

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLANS AND PROGRAMS RELATING TO COUNTER-TERRORISM, COUNTERNARCOTICS, AND BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY

TUESDAY, APRIL 12, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Kay R. Hagan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Hagan, Brown, and Portman.

Committee staff member present: Mary J. Kyle, legislative clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; John W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; and Michael J. Sistik, research assistant.

Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and Hannah L. Lloyd.

Committee members' assistants present: Tyler Stephens, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Gordon Gray, assistant to Senator Portman; Dave Hanke, Grace Smitham, and Russ Thomasson, assistants to Senator Cornyn.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN,
CHAIRMAN**

Senator HAGAN. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities will now come to order. I appreciate my colleague the Ranking Member Senator Portman for also joining us, and our witnesses here today.

This afternoon the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee is actually holding its first hearing of the 112th Congress and, as its name indicates, this subcommittee focuses on new and non-traditional threats to our security and on the capabilities we need to address those threats. This includes threats ranging

from terrorism to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to improvised explosive devices. We also oversee the development and use of the spectrum of responses to these threats, from the most basic research to the most advanced technologies, and the policies and programs to counter these threats.

Today we will examine the plans and programs of the Department of Defense to counter a number of irregular threats that fall under the oversight of the assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities, a very long mouthful, better known as ASD-SOLIC.

Our witnesses this afternoon have responsibility for a wide range of issues and the subcommittee looks forward to hearing your views on current and emerging threats, as well as DOD's plans and programs designed to respond to them. In particular, these include counterterrorism, building political partnership capacity, counter-narcotics, stability operations, information operations, and security assistance programs.

Mr. Gary Reid is the Deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combatting Terrorism and is currently the acting assistant Secretary for SOLIC. In this position Mr. Reid has responsibility for DOD's plans and programs for combatting terrorism, counterinsurgency, and other aspects of irregular warfare.

Among these programs is the section 1206 train and equip program for building the counterterrorism and stability operations capabilities of partner foreign nations, which DOD and the State Department jointly manage under an innovative dual-key arrangement. Mr. Reid also oversees the development and employment of special operations capabilities as they relate to foreign internal defense, military information support, and other indirect approaches to countering transnational threats.

The U.S. and our allies continue to be threatened by al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. As we have seen in recent years, this threat emanates not only from the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also from al Qaeda franchises in Yemen, Somalia, and northwest Africa. These groups have made clear their desire to strike western and U.S. targets. We must remain mindful of the potential for these groups to execute attacks with significant and destabilizing effects, often with limited planning and at a very low cost. The 2009 Christmas Day airliner bombing attempt over Detroit is a chilling reminder of that fact.

The subcommittee looks forward to hearing of DOD's efforts to counter these violent extremist groups, both indirectly through training, advising, informational and other means, and when necessary directly, through offensive military operations.

Dr. James Schear is the Deputy assistant Secretary for Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations. Dr. Schear has responsibility for DOD's role in global stabilization and reconstruction operations, foreign disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and international peacekeeping. He also oversees DOD efforts to work with partner nations to improve security and governments in areas of current or potential conflict. These activities are an important part of our efforts to reduce threats to our security and that of our partners.

The activities overseen by Dr. Schear inherently involve other U.S. Government agencies and international partners, and I hope, Dr. Schear, that you will discuss DOD efforts as part of the broader U.S. whole of government approach to improve the stability and security of vulnerable populations and regions, thereby reducing the ability of violent extremist groups to take root, spread their message, recruit, and plan attacks against the U.S. and our allies.

I hope, Dr. Schear, that you will also speak to U.S. contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, such as the UN peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the form of military observers and staff officers.

Mr. William Wechsler is the Deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats. Among other things, Mr. Wechsler leads the development of DOD policies and plans to disrupt the flow of narcotics, counter the threat from piracy, and interrupt the financing of violent extremist groups. In terms of that counternarcotics mission, one of the key authorities to provide assistance to domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies will expire at the end of this fiscal year. We look forward to hearing whether DOD intends to request an extension of this authority and whether any modifications are needed.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that disrupting the flow of money, the lifeblood of violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal organizations, could have a substantial impact on their ability to recruit, sustain, and conduct operations. Confronting the formal and informal networks that move illicit goods requires a global effort involving inter-agency and international partners. We look forward to hearing from Mr. Wechsler regarding DOD's efforts to identify and counter these networks and what more needs to be done as we move forward.

I am proud to note that many of the DOD efforts we will discuss this afternoon are being carried out around the world by U.S. special operations forces, many of whom I have to say call North Carolina home. As always, we owe them and their families a debt of gratitude for their sacrifice and service to our country.

I'd like to now turn to my colleague and ranking member of this subcommittee, Senator Portman, for his opening remarks. Senator Portman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROB PORTMAN

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate being here with you for our first hearing and I look forward to working with you and other members of the subcommittee on these critical issues.

You just outlined some very difficult and complex challenges we face, our military faces, our Nation faces, and I join you in thanking these gentlemen for joining us and for your service and for the service of so many men and women who are today serving under you and serving in our military.

The determined and increasingly adaptive foes we have out there continue to threaten our stability and safety of the world, of certainly American citizens, here at home and abroad. Again as Senator Hagan has outlined, we have huge challenges ahead of us.

At the same time, we have a huge fiscal challenge here in Washington. So as the world becomes more complex and more difficult, we're also facing a looming fiscal crisis that all of us know needs to be addressed. If it's not, it will only further complicate our ability to navigate some of these challenging issues that are raised today.

So part of what I think we'll look for in this subcommittee will be to ensure that the threats that are out there are being addressed, that the priorities of the Department of Defense are matched appropriately with those threats, and to ensure that taxpayer dollars are being used in the most efficient and cost-effective way possible.

We've seen over the past couple of weeks and months that it's difficult to predict what's going on around the world. If nothing, we've learned that it's mostly unpredictable. I don't think any of us here would have expected the Arab spring to have ushered in such big changes, going all the way from the eastern Mediterranean to North Africa and down the Arabian peninsula, over the past few months. These have enormous and I think lasting implications for our security interests in the area.

Sustained U.S. engagement in my view will be required, particularly during this period of great transition, and terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda will be trying to take advantage of this as well. We need to ensure that they're unable to establish new bases of operation.

Closer to home, since we're also talking about counternarcotics today, we have these transnational criminal organizations that continue to expand their reach, multi-billion dollar networks, often expanding it ruthlessly, and affecting our citizens more and more. While the threat posed by these organizations is great, I think we have seen some successes. I would think the success in Colombia, for instance, in partnering with the United States has led to greater security, stability, and partnership with the Colombian people. So I think we know we can make a difference and we must.

Madam Chair, I'll be brief in my statement to get to the witnesses because we have some terrific knowledge here to be passed along to the committee and for the record. Again, I look forward to hearing what the Department views as the greatest threats facing our Nation, to ensure that we are aligned properly to address those threats, what you're doing to counter them, and what you think in terms of our current resourcing and statutory authorities, are they sufficient to meet those threats.

So again, thank you all for being here today.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Senator Portman.

I know that our three witnesses have all submitted written testimony, so I would like to now call on you to share with us your comments today, and then we'll have some questions. Mr. Reid, if you can begin.

STATEMENT OF GARRY REID, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMBATTING TERRORISM

Mr. REID. Thank you, Chairman Hagan. I started my Special Forces career about 34 years ago on the rolling sand hills of your beautiful State, which we referred to as "Pine Land," and it's a pleasure to be back here with you today; and to you, Senator Portman, as well. To the whole group here, thank you for inviting all of us here today to testify and for the opportunity to share with you the plans, policies, and programs we pursue to address these important security threats you both identified.

In terms of the entire office, the responsibilities of the assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities span a wide range of issue areas, from counterterrorism and direct action to security assistance, humanitarian assistance, support to multinational peacekeeping operations, and countering narcotics trafficking. Each of us will speak to our own perspectives on the current and emerging threats from the vantage point of our respective portfolios, noting that these issues complement one another as we collectively work together to support our U.S. military forces and our National security policy to address these threats.

As I'm sure you know, the Office of the assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict was established to provide senior civilian supervision of special operations activities and low intensity conflict, including oversight of special operations policy and resources. We are the principal civilian advisers to the Secretary of Defense on these matters and provide senior management for special operations and low intensity conflict within the Department of Defense.

As a policy office, the responsibilities of the ASD- SOLIC are unique in that they include service secretary- like roles, such as providing overall supervision of the preparation and justification of special operations program and budget, while also including providing civilian oversight and supervisory responsibilities, such as developing policy and reviewing plans for the conduct of sensitive special operations and coordinating those activities within the inter-agency and overseeing their execution.

As the Deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combatting Terrorism, I serve as the principal adviser to the ASD-SOLIC for DOD policies, plans, authorities, and resources related to special operations, irregular warfare, with special emphasis on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, sensitive special operations, and other activities as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

In addition, I serve as the principal crisis manager for the Office of the ASD-SOLIC in response to international or domestic activities related to special operations and combatting terrorism. I was also recently assigned responsibility for overseeing Department of Defense information operations and we're integrating those activities into our SOLIC-wide portfolio.

Within this broad set of responsibilities, one core mission of my office is to provide oversight of the U.S. Special Operations Command, which has grown significantly since 2001. Created by Con-

gress in 1986, U.S. SOCOM is charged with responsibility to organize, train, and equip special operations forces. These forces are a uniquely specialized component of our U.S. armed forces, trained to conduct operations, including counterterrorism, UW, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, military information support operations, and counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in areas under enemy control or politically sensitive environments.

My office works closely with Admiral Eric Olson, the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, and his staff to ensure these forces have the equipment and resources they need to perform their demanding missions.

Several key initiatives we are pursuing in fiscal year 2012 and building towards '13 and beyond will enhance SOCOM's flexibility and effectiveness. These include: modifying and expanding our heavy lift helicopter fleet, the MH-47 Golf; recapitalizing our medium-lift fleet, the MH-60, and the Kilo and Lima platform variants; increasing the total production of our tilt-rotor CV-22 Ospreys, which have proven themselves in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

We have also been working with the command to recapitalize SOCOM's Vietnam-era C-130 gunship fleet with newer C-130 Juliet models and to advance the nonstandard aviation program to deliver a variety of smaller aircraft that provide intra-theater lift capability. Through these and many other initiatives, we are ensuring our special operators have the tools they need to prevail in current and future conflicts.

As Secretary Gates has mentioned on many occasions, America's dominance in traditional warfighting has created powerful incentives for our adversaries to use alternative methods to counter U.S. influence and interests. For the foreseeable future, the most likely contingencies the U.S. will face involve what we term irregular warfare.

Since 2006, our office has been central to the support of this strategic shift in the Department to improve capabilities and expand DOD capacity for irregular warfare. For example, we have issued guidance and implemented policy on irregular warfare capabilities. We sponsored and I led the DOD 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review team on irregular warfare. We've strengthened our conventional force capabilities for key enablers such as security force assistance, expanded our manned and unmanned aircraft systems for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance, and improved our counter-improvised explosive device capabilities.

We've also worked to enhance language and cultural focus within the general purpose forces, focused on building up regional expertise for Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular, as well as working across the Department to increase counterinsurgency, stability operations, and counterterrorism competency in our conventional forces.

Another core mission that has grown demanding in the last several years is our role in providing oversight of the Department's global operations against al Qaeda and its affiliates, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. I represent the Secretary of Defense on various working groups in the inter-agency and maintain active liaison

with those agencies that have responsibility for national security policy as it relates to special operations and combatting terrorism.

In line with the President's and the Secretary's priorities, a significant degree of our attention is providing oversight for sensitive operations. I oversee development of these operations and others for policies for CT, including combatting terrorism technology and capability development, and I assist, as you mentioned, Madam Chairman, with the administration and implementation of our section 1206 global train and equip authorities and our section 1208 support to special operations authorities, both of which are important tools in the CT fight and for which we appreciate this committee's continued support.

These are among the force development and policy activities that are brought to bear in executing the President's and the Secretary's priorities, including prevailing in today's conflicts in Afghanistan and defeating al Qaeda and affiliated groups around the world.

My office provides extensive—has provided extensive support on the counterterrorism and special operations and overall operational aspects of three administration-wide reviews of strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our current assessment is that strategy is working and we believe we've constrained al Qaeda significantly in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area and degraded their capability to plan and conduct operations externally.

We've devoted considerable resources to bringing our U.S. and partner nations counterinsurgency capabilities to bear, and especially by working to rapidly field capabilities to support them, such as UAVs, counter-IED, and increased rotary wing capabilities.

Our efforts against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan have forced them to diversify into other regions.

This network they have established is a broad syndicate of affiliate organizations in places such as the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, and elsewhere, and these are of great concern to us as well.

In the Arabian Peninsula, al Qaeda poses the most immediate terrorist threat to U.S. interests in the homeland outside Afghanistan-Pakistan. Accordingly, we are working closely with our Yemeni security partners to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, deny them sanctuary, degrade their capability to plan, organize, and train for attacks against the U.S. homeland and our interests.

In East Africa, we're supporting our regional partners to counter the terrorist threat posed by Al-Shabaab, an Islamic terrorist group with nationalist roots but global aspirations and visible alignments with al Qaeda core. Our approach recognizes that a U.S. military presence in this region would be counterproductive and we work very closely through the Somali Transitional Federal Government and the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, to counter Al-Shabaab, to provide the TFG, the Somali government, with the time and space it needs to develop its own institutions, and to support the AMISOM mission of a peacekeeping and disengagement force in Somalia.

Elsewhere in Africa, such as in Mali and other trans-Saharan countries, we're working closely with security partners in these areas to counter the growing threat posed by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

Just a last look around the world, in Southeast Asia, the Philippines has been and remains an important and capable military partner of the United States and they have worked aggressively with us to counter the threat from Al- Qaeda and its affiliates in the region. Over the last 9 years our military efforts have successfully contained the threat posed by terrorist groups in the Philippines and prevented al Qaeda from strengthening their foothold in Southeast Asia.

Through their ability to execute high-end lethal strikes, as well as their competence in preventing festering problems from turning into far-reaching and expensive crises, our United States special operations forces have proven their immeasurable value for securing our National interests. The wars we have been engaged in over the last decade have amply demonstrated how much more valuable those critical skills and competencies will be in the future.

We appreciate this committee's continued support for our work to support these extraordinary men and women who undertake some of the Nation's most demanding missions. Thank you again, Madam Chairman and Senator Portman, for your inviting us here today, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reid follows:]

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Reid. You certainly have a lot to oversee for the special operations-combatting terrorism.

Dr. Schear, if you can give us your opening statement, please.

STATEMENT OF JAMES A. SCHEAR, Ph.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

Dr. SCHEAR. Thank you so much. Madam Chair, Senator Portman: Thank you very much for the opportunity to join my colleagues here today to testify about SOLIC's roles and responsibilities in countering transnational threats to peace and stability. I'd also like to underscore my appreciation for the unwavering support this committee provides to our dedicated service personnel in their performance of their diverse and often dangerous missions.

Madam Chair, with your permission I'll submit my full statement for the record.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Dr. SCHEAR. Thank you.

As the chief steward of SOLIC's Office of Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, "PSO" for short, I oversee a wide-ranging portfolio that spans both preventive, responsive, and partner-focused activities aimed at bolstering security and advancing U.S. interests in regions threatened by extremist violence and natural disasters. My written statement covers much of this ground in detail and I'd be happy to explicate any aspect of it that you wish, including UN peacekeeping, but in my brief prepared remarks I thought it might be most useful for me to highlight PSO's coalition support activities, our work on foreign disaster relief, our Afghan-focused ministry of defense advisers program, and last but not least, our proposal for a new global security contingency fund, which is being advocated by Secretaries Clinton and Gates.

In the area of coalition support, my team oversees and implements specialized authorities and appropriations that allow willing

and able international partners to deploy and operate with us, strengthening both our forces and our international legitimacy. In Afghanistan, for example, over 26 nations receive lift and sustainment support as they serve alongside the U.S. military. The importance of this assistance cannot be overstated. The prospect of operating with 26 fewer partners would dramatically change the complexion of our Afghan-focused efforts.

With this support, our services also benefit from deeper ties with 26 foreign militaries that are now more capable. Most recently, we have also provided some logistics and support using our global lift and sustain authority to eligible partners operating with us under the rubric of Operation Unified Protector, which is the NATO Libya-focused operation.

Our ability to forge effective coalitions is essential to spreading the burdens of global security, but it does involve some heavy lifting. For example, at one point we discovered internally that we really had no well-developed system for accepting a potential coalition partner's offer, based upon a clear understanding of the likely costs and benefits of that partner's participation. So our office created a review process to ensure proper consideration of such offers so that we could get the maximum return on our investment while also avoiding excessive commitments to partners whose capabilities did not match our combatant commander's needs.

We also have primary responsibility for oversight of our military's humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. As you know, DOD is not the lead U.S. Government agency for foreign disaster relief. We operate in support of the U.S. Agency for International Development, typically in high-end disasters that overwhelm the response capability of civilian relief providers.

What this means is that when, say, an earthquake hits Haiti or a tsunami and earthquake hit Japan my team makes sure that our military capabilities are used appropriately and with proper authorization. Because we work on disasters in every region, we strive to ensure that the right people from our interagency community are involved, that our combatant commanders are appropriately linked with USAID, that they know what sort of support is permissible, and that they have sufficient funding and authorities to carry out their mission.

To give you a better idea of our work, I'll proffer up a few examples. When a typhoon hit the Philippines last October, PACOM's helicopters were vital in transporting civilian assessment teams to survey hard-to-reach areas. More recently, in Japan we supported Secretary Gates and Admiral Willard in expediting approval for the use of our overseas humanitarian disaster and civic assistance account to fund our relief operations, and we fast-tracked arrangements to deploy U.S.-based urban search and rescue teams in support of our Japanese allies.

Finally in the wake of the popular uprising in Libya we have assisted a range of State Department-led activities supporting the repatriation of foreign migrant workers fleeing the Qadhafi regime's brutal crackdown.

Madam Chair, I would be remiss if I failed to underscore our partner-focused contributions to the Afghan campaign. Both my colleagues and I invest much time and effort to ensure that U.S.-

trained and equipped indigenous forces can operate effectively and responsibly as we transition out, graceful transition out of Afghanistan.

A key element of that effort is to strengthen Afghan security ministries in a way that sustains our tactical-level investment. For this reason, SOLIC launched the ministry of advisory defense program—ministry of defense advisor program, MODA. Its mission is to generate high-quality, well-trained civilian experts who can establish lasting links to their partner ministries. MODA has been so successful that within 2 months after our first deployment of 17 advisers and Kabul General Petraeus quickly challenged us to recruit, train, and deploy 100 more before the end of this year.

MODA's value added can be measured in very tangible, straightforward ways. As Napoleon once observed, an army marches on its stomach. When the Afghans last year were wrestling with the issue of how best to reorganize and upgrade their slaughterhouse, we dispatched an adviser from our Defense Commissary Agency to assist our Afghan partners in that effort. With his extensive background and skills, our field commanders report that he's had an enormously positive impact.

Madam Chair, I've discussed briefly the work that we do in support of ongoing operations. Our other main focus is on providing capabilities to prevent the onset of recurrence of conflict. We do this through our focus on stability operations across the Department, as well as on targeted programs and policies focused on partner capacity-building. Secretary Gates has rightfully made partner capacity-building a high priority for our Department. Doing so adroitly requires, however, that we successfully navigate what the Secretary has dubbed a patchwork of specialized authorities and funding sources, which has evolved for the most part in a very different security environment than the one we face today.

My team is a kind of navigation aid for our combatant commanders and our regional offices in this effort. We've developed and maintain an online information repository about security cooperation tools that is used DOD-wide.

We're also working to better meet the challenges imposed upon us by today's exceptionally volatile security environment, which leads me to my final point, regarding our proposal for a global security contingency fund. One of the key challenges we face is how to react to threats and opportunities that emerge within a given budget cycle and to recalibrate assistance as or when situations change on the ground. We are challenged not only by a multi-year planning, programming, and funding cycle, but also by inter-agency structures that are not as agile as they should be in the face of transnational threats that span the portfolios of multiple agencies.

To address this challenge, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates have launched a proposal for a pilot program called the global security contingency fund. If enacted by Congress, the two Departments would have a 3-year time frame to demonstrate a new business model and provide a much-needed tool for responding to emergent challenges and opportunities.

Under this fund, the Departments of State and Defense would literally work side by side to provide security assistance to foreign partners, including the military, interior, border, maritime, and

counterterrorism security forces of those countries and their governing institutions. This new fund could also provide assistance for justice sector, rule of law, and stabilization programs when the capacity of civilian agencies is challenged by conflict or instability.

A key feature of the fund is that it would be operated by a small staff of State, Defense, and USAID employees, working in the same office. That staff would be supplemented by experts from other U.S. Government agencies as appropriate. The fund would be used to meet requirements that both secretaries identify as critical and it would allow both Departments to provide targeted funding for that purpose.

Perhaps most critical, the fund would give the U.S. Government a tool to be more responsive to challenging real-world situations. The U.S. is constantly striving to become more agile and smarter in how we create stronger partners in our common interests of building a more robust, sustainable security environment. We hope you will support this fund and look forward to continuing to work with you on its development and to addressing the security challenges we face today.

Again, my thanks for this opportunity to testify.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schear follows:]

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Dr. Schear. I do want to say to all of you that your written statements will be included in the record in full.

Now, Mr. Wechsler, for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. WECHSLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS

Mr. WECHSLER. Thank you very much. I'll try to be brief.

Chairman Hagan, Senator Portman: Like my colleagues, I really do appreciate the opportunity to be here. It's quite an important subject on which you called this hearing.

I want you to know that all of our efforts working together really do have a significant impact on our efforts in Afghanistan and where we confront other this training transnational threats. My job, as you noted, is as DASD for Counternarcotics and Global Threats. We support the National counterdrug control strategy and the National security strategy by providing assistance to local, State, Federal, and foreign agencies to confront the drug trade and narcoterrorism.

The Department of Defense supports law enforcement through detection and monitoring of drug trafficking, sharing information, and helping countries build their own capacity. Our counternarcotics efforts are focused on maintaining force readiness through drug screening for the armed services and outreach to DOD families and their communities.

I really do give the Congress credit for having had the vision to recognize the important role the Department of Defense can and should play to counter the threat of drug trafficking. That's my reading of history. This was an initiative done by the Congress in the late 1980s and one that in many respects was visionary, considering the types of threats that we have confronted since then.

The legislative authorities that you mentioned in your opening statement are absolutely critical to continuing this mission set for the Department of Defense. They have been adjusted slightly over the years as the threat itself has developed, and I look forward to working with you and your staff to continuing that progress in the years ahead.

In Afghanistan, our efforts support the warfighter by building Afghan capacity through information-sharing. In many ways, counternarcotics authorities and funding act as a bridge between law enforcement efforts and more traditional military operations. While the Department of Defense has traditionally provided military support to law enforcement activities going back years, in Afghanistan the expertise and authorities of our law enforcement partners are really supporting our military mission. This is quite critical because the reality is that we're not going to win this war on the basis of legal authorities and expertise that exists within the Department of Defense alone. We're only going to win this by bringing together the whole of government, all of our expertise, and doing what we can do in the Department of Defense to support our inter-agency partners.

Narcotics account for a large proportion of Afghanistan's economy and contribute to insecurity, corruption, poor governance, and stagnation of economic development. Approximately 84 percent of all Afghanistan's poppy production is concentrated in the south and southwest provinces, areas under primary Taliban control. Our revised counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan is incorporated into the overall counterinsurgency strategy and places greater emphasis on interdiction efforts, those joint military-law enforcement operations, and on alternative livelihoods.

Closer to home, as was mentioned by Senator Portman Mexico continues to confront escalating drug-fueled violence, particularly along its northern border with the United States. Our counternarcotics support to Mexico is implemented primarily through U.S. Northern Command and includes subject matter exchanges, training, equipment, and information-sharing. Most of the Department of Defense cooperation with Mexico falls under our counternarcotics program.

When I entered office we were spending very close to zero in this area and now we are allocating over \$50 million every year in this area. I would consider this to be one of those emerging issues that you discussed.

Central America as well continues to face an increasing pressure from drug trafficking and related violent crime, largely as a result of the progress that has been made by the governments of Mexico and Colombia in confronting these organizations. Colombia is a special case, as was mentioned by Senator Portman, in my mind indeed perhaps the greatest success of U.S. national security policy in the last 10 years, a bipartisan success, a very cost-effective success, a counterinsurgency success, and one from which I believe a great many important lessons can be drawn for our wider efforts around the world.

Another emerging area. I recently traveled to West Africa to get a first-hand look at the region where weak governance is increasingly being exploited by drug traffickers as they target the lucra-

tive and growing European market for cocaine. This trend has a number of important national security implications, such as undermining governance and stability in the region and providing a funding stream to western hemisphere criminal organizations that traffic drugs to the United States. This will be a subject for the G-8 under French leadership, after which the Lisbon Conference. We're doing an awful lot more in this area compared to what we had been doing in years past.

The globalization of the legitimate economy has benefited the illicit economy in many of the same ways. Today nearly every country in the world now suffers to some degree from the illicit, illegal drug trade. Make no mistake, the drug trade is by far and away the largest illegal activity that happens around the world. Indeed, the networks that are built on the foundation of the drug trade around the world are the very same networks that all sorts of other transnational threats sit upon, use, employ. We have to be able to go against this criminal nexus in order to go against the other aspects of the transnational crime.

Indeed, we see this, the transnational criminal organizations themselves, diversifying into other criminal activities. One of the issues that we need to work on together with you is the fact that our bureaucracies, our legal authorities, are all designed—many of them are designed on single-issue threats when in fact the threat that we're facing around the world is a nexus of all these threats that come together. That's what we see out there in the world and that's what we have to build our bureaucracies and our legal authorities around.

Our counternarcotics activities in the Department of Defense employ two principal force multipliers to make the best use of finite resources available, and we are very aware of the finite resources that are available. We're very proud to say that I believe that if you go back over the decades in the DOD counternarcotics program what you'll see is it's one of the most cost-effective programs that we have.

Our two principal force multipliers are: first and foremost, building partner capacity among our international partners, so we enhance their ability to work with their U.S. counterparts to maximize the value of taxpayer dollars as a force multiplier.

Second, we stress intelligent and information-driven operations. Targeting based on cued intelligence is much more cost-effective than trying to patrol vast areas of air or maritime or other assets. Part of this queued intelligence is something we're spending an awful lot more time on and hopefully will be able to talk about more today, our counter-threat finance efforts, because it's the money, as you mentioned, Madam Chairwoman, that is really driving a lot of these transnational threats.

It's important to recognize, just to conclude, that when we discuss the transnational nature of this threat that does also include criminal activities that take place inside the United States as well. For instance, the influence of Mexican transnational criminal organizations extends well beyond the Southwest border to cities across the country, including Atlanta, Chicago, and Detroit. All of your constituencies are confronted by this threat.

Unfortunately, coordination of domestic and international activities can be especially challenging inside the Executive Branch. Once again, here the Department of Defense can play an important supporting role to facilitate coordination and information-sharing throughout mechanisms such as a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South in Key West, which I believe is really one of—has been one of the best models of inter-agency coordination in the last couple of decades.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. I welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wechsler follows:]

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler.

We will now have 8 minutes to do questions. Mr. Wechsler, counter-threat finance activities, which you've just been discussing, that does fall into your portfolio. I understand that your office has been active in setting up threat finance cells in Afghanistan and Iraq. A number of administration officials have indicated, however, that the most significant source of money funding terrorism comes from our Gulf States. What is your organization doing to identify and counter the flow of money from these nations? I hear there's actually some points of the year called the funding season.

Mr. WECHSLER. You're indeed correct, Madam Chairwoman. One of the challenges in this area is exactly what you said, that the fundraising networks are global in nature. So when we create mechanisms to facilitate coordination in Iraq and in Afghanistan, those aren't enough. We need to go outside of those areas to really deal with it.

It's very important to recognize the work that we have done inside those war zones in order to collect the right kind of information, in order to bring it together, to map the networks, to identify the key nodes, and then most importantly to identify the key aspect of U.S. power that is most relevant for attacking that particular node. Sometimes it may be military activities—our friends in the Special Forces. Sometimes it will be a law enforcement operation. Sometimes it will be a host country law enforcement operation. Sometimes it will be an influence operation, sometimes a Treasury designation, sometimes diplomatic activity.

We have to have the mechanisms that can make those, make those decisions, and that's what we're building up in the war zones.

Outside the war zones, you take one of these action arms completely off the table as far as the Department of Defense, so we need to rely on our inter-agency partners. But even there, there are roles that the Department of Defense can do because, quite frankly, in some cases our inter-agency partners, according to the tasks that they've been given by the Congress, don't necessarily see it directly in their interest.

Just as an example, the folks at the Drug Enforcement Agency do an absolutely fantastic job at meeting their mission of keeping drugs out of the United States. Very little of the drugs that come out of Afghanistan and go through the Gulf and are part of those networks that end up funding our enemies come to the United States. So if you just look at their mission set, they wouldn't have a lot of people in the Gulf. Indeed, when I went out there last Jan-

uary they had, DEA, had one person in Cairo that covers 14 countries and the Gulf.

So what we said is: We have a mission and we need your authorities. So what they have done, and ICE and most recently FBI, is gotten together and come up with a plan to have greater staffing in the Gulf, so that they can use their authorities to go after these financial networks with those host countries. We in the Department of Defense can support them with resources, but also with planning and analytical skills. So that's how we go about dealing with that problem, ma'am.

Senator HAGAN. Do you actually pay the Treasury for their personnel and providing them with intelligence?

Mr. WECHSLER. We do, not in providing them directly with intelligence, but we do make sure that we can provide the kind of resources that are necessary, whether that is physical space in buildings and in computers and those kind of tools that they use. In some cases we provide resources for TDY and travel and efforts like that. There are limitations on exactly what we're able to pay for legally and we don't go across those lines. But we want to make sure that in this relatively small amount of money that we can provide, which is hugely cost-effective for us to have Treasury as part of the war effort, that that's not the reason why that we fail on this area.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Mr. Reid, let me ask you a question on Afghanistan counterterrorism operations. According to published reports, the tempo of counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan by U.S. and the Afghan special operations forces has increased dramatically in recent months and demonstrated significant results. General Rodriguez stated that the Afghan people are playing an interestingly important role in the success of these operations by helping to provide significantly more tips because they see the Afghan Security Forces out among them more than they ever had because of the increase in the number.

Do you agree with General Rodriguez that the increased presence of Afghan Security Forces has resulted in better intelligence because the population is more likely to come forward with information?

Mr. REID. Thank you, Madam Chair. In short, yes, I do agree with that assessment, and we are into a period now where it's logical we would see an increase in the pace of activity, given our uplift in forces as the President authorized in the last review and the weather, climate factors in Afghanistan in the so-called spring and summer fighting season kicking off. So there is a logical increase.

With respect to the support of the population, again fundamental to our strategy is to put the Afghan forces in the lead. As we build toward a responsible transition, we will see more and more of Afghan forces in the lead. That does engender greater support by the local populace. We see this in our village stability operations, in our Afghan local police program, which has taken off rapidly, is building up beyond 5,000 now forces that are involved in the ALP. It's a village security. It's a non-sort of Kabul-driven local governance, local security apparatus that does fit in with the ANSF in the big picture, but on the village level it is their own actions to push

back on Taliban influence. This creates an information network. It creates an operational capacity that spreads the reach of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police to achieve this exact effect, which is a shifting of public sentiment towards an anti-Taliban position that is vital to the success in the counterinsurgency.

Senator HAGAN. I was over in Afghanistan in January and actually had an opportunity to go to the training center there for the Afghan Security Forces and was quite impressed with the group that we saw.

There's also reportedly 85 percent, I think what you're talking about, of counterterrorism operations that take place without a shot being fired. In light of disagreement between NATO and the Afghan government over civilian casualties, what actions have been taken by the counterterrorism forces to avoid civilian casualties in Afghanistan? And do you believe it is accurate to say that 85 percent of these counterterrorism operations are conducted successfully without a shot being fired?

Mr. REID. That's actually true, and I believe that actually came across at a briefing and we went back and said, is that a footnote anecdote or is that supportable? And the facts are—and it's a difference, and I'm sure in previous times—you've been down at Fort Bragg and seen the counterterrorism demonstrations with the explosions and the breaching and everything. It's still a very valuable skill.

But what we have learned in this war, and particularly in these type of operations, is just going out there and calling them out is effective, and that's what you've seen. And that's what we talk about, without shots being fired.

It's also been optimized in Afghanistan by the use of the Afghan forces as well, so now they have their own folks calling them out. And they know what happens if they don't come out, so they tend to do that.

With respect to civilian casualties, clearly just a horrible, horrible incident when it does occur. We've taken many steps to minimize this with our strike policies, our call for fire policies, our verifications of the targets. It is an ugly, unfortunate aspect of warfare, and among the population, that I would say we will never completely eliminate, but the target control, fire control systems, have been strengthened to the point where we have greatly reduced them, and we will continue to do so.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you for your testimony, gentlemen. You raise so many issues and there are lots to get further information on. I would say that, based on your responses to the chair's questions, your two worlds kind of coincide on the issue of counter-drug programs and narcotics, because I assume you would agree that not just with regard to the Taliban, but generally with regard to terrorist groups, narcotics often plays a role in terms of the funding.

Do you have any sense of what part of the Taliban's resources, for instance, come from the trafficking of narcotics?

Mr. WECHSLER. Quite frankly, Senator, I've seen a lot of estimates that try to get to those exact percentages and I wouldn't stand behind any of them. But what I can say is that it is without question that a very significant proportion of the Taliban's resources come from the narcotics trade and various elements of the narcotics trade. Sometimes it is direct involvement. Sometimes it is taxing it. Sometimes it is facilitating it. Sometimes it's using the drug trafficking organizations themselves as mechanisms to move people, IEDs, other materials, into war zones. There is a mutually supportive relationship in many places that requires us to take down those networks.

Senator PORTMAN. The IG for Afghanistan Reconstruction tells us that we have spent as American taxpayers \$1.5 billion between 2002 and last year on counterdrug activities in Afghanistan alone, \$1.5 billion. This year's budget request from the President I see includes nearly \$400 million in I think it's the overseas contingency operations area for these same efforts.

You've talked a little about this, but what's our objective and is it working? That's a lot of money and there's still a lot of trafficking.

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes. The objective is—there are short-term objectives and long-term objectives. The long-term objectives are counternarcotics objectives, that we want to return Afghanistan to what it was in the 70s when it was not the world's leading source of opium.

The short-term objectives, though, are integrated into our counterinsurgency objectives, and those are not counternarcotics for counternarcotics' sake directed, but they are counternarcotics in order to help break the nexus of the Taliban and the drug trafficking organizations. It's interdiction-related and it's also to support the individual farmers.

You may recall that a couple of years ago the U.S. Government—mostly the State Department, not Department of Defense—spent an awful lot of money on eradication programs. What we've done is we've halted those efforts and said that if there are going to be eradication programs, they're going to be governor, local governor-led eradication programs, because what we found is that in many cases those were not only not productive, but they were counterproductive. What you ended up doing was making enemies out of all the farmers that have lost their livelihood, not impacted the Taliban's finance, and just created more recruits for them.

So what we are doing instead, instead of targeting the farmers, we're targeting the illicit networks behind the Taliban and the drug trafficking organizations. To that respect, they have been quite effective. Just a couple of things—and they've really been effective in this year as the capacities that we built over time, including Afghan capacities, it must be stressed, have really come into, working together with our military capacities.

So in 2010, for instance, Afghan National Security forces conducted 298 Department of Defense-supported CN interdiction operations. The far majority of these operations were in the south, resulting in the destruction of 56 tons of opium, 2 tons of morphine, 11 tons of heroin, and 74 tons of hashish. These are incredible numbers. It's an amazing amount, and every one of those are

things that are taken away from our enemy, and we're starting to see evidence that it is having an effect on them at a strategic level.

Senator PORTMAN. I would just make an editorial comment. You talked earlier about your work and it's very important and I appreciate what you do, Mr. Wechsler. But you focused all on the supply side and not on the demand side, and you should take credit for some of the work that the Guard, the Reserves, and some of your active duty are doing on the demand side, too. Ultimately that's going to be the way to get at this in my view. So tons of narcotics we're talking about apprehending or finding in the Taliban context, that's terrific news. I hope they're not all back next year. As long as there's a market that seems to materialize. And I understand most of that opium goes to Europe, but in terms of what you do here in this country I think it's incredibly important vis a vis Mexico and other problems. So add your demand side accolades to what your team is doing.

Just quickly on SOUTHCOM. You talked about the inter-agency coordination and you talked about Colombia as being an example. You said that you thought that what I said about it earlier was accurate, that it's an example where something worked. Can I ask you something a little off DOD's radar screen, but something very topical for us. Recently General Fraser, SOUTHCOM commander, talked about the potential trade-opening agreement with Colombia as "a very positive, beneficial aspect for our cooperation because of the growing capacity to support the capabilities of the armed forces and law enforcement." Do you see a connection between us finally agreeing with Colombia and moving forward on this trade-opening agreement, which as you know was negotiated with President Uribe 4½ years ago, as being beneficial to I guess all of your objectives with regard to fighting the narcotics trade in Colombia and with regard to the other geopolitical benefits of a strong ally in Latin America?

Mr. WECHSLER. I do indeed, Senator. It's important to recognize how far Colombia has come. I remember I was working at the White House at the end of the Clinton Administration. I'll always remember this number: In 1999 two-thirds of the Colombian public believed that the FARC was going to take Bogota. That's incredible. Two-thirds of the people in Afghanistan do not believe that the Taliban is going to take Kabul right now. That's where Colombia was.

In 10 years time, they have gone from a major exporter of insecurity in the region to a major exporter of security in the region, helping the Mexicans, helping the Central American partners. They have a new government that still has a war that they're fighting. That must be stressed. It has not been won yet. There's been great progress, but it's not been won.

They are looking to the United States to try to understand what the relationship continues to be, and a key part of that relationship is going to be the free trade agreement.

Senator PORTMAN. Do you think it would strengthen President Santos's hand vis a vis FARC and other illicit organizations operating in Colombia?

Mr. WECHSLER. I think it will strengthen the hand of President Santos and everybody else who, in Colombia, who is talking about a strong Colombian-U.S. relationship.

Senator PORTMAN. I don't know how much time I have, Madam Chairman. My clock's not working, which is really a dangerous thing for a Senator.

Senator HAGAN. One more question.

Senator PORTMAN. But, Dr. Schear, thank you for your testimony. You talked about coalition-building. I loved your quote. You said it requires some heavy lifting, literally and figuratively, right? So we do have some capabilities that other countries don't have.

We hear a lot about the close air support in Libya, for instance, being essential to continuing to make progress and that when we pulled out and NATO took the lead we lost some of that capability. How do you respond to that?

Dr. SCHEAR. Sir, I wouldn't dispute the point, but I would probably defer to my colleagues who are more in the—

Senator PORTMAN. You're the coalitions guy, though.

Dr. SCHEAR. I'm the coalitions guy, and we're seized with the opportunity to build coalitions to find the best fit. In a case such as Libya, as you quite rightly infer, there are a range of missions and missions like close air support probably are somewhat more on the high end of capacity and issues of discriminating targets from surrounding civilian areas is a big challenge.

Senator PORTMAN. Just quickly, a follow-on question. Japan: Are we doing everything that we can be doing and have we responded to everything the Japanese have asked us to do?

Dr. SCHEAR. We have made an enormously positive contribution to the response to a very complex situation, which continues to unfold, I have to say. The Fukushima Daiichi reactor facility is stabilizing, but I would say Japan has certainly got a ways to go before we can put that fully behind them.

Senator PORTMAN. Do you feel like we're responding to the requests from the Japanese government?

Dr. SCHEAR. Yes, we are. We have an incredible team out there, our U.S. Forces Japan supported by U.S. Pacific Command, with more than 20 ships and 14,000 service personnel engaged, with many aircraft providing lift into the areas. Our foreign consequence management capabilities are being deployed out there for both training and direct response purposes.

Senator PORTMAN. Our UAVs are being used, I understand?

Dr. SCHEAR. UAVs are part of the repertoire. We're also conscious of the fact we have a force protection requirement, given the numbers of service personnel and American citizens in the Honshu, northern areas of Japan. So we're very cognizant of that.

But I would say thus far we've been doing a fairly strong response in a very positive way, sir.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator HAGAN. Senator Brown.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

When I went to Afghanistan I was amazed. A quarter mile outside the FOB you've got farmers with poppy plants right there, and we're flying over them every single day. They're up waving at us. And the whole eradication thing, I get it, but the cost-benefit anal-

ysis—we lose a farmer, and the amount of money that’s being derived, just the numbers that you just said of the actual product that we’ve destroyed, it’s mind-boggling.

I mean, I’m hopeful that there’s a way to strike a good balance so we don’t have to have our pilots flying out and seeing all the poppy plants that are just there and the farmers waving at us.

That being said, I wanted to shift gears a little bit, because that was kind of the nature of what the chairman and the ranking member were talking about. But according to Iranian state-owned press—and this will be to Mr. Reid—the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps indicated that the IRGC units in his mission would undergo a structural change or reform to align with recent regional developments. Have you noticed or anticipate a change in regional strategy to take advantage of the instability in the region?

Mr. REID. I think the details of a good response to you, Senator, would probably be better I a closed conversation.

Senator BROWN. Great. Let’s do that, then. We’ll make a point to do that.

Mr. REID. Yes, sir.

Senator BROWN. So noted. Thank you.

I’ll just then follow up. What’s your assessment then—and it can be to Dr. Schear as well. As you know, there’s been a lot of investment in training and equipping of Iraqi special ops. These forces have been effective in planning and carrying out operations against al Qaeda in Iraq. What’s your assessment on the capability of the Iraqi special operations forces and how will this significant progress be affected if all the U.S. military forces are withdrawn from Iraq by the end of the year?

Mr. REID. I’m sorry. I thought you said—

Senator BROWN. Either-or.

Mr. REID. It really isn’t my area.

Senator BROWN. Yes, I believe it’s—

Mr. REID. We think the Iraqi special forces were an early sign of our success in training the Iraqi military and they were very responsive and engaged from early on in the conflict. The organizations have matured over the years and they are currently and have been for some time now sufficiently planning, leading, and conducting effective counterterrorism operations in Iraq, albeit however with continued U.S. support.

Looking forward, of course, some details to be filled in about next year in Iraq and what our capabilities will be, but I can say that we are planning an Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq that will have room within that for advising and assisting and equipping functions, as other security cooperation offices do, and we will build upon that as a basis for continued assistance and oversight of Iraqi capabilities, including the special operations forces.

Senator BROWN. So do you think the Iraqi government will request a limited presence beyond next year aside from that?

Mr. REID. I think it’s to be determined what President Maliki will ask for. We hear reports and discussions of different things being considered, but I think that remains to be seen, Senator.

Senator BROWN. If we in fact leave altogether, what do you think the likelihood of them to be able to maintain stability is? Low, medium, high? Do you have any sense on that?

Mr. REID. Well, I think the evidence is they're currently doing the bulk of the security and we're confident that they can shoulder the load going forward. But again, we do intend to have a robust security cooperation office in U.S. Embassy Baghdad.

Senator BROWN. Mr. Wechsler, the National Guard, as you know, plays an important role in the conduct of DOD counterdrug activities. How is the National Guard being utilized in ongoing and planned DOD counterdrug programs, number one? Number two, any additional requests for authority in terms of rules of—I don't want to say engagement, but just rules of interdiction at all?

Mr. WECHSLER. The National Guard has done an extremely good job through the State plan process at supporting State and local law enforcement under the direction of the governors. I don't foresee any change in legal authorities required because they do have the legal authorities to provide that support.

What I am hopeful for is as we develop—as the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security develop greater mechanisms and strategies to combat the efforts inside the United States that I was discussing previously that relate to the threats that are outside the United States, that our National Guard efforts can be increasingly deployed against those problem sets.

Senator BROWN. Mr. Reid, I have a question about Somalia that I think is probably a closed session one as well, if we could maybe deal with that at some point and I'll have Bo connect with you. But talking about Al-Qaeda's ability to use 21st century technology to spread its message and recruit terrorist candidates, what's the Department doing to counter that propaganda effort? And not only that, but other organizations. What are you trying to do to kind of combat that?

Mr. REID. Thank you, Senator. We do have a wide range of programs in this area in the Department of Defense. We work very closely with our Department of State colleagues and their global strategic communications effort. I agree with you, the details of some of those we should probably talk in a closed session.

Senator BROWN. Great, great. Thank you.

Thank, Madam Chair.

Senator HAGAN. Senator Brown, Senator Portman and I both are interested in having a closed session. So when you look at the title of this committee, being the "Emerging Threats and Capabilities," I think we obviously will ask for a closed session, and we'll try to schedule that together.

I might ask a few more questions and then Senator Portman. I want to go back to Libya. I guess, Mr. Reid, how would you characterize the situation in Libya? And, given your responsibilities for unconventional warfare, have you had any involvement in assessing the training and equipping requirements of the Libyan rebels? Just sort of a series of questions and thoughts on Libya.

Mr. REID. As a—I'll take the first part. It's a little bit easier to talk open here, just based on my own experience and assessment. Obviously, as an opposition movement they are dealing with an uphill battle with a longstanding oppressive regime that makes little

distinctions about attacking civilians, civilian targets. So a very difficult situation for any opposition.

Again just speaking in the abstract, they have some advantages based on the geography of the situation and they have shown great strength and motivation as a group. Difficult for them. Again, if you look at this in the context of history, you would probably have wanted to start off with a much longer lead of developing your uprising. This sort of was spontaneous to some extent based on events in the region. So I think that clearly posed some challenges for the group.

With respect to the details of things, of course, as a Defense official and working with our special operations, clearly we have no U.S. forces on the ground in Libya and the strength of the U.S. support to the opposition, as noted by Senator Portman, was through the air and now continued by our NATO partners.

I would just go back and say, with respect to the differences in U.S. air power and that posed by the current effort, not to take anything away from our NATO partners, but you know, we've been saying for quite a while the reason our enemies seek to avoid direct confrontation is because of the overwhelming firepower of the U.S. military and I think that's what you saw happening. I wouldn't recommend anybody mess with the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Air Force in that type of environment, because their capabilities are clearly overpowering and precise.

Going forward, obviously we have some nascent engagements on the diplomatic side. We continue, obviously, the U.S. continues to support the NATO effort, and what you see on a day to day basis is a back and forth now where neither side seems to be able to dominate the other. There's been a shifting back and forth between Ajdabiya and Misurata. Brega in the middle seems to be a balance point. When the rebels—when the opposition gets the Brega, the government kind of gets on its heels, and then they regroup and come back. It's just a day by day situation right now.

Senator HAGAN. There's been discussion back and forth that I've heard about arming the rebels or not arming the rebels. Certainly I think a lot of people are concerned about exactly who the rebels are. What are your thoughts on that?

Mr. REID. Well, I think that's a great point, and we would always have to be careful in any situation that we knew up front clearly who we're dealing with, and it has been much discussed by the Secretary of State and others that we're in that process right now of trying to get a further understanding before we take further steps.

Senator HAGAN. Mr. Wechsler, on counter-piracy efforts off Somalia: Despite a significant and concerted international effort which includes various U.S. agencies and the U.S. military, piracy in the northwestern Indian Ocean and the approaches to the vital sea lanes through the Gulf of Aden continues largely unabated. The tragic deaths of the four Americans recently aboard the sailing vessel *Quest* was yet another vivid reminder of how dangerous these waters have become and the need to find ways to bring the piracy under control and hopefully defeat it.

We're interested in your assessment of the overall counter-piracy efforts to date and what changes you think are necessary in our policies and approaches to better drive the pirates out of business?

Mr. WECHSLER. Sure, thank you. The solution set for this problem—first I want to say, your characterization of the problem is exactly correct. It's been growing and left unabated it will continue to grow. The solution—

Senator HAGAN. How many ships are under hold right now, do you know?

Mr. WECHSLER. I don't know, but we can get you the answer to that, because it does change from time to time.

The solution will not be found on sea. The solution to this problem, as has almost always historically been the case for piracy, will take place on land. The area that the pirates cover would not effectively be patrolled by all of the ships of all of the navies of all of the countries of the world, it is that vast. It cannot be patrolled in this way.

But that is not to say that there aren't more things that can be done at sea. One of the clearest conclusions from the last couple of years about this is that the ships that abide by all of the best practices and then those who go beyond the best practices, they are the ones that are not successfully pirated.

Indeed, one of the most controversial elements is the suggestion that many have made inside the United States that all these ships carry armed personnel on them to protect themselves against pirates. We see consistently that those with armed personnel on side, not military personnel but privately held armed personnel, do not get pirated. Then of course, if you combine that with other best practices, such as traveling fast, traveling high, traveling in bad weather, having citadels that can protect you and control the ship and have radio equipment, having barbed wire on the sides, if you follow these practices you are not taken has been our history.

Senator HAGAN. What was the part about the bad weather? I'm sorry?

Mr. WECHSLER. The pirates are in these small little ships that cannot go in bad weather. So if you are in a large ship and can go in bad weather, you successfully avoid pirates.

But there's a whole series of these practices, and the vast majority of ships that are taken are not abiding by these practices. So that is the number one thing that we can do on the water.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. Mr. Reid, I don't want to get you in trouble, so I'm sure you'll monitor yourself here. But I just have to follow up on your Libya comment and the fact that we do have certain capabilities that other countries don't have, including our NATO allies, as much as we appreciate them. And close air support was something I asked about earlier. Forgetting the decision to engage, once we did engage it seems like our close air support, A-10s, C-130s, our ability to, as you say, inflict damage in a way that makes our enemies concerned about taking us on, that that was largely lost, as I understand it, when the command was shifted to NATO. Is that accurate?

Mr. REID. I apologize, Senator. I'm not sure I understood the question.

Senator PORTMAN. Well, my question is whether those unique capabilities that our Air Force has as compared to France and Britain

and other NATO partners—it seems to me that was lost, that capability, when the command shifted. Is that accurate?

Mr. REID. I apologize again, but I think I'm out of facts here for you.

Senator PORTMAN. That's fine. I don't want to put you in a situation, I really don't. But this is the concern that, as you know, has been expressed by many of us, that once you engage in order to continue to make progress you have to continue to have that capability you talked about earlier, and it seems as though our NATO allies have not been able to make the same progress, and in fact there have been some reversals. And today I'm understanding once again there is some threat to some of the cities that the rebels previously had held.

So anyway, I won't push you on it except to say that that's something that I think ought to be a subject for your group and others to look at.

Can I ask you about your thoughts on how what's going on, the upheaval, the Arab spring, from again the eastern Med all the way around North Africa and certainly the Arabian Peninsula, how that's affected our fight against terrorism, specifically al Qaeda? Has it made it more difficult for us? Do you see any evidence of al Qaeda taking advantage of the situation? And I guess specifically, do you see in Libya al Qaeda taking advantage of the anti-Qadhafi efforts that are under way?

Mr. REID. Thank you, Senator. I think it's a great question and one that we have considered in many different fora. What's most remarkable to me about the situation which you're referring to is that al Qaeda has not found this to be a springboard to increased resonance. I think it was Denis McDonough said this in a speech, that al Qaeda number two, Zawahiri, spent his whole life—spent time in prison, exiled from his homeland, dedicated his entire life to changing the government in Egypt, and what he was incapable of doing the popular uprising did in a very unorganized manner in a period of weeks, less than a month.

It's a very powerful statement to consider, and what it points to is the inability of the al Qaeda narrative to resonate anywhere, including where we might have feared it would resonate the most, which is in Arab countries, and the facts don't support that. al Qaeda has not found the uprising in the Middle East or in Africa to be a springboard into anything and they are largely on the sidelines, which is good.

Of course, with instability comes opportunity. As a special operator myself, I know that, and they know that as well and they certainly would like to try. And you can see signs, and we can give you details in a separate session, but you can see efforts they make, and we can pick up on this. But they're largely ineffective.

The Libya question can probably be more precisely scoped dealing with the free access to weaponry than is the case with Qadhafi's losing control of certain weapons and material, and that has concerned us and there are some separate activities to deal with those as well.

But throughout the region there is a great concern about this very question, and again none of these countries want an al Qaeda-

dominated society or an al Qaeda-dominated government, and I think that's what you see happening.

Now again, as you mentioned, Senator, no one can predict from day to day, week to week, what's happening with some of these places. But I think it's fair to say thus far this has not created a wellspring of pro-al Qaeda sentiment in any of the locations, and in fact the opposite being the case, that the forces of democracy and self-determination are much more powerful in these places where this has played out.

Senator PORTMAN. Yemen is a place where there's a lot of concern right now, specifically concern about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula taking advantage of that unrest. But even there, you don't see al Qaeda making gains?

Mr. REID. Certainly in the remote areas they've had some tactical success, and I think you could attribute much of that to the diversion of military capabilities to Sanaa in the role of regime protection, which is certainly a cause of concern for us. It's also reflective of the problems that we are trying to deal with in Yemen, which is extending the sufficiency and the mandate of the Sanaa-based security forces in the provinces, the opposite direction.

So as much as we have tried to work with the Yemeni armed forces to establish a greater foothold in the tribal regions, we were not to that point when this particular scenario developed. So I think you see some shifting back. But I predict they would be short-lived gains and when they get through this political crisis—and there will be some resolution at some point—we believe again that the will of the security and the will of the population of the Yemeni people is against a strong al Qaeda presence.

They certainly have exploited the safe haven areas, the very remote regions that have never been—much similar in ways to what you see in the FATA, they have never been fully controlled by a central government, and they certainly are opportunistic right now. But I believe that the security mechanism will give its feet back under it when we get through this political crisis that they're going through right now.

Senator PORTMAN. Let me ask you briefly, if I could, about Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is some indication—and that was a positive assessment; I appreciate it. I hope that you're right in terms of Yemen.

But in terms of Pakistan and Afghanistan, there has been very little positive news. And yet we do hear some rumors about rifts developing between the leadership in Pakistan, Taliban leadership particularly, and the fighters who are actually in the fight in Afghanistan. I don't know if you can comment on this in the open record, but there is a report this morning, for instance, that 15 members of the Taliban, including an alleged provincial leader, defected to the Afghan government in the Kandahar Province. I don't know if you're aware of those reports or if you think they're accurate or not.

But my bigger question would be, is this a trend? Do you see the possibility of more defections, and do you see that, again this rumored de-linkage between some of the leadership between Pakistan and fighters on the ground?

Mr. REID. Well, I'd say two things about that. First of all, as we mentioned earlier, they are just now beginning to feel the full weight of the fully resourced counterinsurgency campaign that the President committed to last year as we brought our forces in over the winter and as we intensified our effort to expand the Afghan National Security Forces. The Taliban is really right now—here we are in April—feeling what the summer's going to look like and it's not going to be a pleasant summer.

There will be violence in Afghanistan over the summer and there will be—

Senator PORTMAN. You don't expect the normal resurgence that happens in the summer?

Mr. REID. No, I do not, based on the resourcing and the forces there. I think the signals you're seeing of reintegration, reconciliation movements within these populations of Taliban is exactly the effect that we intend to create, and we've opened up those opportunities. We've expanded the security forces, trying to bring people over to the other side.

Recall too the history of 2001. We didn't defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan through total overwhelming firepower. We created a situation where those fighters realized that it was not productive to be on the losing side and they changed sides, and many of them fled across the border. Many of them stayed and took up the other side. So there is a reconcilable population that we know about. It's clearly there, and we're appealing to it and you're starting to see these shifts. As the strategy plays out over the summer, I believe you'll see more of that and we will be on track, as General Petraeus recently testified and Secretary Flournoy, with this transition process that we're involved in right now.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you.

My time's expired, but I want to thank all three of you and I look forward to further conversations.

Senator HAGAN. I might ask one or two questions, and if you have any more.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo. During the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing regarding AFRICOM last week, General Ham indicated that his command has had limited success in working with the security forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He cited issues of vetting, human rights abuses, and the absence of a plan for sustained engagement. I would like to have any of you who would want to speak on this question have an opportunity to answer, as you all have unique areas and tools to engage in a place like the DRC. How could the United States build a strong and enduring engagement strategy in this country, or is it better not to engage in a country like the Democratic Republic of the Congo because of corruption and other longstanding issues?

Dr. Schear?

Dr. SCHEAR. Madam Chair, you're absolutely right. It's a major challenge, both conceptually and practically. The armed forces of the Congo include a range of formerly warring rebel groups, disparate factions. Trying to integrate them and right-size that organization and subject it to legitimate command and control is a big challenge, and I underscore General Ham's frustrations. He's reflecting on behalf of AFRICOM that this has proved a challenge,

both with respect to gaining full partnerships with the government, working effectively with other countries, including within the UN grouping that has certain security duties, especially in the east, and finding out what the best fit would be in terms of both funding and authorities to achieve a desirable effect.

This is pushing a big boulder up a hill, quite frankly. Congo is a huge country, riven by violence since the mid-1990s.

Senator HAGAN. And so much of that directed against women.

Dr. SCHEAR. Absolutely. And this has been a very intense focus for our inter-agency colleagues writ large, and finding the best mix of training, understanding both the culture and the operational imperatives which gives rise to such awful violence is part of it, and then figuring out exactly what level of training could be delivered, imparted, if you will, to Congolese service personnel and their institutional overseers, is a huge challenge.

I can't offer you any panaceas or any solutions here, other than to say it's a source of very active concern for us.

Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid or Mr. Wechsler?

Mr. REID. I would just add, and actually borrow off of Dr. Schear's opening comments, because if it came to me and my office to deploy special operators to the Congo for a short-term engagement we would immediately start looking at authorities and resources, and that's what we do. What I have is really confined into support to special operations and support to counterterrorism.

What Jim talked about opening up here with the global contingency fund is a perfect example, as he just talked about, where this isn't all just a Defense problem, is we need multiple vectors of security assistance, reform applications to a Congo situation. To do that effectively, we need a flexible authority to work within and not something that's boxed into a very tight requirement, that's only good for that year of execution, and these other things.

This is why we're all jealous of Wil here with the 1004 authority. It's multi-year, you can do other things with it. We'd love to have something like that to deal with these kinds of problems.

So, not making any excuse. We can do certain things on the margins anywhere in the world and, given the right factors, we can surge into anything. But we know—and I've been on many deployments into Africa—where we get in there and get it wrong, it's not going to fix anything.

And it isn't always led with special operators or it isn't always led with military forces, but a really tight package of the right mix of inter-agency. I think that's where we are with this other authority.

Thank you.

Mr. WECHSLER. I'd just add one thing. It's a little outside my lane, but, given the other conversations that you've had: I was at the National Security Council working on peacekeeping operations when Kabila was marching down from Kisingani to take out the Mobutu regime. The Mobutu regime was one of the more brutal in the world at the time and we were very happy for that to go.

But at the same time, what happened since wasn't a period of happiness for the people in that area. As we encounter these volatile regions of the world, we always need to remember that just getting rid of somebody bad isn't the end of the story, and we have

to make sure that we, as Secretary Reid was talking about, understand who we're dealing with on the other side and what the next steps are before we take action.

Senator HAGAN. I want to follow up on the pooled fund initiative and have a couple of questions on that. Are you confident—this is for whomever again wants to answer this. Are you confident that the State Department is committed to making this initiative work jointly? Do you have any concerns that the joint arrangement would be too unwieldy? And are there benefits to having a joint arrangement that offset the procedural challenges of implementing this program jointly?

Then do you have any concern that this initiative is too much of a militarization of foreign policy? So just sort of an overall several questions on the pooled initiative, pooled fund initiative.

Dr. SCHEAR. Madam Chair, by way of a quick set of responses, we think the pooled initiative actually is a good blending of the two Departments' equities. It reflects the State Department's overall leading role in the provision of foreign assistance, but it would be well lashed up with DOD's special concerns about security and defense policy, especially in volatile transnational threat-riven areas. So we think it would be a good balance.

We think this proposal would help us in a very agile fashion respond to emergent challenges within a budget year of execution. We are not proposing to expand the amount of resources going into countries that are already claiming very large amounts of U.S. foreign assistance, but it would help us navigate between and among funding streams in an agile way.

We think, further, it would incentivize inter-agency cooperation. If we have a joint team together working in a top-down fashion, we wouldn't be just depending on nominations coming up the chain and taking a fair amount of time to work themselves out. We would reflect the top-level priorities, but we would seek the advice and the input of field people both at the embassy country team and at the combatant commands.

So it wouldn't just be the 3,000-mile screwdriver. We would be looking for input. But we think that, because both secretaries and their leadership teams are committed, that we have a good chance. We absolutely believe the State Department is strongly behind this. It will be a work in progress. We'll have to give you, if we're fortunate enough to have the opportunity to start this pilot, give you updates, to work with members of Congress on an energetic engagement so we can consult with you and get feedback.

But generally speaking, I think we would view this as a very good opportunity to show how we can work collegially with another very important Department.

Thank you.

Senator HAGAN. I had one other question and then I'll turn it over to Senator Portman. That is, you mentioned, Dr. Schear, about the humanitarian aid to Haiti during the earthquake and then obviously Japan. What is going on in Haiti right now? How involved are we?

Dr. SCHEAR. Our U.S. Southern Command continues to have a coordination cell there resident. Very keenly aware the Haiti, with

its large displaced population still living essentially in tent cities in and around Port au Prince, is very vulnerable.

Senator HAGAN. I did have an opportunity to go there recently.

Dr. SCHEAR. So you've seen.

Senator HAGAN. About 800,000 people in these tent cities.

Dr. SCHEAR. Yes.

Senator HAGAN. It was an incredible sight to see.

Dr. SCHEAR. I think, tragically, we'd have to say that more than a year after the earthquake Haiti is getting back to abnormal. This is not a situation which would enable that country to withstand another major hurricane hit. We were very fortunate in the last season that we didn't have such a direct hit. But we're very concerned about it.

Our USAID colleagues continue to be engaged. We nudge them along occasionally on specific areas. But the key issue is government rebuilding, and this is an internal challenge for the Haitians. The tragedy was that the government of Haiti took a huge hit with that earthquake, and getting them back in the wake of an election finally, with a result that we hope will lend itself to further development, would get that country back on its feet.

I continue to be impressed, as I suspect you were too, by the ingenuity and creativity of individual Haitians. It's just remarkable how well they can cope. But as a society and certainly as a government, they've had big challenges. So we remain attentive to their needs and are watching very carefully to ensure that we can react in an expeditious way if there's a further natural disaster.

Senator HAGAN. Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. I promise this will be my last round and we'll let you guys go.

On this idea of the global security contingency fund, it's certainly something we might be willing to take a look at. As I said at the outset, we are working today within very different budget constraints even than a few years ago. The deficit is 10 times bigger than it was 4 years ago, if you think about that, and we must adjust accordingly. So it's our ability to project force and it's our ability to play an active role even where we're not directly involved as a military, but where the State Department, AID, and others are involved.

So as you're talking about this contingency fund I assume you're talking about taking funds out of other areas, both DOD and Department of State. Of course, State would say that DOD has all the money, which I used to hear at OMB quite a bit. But what is your proposal there, Dr. Schear? Where do the funds come from?

Dr. SCHEAR. Under the terms of the proposal that we're putting forward, we would be requesting \$50 million in actually State Department appropriation and transfer authority for both Departments to transfer up to an additional \$450 million to cover urgent needs.

Now, as, given your background, you well know that \$450 million would be a very large lift indeed, certainly for State, and I will say also for DOD in the current budget climate. This is not a proposal which is designed to really spend a lot of money. We are not going to try and spend up to any given threshold. It's just to meet emergent requirements in a way that we think could actually promote

cost efficiencies. If we can transfer money across funding streams in a way that better targets a specific potential need, we don't have to come for niche authorities in special cases or to otherwise find less optimal ways to fund something.

But we will be looking hard within our own Defense-wide funding for available resources as and when emergent needs come up. This is clearly something on our radar. Our Secretary, our Comptroller Office, policy offices, all scrutinizing this very carefully.

Senator PORTMAN. Well, I'm sure they are, given the Secretary's commitment to finding additional savings in the area of tens of billions of dollars. This is less than that, but it's also—if you want a little unsolicited advice, that's going to be worth what you pay for it, it has to be, because there are efficiencies specifically that State and DOD are now expending funds that would not have to be spent because of the ability to coordinate better and to be more preventive perhaps and more involved in, as the Secretary talks about, soft power from the DOD perspective.

So we'll be eager to see the request, but also the analysis as to what its impact would be on the budgets going forward.

Quickly with regard to Mexico, obviously a huge concern here in this country, as it should be. I think - Mr. Wechsler, correct me—I think 35,000 people or so have now died just in the Calderon administration time period, and just brutality of the cartels is breath-taking.

My question is, what is your assessment? I think I heard earlier—Dr. Schear, did you say we are spending \$50 million a year, or Mr. Wechsler? How much are we spending? Is that the actual total amount of our expenditures, including some of the funding that's going through other channels than the State Department? And is it working, and are what are we doing that's effective and what should we be doing that we're not doing?

Mr. WECHSLER. Any discussion of Mexico has to begin, Senator, with an acknowledgment of the real strength and commitment of the Calderon administration in taking on this fight and taking the fight to the transnational criminal organizations in a way that hadn't been done previously. There are elements of the fight that they've been doing that have been quite successful and there are elements of their fight that have been less successful, as President Calderon himself says quite clearly.

The U.S. Government writ large effort has been under the Merida program, designed at the end of the Bush Administration to do a 3-year State Department-led, \$1.3 billion program for Mexican support. I should note that it differs in one important respect from Plan Colombia, that in Plan Colombia it was a fully whole of government integrated plan, including the Department of Defense as a support organization. This was not the case with Merida. So our efforts that we are doing, which was the \$50 million that I was referring to, are being designed to complement these efforts that are State Department -led.

Everything that the Department of Defense does, which is not in any way the lead for the U.S. Government, nor should it be, is done at the request of the Mexican government. That's important to stress. We do absolutely nothing that is not at the request of the

Mexican government. And a great deal of the work that we do are supporting civilian agencies as well as military organizations.

Senator PORTMAN. On the funding for a second, adding these numbers together, it looks like we're talking roughly \$500 million when you add the DOD 50 plus roughly a third of the 1.3. Is that roughly what we're spending annually during this time period of the Merida commitment?

Mr. WECHSLER. There is a commitment—to be very blunt about it, the first 2 years of the Merida commitment, the State Department was unable to expend the money during those years at a high enough level. So this year the President has, and the Secretary of State, have committed to delivering \$500 million of State Department Merida funds in this calendar year, which will be a wonderfully helpful thing for the Mexicans to do.

At the same time, what we have done in these efficiencies efforts that you describe is try to scrub as much of our CN accounts and to close down programs, and frankly programs that are not unsuccessful, but are just less high on the priority list, in order to shift money towards Mexico, and doing that in this year and going forward across the fiscal year DP. Indeed, when I took on this job one of my very first meetings was to have a budget meeting, and I decided that we were only spending \$3 million out of our budget on Mexico and that the U.S. Government as a whole was spending very little on the area of southern Mexico and northern Guatemala and Belize, which is a really—

Senator PORTMAN. Northern triangle.

Mr. WECHSLER. Exactly. So we put forward a proposal to increase the amount of money, and the Congress thus far has approved it, to increase the amount of money that we were spending in that area, because that seemed to be an underresourced area.

Senator PORTMAN. By the way, in that area apparently incredible violence. One of your commanders recently said that outside of a war zone it was the most dangerous place he can imagine.

Is that all about traffickers fighting for position coming up from further in the south? Or what is it about the northern triangle area that has become so dangerous?

Mr. WECHSLER. It's a lack of full government control.

Senator PORTMAN. This would be parts of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, southern Mexico, I take it?

Mr. WECHSLER. Exactly. It is in part a problem of those countries themselves and their security control over there. But what they are also being affected by is the Mexican transnational criminal organizations that are moving south. The Zetas, which are the most violent of and have really moved the overall level of violence to a great degree, abetted by the other transnational criminal organizations in Mexico, they have moved south into Guatemala and are contributing to the spike in violence that we see there as well.

In part they're doing that as a result of the success that President Calderon has had, but in part it's also just moving to get greater control over different legs in the value-added change from the farmer to our streets in America.

Senator PORTMAN. How about Panama? Where does Panama fit in this? We also are working on a trade-opening agreement with Panama, as you know, and it has been a great partner on security

and I understand they have a good cooperative arrangement with us at every level, including DOD.

Mr. WECHSLER. They do indeed, although it needs to be said that they're not—they have challenges themselves, challenges that we need to work with them on. But there is a great level of cooperation to work on those challenges, particularly in individual areas.

Senator PORTMAN. Can I get you on the record on that trade-opening agreement also? Would that help by establishing a better commercial relationship with Panama to strengthen their hand in dealing with narcotraffickers and others who might use that as a financial haven?

Mr. WECHSLER. Anything that would help, that would encourage, as this would, to encourage the Panamanians to make further improvements on their anti-money-laundering regime and their ability to go after the money, which is one of the predominant challenges that exists in that country.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear and Mr. Wechsler, thank you so much for your testimony today, your preparation, the job that you're doing. I know that these are very difficult times for so many places around the world and I really do appreciate what you're doing.

I do want to say that we're going to keep the record open for any colleagues that have—that may have questions for the record, until the close of business day on Friday. Also, we will be having a closed session and staff will coordinate that schedule with you.

With that, this subcommittee meeting is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]