# HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

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**THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2010**

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, McCain, Thune, LeMieux, and Brown.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel.

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican staff director; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.

Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Today's hearing is to receive testimony on the current security situation on the Korean Peninsula and discuss the implications of recent developments such as the March 26th attack on the Republic of Korea naval ship Cheonan, the decision to delay the transfer of wartime operational control of the Republic of Korea armed forces from the United States to the Republic of Korea, and the prospects for regime change in North Korea, among other issues.

On behalf of the committee, let me first welcome our witnesses: assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson; assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell; and General Walter Sharp, Commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces-Korea.

The committee appreciates your service, each and every one of you. Your insights on this important topic are of great significance to us.

While many of our Nation's military and diplomatic efforts remain centered on the continuing mission in Afghanistan, we must also keep focused on challenges in other regions of the world. One such region is northeast Asia and in particular the Korean Peninsula, which has been embroiled in various stages of conflict since the start of the Korean War.

This year, as we commemorate 60 years since the beginning of that war, it is appropriate that we recall the noble and extraordinary service and sacrifice of the service men and women of the United States and allied armed forces that fought in the Korean War, as well as those who have served on the Korean Peninsula since, sacrificing selflessly and giving of themselves tirelessly to help preserve the fragile peace that we hope will one day develop into a firm and reliable peace.

Although the fighting ended in 1953, today the North and South remain technically at war. Over the nearly 6 decades since the armistice agreement was signed, the Korean Peninsula has become a tale of two countries, standing as a true testament to the power of democracy and free society on the one hand and serving as a stark reminder of the debilitating and destructive nature of a repressive totalitarian regime on the other.

Indeed, the 60 years of relative stability on the peninsula has enabled the Republic of Korea, to the south of the Demilitarized Zone, to thrive, developing into one of the world's most vibrant, accomplished, and prosperous democracies. But to the north, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as North Korea is known, continues to wither under the weight and pressure of its own destructive policies, with its people suffering from hardships and neglect caused by a regime seemingly concerned only with its own survival and determined to use threats and aggression to achieve that end.

As a result, the security situation on the Korean Peninsula remains precarious, and recent events remind us that it is one of the most uncertain geographic areas in the world, due in large measure to the longstanding reign of a regime unwilling to conform to even the most basic standards expected of a sovereign nation and a responsible member of the global community.

Characterized mainly by unpredictability, the words and actions of the North Korean government have for the past several decades vacillated between modest cooperation and unabashed aggression. International efforts to rid the peninsula of nuclear weapons through the Six Party process have come to a virtual standstill, and since nuclear inspectors left North Korea more than a year ago the actual status of North Korea's nuclear program has been largely unknown.

It is important that we do not lose focus of the key goal of denuclearizing the peninsula. The United Nations, through various Security Council resolutions such as 1718 and 1874, has provided tools to sanction and pressure North Korea to conform its policies and behavior to international principles. While the North Korea issue and the specter of proliferation of nuclear technology garner much of the international attention, and rightly so, also of concern are the intentions of the North Korean regime, which maintains a robust conventional military and continues to pursue and develop a ballistic missile capability that represents a substantial threat to stability and security on the peninsula and throughout the region.

Equally alarming, of course, is that North Korea maintains that costly military while millions of its people are starving and suffering from the lack of even the most basic human needs.

Highly disturbing is the willingness of North Korea to attack without warning or provocation, as was the case on March 26th when the South Korean naval ship Cheonan was split in two and sunk, killing 46 South Korean sailors, by what an international team of experts determined to be a torpedo fired by the North Koreans. The Cheonan incident underscores the uncertainty of the peninsula and highlights the need to maintain a high state of readiness and to protect against unprovoked aggression. In the aftermath of the attack, the United States and the Republic of Korea have begun an enhanced schedule of combined exercises, which includes more naval exercises in the waters around the peninsula.

Other recent developments of interest to the committee include: the decision by President Obama and South Korean President Lee, announced in June, to delay the transfer of wartime operational control of the Republic of Korea forces from April of 2012 to now December of 2015; developments in North Korea, including reports that the regime may be preparing plans for a succession in leadership; indications of possible proliferation of nuclear weapon technology by North Korea to other countries, such as Burma; and the current state of the North Korean ballistic missile program.

Of course, it's important to view developments on the Korean Peninsula not just in the context of their effect on the peninsula itself, but also in the context of their effect on Northeast Asia as a whole and on the strategic and stability of the broader Asia Pacific region. To that end, we will also be interested in hearing from the witnesses their views of how recent developments on the peninsula impact the region at large and implicate the military and diplomatic dynamics in countries like Japan, China, and Russia.

The Republic of Korea remains one of the United States' most steadfast and reliable allies and the military alliance is vital to a lasting security on the peninsula and throughout the region. As the United States and the Republic of Korea move forward with plans to strengthen that alliance, it is important that both countries remain committed to making the investments needed to support the realignment of U.S. forces and to prepare for the transfer of wartime operational control in 2015 now.

Security and stability in this region must remain a top U.S. priority as the international community works to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to establish reliable path-

ways for the delivery of assistance and aid to the people of North Korea, and ultimately to secure and preserve a lasting peace in this important part of the world.

Again, we welcome our witnesses and we look forward to their insights on this very timely subject.

Senator McCain.

**STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN**

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank our distinguished witnesses for joining us this morning and for their service to our Nation.

I'm very pleased we're holding this important hearing today. The Asian Pacific is one of the most consequential regions in the world today. It's the main driver of the tectonic shift in the global distribution of power that is reshaping our world. It's increasingly at the heart of our Nation's security, our prosperity, and our global diplomacy. And it is a region in which the United States finds both some of our greatest allies as well as some of the worst threats to international security.

All these factors come together most vividly in Northeast Asia, and in particular on the Korean Peninsula. 60 years after the start of the Korean War, the peninsula remains very tense. But while the situation in North Korea has rarely been worse, our alliance with South Korea has never been better.

Under the strong leadership of President Lee Myung- bak, the Republic of Korea is realizing its goal of becoming a responsible global leader and our alliance is flourishing as a result. Seoul will host the next meeting of the G–20 and our two militaries are in the midst of some of the most sophisticated and important joint exercises we have ever conducted in the seas around the Korean Peninsula. I'm very pleased that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have joined as observers.

In addition, the Republic of Korea recently announced strong additional sanctions against the Iranian government for its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. This decision was not easy or cost-free for Korea's government and companies, and it's another reminder that Congress must pass the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

The success of our Korean ally stands in stark contrast to the situation in the North, which has been deteriorating dramatically. In the past 18 months, the North Korean regime has tried twice that we know of to ship arms to Iran. It has conducted a second nuclear test. It carried out a catastrophic revaluation of its currency. It wiped out a lifetime's worth of savings in a matter of hours for most North Koreans.

According to the Pentagon's 2010 ballistic missile defense review, if North Korea continues on its current trajectory it could soon have the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon, not only to its neighbors, but to the United States.

Most recently, a complete and thorough investigation by the Republic of Korea with the participation of numerous independent parties determined conclusively that a North Korean torpedo was responsible for the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan and the loss of 46 of her sailors. It now appears that Kim Jong Il

is attempting to pass his tyrannical power to his young son, so the odds of further North Korean provocations could be growing.

The administration has taken some good steps to impose additional pressure against North Korea, including a new presidential authority to sanction persons and entities that facilitate North Korea's trade in arms, drugs, counterfeit goods, and currency and other illicit activities, the real lifeblood of the Kim Jong Il regime. Yet it's not clear what objective the administration is seeking to achieve with this pressure, nor is it clear why the North Korean regime would choose to give up its nuclear weapons now when it has never been willing to do so before, despite repeated international attempts to negotiate, cajole, bribe, and pressure them into nuclear disarmament. And unfortunately, China's recent behavior makes it even harder to imagine how to formulate an effective strategy on North Korea.

China's response to North Korea's recent provocations calls into question its willingness to act as a responsible stakeholder in the international system. Rather than support the Republic of Korea after the sinking of the Cheonan, acknowledge North Korea's blame and use its leverage with North Korea to change its behavior, China has instead worked to water down the response of the United Nations, shielded North Korea from accepting culpability for its aggressive acts, and even challenged the right of the United States and our allies to conduct joint exercises in international waters.

Meanwhile, the additional sanctions against Iran that Japan and the Republic of Korea recently adopted highlight how increasingly out of step China is with the requirements of global leadership on this vital security issue.

The challenges we face on and around the Korean Peninsula make it all the most important for the United States and our allies to organize ourselves well for our mutual defense. While it was right to delay the transfer of operational control for the defense of the Republic of Korea, there's no doubt in my mind that South Korean forces are among the most capable and best equipped in the world, and that the Combined Forces Command's Strategic Alliance 2015 Initiative will lend even greater credence to the U.S. commitment to South Korea and our mutual defense.

Today's hearing is an opportunity to discuss this and many other issues pertaining to our forces in Korea, as well as the growing challenges we face in Northeast Asia, and I want to thank our witnesses again for appearing here today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Let us begin with you, Secretary Gregson.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WALLACE C. GREGSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS**

Mr. GREGSON. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense views

on the Korean Peninsula. I'm pleased to report that 2010 has been a landmark year for the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance. The U.S.-ROK alliance is a key pillar of U.S. strategy for a region undergoing tremendous political, economic, and security-related change. This comprehensive relationship, spanning the defense, diplomatic, and economic spheres, continues to serve as a source of stability in the face of unpredictable and provocative North Korean behavior.

As you know, this past June marked the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. At its most basic level, the mission of our alliance today remains the same as it did 60 years ago, to deter aggression against the Republic of Korea and to fight and win should deterrence fail. North Korea's 26 March torpedo attack on the ROK naval ship Cheonan, which killed 46 sailors, is a somber reminder of the active threat that North Korea poses to regional stability. In such a high threat environment, the U.S.-ROK alliance's mission to deter and defend takes on added significance and remains our primary focus.

While this deter and defend mission remains the top priority of the alliance, the U.S. investment in Korea's security has helped create an alliance whose value extends far beyond the security of the Korean Peninsula. America's stake in the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula transcends social and economic interconnectivity, to include shared identities as liberal democracies that promote a peaceful and prosperous Asia. In the Republic of Korea, the United States has a partner that contributes to upholding international norms and promoting international peace and stability.

In stark contrast, North Korea poses a multifaceted threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia Pacific region. Pyongyang possesses a large conventional military and its active pursuit of a nuclear capability, ballistic missile testing and development, and weapons export activities cause serious concern. The threat North Korea poses exceeds any simple measurement of military power. Its proven track record of marrying capabilities with deadly intent has resulted in unnecessary crises, tension escalation, and, as the attack on the Cheonan demonstrated, the tragic loss of life.

North Korea has adapted to the U.S.-ROK alliance's conventional military superiority by developing tactics and weapons systems that equip them with offensive capabilities that avoid confronting the military strength of the alliance head up. In the context of North Korea's efforts to develop a nuclear program, its ballistic missile efforts become an even greater concern. Nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, if developed and fielded, would pose a threat to regional peace and stability that would be orders of magnitude greater than the already heightened threat that its current unconventional capabilities pose.

North Korea may become emboldened to pursue even more provocative activities than we have witnessed in recent years if it makes significant strides in its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology.

At the same time that North Korea develops conventional, unconventional, and WMD capabilities for its own purposes, it continues to export military technologies. We're working closely with the

international community to deter, track, and stop North Korean arms sales.

I'd like to touch just briefly on the strategic value of the U.S. military's presence on the Korean Peninsula. Since the armistice agreement was signed in 1953, the U.S. military posture on the Korean Peninsula and in the region more generally has been successful in preventing major war from erupting again. Deterrence has worked. Fundamentally, the presence of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula continues to generate a security dividend that has allowed countries like the Republic of Korea and Japan to flourish economically and politically. Those countries' contributions to international peace and stability would be impossible if not for the security assurance our military presence provides.

To preserve our security commitment to the Republic of Korea, the United States must maintain a forward military posture. 28,500 troops stationed somewhere in the United States do not have the same deterrent effect as the same number stationed in the Republic of Korea. It is our forward presence that most effectively communicates our resolve to defend our allies and preserve our vital interests in Asia. Successful deterrence relies on credibility as much, if not more than, capability.

The security dividend resulting from our longstanding military presence in the region is generally well known, but ongoing efforts to transform the alliance deserve attention. I will defer to General Sharp on the details of this effort, but I will note that Strategic Alliance 2015 is an important umbrella concept that encompasses and harmonizes many different alliance transformation efforts.

The foundation of Strategic Alliance 2015 is the plan to transition wartime operational control of forces to the Republic of Korea joint chiefs of staff. Some of the related initiatives that support OPCON transition, which is now scheduled to take place by December 2015, will result in a more strategically positioned military footprint, as well as military plans and exercises that are updated to better account for the most probable threats that we could face today and in the near future.

The United States is a resident Pacific power, as shown by our U.S. military presence and the interests we protect. Our presence on the Korean Peninsula and our strong relationship with the Republic of Korea promote peace and stability in the region and enduring interests of the United States and the world.

Thank you for allowing me to appear before you today and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gregson follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Secretary Gregson.

Secretary Campbell.

## STATEMENT OF HON. KURT M. CAMPBELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it's an honor to testify before all of you gentlemen, and it's also terrific to be with my colleagues and friends here on the panel before you today.

I'd like to submit my full testimony for the record and just summarize a few brief points for you as we get started here this morning.

Let me first fully support every word each of you said in your opening remarks this morning. I think it is well understood that the United States faces enormously consequential challenges in South Asia. Currently our young men and women are involved and engaged actively on challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. But it is also the case that increasingly the drama of the 21st century is playing out in the Asian Pacific region. The United States has to understand that for us to be successful as a Nation we have to be more actively engaged in every aspect of diplomacy, economic, security, and other deliberations that are under way now in the Asian Pacific region.

I must say that I think President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Secretary Gates appreciate that, and we have tried to act in accordance with this fundamental reality of the 21st century.

One of the key national priorities of the United States is the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. I think as each of you, Mr. Chairman and Senator McCain, have underscored, we've faced some urgent challenges on the peninsula over the course of the last many months, and we have worked closely with our friends and allies to respond accordingly.

The basis of our strategy in Northeast Asia rests on two very strong and important allies. The United States' relationship with Japan—Japan remains the cornerstone of our engagement and our security partners in the Asian Pacific region. We have worked, with the strong support of General Gregson and others, on continuing to revitalize that effort, that security partnership, an effort that was undertaken with great effect over the course of the Bush Administration. We've tried to build on that. We recognize the importance of Japan. It's hard to be successful in Asia without that very strong and central relationship.

We also have taken real steps in recent years to strengthen the critical partnership, as General Gregson has underscored, with South Korea. That partnership is increasingly not simply centralized on the Korean Peninsula. It's a global alliance. Korea is working with us in a variety of places, in Afghanistan, as Japan is as well. We're very pleased by the direction of both of these critical alliances in Asia.

It is also the case that each are—we are recognizing important milestones. This is the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton were both recently in South Korea to commemorate that solemn occasion. Later this year, President Obama and in fact most of the administration will be in Japan to recognize the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of our security partnership and treaty with Japan. So important times in both relationships, in Japan and South Korea.

I think the sinking of the Cheonan provided a very clear and stark reminder of the dangers on the Korean Peninsula, and I think the last 6 or so months have been a case study in close coordination, not just between the United States and South Korea, but also with our other allies and friends in the region. We've worked hard on every single element of our overall strategy. General Sharp will talk about our military steps, our exercises, other steps to increase and enhance our deterrence capabilities, our diplomacy, both in the region and in the United Nations, and more

recently steps associated with sanctions policy and the like to send a very clear message that such provocative actions as undertaken by the North Koreans cannot be tolerated, and there must be a united front to confront such provocative steps.

I must say again I'd like to underscore very clearly the point that both the chairman and Mr. McCain made about, Senator McCain made, about President Lee Myung-bak. He has been an extraordinary partner in South Korea, one of the most able and effective leaders that we've ever had the pleasure to work with in Asia. I think he has conducted himself in the wake of the Cheonan with a statesmanship and a calm that has been truly inspirational at every level, and we're very grateful to have the chance to work with him going forward.

I must say that in the current environment I think it's clear that the United States has to be prepared for every and all situations on the Korean Peninsula and we are attempting to do that through very quiet, intimate, internal deliberations on a variety of circumstances, through planning exercises, through external diplomacy. It's also the case with the recent visit of Ambassador Bosworth and Ambassador Sun Kim throughout the region.

We're also prepared for truly productive diplomacy with North Korea. We stand ready, working with our allies, to do so under the right circumstances.

I must also say that we also have to take important steps in Asia to underscore our leadership. I must associate myself strongly with Senator McCain on the Korea Free Trade Agreement. I think this is a strategic priority of the United States and I think the imperatives there are clear, and I think President Obama has indicated the way forward in this regard.

I think the situation in Northeast Asia is extraordinarily complex. It requires the strong leadership of the United States, and with the strong support of the Congress and the Senate and the colleagues sitting before you today, I think we're up to that challenge.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Campbell.

General Sharp, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF GEN WALTER L. SHARP, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND; COMMANDER, REPUBLIC OF KOREA-U.S. COMBINED FORCES COMMAND; AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-KOREA**

General SHARP. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee: I thank you very much for this opportunity to update you today on the security situation in the Korean Peninsula.

Before I start, if I may, sir, I'd like to introduce my Command Sergeant Major, Bob Winzenried, who is here with me, who is so critical in taking care of those 28,500 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that are part of the peninsula. It's an honor for both of us to be here today, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. A warm welcome to you both, and please pass along to those 28,500 men and women and their families our thanks and our gratitude to them for our service.

General SHARP. Thank you, Senator.

Actually during my last testimony in front of you on the 26th of March, North Korea launched a premeditated and unprovoked attack on the Republic of Korea Navy ship the Cheonan. After aiding our Korean allies with recovery operations, a multinational investigation led by Korean, British, Australian, Swedish, Canadian, and United States experts concluded the following: A shock wave and bubble effect generated by an underwater explosion of a North Korean-launched torpedo at a depth of 6 to 8 meters and 3 meters left of the center of the ship caused the ROK ship the Cheonan to split apart and killed 46 sailors.

After the publication of these findings, the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission established a special investigation team which, based on a multinational investigation, concluded that North Korea attacked the Cheonan and it was a major armistice violation.

Our Republic of Korea allies and the United States have launched a series of sea, air, and land exercise to better prepare us to deter and defeat North Korean provocations. The first of these exercises, Invincible Spirit, was successfully led in the seas off the east coast of Korea. Others are scheduled in the near future and, along with our regular exercises such as Ulchi Freedom Guardian and Key Resolve, these exercises have all greatly expanded to include training that focuses both on deterring and defeating future provocations by North Korea.

The attack on the Cheonan along with the continued development and testing of nuclear and ballistic weapons in violation of multiple Security Council resolutions, demonstrates that North Korea continues to be a great threat to peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. The continuing focus of North Korea on weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile technology, special forces, long-range artillery threats to civilian populations, and asymmetrical means, along with the declared regime goal of North Korea to become a great and powerful nation by 2012, suggest that it will continue to threaten the region and the Republic of Korea in the future.

On the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance front, the Korean President, Lee Myung-bak, requested and President Obama agreed to adjust the transition of operational control from April 2012 to 2015. Although the Republic of Korea and the United States were on track militarily to complete the operational control in 2012, this adjustment will allow the alliance to synchronize a number of ongoing alliance initiatives, of which transition of operational control is just one of them.

The new, much more comprehensive plan, called Strategic Alliance 2015, goes well beyond OPCON control. It synchronizes all the transformation initiatives currently under way, to include refining and improving our OP plans, more realistic training and exercises, the development of new organizational structures, the acquiring,

organizing, and training, improved capabilities, and the movement of U.S. forces to two enduring hubs.

Strategic Alliance 2015 will enable the Republic of Korea and the United States Forces to successfully confront future security challenges and set the conditions for lasting peace in the Korean Peninsula and in the region.

Tour normalization complements our other transformation efforts by providing the command with soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who are highly trained in all of our contingency plans, who possess in-depth knowledge of the North Korean threat, and who have a strong professional and personal knowledge of and training with our Korean counterparts and hosts. It also clearly demonstrates the commitment of the United States to the region and to the Republic of Korea, a factor that I think is both critical now and even moreso in the future. Tour normalization also reduces the stress on our military by eliminating an unneeded unaccompanied tour.

Your continued support in this initiative is critical and very much appreciated.

An important part of the command's Yongsan Relocation Program and land partnership initiatives is housing. To meet our future housing needs at Camp Humphreys, the Department is developing a Humphreys Housing Plan. This plan is examining the combination of several housing options. First is the Humphreys Housing Opportunities Program and second is Army Family Housing MILCON construction.

The Army Housing Opportunities Program draws upon the private sector development, financing, and operational support for the construction and operation of housing units without the need for military capital investment. MILCON construction, if approved, supports the housing needs for the additional families that HHOP cannot house. Combining new financial models with traditional means of funding moves us significantly closer to our goal of providing service members and their families with quality housing and facilities after they move to Camp Humphreys under the Yongsan Relocation Program and the Land Partnership Program.

Again, your support is greatly appreciated.

Northeast Asia and Korea remain the location of some of the greatest security opportunities and challenges. The North Korean threat continues to transform itself. The conventional threat continues, but we now face an enemy capable of using a number of asymmetrical means to threaten its neighbors in hope of gaining concessions, while also violating past agreements, international norms, and the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The Republic of Korea and the United States are more strongly united than ever before to deter North Korean provocations and aggression and to defeat them if necessary. Strategic Alliance 2015 will provide us with the means with which we will successfully maintain peace and promote freedom in Northeast Asia.

Together, the Republic of Korea and the United States have kept the peace in the region for 57 years. I am confident that we will continue to do so until a lasting peace has been established in the region.

Again, I thank you for your support and for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Sharp follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General Sharp.

We're going to have votes throughout the morning, so we just will need to try to work through those votes. Let's try a first round of 7 minutes.

General, South Korea showed great restraint in not retaliating for the attack on the Cheonan. Were you surprised by the relatively mild response to this unprovoked attack?

General SHARP. Sir, I think starting on March 26th South Korea acted very, very responsibly, in that they first, in the international community, first had to go to determine what caused the incident, because, as you recall, back on March 26th there was clearly uncertainty as to what caused the sinking of the ship. Had it run aground? Was there a mine? It was unclear.

What Lee Myung-bak did is he said: We have to be clear and determine exactly what the cause was. So hence he had an international group of experts to come in and take a look at it, and work through really the next several weeks. Then it became clear that this was a premeditated attack by North Korea.

I think that during that time period President Lee made it very clear that he was not going to stand for any future provocations. But his big focus at the time—and I think rightfully so—was determining the exact cause and then working this through the United Nations in order to be able to condemn North Korea.

Chairman LEVIN. When President Lee says he's not going to stand for future provocations, what does that mean, given the fact that there was no response really of a significant nature from South Korea to this attack? This isn't just a provocation; this is an attack, a premeditated attack.

General SHARP. Sir, he has done some things and the military has done things. They have changed some of their tactics and techniques, both along the DMZ and especially out in the West Sea, of how they operate in order to be able to ensure that this does not happen again and that they are better prepared to respond to it in the future.

I think what he did was work very closely on the diplomatic side in order to be able to garner international support to blame North Korea and to call on them to stop doing these types of acts in the future.

Chairman LEVIN. China has been reluctant to publicly criticize North Korea for its actions generally, and most recently was unwilling to acknowledge North Korea's involvement in the attack and sinking of the ship. Let me I guess address this to you, Secretary Campbell. Why is China reluctant to hold North Korea to account for its actions?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say just very quickly in terms of the previous question, I think the fact is that South Korea responded across a range of areas: sanctions, very strong and clear language to the Nation, military steps that General Sharp has underscored, and also an effort at the United Nations.

I think there was a profound recognition of what are the stakes involved. Later this year, South Korea is holding what for them is probably the most historic international event in their history, the G–20, the first time it's been held in South Korea. So in truth I think this was an act of great statesmanship and restraint, a very difficult act, and one which I hope the United States supported fully.

As you indicate, Mr. Chairman, the truth is that the Cheonan incident I think makes clear that China has a very complex calculus that they look at on the Korean Peninsula. I think at a strategic level the United States and China share some things in common. We want to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. We seek a Korean Peninsula without nuclear weapons. But it is also the case that they have a long historic relationship with North Korea. They also have over the course of the last 10 to 15 years built a very strong relationship with South Korea.

I think through some of the diplomacy they have undertaken at the UN, which, as President Obama and others have indicated, we were disappointed in certain circumstances during the course of some of that diplomacy. Ultimately we were relatively satisfied with the outcome in terms of the overall statement, but the process was quite difficult.

I think through some of those actions they have complicated their relationship with South Korea. I think they're going to have to take steps over the course of the next several years to rebuild that relationship.

In recent meetings, both the visit of the vice foreign minister here to Washington, Cui Tiankai, and also the visit last week with Deputy National Security Adviser Tom Donilon and Larry Summers, I think there was an appreciation that the United States and China must step up its dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, and we are seeking to do so.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Well, we've heard about stepping up dialogue with China for a long, long time, and it hasn't resulted in anything as far as I'm concerned. You say that this event and their failure to take a decent position in response to the attack on the ship you said complicates their relationship with South Korea. Well, it sure doesn't help their relationship with us as far as I'm concerned. I think it's totally unacceptable that China is so unsupportive of strong action against North Korea when you have not just a provocation—that word is pretty mild—you've got an attack, premeditated attack on a ship, that killed 46 sailors.

So I think it's totally unacceptable and I think China ought to be told, in no uncertain terms, that it complicates its relationship, not just with South Korea, but with us as well.

Now, the delay in terms of the transfer of wartime control of South Korean troops from 2012 to 2015, it seems to me is also troubling. Maybe it's the result of the attack on the ship. If that's the main cause, that's one thing. But if it's the result of their not being prepared to take on that responsibility in April of 2012 the way they were supposed to, that's something very—that's very different, because I think we have to expect that South Korea has to step up in terms of costs, in terms of responsibility.

The cost of maintaining our troops is a high cost. The cost of just shifting the location of our troops has now gone up significantly. The share of that cost was supposed to be 40 percent, I believe, of the $10 billion cost would go to South Korea. Well, it's now $13 billion. We're not asking them, we never would and never have, to pay our troops, but when it comes to the cost of maintaining our troops in their country it seems to me it's very different.

I'm troubled by the delay, I must tell you. Was this requested, General, by President Lee or was that our idea?

General SHARP. Sir, that was requested clearly by President Lee to President Obama in June, and there were lots of discussions about the delay. I believe what it boiled down to is President Lee did not feel that 2012, with what's going on in North Korea and in other places around the world, that 2012 was the best time to make such a major change in this alliance and to disestablish Combined Forces Command and to go into a supporting and supported relationship.

What we have done is to make sure that that additional time between 2012 and 2015 make us stronger, and I do believe that when we come out of this, the synchronization of the initiatives that I talked about in my opening statement, we will be a stronger alliance because of it.

We have made very clear to the Republic of Korea that this is not business as usual. This is not just a delay of 3 years and just extend the milestones. In fact, I joined the Two Plus Two in July when our two secretaries were there. The base plan for Alliance 2015 was agreed to. When Secretary Gates and Minister Kim Tae-Young will meet on October the 8th here in Washington for the SCM, they will sign some very detailed annexes which cover the very details of what we mean when we say we're going to develop new, realistic plans based upon what we see going on in North Korea and the region to deal with the full range of possible contingencies; that all of our exercises now and in the future will exercise against those types of contingencies; that the Republic of Korea will buy, organize, and train the capabilities they need in order to be able to truly lead the war fight by 2015; we'll have a comprehensive certification program, not only on OPCON, but all of the different programs; and that we will synchronize that with our move south and our move down to Camp Humphreys.

So again, from an alliance perspective I believe that President Obama, after talking with our alliance partner, at the request of our alliance partner, agreed to delay it in order to be able to help improve our capabilities over the next several years.

Chairman LEVIN. Well, as you remember, in March this committee was informed that the transfer of wartime control of Korean troops, not ours but Korean troops, which has been planned for so many years, delayed a number of times, we were assured in March which was on track for April of 2012. So this is another—it's a long delay, and I hope it's the last one. But I've heard this explanation before and I think it just basically takes some of the pressure off South Korea to do what they need to do to control their own troops operationally in time of war.

So I'm troubled by that length of the delay. I think symbolically the delay because of the attack may have been appropriate, for 1

year. But the 3-year delay to me is excessive and sends to me the wrong signal to the South Koreans in terms of what they have committed to do for a decade now, which is to be ready to take operational control of their own troops.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Campbell, would you agree that one of the strongest measures we could take to affirm our relationship with South Korea would be to ratify the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would agree with that, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. And isn't it true that South Korea is now concluding free trade agreements with other countries?

Mr. CAMPBELL. That is correct, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Which gives us a disadvantage in the long run by not having those same kinds of agreements?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would simply stand by the first statement that you made, yes.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Gregson, does North Korea have a reliable nuclear capability?

Mr. GREGSON. We know that North Korea aspires to a nuclear capability.

Senator MCCAIN. I'll repeat the question: Does North Korea have a reliable nuclear capability?

Mr. GREGSON. Not to our knowledge.

Senator MCCAIN. Does North Korea have the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon?

Mr. GREGSON. Not to our knowledge.

Senator MCCAIN. That's very interesting, because published reports indicate that they certainly have a—do they have a nuclear capability, then, Secretary Gregson?

Mr. GREGSON. They have demonstrated the ability to detonate nuclear devices.

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Campbell, one of the reasons why we get a little cynical around here is exemplified by the comment you made about China. We recognize—I wrote it down: "step up its dialogue," "step up its dialogue." Remarkable statement. The Chinese have not only not helped us with Korea over the years, they have been an obstacle to increased sanctions. They warned the United States that we shouldn't send an aircraft carrier into international waters. And so we need to, quote, "step up the dialogue."

Secretary Gregson, do you currently see any evidence of technology transfer between North Korea and Iran?

Mr. GREGSON. Yes.

Senator MCCAIN. Could you in open hearing, or maybe it's classified, give us an idea of what kind of technology transfer is taking place between North Korea and Iran?

Mr. GREGSON. I'd rather do that in a different session.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you admit, though, that this is serious?

Mr. GREGSON. Yes. North Korea has demonstrated frequently their intent to violate a number of international norms, sanctions, and resolutions to transfer forbidden military technology to more than one other party.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have any information that the North Korean submarine that sank the Cheonan was using Iranian technology?

Mr. GREGSON. I'd rather go into that in a separate session.

Senator MCCAIN. Is it possible that the same act of, quote, "provocation" could have been committed against a United States warship just as easily?

Mr. GREGSON. Certainly the ability to attack from ambush, to conduct a surprise attack, is a threat, yes, that could have been attempted. I would not characterize it as "just as easily."

Senator MCCAIN. But there's a possibility that—well, the North Korean submarine had the capability to launch an attack on a United States ship just as they did a South Korean corvette.

General Sharp, have you seen—in light of the usual turmoil that accompanies the succession imbroglios that we've watched in the past as far as North Korea is concerned, have you seen increased acts of provocation on the part of the North Koreans and-or military buildup on the other side of the DMZ?

General SHARP. Sir, not military buildup. The summer training cycle they have gone through over the last several months has been a normal or maybe even slightly below normal summer training cycle that they've gone through. But up until very recently, with the release of several people—but up to that point before that, the acts, especially out in the northwest islands with some artillery firings out in the West Sea were clearly acts to demonstrate—I also don't like the word "provocation," but to clearly demonstrate to the people of South Korea that they have the capability to do things at their will. So we have seen those continue until very recently.

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gregson or Secretary Campbell, it seems that the youngest son will be the successor; is that the tea leaves reading that we get out of this?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Your guess is as good as ours, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, that's an interesting comment on our intelligence capability in North Korea.

General Sharp, what is in your view the readiness and capability of the North Korean military?

General SHARP. Sir, as you know, it's an extremely large force that is positioned very close to the DMZ, and we believe that if they wanted to do an all-out attack they could do that with very little notice. We have seen them over the last several years primarily putting their money into their ballistic missile force, their nuclear capability, and their special operating forces. They have not put as much money, we do not believe, in their conventional forces.

But when you really take a look at it, with that many millions of North Korean soldiers that have one mission, is to attack south and to kill as many as you can, you don't need a whole bunch of technology to be able to do that, and money going into it. We still see the great majority of North Korean money going into their military-first policy.

Senator MCCAIN. And that, in the scenario, would be a devastating artillery attack on Seoul?

General SHARP. Sir, they clearly have well over 200 long-range systems that could strike the heart of Seoul today without moving

either their weapons or their ammunition, and with a city of 28 million that's within that range. We work very hard, as you know, in our war plans to be prepared to quickly take that artillery out, both by counterfire artillery and by joint fires by our naval and our air forces, both on the Republic of Korea and the U.S. side. We work that very hard throughout the year in many, many different exercises.

But I've got to be realistic. We're not going to be able to stop all that artillery and there will be a lot of destruction if they choose to do that.

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gregson, if we feel it necessary will we continue to send aircraft carriers and other naval vessels into the region, which China has, quote, "warned" us that we shouldn't send carriers or naval power into these, quote, "international" waters?

Mr. GREGSON. Yes, we will. The ability to exploit freedom of the seas has been a principle of our republic since the beginning.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you and Senator McCain for convening this hearing. It reminds us, I think, that not so long ago, certainly as the last century was ending and we were looking to this century, we were saying that our focus would be on the Asia Pacific region in terms of the opportunities and the security challenges. Needless to say, because of 9–11 our focus has been on the Middle East and South Asia.

But that doesn't mean that history has stopped moving in the direction it was moving in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific. This area remains, as the opening statements of the chairman, the ranking member, and your statements and questions and answers now reveal in some detail, a very dynamic, dangerous, and important area for our National security.

We are a Pacific Nation and our presence there is not only critically important to our security and our economic wellbeing, but to the security and economic wellbeing of the region. It's important to say that so many of the countries in the region depend on our presence there.

So I appreciate the opportunity that the leadership of this committee has given us to focus on this, and of course our relationship with South Korea just gets better and better. This is an increasingly strong and important alliance to us of real mutual benefit.

I couldn't agree more about the strategic importance of the Korea Free Trade Agreement. I do want to say for the record that Senator Webb and I reached out to some of our Democratic colleagues in the Senate to show that there was bipartisan support and ten of us, oh, a month or so ago sent a letter to President Obama urging him to expedite movement of the free trade agreement this year through Congress.

I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony, also for their leadership, particularly in the time since the North Korean attack on the Cheonan. I appreciate President Obama's strength and soli-

darity with President Lee and our allies in South Korea in the aftermath of the Cheonan and all that we've done.

I must say that this morning in the New York Times former President Carter has an op-ed piece which contrasts so dramatically and disappointingly for me with the policy that the administration has followed, in which he says: "North Korea wants to make a deal." There's one really stunning omission here. President Carter finds it possible "to say that the North Koreans he spoke to expressed concern about several recent American actions, including unwarranted sanctions, ostentatious inclusion of North Korea among nations subject to nuclear attack, and provocative military maneuvers with South Korea." But he fails to mention the Cheonan incident and that certainly puts in doubt his conclusion that the leadership of North Korea that he spoke to is anxious to re-engage again.

In this regard I want to read from I thought a great statement that Secretary Gates made at the Shangri-La conference in Singapore last year: "I think that everyone in the room is familiar with the tactics that the North Koreans use. They create a crisis and the rest of us pay a price to return to the status quo ante. As the expression goes in the United States, I'm tired of buying the same horse twice."

Secretary Gregson, Secretary Campbell, in my opinion President Carter is asking us to buy the same horse that we bought many times before. And I wanted to get your—it seems so inconsistent with the direction of the administration policy regarding North Korea that I wanted to invite either your reaction to the Carter statement, which I think is awful, or your statement of where the administration is on North Korea today.

Secretary Gregson or Secretary Campbell?

Mr. GREGSON. We were very pleased with Secretary Gates's comment at the Shangri-La dialogue. Part of it was prepared, part of it was pure Secretary Gates, so that was not a staff product. That was Secretary Gates.

We in the Department of Defense believe that it has been North Korea's history to create a crisis, to conduct an attack, and then we make concessions to bring them back to the table for dialogue, as Senator McCain characterized. We're determined not to do that this time. We have the sanctions in place that we think can make a difference. As General Sharp eloquently discussed, we're reinforcing our alliance capabilities in every way that we can possibly do. We are pressing on the international community to maintain a consensus that will ameliorate or stop the illegal North Korean activities, and we want to see a meaningful change, meaningful reactions by North Korea, before we even begin to have negotiations.

If they will negotiate and begin to do it in good faith, with all that lies under that, then many things are possible. But as Secretary Gates eloquently capsulized, we don't want to buy the same horse again.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Secretary Campbell, do you want to add to that?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes, thank you, Senator. Frankly, I too was surprised by the omission of the Cheonan in President Carter's op-ed today. I must say we were grateful that he was successful in his

mission to free the American citizen, Mr. Gomes, that had wandered into North Korea. We have gratitude for that and obviously for much of the work that he does.

I think the statements that he put out from the North Koreans are well known to us. We've heard many of these before in previous interactions with the North Koreans. I would just note that the sanctions that he reports that the North Koreans are concerned by are not simply the sanctions that have recently been put in place by our Treasury Department, but more specifically the UN sanctions, which China was a strong supporter of, 1874. Those have really bitten and caused some anxiety among the senior leadership in North Korea.

I think it would be fair to say that we're looking for several things. One is some degree of reengagement between North and South. That is an inevitable process that must take place, and we're looking in many respects to the lead from South Korea on how that process goes forward.

But, as General Gregson has underscored, we are looking not to repeat the process of the last 10 or 15 years. We are looking for a sincere and clear signal from the North Koreans that they want to embark on a real process of negotiations on its nuclear and other capabilities.

I must say that I think we're trying to exhibit what Secretary Clinton describes as strategic patience. I think to date we've been relatively successful in this regard.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

My time's up.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator LeMieux.

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, thank you to all three of you for your service. I want to start by asking a question to Secretary Gregson. The firing upon the Cheonan by the North Koreans, do you consider that an act of war?

Mr. GREGSON. It can be characterized as such, yes.

Senator LEMIEUX. Certainly if one of our military ships was fired upon by the North Koreans we would consider it an act of war, wouldn't we?

Mr. GREGSON. Yes.

Senator LEMIEUX. We have a treaty, a mutual defense treaty, with the North Koreans—the South Koreans, excuse me. In the firing upon the ship and then the evaluation that determined that it was the North Koreans who in fact fired upon the ship, has there been any evaluation of our obligations under that treaty?

Mr. GREGSON. Continuous obligations. The decision on how to respond is an alliance decision, with due consideration for achieving our overall goal, which is protecting the Republic of Korea and protecting peace and stability in Asia.

As we know, the Cheonan is not the first provocation. North Korea is a country that attempted deliberately to assassinate the cabinet of the Republic of Korea, that executed a deliberate attack on the Blue House, their equivalent obviously of our White House. Since 2002 we've seen an uptick or an increase in attacks of a dif-

ferent kind, of a lesser impact than that on the Cheonan, of course—seizure of fishing ships, things like that.

This is a consistent type of behavior from North Korea, unfortunately.

Senator LEMIEUX. Do you expect for South Korea—now that the information is in, the analysis has been concluded that this was an attack from the North Koreans, do you expect some kind of military response?

Mr. GREGSON. I expect that we will continue to stay in close consultation with the Republic of Korea on actions that we will take in the future. I agree with General Sharp's characterization that President Lee Myung-bak demonstrated tremendous statesmanship under considerable pressure in the reaction of the Republic of Korea to this attack.

Senator LEMIEUX. This attack and the other ones that you just mentioned, aren't they sufficient justification for us to—and perhaps this is a question for Secretary Campbell—to put North Korea back on the state sponsor of terror list?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Our judgment was that these provocative actions required a separate action, and so we have issued an executive order, very broadly conceived, that identifies a whole range of activities in North Korea. So yes, in many respects this is a definitional issue and so I would actually, Senator, agree with you. This was—

Senator LEMIEUX. This was an act of terrorism, wasn't it?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Act of war, actually.

Senator LEMIEUX. So can we—are we moving forward on putting them back on the list?

Mr. CAMPBELL. We have a process that's under way that is specific associated with looking with various actions that North Korea has undertaken in the past and could undertake in the future that are involved with international terrorism. That is different than the specific act associated with the sinking of the Cheonan. So we have taken very specific actions with regard to the sinking of the Cheonan with the new executive order that is extraordinarily broad, very deep, a variety of military steps—exercises, enhanced deterrence.

Actually, I think the decision on OPCON transfer was the right one. We have done a number of things in Northeast Asia to send a very clear signal of our direction forward.

Senator LEMIEUX. But does that mean that we're putting them back on the state sponsor of terror list or we're not?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think I've answered, I've tried to answer your question.

Senator LEMIEUX. The answer is no or yes?

Mr. CAMPBELL. We have a process, an ongoing process, that is associated with evaluating data associated with what North Korea is doing in a global context associated with terrorism. The sinking of the Cheonan—

Senator LEMIEUX. Because that's separate and apart, then. But are you, separate and apart from that attack, evaluated whether or not to put North Korea back on the list?

Mr. CAMPBELL. We are constantly evaluating that, yes.

Senator LEMIEUX. Is there a decision point that you see coming forward? Is there a time when I should expect that you will make a decision?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think that is an issue that we could address in private session, yes. Thank you.

Senator LEMIEUX. Okay.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Secretary, Senator McCain was asking you about the free trade agreement and the importance of it, and you agreed the importance of having that free trade agreement entered into. We also have one pending with Colombia and Panama. Do you know when the administration is going to send these agreements to the Congress to have them approved?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I don't know, Senator. It's outside of my area of responsibility in terms of Latin America. I do know that President Obama has indicated his desire to move in the near term on the Korea Free Trade Agreement, and I would just associate myself with your comments about the—it's not only important at an economic level, but it has enormous strategic consequences as well.

Senator LEMIEUX. I was talking to our National Security Adviser and he was telling me that he believed it was a national security issue for Colombia certainly. Would you agree that it's a national security issue for South Korea that we enter into this agreement?

Mr. CAMPBELL. If I could just even go further, Senator, I think it's not just a national security issue for South Korea; I think it is for the United States. I would just underscore just one thing. I've spent the last year and a half out in Asia considerably, and there are doubts about our staying power and our ability to play the dramatic leadership role in the future that we played in the past. It requires an all hands on deck approach. It has to be multifaceted. It has to be intense diplomacy, not just bilateral but multilateral. It requires the kind of military effort that General Sharp indicates. Also it requires the kind of initiative that you underscore on the Korea Free Trade Agreement.

So yes, it's not just for the South Koreans. It's for us as well.

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you very much.

I want to switch gears a little bit and talk about succession plans for North Korea, allegedly the third son here being put in line, Kim Jong-un. If the succession doesn't happen or for some reason North Korea fails, does State and Defense and the military have a strategy for trying to ensure that this nuclear material does not get lost or turn up in the hands of someone else? Is there a security strategy for that?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I'd like to just apologize at the outset. I actually made a flip answer to Senator McCain's very important and timely question about the succession. The truth is, though, what I was trying to underscore, is that in fundamental ways North Korea is still a black box. We have some glimpses and some intelligence and the like. But the truth is oftentimes in retrospect some of that intelligence has proven to be wrong. It's a very, very hard target, probably the hardest target that we've faced in the global arena.

I will just tell you that we have to be prepared for all circumstances, and I mean all circumstances, and the level of interaction that is undertaken inside the U.S. Government is intensive, and that extends also to a dialogue and extremely close coordina-

tion with South Korea and Japan. So I would answer your question that way.

Senator LEMIEUX. If I could just conclude, Mr. Chairman, with a question to General Sharp.

General, you and I have spoken before about the status of the military housing for our young men and women who are serving us there. Are you getting the MILCON dollars you need to make sure that they're in good conditions in their houses for our folks who are serving?

General SHARP. Sir, for where we are right now we are okay. We are working through within the Department some options on how to be able to continue providing those houses as we move down to Camp Humphreys. I kind of mentioned in my opening statement a couple of the options the Department is looking at right now.

I actually have some meetings this afternoon to discuss them with several members of the appropriate committees to get your thoughts, because it is critical that we take care of our service members that are so—and their families. We've all talked here so far this morning about how important it is for us to maintain our commitment in Korea and to demonstrate that, not only to the Koreans, but to North Korea and to China. I think clearly having our families there, having the force level there, demonstrates we're going nowhere. So being able to properly take care of them with housing is absolutely critical, and we will have to work through very quickly how to be able to do that as we move down to Pyongtaek and to Camp Humphreys.

Senator LEMIEUX. We share that priority with you. So thank you for your commitment to that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Secretary Gregson and Secretary Campbell, first, have we been able to establish the motivation, the rationale, the objective, of the attack on the South Korean vessel by the North Koreans? Or is that something that's still difficult to determine? Was it a bureaucratic miscue? Was it directed on high? Was it part of—do we know anything about it?

Mr. GREGSON. Senator, there are two theories. One is that it's a reaction, a reaction to the November 2009 naval firefight between forces of the Republic of Korea and North Korea. The other theory is that it's somehow tied into the mysterious succession politics inside North Korea. I'm not personally aware that anybody has a definitive answer beyond those two competing theories.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Could I just add a third to that if I could, Senator Reed. I first of all associate very closely with the answer of General Gregson. But I think that, as General Gregson underscored, this is not the first time something like this has happened. They have happened periodically.

I think you find, if you look at sort of a calendar of events, these kinds of provocations tend to occur before major events in South Korea that highlight the success of South Korea, the Seoul Olympics and the like. And again, as I stated at the outset, the upcom-

ing G–20 is a very big deal, a very big deal for the South Koreans. It's the arrival of South Korea on the global stage, probably again the biggest diplomatic achievement in their history. One could imagine that this would play into part of the dynamic that we've seen in North Korea.

But I have to underscore that in many respects this is a black box. We really don't know very much about the motivations, ultimate goals and ambitions behind such a dangerous and provocative act.

Senator REED. Let me change gears. I understand—and correct me if I'm incorrect—that the Chinese were not aware beforehand of this attack, that there was no—they had no information either. And it seems clear from every rational source that this was a torpedo attack by the North Koreans. What's the motivation for the Chinese to reject what is obvious, what is dangerous, and also something that apparently they weren't even tipped off to?

Any views on that? I know we're trying to make estimates about very difficult issues.

Mr. CAMPBELL. It is our best judgment that China had no foreknowledge of the action, as you indicated, Senator. I tried to indicate at the outset that we believe that the calculations for the Chinese on the peninsula are complicated, very complex. They have been supportive in the past of certain initiatives. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 in the aftermath of the nuclear weapons detonation—a very powerful signal to the international community, including China.

They've taken other steps. They've played I think an important role during certain critical junctures in the Six Party Talks. I think—I wouldn't want to put words in the mouths of Chinese friends. I think they believe that this is an incredibly critical period, perhaps a somewhat uncertain period in North Korea, and they have told us that they believe that certain steps could drive North Korea to the wall and that was not in their strategic interests.

Senator REED. We talk about the complicated dynamics for the Chinese. We also have complicated dynamics. This is a general question and it might just elicit a nod, but to what extent are our strategic objectives complicated or indeed compromised by our economic relationship with the Chinese? I mean, there are issues like this where we could take a much firmer course with the Chinese, but we have other issues at play. Do you want to—will I get more than a nod?

Mr. CAMPBELL. If I could say, I understand your question, Senator. But I actually think those considerations do not come to play in this regard. If you listen carefully to how General Gregson answered the question, our most important guiding principle on the Korean Peninsula is the objectives, the wishes and desires of the South Korean people. So what we have tried to do is steer our course with the South Koreans, and that has been our primary objective in this regard.

The truth is that we took a very strong line at the United Nations and we worked very hard with our allies and others to get the Presidents' statements through. This was tough diplomacy, very challenging diplomacy. But the most important consideration

for us on the peninsula really is to ensure that we are closely aligned with the South Koreans in all our strategies.

Senator REED. General Gregson, do you have a comment?

Mr. GREGSON. Yes, I do. Thank you. I concur completely with Secretary Campbell's statement. I'd also like to emphasize that there is a very strong alliance consensus for our way forward and has been since before the Cheonan incident. The consensus accelerated after the May 2008—sorry—May 2009 North Korean alleged nuclear device detonation and the missile test, certainly accelerated with the Cheonan. That's the cooperation is U.S., Republic of Korea, and Japan; Republic of Korea of course most directly affected by the Cheonan attack, but Japan has also been victim of kidnapping actions by North Korea, has been victim of attempted incursions by North Korean infiltration vessels, various things. So they are very closely aligned here.

All three of our Nations are firmly in agreement on the importance of peace, stability, deterrence in Northeast Asia and all three of us consult continuously on the ways forward, the actions to take, our sensing of the situation.

On that alliance consensus, we have been building the international consensus to constrain North Korea's attempted transfer of illegal materials to other countries of interest and things like that.

This abiding consensus allows us to take a solid alliance approach to these various actions by North Korea and allows us also to have an alliance consensus to the reported—underline, "reported"—gestures lately by North Korea to want to talk about various matters.

Senator REED. Very good.

My time has expired. Let me commend General Sharp for his leadership and for that of his soldiers and his sailors, airmen, marines. Thank you very much, sir, and we look forward to seeing you soon. Good luck.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

We have a vote on. Senator Reed, are you going to want to have a second round? Do you need a second round?

Senator REED. The chairman has been most gracious. I have a reprieve, unfortunately, gentlemen.

Just two quick questions, one to General Sharp. In your plans going forward, you are pulling the bulk of your forces away from the DMZ as I understand it, but your training areas historically are close to the DMZ. Are you going to have some issues with training, particularly in a country that is rapidly developing and urbanizing and wealthy like Korea?

General SHARP. That's part of the plan, sir. Actually, we are keeping all of our training ranges, Rodriguez Range and the other ranges that we have up near the DMZ right now. In fact, we're continuing to modernize those ranges.

The move south has been accounted for. There will be a railhead as part of the plan put into Camp Humphreys and a rail line going up. So it will be a very similar movement to what we do in Germany to get to De Graef and to Hohenfeld. So we have accounted for that, sir.

Senator REED. Very well.

Just a final question to the Secretaries. Just a general sort of evaluation of the sanctions, their effectiveness, the cooperation. Particularly—again, I don't want to be a broken record—the cooperation by the Chinese. I do sense that the Japanese, the South Koreans, and the United States are clearly shoulder to shoulder, but that's only part of the team that you need. So can you just give me a quick reaction, General Gregson, Secretary Campbell also?

Mr. GREGSON. I think we're very encouraged with Chinese support on that front.

Senator REED. Well, this is the question I got the nod. So thank you very much.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.

I'm just going to ask a few questions, and if none of my colleagues are back when I'm done, because I have to go to vote, too, then we're going to recess for a few minutes until a colleague comes back.

General, you've indicated that continuing attempts to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities by the North is your number one concern. Is there an appropriate balance in your judgment between our contributions to missile defense in the region and South Korean contributions? Or do you look for South Korea to increase its contribution to regional missile defense?

General SHARP. Sir, South Korea, as you know, have recently bought Patriots. They will have several more of them and increased missile capability delivered over the next several years, to include some command and control additional things to be able to link them in with ours. As you know, they have now two Aegis ships. They just launched their second Aegis ship about a week ago and have another one in the railyard. So there is—they are increasing that capability.

We are trying to work very hard—in fact, Secretary Gregson has worked very hard—to try to work the three countries of South Korea, the United States, and Japan to do some better coordination in order to be able to have regional type ballistic missile defense, and we're working through those initiatives.

Chairman LEVIN. General, you've indicated that our tour normalization program demonstrates a commitment to South Korea and to the region. How do you respond to those who suggest that we shouldn't be using our military families to demonstrate that commitment in a potentially dangerous location?

General SHARP. Sir, I believe that the long-term tours of our service members in Korea greatly increases my combat capability if I don't have to train a new soldier every year. I believe that Korea is a safe place for our families to live and that we have very detailed and very exercised NEO plans. That would be a huge task if we had to NEO everyone out, but I'm confident that we could do that.

I think that the deterrent value of our military, the 28,500, and the demonstration that we are here for the long run, that not only we say in words but we say it in our actions of having family members and properly taking care of them over there, is a strong deterrent value. I was in Fulda in the mid-1980s with families and I

that helped and that demonstrated that we were staying in West Germany and weren't going to stand for the threat of the Soviet Union at the time.

Our obligation, my obligation as the commander there, is to watch very closely for indications that it's time to get those family members out of harm's way, so that we can truly be prepared to defend the Republic of Korea. I take that very seriously. We work it very hard in exercises throughout the year. We have a very detailed plan for NEO that we have worked, not just on the U.S. side, because it will require a lot of Korean support. But the plan is very, very detailed and Korea, South Korea, also understands that responsibility.

So I believe that tour normalization is extremely important, not only to our families, but more importantly to our capability and to our commitment to the region.

Chairman LEVIN. General, what's your assessment of the current level of readiness of the Combined Forces to respond to aggression from North Korea?

General SHARP. Sir, I think the Combined Forces is ready to respond to aggression from North Korea. We just finished up in August Ulchi Freedom Guardian Exercise, our annual summer exercise, which was based upon an attack from North Korea. But this exercise, as I said, stated in my opening statement, we have expanded our exercise program to really take a look at how we think North Korea would do some limited attacks, what sorts of different incidents would they do prior to a conflict to try to prevent us from the reinforcements that are going in, to try to prevent us from taking our defensive positions, some things that they could do very early on.

The exercise went very well. I was very pleased with the fact that we're getting at some of the much more difficult issues, but the very realistic issues. I am confident that we're prepared for an aggression, whether it's limited or all-out from North Korea.

Chairman LEVIN. You'd say we're in a high state of readiness?

General SHARP. Sir, we are in a high state of readiness.

Chairman LEVIN. As I mentioned before, General, the cost of moving U.S. forces originally further south was $10 billion. The South Korean share was $4 billion. The cost is now estimated at about $13 billion. Is that a fairly firm estimate now or is that going to continue to climb? And does the South Korean share go up? In other words, are they going to take on about 40 percent of that additional $3 billion? Is that part of the deal?

General SHARP. Senator, as you know, when we agreed in the Yongson relocation program to move out of Seoul, the Republic of Korea said they were going to pay for all of those costs, minus the housing that we have off post. They are doing that.

We also said when we wanted to move the Second Infantry Division, which is called the Land Partnership Program, and consolidate them at the same location, the Koreans agreed to get the land, but they said we had to create the facilities. The costs of those facilities are being borne in combination by both the United States and the Republic of Korea.

This actually is a big question going on in the news over in Korea right now, about are we using some of the burden-sharing

money in order to be able to build what we need down at Camp Humphreys. What I've told the—

Chairman LEVIN. I'm not sure what your answer is. I'm afraid I'm going to have to cut you short because I have to vote. I'm sorry to do that. But if the increased cost overall goes from $10 billion to $13 billion and the original Korean share as I understand it was $4 billion, is that $4 billion going to increase proportionately now that the total is $13 billion or not?

General SHARP. Sir, the Koreans are paying a lot more than $4 billion.

Chairman LEVIN. So that's your answer, is the $4 billion figure is wrong?

General SHARP. That's right.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in terms of the increase in the cost, estimated cost, will their—will they pay a proportionate share of that increased cost?

General SHARP. Sir, I'd rather cover that in a closed session.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Well, or for the record.

General SHARP. And for the record, yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. I hope that's not a closed—that's not a classified issue.

General SHARP. No.

Chairman LEVIN. But if you can give us that for the record, that would be more than satisfactory.

General SHARP. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. We're going to be in recess now until a colleague comes back, which I expect to be any minute, hopefully not more than 10 minutes. But let's say we will recess for 15 minutes or when a colleague comes back on either side of the aisle, whichever is earlier.

[Recess from 11:03 a.m. to 11:10 a.m.]

Senator Lieberman [presiding]: The hearing will come back to order. I thank all of you, my colleagues. I went and voted on the first. There's a second. I think by the time I finish my questioning somebody else will be back.

I thank you very much for your testimony. General Sharp, I had a different reaction than Chairman Levin did to the transfer, to the delay of the transfer of operational control. My own feeling was, as I heard it, was that it was not really related to the capabilities of the military of the Republic of Korea, but more to the surrounding political and diplomatic environment, the concern about various anniversaries coming up and North Korea, provocative action by them, elections coming in the United States, perhaps transition of power in China—just an unsteady time in the region, and going back to what Secretary Campbell said about the doubts in the region about our staying power, that motivated that delay mostly. That's why I greeted it positively.

Was I right? Was it—in other words, am I right that not any significant part of the delay is based on a concern about the capabilities of the military of the ROK?

General SHARP. Sir, as you know, over the last 2 years we have gone through numerous exercises to ensure that the military, both

on the Republic of Korea side and the U.S. side, is properly organized and trained and had the right plans in order to be ready for 17 April 2012. Very detailed certification checklist that was done by external evaluators.

I had to report that to Secretary Gates and Minister Kim Tae-Young at the yearly SCM. My report was, and I still hold by it, is that militarily we were on track in order to be able to move into a supported-supporting relationship by 2012.

My understanding—I was not there, but my understanding when President Lee and President Obama talked back in June was that they talked much broader than just on the military side; all the other incidents, some of which that you met, I'm sure, came up in that discussion; and that President Obama agreed for the sake of the alliance for the ability to be able to continue to strengthen the alliance over the next 3 years, he agreed to that delay.

What Secretary Gates charged us to do is then to make it a much more comprehensive plan than simply moving into a supported to supported relationship, so that the synchronization will allow us to do some things over those 3-year period to get us stronger versus some things we would have done in parallel. That's what the current plan is that we'll codify here on the 8th of October when the Secretary and the minister get together again.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, I appreciate that answer.

Secretary Campbell, let me ask you to pick up some on your comment about some of the doubts in the region about our commitment to stay strongly in the region. I think you raised it around the Free Trade Act as a way for us to express in one way our commitment to the region. I want to come at this from a slightly different path, which is China.

Two things. One is the aggressiveness of the Chinese both toward us and their neighbors. I was interested that recently, and I think for the first time publicly, Prime Minister Singh of India commented on that, publicly questioning the greater aggressiveness of the Chinese. They're obviously spending a lot of money to build up their military. I noticed Andy Krepinevich had an op-ed piece this week in which he worried publicly about the danger that in a few years China will have the capability to make it much harder for us to project power and defend our allies in the Asia Pacific, and that their military buildup seems to be specifically built around area denial and an anti-access strategy.

So I wanted to invite your general comment on the way in which China's military buildup and more aggressive posturing fits into your concern, which I agree with, that there's concern in the region about whether we're there to stay.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. If I may, let me just harken back quickly to the question that you asked General Sharp. My own sense is that your assessment of the complex motivations behind the decision are completely accurate. So I would associate myself with what you are indicating going forward, a very complex time in the region.

There are many factors at play in the Asian Pacific region. One of them is the extraordinarily rapid ascent of China as a global player and a global power, a country that withstood some of the

challenges of the global economy in the last several years, very well positioned accordingly.

We are in a situation where we have a very complex relationship with China. There are a number of areas that we're seeking to work very closely with them on—climate change, issues associated with nonproliferation. They've worked with us on Iran, again in circumstances on the Korean Peninsula; in certain circumstances associated with piracy and the like.

So there are areas that we have been able, oftentimes through exerted diplomatic effort, to work closely together. There is invariably areas where we compete. We seek to compete in peaceful ways. But at the same time, as the Pentagon military report recently stated and as Secretary Gates has underscored publicly at Shangri-La and elsewhere, there are some military developments that we seek greater clarity into, that have raised concerns about our own forward deployments overall.

There have been a number of interactions with China in recent months on issues that are of mutual concern, and some of those interactions can be quite tense. Our overall desire, however, is to maintain a steady as she goes relationship with China, with the recognition that there will inevitably and invariably be areas where we have differences, and sometimes those differences are quite intense.

I would simply say I would use a slightly different word than "aggressiveness." I think they are more assertive on the global stage.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right, and in the neighborhood.

Mr. CAMPBELL. In the neighborhood, yes. But I think it is also the case that I have never seen an environment in Asia in which the United States is more welcomed to play a more significant role, not just in Northeast Asia, where we've talked primarily today, but Southeast Asia as well. I think one of the desires of the administration is to take a multifaceted approach, deeper integration in regional diplomacy, in multilateral institutions, working with India, drawing India in more to the Asian Pacific region, working towards consequential diplomacy with China.

This is not a relationship, Senator, I think as you know, that the United States has much experience with. We've had a monochromatic kind of relationship in the past with the Soviet Union. That's not what the relationship is like with China. It's deep, it's complicated. There are areas of cooperation. There are areas of discord. How we manage that is going to be the primary diplomatic challenge for the United States over the course of the next generation.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate the answer.

I don't want to take the time today, but at some point we all ought to come back together and talk about how we should respond if in fact what the Chinese are basing their military buildup on is—and I know we're already focused on this to some extent—an area denial and anti-access strategy.

But I want to move on to another subject. You said, Secretary Campbell, earlier, and I agree with you, that our historic relationship and alliance with Japan has been at the center of our policy and relations in this part of the world, and that remains so. Obvi-

ously, we're very grateful for the extraordinary depth, growing depth, of our relationship with South Korea.

In that regard, I wanted to say that I've been impressed by the degree of trilateral cooperation between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan in the wake of the Cheonan attack, including the dispatch of those Japanese advisers to the U.S.-ROK exercises in July. I wanted to ask any of the three of you or all of you, if you want, to speak to the efforts that we are making now to improve trilateral security cooperation among these three great democracies and whether there are opportunities that you see to institutionalize greater trilateral cooperation going forward.

Mr. CAMPBELL. First of all, thank you for the question, Senator. I have to say that in many respects the architect and implementer of this extraordinarily important trilateral interaction on defense and diplomacy is General Gregson.

I want to say one thing very quickly about our relationship with Japan. I think too often, particularly in media reports, there is a focus on one issue and only one issue, this very challenging issue associated with a base in Okinawa, Futenma, and what is often overlooked are the extraordinary commitments and contributions Japan has made.

So when you ask people who is the second, behind the United States, largest contributor to various reconstruction and other efforts in Afghanistan, very few people will realize that it's Japan. That is a decision that was taken by this new government in Japan.

Recent sanctions put in place against Iran; who is one of the leading countries that got out in front of this? We didn't have to twist their arms. Japan. Very much unlike a situation that we faced in the past.

Which country has put money behind various initiatives to deal with the global issues associated with climate change in the aftermath of Copenhagen? Japan. Which country has contributed to the piracy efforts in the areas around Africa? Japan.

Unfortunately—and who has stepped up considerably with the kind of support necessary for us to sustain our military and security relationship in Northeast Asia? Japan.

So, unfortunately in this environment, where we are working on a very challenging issue in Okinawa, Japan has not gotten the credit it deserves for really working, not only closely with the United States, but through General Gregson and others at the Pentagon much closer coordination on the Korean Peninsula.

What we have seen with this new government in Japan is a rapprochement with countries that have had problems with Japan because of a variety of historical issues. You've seen a real coming together between Lee Myong-Bak and the Japanese leadership about the need to focus more on the future than on the past.

I think we can build on that further. I'll leave it to Chip to talk about that in greater detail.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. I appreciate that answer.

General Gregson.

Mr. GREGSON. I would just briefly add quickly. Secretary Campbell gives me too much credit. Secretary Gates and the minister of defense of—ministers of defense of our two closest allies investment

been instrumental in bringing this cooperation together. May 2009 at Singapore, in the immediate wake of the North Korean reported or claimed nuclear device detonation and the missile launches saw the first trilateral defense ministerial meeting amongst the three allies, and the cooperation has just built from there.

I mentioned earlier—I think you were out—that the alliance consensus, U.S., Japan, Republic of Korea, on how to respond to North Korea is the foundation of the international consensus that we've built and sustained, thanks to the State Department and others, to constrain North Korea.

Our bases in Japan are just as necessary to the defense of the peninsula as they are to security throughout all of Asia. We are undergoing two very complex alliance realignment efforts at the same time, General Sharp's effort in the Republic of Korea and then the other realignment effort across the Pacific. As Secretary Campbell mentioned, one airfield gets almost all the attention, but a number of other really breathtaking initiatives with Japan to better realign our forces, our bilateral capabilities, for the future, have gone on with relatively no drama.

I'm very much an optimist on our ability to not only sustain our presence in the western Pacific, but actually to increase it and improve it.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks for the answer. It struck me as you began that you haven't learned a lot around Washington, because you're giving other people credit, which is not what happens.

Mr. GREGSON. Well, you know what I mean.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. I think you deserve a lot of the credit, but so do the other two ministers.

General.

General SHARP. Sir, just some specifics. What we're trying to work and what we have done over the last several years specifically on the U.N. rear bases which are in Japan is, there have been many folks from the national assembly in Korea that have gone over and visited those to understand the importance of Japan to our warfight. We're working very closely with them, as I said earlier, on ballistic missile defense, on search and rescue missions out, to be able to do that, and on PSI type of activities. So that the military to military cooperation, we're trying to continue to improve that, so if there was a major conflict we'd be prepared for that from a trilateral perspective.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I'm going to ask one more question, and I've been hoping somebody would return. But this is a bit more diplomatic than military, so I'll focus on you, Secretary Gregson. I've been troubled by what seems to be the Chinese ambivalence and reluctance on the Iran sanctions. They've put themselves in a position of being outside what is a really impressive and I think effective, growing global consensus. Japan and South Korea are playing very strong, initiating, proactive roles here.

I noticed in one of the papers today that the Chinese had cancelled Mr. Einhorn's visit to Beijing. I just wanted to ask you to reflect a bit on what we can do in the midst of all of this, because we all want to manage our relationship with China well, to bring them more into the global consensus on a really critical security issue and diplomatic issue like Iran.

Mr. GREGSON. As Secretary Campbell has stated a couple of times today, our relationship with China is complex, to say the least. We're continuing to work not only with China, but with all other concerned nations, to find an answer to our issues with Iran.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Senator Campbell?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Let me try on that, Senator. I'd build on what General Gregson has said. I think there are a couple of ingredients that go into when you are successful in these circumstances with Chinese friends. One is persistence. This has to be undertaken over an extended period of time.

Number two is that any time you sit down with Chinese friends you have a hierarchy of issues. You want to make sure that hierarchy is consistent and that the issue in question is near or at the top, not just from one interlocutor but all of them. I think that has been the case, both of those have been the case, vis a vis China to date.

Third is to make the powerful case about why moving in a certain direction is not just an American or larger interest, but in Chinese interests, and to try to articulate that reason why the sanctions effort with an attempt to change the very provocative behavior of the Iranian leadership with regard to nuclear weapons at this juncture is our best option.

I think lastly is to undertake a diplomatic campaign whereby China does not feel that it wants to be perceived as the odd man out.

So I think we're going to see over the course of the next couple of months an increasing recognition of a successful campaign, which I think you rightly and accurately portray, in which you've got European, Russian, South Korean, Japanese, and other efforts at very broad and biting sanctions. I think it's going to be very clear to Chinese friends that they do not want to be an outlier in this regard.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excellent.

I'm afraid I do have to go back to that second vote, so I'll put the hearing in recess, or at least at ease, until Chairman Levin returns. I want to thank the three of you. This for me has been a very informative, educational hearing, honest, direct. Your testimony has been very strong and impressive, so I'm grateful for the leadership that the three of you are giving in this critically important part of the world.

See you soon.

[Recess from 11:30 a.m. to 11:38 a.m.]

Chairman LEVIN. We're going to come back in session just for a couple minutes. I think there will not be other Senators able to get back, so I just have one additional question. Unless other Senators arrive, this will be it.

It has to do with the Six-Party Talks. Secretary Campbell, let me ask you the question. As has been mentioned, the Six-Party Talks were stalled at the end of 2008, and then the North Koreans expelled the international nuclear inspectors. There is little reason since then to believe that North Korea will end its nuclear program. As a matter of fact, it appears somewhat contrary, that they remain intent to pursue a nuclear weapons program. That is evi-

denced by the test of June 2009, as well as the statements to that effect which they've made.

Now, the administration has consistently said that it wants to see North Korea demonstrate through concrete actions its commitment to the complete and verifiable abandonment of nuclear programs. So my question to you is this. What conditions need to be met in your judgment before the Six Party Talks can be restarted? What are the prospects for restarting the talks with North Korea, whether in a Six Party format or perhaps some other format?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You've fairly accurately stated our position in your question, but I'll try to restate aspects of it back to you. First of all, Ambassador Bosworth and Ambassador Sung Kim are just completing their trip, consultations through the region. I think our position has been clear, it's been consistent, that we are prepared, under the appropriate conditions, to reconvene the Six-Party framework to deal with the difficult challenges posed by the nuclear provocations on the part of the North Koreans.

In the current environment, given what has just transpired, we think an essential first step has been, needs to be some reengagement between North and South Korea. I think that is going to be critical going forward and, as we have long held, we also think that it's going to be significant that North Korea again, as we've said in the past, underscore its commitment to fulfil its commitments that it took in 2005.

We are looking very clearly for those signs, and I think that in the coming days Ambassador Bosworth and Ambassador Sung Kim will be publicly underscoring what they learned on this particular trip to Japan, South Korea, and China.

Chairman LEVIN. Is there any likely prospect that these talks—well, let me ask you this. If there were a change in the leadership, we don't have any idea as to where that would lead? I think your answer was accurate, that our intelligence doesn't give us any clear suggestion as to who would be the likely successor. You may have stated that in a way which was overly succinct, but it was also accurate.

Do we have any assessment as to whether or not it would be more likely that the Six Party Talks would get back under way again if there were a change in the leadership? Is it more or less likely that, to the extent that you can make this assessment or that the intelligence community can make it, that the current leadership would be more likely to find a way back or take steps that are essential for the Six Party Talks to resume than its potential successor?

Is there anything on that issue, as to Six Party Talks resuming and who would be the leader?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Chairman, it's an appropriate question and it's a very difficult, very hard hypothetical. In fact, we just don't know enough to know. I think one of the things that we are trying to do in this environment is to state very clearly what our position is, which we feel has been consistent over time.

I think there is a great benefit to that consistency, very clear statement of our purposes and our joint efforts on the part of both Japan and South Korea, and also I think on China. I believe that

what is changing is perhaps a greater desire on the part of China to see progress in the Six Party Talks. How that desire will be manifested, again the conditions will tell. But I think they understand very clearly the dangers and the risks that the current situation poses.

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you all again for your service, for your testimony. Unless any of you have something you want to add, we will stand adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the committee adjourned.]