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Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA IN
REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM

Thursday, April 16, 2015

Washington, D.C.

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DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 AND THE
FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

Thursday, April 16, 2015

U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John
McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators McCain
[presiding], Inhofe, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Reed,
McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.

1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM ARIZONA

3 Chairman McCain: Good morning. The committee meets
4 today to receive testimony on U.S. Pacific Command and U.S.
5 Forces Korea.

6 I'd like to thank both of our witnesses, Admiral
7 Locklear and General Scaparrotti, for appearing before us
8 today and for their many years of distinguished service.

9 The past 3 months, this committee has received
10 testimony from many of America's most respected statesmen,
11 thinkers, and former military commanders. These leaders
12 have all told us that we are experiencing a more diverse
13 and complex array of crises than at any time since the end
14 of World War II.

15 As we confront immediate challenges in Europe and the
16 Middle East, the United States cannot afford to neglect the
17 Asia-Pacific region, which Secretary Carter has called,
18 quote, "the defining region for our Nation's future." Put
19 simply, if the 21st century is to be another American
20 century, the United States must remain an Asia-Pacific
21 power. Our national interests in the Asia-Pacific are deep
22 and enduring. We seek to extend free trade, free markets,
23 free navigation, and free commons -- air, sea, space, and
24 now cyber. We seek to maintain a balance of power that
25 fosters the peaceful expansion of human rights, democracy,

1 rule of law, and many other values that we share with
2 increasing numbers of Asian citizens. And we seek to
3 defend ourselves and our allies by maintaining the
4 capability to prevent, deter, and, if necessary, prevail in
5 a conflict.

6 Achieving these objectives will require sustained
7 American leadership. We must use all elements of our
8 national power. In particular, I am hopeful that Congress
9 will pass trade promotion authority for the Transpacific
10 Partnership. This vital trade agreement will open new
11 opportunities for trade and level the playing field for
12 American businesses and workers, while sending a powerful
13 strategic signal about America's commitment to the Asia-
14 Pacific.

15 Yet, we must remember that our soft power is the
16 shadow cast by our hard power. That's why the United
17 States must continue to sustain a favorable military
18 balance in the region. The Department of Defense will need
19 to update concepts of operations with emerging military
20 technology to enable our military to operate in contested
21 environments. From projecting power over long distances
22 and exploiting the undersea domain to developing new
23 precision-guided munitions and to investing in innovative
24 ways to build the resiliency of our forward-deployed
25 forces, we have a great deal of work to do if we aim to

1 sustain our traditional military advantages in the Asia-
2 Pacific region. None of these will be possible if we
3 continue to live with mindless sequestration and a broken
4 acquisitions system.

5 As we build and posture forces to secure America's
6 interest in the Asia-Pacific, we must remain clear-eyed
7 about the implications of China's rise and its evolving
8 foreign and defense policy. As Director of National
9 Intelligence James Clapper told this committee back in
10 February, China is engaged in a rapid military
11 modernization deliberately designed to counteract or thwart
12 American military strengths. I believe China can and
13 should play a constructive role in the Pacific -- Asia-
14 Pacific region. Unfortunately in recent years, China has
15 behaved less like a responsible stakeholder and more like a
16 bully.

17 In the South China Sea, we have seen the latest
18 example of a trend toward more assertive behavior. China's
19 land reclamation and construction activities on multiple
20 islands across the Spratly Chain and the potential command
21 and control, surveillance, and military capabilities it
22 could bring to bear from these new land features are a
23 challenge to the interests of the United States and the
24 nations of the Asia-Pacific region. Such unilateral
25 efforts to change the status quo through force,

1 intimidation, or coercion threaten the peace and stability
2 that have extended prosperity across the Asia-Pacific for
3 seven decades.

4 As I wrote in a letter, together with my colleagues,
5 Senator Reed, Corker, and Menendez, the United States must
6 work together with like-minded partners and allies to
7 develop and employ a comprehensive strategy that aims to
8 shape China's coercive peacetime behavior. This will not
9 be easy and will likely have impacts on other areas of our
10 bilateral relationship. But, if China continues to pursue
11 a coercive and exlatory to the resolution of maritime
12 disputes, the cost to regional security and prosperity, as
13 well as to American interests, will only grow.

14 I'm also concerned by the recent assessment from
15 Admiral Bill Gortney, the head of NORAD in Northern
16 Command, that North Korea has an operational road-mobile
17 missile that could carry nuclear weapons to the United
18 States. General Scaparrotti, I look forward to hearing
19 your assessment of this potential breakthrough and the
20 implications of our -- to our national security if the
21 erratic and unpredictable regime of Kim Jung-Un achieves
22 the ability to carry out a nuclear strike against our
23 homeland.

24 I thank the witnesses and look forward to their
25 testimony.

1 Senator Reed.
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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr.
4 Chairman.

5 Let me join you in welcoming Admiral Locklear and
6 General Scaparrotti. Thank you, gentlemen, for your
7 service and sacrifice, and that of your family. And,
8 particularly, convey to your men and women under your
9 commands our deepest appreciation for what they do every
10 day.

11 On Tuesday, we had an extremely insightful hearing on
12 some of the challenges we face in the Asia-Pacific region.
13 The consensus from the panel is that we face some very
14 serious challenges, especially in light of China's
15 increasing military budget and destabilizing activities in
16 the region. And one of the biggest challenges will be to
17 continue to provide, as we have for 70 years, security,
18 stability, and free transit in the Pacific, particularly,
19 as Senator McCain emphasized, with pending sequestration in
20 the face of declining resources that we have. And I echo
21 his call for the end of sequestration.

22 Admiral Locklear, we'd be very interested in your
23 views about the land reclamation activities of China in the
24 Spratlys and elsewhere. That is something, as the Chairman
25 has noted, that we both, along with Senator Menendez and

1 Corker, objected to, or at least criticized. What more,
2 also, must we do to build the capacity of our partners in
3 the region, to help them with the maritime domain
4 awareness, and to encourage all the regional actors to seek
5 legal redress to problems, not to invoke lethal threats
6 with respect to sovereignty and respect to stability in the
7 region?

8 As the Chairman indicated, Admiral Gortney's comments
9 this week, and I will quote him as he said, North Korea,
10 quote, "has the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a K9-08
11 and shoot it at the homeland." Quite disturbing. And,
12 General Scaparrotti, would you, in your comments or
13 questions, please let us know about the dimensions of this
14 threat as it exists today and as it might evolve in the
15 future?

16 Again, we thank you, because the North Koreans appear
17 to be not only, unfortunately, well armed, but very
18 difficult to predict their behaviors, and your views and
19 insights will be extremely important. Also, if you could
20 comment on the possible deployment of a THAAD missile
21 defense system and its contribution to the defense of our
22 allies, the Republic of South Korea.

23 We are considering all of these challenges, once
24 again, under the constraint of serious budget limitations.
25 And, Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti, please

1 indicate to us the impact of sequestration on your
2 operations. It would be very helpful, I think.

3 Thank you very much for joining us.

4 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 Chairman McCain: I thank the witnesses.

6 Admiral Locklear.

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1 STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR III, USN,
2 COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

3 Admiral Locklear: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
4 Reed, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank
5 you for this opportunity to appear before you today with
6 General Scaparrotti.

7 Before we begin, I'd like to ask that my written
8 statement be submitted for the record.

9 Chairman McCain: Without objection.

10 Admiral Locklear: For more than 3 years, I've had the
11 honor and privilege of leading the exceptional men and
12 women, military and civilian, of the United States Pacific
13 Command. These volunteers are skilled professionals
14 dedicated to the defense of our Nation, they're serving as
15 superb ambassadors to represent the values, the strengths
16 that make our Nation great. I want to go on record to
17 formally thank them for our -- for their service, and their
18 families for their sacrifices.

19 In U.S. PACOM, we continue to strengthen alliances,
20 our partnerships, maintain an assured presence in the
21 region, and demonstrate an intent and resolve to safeguard
22 U.S. national interests.

23 When I spoke to you last year, I highlighted my
24 concern for several issues that could challenge the
25 security environment across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Those

1 challenges included responding to humanitarian assistance
2 and disaster relief, dealing with an increasingly dangerous
3 and unpredictable North Korea, a challenge that General
4 Scaparrotti and I remain aligned in addressing, a continued
5 escalation of complex territorial disputes, increasing
6 regional transnational threats, and the complexity
7 associated with China's continued rise. In the past year,
8 these challenges have not eased. They will not go away
9 soon. But, the Asia rebalance strategy has taken hold and
10 is achieving intended goals.

11 However, the greatest challenge remains the continual
12 physical uncertainty resulting from sequestration. If the
13 Budget Control Act remains in force, the greatest challenge
14 in the Indo-Asia-Pacific will be dealing with the
15 consequences to the security of our national interests and
16 to respond to a rapidly changing world. I echo the
17 Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
18 Staff, and the Service Chiefs' testimony before Congress.
19 Our Nation is being forced into a resource-driven national
20 security strategy instead of one properly resourced and
21 driven by our enduring interests. In the Indo-Asia-
22 Pacific, we are accepting more risk, not less.
23 Sequestration will force harmful reductions in force size,
24 structure, and readiness. It will reduce my ability to
25 manage crisis space, provide options to the President, and

1 diminishes United States prestige and credibility in the
2 region and around the globe.

3 In the last year, the great -- at great expense to the
4 readiness of the surge forces' position in the continental
5 United States, PACOM has been able to maintain its forward
6 forces focused on protecting the homeland, deterring
7 aggressors such as North Korea, strengthening alliances and
8 partnerships, and developing the concepts and capabilities
9 required remain dominant in a world that is growing in
10 complexity with threats that continue to increase against a
11 seemingly unending stream of constraints. Without adequate
12 resources, we will be forced to make difficult choices
13 today that will have strategic consequences to our future.

14 I'd like to thank the committee for your continued
15 interest and support. I look forward to your questions.

16 [The prepared statement of Admiral Locklear follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: General Scaparrotti.
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1 STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA,
2 COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES
3 COMMAND/U.S. FORCES KOREA

4 General Scaparrotti: Chairman McCain, Ranking Member
5 Reed, and distinguished members of the committee, I'm
6 honored to testify today as the Commander of the United
7 Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States
8 Forces Korea.

9 On behalf of the servicemembers, civilians,
10 contractors, and their families who serve our great Nation
11 in the Republic of Korea, one of our most important allies,
12 thank you for your support.

13 I've prepared brief opening remarks, but I would like
14 to ask that my written posture statement be entered into
15 the record.

16 Chairman McCain: Without objection.

17 General Scaparrotti: Last year, I testified that the
18 combined and joint forces of the United States and the
19 Republic of Korea were capable and ready to deter and, if
20 necessary, respond to North Korean threats and actions.
21 Due to our accomplishments in 2014, I report to you that
22 our strong alliance is more capable of addressing the
23 rapidly evolving and increasingly asymmetric North Korean
24 threat.

25 In recent years, North Korea has aggressively

1 developed and utilized asymmetric capabilities, such as
2 cyber warfare, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles, to
3 advance its interests. To put this in perspective over
4 time, in 2012 my predecessor noted North Korea's
5 advancements in cyber and nuclear capabilities during his
6 opening statement to this committee. A year later, North
7 Korea conducted cyber attacks on South Korea's banks and
8 broadcasting stations. And in 2014, they boldly projected
9 their cyber capabilities against Sony Pictures in the
10 United States, in an effort to inflict economic damage and
11 pressure -- and suppress free speech. This example
12 represents a trend that is persistent across several North
13 Korean asymmetric capabilities.

14 My top concern is that we will have little to no
15 warning of a North Korean asymmetric provocation which
16 could start a cycle of action and counteraction leading to
17 unintended escalation. This underscores the need for an
18 alliance to -- for the alliance to maintain a high level of
19 readiness and vigilance.

20 Last year, the alliance took significant steps in
21 improving its capabilities and capacities to deter
22 aggression and to reduce its operational risk. But, our
23 work is not done. In 2015, we will maintain this momentum
24 by focusing on my top priority: sustaining and
25 strengthening the alliance, with an emphasis on our

1 combined readiness. This includes ensuring the rapid flow
2 of ready forces into Korea in the early phases of
3 hostilities and improving ISR capabilities in critical
4 munitions.

5 Chairman, the return of sequestration would negatively
6 impact these priorities, reduce readiness, and delay
7 deployment of the forces required to defend the Republic of
8 Korea and U.S. interests. In crisis on the Peninsula, this
9 will result in more military and civilian casualties for
10 the Republic of Korea and the United States, and
11 potentially place the mission at risk.

12 The men and women serving on freedom's frontier,
13 defending the Republic of Korea, remain thankful for this
14 committee's unwavering support in prioritizing resources
15 that enable us to defend our national interests in Asia
16 while advancing universal values and international order.
17 I'm extremely proud of our servicemembers, civilians, and
18 their families serving in the Republic of Korea, who never
19 lose sight of the fact that we are at freedom's frontier,
20 defending one of our most important allies and vital
21 American interests.

22 Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.

23 [The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti
24 follows:]

25

1 Chairman McCain: Thank you very much.

2 General, I mentioned in my remarks, Admiral Gortney
3 said that North Korea has an operational road-mobile
4 missile that could carry nuclear weapons to the United
5 States. Do you agree with that assessment?

6 General Scaparrotti: Senator, I believe that they've
7 had the time and the capability to miniaturize a nuclear
8 warhead. They've stated that they have an intercontinental
9 ballistic missile that has nuclear capability. They've
10 paraded it. And I think, as a commander, we must assume
11 that they have that capability.

12 Chairman McCain: Admiral?

13 Admiral Locklear: I would agree with that assessment.
14 I mean, we haven't seen them effectively test it. But, we
15 -- you know, as commanders, all the indications are that we
16 have to be prepared to defend the homeland from it. And
17 we're taking actions to do that.

18 Chairman McCain: And those actions are?

19 Admiral Locklear: Well, first, we work very -- in
20 PACOM, we work very closely with NORTHCOM to ensure that
21 the defensive capabilities of our ballistic missiles
22 systems are optimized. Forces forward in the theater that
23 I and General Scaparrotti have command of are integral to
24 that. Our ability to -- in the region, to partner with our
25 Japanese allies and our South Korean allies to bring the

1 BMD capabilities to bear has been productive. In addition,
2 we've been in discussions about potential deployment of
3 additional THAAD battery, not -- beyond the one that's in
4 Guam, but on the Korean Peninsula.

5 Chairman McCain: General, this is rather disturbing,
6 particularly given the unpredictability of this overweight
7 young man in North Korea. Is that --

8 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir, that's --

9 Chairman McCain: Is that a disturbing factor?

10 General Scaparrotti: That's a disturbing factor, sir.
11 And I think -- you know, I believe that Kim Jung-Un is
12 unpredictable. He has a mind that he can intimidate. He
13 does that with provocations. He's committed provocations
14 this year. So, I think it's a great concern, given the
15 leadership there, as well.

16 Chairman McCain: Let's talk about China and the
17 reclamation. Admiral, we, from time to time, put a picture
18 up of the areas that are reclaimed by China out in the East
19 China Sea -- or South China Sea. And the problem is, our
20 pictures don't keep up with their activities. Is it --
21 it's my information that they have now, in the last year,
22 filled in some 600 acres of land and are constructing
23 runways and possibly artillery and missile defense systems.

24 The Congressional Research Service -- Congressional
25 Research Service, on April 6th, issued a report on this

1 issue, and I quote their report, saying, quote, "The
2 publicly visible current U.S. strategy for dissuading China
3 from continuing its land reclamation activities appears to
4 focus primarily on having U.S. officials make statements
5 expressing the U.S. view that China should stop these
6 activities, on the grounds that they are destabilizing and
7 inconsistent with commitments China has made under the
8 nonbinding 2002 DOC."

9 Do you know anything else about our strategy
10 concerning China's continued expanding and filling in these
11 areas, which are international waters? And how great a
12 threat do you -- does that appear to you, Admiral, as far
13 as long-term threat to our commitment to freedom of the
14 seas?

15 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir.

16 Well, the overall U.S. strategy, I think, is well --
17 goes well beyond the military component of what I deal with
18 each day. And so, I only make recommendations on the
19 military side. So, I'd refer the politics -- policy
20 decisions about --

21 Chairman McCain: And your --

22 Admiral Locklear: -- how we deal with --

23 Chairman McCain: And your recommendations are?

24 Admiral Locklear: Well, in general, where you find
25 that the U.S. has a clear policy on how it feels about

1 something, military solutions or diplomatic solutions
2 become easier for that. The policy we have in the South
3 China Sea, as I understand it today, as is, we take --
4 globally, on territorial disputes -- is that we don't take
5 sides in those territorial disputes, that there's -- but
6 that we do want them worked out in peaceful, non-coercive
7 ways in legal matters. And that's been expressed --

8 Chairman McCain: -- those actions --

9 Admiral Locklear: -- to all the countries in the
10 region.

11 Chairman McCain: -- could, over time, impede our
12 ability to navigate through those areas --

13 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir. Well, I think that,
14 given the fact that the -- my view -- of all the claimants
15 in the South China Sea -- and some of them -- well, they
16 all own some of these land features and have different
17 postures and different --

18 Chairman McCain: I mean, we don't fill in areas of
19 some 600 acres, either.

20 Admiral Locklear: No, sir. No, they don't. And so,
21 my assessment is that all the claimants, except for China,
22 are just kind of doing what they agreed to in 2002, is,
23 they're just maintaining them in -- as -- while the legal
24 processes would work out. The Chinese, however, are doing
25 much different than that. They're -- obviously, as you've

1 stated, it's been aggressive. I think it's been -- how
2 fast they've been able to do it has been actually
3 astonishing. They're building a network of outposts to
4 enforce control over most of the South China Sea. The
5 Southeast Asian nations are increasingly worried that PRC's
6 new capabilities will allow China to take de facto control
7 of the surrounding waters, you know, places like Fiery
8 Cross Reef, where they're putting in a runway. I mean,
9 just in the last 10 months, it went from a barely
10 noticeable feature to now having a deepwater port on it and
11 a potential runway. This will allow the PRC to -- number
12 one, to improve their ability to put their maritime
13 security force down there, which is the equivalent to a
14 coast guard or a fisheries patrol, which, to give you a
15 magnitude of the size of the PRC's capabilities, if you
16 take all the Southeast-Asian countries' coast guards and
17 put them together, it's still a smaller number than what
18 China has been able to produce. I have also observed that
19 they've taken what would have been considered, a couple of
20 years ago, gray-hulled warships and painted them white and
21 turned them into maritime security craft. So, it has been
22 astonishing.

23 And to get -- we -- you know, we portray this -- I
24 think, try to, to the PRC, to China, and their response is
25 generally, "Well, this is our sovereign territory," and,

1 "Stay out of our business," which is for them to enforce
2 their "nine dash line" claim.

3 So, the implications are, if this activity continues
4 at pace, is that it really would give them de facto
5 control, I think, in peacetime, of much of the world's most
6 important waterways, of where much of the world's economic
7 energy is created. It would -- if they desired, it would,
8 in the future, them the opportunity to have outposts to put
9 long-range detection radars in there, to place -- put more
10 warships. They could put warplanes to enforce potential,
11 down the road, air defense zones. So, those are the kind
12 of scenarios we have to think about. And it certainly
13 complicates the security environment.

14 So far, the ASEAN nations, who have tried to work with
15 China on this to develop a code of conduct, in my view has
16 been -- not produced very much at all. In fact, you know,
17 the ASEAN is an effective diplomatic organization, but it's
18 not designed to handle these security issues that pop up.

19 So, I think we've got to watch this situation very
20 carefully.

21 Chairman McCain: Senator Reed.

22 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

23 And, General Scaparrotti, we have a -- very
24 complicated relations with the Chinese, and it's
25 particularly in the context of North Korea. To what degree

1 do you have, sort of, the -- a contingency plan to
2 communicate with them if there is a provocation -- a
3 serious provocation by the North Koreans that would
4 introduce the idea of using, you know, force?

5 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir.

6 Well, you know, as we -- even in our exercises, one of
7 the first priorities is communications with China if
8 there's conflict on the Peninsula. And so, we exercise
9 that in communications even in our exercises. And, of
10 course, it's very important for us to understand that and
11 ensure that they understand our intent.

12 Senator Reed: Now, that's one side of the equation.
13 The other side of the equation is, to the extent that
14 they're facilitating some of these activities by the North
15 Koreans, particularly cyber, do you have any sort of sense
16 of that degree of facilitation? And the general question
17 is -- you know, they have to appreciate the instability of
18 this regime, the irrationality of the regime. They like
19 the buffer between South Korea. They like it because
20 they're affecting our behavior and disturbing us. But,
21 they have to, I hope, realize there's the danger of, you
22 know, looking the other way. Is that --

23 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir.

24 I'd -- and I think they do. My sense is -- in those
25 who had conversations with them -- I haven't talked to

1 their military directly -- but, that they also are
2 concerned and have some frustrations with the Kim regime.

3 I -- in terms of cyber, you specifically asked that
4 question. You know, we know that North Korea has -- some
5 of their cyber activities take place in China. But, I
6 don't know, and I haven't seen intelligence that would lead
7 me to believe, that they've had a direct relationship with
8 North Korea in their cyber development.

9 Senator Reed: And just, finally -- and then this
10 spans not just the military capacity, but diplomatic
11 capacity -- are there efforts to try to move the Chinese
12 government to be more proactive, in terms of with financial
13 pressures, with diplomatic pressures, to at least
14 demonstrate to the North Korean regime that, you know,
15 they're -- they can't do these things?

16 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir, there has been.

17 Senator Reed: Yeah.

18 Admiral Locklear, you've described a situation in the
19 South Pacific and the Southeast Pacific as one where China
20 is exerting itself. The witnesses in the last panel
21 suggested that, in terms of the North Pacific -- Korea,
22 Japan, et cetera -- we're fairly well positioned against
23 potential operational threats. But, it's not the case in
24 the Southern Pacific and the Southeast Pacific. Is that
25 fair?

1 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir. It's a large region.
2 You know, as we've talked about, the beginning of the whole
3 rebalance discussion was trying to move ourselves from what
4 had been a post-Cold-War to kind of a location in Northeast
5 Asia, and to bring that to be more relevant to the security
6 challenges throughout the region.

7 So, a number of initiatives. One is that we, with our
8 Filipino allies, have reinvigorated that alliance and are
9 looking at the capabilities to help them improve their
10 minimum defense, but also to improve access to the region
11 to ensure better security.

12 We've opened partnerships with nations in Southeast
13 Asia that we probably wouldn't have considered possible in
14 the last couple of decades -- Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia
15 -- countries that have become increasingly important to the
16 security of the region and to the global security
17 environment.

18 Senator Reed: As the Chinese are creating these
19 artificial islands in the Pacific, there are a lot of, you
20 know, real geographic islands that our allies control. Are
21 we thinking about, in conjunction with our allies,
22 positioning forces forward -- in effect, using the islands
23 as sort of a way to deny, you know, ocean to the Chinese,
24 they appear trying to do to us?

25 Admiral Locklear: Well, I wouldn't go into specifics

1 of where we would -- where our planning would take us, in
2 this forum, sir. But, I would say that, first, we're doing
3 is, we're ensuring that the five alliances that we have
4 there are set right for the security that we're going to --
5 the security environment we're going to see ourselves in in
6 this century. And we're encouraging -- and, to their
7 credit, most of them are spending money, and spending money
8 on defense assets, and are -- and they want the things that
9 allow them to be able to be complementary to us. So, we're
10 -- we are working hard in that area.

11 Senator Reed: A final question, Admiral Locklear.
12 Admiral Roughead was here on Tuesday and indicated that the
13 -- one of the clear advantages we have is our submarine
14 fleet in the Pacific. In fact, he recommended doubling the
15 number of deployed submarines. Is that your view also, in
16 terms of a -- particularly with their aerial denial, their
17 surface capabilities -- is that your view also?

18 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir. Well, I've said to this
19 forum before, we have the best submarines in the world. We
20 continue, I think, to outpace the rest of the world in that
21 capability. I'd -- in the -- my AOR, they are essential to
22 any operations that I have, both in peacetime and in crisis
23 and contingency. I have concern about the size of the
24 submarine force as we go into this -- middle of this
25 century, and our -- and its ability for it to remain

1 relevant, globally. Plus, we're going to have to figure
2 out this replacement of our strategic nuclear submarine
3 force, which is the most survivable leg of our triad, and
4 the importance of that as we see the modernization of
5 strategic nuclear capabilities in both countries like China
6 and Russia.

7 Senator Reed: Just, finally, the submarine appears to
8 be the only weapon system that still can approach virtually
9 to the shores of China and deliver, if necessary, weapons.
10 Is that true?

11 Admiral Locklear: Well, sir, I wouldn't say it's the
12 only system.

13 Senator Reed: Okay. That -- that's more encouraging.
14 Thank you very much.

15 Chairman McCain: Senator Inhofe.

16 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 First of all, Admiral Locklear, let me thank you again
18 for the hospitality you accorded us and our whole group
19 when we were in Hawaii and we laid the wreath on the
20 memorial of the U.S.S. Oklahoma. And that was -- you went
21 out of your -- beyond your call of duty.

22 On that same trip, we went to South Korea. At that
23 time, I recall, in some of our meetings there, they were
24 talking about the use of a -- well, now, the -- banning the
25 use of the cluster munitions, which have been very

1 effective. In fact, that's probably the place where they
2 were -- because of the proximity between North Korea and
3 South Korea -- where they were most effectively used at
4 that time. Now we have a policy, which is a self-imposed
5 policy -- I'm not criticizing it, and I know the reasons
6 for it -- but, we're being forced to discontinue that. And
7 I'd like to ask you, what are we doing, in the place, to
8 perform those functions, those missions that we were
9 depending upon the clusters?

10 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir. As you know, the
11 cluster munitions, as you indicated, very important to our
12 plans in -- particularly on the Peninsula, if there were a
13 crisis. There is presently work underway to replace our
14 present munitions with those that will provide the same
15 effects, but with less -- you know, meeting the
16 requirements of the treaty. In essence, less than 1
17 percent dud rate.

18 Senator Inhofe: Yeah, you talked about the -- you've
19 both talked about the increase in the casualties as a
20 result of some of the lack of abilities to use some of the
21 equipment we've used in the past. Is this something that
22 could expose more risk and more casualties by not having
23 this capability and not replacing it with something as
24 effective?

25 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir, absolutely. It's a

1 critical component of our planning on the Peninsula.

2 Senator Inhofe: Okay.

3 Let me -- I know that both of you agree with this
4 statement that was made by James Clapper, so we don't need
5 to rehash all that, but when he said, "Looking back over by
6 now more than a half century of intelligence, we've not
7 experienced a time when we've been beset by more crises and
8 threats around the globe." I think both of you agree with
9 that. You've stated that in the past.

10 I'd like to get, in kind of the remainder of the time,
11 Admiral Locklear, talking about the submarines thing.
12 Senator Rounds and I were on the U.S.S. Carl Vinson last
13 week. And, without having any details in this setting, it
14 was -- they were very busy. We're now down to 10
15 submarines. Admiral Roughead said, on Friday, that we're
16 going to have to be moving one -- or we should move one of
17 those into the Pacific.

18 Now, my question would be -- and, Admiral Locklear, I
19 think it was a year ago, before HASC, you were quite
20 outspoken in the fact that we should have 11 carriers to
21 carry out the mission. Will you still -- do you still feel
22 that way?

23 Admiral Locklear: I do. Yes, sir, I do.

24 Senator Inhofe: You'd like to get back to that,
25 wouldn't you?

1 Admiral Locklear: I'd like to get back to it. I
2 mean, we've -- I think the Navy is undergoing a bathtub --
3 I call it a "bathtub of readiness" now, because we delayed
4 -- through the war years, we delayed readiness --
5 maintenance on these nuclear aircraft carriers. So, on one
6 hand, they are magnificent machines; on the other hand, you
7 have to take care of them correctly to make sure they're --

8 Senator Inhofe: Yeah.

9 Admiral Locklear: -- safe. And so, we'll be enduring
10 that, I think, for the next 5 to 6 years before we get back
11 to where -- the level we need to be, I think, for kind of
12 day-to-day operations in my AOR.

13 Senator Inhofe: Well, of course, maintenance and
14 modernization are the first two things to go when you're
15 faced with what we've been faced with. And I -- in the
16 event that you do move one into the Asia-Pacific area,
17 where would it come from? What kind of a vacuum would be
18 left behind in other AORs?

19 Admiral Locklear: Well, I think that decision would
20 have to be made at the Secretary of Defense level. But, we
21 have -- you know, generally, we have 11 aircraft carriers,
22 and, out of that 11, we -- they generate a global presence
23 of some number, kind of, for day-to-day operations, and
24 another level that would be able to surge in times of
25 crisis or in times of conflict. I think that aircraft

1 carriers are probably best suited for the types of missions
2 that we do in the Asia-Pacific today. And where it would
3 come from, I can't say, but my guess is, it would probably
4 come out of the Middle East, given that that's been the
5 primary demand signal for a carrier presence in the last
6 decade and a half.

7 Senator Inhofe: Well, when Senator Reed's -- in your
8 final response to his last question, I -- it came to my
9 mind that -- the carrier capability.

10 Well, that's very helpful. And I -- but, I'd like to
11 have, for the record, something in a little bit more
12 detail, because some of us are not as familiar as we should
13 be with that capability. In fact, I'm going down to
14 Norfolk this weekend to try to become a little bit more
15 informed on this. So, if you could, for the record, try to
16 come out with where we might have the capacity of where we
17 could afford to move something into the Pacific, and then
18 how busy everybody is at the present time, it would be
19 helpful.

20 Admiral Locklear: All right, sir.

21 [The information referred to follows:]

22 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Chairman McCain: Senator Hirono.

2 Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 I want to thank both of you gentlemen for your
4 service, and, of course, the service of the men and women
5 who serve under your commands.

6 And, Admiral Locklear, my very best to you in your
7 future endeavors. Thank you very much for being PACOM
8 Commander.

9 Admiral Locklear, I know that Secretary of Defense Ash
10 Carter spent, as I understand it, a day with you. And so,
11 are -- were the discussions that you had with him
12 reflective of the priorities as you've laid out in your
13 testimony today?

14 Admiral Locklear: Yes, ma'am.

15 Senator Hirono: You did mention that, with everything
16 that is going on in South and East China Seas, and the
17 provocation of North Korea, that we do need to strengthen
18 our alliances with our partners and also establish new
19 relationships. And, in this regard, despite historical
20 differences, last December the U.S., South Korea, and Japan
21 signed an information-sharing arrangement in what appears
22 to have been a first step in what Deputy Secretary of State
23 Tony Blinken calls, and I quote, "a profoundly positive
24 trajectory," end quote. Admiral, please discuss the
25 relationships between South Korea and Japan, and the

1 challenges we face in furthering a trilateral
2 U.S./Japan/South Korea alliance.

3 Admiral Locklear: The challenges we face, from my
4 perspective, are primarily political and social challenges.
5 On the military side, the militaries, if allowed, are able
6 to work together for -- I think, for the common good of the
7 security in Northeast Asia, in particular. The impediments
8 -- what's happened thus far is, because of the political
9 pressure to not have true information-sharing agreements
10 between Japan and Korea, limit our ability to allowed us to
11 bring together, in a trilateral way that optimizes the
12 forces that they've invested in and we've invested in, and
13 particularly in critical areas, such as ballistic missile
14 defense, et cetera. So, I highly encourage both Korea and
15 Japan to move forward, at the highest level of governments,
16 with the types of agreements that allow us to optimize the
17 military capability that this trilateral arrangement can
18 bring.

19 Senator Hirono: So, the information-sharing
20 arrangement that was agreed to, you're saying that that is
21 not enough. It's not what you would consider a true
22 information-sharing arrangement.

23 Admiral Locklear: Well, it is a good start.

24 Senator Hirono: Again, to you, Admiral. Many
25 countries within the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are

1 increasing their defense capabilities. China is procuring
2 submarines quickly. We've heard all of this. Japan,
3 India, South Korea, Singapore, and Australia have been
4 shoring up their military capabilities. Malaysia and
5 Indonesia have a couple of more submarines. And Vietnam
6 recently announced the purchase of Russian-made submarines.
7 How will the continued growth of the region's submarine
8 fleet impact the balance of power within the South China
9 Sea region? Does this cause us to adjust our strategies or
10 basing decisions if growth continues on its current
11 trajectory?

12 Admiral Locklear: Well, the Indo-Asia-Pacific region,
13 or the PACOM region, is the most militarized part of the
14 world. And it's increasing in its militarization, because
15 most of the countries there have the resources now, and the
16 will and the desire, to grow their militaries.

17 Those that have the military capability to actually
18 operate a submarine force are pursuing that, because they
19 understand the symmetric advantages that it brings, they
20 understand the ability for access and aerial-denial
21 capabilities that submarines bring. And they also
22 recognize the significant deterrent value that submarines
23 bring.

24 So, my numbers are -- roughly are -- there's about 300
25 submarines in the world that aren't U.S. submarines. Two-

1 hundred of them are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Now, some of
2 those are owned by our partners and allies. But, many of
3 them are not. And so, the increasing number of submarines
4 that have increasing lethality, increasing quietening
5 technology, certainly does change the dynamic of how we
6 have to operate in that -- in the area, and the type of
7 tactics and procedures and operational concepts that we
8 have to develop to ensure we remain dominant.

9 But, I look at it as like a fact of life. It's going
10 to happen. And we have to deal with it.

11 Senator Hirono: So, in our dealing with it, though,
12 especially with our partner -- with our allies -- does this
13 require us to be very -- much more collaborative and to
14 share information so that we're on the same page, so to
15 speak, in that part of the world?

16 Admiral Locklear: It does. It not only requires us
17 to share, bilaterally, more in a particularly difficult
18 environment -- undersea and maritime domain -- but it also
19 requires them to be able to share with their other
20 neighbors that have that capacity, as well. And, as you
21 know, in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, those multilateral
22 organizations don't exist to facilitate that. So, we're
23 seeing the growth of that, but it's a work in progress.

24 Senator Hirono: Thank you.

25 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1 Chairman McCain: Senator Wicker.

2 Senator Wicker: Thank you.

3 Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.

4 We have a memo, here, talking about noteworthy
5 challenges in the Pacific area. And they list, of course,
6 North Korea as the most dangerous and unpredictable
7 challenge. And I'm sure both of you agree with that. But
8 also, territorial disputes in the East and South China
9 Seas; natural disasters, including weather and disease;
10 violent extremism; transnational crime; Russian intent and
11 Chinese intent.

12 Are there any of these, gentlemen, that would not
13 involve a need to deliver our marines quickly and
14 effectively through amphibious ships?

15 Admiral?

16 Admiral Locklear: Well, I think, historically, the
17 Marine Corps is a cornerstone of the force structure that
18 we have in the Asia-Pacific. I mean, it's uniquely suited
19 for large archipelagos, large sea spaces. It uses the sea
20 as a -- as highways to move around on. And it's -- I can't
21 -- of all the ones you listed there, I can't think of one
22 that the Marine Corps does not play as a part of the joint
23 force in a significant way. So, yes, they do play in all
24 of those.

25 The question of whether or not they have enough lift?

1 The answer to that's no. We don't have enough lift. And
2 I've said this before, we've got to -- not only is it our -
3 - the number of amphibious ships that we can build in our
4 own shipyards, but we've got to look at connectors, we've
5 got to look at the types of alternative platforms that
6 allow us to operate in more unique --

7 Senator Wicker: Connectors.

8 Admiral Locklear: -- security environments.

9 Senator Wicker: Connectors and alternatives.

10 Admiral Locklear: Connectors and alternatives. I
11 mean, connectors are like joint high-speed vessels that
12 move marines and troops around faster. There's -- so, it
13 -- it also gets into the whole issue of, How do you -- in
14 huge crisis, in large crisis, what is your military sealift
15 command? What is the condition --

16 Senator Wicker: Okay.

17 Admiral Locklear: -- of that?

18 Senator Wicker: Well, I want the General to get a
19 crack at this question, too. But, let's talk about that.
20 We understand that we have a requirement for 50 amphibious
21 ships. Is that correct?

22 Admiral Locklear: Well, I don't know that I would --
23 I've heard the number 50. I think you'd have to go back to
24 the Department of the Navy for them to calculate, globally,
25 how many they need.

1 But, we've had a greater pressure on our amphibious
2 force, particularly in -- when we have operations in the
3 Middle East that now require us to put marine units in
4 position to be able to monitor things like embassy safety
5 and for embassy extraction in the very hot spots. So, all
6 that's put a demand signal that's pulled the amphibious
7 capability --

8 Senator Wicker: It's a very real contingency that
9 happens.

10 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Wicker: Correct? Well, okay, the information
12 I have is that we have a requirement for 50, and we only
13 have 30 amphibs in our inventory. And, of those ships,
14 approximately 15 to 20 are operationally available. Would
15 you say that that is pretty close to being correct
16 information, Admiral? Thirty in the inventory and 15 to 20
17 operationally --

18 Admiral Locklear: Thirty is about my understanding of
19 it.

20 Senator Wicker: Okay.

21 Admiral Locklear: And operation availability,
22 depending on how they define it -- I mean, my AOR, I have a
23 amphibious readiness group that's in -- west of the Date
24 Line all the time, that's available on a much greater basis
25 than that. But, globally, I would say that's probably

1 about right.

2 Senator Wicker: General, let's let you weigh in on
3 this. And how would the effectiveness of our marines be
4 diminished if there are insufficient amphibious ships to
5 get them delivered effectively?

6 General Scaparrotti: Senator, I would just say this,
7 that they're very important to me, on the Peninsula, for
8 rapid response, and they're a critical part of all of our
9 plans. Operating on the Peninsula, it's the Marine Corps
10 and their ability to be lifted quickly to different places.
11 They provide me agility. It's the quickest, you know, kind
12 of the most succinct way to put it. I am very concerned
13 about the amount of lift available in order to support our
14 plans, and the maintenance of that lift, as well.

15 Senator Wicker: Now -- so, if we don't have enough
16 amphibs, the connectors alone are not a solution, are they?

17 General Scaparrotti: Well, sir, you know, we've
18 looked at alternative methods of -- and the use of
19 alternate ships in order to help us with the delivery of
20 marines. I can be more specific, you know, in a response
21 for record, as to how we look at our planning.

22 [The information referred to follows:]

23 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Wicker: Thank you very much.

2 And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 Chairman McCain: Senator Heinrich.

4 Senator Heinrich: Mr. Chairman? Oh, thank you.

5 Admiral Locklear, I want to start with a little bit on
6 missile defense. And, obviously, the Asia-Pacific is of
7 critical importance to the U.S., both economically and
8 strategically, yet the current security environment in your
9 combatant command is increasingly complex. Countries in
10 the region continue to invest in greater quantities of
11 ballistic missiles with extended range and new
12 capabilities. While I think we should continue to invest
13 in missile defense programs that are proven and effective,
14 I also think we should be investing in left-of-launch and
15 other nonkinetic means of defense.

16 Given the vast number of incoming missiles that an
17 adversary could use to potentially overwhelm U.S. missile
18 defense systems, I want to get your thoughts on what steps
19 are being taken in the realm of left-of-launch
20 technologies, like electronic warfare, cyber, that could
21 blind, deceive, or destroy enemy sensors before they
22 actually launch.

23 Admiral Locklear: Well, Senator, I agree very much
24 with your assessment that the ballistic missile defense
25 threat grows because of the ability for them to -- you

1 know, for people to produce ballistic missiles at greater
2 distances -- that have greater distances and greater
3 accuracies, and have multiple reentry vehicles, and those
4 types of things that complicate the problem and that you
5 can't build enough interceptors to take them all out. You
6 just can't. You're in a tail chase that you can't do.

7 That said, I think there is a good place for a good,
8 solid amount of ballistic missile defense. It's a
9 deterrent. It buys decision space. It makes the decision
10 for the -- whoever's going to fire it at you a lot harder
11 for them to make. And, when they do, it gives your troops
12 that are in the way of them some confidence that at least
13 they'll be able to get through the first few minutes of
14 this thing before we have to take other action. So, we are
15 working left-of-launch and thinking differently about how
16 we would produce -- how we would attack this particular
17 problem.

18 One of the things that -- it's not just about EW and
19 cyber. Those events are being worked, and I won't go into
20 them in this particular forum, but they are being pursued.
21 But, it's also more about thinking differently about how
22 you employ your forces and at what trigger points would you
23 do things like dispersal of your force in a different way
24 throughout the region. How would you do selective
25 hardening of places that would -- and put in place things

1 like rapid runway repair kits in the place of where you
2 have to have them? Through this body, you all have allowed
3 us to go forward with some of those initiatives in some of
4 the places that we have in the Asia-Pacific. Hardening
5 some fuel heads and those types of things make -- can make
6 a big difference.

7 So, left-of-launch is a priority for us.

8 Senator Heinrich: Let me ask a question that sort of
9 overlays on that, in terms of emerging technologies.
10 What's your assessment, at this point, on the value of
11 directed energy systems to support defeating missile
12 threats? And do you think that directed energy should be a
13 priority for the research-and-development community, given
14 the advancements in the last couple of years?

15 Admiral Locklear: Well, we've seen some progress. I
16 think the Navy has some directed energy systems that are
17 employed in operations routinely that have proven
18 effective, at least in the tactical area.

19 I'm in favor of directed energy weapons if they get
20 the job done, if the technology is there. I kind of live
21 in the here-and-now problem.

22 Senator Heinrich: Right.

23 Admiral Locklear: And I project --

24 Senator Heinrich: I understand.

25 Admiral Locklear: -- hopefully, project into the

1 future what we might need. Directed energy, if it solves a
2 -- if it's a good, solid solution set for the types of
3 threat we're facing, then we should pursue it.

4 Senator Heinrich: Speaking of here and now, are you
5 familiar with CHAMP, the Counter-electronics High-Power
6 Microwave Advanced Missile Project?

7 Admiral Locklear: I am familiar with it.

8 Senator Heinrich: What kind of value do you think
9 that could bring to the theater?

10 Admiral Locklear: I think, if it was properly tested
11 and then fielded, that it would be something that would be
12 of interest and benefit.

13 Senator Heinrich: Thank you very much.

14 I'll yield back, Mr. Chair.

15 Chairman McCain: Senator Fischer.

16 Senator Fischer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

18 General, in your prepared remarks, you talk about
19 North Korea's emphasis on asymmetric capabilities,
20 especially its missiles and its cyber threats. Can you
21 elaborate on North Korea's ballistic missile and cyber
22 programs, and discuss what the Command is doing to counter
23 them? And then, can you let us know, How do you see their
24 investment in these areas impacting your needs in the
25 future?

1 General Scaparrotti: Thank you, Senator.

2 Well, first of all, North Korea has focused its
3 resources within its military on their asymmetric
4 capabilities, which are several. Probably the most
5 important are the ballistic missile and nuclear. We
6 discussed the nuclear here. You know, we've seen a number
7 of indicators of how they're advancing their nuclear
8 capabilities. And then, within their missile force, they
9 have more than several hundred ballistic missiles. The
10 predominance of those are close-range and short-range
11 ballistic missiles that affect or influence the Peninsula,
12 but they've also deployed both medium- and intermediate-
13 range that influence the region. And, of course, the
14 development of the intercontinental ballistic missile has
15 impact here in homeland security in the United States.

16 They've not slowed down at this. We've seen, as
17 you've seen, this past year, they demonstrated their
18 capabilities and conducted tests. They had more missile
19 events or launches in '14 than they've had in the previous
20 5 years together. Each of these being a -- you know, a
21 violation of the UNSCRs.

22 We have been taking steps, both in, you know, material
23 capability, in terms of our ballistic missile defense, to
24 counter that, as well as work with the Republic of Korea in
25 their ballistic missile defense. They just recently funded

1 an upgrade to their Patriot-2s to PAC-3s, which is very
2 important. We're working with them closely, in terms of
3 interoperability, and we're also working with them on their
4 material solutions, particularly, you know, their Air
5 Missile Defense Center and system that they've recently
6 established. We're working closely on that.

7 And then, finally, as the Admiral just noted, you
8 know, we look at the posture of our force, the preparation
9 of our force and our plans; and all of those things, in the
10 last couple of years, has been rather dynamic in order to
11 change as our threat in North Korea changes.

12 Senator Fischer: And as we talk about missile
13 defense, how do you interpret China and their vocal
14 opposition to placing a THAAD battery on that Peninsula?

15 General Scaparrotti: Well, personally, I -- you know,
16 I think this is a decision for South Korea, having to do
17 with the defense of their country, and, from my perspective
18 as a commander there, defense of our troops.

19 Senator Fischer: But, do you think that they are
20 narrowly focused on missile defense, or do you think
21 they're trying to, maybe, exert some greater influence over
22 the Republic of Korea's defensive strategy as a whole?

23 General Scaparrotti: I think it's a greater
24 influence. The THAAD system, if employed, is focused on
25 the defense of the Peninsula. That's what it is

1 specialized to do. It doesn't have any influence beyond
2 that.

3 Senator Fischer: So, that would improve their
4 defenses, then, against North Korea, correct?

5 General Scaparrotti: Yes, ma'am, it would.

6 Senator Fischer: And do you think that South Korea
7 and the United States would push against the Chinese
8 reaction to that?

9 General Scaparrotti: Well, ma'am, you know, this is a
10 -- the decision process is underway right now, and it is --
11 I can discuss, in a military perspective, but, you know,
12 from a political and strategic perspective, I think both
13 countries are taking that into consideration right now, in
14 terms of the other impacts that have to do with the
15 employment of THAAD on the Peninsula.

16 Senator Fischer: And as we look at the North Koreans
17 and their missiles, are they moving away from their more
18 traditional conventional forces, which they have -- what is
19 it, the fourth largest in the world now -- are they moving
20 away from that?

21 General Scaparrotti: Ma'am, I wouldn't say they're
22 moving away from it. I think they've changed their
23 strategy a bit. It is the fourth-largest military in the
24 world. It's a very large conventional force that's
25 postured forward along the DMZ. So, it is a -- it's still

1 a very present and dangerous threat. But, they're not
2 resourcing it in the same way that they had in the past.
3 So, we've seen a reduction in their capability,
4 conventionally.

5 Senator Fischer: Thank you, General.

6 Thank you, Mr. Chair.

7 Chairman McCain: Senator King.

8 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

9 Admiral, we had some fascinating testimony 2 days ago
10 on this subject. I commend the record to you. One of the
11 pieces of testimony was the historical record of the
12 confrontation between a rising power and an existing power.
13 Graham Allison, from Harvard, called it the "Thucydides
14 Trap," wherein 12 of 16 instances in world history where
15 you had a rapidly rising power confronting an established
16 power ended in war. And there -- obviously, that's a
17 daunting observation -- there has never been a power that
18 has risen as far and as fast as China in the last 25 years.
19 Do you see military conflict with China in any way
20 inevitable? But, given the "Thucydides Trap," how can we
21 avoid it?

22 Admiral Locklear: Well, I don't think that conflict
23 is inevitable. I think that the world we're in today is
24 probably a different world than the ones we've been in
25 before, when a great power rose. The effects of

1 globalization and economic globalization and the movement
2 of people, the interconnectedness of banks, of industry, of
3 all these things that you know very well about, I think
4 have made it imperative that we understand the rise of
5 China, in that we, to some degree, accommodate the rise of
6 China, where we can, to attempt to shape the rise of China.
7 I've said, on many occasions, that a China that would --
8 and a China with a military that would come forward as a
9 net provider of security rather than a net user of security
10 would be beneficial to, not only the region, but would be
11 beneficial to us, as well. And I think that's an
12 achievable goal. I think that has to be looked at how do
13 we deal with China globally, in global institutions, from
14 their role in the United Nations to how they're behaving
15 and conducting themselves in other regions of the world,
16 and how we interact with them there. I also think it will
17 require us to have a pinpoint focused on how we see their
18 influence in this region that we've been talking about
19 today, which is primarily East -- Southeast Asia and
20 Northeast Asia, and to understand -- we have to try to
21 understand what their side of the equation is. And, to be
22 honest with you, some of the things they've done are quite
23 -- aren't really clear today.

24 So, we always get into the debate about whether we
25 should continue mil-to-mil if we're unhappy with the things

1 they're doing -- mil-to-mil engagement. I am a proponent
2 of continuing to take some risk there, because there is
3 benefit in us continuing to have dialogue to try to
4 establish those types of frameworks that allow us to
5 communicate with each other in crisis. We've had some good
6 work with the PRC lately, of building some confidence-
7 building measures that allow us to understand how to
8 operate with each other in these constrained waterways so
9 that we don't have a bunch of lieutenants and captains and
10 commanders of ships out there making, you know, bad
11 decisions that might escalate us to something that we
12 didn't -- escalate us into a "Thucydides Trap."

13 So, we need to, I think, continue to keep engaging
14 them, but I think we need to be forthright about how we
15 feel about these things and what the U.S. position is on
16 behavior when it doesn't match what our allies and our
17 partners and our value systems support.

18 Senator King: Well, clearly, in recent years, the
19 thrust of the Chinese has been economic. But, in even more
20 recent years, it's been military, as you have testified
21 today, tremendous growth in subsurface, everything else.
22 What do you make of these actions, which can only be
23 characterized as aggressive, building islands off the
24 shore, and the increased patrols in the South China Sea?
25 What do you read into that, in terms of China's military or

1 expansionist intentions?

2 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir. Well, I think it -- the
3 Chinese communicate to us pretty clearly what they're
4 doing. They see themselves as a renewing power. They have
5 the assets to build a military. They're building
6 particularly in the army -- I mean, the navy and the air
7 force, because they understand the importance of protection
8 of a -- of the global areas that -- and you're starting to
9 see them operate globally in different places, which they
10 didn't operate, years ago.

11 They've told us, over and over again, that they
12 believe that the "nine dash line" in the South China Sea is
13 their historic territorial waters. They have -- as far as
14 I have -- understand, they refuse to participate in
15 international legal venues. You know, the Filipinos have a
16 case at the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention Tribunal now to
17 -- challenging the "nine dash line." And, far as I know,
18 the Chinese have refused to participate in that.

19 And so, what they are doing is, they're -- through
20 what they articulate as peaceful means, they're building
21 these land reclamations, they're establishing their
22 position in the South China Sea, which opens their options
23 for down the road as this thing -- as this situation
24 continues to unfold.

25 Senator King: I'm out of time. A one-word answer.

1 Do you believe it would be beneficial to the United States
2 to accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty?

3 Admiral Locklear: Yes.

4 Senator King: Thank you.

5 Thank you, Mr. Chair.

6 Chairman McCain: Senator Sullivan.

7 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 And, gentlemen, thanks for your testimony and your
9 service.

10 Admiral Locklear, thank you for hosting me a couple of
11 weeks ago. Appreciate the time. Please send my regards to
12 your staff. Three hours on a Saturday is well above and
13 beyond the call of duty for anybody, so let them know how
14 much I appreciate that.

15 You know, I've been critical of many aspects of the
16 President's national security strategy, in part because I
17 think we've lacked credibility. When we say something that
18 we're going to do as a country, we need to do it. And, I
19 think, in certain areas of the world, we haven't done that.
20 And I think it undermines our national security when we do
21 that.

22 One area of the President's strategy that I have been
23 support of, both militarily and economically, is a -- the
24 Chairman stated, about TPP -- is the rebalance to the Asia-
25 Pacific. And I'm -- you know, I believe we need to make

1 sure this rebalance and optimization of our military forces
2 in the region is credible. We're saying that we're going
3 to rebalance. We need to actually do it. Do you agree
4 with that?

5 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir, I do. And I think that
6 the rebalance is -- goes far beyond just military, though.

7 Senator Sullivan: Right.

8 Admiral Locklear: I think we have to also get our
9 economic house in order, as well. Otherwise, all the
10 military rebalancing we do will not have the effect that we
11 want it to have.

12 Senator Sullivan: I agree with that. I appreciate
13 the map, the AOR map. Wanted to talk briefly -- you know,
14 Alaska is no longer in your AOR, but, as we discussed, the
15 troops and -- which are significant, both in terms of Army
16 BCTs and a very Air Force presence -- those troops are
17 still OPCON to you, in the event of contingencies, aren't
18 they?

19 Admiral Locklear: That's correct, sir.

20 Senator Sullivan: And how critical do you see these
21 troops -- and, General Scaparrotti, please comment -- in
22 the region, in terms of not only shaping, but also
23 contingency forces, with regard to your Op Plans?

24 Admiral Locklear: Well, Senator, the forces in
25 Alaska, you know, if you take a look at the globe, they're

1 as far west as -- or maybe even farther west, in some
2 cases, than Hawaii is. So, the response time that those
3 forces would have into any significant contingency in
4 Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia would -- is quite good,
5 and important. That's why the forces, I think, have been
6 OPCON -- COCOM to me for -- or, to PACOM, for a long time.
7 There's a variety of forces up there that are important to
8 us -- the fighter squadrons that are there, the BCTs that
9 are there -- including the ranges. The range complexes
10 that we have in Alaska are very important, because that's
11 where we get our high-end training for, sort of, our
12 hardest types of environments that our aviators may have to
13 fly in. So, it's --

14 Senator Sullivan: General Scaparrotti, how about you,
15 in terms of just the Korean contingency issues?

16 General Scaparrotti: Well, I agree with Admiral
17 Locklear. We rely on those forces as a part of our quick
18 response, which we'll need in crisis. We also train with
19 them regularly, and we also send forces to train there,
20 too, to --

21 Senator Sullivan: Do you think if we removed one or
22 two BCTs from Alaska, do you think that would show that
23 we're committed to a rebalance or undermine our rebalance
24 commitment? Again, this goes to credibility.

25 General Scaparrotti: Well, I think that -- from the

1 perspective of, you know, what the other outcomes were of
2 that, from a regional perspective, there would be questions
3 about the loss of troops in --

4 Senator Sullivan: And the credibility of our
5 rebalance strategy?

6 General Scaparrotti: I think you'd have to look at it
7 holistically. I'd prefer not to take it from just one
8 perspective, here. But, I think you'd -- I'd have to
9 understand the remainder of the changes that were taking
10 place if, in fact, that were to happen.

11 Senator Sullivan: Admiral Locklear, do you think that
12 would undermine our rebalance credibility? Two BCTs --

13 Admiral Locklear: Well --

14 Senator Sullivan: -- in the region leaving the
15 region?

16 Admiral Locklear: Yeah, I would answer it in general
17 terms. I think that any significant force-structure moves
18 out of the -- my AOR in the middle of a rebalance would
19 have to be understood and have to be explained, because it
20 would be counterintuitive to a rebalance to move
21 significant forces in another direction.

22 Senator Sullivan: I agree with that. And I think
23 it's a really important issue as we look at the rebalance
24 as a successful rebalance that's credible.

25 Can I turn to -- I want to also commend you for what

1 you stated in Senator Wicker on the strategic lift issue.
2 I think that that was certainly something I saw, on my
3 recent trip, that was a concern. We're moving forces to
4 different parts of the region, but the strategic lift seems
5 to be lacking, both Air Force and ARG capacity. But, to
6 get there, we need to have a successful laydown. Are you
7 confident that the realignment of forces from Okinawa to
8 Guam and Australia and other places is going to be on
9 schedule, in terms of costs and timelines that the
10 Department has laid out? I know that's something that this
11 committee, as you know, has been very focused on.

12 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir. Well, you know, in the
13 last 3 years, I've had a lot of time to take a look at this
14 and to work through it. And my overall assessment is that
15 we're on plan at this point in time.

16 Senator Sullivan: Thank you.

17 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 Chairman McCain: Senator McCaskill.

19 Senator McCaskill: Admiral, in March the GAO
20 published a report on operational contract support. And
21 I'm nerdy enough about operational contracts that I pay
22 close attention to this stuff. As you know, we wasted
23 billions of dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan because we had
24 not embraced training on contracting as a core capacity of
25 our commands engaged in the contingency. And in that

1 report, it indicated that your command is the furthest
2 behind in incorporating operational contract support in its
3 joint training exercises and operation plans. Now, I know
4 that GAO noted that you have taken some recent positive
5 steps to address this, but I'd like you to lay out, if you
6 would briefly, the steps you're taking to include
7 operational contract support in your command's joint
8 training exercises.

9 Admiral Locklear: Well, thank you. I -- not to make
10 excuses, but I think the reason that we're probably behind
11 is because we haven't had the demand signal that was put on
12 the commanders in the Middle East in the last several wars,
13 and we haven't had that type of a massive, rapid buildup to
14 support a war effort anywhere.

15 That said, we did recognize it, after that report, as
16 a deficiency. And we're looking hard at, Where are those
17 contracting decisions made? How is the commander have
18 visibility to those contracting decisions during the
19 execution of a crisis or an execution of a campaign?
20 Because, you know, when a crisis occurs, stuff just starts
21 coming. And that's good. That's what makes us so strong.
22 But, when it starts coming, then, at some point in time,
23 you have to decide what's enough and what's not enough, and
24 then who's going to be the steward of it down the road.
25 So, we're trying to understand the command and control of

1 those contractors and how much the leadership knows, and
2 what they need to know, and when.

3 Senator McCaskill: Well, I think it's so critical
4 that we never lose sight of this contracting oversight and
5 planning and training as a core capacity, because we're
6 never going to go back to the day -- my father peeled
7 potatoes in World War II -- we're not going to have our
8 trained warfighters peeling potatoes ever again. And all
9 we have to do is look at the long, ugly saga of all the
10 LOGCAP contracts to realize what happens when contracting
11 is not considered a huge priority. So, I appreciate your
12 attention to that.

13 On another note, I know that you are the primary
14 jammer provider, in the Navy, for DOD. Could you speak
15 about the role of airborne electronic attacks and how
16 critical they are? And how critical is the asset of our
17 really only electronic warfare capability that is provided
18 by the Growler?

19 Admiral Locklear: I've been a huge supporter of
20 Growler for my entire Navy career. The transition of the
21 Prowler squadrons, which were so significant in many of our
22 conflicts, and provide us what I thought was a asymmetric
23 advantage in our airspace because of their capabilities, I
24 was glad to see that -- those capabilities, and jammer
25 types of capabilities, transition to a -- you know,

1 basically, a fourth-generation-plus aircraft that can
2 operate effectively in denied airspaces.

3 So, in any campaign that I would envision that would
4 be of a higher-end warfare in my AOR, electronic warfare
5 attack provides me battlespace that I have -- may have to
6 go fight for. And those Growlers and, to some degree, the
7 other higher-end capabilities that we have are critical to
8 allowing us to have that access.

9 Senator McCaskill: I -- finally, I want to touch on
10 the stresses that we're feeling on remote piloted aircraft.
11 As you know, Whiteman is the home to the 20th
12 Reconnaissance Squadron, and those pilots and those sensor
13 operators and those intelligence personnels, along with the
14 airmen who are operating the Predator and the Reaper, are
15 very important. We are putting incredibly high demands on
16 these folks. I mean, they're not getting normal rest.
17 They are not getting time for training. We can't even
18 rotate some of them into a training capacity, because the
19 demand is so high.

20 Could you briefly talk about what steps can be taken
21 to alleviate what I think is a critical problem? I mean,
22 these guys are -- they're -- they are working round the
23 clock, and getting very little break. I don't know that we
24 would do this to a traditional warfighter, but we're doing
25 it to these RPAs.

1 Admiral Locklear: Well, the advent of these systems
2 in the past couple of decades, and the obvious benefit that
3 they've brought to the battlespace, has put pressure, I
4 think, on the Air Force to be able to produce the types of
5 people and to be able to man them. But, the --
6 unfortunately, the demand signal just goes up and up and
7 up.

8 One of the asymmetric strengths of the United States
9 is our ability to sense and understand what's going on. We
10 have the best ISR in the world, but it's way overtaxed for
11 the number of demands we have globally. And that's where
12 it's showing, is in the faces and the working hours of
13 these young people. So, we need to rationalize, number
14 one, what are the platforms that we're going to invest in
15 the future, and then build a structure of man, train, and
16 equip underneath it that's sustainable.

17 Senator McCaskill: Yeah, I particularly worry,
18 because I think we have a tendency to think of these as
19 machines, and don't realize the human component of this and
20 the stresses they have. I mean, these guys are manning
21 these things for 10-12 hours, and then going home to their
22 families for supper and homework, and then getting up
23 pretty quickly and going back at it. And it's a unique
24 kind of role, and certainly nontraditional, as we look at
25 the history of our military. And I just want you to share

1 with your colleagues that, talking to some of these folks,
2 you know, it's clear to me that we need to be thinking
3 about their well-being and whether or not we are
4 overutilizing them, and what kind of stresses we're going
5 to see in that personnel.

6 Thank you.

7 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Chairman McCain: Senator Ernst.

9 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

10 Thank you, Admiral Locklear and General Scaparrotti,
11 for being here today, and for your men and women that
12 serve, as well. I appreciate it very much.

13 As you know, the DOD is planning to transfer
14 operational control, or OPCON, of South Korea forces to the
15 South Korean government in the event of another conflict on
16 the Peninsula. And this OPCON transfer has been discussed
17 for many, many years. It was originally supposed to take
18 place in 2007. It's been delayed many, many times in the
19 past number of years. And it does appear to be, currently,
20 indefinitely postponed. So, can you describe some of those
21 challenges that we're being faced with, and those that the
22 South Koreans are facing in their efforts to create
23 conditions which would allow us to successfully do the
24 OPCON transfer?

25 General?

1 General Scaparrotti: Yes, ma'am, thank you.

2 As you know, this past October, the Secretary of
3 Defense and the MINDEF agreed upon a conditional approach
4 to OPCON transition -- or OPCON transition. In the past,
5 it had been focused on a date with capabilities. So, in
6 short, I agreed with the change that we made to focus on
7 capabilities and conditions, as opposed to shooting for a
8 date.

9 Three general conditions. The first is, is that South
10 Korea develop the command-and-control capacity to be able
11 to lead a combined and multinational force in a high-
12 intensity conflict. The second is that it -- that they
13 have the capabilities to respond to the growing nuclear and
14 missile threat in North Korea. And the third general
15 condition is that this transition take time at a -- take
16 place at a time that is conducive to a transition.

17 Now, there are specific capabilities I mentioned that
18 are listed in detail as a part of this -- a part of the
19 agreement. I'll cover, generally, the main areas.

20 The first was C4 -- command and control, computers --
21 in terms of their capability there, which I mentioned
22 earlier; ballistic missile defense, generally, and their
23 capability there; the munitions that they have to have on
24 hand for us to conduct a high-intensity conflict; and then,
25 finally, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

1 assets necessary in an environment that is very challenging
2 for ISR, and particularly with the assets and the
3 asymmetric assets that North Korea is developing.

4 So, in a nutshell, those are the things that are the
5 challenges that we have, as an alliance, and Republic of
6 Korea is focused on enhancing.

7 Senator Ernst: Thank you.

8 Admiral, do you have any thoughts?

9 Admiral Locklear: No, I think the dynamic that's most
10 changing in this dialogue about OPCON transfer is the
11 behavior of Kim Jung-Un. And so, that has to be brought in
12 the calculation, as well.

13 Senator Ernst: Thank you.

14 And, General, I do agree, absolutely, it's
15 capabilities versus calendar. We have to look at those
16 capabilities.

17 So, realistically, do you think moving forward with
18 OPCON transfer -- is that in foreseeable future? And if it
19 is, what are the benefits to us, then, of doing the OPCON
20 transfer?

21 General Scaparrotti: Well, I think it is foreseeable.
22 I don't think it's in the short term. And I think it's of
23 benefit, in terms of -- you know, our presence in the
24 alliance that we have with Republic of Korea, I think, is
25 very important for regional security. It plays into global

1 security, as well, because they've been a very good partner
2 of ours for a number of years, and they're developing the
3 capability, and they've actually employed forces around the
4 world, and they've deployed in support of us, as well, in
5 some of the conflicts that we've been involved in.

6 So, I think, in the long term, the alliance and its
7 development in this regard is good for both countries.

8 Senator Ernst: Very good. I do know the South
9 Koreans were engaged at Tallil Air Force Base when my
10 trucks were rolling through that area. And we do
11 appreciate their support of those types of efforts.

12 I have very little time left, but I do want to thank
13 you, gentlemen, for being here today, as well as the
14 service of your men and women.

15 Thank you, Mr. Chair.

16 Chairman McCain: Senator Kaine.

17 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, to the
18 witnesses, for your testimony today.

19 Mr. Chair, I appreciate the way you're doing these
20 hearings. I now see the method in the madness. To have
21 the strategic hearing a couple of days ago -- we had a
22 wonderful hearing with some strategic experts on this topic
23 -- before we get to ask you questions actually makes this
24 discussion work very well. And I appreciate the Chair
25 setting it up that way.

1 Three quick questions. Admiral Locklear, as our
2 military lead in PACOM, describe why U.S. support for the
3 Law of the Sea Treaty is something you'd support. You gave
4 the one-word answer to Senator King, and I'm asking the
5 "Why?" question.

6 Admiral Locklear: Well, I'll speak about it from the
7 military side, or from the sea side. It's --

8 Senator Kaine: There are additional elements, as
9 well.

10 Admiral Locklear: There are additional elements --

11 Senator Kaine: From the military side.

12 Admiral Locklear: -- in it that I won't comment on,
13 because it's not my area to do.

14 But, first of all, it's widely accepted, after a lot
15 of years of deliberation by many, many countries, most
16 countries in my AOR. It provides a framework that we --
17 that most countries that look at it believe is useful for
18 us determining who, particularly in these sea spaces and
19 these EEZs and things that aren't quite, provides a proper
20 framework for how to go about dealing with those disputes.
21 So, it's a rule of law, a rule of process that's a good
22 thing. By not being in -- to be honest with you, on the
23 military side, we've been directed by numerous Presidents
24 to comply with the Law of the Sea, at least as it reflects
25 the way we interact with our -- with other countries and

1 our partners.

2 That said, when we're not a signatory, it reduces our
3 overall credibility when we bring it up as a choice to --
4 of how you might solve a dispute of any kind.

5 Senator Kaine: Second question, to the "Thucydides
6 Trap." You indicated that the U.S. should do what we can,
7 reasonably, that is within our interests, to accommodate
8 the rise of China within the network of global
9 institutions. And I think you laid out a pretty good
10 rationale. The more they are engaged in the global
11 institutions, that can have a pro-stability effect.

12 One current matter that is pending before Congress is
13 reforms to the IMF that would enable China to have more of
14 a role -- more voting power, but also more of a financial
15 obligation, in terms of the work of the IMF. I don't want
16 you to comment on, you know, IMF reform if that's not your
17 lane and you don't have an opinion. But, that is the kind
18 of thing, wouldn't you agree, that we ought to be taking a
19 look at if we're going to try to accommodate China's
20 growing influence? Having them more engaged and play more
21 of a leadership role in global institutions -- you
22 mentioned the U.N. as one -- but, global institutions like
23 the IMF is one way to accomplish that integration that can
24 be ultimately a pro-stability move? Would you not agree?

25 Admiral Locklear: Yes, I absolutely agree. I mean,

1 you know, if China is -- inevitable rise to be a world
2 power in the many different venues, they inevitably have to
3 participate and be part of those institutions. And they
4 have to take some responsibility for these things.

5 Senator Kaine: Kind of the commonsense -- you know,
6 the law firms that get founded by strong partners, they
7 often run aground when the next generation of young,
8 excited partners want leadership roles. And, you know, law
9 firms that don't make room for the young leaders as they
10 come up find that they split away and then they end up
11 being harsh competitors. If they find a way to accommodate
12 them in, it often holds it together. I mean, it -- you
13 know, it just seems like that's kind of a basic analogy
14 that we see a lot in human situations.

15 Well, I would hope that, on both Law of the Sea and
16 IMF reform, that we would take it seriously, here, because,
17 while they have nonmilitary dimensions, I do think they
18 bear directly upon some of the military issues that we
19 might have.

20 Last thing I'd like to just commend you on and ask you
21 one final question. I like the fact that you, in your
22 written testimony -- and I like the fact that some of our
23 witnesses the other day -- talk about Indo-Asia-Pacific.
24 You know, the -- India has had an interesting history,
25 militarily, with the United States. And, more generally,

1 the Congress Party kind of have a long nonaligned tradition
2 that actually made them slant a little bit toward Russia,
3 in terms of purchasing material. But, now they are
4 significantly engaged with the U.S. and U.S. companies.
5 They do more military exercises with the United States than
6 they do with any other nation. I think there is an
7 opportunity, under Prime Minister Mothi -- I know the Chair
8 has spent time with him, and others have, too -- to deepen
9 that relationship. Just, as I conclude, could you share
10 your thought on the U.S./India military partnership at this
11 moment?

12 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir.

13 Part of the rebalance was to develop a strategy for a
14 longer-term security relationship with India. We're doing
15 that. We have, I think, a tremendous opportunity, here, as
16 the leadership changes in India, and the world changes, for
17 them to be a growing partner with the United States -- not
18 necessarily an aligned partner, but a growing partner. I
19 believe that some of the defense trade initiatives that we
20 have with them will help bring us together in a more
21 productive way for many years to come.

22 Senator Kaine: Thank you very much.

23 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 Chairman McCain: Senator Sessions.

25 Senator Sessions: Thank you very much.

1 And thank both of you for your work.

2 And we -- General Scaparrotti, I do believe that the
3 work in South Korea is important. And we've been able to
4 draw down our numbers. And I know the South Korean
5 military is more effective, in many ways, than they have
6 been. But, I think it is an important relationship.
7 They've been good allies, as have the Japanese and others
8 in the Pacific. And that long-term umbrella
9 relationship/partnership that we've had remains important,
10 I think, to the world and to United States interests. So,
11 I appreciate the work that you're doing. I appreciate the
12 importance of the Pacific. It's just undeniable, it seems
13 to me.

14 Our Strategic Subcommittee has dealt a good bit with
15 nuclear weapons, our relationship with Russia, the drawdown
16 of our treaty -- under the treaty, our nuclear weapon
17 system, Admiral Locklear, but we don't talk enough about
18 China's position. They've built a nuclear weapons
19 capability, and I assume they have the ability to surge
20 that at any point they choose to. They have the finances
21 and the technology and the capability of doing that. Is
22 that correct?

23 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir. We've observed them
24 pursuing a deliberate modernization of their nuclear
25 forces, both those that are land-based and the ones that

1 are subsurface-based. They now have, I believe, three
2 operational submarines in the Pacific -- ballistic missile
3 submarines. That could grow, I think, to four or five in
4 the future. And we know that they're pursuing missile
5 systems to be -- missiles to be able to put on there that
6 will extend their ability for nuclear -- second-strike
7 nuclear attack is what they explain -- how they explain it.
8 But, it is growing, and I think that it will be a continued
9 consideration for us as war planners.

10 Senator Sessions: We, in Congress, and policymakers
11 in Washington, need to understand the reality of the -- a
12 nuclear-armed submarine. How many missiles would that --
13 those submarines -- Chinese submarines be able to handle
14 and launch, and how many warheads could they launch?

15 Admiral Locklear: To give you an accurate answer, let
16 me respond to that for the record, if you don't mind. But,
17 multiple.

18 [The information referred to follows:]

19 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Sessions: Would it compete with our
2 capabilities? Or -- if you're able to say. If not, that's
3 all right.

4 Admiral Locklear: I wouldn't say, sir.

5 Senator Sessions: All right.

6 One of the strategies that China has used has been to
7 create a zone outside the nation to make it difficult for
8 our ships to inhabit, and put them at risk. Is that
9 continue -- is that part of a DF-21 missile plan? And do
10 they have other plans designed to make it more difficult
11 for our ships to be within hundreds of miles of the shore?

12 Admiral Locklear: Across the board, the Chinese have
13 improved their -- greatly improved their ability to build
14 missiles of all kinds -- cruise missiles, ballistic missile
15 defense, air defense missiles. So, they do have, I think,
16 quite credible technology. The DF-21 missiles you're
17 talking about is a missile that I -- that they're fielding
18 and testing and producing, that could potentially, if
19 employed properly and work right, it would put U.S. forces
20 at sea at risk at greater and greater distances. But, it's
21 one of those things that we are dealing with and trying to
22 answer.

23 Senator Sessions: I think you're correct. And I
24 think the Navy's thinking clearly about that, and in a wise
25 way.

1 What about the capabilities that we have? Army has
2 some potential land-based missiles that could create, also,
3 a zone around our interests, our country, our territories,
4 that could protect us. Has any thought been given, as I
5 believe Secretary Hagel mentioned, of using some of those
6 capabilities to -- from land -- to provide a better safe
7 zone around our bases and territories?

8 Admiral Locklear: I wouldn't know, Senator, exactly
9 what Secretary Hagel was talking about that time, but I'd
10 be glad to get specifics and to answer it.

11 [The information referred to follows:]

12 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Sessions: All right.

2 Well, thank you both for your service. And I believe
3 we have a fabulously capable military, well led by talented
4 leaders. And we thank you for that.

5 Chairman McCain: Senator Donnelly.

6 Senator Donnelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 And thank you both for your service.

8 Admiral Locklear, what would you say is -- and I
9 apologize, I haven't been here the entire time -- when you
10 look, the two biggest challenges you look at in your
11 command?

12 Admiral Locklear: Well, the biggest challenge, off
13 the bat, is making sure that we can respond effectively to
14 what I think is the most dangerous situation, is the North
15 Korea Peninsula. So, I have a huge responsibility for
16 helping NORTHCOM with the defense of homeland, defending --
17 defense of Hawaii, defense of Guam, and then follow-on
18 forces on things that flow in to support General
19 Scaparrotti on what could be a very short-line problem in
20 Korea. So -- North Korea -- so, that's kind of number-one
21 problem.

22 Senator Donnelly: Okay.

23 Admiral Locklear: But, the second, I think, is just
24 ensuring that the rebalance does what it needs to, to
25 ensure that U.S. is properly positioned in the Asia-Pacific

1 for the rest of this century. And under that fall a lot of
2 things: ensuring that the alliances are as strong as they
3 can be, building new partnerships, and, in some cases,
4 ensuring that the rise of China doesn't turn into a
5 "Thucydides Trap."

6 Senator Donnelly: Okay.

7 General Scaparrotti, as you look at Kim Jung-Un, when
8 you look at the decisionmaking process that he uses -- and
9 I don't know that the appropriate word is "random," but
10 would you say, is there, like, a chain of command or a
11 general structured way that decisions are made, or is it
12 pretty much -- you're not usually certain as to which way
13 something's going to go with him?

14 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir, thank you.

15 We don't know a lot about the decisionmaking process
16 inside of that regime. If you look at just the 3 years
17 he's been the leader, he's changed his senior leadership
18 more than his father and his grandfather, put together.
19 And so, from one perspective, the use of carrot and stick,
20 the use of brutality, in many cases, in order to ensure
21 absolute loyalty to him, I think, undercuts and leaves
22 concern with me that, one, he's got a group around him that
23 will be frank with him, that won't only tell him what he
24 wants to hear. So, I think that's a dynamic within that
25 decisionmaking process that gives me concern.

1 Senator Donnelly: And as you look at the way the
2 decisionmaking is going on right now, it appears there is
3 somewhat of a move toward Russia, toward creating an
4 additional strengthening of bonds between them. Do you
5 think that provides any more stability for them, or do you
6 think it just makes them more dangerous?

7 General Scaparrotti: Well, I think you can see, not
8 only the outreach to Russia, but others in the last year,
9 as an attempt by them to get around the sanctions, which
10 are having an effect, and to develop others that would
11 provide trade and funds to them, which, you know, their
12 economy, they're very tight, particularly given the
13 percentage of it that he puts into his military. So, I
14 think that's his attempt, there. We don't see a lot of
15 return on those efforts at this point.

16 Senator Donnelly: Admiral, when the North Koreans
17 start to saber-rattle and start to make a lot of noise,
18 oftentimes, your command brings a presence into the area
19 there and helps to change the discussion. Do you have
20 fears or concerns about any plans they might have to come
21 after your fleet, in particular?

22 Admiral Locklear: Well, certainly, when we're talking
23 in the context of North Koreans, you can't rule out any
24 unpredictable type of --

25 Senator Donnelly: Right.

1 Admiral Locklear: -- activity. So, we know that they
2 also pursue a pretty significant sea -- you know, missile
3 program, whether -- how good it is, sometimes we're not
4 sure. But, that's not just a ballistic missile capability,
5 but a -- cruise missile capabilities that would have to be
6 considered when forces were put in the area. But -- and
7 they also have a submarine force that's -- if it's
8 operational, could be quite unpredictable, with mini-sub
9 and things like that.

10 But, they're generally locally contained, not far-
11 reaching. So, at this point, I'm not really concerned
12 about our ability to project power, should we have to
13 support a contingency in North Korea.

14 Senator Donnelly: General, what is the one thing in
15 your command that you're most concerned about?

16 General Scaparrotti: Sir, I'm most concerned about a
17 provocation, which North Korea commits two or three every
18 year, and one of those provocations escalating into
19 conflict.

20 Senator Donnelly: Thank you.

21 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22 Chairman McCain: Senator Cotton.

23 Senator Cotton: Admiral Locklear, General
24 Scaparrotti, thank you both for your time and for your
25 service, and, more importantly, for the service of all the

1 men and women in uniform that you represent in your
2 commands.

3 Admiral Locklear, do you believe that China's
4 increasing aggression in the South China Sea reflects their
5 calculations that the U.S. lacks the willpower and
6 capability to challenge them in the South China Sea?

7 Admiral Locklear: Well, I'd -- you'd have to ask the
8 Chinese if that's the way they feel about it. My guess is
9 that they -- as they always do, I believe, they listen
10 carefully to how the U.S. feels about things, globally as
11 well as in that region, and, where they have a clear
12 understanding of U.S. position, they have a more -- a
13 tendency to understand it and respect it.

14 Senator Cotton: Do you think the balance of power is
15 shifting to the point where they believe that they now have
16 a military advantage over us in their regional waters
17 inside the first island chain?

18 Admiral Locklear: I don't think they think they have
19 a military advantage over us, because they also recognize
20 that we're a global power, and that they're not a global
21 power. I think that they believe that their ability to
22 build and produce the military they have has provided
23 additional decision space for them in their local region.

24 Senator Cotton: One point you mentioned is the
25 importance of clarity. Deterrence works best whenever the

1 lines we draw are clear and strongly enforced. I've read
2 press reports recently that, during Prime Minister Abe's
3 visit to Washington later this month, the United States may
4 make an explicit pledge to protect the Senkaku Islands,
5 which are currently under administrative control of Japan.
6 But, China also claims them. Do you think that would be a
7 wise step to take for the purposes of stability in the
8 East-Asian theater?

9 Admiral Locklear: Well, my understanding is, we have
10 pretty much made it clear our position in the East China
11 Sea, as it relates to the Senkaku Islands. We still
12 maintain we don't take a side on territorial disputes, so,
13 in the long run, the issue of the sovereignty of Senkakus
14 is for them to figure out. But, what we have said, and
15 it's been said at numerous levels, is that the Senkakus
16 Islands do fall within the administrative control of Japan
17 and do fall within the mutual defense treaty with Japan.
18 And I believe that that, alone, has provided a level of
19 stability to the issues in the East China Sea, Northeast
20 Asia.

21 Senator Cotton: The press reports -- I appreciate and
22 understand and agree with the points you have made -- the
23 press reports I've seen have suggested that we would be
24 reducing that to writing, though. And writing, in these
25 matters, I think, can provide some more clarity than words.

1 Could you comment briefly on your military-to-military
2 relations with Thailand at the time?

3 Admiral Locklear: Well, we maintain military-to-
4 military contact with Thailand. We do it at a lower level,
5 a post-coup or post- -- post-coup. We were on a very good
6 glide slope, a very positive glide slope. I think the --
7 prior to the coup, the opportunities that we were pursuing
8 together were quite good for the region. Thailand is our
9 oldest ally. In the end, it's my expectation that we want
10 to keep Thailand. We love the Thai people. They've very
11 close to American people. And we have similar value
12 systems. And so, it's important for that.

13 But, post-coup, we have truncated a number of
14 military-to-military activities, reduced them in scope.
15 And we're managing those through an interagency process,
16 where we go through and decide, "Is this one that we want
17 to continue, or not?" What we're hopeful for is that the
18 leadership -- current leadership in Thailand will move
19 actively and aggressively to restore, you know, rule of
20 law, constitutional processes, and civilian control of
21 government.

22 Senator Cotton: Thank you.

23 And, General Scaparrotti, Korea is, in many ways, a
24 unique area of operations in the world, calling for some
25 unique capabilities. I want to speak briefly about cluster

1 munitions. Our stated policy is, as of January 1, 2019, we
2 will no longer use such munitions that have a greater-than-
3 1-percent unexploded rate. Can you describe the effect
4 this policy will have on current operations and contingency
5 planning, and also maybe the challenges it'll -- we'll face
6 achieving that rate?

7 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir.

8 The cluster munitions are an important part of the
9 munition inventory that I have. They -- because of the
10 effect that they create for me. There are plans right now,
11 work being done, for a replacement munition that would meet
12 the requirements of less than 1 percent dud rate. But, I
13 -- that's a requirement that we must meet, as you said,
14 before 2019. We would use other munitions, but the
15 munitions that we have available just simply don't provide
16 the effect that the -- of those that I have today in my
17 inventory.

18 Senator Cotton: Okay.

19 Gentlemen, thank you both again for your service and
20 the service of all those you represent, and your families
21 and theirs.

22 Chairman McCain: Senator Shaheen.

23 Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 Admiral Locklear, General Scaparrotti, thank you both
25 for being here this morning.

1 Admiral Locklear, in your testimony, you point out the
2 significance of China's military modernization efforts.
3 And, earlier this week, we heard from Admiral Roughead,
4 from some other experts on East Asia, about China's
5 modernization and how swiftly that has happened. What do
6 we need to do to respond to what's happening in China? And
7 can you also talk about how, if we go back to a level of
8 funding that's required by sequestration, what that does to
9 our efforts to make sure that we are technologically ahead
10 of where the Chinese are?

11 Admiral Locklear: Well, I think, first of all, we
12 need to continue to encourage the Chinese to be more
13 transparent, and to be more forward-leaning in how they
14 respond to their neighbors, how they respond in the
15 international community, to be a responsible leader in the
16 region. I mean, if they're going to have a military, and
17 they want to use it for security, then they should be part
18 of the global security environment, participating with
19 others, not being at odds with them. And that's a choice
20 they have to make. We also have to make a choice to accept
21 them into that environment. So, that's something we have
22 to always consider. And there may be some risk as we do
23 it, because we -- as they rise as a power, it will be
24 collaborative, on one hand, and competitive, on another.
25 And that kind of relationship resorts in friction, and it

1 will always be friction. And then that friction, some of
2 it, may end up happening in the South China Sea or the East
3 China Sea. So, managing that friction, and understanding
4 how to manage it so it doesn't escalate into a large
5 contingency, is very, very important for all us,
6 particularly between the United States and China. So,
7 we're working that part of it.

8 Senator Shaheen: And so, before you answer the
9 sequester question, how important is the effort to
10 rebalance -- I use that term in parenthesis -- to Asia that
11 --

12 Admiral Locklear: Right.

13 Senator Shaheen: -- has been set out in doing those
14 kinds of things --

15 Admiral Locklear: Right.

16 Senator Shaheen: -- with respect to China?

17 Admiral Locklear: Well, the rebalance is not about
18 China. China is just one of many issues around --

19 Senator Shaheen: Right.

20 Admiral Locklear: -- why the U.S. should be in Asia-
21 Pacific, why we should have a security posture there. But,
22 they are a big concern in that. And so, the rebalance is
23 -- and, on the military side, ensuring that we have the
24 right assets to be able to manage the situations, to be
25 able to understand the environment, and to be able to

1 respond effectively, are extremely critical. The readiness
2 of those assets, the readiness of the men and women that
3 man them, are critical.

4 So, in sequestration, what happens is that, in
5 general, you have less force structure that's less ready,
6 that's less technologically capable. So, we get under
7 fiscal pressure, like we're in now, the first -- one of the
8 first things to go is technological advances, because we've
9 got to keep what we've got, right? Because nobody wants to
10 change. So, the things that we need to stay relative, not
11 only in that part of the world, but globally, in the
12 technological arena in warfighting, starts to get pushed
13 off the table, and pushed to the right. And it gets pushed
14 into timelines that make us start to lose our technological
15 advantages in warfighting.

16 Senator Shaheen: One of the things we heard from
17 former Admiral Roughead earlier this week was the
18 importance of continuing the carrier-launched UAVs, and
19 that that program would become even more important as we
20 look at what we need to do in the Asia-Pacific. Do you
21 share that view? And how do you see that affecting what we
22 need to do in that part of the world?

23 Admiral Locklear: Well, I think, in general, the --
24 whether they're launched off of carriers or launched
25 anywhere else in my particular area, that unmanned

1 vehicles, both air and surface and subsurface, are a
2 significant part of the future. So -- because anytime you
3 can take man out of the loop, you operate in denied
4 environment. It's a much easier -- there's a lot of
5 benefits to it.

6 So, to the degree that the -- a UAV would be from a
7 carrier -- a carrier, for me, is just a very flexible
8 airfield that can operate widely through the theater. So,
9 I would see huge benefits in being able to operate long-
10 range ISR, long-range strike, if necessary, from those
11 platforms.

12 Senator Shaheen: And, General Scaparrotti, is this
13 something that would be beneficial to you in the Korean
14 theater?

15 General Scaparrotti: Yes, ma'am, absolutely.

16 Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

17 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 Chairman McCain: Senator Ayotte.

19 Senator Ayotte: Thank you, both of you, for what
20 you're doing for the country.

21 I wanted to ask about -- follow up, Admiral Locklear,
22 on your written testimony, where you said, "Iran has built
23 its robust nuclear infrastructure and advanced its
24 ballistic missile systems with materials that have passed
25 through U.S. PACOM AOR. Can you help us understand how are

1 they getting these materials? And also, could you describe
2 for us what you understand is the cooperation between Iran
3 and North Korea, in particular on their missile programs?

4 Admiral Locklear: Well, I think it's pretty well
5 known that there's been a movement of proliferation
6 activity from our -- from North Korea into Iran, in this
7 case, of the types of technologies Iran was looking for.
8 And I think that's been known through the interagency for
9 some time.

10 Senator Ayotte: And do you think that's how they're
11 advancing their ICBM program? With advice from North
12 Korea?

13 Admiral Locklear: I would say I wouldn't discount
14 that as a possibility.

15 Senator Ayotte: Yeah. So, in addition to that,
16 you've also noted that North Korea continues to procure for
17 its nuclear and ballistics missiles program and -- from the
18 region in a network of individuals and entities in the
19 region. And, as you know, that violates U.N. Security
20 Council Resolution 1718, in terms of the ability of member
21 states to directly or indirectly supply to North Korea
22 these kinds of materials. And obviously there are many
23 U.N. resolutions that apply to Iran, as well. But -- so,
24 as I look at that testimony, what more can we do to isolate
25 North Korea, in terms of those that are supplying the

1 country things that we don't want them to have and are
2 against United -- U.N. resolutions? And who do we need to
3 be tougher on in the region in that regard?

4 General Scaparrotti: Well, I think that, primarily in
5 terms of proliferation security, we have a proliferation
6 security initiative that's global in nature, and
7 multinational. I think that's also an important key,
8 because we have to bring in -- we have to deal with other
9 nations that help provide intelligence and also forces that
10 may help us in interdiction, et cetera. We -- and
11 continuing our training in that regard, which we do.

12 In terms of the nations that I think we have to be
13 concerned about, I'd prefer to answer that actually for the
14 record in a classified document, as opposed to here in the
15 open forum, if I could.

16 [The information referred to follows:]

17 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 Senator Ayotte: Of course. Thank you, General. I
2 appreciate that.

3 I also wanted to follow up, Admiral Locklear -- I
4 note, in your written testimony, you mentioned Taiwan, I
5 believe, once, in passing. In light of China's major
6 military buildup, what's your assessment of the current
7 balance of military capabilities in the Taiwan Strait,
8 between the PLA and Taiwan? And where does Taiwan have an
9 advantage? And where is the PLA's advantage? So, what
10 concerns are you hearing from the Taiwanese, and what
11 platforms, weapons, assistance, and training has Taiwan
12 requested from the United States that we haven't yet
13 provided?

14 Admiral Locklear: Well, we have a robust interaction
15 from the PACOM headquarters with Taiwan. In fact, we have,
16 ongoing right now over there, their major annual exercise,
17 where we participate with them. We send advisors,
18 overseers, and we go -- and, in fact, we sent General
19 Thurman, who used to be Scaparrotti's predecessor, who will
20 be over there with them, at my request, advising them and
21 assisting them. And so, that's important.

22 I think that, in general, over time, the capabilities
23 of the PLA -- the PRC -- will vastly eclipse what the
24 Taiwanese could produce on their own. It's just a matter
25 of magnitude of force size if China -- the PRC stays on the

1 course that it's on now.

2 We -- my task is to support the Taiwan Relations Act
3 and to provide my advice to the -- up to the OSD and then
4 up to the President for him to decide on what we -- what
5 kind of things we provide.

6 I know that they have requested our assistance in
7 submarine programs, and we're contemplating that at this
8 point in time, but not -- have not committed them one way
9 or the other. They are particularly interested in us
10 helping them in cyber security areas that allow them to
11 pursue asymmetric capabilities that will improve their
12 defense and improve their confidence that they can make
13 decisions on their own and not be coerced.

14 Senator Ayotte: Thank you.

15 Chairman McCain: Colonel Graham.

16 Senator Graham: Thank you, Captain.

17 Admiral, would you describe China's behavior toward
18 their neighbors as provocative?

19 Admiral Locklear: I would call it aggressive. And I
20 guess provocative would be in the eyes of the beholder.
21 But, from my view, it's aggressive.

22 Senator Graham: From the eyes of the Japanese, would
23 you say it's provocative?

24 Admiral Locklear: I think they would say yes.

25 Senator Graham: Okay.

1 North Korea. General, would you say the regime, on a
2 good day, is unstable?

3 General Scaparrotti: No, sir. I'd say the KJU is in
4 control. We see no indicators of instability at this time.

5 Senator Graham: So, you think we don't have to worry
6 much about North Korea?

7 General Scaparrotti: Oh, no, sir, that's not --

8 Senator Graham: Okay. When I --

9 General Scaparrotti: -- what I'm trying to say.

10 Senator Graham: -- say "unstable," I mean
11 unpredictable, provocative.

12 General Scaparrotti: Unpredictable, provocative --

13 Senator Graham: Yeah.

14 General Scaparrotti: -- danger. Yes.

15 Senator Graham: Yeah, that's what I meant. I was --

16 General Scaparrotti: Willing to -- I think, willing
17 to be provocative, as well.

18 Senator Graham: So, in your backyard, you've got
19 dangerous, provocative, unstable, with nukes in North
20 Korea, right?

21 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir, within short distance
22 from the capital.

23 Senator Graham: The leader of North Korea seems to
24 be, like, nuts. I don't know how else you'd describe the
25 guy, but he seems nutty to me.

1 So, under sequestration, at the end of the day, how
2 will your ability to defend the Korean Peninsula and our
3 interests in that region be affected, from an Army point of
4 view?

5 General Scaparrotti: Well, from a holistic point of
6 view, sequestration would, as Admiral Locklear just said,
7 end up with a smaller force, a less ready force, probably a
8 force --

9 Senator Graham: Well, if the Army goes down to
10 420,000 -- let's say that's the number they one day hit if
11 we don't fix sequestration --

12 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Graham: -- how does your theater of
14 operations fare, in terms of threats and --

15 General Scaparrotti: Sir, in high-intensity conflict
16 that you'll have on the Korean Peninsula, I'd be very
17 concerned about having a force that had enough depth,
18 particularly for sustained operation.

19 Senator Graham: So, it would be seen as weakening our
20 position in Asia, right?

21 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Graham: Admiral, under sequestration, the
23 Navy would have approximately how many ships if it was
24 fully implemented?

25 Admiral Locklear: Well, I'd have to refer that back

1 to the Navy. I don't have the exact numbers.

2 Senator Graham: How many do you have in your --

3 Admiral Locklear: I have about 150 ships in my AOR
4 that are assigned from -- all the way from San Diego to the
5 theater. Probably about 50 or so of those are west of the
6 Date Line at any given time. So, what would be impacted by
7 the size of the Navy is their ability to rotate forces
8 forward to augment the ones that are west of the Date Line
9 all the time, which is the problem we're having now with
10 sustaining our numbers, because of the readiness bathtub
11 we're in, even with the size we have today. So,
12 sequestration would just drive that further into the
13 ground.

14 Senator Graham: It would be hard to pivot to Asia
15 under sequestration.

16 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Graham: All right. So, the likelihood of a
18 armed conflict between South Korea and North Korea, how
19 would you evaluate that on a 1-to-10 scale -- 1 being very
20 unlikely, 10 being highly likely -- say, in the next 10
21 years?

22 General?

23 General Scaparrotti: Well, sir, I think that -- I'd
24 caveat by saying that I think that KJU knows that if he
25 were to conduct a conventional attack on South Korea, it

1 would be the end. So, I don't think that's his purpose. I
2 think it's to maintain his regime. But, I think, over a
3 10-year period, it's above a 5. It's a 6, probably.

4 Senator Graham: And the more we reduce our forces,
5 the less deterrent -- it may go up a 7.

6 General Scaparrotti: Sir, I think, with less
7 deterrence, it becomes more likely that we'd have a
8 conflict.

9 Senator Graham: Okay.

10 Admiral, from your point of view, if we reduce our
11 forces in your theater of operations to sequestration
12 level, do you think that encourages China to be more
13 provocative?

14 Admiral Locklear: I think any signal that we send
15 that we're less interested in the Asia-Pacific, on the
16 security side, than we currently are would be an invitation
17 for change in the region and that China would be interested
18 in pursuing.

19 Senator Graham: Do our allies in the region -- are
20 they're beginning to hedge their bets? What's their view
21 toward our footprint and where we're headed?

22 Admiral Locklear: I don't think they're necessarily
23 unsatisfied with our military footprint. I think what
24 they're concerned about most is that -- is the growing
25 divide between what they see as the economic center of

1 gravity, which is predominantly Asia or -- and more and
2 more around China, and their security center of gravity,
3 which is around us. So, that creates a conundrum for them
4 as they have to deal with strategic decisionmaking. You
5 know, they want us as a security grantor, because they
6 believe that we're -- I mean, they see us as a benevolent
7 power, and they like how we operate, but they also see us
8 as a diminished economic power in the region that they have
9 to deal with that.

10 Senator Graham: Thank you.

11 Chairman McCain: Admiral and General, I would
12 appreciate it if, for the record, you would give a written
13 estimate to this committee as to the effects of
14 sequestration on your ability to carry out your
15 responsibilities. And please make it as detailed as you
16 wish. We're going to have this fight again on
17 sequestration, ongoing. And members of this committee are
18 dedicated to the proposition that we have to repeal
19 sequestration. And your testimony as to the effects of
20 sequestration can affect that government -- that argument
21 probably more effectively than anything that members on
22 this side of the dais could accomplish. So, I would very
23 much appreciate it if you would give us, as detailed a
24 possible, short-term and long-term effects of sequestration
25 on your ability to carry out your responsibilities.

1 [The information referred to follows:]
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1 Chairman McCain: Admiral, is this your last
2 appearance before this committee?

3 Admiral Locklear: Yes, sir, it is.

4 Chairman McCain: Well, I want to take the
5 opportunity, on behalf of all of us on this committee and
6 in the United States Senate, thanking you for your
7 outstanding service. I think you can be very proud of the
8 many contributions that you've made to this Nation's
9 security. And you're one of the reasons why leaders in
10 uniform are so highly respected and regarded by the people
11 of this Nation. So, I thank you, Admiral.

12 This hearing is adjourned.

13 [Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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