

**HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DE-
FENSE PROGRAM**

TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, Nelson, Webb, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Collins, Cornyn, and Vitter.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Daniel J. Lerner, professional staff member; and Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Christine G. Lang, and Brian F. Sebold.

Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bow-

man, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Matthew Rimkunas, assistant to Senator Graham; Dave Hanke, assistant to Senator Coryn; and Joshua Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. This morning's hearing is one in a series of posture hearings held annually with the combatant commanders as part of this committee's review of the President's budget request for the coming fiscal year budget. Our witnesses are Admiral James Stavridis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander of the U.S. European Command; and General C. Robert Kehler, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. We welcome you both.

Admiral Stavridis is no stranger to this committee, having previously served as Commander of the U.S. Southern Command. This is his second appearance before this committee in his current position. But he comes at a most propitious time, being Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, in other words our NATO commander.

This is General Kehler's first opportunity to testify before the committee as the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, having assumed command responsibilities just 2 months ago. General Kehler is not new to the issues, however, as most of his career has been involved with strategic and space systems.

On behalf of the committee, let me thank you both for your long and distinguished service. We would also like to recognize the men and women who serve in the European Command area and around the world as members of the forces of the Strategy Command as they support and enable a wide range of important global missions. Please pass along the appreciation of this committee to them for their commitment and their dedication, and to their families for the essential support that they provide.

Once again, our service men and women have been called into harm's way, this time as part of an international coalition to prevent the Qadhafi regime in Libya from carrying out a bloodbath against the Libyan people, who are currently seeking, often at great risk, the same democratic and human rights that are inspiring others in the Arab world.

President Obama has taken a thoughtful and deliberate approach to U.S. involvement in the Libyan crisis, emphasizing that a military mission be limited and also have the support of a broad international coalition, including the endorsement of the United Nations and the Arab League. Securing the support and participation of an international coalition has been critical, both for regional and international acceptance of the use of military force and for ensuring that the risks and costs of operations are not principally America's.

The President has consistently made clear that the U.S. leadership of this mission would be limited in time, that there would be a handoff of command and control to a NATO-led coalition, which currently includes at least two Arab countries.

President Obama has reiterated that it is a U.S. goal that Colonel Qadhafi should go. To achieve that goal without foreign ground forces, the United States has applied significant tools of national power to increase heavy pressure against Colonel Qadhafi, his fam-

ily, and close associates, including economic sanctions, a travel ban, and a freeze on more than \$30 billion in Libyan assets.

Today representatives from coalition countries, as well as from the United States, the Arab League, the African Union, and other Arab countries, are meeting in London to discuss the international effort in support of the Libyan people. Qadhafi is more and more isolated and his military capabilities continue to be degraded, and air strikes will continue as long as he continues to threaten his own people.

The international community, including critically important Arab countries, have responded to Qadhafi's repression with UN Security Council Resolution 1970, which imposed sanctions and a weapons embargo against Libya, and UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorizes the use of "all necessary measures" to impose a no-fly zone and to protect Libyan civilians from the threat of attack by the Qadhafi government.

While coalition operations to enforce the UN Security Council resolution were initially under a task force led by the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, both EUCOM and STRATCOM have provided important support to establishment of the no-fly zone. Maritime and air assets based in Europe participated in the no-fly zone and in operations to protect civilians. STRATCOM demonstrated its global strike responsibilities when the B-2 Stealth bomber bombed airfields and other targets in Libya.

Our coalition partners have brought significant assets to the arms embargo and no-fly missions against Libya. Enforcing the no-fly zone has involved aircraft from ten countries, including Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and maritime operations are being conducted by nearly 40 ships, two-thirds of which are provided by coalition partners, including aircraft carriers from France and Italy.

Last week NATO took charge of the mission of enforcing the arms embargo and the no-fly zone against Libya, and on Sunday the North Atlantic Council, NATO's political body, agreed to take command of all aspects of the military operations under UN Security Council Resolution 1973, including the mission of protecting the Libyan people. Canadian Lieutenant General Bouchard, who will head the task force in charge of these operations, will report through the NATO Joint Task Force Command-Naples to Admiral Stavridis in his capacity as NATO Supreme Allied Commander-Europe.

The President carefully laid out—set out the mission and helped organize a UN mandate and a coalition to pursue it before that mission was launched. It has gained momentum and achieved some notable success, and so far without any allied casualties. It is a unique moment in history when the international community comes together and acts to stop a tyrant who is massacring his people.

The President from the beginning said the military mission did not include regime change. If it did, it would surely require outside ground forces, which the President clearly and properly rejects. Our military leaders' fear of mission creep has been understood by the President and respected. Those who favor including in the military mission the toppling of Qadhafi need to address the problems

created by getting deeper into the land of an Arab country, putting ourselves in the middle of a civil war, almost certainly destroying the coalition, and ignoring the UN mandate. The creation of that international coalition and mandate are of historic importance and essential to avoiding serious pitfalls.

The goal of our effort is to make it possible for the Libyan people to have the opportunity to decide Qadhafi's fate, just as the Egyptian people decided Mubarak's. If the situation on the ground in Libya continues to be volatile and Qadhafi continues to threaten his own people, then the issue arises as to whether the coalition should arm the opposition in Libya. Because such a step must be considered in the context of a NATO decision, it will require consensus. One critical consideration is whether providing arms to the rebels would be consistent with the mission and the mandate for intervention and, perhaps most importantly, whether the NATO coalition and its partners would maintain the critically essential unity if such a policy were adopted.

President Obama has been cautious in weighing the conditions for the use of military force. I believe he will continue to weigh carefully the pros and cons of providing offensive arms, such as heavy vehicles and artillery, to the opposition.

In Afghanistan, our European allies and partners make up the vast majority of the 48 countries in the more than 40,000 non-U.S. troops participating in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. Along with 90,000 U.S. troops, our ISAF partners' contributions have been significant, and we honor their sacrifices. At the NATO Lisbon summit last November, the ISAF participants agreed to endorse the Afghan government—agreed to endorse the Afghan government's assuming responsibility for security. This is an important and a welcome step, and recently President Karzai announced the first round of provinces and districts across Afghanistan where Afghan Security Forces will take the security lead starting this summer.

If we are to succeed, our message and our actions must be two-fold. We must impart a sense of urgency to the Afghans on the need to take ownership of their country's security, which is why I've been such a strong supporter of the July 2011 date set by the President to begin reductions of U.S. forces and begin accelerating the transition of security responsibility to Afghan Security Forces.

At the same time, we must assure and reassure the Afghans that as they assume more and more responsibility for security, we will be there to support them. Our European allies need to focus more on seeing this mission through to a successful conclusion and NATO members need to meet ISAF requirements for trainers for the Afghan army and police.

The balance of my statement I will put into the record, and I will call now on Senator McCain.

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank our witnesses for joining us this morning and for their many years of service to our Nation. On behalf of the entire committee, I'd like

to extend our thanks to all of the brave men and women in uniform you lead, who sacrifice so faithfully for us.

I'd like to echo the chairman in saying it's a pleasure to have General Kehler before the committee for the first time in his capacity as Commander of U.S. Strategic Command. Of course, it's always a pleasure to have Admiral Stavridis back before this committee to discuss the many complex challenges in the European Command, especially with U.S. forces engaged in military operations in Libya and with the upcoming transition of that mission to NATO command.

As the chairman said, the committee will hold a hearing this Thursday on the current operations in Libya, so let me just say briefly, the decision to intervene militarily in Libya was right and necessary. I believe that last night the President made a clear and convincing case for that. The President's action surely averted a mass atrocity in Benghazi. Had we not intervened, Libyan refugees would now be destabilizing Egypt and Tunisia, America's moral standing in the broader Middle East would have been devastated, as we turned a deaf ear on Arabs and Muslims who were pleading for our rescue. The result of all this would have been a fertile breeding ground in Libya for radicalization, hatred, and the ideology of Al-Qaeda.

Now that we have prevented the worst outcome, we have an opportunity to achieve the broader U.S. goal in Libya, as the President stated, forcing Qadhafi to leave power. I disagree with the President saying that the use of force should be ruled out, but clearly facts on the ground show that we are taking necessary steps to do so.

With our support, opposition forces are making significant progress toward that end on the ground. We just saw in Serte that U.S. and allied air power is the key element in whether these rebels, anti-Qadhafi forces, succeed or fail. We need to keep the pressure on Qadhafi and add to it where possible.

Qadhafi may crack. I think it's very possible that he may do so. But I don't think we can place all of our hopes on outcome. A long and costly stalemate is not in our interest. It was not in our interest to have a 10-year stalemate in Iraq following Operation Desert Storm. A long and costly stalemate in Libya would not be beneficial to any of the parties.

Though our focus is now on Libya, we must remember how many vital and diverse national security issues are being addressed in both of the commands that our witnesses lead. In the U.S. European Command, all of the many diverse missions of our armed forces intersect, from combatting transnational threats like terrorism or cyber attacks to building partnership capacity, from supporting NATO's counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan to maintaining the strategic balance of forces with other Eurasian powers. U.S. European Command is doing it all.

In addition to Libya, I'd be interested to hear what steps, if any, are being taken to support the defensive rearmament of Georgia. It's not in our interest to leave a stalwart partner and NATO aspirant country without the means to properly defend itself.

I also believe the entire committee would be interested in an update on the initial phase of our deployment of the European-based

Adaptive Approach to missile defense, as well as the progress made in projections for meeting the time line set forth by the President for phases 2 through 4. This is especially important in light of recent statements by Russian leaders rejecting stated U.S. policy of deploying all four phases of this critical missile defense program.

I know that both our witnesses have been involved to varying degrees in the search for common ground on missile defense with Russia. We'd be eager to hear both of our witnesses' assessment on the prospects of such cooperation ever occurring.

Similarly, General Kehler, you take command of the Strategic Command at a pivotal time, as we embark on a robust modernization of the nuclear triad and weapons complex, define strategic defense capabilities for the 21st century, and cement the role of cyber security and cyber warfare as core competencies.

The President's budget for fiscal year 2012 represents the initial investment in what will be a costly, yet vital, reinvestment in nuclear weapons modernization. The importance of Congress fully funding the long-term modernization of the nuclear weapons complex should have been driven home last year during the debate over the new START Treaty. Yet, in the full year fiscal year 2011 appropriations bill that Congress is now considering for DOD, the House has cut the President's request by \$312 million and the Senate cut the request by \$185 million. These actions are very troubling to me and I'd like to know whether you share this assessment, General Kehler, as well as how such cuts would affect your command's mission of fielding safe, reliable, and effective strategic forces.

Finally, on the issue of our cyber security, I was struck by a statement that General Keith Alexander made in recent testimony to the House Armed Services Committee. He said, and I quote: "We are finding that we do not have the capacity to do everything we need to accomplish. To put it bluntly, we are very thin and a crisis would quickly stress our cyber forces." General Alexander was also very clear that the threat is not a "hypothetical danger."

I remain concerned that the Department of Defense lacks both the necessary legal authorities and the sufficient trained personnel to fully perform its critical role in the realm of cyber security.

Again, I welcome the witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Admiral Stavridis.

**STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER,
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND/SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
EUROPE**

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Mr. Chairman, ranking member, members of the committee: Thank you. It's a pleasure and an honor to be with you here and also a great chance to be with Bob Kehler for his inaugural testimony, as several of you pointed out.

I would like to take just a moment up front to mention some of the things we're doing at U.S. European Command, and I'll group them into three broad categories. One is military operations, one is partnering and training with allies and friends, and the third is something I think very important and it's engaging with the inter-agency.

In terms of military operations, I'll conclude with a word about Libya, but let me start with a word about Afghanistan. At any given time, about 80 percent of the 45,000 non-U.S. troops who are in Afghanistan come from Europe. At this moment we have 12,000 U.S. European Command soldiers who are forward deployed. So we very much focus on Afghanistan from U.S. European Command and try our best to support General Jim Mattis and of course General Dave Petraeus, who's both our NATO and our U.S. commander in Afghanistan.

Like General Petraeus—and of course he was up about a week ago—I am today cautiously optimistic about Afghanistan. I see progress. As Dave said, it's fragile, but I believe that we are moving forward in the right direction. Today we have a coalition of 49 troop-contributing nations, the largest coalition in history, and it is making I think measurable progress in the transition to Afghan-led security operations.

So I can talk more about that in the question and answer period, but I did want to register my sense of optimism, cautious optimism, for our progress in Afghanistan today.

In terms of partnership, I think that's a very important aspect of what we do at U.S. European Command. 51 nations who are part of our military-to-military relationships. Last year, for example, we did 33 major exercises, engaging about 50,000 folks. We do a significant amount of training across the spectrum. Senator McCain mentioned Georgia. We do a fair amount with Georgia. I think that partnership-building is part of why there are 45,000 non-U.S. troops today with us in Afghanistan.

The third point quickly: inter-agency. We are also very engaged in European Command with our inter-agency partners. I think that's important—everything from disaster relief, where we were engaged with both Israel and Russia last year after forest fires, to working with the Drug Enforcement Administration on stemming the flow of narcotics out of Afghanistan because the profits and the money from that goes right back into the pockets of the Taliban.

So those three things, Mr. Chairman and ranking member, are where we're trying to focus: military operations, our partnering, and on our very good work with the inter-agency.

In terms of future challenges, we talked about Afghanistan. We are also very concerned about the ballistic missile threat, as Senator McCain said. We can talk about how we're doing, and I think the answer is reasonably well, on implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach. We are seeking the right balance of relationship with Russia, trying to find zones of cooperation where we can. We continue to work on our relationships with Israel and Turkey military-to-military, both very important. And we've mentioned terrorism and cyber, and all of those things are indeed on our plate.

Let me say a word about Libya since both the chairman and the ranking member mentioned it in their opening statements. I would like to clarify that I wear two hats. One of course is U.S. European Command, and in that U.S. capacity I am what is called a supporting commander. I am supporting the lead combatant commander, General Carter Ham. He is the principal U.S. operator and has been largely responsible for leading the coalition that has

been in operation for several weeks. My role there is support and logistics and moving troops forward for him, and I of course can talk about all that.

In terms of my other hat as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, I am effectively the operations officer for NATO. In that regard, as Senator McCain and Senator Levin mentioned, we are in fact taking this mission. We have already taken the arms embargo mission as of several days ago. We've taken the no-fly zone and now we are prepared over the next 24 to 48 hours to take over the protecting the population, all of which stems directly from the UN Security Council resolution.

So we are in the process of transitioning to a NATO-led operation from this coalition and I can certainly talk about aspects of that in my NATO hat as desired.

I hope that gives you a quick overview of what we're focused on at U.S. European Command. I'll conclude by saying I'm very proud of the men and women who serve there. I'll certainly carry back the comments of the chairman and the ranking member and the whole committee, and I would conclude by saying that we at U.S. European Command are very grateful for the Congress, for the Senate and the House of Representatives, for the support you give us, for taking the time to come and visit us, and for your interest and your questions, which sharpen our responses and hopefully help us contribute to U.S. national security.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Admiral Stavridis.
General Kehler.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF,
COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND**

General KEHLER. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee: Thanks for the opportunity to present my view on United States Strategic Command's missions and priorities. As you've noted, I'm privileged and humbled to appear today for the first time as the Commander of Strategic Command.

I'm also pleased to appear today with Admiral Jim Stavridis, the Commander of European Command and, of course, a great colleague that I'm looking forward to getting to know better and work with in the coming years.

No question, Mr. Chairman, today's national security landscape is marked by protracted conflict, constant change, and enormous complexity. We're facing a significantly different operating environment than those we have experienced in the past.

Of the threats we face, weapons of mass destruction clearly represent the greatest threat to the American people, particularly when they are pursued or possessed by violent extremists or state proliferators. To deal with the environment today demands faster and more comprehensive awareness, strategic thinking, flexible planning, decentralized execution, rapid innovation, and unprecedented information-sharing.

STRATCOM's mission remains clear: to detect, deter, and prevent attacks against the United States and to join with the other combatant commands to defend the Nation should deterrence fail.

STRATCOM's first priority is to deter nuclear attack on the United States and our allies. As we implement the new START Treaty, we are committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and we are also the strongest possible advocates of the investments that are needed to sustain and modernize the nuclear triad and the nuclear weapons complex that underpins it.

While nuclear deterrence is our number one priority, STRATCOM also has broader responsibilities in the 21st century. Ongoing operations demand our full commitment as well. So in partnership with the other combatant commands, our next priority is to improve our plans, procedures, and capabilities to address regional problems, especially where those problems or where the capabilities to address them cross regional boundaries.

On that note, STRATCOM also is a supporting command to U.S. AFRICOM. You mentioned that we provided B-2s early in the operation for AFRICOM's use. We are also taking steps and have taken steps to make sure that they have the space capabilities that they need, to make sure that the networks are there and operational and have sufficient capacity and are secured, and have also provided planners to Africa Command on a variety of issues that STRATCOM had expertise on.

So we are engaged as a supporting command in ongoing operations there, as well as our long-term engagement in other regions of the world in support of the other combatant commanders. Our activities primarily in that regard are synchronizing, synchronizing planning and capabilities for things like missile defense, ISR, electronic warfare, combatting weapons of mass destruction, and all of those synchronization efforts I believe are helping to bring unity of effort to regional operations and increased effectiveness to the capabilities that we can bring to bear.

Another one of our priorities is to improve our capabilities and operating concepts in the important civil and national security areas of space and cyberspace. Space, of course, is increasingly contested, congested, and competitive, and its importance to the United States goes far beyond national security. Ensuring uninterrupted access to space and space-based capabilities and improving our awareness of objects and activities in space and enhancing the protection and resilience of our most critical systems are all essential objectives.

Achieving those objectives demands continued investments to improve space situational awareness and to sustain our critical space capabilities, while we also pursue increased opportunities with allies and commercial partners.

Our greatest challenge in cyberspace is to improve our ability to operate and defend the DOD network at network speed, to make sure our critical activities can continue even in the face of adversary attempts to deny or disrupt them. STRATCOM and its sub-unified command U.S. CYBERCOM are working hard to improve our organizations and relationships, enhance our network situational awareness and protection, increase our technical capacity, and to develop the human capital we need as we look to the future.

We have much to do, but we also know today's fiscal environment demands that we must maximize both mission effectiveness and taxpayer value. We'll continue our efforts to identify every pos-

sible place where we can become more efficient as we work to become even more effective.

Finally, we're committed to taking care of our warriors, our government civilians, and their families. To this end, STRATCOM fully supports the efforts of the services to properly train, equip, support, and care for our men and women, and we will work diligently to ensure that they have a safe and a positive work environment.

Mr. Chairman, great challenges lie ahead, but so too do great opportunities. The men and women of STRATCOM perform their difficult mission with remarkable skill and dedication every minute of every day. I'm proud to be associated with them and look forward to working with you and the committee as we address these important national security issues.

Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General.

Let's say a first round of 7 minutes.

Admiral, let me start with you. Do you agree that it was important to secure international support and participation, including a U.N. resolution and including support by Muslim countries, before commencing military operations against Libya?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, I think any time the United States can operate in a coalition environment that's to our advantage. Again, Afghanistan I think is a good example, with 49 partner nations. So I would agree with that.

Chairman LEVIN. From a military perspective, what difference does it make to have that international support in place?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It makes a very significant difference in a wide variety of ways. Let me name three. One is the simple addition of resources. Taking Afghanistan as an example, as I mentioned earlier, 45,000 non-U.S. troops there, 98,000 U.S. So significant resource contribution.

Chairman LEVIN. Is that true in Libya as well?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It certainly is. In Libya, for example—and I think you mentioned in your opening statement—today there are roughly 40 ships operating in general support of that operation. Only about 12 of those are U.S. ships. So that addition of resources I think is first and very primary.

Second, you get the exchange of ideas. When we have both in Afghanistan and in Libya today, where we have 28 NATO nations and Arab nations coming together, you have different views of looking at things. That can at times create friction, but I would argue over time it creates better ideas, because no one of us is as smart as all of us thinking and working together.

Then thirdly, I would say access. To do an operation like Libya or Afghanistan requires overcoming the tyranny of distance and geography. We do that best with allies, because not everywhere is international air space, not everywhere are the high seas.

So those would be three things I would say off the top of my head.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, as to the decisionmaking process that lies ahead of us, what will happen if Qadhafi's forces appear to truly

stop fighting? Who would make the decision as to whether or not that was real and then what the response should be? Is that a military decision in the field? Is that a political decision by NAC? Who makes that decision?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I think it would begin in the field with on-the-ground assessments. Of course, as we appreciate, in the last 5 weeks of this operation I've heard personally at least five different ceasefires announced by Qadhafi's forces, none of which have been true. So it would have to begin with on-the-ground assessment.

It would be backed up by higher level intelligence assessments. That data would then be flowed into the joint task force commander for NATO, Canadian General, Lieutenant General, Charlie Bouchard. He's headquartered at Naples. It would be assessed there in an operational context, moved up to my headquarters in Mons, Belgium, where the SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, we would put a strategy view on it.

Chairman, it would then go to the NAC, the North Atlantic Council, to be evaluated for whether there would be a shift in direction which would be given to us.

Chairman LEVIN. If the evaluation was that it was a real stoppage of war you Qadhafi against his own people, what's the effect of that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I think there would be actually another level that this discussion would have to go to, which would be the United Nations, since the authority for NATO to participate in this operation is under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973.

But taking your hypothetical, if there was an assessment by NATO that this had changed conditions on the ground, then I think there would be, depending on the situation, a probable pause in activity while it was evaluated at a political level as to further steps.

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of arming the opposition forces, is there a consensus within NATO or the North Atlantic Council as to whether to arm the opposition forces, and have you made a recommendation or have you received one from General Bouchard?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I have not made or received such a recommendation. Of course, we're at very early days at this point.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you have any recommendation on that at this point?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do not at this point.

Chairman LEVIN. Has NATO engaged with the Libyan opposition forces, or the NATO representative?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. There is not a NATO representative on the ground in Libya at this time to my knowledge.

Chairman LEVIN. Shifting to Afghanistan, Admiral, do you continue to support the beginning of reductions of U.S. forces from Afghanistan by July of this year?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. General Petraeus is evaluating that now and I'm awaiting his recommendations.

Chairman LEVIN. I believe in the past you've indicated that you do support the President's decision to begin the reductions in July,

with the pace of those reductions to be determined by conditions on the ground?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Conditions-based, I agree.

Chairman LEVIN. In terms of the pace of reductions.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Is that still your position?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. During the committee's hearing on February 17, Admiral Mullen said the decision to begin reductions of U.S. troops in July of this year has given the Afghan leadership a sense of urgency that they didn't have before that decision was made. Do you agree with Admiral Mullen?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do. I would add that it has also energized their efforts in training the Afghan Security Forces, which I think is central to whether or not we will be able to begin those reductions.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you support increasing the end strength, increasing the end strength targets for the Afghan army and police by up to an additional 70,000 personnel by the end of 2012?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I believe that additional Afghan security forces will be necessary over time. I have not done the specific analysis of number or time line, but I believe our current target of 305,000 would probably be better served in the long term to have an increase in that number, yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, you made reference to the radar deployment in Europe this year. You've indicated that there's some progress being made, I believe, by that deployment. There's been some suggestion from Secretary Gates, who was recently in Moscow, that there's a possibility of missile defense cooperation with Russia. President Obama and President Medvedev have discussed that as well by phone, accordingly—apparently, and the White House statement was that President Obama affirmed why the U.S. believes that cooperation with Russia on missile defense could enhance the security of the U.S., Russia, our allies, and our partners.

Now, as the combatant commander responsible for working with Russia through EUCOM and through NATO, would you agree or do you agree that missile defense cooperation with Russia, if done properly, could be in our interests? Do you believe it's possible that we could agree on cooperative measures with Russia?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir, I think it's possible. I think several steps would have to occur for us to get to that point, beginning with getting our own security deployed and settled and in place. Then that would have to be connected with a NATO system, because I think it's very important as we approach a missile defense relationship with Russia that it be done in a NATO–Russia context. So that would be the next step, would be connecting the missile defense through the ALTBMD and the ACCS system.

Then thirdly, I think at that point you would have the possibility, as you mentioned, of finding a zone of cooperation that could provide missile defense cooperation between the United States, in a NATO context, and Russia.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Admiral.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, do you agree that when the no-fly zone was implemented Qadhafi was basically at the suburbs or on the outskirts of Benghazi and, as the President stated, there would have been a massacre of very large proportions?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. I think everything about Colonel Qadhafi's history would tell us that?

Senator MCCAIN. Would you agree that 3 weeks earlier if we had imposed a no-fly zone that, when the momentum was on the side of the anti-Qadhafi forces, that it's very likely that Qadhafi would have fallen then?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it's hard to say if Qadhafi would have fallen then or not.

Senator MCCAIN. Isn't it very clear that the use of air power and armor is what reversed the tide against the anti-Qadhafi rebels?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. So, at least in the view of some of us, an opportunity was passed up by not invoking a no-fly zone 3 weeks ago, which would have then prevented Qadhafi from using his superior armor and air power to drive the rebels all the way back to Benghazi. So there's an up side and a down side to seeking coalitions. There is an argument to it that you should act in warfare when the opportunities present themselves.

You do agree that air power is decisive in this conflict on the side of the anti-Qadhafi forces?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It has been thus far.

Senator MCCAIN. The UN resolution as I understand it says we should take all necessary measures to prevent humanitarian disasters to befall the Libyan people, all necessary measures, right?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. And the Lieutenant Bouchard just said that the goals of the air campaign remain the same, and I quote him: "to protect and help the civilians in population centers under the threat of attack." Do you agree with that, General Bouchard's statement?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Does that mean that that "protect and helping the civilian population centers" goes all the way to Tripoli?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that any time there is a threat to the population of Libya we have sufficient rules of engagement to strike against forces that are demonstrating hostile acts or hostile intent against them.

Senator MCCAIN. So there is hostile intent taking place in the city of Tripoli, wouldn't you agree, in suppression of anti-Qadhafi forces?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that any Qadhafi forces that are demonstrating hostile intent against the Libyan population are legitimate targets.

Senator MCCAIN. So basically what's happening here is we're saying that we won't overthrow Qadhafi by force, but in the interest of protecting and helping the civilian and population centers under the threat of attack we are moving rapidly to the west.

The media is reporting, correct, that we are employing AC-130s and A-10s to provide more targeted close-in protection for civilians?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. That is correct, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. So the only other question—I know this is a very tough one, but there are persistent rumors that Qadhafi really has very few friends and it's likely that at some point he will—they will crack and he will either leave, be killed, whatever. Is that something that you think is a pretty good possibility, that may happen?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. As I look at the situation in Libya, Senator, you can see a wide range of possibilities out ahead of us, that run from a static stalemate to what you just described, Qadhafi cracking. I think that if we work all the elements of power, I think we have a chance at, a more than reasonable chance, of Qadhafi leaving, because the entire international community is arrayed against him. I think the events today in London, where 40 nations are gathered to discuss this, would lend weight to the theory that, as Secretary Gates said in testimony or on a talk show, he probably doesn't need to be hanging any new pictures.

Senator MCCAIN. And he—clearly, we just want him gone, whether to live with Chavez or meet Hitler and Stalin or be in a criminal court; is that—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that the international community, virtually every world leader, has ascribed to a statement along the lines that Qadhafi should leave Libya.

Senator MCCAIN. But a stalemate is not an acceptable solution. I think we learned that from the Iraqi experience after Desert Storm, that sanctions and no-fly zones don't succeed. Is that a lesson we could draw from that experience?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think a stalemate is not in anybody's interest.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

Is the United States at present providing defensive weapons to Georgia or helping Georgia acquire such weapons?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, we are working with Georgia in training their security forces.

Senator MCCAIN. I'm asking about weapons.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. In terms of defensive weapons, at this moment we are not providing them what I would term high-end military defensive weapons.

Senator MCCAIN. You know, it's hard for me to understand, since the Russians still occupy territory that is clearly Georgian territory and continue to threaten Georgia. And yet we're not even giving them weapons with which to defend themselves. It is not comprehensible.

Do you believe the Russian Federation is serious when its leaders say that they will withdraw from the new START Treaty if the United States deploys all phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense? Do you believe they're serious?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I'm not familiar with their making that dramatic a statement. I've seen other statements that would indicate they intend to continue a dialogue and discussion with us moving forward across the missile defense sphere.

Senator MCCAIN. General Kehler, does DOD have the necessary legal authorities it needs to respond to a cyber attack?

General KEHLER. Senator, it doesn't have all the authorities it needs. In fact, in some cases our role has been defined at this point to defending, protecting the DOD network. The relationship outside that is being established with the Department of Homeland Security, that does have the lead for protecting critical infrastructure across the United States. So there are limits to what DOD can do today.

Senator MCCAIN. Would you do me—would you please submit to the committee in writing what you think is necessary in order for us to give you the capability to defend this Nation against a cyber attack? A lot of us feel that that is the new battleground of the 21st century, and for you not to have all the tools at your disposal to protect this Nation's national security interests in the event if a cyber attack is not an acceptable situation.

We've been bouncing around between different committees, Intelligence and Armed Services and Homeland Security. Everybody's got a different idea. I think it would be—we would be well served if you would provide us, at least in your view, what is absolutely minimal necessity in order to defend the country.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. I would add one other point. The DOD has reached out to industry at this point to do a pilot program with them to see as we work through what that would take what additional authorities might be involved there. But I think that there are some additional steps being taken now and I will provide you my thoughts more later.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain, and we will share your answer in that regard with Senator Lieberman's committee; Senator Collins, the ranking member of that committee, are deeply involved in that, and a number of other committees as well. There is being organized legislative efforts to make sure that you have all the authority and other agencies have all the authorities that they need and that they work together to make sure that there are no cracks on our defense and that there's clarity in terms of the authority and responsibility for the response as well. So we'll share that with Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins and the other committees.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Let me just pick up very briefly on what you've said, General Kehler. Your testimony, which I know to be absolutely valid, that you don't have sufficient legal authority, although I suppose in a time of crisis the President could invoke his constitutional authority as the Commander in Chief to direct the Pentagon to take the action it would have to take, really is a clarion call, and I hope people hear it, because we're not adequately defended from cyber attack today.

The fact is that the Department of Homeland Security, which Senator Collins and I, our committee, oversees, has been working much more closely on these matters with the Pentagon and the NSA. But we urgently need to get over classic Senate committee territorial turf battles and pass legislation this year to clarify au-

thorities for protection of American cyber space, including, as you suggest, particularly the majority of American cyber space, which is privately owned.

There was an encouraging meeting a couple of weeks ago which was convened by the two leaders, Senator Reid and Senator McConnell, and the chairs and ranking members of the relevant committees. We're on a course now to try to get legislation, hopefully before the Senate—by the end of the spring. So I appreciate what you've said.

I thank you both for your service. Admiral Stavridis, let me just come back to where we are in Libya now and the role of NATO. I think your description of the kind of—the line of authority was very helpful to people, because as we say now that the U.S. is turning over authority to NATO it's very important for us to understand what NATO is. I'm glad NATO's involved, of course, because what's happening in Libya is not just a concern for America or a threat to America. It's a concern to most of the rest of the civilized world and therefore it's very important that NATO and our allies in the Arab world be involved.

But it's not—when the U.S. turns responsibility over to NATO, it's not like we're taking a hot potato and throwing it to somebody else. We're NATO. Not all of it is NATO, but we're at the heart of NATO. We're most of NATO. We have great allies with us there.

Just to go over this quickly, three missions now moving to NATO control. The arms embargo, am I correct that that is now being overseen by an Italian officer?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. Just to add to what I said earlier, there's an Italian three-star in Naples—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Who has command of the maritime piece of this.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Then there's a Canadian three-star who is the joint task force commander, and the air piece of it will actually be run out of Turkey, out of Ismir, Turkey, by a NATO headquarters there, which has a U.S. three-star and a French three-star. So you've really got Italian, French, Canadian, American, all in the chain of command.

Just to put a metric on it, of the 40 flag and general officers that are involved in this whole thing, only five of them will be American as we move forward.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And the civilian protection mission, who's that under now?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. That's under Lieutenant General Bouchard.

Senator LIEBERMAN. The Canadian.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The joint task force commander, executing through the other two officers I mentioned.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Just let's follow that chain up. Who do they report to?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. They report to the NATO joint force commander, Naples, who is an American four-star, Sam Locklear, who was also the commander of the Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn, which was the Libyan operation. So there's good continuity in that as he fits in both of those operations.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So we've got—right, we've got continuity and another American officer there. And then does he report directly to you?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. He does.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And obviously, you're a distinguished American Admiral and we're proud of you and thank you for your service.

Then you report to the North Atlantic Council.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do. I would add that my report goes through a committee, a military committee headed by an Italian four-star admiral, Admiral Di Paola, who is actually the senior officer in NATO. That committee takes my advice, puts a military eye on it. Admiral Mike Mullen is the American member of that 28-person body. It's all the chiefs of defense, we would say all the chairmen of the joint chiefs. Then the advice goes to the North Atlantic Council.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And am I right that the North Atlantic Council gives you, if I might put it in these terms, general authority, but does not have to approve every mission that you carry out?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. For instance, if Qadhafi's forces are surrounding a town in Libya, you don't have to go back to the NAC to get approval in terms of protecting civilians?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. I appreciate that.

So again I make the point that having NATO involved is critically important, for all the reasons the President said last night, but it's not like the U.S. is not involved. We're very centrally involved, and we should be.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. Again, that chain of command that I just described is not dissimilar to the one that we used in Afghanistan from a NATO perspective.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Exactly.

As you know, we have taken a very forward-leaning understanding of the part of the UN resolution that talks about "all necessary measures" to protect the Libyan civilians, and again I think that's the right thing to do. We've effectively, based on the UN mandate, prosecuted a campaign of air strikes against Qadhafi's forces, which has not only protected civilians, but also paved the way, as General Carter Ham said yesterday, I believe, for the rebels—we call them freedom fighters—in Libya to advance.

I wanted to ask you whether you're confident that NATO is united in its interpretation of the civilian protection mission going forward, so that there will not be a diminution of that mission in the days and weeks ahead with NATO in control?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I'm confident I have the rules of engagement that I need to continue the campaign in the manner to which it's been conducted.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I want to ask you a final question. My time is running out. As you know, we're under grave budgetary pressure here and there are already calls from some quarters to reduce the U.S. military footprint in the European Command area of responsibility that you have. I'm struck by the fact that what's happening in Libya makes the argument for the continued importance of our

military footprint in Europe and enabled our operations in North Africa.

I wanted to ask you if you'd just take a moment to essentially respond to the point that's made that, hey, the Second World War is long over, the Cold War is over; what the heck are we still doing in Europe?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, I always like to start answering that question by just putting some context to it. So if we could, let's go back to the end of the Cold War, when there were 400,000 soldiers and sailors and airmen and marines, and we had 1,200 bases and sites around Europe. That was a big, muscular operation. We've now reduced that by about 75 percent. We're down to about 80,000 U.S. troops in Europe. We've come down to about a dozen main operating bases. We still have lots of little outlying sites, but we've reduced that overall footprint 75 percent.

I think the European platform permits us to reassure allies, to deter, to conduct military operations, as we're doing today in Afghanistan and in Libya, and to do this training and building of partnership capacity. Those are vital functions.

So I'm comfortable that we can take a little bit more out of that, a little bit more efficiency. And we've looked very hard at that over the last year and we're very close to a decision that I think will make some minor reductions in that. But overall I think we've seen the real value of this European footprint and I really applaud the wisdom of the Congress, which has supported it, because—for the four reasons I mentioned, I think it's a very valuable one for us.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Admiral, and thank you, General. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think most of the questions on Libya have been asked and I suspected that would be the case. But there's one other one that's a little bit sensitive, I think, but somebody has to say it. There have been several reports about the presence of Al-Qaeda among the rebels, among those with whom we are associated. What are your thoughts about that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, as you can imagine, we're examining very closely the content, composition, the personalities, who are the leaders in these opposition forces. The intelligence that I'm receiving at this point makes me feel that the leadership that I'm seeing are responsible men and women who are struggling against Colonel Qadhafi.

We have seen flickers in the intelligence of potential Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah. We've seen different things. But at this point I don't have detail sufficient to say that there's a significant al Qaeda presence or any other terrorist presence in and among these folks. We'll continue to look at that very closely as part of doing due diligence as we move forward on any kind of relationship.

Senator INHOFE. I don't say this critically of you, of course, because you didn't make this decision. But wouldn't that have been a good idea to find out before we took some of the steps that we're taking?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I think that from the moment this crisis has unfolded I think there has been a great deal of intelligence

applied to this, although General Ham as the AFRICOM commander would be in the best position to give you the detail on that.

Senator INHOFE. I was planning on talking to him.

Let me carry on a little bit from what Senator Lieberman was saying. I was going to approach it from a little different perspective. Back in the 90s, it was actually Jim Jones at that time was talking about the reduction of our presence, our installations, our personnel in Western Europe. At that time one of the reasons was, with the—and this was particularly true in Germany—with a lot of the problems that were existing at that time with the environmental movement, they were somewhat restricted in what our capabilities were going to be in terms of how many hours we can train, how many days a week, after hours, and this type of thing. That was one of the considerations at that time.

I'd like to ask you, first of all, has that changed? And then second, I have another question to ask about our presence there.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would say that in my 2 years roughly as the commander of EUCOM I have not felt any restrictions on my ability to do the kind of training in maneuver in Germany or in any of the other countries. In fact, Germany hosts Grafenvere and Hohenfels. I think you visited there, sir, our big training center there, probably a premier training facility. We've put 17,000 people there in the last year.

Senator INHOFE. I think a lot of that was before you arrived at that position.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it was, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Because at that time I actually went over to Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, Romania, some of these places, where they were wanting us to come over and they were willing to give us 24-7 and also do a lot of the billeting and other things. So I just wondered where that was now.

Well, let me ask you this. There's a lot of criticism since the downgrade. I was shocked when I read your written testimony and found that it was down 80 percent from where it was in the 90s. I didn't realize that. That being the case, there's still some MILCON that is going on there, and I know a lot of people are critical of that, and there are some parochial reasons for that back here also.

But with that being the case, could you talk about any kind of a consolidation that's taking place that is going to justify any MILCON and how that works in our current position?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, we are doing a great deal of continuing search for these efficiencies and we are consolidating our footprint and have been doing so over the last 5 years. In fact, I'm testifying in front of the MILCON Subcommittee and will have a chance to lay that out. But I think we have a reasonable plan that strikes a balance between what we need to do to support our families in Europe as well as maintain the headquarters that's undertaking the operations we're seeing today.

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Yes, because—and I'm sure you will get asked a lot of questions about that when you are before the Appropriations subcommittee.

These partnership programs with States, there's some 20 I guess going on right now. I know that my State of Oklahoma has—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Azerbaijan.

Senator INHOFE.—Azerbaijan. They have all kinds of good reports, but I'm wondering how you see it when you're over-viewing, looking at the whole thing. Is it time, resources well spent with our Guard activities?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, it is. We have 22 of these programs around. The one from Oklahoma, for example, does everything from prosaic military training to police training to oil field training. I mean, we try to match up the State with the country. I think the presence, for example, of the Oklahoma State partnership program has been very helpful in Azerbaijan in maintaining our access through our transit routes because of the strong mil-to-mil relationship.

Multiply that by 22 all around Europe and you can see the bang for the buck here is really quite significant.

Senator INHOFE. Well, that's good. That's what I'm getting from our people there, so I assumed that that was the case.

I just came back from spending some time in Israel and talked to Prime Minister Netanyahu for some length. His first comment was "Welcome to the earthquake" when we got over there. When you stop and think about it, everywhere over there. I mean, we've been talking about Libya, but you've got Iran, you've got Syria, you've got—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Egypt.

Senator INHOFE.—Egypt. So we have that only one great friend there. Do you think we're doing enough to ensure the defense of Israel? Any comments you could make on that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I had the same conversation a week ago with Lieutenant General Benny Ganz, who is the chief of defense, the chairman of the joint chiefs, if you will, of Israel. We talked all around the region. I think Israel is watching very closely these events on their periphery, as they should be.

Part of our job is to reassure them and continue to engage with them. From U.S. European Command, we're doing that across everything from missile defense to weapons systems to training to intelligence exchange. It's a good time for all of us to recognize exactly what you said, that Israel is in the middle of an earthquake zone, and from a military-to-military perspective we're working very closely with them.

Senator INHOFE. Well, I was going to get into a couple other programs that I know you're enthusiastically supporting and have in the past, like the train and equip program, the CERP, and CCIF. But let me just mention, if there's not time to answer this, General: My concern has been, back when we took out the plans for a ground-based interceptor in Poland, with the necessary radar in the Czech Republic, that by the time we would receive the same capability we were looking at a program that there's really not anything definite in terms of when it will come along.

What I'm talking about is the SM-3 Block 2B, the long-range program. Right now we don't have a date. It's still a concept. My feeling is that the others, like the Block 2A and other programs, are good, they're coming along. We have the Aegis capability and all of that. But for the record, since my time has expired, I'd like to have you share with me whether you share my concern over the

fact that we would have had in my opinion that capability much sooner? And when our intelligence gives us a range that Iran's going to have this capability that we all dread thinking about, somewhere between 2015 and 2020, to me that's what keeps me up at night. So if you could for the record get into as much detail on that as possible, I would appreciate it.

General KEHLER. Sir, I'll provide that for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator REED.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service and your testimony today. Admiral Stavridis, the President has quite rightly ruled out any ground forces entering Libya from the United States. But at least looking ahead, there is the possibility that through many possible outcomes—the Qadhafi regime departing swiftly or rebels ejecting it—that there would be a need for some stabilization on the ground. Is that something that NATO is considering?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I wouldn't say NATO's considering it yet. But I think that when you look at the history of NATO, having gone through this as many on this committee have with Bosnia and Kosovo, it's quite clear that the possibility of a stabilization regime exists. So I have not heard any discussion about it yet, but I think that history is in everybody's mind as we look at the events in Libya.

Senator REED. These events, obviously, are moving fast.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I understand.

Senator REED. Let me ask another question which is related. As you pointed out in your opening testimony, a significant number of forces in Afghanistan are NATO forces or European allies. What effect, if any, has the current operation in Libya had on their ability to maintain their presence in Afghanistan?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. As I was saying to someone the other day, if you can be lucky in terms of how a crisis unfolds, one aspect of the Libyan crisis is that the types of forces, ships and aircraft principally, are precisely the forces that are not in such high demand in Afghanistan, a landlocked state, where the Taliban have no air capability. So in that sense I'm confident that we'll be able to move forward and keep the resource balance both ways.

Again, I do want to say the allies have been very forthcoming with ships and aircraft, as I pointed out in talking to the chairman, and I'm confident we'll have the forces we need to do this in both places.

Senator REED. I'm sure you once again want to, for the benefit of Senator Lieberman and I, point out the decisive role of submarines in conducting this operation.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator Lieberman will be happy to hear that there are submarines involved in this, and they are part of the NATO force that is doing the arms embargo and are a stated requirement.

Senator REED. And also delivering land attack missiles.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Indeed they are, 196 of them from U.S. submarines, for example.

Senator REED. Thank you.

We had the opportunity—I want to open this question up to General Kehler also—to talk about the emerging cyber dimension in warfare and our lack of preparedness. Senator McCain referred to it in his comments, and General Alexander's comments also. From your perspective as the NATO commander, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and yours from Strategic Command, General, your general comment? And I'll start with Admiral Stavridis.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir. From a NATO perspective, because that will be different than what Bob will talk about, from a NATO perspective we're very aware of this. It's part of our strategic concept which just came out. NATO has two organizations that focus on this. One is the NATO Cyber Defense Center in, appropriately, in Tallinn, Estonia, a nation that has suffered a cyber attack, and also the NATO Computer Incident Response Organization, which is part of my organization in the SHAPE headquarters.

Those two together work with General Alexander, and I would conclude by saying we are also pushing to engage with the European private sector. Just as General Kehler said a moment ago, this private-public nexus is so important in the world of cyber, and we're working very hard to engage European private through the NATO piece, so that we can then connect with U.S. efforts through Keith Alexander and up to his boss, General Kehler.

Senator REED. Can I just follow up? You just appointed a special assistant for public-private partnerships. Is this the whole range of public-private partnerships?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Exactly. I believe, Senator, that we have learned how to do joint operations. We are getting much better at inter-agency operations. I think a growth area in security is private-public and where those two things connect, and cyber is probably the prime example of it at this moment.

Senator REED. Are there any other CINCs that are doing what you are doing?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. We're sharing that idea now and I think there's general interest in it, yes, sir.

Senator REED. Thank you.

General Kehler, please. Any comments would be helpful?

General KEHLER. Senator, I would just add that you've hit on a key aspect here with the public-private partnership activity. Certainly here is a domain that is largely in the public domain. So I don't think we have much of a challenge any longer convincing people how important cyber security is.

What we see here is a threat that is evolving from everything from the old nuisance hackers, the 13-year-old in the basement down the street, to exploitation, where people deliberately come in and steal things through cyberspace from the networks, to denial of services or other activities, to perhaps a place where they will go to destructive activities.

In every one of those cases, as you look at defining the role of government, as defining the role of the Department of Defense, defining the role of private industry and others, that's the issue that is foremost on our plate these days, is making sure that we have

put in place the right relationships, the right roles and responsibilities, in some cases making sure that we have the right authorities in place, so that we can act at what our cyber experts would call network speed, which is a very tough challenge for us.

Most of the frustration I think that many of us have is that it seems like we're always closing the barn door after the horse is gone. So we have to be in a position here where we can do better in terms of protecting ourselves. I think we've done a lot over the last couple of years to get the Department of Defense in a better place. It will not happen overnight. We started with this disparate collection of networks that we are trying to make behave as one network for the Department of Defense. That in and of itself is a challenge. But we are making some progress here.

The next steps that we have to take, though, is to have better situational awareness. That's a shared responsibility between the combatant commands, for example, and broader than that, out into the public domain as well. We have to have better capacity and that gets to our ability to recruit and train and retain the right cyber experts. Then of course it gets to the authorities question, so that we have properly sorted out this balance between our constitutional protections and our need to act on behalf of the Nation, of course with the appropriate civil authorities in the lead.

So those are the challenges that we have today. Those are being worked very hard in many places. I'm confident that we're making progress, but we will return to all of you, as I was asked to do earlier today, with some specific suggestions.

Senator REED. My time has expired, but just a final comment. And you may get back to me or just make it in a round of questioning. I think we've become so dependent sort of instinctively on things like GPS systems. Do we ever train at NATO or at Strategic Command off-line, with a compass, which is a very challenging device—I can testify to that. GPS is a lot easier—or, in a concept of installations, redundancy? That is, old systems that in an emergency you can get off line and use them?

I guess my focal point would be, if a natural disaster can wreak the havoc in Japan, someone messing with their control systems electronically could produce the same catastrophic effect. So I think we're at the verge of a whole new dimension in warfare, and I'm glad that you gentlemen are thinking thoughtfully about these issues. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Well, I think Senator Reed has raised such an important question. Would you get back to us on that issue, on the redundancy and the backups, including some of the old-fashioned types, in case our more modern technology are interfered with? Could you get back to the committee on that issue?

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

General KEHLER. Will do. The short answer is we're not as good as we need to be, but we are working on it.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. And if I could add, this is an area in which coalitions are helpful, because many of our allies aren't at the same level of technical capability and we get a window into other ways of doing business. And I will provide an answer as well, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. For the record, thank you.

Senator BROWN.

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm just wondering if you both could comment on the level of disruption, if any, on those under your command caused by the CRs that we're dealing with?

General KEHLER. I'll start. Our principal concern at this point is twofold. One is the start of military construction products—projects. That's becoming more and more of an issue for us. And then second there's just kind of a psychological overhang that is disruptive to the troops, because, although they know their pay and their essential services will continue, many of the functionalities that support them are vested with our civilian workforce, and that would be problematic as well. So those would be two things I would point to.

General KEHLER. I'll pick up on that, Senator, in that, first of all, we're in this interesting time period now where many of the combatant command headquarters are becoming over 50 percent civilian workforce. So the civilians are concerned about what will happen here and will there be a government shutdown and how this will impact them, and I share their concern.

Second, I'm also concerned about some issues that are outside the Department of Defense's budget. Specifically what I'm interested in is making sure that we continue the investment plans that were laid in for the National Nuclear Security Agency because of the work that they are doing for us regarding the stockpile, and the anticipation that we have that they will need to provide additional investment so that we can restore the stockpile as we go forward and do the appropriate life extension programs.

So I'm concerned about those two things and have been somewhat reassured that in the stockpile work I believe that we are okay to continue as it is. But I am concerned as long as the CR process is going on that those two things are okay.

Senator BROWN. I can tell you just for the record, and based on my personal dealings with our caucuses, no Republican is talking about shutting down the government. We're hopeful that we can come together and continue to not only address our budgetary concerns, but come together and move our country forward and give you the stability you need. So I'm going to continue to work in that regard.

General Kehler, also I know—is it true that—and I believe it is, but I want to just hear it from you—that the cyber attacks are growing? As we talked about, for 17 minutes last April DOD networks along with other government networks, were routed through China; is that accurate?

General KEHLER. Senator, I'll have to get back to you on that. I'm not—that one doesn't jump into my mind, but let me find out and I'll get back to you.

Senator BROWN. If you could actually, because obviously that has a great concern to me and many others. I know when you came before us and we confirmed you that was one of your concerns, is dealing with, obviously, the cyber security and people, whether it's

the everyday young hacker or established terrorist cells trying to gain access to vital security information.

I concur with the chairman. If there's something that you need that you don't have, I'd like to know about it. You talked about being reactive versus proactive, and I for one would like to be very proactive.

General KEHLER. Sir, if I could, though, just add a point. I'll check and make sure that I understand the issue that you're asking about. However, having said that, one thing about the global Internet is that it's global, and the pathways that information takes through that Internet are sometimes interesting pathways.

Having said that, though, for our critical information in the Department of Defense we take great care to make sure that that information is properly protected. We have, again, more work to do, but I don't want you to think that we're not taking steps to make sure that that information is protected.

Senator BROWN. No, I wouldn't think that. Thank you.

Admiral, I, like many others, have been wrestling with our involvement in Libya. On the one hand, I understand the need to protect innocent civilians and you kind of draw a line in the sand when you recognize that, you know, enough is enough. But I'm also wrestling with, and I've been asked the question, like who's next? Under what circumstances do we do the same thing with the other countries that are facing very similar circumstances? Are we going to now be the northern light for the entire region and in fact be there to basically address every concern of every country?

I guess that's my first question, if you could comment on it. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, I think the President in his speech last night addressed that concern and did it very well, and I think that's the policy level at which a decision like that would be made, would be in the Executive Branch with the President, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State.

Obviously, at my level, my job is to provide options from a military context and then, when given a military mission, execute it. Our current mission, as we've talked about, is everything from the humanitarian to the arms embargo to the no-fly zone to the protect the population. So I'm comfortable with the mission I've been given. We're executing that. And if and when there are decisions about other conflicts, then certainly we'll be prepared to do that.

Senator BROWN. And I appreciate the job you're doing, and obviously they say jump, you say how far, and I understand that. I, like many others, are obviously concerned if there is a next.

Is it true that we have been flying virtually all of the military aircraft sorties into the region over the last couple of days? Is it us mostly or not?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, sir. I can give you just a rough idea of the numbers.

Senator BROWN. If you could, that would be great.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sure. We have flown the majority. I think in very round numbers, out of 1600 sorties the United States has flown 950 of them. So we've probably flown 65 percent of the sorties. As we now get NATO into the picture, I think you'll see that

U.S. percentage go down significantly and I think you'll see the allied component of it go up.

But I think for ballpark purposes, about 60–40 U.S.- allied. Just to give you one other number, if you don't mind, the actual strike sorties, the bomb dropping, we're roughly 50–50 U.S. and allied. So I think the allied contribution has been reasonable and I think it'll increase a bit as we get into the NATO—

Senator BROWN. In terms of submarines, Tomahawks, et cetera, we're the only ones.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. In terms of Tomahawk missiles, those were virtually all from the United States. There were a handful from the Brits, but for all intents and purposes the Tomahawks were a U.S. mission with a little bit of help from the Brits.

Senator BROWN. What's the cost per Tomahawk?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I'll find out and get back to you. I want to say \$1.5 million.

Senator BROWN. That's my understanding as well. And how many did we drop?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. 200.

Senator BROWN. That's some real numbers. I'm concerned, obviously, about when we get into these conflicts. Here we are, we're wrestling with cutting billions and we're dropping billions on the other hand. Like I said, who's next, what's next? I'm a little concerned as to where we're going from here, but I'll deal with that in other measures.

But I do appreciate you coming. I always find these very helpful to understand the whole picture better. Thank you.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Brown.

Senator Manchin.

Senator MANCHIN. Admiral, General, thank you so much, first of all, for being here and thank you for your service. I can tell you, I've met the finest that America has to offer and they're right in the Department of Defense and the services and all of our military.

With that being said, do you plan—and Admiral, either one can answer, probably yourself—plan to be asking for an appropriation, supplemental appropriations from DOD, from Congress here to support the Libyan operations moneywise?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, those—a decision like that would come from the Secretary of Defense or elsewhere in the administration. But that would not be something a combatant commander would precipitate.

Senator MANCHIN. Total cost has been quite high, as far as I know that Senator Brown just mentioned it, and we're all concerned about that, because we're going to be making some difficult decisions here, right here in America, and the cost that we're spending elsewhere is real concerning. I think the first week was approximately \$600 million-plus?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, again I'm probably not the right person to give you a set of numbers. But I think it's fair to say that the operation will be in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars. I think that's a fair estimate. But I'm not the right person to ask. I can certainly convey that to the Department and get you the right number.

Senator MANCHIN. Do you have an estimation on timetable, how long you think we'll be there?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I think it's very difficult to ascertain that.

Senator MANCHIN. Okay. Do you think the coalition—do you believe that any part of the coalition expects to put ground troops in Libya, or are there ground troops in Libya now?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, there are no ground troops in Libya now to my knowledge, and—

Senator MANCHIN. By any of the coalition or NATO?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Not to my knowledge. And I have heard no discussion of doing so at this point.

Senator MANCHIN. So you don't know of any of the coalition that's planning on having ground—we've said that we will not, as Americans, we will not put American troops on the ground in Libya.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Right.

Senator MANCHIN. Is that still correct?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is correct, and it is also correct that in the conversations around NATO over the last number of weeks as this was debated there was no discussion of the insertion of ground troops by any other partner.

Senator MANCHIN. To both of you, if you would—and General, maybe you can start this one off—why do you believe that the image of the United States is so poor in the Middle East? With all that we try to do and all the good that we try to do, why has the image of our country been so poorly received and is at all-time lows as I'm understanding?

General KEHLER. Sir, I can't really speculate on why that is.

Senator MANCHIN. Well, you've seen the polls. You know what's going on, right?

General KEHLER. Well, I've certainly seen the press reporting that asserts that.

Senator MANCHIN. Okay.

General KEHLER. It's very difficult for me, not having responsibility for that region, to be looking at that information every day and having my own opinion on why that might be.

Senator MANCHIN. But we have everybody's opinion that comes and you hear all the different—everybody has a little different take on this. But the bottom line is, as I've always said, when you're an unwelcome visitor, you usually leave. We don't seem to be a welcome visitor or a welcome neighbor, if you will, to the Arab League, even though they might want us for certain areas. But we don't seem to have the support of the people.

And I can't figure that out. We're here trying to liberate. The greatest country in the world is the United States of America. We're the most generous country. But for some reason, in the Middle East that doesn't transcend. I don't know if it's something that we're doing wrong from a military end of it or from our policy end.

Do you have any comment on that whatsoever, what we could do to improve our image?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would say, as to why the United States is challenged in parts of the Middle East, has to do with our overall operations in Iraq, in Afghanistan, which by and large have not

been popular in that part of the world, both Muslim countries; our relationship with Israel, which is at odds with many of these Muslim states; and in fact—it's important, however, to make the point that we do enjoy positive relations with many of the Arab nations, certainly at the military to military level.

If I could, I'll give you two concrete examples of that. Both stem from my experience in NATO. One is the NATO engagement with what's called the Mediterranean Dialogue, which has as its partners Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, as well as Israel. So it's possible by working diligently and finding zones of cooperation to improve these sort of relationships.

The other place I would mention from a NATO perspective and also an area in which the United States has good relations with Muslim countries would be in the Gulf, where the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative of NATO counts among its members essentially all of the Gulf states there. Of course, in the coalition that we're undertaking today, Senator, we enjoy the support of the UAE and Qatar, both of whom are flying actual missions as part of this.

So I think your point is well taken, that we need to work on this. But all is not lost. I'd close by saying we enjoy a very positive relationship with a very prominent Muslim nation and that is Turkey, who is a member of NATO, is involved in this coalition with us, is in Afghanistan with us. So it's very possible to have very positive relations with—

Senator MANCHIN. But our relations are pretty poor, right? I mean, as far as the image of the United States being in the Middle East from the citizens of the Middle East?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that's a fair statement, yes, sir.

Senator MANCHIN. Let me ask another question I have. You were talking about the rules of engagement, which I took to understand that basically we're able to engage whenever we think there is any threat or harm to American troops or American mission. So you feel free to do the rules—the rules of engagement apply in Libya?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir, they will along those lines, as well as rules of engagement that permit everything from stopping ships that we think are bringing weapons in to stopping Qadhafi's forces if they are attacking the population or demonstrating the intent to.

Senator MANCHIN. What about the rules of engagement in the Afghanistan war, in the Pakistan mountains, where the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda that we know of? You don't have the same green light on the rules of engagement there as you do in Libya?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The rules of engagement in Pakistan are fundamentally different, yes, sir, from the rules of engagement that are in place in the Libyan campaign.

Senator MANCHIN. So when we know that there's being harm orchestrated, being directed, we can't do a thing about it?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think General Petraeus addressed this when he was here last week, and I think he would tell you that he's in constant dialogue with his counterparts across the Pakistani border, notably General Kayani of Pakistan, to try and work on these cross-border issues.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you. If you could—I know that Chairman Levin has been getting some information on that, and if we could just be kept up on the cost on a weekly basis, on the cost of

what we're incurring as far as the United States military, would that be a fair question?

Chairman LEVIN. It's a fair question and we can ask that directly of the Defense Department if you'd prefer.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. That would probably be the best—that's going to be the best source, rather than feeding it through me, sir.

Senator MANCHIN. Chairman, if you will do that I'd appreciate it very much, and if we can keep the committee updated on what the cost to the American people for that support would be.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Manchin has made a really good effort to ascertain these costs. I've tried the best I could to get some information, but it's kind of slow in coming, and he's right in asking for it. We will ask the right people in the Defense Department to promptly give us a cost estimate as up to date and then a week by week estimate as well. Thank you for pressing that, Senator Manchin.

Senator Ayotte is next.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral and General, for your service to our country. Again, pass on our gratitude to the troops that serve underneath you for the important work and the sacrifices that they're making for us.

I notice you described, Admiral, somewhat the mission in Libya. How do we define success in Libya?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think the mission that I am given and under which I am operating at the moment, the military mission, has some clear metrics associated with it. Let's take the arms embargo, for example. It would be zero penetration of Libya with arms coming to resupply Colonel Qadhafi, for example.

In terms of protecting the population, I think our metric would be is the population safe, are the civilians under attack. So what we would want to over time establish is a situation which we would call in the NATO context a safe and secure environment for the population.

In terms of the no-fly zone, the metric's obvious. It's no flying by any of the—any of the military aircraft or any other aircraft without authorization from NATO.

In terms of the humanitarian mission we've been assigned, it's numbers of refugees, are they receiving the care, and so on.

So I think that's the military mission we've been given, and we have some reasonable metrics that will apply as we go forward to make sure that we meet those for policymakers.

Senator AYOTTE. I certainly understand and appreciate those metrics. I guess my question is getting at overall what's our objective? How do we measure successes in Libya? Meaning, if we've got Qadhafi in power and he decides to wait us out, one of the concerns I have is what's our strategy if that's the outcome?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that if you look at what's happening today again in London, where 40 nations are coming together to discuss this, I think virtually every nation's leader has spoken to the desirability of the departure of Colonel Qadhafi. So how the international community arrives at that I believe will be a combination of the kind of work that's being done in a military context

by and under the auspices of the UN Security Council resolution and NATO, coupled with the economic sanctions, the financial control of assets, of Libyan goods that are outside the travel restrictions.

By putting that cumulative pressure on the regime in Libya, I think you have the best chance of achieving what the heads of state have indicated they desire.

Senator AYOTTE. And don't you think it will be also difficult without some type of military involvement to get a man like Qadhafi to go?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it's hard to say. When you look historically at different leaders, sometimes they stay and they fight and they die, and sometimes they crack and they give up and they leave the country. There's a wide spectrum of what could happen going forward.

I think it is clear that the international community, as indicated by the statements of the leaders of so many different countries, have indicated that it's time for Colonel Qadhafi to leave.

Senator AYOTTE. I'd like to follow up on a question that Senator Inhofe asked you about, and that's the relationship or whatever information we may have, the relationship between Al-Qaeda and the rebels in Libya. There was open source reporting earlier this week that Al-Qaeda affiliates in North Africa may have stolen surface-to-air missiles from an arsenal in Libya recently. Can you tell us about that incident, and also what does that say, if anything, about the relationship between the rebels and Al-Qaeda affiliates?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think I'd like to take that question for the record and come back to you, so I can give it the full benefit of a classified response. I think that would probably be the appropriate way to tackle that one.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. I appreciate that, and appreciate that some of that information might need to be classified. But I think it's a very important question for us to understand in this committee.

I'd also like to ask you about, overall with your command, the command of the European forces, to be a member of NATO we've asked each member of NATO to commit at least 2 percent of their GDP toward military spending.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Right.

Senator AYOTTE. Yet not all members of NATO are committing 2 percent of their GDP to military spending.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. That's correct.

Senator AYOTTE. In fact, what we're seeing is even our strongest allies, for example the United Kingdom and France, are having—dealing with the same budget pressures that we're dealing here with in the United States. How do you impact—how do you believe that that's going to impact NATO? And also, given the fact that we're relying substantially on NATO for our involvement in Libya right now, with people withdrawing from their commitment in terms of percentage that they're willing to spend on military spending, how do you think that that will impact our readiness, A, going forward, and B, in particular this conflict in Libya?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Let me kind of give you the good news and the bad news. The good news about NATO is that it's a resource-

rich alliance. The GDP of NATO is about \$32 trillion. It's about twice the GDP of the United States. And the GDP of NATO is about half that of the world's GDP. So the good news is there are resources there to meet these commitments, in my belief.

The bad news is, Senator, what you just pointed out, that our allies in many cases are not committing even the minimum 2 percent. I find that—I am concerned about that as I look at the future of the alliance, where some members are meeting that commitment and others are failing to do so. I think it is incumbent upon particularly nations like ours, that are very much meeting the commitment and our leaders, to continue to make this point. And I thank you for asking me about it. It's something I talk to all of the uniformed military members about constantly. It is very concerning.

In terms of willing it get better, I think we all hope that as we emerge from this series of global economic concerns that there will be a rise in the economy and there will be more breathing space. But in the immediate future I agree with you; I think it's extremely concerning and we should continue to talk and to encourage and to pressure our allies to meet those kind of spending commitments.

Senator AYOTTE. Well, I certainly share your concerns, particularly given the conflicts that we are leading throughout the world, that that commitment has to be the commitment that we're making. So I certainly will be an advocate for that with our allies.

I see that my time is up. I just wanted to also reiterate to both of you, I think it's very important, to follow up on the chairman's comments and Senator Manchin's comments, that this committee get very good information on the cost of the conflict in Libya and regular updates, given the fiscal challenges that we're facing right now in this country. I think also, particularly none of us wants to see this diminish our efforts in Afghanistan.

So I appreciate both of your service, distinguished service to our country, and thank you very much for answering my questions today.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.

Senator Blumenthal.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for your extraordinary service to our Nation. Again, I join my colleagues in thanking the very courageous and dedicated men and women who work under you in defending our Nation and its national interests.

I would like to ask a question about the health of the men and women who come to you after serving in conflicts or directly under your command, conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly as to traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress, whether you consider the ongoing efforts sufficient to address their needs, their health needs, in those areas?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I'll start, Bob. I am particularly concerned about traumatic brain injury, and because my duties with NATO bring me often to Afghanistan and also because in my European Command region I have Landstuhl Medical Facility, one of our largest military hospitals, I have a fair amount of opportunity to see all of this.

I think TBI, traumatic brain injury, in particular is something that needs more focus. I believe that we have yet to really understand the extent of the challenge we have ahead of us because of the concussive effect that many of our young men and women are undergoing. So it's an area that I am focused on. My wife has focused on this as well in terms of family and family support. It can be difficult to diagnose, as you appreciate, and we are all working very hard on the challenge. But I think it's worth highlighting TBI in particular from my experiences.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. General?

General KEHLER. Senator, I would add to that, although there aren't that many STRATCOM people forward deployed, we have a fair number of combat veterans, of course, that have returned to STRATCOM. If I may, just let me back up 60 days to when I was commanding a service component where we were deploying a fair number of people forward all the time. I share Admiral Stavridis's concern about TBI.

But I also am still concerned about PTSD, the post-traumatic stress syndrome. I am—we have not yet cracked the nut here that relates PTSD and other experiences—and oh, by the way, it's not just as a result of combat, but stressors that are occurring elsewhere—and the suicide rates that we are seeing, which are still far too high. As a commander, I am greatly frustrated that all of the things that we are trying, all the things that the services are trying, still do not seem to have turned the corner for us in addressing what is far too high a suicide rate.

So I remain concerned about that. I believe that the physical care that our wounded warriors received is superb. In the visits that I've made to our hospitals and the visits that my wife makes to the hospitals in her work to do things like help sew adaptive clothing for those who have been wounded and all of the efforts that go on there, I am encouraged by what I see and I believe that our people from battlefield to Landstuhl to the air medevac that occurs in all of that, I think they get magnificent care.

But we haven't gotten yet to the bottom of why our suicide rates are way too high, and there is some relationship here, but it is not a sole relationship with combat or the unique stresses of combat. There are other stressors in our people that are showing themselves. So we are spending a lot of time and energy trying to work on that. I know all the service chiefs are working on that. I know that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman and others are all equally concerned. We have more to do, I think, to take care of our people in that regard.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I want to commend both of you for your very eloquent remarks on this issue, and particularly on the suicide issue, because I know that you and your colleagues are doing more than ever and the quality of care has improved in ways that might have been unimaginable just a few years ago. And yet in these areas of TBI and post-traumatic stress and suicide, we still have a lot of work to do.

I would just say, I know this sentiment is shared by many of my colleagues that anything we can do to help you we would very much like to do.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If I could just add one thought, in a sense I suppose it's a positive one. We've come a long way since Vietnam in this regard. You look back at the literature post-Vietnam—a book about this is “Achilles in Vietnam,” which is a study, early study of PTSD and its effects. We have learned an awful lot. We are still, I think, in the discovery phase, and that's an area we need to continue to learn more about.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.

In the brief time that I have left, I'd like to ask you regarding the bilateral security cooperation that you lead with Israel as a cornerstone of our larger strategic relationship in ways that are both large and small, how the Phased Adaptive Approach concerning missile defense will be executed with regard to Israel's security and Israel's contribution to protecting Europe?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, we enjoy, as you know, an extremely robust broad-spectrum relationship with Israel. But I would say our particular work in missile defense is quite strong. We have a whole series of exercises that we do. I had the chance to go a little over a year ago and see one of the major deployments of this nascent Phased Adaptive Approach set up in and around Israel. We keep ships that are engaged in that network.

I'm very confident that that's an area where we have learned a lot and that we are then going to be able to apply that in the European Phased Adaptive Approach and knit all of that together, that knowledge that we shift from our work with Israel to our work with Europe.

General Kehler may want to comment from his background. He's also very deep into missile defense.

General KEHLER. Sir, I would just echo this. The relationship with Israel actually goes beyond the operational relationship. There's a technical relationship there on missile defense as well. I think that the Director of the Missile Defense Agency would tell you that he has a very strong relationship there. We find, I think, as Jim Stavridis just said, that there will be—there are many positive lessons that have been learned from our relationship with Israel that can be applied elsewhere as we look at the Phased Adaptive Approach, both in Europe and elsewhere.

I think an important recognition that you are making here, without saying it directly, is the importance that we see to being able to counter the large proliferation of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles that are now appearing in our theaters around the world and that pose a threat to our forward-deployed troops and our allies.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you for articulating that recognition on my part better than I could have done, and thank you for your testimony here today, which has been very useful and important. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.

Senator COLLINS.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, you mentioned how important it is to define roles and responsibilities when it comes to cyber security. I certainly agree with that statement. I want to make sure that you're aware that Senator Lieberman and I have been working on this issue for the

past 2 years in the Homeland Security Committee. The fact is that in our country 85 percent of the critical infrastructure that is at risk is in the private sector, and it is the Department of Homeland Security that has the lead in establishing that relationship.

We are working, as the chairman mentioned, in a bipartisan way to try to develop a bill. We need to do so because there are an astonishing 1.8 billion attempted attacks on government computers each month. I'm not sure people realize that the volume has just escalated.

So as you prepare your report for this committee and your comments and advice, I want to make sure that you're more fully aware of what is going on with our Homeland Security Committee, and we will get you information about our bill to better inform your comments.

General KEHLER. Senator, thank you. I am aware of all the hard work that's been going on there and I would appreciate whatever information we can get from that.

I would add one other point, if I may. To me anyway, the interesting question for us—over the whole time that we've had a U.S. military, we have carved out the appropriate relationship between the military and civil activities. That's what needs to get carved out here, is that appropriate relationship. I think what has driven us in an interesting direction here is the speed with which this is all emerging.

So the work that you have been doing in the Homeland Security Committee and I think the MOA that was established between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security is a very, very good start. So thank you for that offer.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you for that clarification. My concern was your earlier comments could have been interpreted as saying that the Department of Defense should take over all responsibility in this area. That would be, I think you would agree, a mistake. It would raise all sorts of civil liberties issues. I don't think that's what you were intending to convey in response to Senator McCain's question.

General KEHLER. Certainly not, and thank you for pointing that out.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Admiral, I'm going to turn to some of the questions about Libya while we do have you here. Again, I do want to thank both of you for your service as well. You stated in response to a question from our chairman that it was important to have a United Nations resolution and an international coalition. Don't you think that it also would have been helpful to have a Congressional resolution that specifically authorized the military strike against Libya, given that there was no national emergency on our part?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would defer that question to the Executive Branch, as in the President or the Secretary of Defense. When I commented that it was good to have a United Nations Security Council resolution, I'm talking about the military clarity that that provides in terms of what the mission I'm supposed to do as a military officer is all about.

Senator COLLINS. That's certainly a fair response and the one that I thought that you would give, and understandably would

give. But since you did answer the chairman's question about the desirability of the UN resolution, I did think it was fair to ask you that.

Let me turn to another issue. Secretary Gates stated that the action by the UN Security Council with respect to Libya originated with the unanimous resolution of the Arab League and also the action taken by the Gulf Cooperation Council. Now, I know that Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are now participating in the coalition and providing some aircraft. But the fact is that there are many Arab nations in the neighborhood with significant air assets that to date do not seem to be participating.

From 2001 to 2008, we provided \$10 billion in foreign military sales to Egypt, another \$10 billion to the Saudis, not to mention \$2.6 billion to Turkey, \$2.4 billion to Kuwait. The Saudis have more than 200 F-15 fighters. Egypt operates more F-16s than all but three countries in the world.

I'm very concerned about the lack of Arab state participation in enforcing the no-fly zone. In fact, I believe they should have taken the lead. I realize that only the United States and a few of our allies have the capabilities to provide intelligence, coordination, and logistics. What is the reason that we're not seeing more of a contribution from Arab states in the region, particularly those that do have significant air assets?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I'm not sure I'm qualified to walk you through nation by nation in terms of why an individual nation would decide to either participate fully with air strikes or to fly in the no-fly zone or to simply support the resolution in the Arab political body. I can certainly go back to General Mattis, who is the combatant commander for that region, who I think could really walk you through every one of them. And I think it's a legitimate question.

What I can say, Senator, is from a NATO perspective, which is where I touch this issue, we will continue to aggressively pursue participation by the Arab states in all aspects of what we are doing. As I mentioned earlier in response to another question, we have two mechanisms for doing that in NATO, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative. Those are both bodies in which we can continue to move these requests forward and from certainly a military to military level put pressure on them to fully participate in this.

So I think it's a good question. I will go back and have the Department come back with a nation by nation breakdown to help understand it, and from a NATO perspective we'll continue to push forward to get as much support as we possibly can from the other Arab states.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins.

Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, gentlemen. Let me turn to Libya. Let me make an initial comment. I support the actions of the President and this administration. I think for us to have stood by while Qadhafi moved on the towns and cities of the western part of Libya would

have been unconscionable. I think we wouldn't—it would have been indefensible.

Having said that, I've also made it clear I'm going to continue to ask as many questions as come to mind. Admiral, if I might, as you know, the rebel forces have been more or less welcomed by the civilian populations in the east. But if the rebels are able to close in on cities that are generally more supportive of the Qadhafi regime, how will NATO protect civilians caught in a potential crossfire?

Then that question can become even more intriguing and important if you frame it this way. If rebel forces fire on civilian targets or military targets that place civilians in harm's way, how are we going to protect those innocent people? Would we fire on the rebel forces, for example?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, from all that I've seen, at the current stage of this conflict we are working very hard to protect all of the civilian population. And in doing that, we are setting up air zones. This is where the no-fly zone is actually more than simply a no-fly zone. It is a protective zone that allows us to use our air assets to interdict a situation in which civilians are coming under attack.

In terms of whether or not we would parse through civilians versus rebels versus opposition leaders versus Qadhafi forces, we would have to rely on our intelligence, particularly our signals intelligence, to have a sense of what's occurring on the ground, and then make conditions-based decisions at that time.

Senator UDALL. It is difficult, though, Admiral—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It is difficult.

Senator UDALL.—as you present the various scenarios.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Senator UDALL. Particularly when you move into more densely populated areas.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Indeed.

Senator UDALL. And how do our aircraft prevent civilian casualties and other damage.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it'll be extremely challenging. We are aided by a sense that I think is manifest in much of the country, which is against Qadhafi. I think that as more and more pressure is applied, as we continue to apply both economic sanctions, financial freezing, we squeeze the economy, I believe that his support base will shrink and the tribal aspects of Libya will come to play in a way that will hopefully achieve the policy indication of a departure of Qadhafi.

But I agree, it's going to be complicated and conditions-based as we move through.

Senator UDALL. Ideally, the use of military force here is designed to create political space so that the Qadhafi regime falls, either of its own accord and its own decisionmaking or through outside forces, particularly brought to bear by the rebel forces.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Senator UDALL. I think that's the end game, using military force to drive political ends. And I see you agreeing and in acknowledgment.

If I could, I'll turn to an entirely different subject, to General Kehler. I know you talked about ITAR. Since I came to the Congress in 1999, we've been talking about ITAR and the way in which

it restricts our private sector. Increasingly, I think you could make the argument that it actually does the opposite of enhancing our National security, because we are not developing the kind of capabilities that we might.

Could you speak to that assessment and then, more specifically, how have our export controls under ITAR affected our military space acquisitions and development? Then I think most importantly, are these export controls slowing the development of critical space-based assets that support our warfighters?

In other words, I guess I'm saying that this policy is contradictory to other policies that we have in place, although well-intentioned when it was first put into place.

General KEHLER. Senator, I think your concerns are well founded. From my current seat as the commander of STRATCOM, here's where this impacts us most. That is, just as you suggest, if in fact our industrial base cannot provide the kinds of capabilities that we need, then we need to go back and take a hard look at why that is. What impact that has on us as a military operational force, of course, depends on what it is that has been delayed.

But there is at least one thread that runs back through our industrial base. It isn't the only thread, but there's at least one thread that runs back there, that says that export controls, while well intentioned, while some need to be there to preserve the best of our National security technologies and capabilities, that there is a danger here that export controls, if not reviewed and refined, can in fact create the opposite kind of a situation here, where our industry is no longer competitive, therefore our industry is declining, therefore their ability to provide for us is also declining.

The President's new national space policy that was signed last summer and the recently approved national security space strategy both point this point, and they both essentially say it's time for us to go back and take another look at ITAR. I support that. I think it's time for us to do that kind of a look. There needs to be a careful balance struck here between preserving and protecting our highest, most important national security technologies, especially where they relate to space and where they relate to cyberspace, although that's not directly touched in quite the same way.

But I think it's time for that sort of a review and I would encourage that.

Senator UDALL. With well-intentioned efforts, you can build walls so that those outside the walls can't see in or get in, but the same situation then applies to those who are inside the walls. It's harder to get out and it's harder to see over the top of those walls.

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. And there are many, many, many, many instances, certainly in my last job, where I had some responsibility for acquisition, where industry would come to us and say: The reason we are having trouble is because of ITAR. Again, I wouldn't—it's not a blanket indictment of ITAR, nor is it a blanket indictment of the intent behind ITAR. I do think, though, execution needs a harder review and that needs to occur soon.

Senator UDALL. And I also think there is joint jurisdiction here, some question about jurisdiction between State and the DOD and the committees that are involved, which I know the chairman's en-

gaged in. I think this is the time to push this in ways that perhaps we haven't.

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. No question about it, this is a shared responsibility and the Department of State does have a significant role here in all of this.

Senator UDALL. Thank you again. Thank you, gentlemen.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator SESSIONS.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank both of you for your service to the country, and we appreciate your leadership. I've gotten to know both of you and have great personal affection and admiration for you.

I do think that Senator McCain and Senator John Kerry were correct when they called early on for a no-fly zone in Libya, at a time when momentum was with us and we were making—they had a chance to be decisive, I think, in the outcome of the effort. As a result of the delays that have occurred, we now have a more difficult position and difficult situation.

Senator McCain, to his credit, is a patriot. He's not criticizing the President. His view simply is that if this is the right thing let's do it and we'll support the President in his action.

Admiral Stavridis, you mentioned that it is important to secure the UN and NATO resolutions before action. You noted that the entire international community is against him. But Congress has not voted, as Senator Collins—we got approval from a lot of different places, but we don't have one from Congress.

General Kehler, a no-fly zone it seems to me normally means that you use usually our Air Force to ensure that an enemy's air force is not able to attack forces that we think ought not to be attacked. It normally does not cover, it seems to me, the attacking by our air of the enemy forces on the ground on one side of a conflict. Would you comment on that briefly?

General KEHLER. Sir, again from my role in STRATCOM I think that's a difficult point for me to comment on. I've heard the operation described as a no-fly zone, but I think actually there's some additional language that goes with that that characterizes the operation in the way that it's being conducted.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, additional language comes from the United Nations, apparently, which is nice to have. But I would ask you, Admiral Stavridis, what if China had vetoed that resolution? What if Turkey or some other country in the NATO family objected? What if the Arab League had some objections to this? Would the United States then stand by and allow a slaughter to occur?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that's a decision that would squarely rest with the President in terms of making an Executive Branch decision and then in terms of—my point in saying that the United Nations Security Council resolution was a good thing to have is that it simply broadens the mandate. From a military officer's perspective, the UN Security Council resolution, sir, lays out those military tasks very clearly. So in that way I think it was helpful.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think that is interesting, that you seem to be taking as your command the United Nations and the rules of engagement they have authorized, and we don't have any

United States rules of engagement that I've understood with clarity, certainly not from Congress. It's not your fault. I'm just saying I think that the extent to which Congress has been bypassed in this process is rather breathtaking.

And the idea that—I hope there's no suggestion that we're establishing a precedent by which the United States won't act unless multiple international bodies approve that action, because I remember the famous Patton quote, "A good plan violently executed today is better than a perfect plan tomorrow." Sometimes that means a lot of lives at stake. Proper, prompt, aggressive action can be decisive in military conflicts, isn't that true, Admiral Stavridis? And delay can be fatal to the success of an operation?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. That is true, and we see examples of that in history.

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, you know, we love our European allies and I understand you've proposed and suggested we might delay the withdrawal of some of our brigades from Europe. We have I believe four now and the plan is to come down to two. Our German friends are some of the best economic and political partners we have in the world. However, tell the American people why we have to have 40,000 troops in Europe if they're cutting their budgets far more substantially than we're cutting ours?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Just to walk through this, we currently have four brigade combat teams in Europe as part of about 35,000 soldiers that are there. It bumps up to 40,000 at times. There was a decision made several years ago to cut back to two, and then—

Senator SESSIONS. I was part of a CODEL that traveled to Europe to examine the bases that would be enduring. It was during a time we were closing U.S. bases under the BRAC policy.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. So subsequently, in the course of the Quadrennial Defense Review the Department decided to take one more look at that decision as to whether we wanted to cut all the way back to two or reduce some other level of that. That analysis has been going on for about 6 to 8 months and is now reaching final decision. So I don't think that has—in fact, I know that has not been announced as yet.

But I believe that your fundamental question is why do we have troops in Europe at this stage, given that they have the resources to defend themselves and so forth. I would say there are still legitimate reasons for a reasonable number of U.S. troops in Europe. As we talked about earlier, we're down from 400,000 in Europe down to—we've come down 75 percent already since the end of the Cold War.

I think the reason for them is partly what you're seeing right now. It's the use of these bases in Europe as forward areas from which we can operate in Afghanistan and Iraq and Libya as we are today. It's also deterrence. It's also reassurance, and it's training and working with these allies. I would argue, sir, that—

Senator SESSIONS. Well, you—I believe in your statement you say it's a demonstration of United States commitment. If Europe isn't committed to defending itself, does it need to have us to defend them? We've got Europeans that pretend to help us in Afghanistan, but who won't allow their soldiers to fire their weapons.

The GAO has reported that it costs \$17 billion for the DOD installations in Europe and they estimated \$24 billion through 2015 to operate and maintain our bases there. Is NATO so frail that we've got to have another \$1.8 billion construction project to maintain perhaps more troops than the plan has called for?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, Senator, again we're looking very hard at making every reasonable reduction in those numbers of troops. But I would argue, let's take Afghanistan as an example. We have 45,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan with us. We've lost, very tragically, 1400 of our young men and women killed in action. Our allies have lost 900 killed in action. On a proportional basis, that's actually higher than our own losses.

So they're in it. They're in the fight in Afghanistan. I would argue that part of the reason they are there with us in Afghanistan and they're with us in Libya is because of those enduring commitments, fully taking your point that we ought to look at every reasonable way to reduce it to a minimum in order to give our U.S. taxpayers the best bang for the buck.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I know you're familiar with Japan and our fleet that's there and how much Japan supports it.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. They pay about 40 percent of the cost of our military bases in Japan. I believe the Europeans have gotten far too comfortable under the American umbrella. They're reducing their budget substantially across the board. We're trying to hold ours at a minimum reduction, maybe without reduction, and they want us to keep more and more troops there. I think that's a situation that cannot continue, and both of you need to know that when our government spends \$3.7 trillion and takes in \$2.2 trillion that we are on an unsustainable path, as the Federal Reserve Chairman has told us. Money is going to be tight in the defense budget and these are some areas, it seems to me, that real savings can accrue without weakening our ability to defend America.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator NELSON. Yes, Senator Nelson. I'm sorry.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral and General, for your service, and all those who serve with you. We appreciate so much the commitment to the defense of our country.

General Kehler, in your written testimony you discuss the need to build a new U.S. strategic command and control complex and you note that reliable and assured command, control, and communication from the President to the nuclear forces are fundamental to our strategic deterrent. This requires resolving some gaps in our capabilities, gaps that need to be addressed and will be addressed by the planned new strategic command and control complex and the nuclear command, control, and communications, C3, node at Offutt Air Force Base.

To the extent that you can expand on the C3 plans and the requirements and how the new strategic command and control complex will meet national security. would you please try to explain so that we can understand? It's more than a building; it's a housing structure for a command. Please outline that?

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. Strategic Command as a location fulfills a unique role in the overall national nuclear command and control system. It is a unique node, if you will, on a network of nuclear command and control, but it is a unique node, a fact that we came to discover with great clarity when we had an eight-inch water main break in that building back in December and seriously impacted our ability to get the job done.

Therefore, as we look at retaining the appropriate nuclear command and control capabilities, those things that are at Strategic Command right now that are encompassed inside that physical plant, the headquarters building itself—we're talking about unique planning tools, we're talking about unique operational command and control activities, and we're certainly talking about unique fusion capability there to begin to pull the pieces of not only our nuclear command and control, but space and cyber space and other pieces, together as well.

So as we went forward to look at how we need to address the vulnerabilities that we have there, the physical vulnerabilities, from what is now an antiquated physical plant, a plant that was never designed to do what we are asking the command to do today—in fact, when that physical plant was built, the command had one mission and that was nuclear deterrence. Today that is one of many missions that Strategic Command has.

So as we looked at this, the physical plant is not going to be capable of keeping up. Therefore, the analysis that was done prior to my arrival leads us to believe that the best course of action is to create an updated command and control node with the appropriate planning tools and other things and to surround that essentially with a new building. That's the pathway that we are on.

When we look at building a new building, I think that that's not an adequate way to describe this, because a new building is one thing. What we are actually creating here, though, is a command and control node, a nuclear command and control node, a planning center that has unique capabilities for global planning requirements, that has to be housed in a facility that can support that. So those two things together is what we are asking the Congress to support.

Senator NELSON. Thank you.

Admiral, at the onset of the operations in Libya the President noted the U.S. unique capabilities to establish a no-fly zone, in other words the Tomahawk missiles, and the U.S. employed those unique capabilities in support of the UN resolution and with the partnership of NATO. I understand that the committee, our committee, has asked and is working to get a cost to date for the mission in Libya, along with weekly cost reports, and I appreciate this as I believe it's needed, because there are really two questions that go beyond what the role of the mission is. That is the cost and how long.

I've had a number of people ask me if there is any kind of an exit strategy, although those same people didn't necessarily ask that question about Iraq or Afghanistan. They are asking it right now. Could you give us some indication of what we're looking at in terms of costs to date, just on the basis of maybe ballparking it?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Again, Senator, as I mentioned to a couple of your colleagues, I'm really not the right person to ask. But I will say that the operation as it runs over months will be in the hundreds of millions of dollars, I would say.

Senator NELSON. Hundreds of—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Hundreds of millions of dollars, yes. But again, I've pledged to Chairman Levin to take back the message to the Department that you're looking for a cost to date and weekly updates, and I believe that will be registered loud and clear back at the Department and I understand that.

In terms of an exit strategy, I think events at this point are so fluid. I mean, we're five weeks into this thing. The first set of protests began on the 15th of February. The UN Security Council resolution was 30 days later, 17th of March. NATO has taken over the mission. I mean, everything has moved extremely rapidly.

So as I look out the spectrum of how this could unfold, I think it's frankly premature to say what's our exit strategy until we have at least a little more clarity moving forward.

Senator NELSON. With respect to NATO, do you have information that would indicate what percentage of the total costs or the total budget of NATO is borne by the United States Government, as a percentage?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I will find out the answer to that. I think that the NATO budgeting structure, unlike the United Nations, which is balanced and in some ways bigger nations pay more, I think the NATO common funding pool is exactly that, a common funded pool. And I don't think the United States pays a disproportionate share of NATO costs.

Now, when you get into operations that NATO is doing or any operational setting, the NATO approach is costs lie where they fall, which means that the Nation that is bringing a force to the fight is the one that pays for that force. So in that sense, taking Afghanistan as an example, the United States is about two to one in terms of a ratio, so it would be bearing roughly twice the cost, for example. But those are very rough estimates. I'll refine those and report back to you.

Senator NELSON. That would be fine.

Thank you very much to both of you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, General, welcome. It's good to see you both.

General, if you'll forgive me, I have a number of questions that I need to ask the Admiral. But we appreciate your service. In the limited time we have, I wanted to focus my attention on Admiral Stavridis.

I'm struggling a little bit, Admiral, to understand, sir, what the plan is, now that we've intervened in Libya and then handed things off to NATO, especially given the unrest still extant in Egypt, places like Bahrain. Who knows where this contagion will spread and how it will all end. I think part of this inability to understand what the plan is is because the President—and here again, this is not your fault, but the President did not come to Congress and engage Congress in this discussion about his intentions. So that's why we have a lot of these questions.

But I want to ask you first of all, just sort of to help me understand it as you understand, what the contours are of this new doctrine of intervening for humanitarian purposes and not when our, as Secretary Gates said, our vital interests nor an imminent threat was likely to come from Libya, but we intervened to save civilians, which I understand and any human being with a heart would feel compassion for.

But it strikes me that, for example, there have been civilians killed in Syria in protests against the government. We know Syria is a state sponsor of international terrorism. It is a police state, and that it has facilitated the entry of foreign fighters into Iraq that have killed American troops. We know that Syria is complicit with Iran in the shipment of weapons through Syria to Lebanon that Hezbollah can use to then attack Israel.

So it strikes me that Libya, as bad as Colonel Qadhafi is, he's been in power 42 years. Why Libya and why not Syria? Can you help me understand as you understand it why, why Libya, why not Syria?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. As to why Libya, I think that as we look at the NATO side of this thing—and that's where I'm somewhat qualified to speak on this. In terms of U.S. policy decisions, I think those more fairly rest with, at my level, with General Ham from AFRICOM, Secretary of Defense Gates, and so forth.

But I can tell you from a NATO perspective, as the NATO organization looked at the imminent possibility of a massive slaughter in Benghazi, I think that catalyzed NATO. It was the size of it, it was the ability that NATO had because of the geography of Libya being so close to Italy, and it was looking at the potential outcomes from that event from a European perspective of potential mass migrations. Destabilization into Egypt was a significant concern in the halls of NATO.

So think it was, Senator, a combination of proximity to Europe, the sense of imminent mass disaster, and the capability. Here I would draw a historical parallel going back to the conflict at Bosnia, which you may remember in the 1990s there was an event at a place called Srebrenica, you may remember, where 8,000 men and boys were executed essentially in a day or 2. It was as a result of that—that kind of catalyzed NATO at that time, and I think it's probably fair to say the memory of that and the fact that Benghazi looked as though it was going to fall and potentially have a similar scenario, based on the statements of Qadhafi and his son.

So I think all of that came together.

Senator CORNYN. Fair enough. I think our experience in the Middle East, thought, has been when America intervenes that—I guess, I think it was General Powell who coined the “Pottery Barn Rule”: If you break it, you own it. We've seen our intervention in Iraq and in Afghanistan not go exactly as we might have planned, to say the very least, which causes me concerns about what the future is going to mean in Libya under a NATO command.

Just so we can understand this, I believe that the question that Senator Nelson was asking, my understanding is you're correct in terms of the financial contribution the U.S. makes to NATO. But right now, out of the 132,000 troops that are in Afghanistan, about

90,000 of those are U.S. troops, but they fall under NATO command, correct?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. Just to sharpen the numbers slightly, 98,000 U.S. troops and 45,000 non-U.S. troops, so about two to one would be the ratio there.

Senator CORNYN. I thank you for that. In your view, are NATO adequately resourced in terms of personnel and financial resources?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. In terms of—

Senator CORNYN. In Afghanistan?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. In Afghanistan, yes, sir. And in fact, another set of numbers that are worth knowing, and I mentioned them to one of your colleagues, of killed in action, there have been, sadly, over 1400 U.S. So two to one, you would expect about 700 of the allies. In fact, 900 allies have fallen. So they are in this fight with us and are taking losses and are, I believe, making a significant contribution.

Senator CORNYN. Admiral, my staff has handed to me an article that quotes General Caldwell, who is commander of NATO's training commission, as you know, who said that NATO still faces a shortage of 740 trainers needed to train Afghan soldiers and policemen. But assuming, assuming that NATO is able to handle its commitment in Afghanistan, could you explain? If in fact NATO does decide to deploy stabilization forces—that means boots on the ground—in Libya, that would include U.S. troops under NATO command, wouldn't it?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If NATO decided to deploy troops, whether or not the United States decided to participate with troops would be a national decision for the United States. Let me turn it around. In terms of the no-fly zone that we're enforcing right now, Senator, Germany, for example, has chosen not to participate in that mission. So it's not required that every nation in NATO participate in every mission. There is a capability to choose among them, and that tends to balance itself out.

For example, the Germans, who are not in the Libyan operation, are contributing 5,000 troops in Afghanistan. They're actually the second largest non-U.S. contributor there.

Senator CORNYN. My time is running out. Let me just conclude with this question. Assuming the humanitarian crisis that you detailed and that the President talked about last night is sufficiently compelling to warrant the intervention of the United States military and now NATO's involvement, can you imagine any set of circumstances where NATO would just simply pull out and allow that humanitarian crisis to continue? Or do you think it's more likely than not that it would see it to some sort of satisfactory conclusion that did not involve a massive loss of innocent civilians' lives?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It's always dangerous to talk about a hypothetical, but I think that, based on the conversations I've seen and heard around NATO as the alliance signed up for the mission, I think NATO will see it through to conclusion. I'll give you a practical example, if I may: Kosovo, 1999. The alliance decided to go in. It went in with air strikes. It then sent in boots on the ground. When I took this job 2 years ago, there were still 15,000 NATO troops in Kosovo. Today that's come down to about 5,000. That's okay. That's indicative of the ongoing level of engagement.

And by the way, of the 5,000 troops, only about 700 of them are U.S. troops.

Senator CORNYN. Do you see—this is my last question. Do you see any scenario under which Qadhafi—the NATO mission would be deemed a success, where Qadhafi would remain in power?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that the international community, speaking through all the leaders, has continued to indicate a desire for Colonel Qadhafi to leave. The NATO mission at the moment is humanitarian, arms embargo, no-fly zone, protect the population. How you square those two I think will be determined in the weeks and the months ahead.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.

Senator Hagan.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to both of you for being here and the great job that you're doing for our country. We really do appreciate it.

One of my concerns has to do with the STEM education in our schools, science, technology, engineering, and math. I know that developing and expanding and sustaining and retaining a steady stream of cyber specialists is critical to our National security. General Kehler, in your prepared statement you indicated that the cyber workforce is growing, but retaining—recruiting adequately trained and equipped cyber warriors is challenging. You also mentioned the importance of partnering with our Nation's educational and commercial information technology entities to spur domestic math and science interests.

This is certainly an area that I'm extremely interested in. I was reading recently where out of 34 nations the U.S. is 14th in reading, 17th in science, and 25th in math. So I think this is a huge concern.

Can you describe some of your efforts in recruiting a steady stream of cyber warriors and how can Congress help you in this regard? And have you and your staff been engaged with universities and high schools that specialize in the STEM education?

General KEHLER. Senator, let me answer the middle question first. We appreciate the fact that the Congress continues to mention STEM and the fact that you all have as part of your general agenda, some of you with specific agenda items. To continue to push that is important for all of us and I think for our overall national security, not just in cyber, but as I look across the board in Strategic Command we're the beneficiary of a great deal of our highest tech weaponry. No question about it, both in the industrial base that produces that for us as well as in the military members that we have to recruit to be part of those operations, STEM is critically important to us across the board.

Let me get to the specifics of cyber. Each of the services have now put together programs to recruit, train, certify, and retain cyber specialists. We have put from Strategic Command a bit of a demand signal on the service components. For example, what they brought to Cyber Command initially was a policing up, if you will, of all the service specialties that already had a hand in the cyber business. What we said to them in the last year or so was: That's not enough; we need to increase the demand signal.

So we are now going through requirements studies, if you will. The first one was completed. We laid on the services a requirement for a thousand more cyber operations people. That was split among the services to about 300 each and the wheels are turning to produce those.

It's now up to us to come back and quantify with a little bit more fidelity what additional cyber capacity we need. We know we need more. The question is how much more and of what skills. So the services are being responsive, I believe, in this regard. All of them have a way to recruit from the beginning. In fact, at least one of them has put in place the requirement all the way into basic military training for basic cyber awareness. Almost like every Marine's a rifleman, every sailor's a firefighter, every service member, certainly every airman—I can speak for a service I just came from—every airman is going to be a cyber defender.

I think that that kind of philosophy is going to be very helpful in the long run. In addition, there are advanced degree programs that have been put in place, both in the Air Force and the steps are being taken in the Navy. So as we retain these people as we go forward, I think there's going to be a great deal of ability for us to try to keep up with the private sector, which, as you know, is where most of the rapid advances occur.

The final thing that I would occur that the services have done that makes me feel good as the user of those capabilities is they're looking very hard at the Reserve components and at the National Guard, because where it makes sense for us to link up the Reserves and the Guard with the civilian community that they are attached to and that they come from is in cyber.

Go to places like Seattle or Silicon Valley or the Carolinas or places where are the hotbeds of cyber high tech activity are; those are ideal places for Reserve units or National Guard units that can do double duty, if you will, keep a foot in that civilian community while bringing those kinds of talents to national security as well.

So I would tell you that I believe that the wheels are turning. I believe that progress has been made. We are looking ourselves at what joint training might look like, what joint certification might look like, how is it that we ask the services to provide complementary capabilities, not competitive capabilities. So far what I've seen out of the services is they're amenable to working with STRATCOM and Cyber Command in all of those ways forward.

I would make one other point. I think the Deputy Secretary of Defense has had a great leadership role in all of this. He has been very vocal in his commitment from the Department's standpoint to want to have the Department correctly positioned to have the capacity that we know we're going to need for the future.

Senator HAGAN. Well, I can see you are very interested in this, too, because I think it's something obviously for our National security and we need to do a much better job. And I know that you're always in competition with the private sector, too. And I'm glad you mentioned North Carolina.

A couple of weeks ago I asked the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michèle Flournoy, how our NATO partners can significantly contribute to growing and training and equipping a sizable and capable Afghan National Security Force. Under Secretary

Flournoy indicated that this is an area for potential reinvestment by our NATO and ISAF partners, particularly as some of our partner forces redeploy or change the nature of their commitment to the mission.

Admiral Stavridis, can you describe your efforts aimed at conveying to our NATO allies the importance of maintaining forces in Afghanistan at appropriate levels and providing additional funding for the Afghan National Security Force Trust Fund? I was recently over in Afghanistan and had an opportunity to visit the training center there and there was a lot of good work going on.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, Senator. I'm very pleased, as I think you were with your visit, with the overall training effort. Lieutenant General Caldwell, who heads that mission, has about 5,000 people on his team. They have at any given moment about 35,000 Afghans in training. They have trained 100,000 Afghans, for example, in literacy, speaking of education, which is really an extraordinary thing. In addition to all the warfighting skills, they're teaching basic reading to many of these young Afghan men and women.

What we are encouraging the allies to do now as some of them are withdrawing forces, to shift those to the training mission. I'll give you two practical examples. The Canadians, who have fought very valiantly in Afghanistan, decided to downsize their combat mission, but they have added almost 1,000 people to a training mission, which is flowing into Afghanistan right now.

The second one I would mention are the Dutch, who also fought very valiantly, too many casualties in southern Afghanistan. They've decided to shift to a training focus and they're moving to bring 545 members to focus largely on training, with a few other activities as well. So we're showing them as an example to other nations, and as we begin this transition this summer in Kabul, in Mazar e-Sharif, in Herat, in Panshir, in Bamayan, we are going to be able to turn over to the Afghans to do the warfighting and take some of our forces to do the training. In the end, that's how we will succeed in the security dimension in Afghanistan. We are going to train our way to success there.

Senator HAGAN. How about the funding of this?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The funding is in place. It is at the moment, I would hasten to say, largely, overwhelmingly from the United States, and that's something that we need to work on with our allies. This is an area, Senator, where even nations that are not in the troops on the ground portion of this I think can be very helpful.

There are 70 nations that are engaged financially in Afghanistan. 48, almost 49, have troops on the ground. But that trade space is a place where I'm encouraging our National folks to focus, our diplomats to focus, on funding this Afghan Security Training Trust Fund. I agree with you, that's an area where they could do more.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you Senator Hagan.

Senator VITTER.

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for your service, and thanks to all the great service of the men and women in uniform who serve with you.

Admiral, I think the fundamental confusion about the situation in Libya is this: The statement is that we're mostly there to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. Everyone knows that the greatest threat toward that end is Qadhafi remaining in power and regaining control of the country. Yet ousting Qadhafi is not a goal of the operations.

To the average Louisianian, that doesn't connect. Can you explain that to us?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I can only explain what I do as a military officer leading from the NATO perspective. The military mission I've been given, Senator, is to focus on all the things we've talked about in the course of this hearing, which range from the humanitarian operation to the arms embargo to the no-fly zone to protecting the population.

Now, as distinct from the military mission that I am charged with, as I listen to all of the world leaders talk about this there's a consistent refrain that the time has come from Qadhafi to move on. I think the way those connect is a sense of by our participation in protecting the people of Libya we create a safe and secure environment in which the people of Libya can make a determination, and that they then have the ability to undertake the kind of effort that would in effect create regime change, as we have seen in other nations in the Middle East.

So I think that it's fair to say that the regime change is an aspiration that has been articulated by many world leaders and is under discussion today in London, I'm sure. The military mission that I have at the moment that I am focused on, that I am charged with, is the one that I described to you a moment ago. I don't think the two are directly linked, but they may connect over time, particularly if we add other tools to the kit in terms of the financial squeeze, in terms of the travel restrictions, finding the money and crushing it off I think are all part of this.

But again, we're very early days in this process. We're 6 weeks into it and at the moment my focus as a NATO commander is on the military mission that I've been given.

Senator VITTER. Can you imagine progress of the Qadhafi forces not posing serious humanitarian threats?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think from everything we've seen in the last 5 or 6 weeks, whenever Qadhafi's forces have an opportunity to move and to operate, they pose a threat to civilians, very much so.

Senator VITTER. Okay. I guess that's my general point. We're somehow trying to have it both ways, that this is a humanitarian mission, but we're not taking sides in a civil war. My main point is that that is rounding a square peg and you can't do it. I think it would be more constructive to be direct and clear about it so we know what we're getting into or what we're not getting into.

Do you have any reaction to that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think those are points that would be well taken up with the policymakers in the Department of Defense. I believe you'll have a series of hearings in which that could be appropriately addressed. At my level, as a military officer I'm very focused on the mission that I've been given from my civilian leadership.

Senator VITTER. Okay. The cost of this. We're going to get reports on the ongoing cost of these operations. Can you tell us generally what current defense accounts are being used to offset these costs?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, sir, again not within my purview either as a combatant commander in EUCOM, where I am flowing forces to AFRICOM—the budgetary train that comes behind that is handled by each of the individual services, and so the Department of Defense would be able to give you that answer. I'll, as I mentioned to the chairman, I'll gladly convey that back.

Senator VITTER. Well, if you can add to the request that we've talked about before, that we also get a report specifically about where money is coming from.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Senator VITTER. Thank you.

Finally, intelligence. The President specifically highlighted intelligence as a significant continuing U.S. role in his remarks last night. At the same time, on the same day Vice Admiral Gortney stated that we have limited intelligence capability and specifically we don't know who the rebels are. Can you—those seem like inconsistent comments. Can you explain that?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I think that—yes, sir, I can take a try at it. I think we're again very early in the process. I think when Admiral Gortney was talking about limited intelligence he was talking about having the opportunity to really understand who is in the opposition, what is their background, what are their connections, who are they talking to. We're in the process of working very hard, as you can imagine, to gather that intelligence right now.

In terms of intelligence support to the mission broadly, we're talking about the whole array of U.S. capabilities. That's everything from satellites to signals intelligence to U-2s to other aircraft that are gathering intelligence. So those two elements kind of come together. One is a resource and an enabler and the other is a proximate intelligence requirement or need, and by enabling and using those resources in the operation we have a much better chance of gathering the specific intelligence on the opposition that we very much need.

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Vitter.

Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Stavridis, General Kehler, I am sorry that I missed your testimony. I was presiding. But I'm delighted to be here and to have you both here. General Kehler, it's nice to have you here as the commander for the first time of STRATCOM. But I think all my questions are NATO-related, so I will direct them to Admiral Stavridis.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think General Kehler's going to put in a request to always testify with me. [Laughter.]

Senator SHAHEEN. I'm not surprised. But I only have one Libya question, so that should make you feel better.

I want to pick up on the concern that was raised by Senator Collins about Arab involvement in the mission in Libya. I share the commitment that I think you expressed and she raised about maximizing the engagement on the part of the Arab—our Arab allies in

what's happening in Libya. I know that some had expressed concern that having the mission led by NATO might discourage some of our Arab allies from participating.

Can you tell me if that's your view and what you've heard from countries, Arab countries, about NATO's leading the mission?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I can, Senator. I do not agree with the statement that shifting the mission to NATO will reduce Arab participation. I base that on several factors. One is, and I've mentioned it a couple of times in the hearing—one is two sub-organizations we have at NATO that you know about: the Mediterranean Dialogue, which has five Arab nations from around the periphery of the Mediterranean, in fact, almost all of the ones in North Africa, except Libya; and the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, which is a similar organization in the Gulf States of the Arabian Gulf.

Both of those organizations give NATO an ongoing set of relationships with I believe 11 Arab nations in total, and we have tapped each of those and overwhelmingly the impression we get is that the Arab states are very willing to operate with NATO. As you know, we already have two. There are a couple more coming or in sensitive conversation. But I think the range of participation and engagement, in the end doing this under NATO auspices will be very positive, and we'll continue, as I told Senator Collins, to work it very hard. And I'll come back to you in 30 days and follow up on that particular point.

Senator SHAHEEN. So they would be participating as full partners sitting around the table as decisions are being made?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would say that for military operations the 28 member states of the North Atlantic Council will be the deciding body. This is parallel to the situation in Afghanistan, where the 28 NATO nations are the actual military decisionmakers.

Around that nucleus of 28 NATO nations, the political partners come together and there's very free dialogue, and yet they don't have delineated control over the military operations. That's a pretty functional arrangement, I think.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Now I want to switch to the Balkans. You mentioned Kosovo and the reduction in both NATO and U.S. forces in Kosovo. Is it your assessment that we're making good progress there? One of the concerns that was raised with me over the weekend when I was at the Brussels conference was concern about some of the holy sites in Kosovo and the extent to which they would be secure if the NATO forces withdrew.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, I think we're making very good progress in Kosovo if you look at a time scale. 10 years ago we were literally launching Tomahawk missiles into Belgrade to kind of kick off that conflict, just over—just over 10 years ago. When I came on the job, we had 15,000 troops. Because we've been able to maintain a safe and secure environment, we reduced to 10,000, and in February I came down to 5,000 troops.

I'm very comfortable at that level. In a year I'll take another look and I think we're going to work our way out of a job in Kosovo, because the ongoing dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo continues to improve.

In terms of the sensitive sites, we started out with nine of those. We have turned over six of them at this point. We're about to turn over a seventh. The final two are particularly sensitive and we're going to hold those, I think, for some number of months into the future. But you're very correct to raise that as an indicator of what we'll look at as we go forward to really ultimately close this mission out.

But overall, I am pleased with the progress in Kosovo and I believe we're on the right trajectory.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, that's encouraging.

In April, last April, NATO placed a number of conditions on Bosnia's membership action plan. I was one of those who argued that it would be important to offer MAP for Bosnia as they are trying to work their way through some of their governmental structures. At this point, however, given the challenges that they've had in putting together a government, can you talk about what progress there is in moving forward on MAP and what message the people of Bosnia might want to take away as they watch their leaders squander what I think is a real opportunity?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think you categorized it correctly, in that there is continuing acrimony between the three major groups in Bosnia, which I think is holding them back from making significant progress on the MAP at this time.

One concrete example would be the allocation of defense properties, which are distributed amongst the Croat and the Bosniak and the Serbian ethnic populations, bringing those together in a centralized way. We have yet to see real progress on that. That's for example one of the conditions of movement on the MAP.

So I am not encouraged about that. We will continue to work with them and try and move progress there, because I think that's very important and I am concerned about Bosnia falling backward if we don't all continue to work together there.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

I'm out of time, so I won't ask you about the new strategic concept and I will save that for another time.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

I just have a couple questions. First of all, Admiral, you testified earlier that you are comfortable with the mission which has been given to you. I take it that means that you view that the mission is sufficiently clear; is that correct?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Speaking as a NATO commander, I hold this mission as a NATO commander; yes, sir, it is clear to me what the North Atlantic Council has tasked me with.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, and you've said you're comfortable with that mission?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I am comfortable with that mission.

Chairman LEVIN. The fact that there's not yet an exit strategy is not troubling to you?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. It's very early in the process and I am confident that one will develop. Again, events in London today may give us some indication.

Chairman LEVIN. General Kehler, you made reference or you were asked about the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe. Can

you tell us—well, let me ask you: Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe? I'm not sure you point blank answered that question.

General KEHLER. Yes, I do.

Chairman LEVIN. Why?

General KEHLER. Missile defense for the United States has been based on two major objectives. Objective number one has been to make sure that the homeland, that our homeland, is protected against a limited ballistic missile attack from North Korea and to extend that if events warrant and Iran develops similar capacity.

At the same time, objective number two that has emerged has been to make sure that we are responding to the regional threats that we see that are growing at a very, very fast pace. So the Phased Adaptive Approach is intended to put resources in the theaters where we need to add to the defenses of U.S. troops and our allies, but to do so in such a way that it builds upon the threat. I support that. I think that's the right way to go forward. I think that gives us a prudent way to go forward and it allows us to hedge our activities as well.

I think inherent in both pieces of this missile defense activity that we are putting together, there are appropriate hedges in place that allow us to adapt and to respond as needed.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, the regional threat is an existing threat, is that correct?

General KEHLER. The regional threat is an existing threat and growing.

Chairman LEVIN. And is it true that the Phased Adaptive Approach addresses an existing threat?

General KEHLER. It does, yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Unlike the previous approach, is that correct? Because isn't the existing threat the short and medium-range missiles?

General KEHLER. That's right.

Chairman LEVIN. Particularly the Iranian missiles?

General KEHLER. Yes, and that includes Iranian missiles, that includes missiles from other actors as well.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. But the advantage of the Phased Adaptive Approach as I understand it is that it addresses that existing threat?

General KEHLER. It does.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, the other threat, which is the threat to the homeland, can be addressed by, hopefully, by the existing defense that we have on the West Coast, including Alaska and California; is that correct?

General KEHLER. That's right. That's the GMD, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, thank you so much, both of you. Yes, Admiral?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, if I could, I'd like to just make a comment about a naval officer because I'd like this to go into the Congressional Record. Vice Admiral Robert Moeller died yesterday, Vice Admiral. He was the first Deputy Commander of U.S. Africa Command. You met him, every member of this committee met him.

He came around and created very largely Africa Command along with General Ward.

He died last night, but I wanted to say for the record that the performance of Africa Command I think during the Libyan operations has been exemplary, and I believe that the quality that Vice Admiral Moeller built into that organization were part of it, and I wanted to say that on the record.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you for mentioning that. We appreciate that. What was the cause of his death?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, he died of ALS, Lou Gehrig's Disease, as it's commonly known.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you for making reference to him and his valiant service.

Thank you both for the service that you've given to our country, for the men and women with whom you work, and to your families.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the committee adjourned.]