build partner nation capacity in the areas of security and rule of law. What is your assessment of the implementation of this authority? Do you believe it's achieving its intended objectives? If not, do you believe modifications are required?**

The GSCF enables the Departments to address emergent opportunities and challenges in partner's security sectors that could not be planned for but that have a direct bearing on our national security interests and do so in a more collaborative and integrated approach.

While I have not been involved in the implementation of the GSCF, I understand that the Departments of Defense and State have made significant progress towards improving joint implementation of the program and intend to incorporate a robust monitoring and evaluation framework to assess each individual GSCF project, as well as the overall program in the country of interest. If confirmed, I look forward to sharing the results of the assessment effort with the Congress, and specifically this Committee. I will welcome your help and continued guidance as we continue to mature the GSCF.

**What is the relationship of the train and equip authority to other security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics assistance, foreign military financing, and other Title 22 authorities? What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?**

U.S. security sector assistance authorities across programs are complementary, and I will strive to avoid unnecessary duplicative efforts. The counternarcotics authorities are focused on providing the Department of Defense the ability to support U.S. or other government efforts to counter the flow of narcotics globally. If confirmed, the Global Security Contingency Fund, Section 1206, and counternarcotics authorities would fall under my purview, and I would monitor their implementation to ensure they continue to be used appropriately, and in keeping with their intent. I understand that the President issued new guidance on security sector assistance in April. If confirmed, I will strive to strengthen our capacity to plan, synchronize, and implement security sector assistance through a deliberate and inclusive process that ensures alignment of activities and resources with our national security priorities.

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

Yes, if confirmed, I will appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress when called upon to do so.

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD (SO/LIC)?**

Yes, if confirmed, I will provide this Committee or members of this Committee accurate and appropriate information to the best of my ability when called upon to do so.

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the necessary information to this Committee and other appropriate Committees and their staff when asked to do so.

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the Committee the necessary documents when appropriate and will consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing documents.