

NOMINATIONS OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND; AND LTG LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ

THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 2010

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Ben Nelson, Webb, Hagan, Burris, Kaufman, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Graham, Thune, LeMieux, Burr, and Vitter.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican staff director; John W. Heath, Jr. minority investigative counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, and Christine G. Lang.

Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christiana Gallagher and Ann Premer, assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator Burris; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brooks Tucker, assistant to Senator Burr; and Michael Wong, assistant to Senator Vitter.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

The committee meets this morning to consider the nominations of two extremely distinguished senior military officers, General Raymond Odierno, nominated to be Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin, nominated to be general and Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq. On behalf of the committee, let me thank you both for your devotion, your commitment to the service of our country, your willingness to be in positions of extreme responsibility.

We know that nominees are not alone in making these sacrifices, and so in advance we thank your family members for the support which they will need to continue to provide to you. We have a long-standing tradition of asking our nominees to introduce family members who are present, and let me do that at this time.

General Odierno, if you have family members with you, we'd be delighted for you to introduce them.

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have my wife, Linda, with me today.

Linda, if you could stand up, please?

My wife of 34 years has been with me my entire Army career, supported our families and our soldiers and continues to do that on a volunteer basis. As you all know, and we know, we couldn't do it without their great support that they give us, and I thank her for her support and sacrifices that she's given these last several years.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you so much for your great service in support of not only your husband, but all that he does for our Nation.

General Austin, do you have family members with you?

General AUSTIN. I do, Mr. Chairman, and I'd ask my wife, Charlene, to stand up, please?

Before I introduce Charlene, though, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to applaud the efforts of all of the family members that support our military day in and day out. They've made great sacrifices to our Nation and they give a lot each and every day.

Charlene's no exception. She's been my bride for 25 years. She's a trained counselor by profession, and she's been in the service of our soldiers and family members for the entire time that we've been together. I'm very grateful for her sacrifices and her continued support.

Thanks a lot, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to introduce her.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, and thank her as well.

We, this committee, spend a lot of time supporting our men and women in uniform and we also make it a point to focus on their families and the kind of support that they deserve.

Each of our nominees has served this country in the military for more than 30 years. They've shouldered the awesome responsibilities of senior leadership of American troops in combat.

General Odierno is no stranger to this committee, he's commanded U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq nearly continuously since December 2006. In fact, during that time, General Odierno has had, I understand, only one small 7-month break in the last 47 months.

General, your service and sacrifice and that of your family are well-known to all of us. They are deeply appreciated. We have a tremendous respect and confidence in you. If you are confirmed, you have the important responsibility of providing mission-ready joint-capable forces to our combatant commanders around the world. This command also supports the development and integration of present and future joint interagency and multi-national capabilities.

Our committee has a longstanding interest in this Command's mission, responsibilities, authorities and activities with respect to joint doctrine development, training, experimentation, and acquisition.

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to stress the readiness and resources of our Armed Forces. JFCOM's leadership as the joint force provider for present and future operational needs of the Department of Defense (DOD) is essential.

We're particularly interested in hearing General Odierno's views on JFCOM's contribution to the development of capabilities and the generation of forces to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders, as well as his assessment, based on his experience over the last few years of the readiness of both deploying ground forces, and nondeploying forces, and we'd be particularly interested, also, to hear General Odierno's views on the future of JFCOM's contribution to the joint acquisition, transformation, and readiness of our military through what promises to be the very challenging years ahead.

In addition, the committee is interested in the role that joint experimentation, including JFCOM's modeling and simulation activities plays in advancing our warfighting capabilities. We have a significant interest in pressing the Department on plans to reduce the number of contractors and to transfer responsibility to DOD staff, as Secretary Gates has said that he would do.

Lieutenant General Austin currently serves as Director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, and that is an extraordinarily important position. We've come to know of his great service in that position. But he also has important recent experience commanding U.S. and Coalition Forces in combat as Commanding General of Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and prior to that, commanding the 10th Mountain Division in Afghanistan.

If confirmed, General Austin will assume command of approximately 82,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, on the way down to 50,000 by the end of this coming August and leading to the eventual withdrawal of all of our forces by December 2011.

The drawdown of U.S. forces is based on our security agreement with the Government of Iraq. It is supported by the increasing capability of the Iraqis Security Forces to shoulder the responsibility of maintaining order in their country.

However, enough challenges remain, as the Iraqis still have not established a government following the elections last spring. They still need to wrestle with the political future of their Northern Provinces, and come to an agreement on how to distribute Iraq's abundant oil revenues.

Within that context, the drawdown of U.S. forces is a complex military operation. When confirmed, General Austin will continue

to carefully manage the change of the U.S. force's mission from counterinsurgency to advising and assisting the Iraqi security forces, targeted counterterrorism operations and force protection. All of which must occur while redeploying to the United States tens of thousands of personnel, and shipping millions of pieces of equipment out of Iraq.

A critical part of the drawdown of U.S. forces is the interagency transition from DOD lead to the Department of State lead with respect to U.S. long-term relations, and the host of stability and reconstruction activities in Iraq. We'd be interested in hearing General Austin's views on the importance of that transition, and if confirmed, what actions he will take—if any—to ensure that it is accomplished efficiently and effectively.

We're also interested to hear General Austin's views on the challenges of redeploying those large numbers of equipment and the remaining 82,000 personnel from Iraq. Some of that equipment needs to be sent to Afghanistan for our operations, and where appropriate, by transferring some of that equipment to the Afghan Security Forces to accelerate their taking responsibility for their country's own security.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank our two very distinguished witnesses for appearing before the committee this morning. General Ray Odierno and General Lloyd Austin are two of America's finest military leaders. They are also, for some of who are smaller in stature, causing us to ask whether there is a height requirement for command of our mission in Iraq.

I want to take this opportunity today to thank our witnesses, and especially their families, for their many decades of faithful service and sacrifice to our Nation. I'd like to extend our gratitude to both of you for your tremendous commitment to our Nation's fighting men and women of whom we ask so much, and who never has let us down.

This hearing, obviously, is colored and dominated by the issue of Iraq, its past, its present, and its future. When General Odierno returned to Iraq in 2006, it was all but a failed state. But over the next 2 years, as the operational commander of the surge, a strategy which was opposed by many members of this committee and dire predictions of failure were made, and then for 2 more years as our top commander, General Odierno was instrumental in the U.S. and Iraqi effort that turned the situation around.

Perhaps the highest compliment I can pay to General Odierno is that he has ably and impressively filled the very big shoes of his predecessor, General David Petraeus. I'd go one step further: much of the credit for the amazing turnaround in Iraq has gone to General Petraeus, and that credit is richly deserved. But not enough people understand the absolutely indispensable role that General Odierno played, both in conceiving of the surge strategy and then driving it day in and day out, hour by hour, toward victory. There is no way that the surge could have succeeded without him.

General Odierno's forward-looking and adaptive leadership make him an ideal choice to head up our JFCOM where he will be on the forefront of defining and shaping how our force will tackle a complex and diverse array of challenges in the years ahead, from raging insurgencies and rising powers, to humanitarian relief and building partnership capacity.

General Austin has also been a vital part of our Iraq team. Under his leadership of our day-to-day operations, U.S. forces in Iraq carried out the critical work of consolidating the success of the surge and beginning the transition to Iraqi leadership. Perhaps the highest compliment I can pay to General Austin is that he took over for General Odierno as our operational commander in Iraq in 2008, and we never missed a beat.

With the prospect of a second command transition from General Odierno to General Austin, and with the final phase of our redeployment out of Iraq soon to unfold, we can be confident that our mission in Iraq is in the best of hands.

To be sure, the situation in Iraq is still fragile and fraught with difficulty. The country is in the midst of a pivotal and challenging process to form a new government, which is taking longer than many of us had hoped. Still, it is more important to get a good government in Iraq than a fast government. At the same time, serious internal and external threats to Iraq remain, as we have so tragically seen in recent months. Yet, the Iraqi security forces continue to grow more capable and professional, and they, not our troops, are now in the lead in the most critical parts of the mission. It is absolutely essential that the United States, including the Congress, remain deeply engaged with Iraq during this critical transition. Though the nature of our commitment to Iraq is changing, that commitment is enduring.

We would welcome the views of both of our witnesses on some of the most important issues now facing us in Iraq, on the continued Iraqi efforts to form a new government, on the transition from a military to a civilian-led U.S. mission, and especially on this committee's decision to cut \$1 billion from the President's \$2 billion request for the Iraq Security Forces Fund, by the way, without consultation with the minority, and replaced by earmarked pork-barrel projects. One of the really, most unusual acts that I have seen in the years that I have served on this committee.

The United States has sacrificed so much in Iraq. So many lives have been given and so many resources have been committed, and against all odds, success is within our grasp. The one Iraqi institution that will do the most to determine whether this success will be sustained is the Iraqi security forces. Considering how high the stakes are in Iraq, it is inconceivable why this committee would arbitrarily slash funding for Iraq's security forces.

I look forward to discussing this and many other issues pertaining to our mission in Iraq with our witnesses today. I want to thank them again for their many years of service, and for their desire to step forward once again to be considered for these two important commands.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our two very distinguished witnesses for appearing before the Committee this morning.

General Ray Odierno and General Lloyd Austin are two of America's finest military leaders. They are also causing some of us to ask whether there is a height requirement for command of our mission in Iraq.

I want to take this opportunity today to thank our witnesses, and especially their families, for their many decades of faithful service and sacrifice to our Nation. I would also like to extend our gratitude to both of you gentlemen for your tremendous commitment to our Nation's fighting men and women—of whom we ask so much, and who never let us down.

This hearing is colored by Iraq—its past, its present, and its future.

When General Odierno returned to Iraq in 2006, it was all but a failed state. But over the next 2 years, as the operational commander of the surge, and then for 2 more years as our top commander, General Odierno was instrumental in the U.S. and Iraqi effort that turned the situation around.

Perhaps the highest compliment I can pay to General Odierno is that he has ably and impressively filled the very big shoes of his predecessor, General David Petraeus. I would go one step further: Much of the credit for the amazing turnaround in Iraq has gone to General Petraeus, and that credit is richly deserved. But not enough people understand the absolutely indispensable role that General Odierno played, both in conceiving of the surge strategy and then driving it day in and day out, hour by hour, toward victory. There is no way that the surge could have succeeded without him.

General Odierno's forward-looking and adaptive leadership make him an ideal choice to head up our Joint Forces Command—where he will be on the forefront of defining and shaping how our force will tackle a complex and diverse array of challenges in the years ahead, from raging insurgencies and rising powers, to humanitarian relief and building partnership capacity.

General Austin has also been a vital part of our Iraq team. Under his leadership of our day-to-day operations, U.S. forces in Iraq carried out the critical work of consolidating the success of the surge and beginning the transition to Iraqi leadership. Perhaps the highest compliment I can pay to General Austin is that he took over for General Odierno as our operational commander in Iraq in 2008, and we never missed a beat. Now, with the prospect of a second command transition from General Odierno to General Austin, and with the final phase of our redeployment out of Iraq soon to unfold, we can be confident that our mission in Iraq is in the best of hands.

To be sure, the situation in Iraq is still fragile and fraught with difficulty. The country is in the midst of a pivotal and challenging process to form a new government, which is taking longer than many of us had hoped. Still, it is more important to get a good government in Iraq than a fast government. At the same time, serious internal and external threats to Iraq remain, as we have so tragically seen in recent months. Yet, the Iraqi security forces continue to grow more capable and professional, and they, not our troops, are now in the lead in the most critical parts of the mission. It is absolutely essential that the United States, including the Congress, remain deeply engaged with Iraq during this critical transition. Though the nature of our commitment to Iraq is changing, that commitment is enduring.

We would welcome the views of both of our witnesses on some of the most important issues now facing us in Iraq—on the continued Iraqi efforts to form a new government, on the transition from a military to a civilian-led U.S. mission, and especially on this committee's decision to cut \$1 billion from the President's \$2 billion request for the Iraq Security Forces Fund. The United States has sacrificed so much in Iraq. So many lives have been given and so many resources have been committed, and against all odds, success is within our grasp. The one Iraqi institution that will do the most to determine whether this success will be sustained is the Iraqi security forces. Considering how high the stakes are in Iraq, it is inconceivable why this committee would arbitrarily slash funding for Iraq's security forces.

I look forward to discussing this and the many other issues pertaining to our mission in Iraq with our witnesses today. I want to thank them again for their many years of service, and for their desire to step forward once again to be considered for these two important commands.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Inhofe has asked for a very brief unanimous consent.
Senator INHOFE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.

Unfortunately, I won't be able to stay for this hearing, but I want to make sure that I get on record.

I've been blessed to get to know both General Odierno and General Austin in the place where it means the most: in the field, and seen them in action. I want to thank them so much for their service, and for the time that each one of you gave me in my office yesterday. All of my questions have been answered, and just for the record, I would like to say that these guys today are not nominees, they're American heroes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me a chance to say that. Chairman LEVIN. All right, thank you, Senator Inhofe. General Odierno.

STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR RE-APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

General ODIERNO. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, I'm deeply honored to be here today, and humbled that I've been nominated by the President and the Secretary of Defense to serve as the Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before the committee today. I promise you that, if confirmed, I will dedicate myself to carrying out my duties to the best of my ability and continue to work openly with Congress.

Should you confirm me, my first priority will be to support all of our combatant commanders, and prepare our U.S. Joint Interagency Team to meet the needs of this evolutionary and complex environment in which we must continue to operate—but not only operate, but succeed.

I will never forget my responsibilities to ensure our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, as well as our dedicated families, are prepared and ready to take on all of the challenges ahead.

If I could just take a few minutes, I would like to speak just quickly about Iraq. Today we are at a pivotal time in Iraq. Following successful elections in March, and the seating of the parliament on June 14, the new legislative body has begun the process of forming the next government.

We are working closely with Iraqis partners to enable a process that yields an inclusive governing body, that is representative of the diversity of the Nation and the results of the elections. Although violence still persists in Iraq, we continue to see a steady decline in overall incidents, in overall civilian casualties and Iraqi security forces casualties, and also a reduction in the number of high-profile attacks inside of Iraq.

Since 30 June 2009, the Iraqi security forces have assumed full responsibility for planning and executing security operations inside of Iraq. Working closely with the Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States, we have developed a roadmap for the future of Iraq and our mission there. In accordance with the Presidential guidance, our plan to responsibly drawdown our force to 50,000 and end combat operations and transition to stability operations by 1 September is on track.

Today, we have just under 82,000 U.S. troops on the ground, down from a high of 165,000 in 2008. As we transition to a civilian-led presence, we will continue to conduct partnered counterterrorism operations and provide combat enablers to help the Iraqi security forces maintain pressure on the extremist networks.

But our primary mission will be to train, advise, and assist the Iraqi security forces, to protect the population against internal and external threats. Additionally, we will support the U.S. Embassy, and specifically Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the United Nations, and other nongovernmental organizations dedicating to continuing the build of Iraqis capacity. Guided by the Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States and the Government of Iraq and using a whole-of-government approach, we will continue to set conditions for a secure, stable, self-reliant Iraq, and set the foundation for an enduring strategic partnership between the United States and the Government of Iraq. The stability of the region and the interests of the United States depend on it.

During my time in Iraq, I've had the privilege to watch our servicemembers perform superbly. Whether conducting full spectrum combat, counterinsurgency, or stability operations, in a complex and ever-changing operating environment, our servicemembers have displayed unparalleled adaptability and ingenuity to work through the toughest issues.

If confirmed, I'm committed to applying the lessons I've learned in almost 5 years as a Division, Corps, and Force Commander inside of Iraq, that I will dedicate myself to ensure that in my duties as the Commander of JFCOM, I plan to use that experience to develop our joint doctrine and capabilities, evolve our professional military education, and support our servicemembers currently deployed around the world.

I'm very thankful for the continuous support I've received from Congress, and I'm deeply honored by the confidence placed in me to continue to serve. It is the greatest privilege to lead the men and women of our Armed Forces. I look forward to your questions.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General Odierno.
General Austin.

**STATEMENT OF LTG LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA, TO BE
GENERAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-IRAQ**

General AUSTIN. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and to all of the distinguished Senators of the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today and thanks to all of the members of this committee for your unwavering support to our service men and women and their families.

As we enter our 9th year of sustained combat operations, our young men and women, along with their families, continue to answer the Nation's call, and carry the heavy burdens of the current wars, and they are performing magnificently. As a soldier, it has been my great privilege to serve the United States of America for the last 35 years, and it is a tremendous honor to be nominated to command U.S. Forces-Iraq. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our Nation's work in Iraq. I understand that a stable environment in the Middle East and Southwest Asia is essential to U.S.

interests, and that the future of Iraq is inseparable from the future of this critical region.

A sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq will contribute to the stability in the region, and will be a major ally in our fight against al Qaeda and its extremist allies.

Conditions in Iraq have improved significantly over the past 3 years. The government has demonstrated respect for the rule of law, and is moving towards the peaceful transfer of power through legitimate elections. Civil capacity and economic conditions continue to improve, and al Qaeda in Iraq, and other violent extremist groups have been severely degraded.

While we have achieved progress over the last few years, I am keenly aware that the mission is not without risk, and our work remains unfinished. Malign external influences continue to infringe on Iraqi sovereignty, and al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups still pose a threat to the government and to the Iraqi people, and ethno-sectarian tensions continue to impede a unified national vision for all Iraqis.

If confirmed, I would focus on a number of things. We would continue to develop a long-term and mutually beneficial relationship with the Iraqis. An enduring U.S.-Iraqis strategic partnership and positive strategic relationships between the Government of Iraq and its regional neighbors are essential to security and prosperity in Iraq and across the region.

We would accomplish the U.S. military drawdown by responsibly transferring missions and tasks to the Government of Iraq, to the Department of State, and to other appropriate international organizations. During this transition period, our forces would continue to advise and train the Iraqi forces to develop their security capabilities, and support their ability to protect the Iraqi people.

In conjunction with our regional and global counterterrorism strategy, we will continue to conduct partnered counterterrorism operations to defeat al Qaeda and other extremists in Iraq. We would assist the development of effective ministries, and enable Iraq to meet the needs of the people, and we would support efforts to advance enduring solutions for Iraqi national unity. The foundational requirement for all of this is security and stability, and that can only happen through a capable and professional Iraqi security forces.

We've achieved much in Iraq through the courage and sacrifice of our U.S. service men and women, and the Iraqi people and the Coalition Forces that fall alongside the Iraqis in some of their most perilous times. I am committed to achieving our national objectives and I am dedicated to all of the brave people who've sacrificed to help build toward a stable and secure Iraq.

I want to assure everyone that, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to achieve our national objectives in Iraq. I would look forward to working with this committee and I would ensure that the American values are adhered to by the U.S. forces in Iraq.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General Austin.

Let me ask, now, standard questions that are asked by this committee of all of our nominees.

First, and you can answer together, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

General AUSTIN. I have.

General ODIERNO. I have.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

General AUSTIN. No.

General ODIERNO. No.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications including questions for the record at hearings.

General AUSTIN. I will.

General ODIERNO. I will.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

General ODIERNO. I will.

General AUSTIN. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

General ODIERNO. Yes.

General AUSTIN. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

General ODIERNO. Yes.

General AUSTIN. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked, before this committee to do so even if those views differ from the administration in power?

General ODIERNO. Yes.

General AUSTIN. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication in a timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

General ODIERNO. Yes.

General AUSTIN. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you both.

Let's try a 7-minute first round.

General Odierno, let me ask you first, the legislative elections were held last March, they provided no clear winner and the government has not yet been formed. Let me ask you, and then General Austin, what is your assessment of the situation in Iraq, particularly relative to the delay in the formation of a new government and what is its impact on the security situation in Iraq and on the planned drawdown of U.S. forces?

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would just say the elections themselves were historic in nature, and the outcomes were historic. We had record numbers of Iraqis show up for the elections. In addition they had a chance to vote freely.

In a poll that we took, 85 percent of the people felt that they were not influenced at all in their votes, and I think that shows

why we had such a close outcome in the elections, and I think that's extremely positive.

We then had a challenge to the election results, they did a recount, and the recount, once again, validated that, in fact, the elections were credible and legitimate. All of this reinforcing the democratic processes that were put in place by the Iraqi High Electoral Commission, supported by the United Nations. I think all of these things added to the credibility of the elections.

The long time period has made many of the people in Iraq a bit nervous during this period where we have what we call a caretaker government, but what's been encouraging to me has been the actions of the Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi security forces have remained professional and dedicated to accomplishing the mission at hand: sustaining security levels, and allowing the process to continue.

It's important that the Iraqis get the government right, that they have a government that is a unity government that is representative of all of the people, and it's important that they be given time to do that. But they must realize they must also move forward quickly, so that people don't take advantage of that.

Chairman LEVIN. General Austin, do you wish to add anything to that?

General AUSTIN. Mr. Chairman, I share your concern with the amount of time that it's taking to form the government. Having said that, I am confident that the Iraqis will transfer power peacefully.

I agree with General Odierno that it's absolutely encouraging that despite the fact that it's taken them a little longer than we'd like to see them take, the numbers of attacks in Iraq have continued to go down and the Iraqi security force is performing admirably.

Chairman LEVIN. Let me ask you both, do you continue to support the drawing down to 50,000 U.S. troops in Iraq by September 1?

General AUSTIN. I do, Mr. Chairman.

General ODIERNO. Mr. Chairman, I've been clear about this, I think it's the right time to do that. I think with 50,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on the ground it gives us enough capability to continue to ensure that we continue to make progress towards a self-reliant Iraq.

I think the Iraqi security forces have been in control of the security situation, in charge of it for several months, now. They've proven that they can do this with our support. Over the next few months, we'll slowly reduce that support, and I think we're in line to get to 50,000 by 1 September.

Chairman LEVIN. General Austin, when you take over, now, you'll be facing the reduction by the end of next year to no U.S. combat troops in Iraq. Do you support that?

General AUSTIN. I absolutely do, Mr. Chairman, and I'm confident that based upon plans that have currently been laid out that we're on a good glide slope to get to where we need to be.

Chairman LEVIN. General Odierno, the number of contractors working under JFCOM currently outweighs the number of military personnel assigned to JFCOM. Some of those contractors, the ones

that are hired as senior mentors can earn upwards of \$1,600 a day for their services, which is more than an Army private running combat missions earns in an entire month.

Given the decision by Secretary Gates to convert the in-source contractors to government employees, will you look at this situation and see whether or not JFCOM is going to move in that direction, as well?

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have looked just peripherally, initially at the number of contractors, civilians, and military in JFCOM. I'm going to take a look at it when I get down there and understand what the dynamic is.

As you've stated, there are more civilians and contractors than military. We want to make sure that we have military people doing military roles, governmental employees doing inherently governmental roles, and that contractors are limited to doing only those roles that they are authorized to do, and we'll continue to look at that.

In regards to the senior mentor program, I understand that JFCOM is working with the Department of the Navy, who is the executive agent for JFCOM to be in line with Secretary Gates' guidance in bringing that program online. I would just say that the value of that program has been immense. I have personally been trained with this program for 10 or 12 years, now, and the impact it's had on preparing me to be ready to face complex issues is extremely important.

It's important that we get this program right, and that we continue to have a program that allows senior leaders to have mentors and help them to learn through others what they have experienced.

Chairman LEVIN. I hope you will not only look at those matters, but look at the way in which the funding is provided to those mentors and contractors which then apparently get a cut of the money that goes to the mentors themselves. There's a lot to be looked at in that area, and I'm glad to hear you'll be doing it.

Are you familiar, General Odierno, with the request of the Defense Minister in Iraq for the upcoming budget of \$7.4 billion and the fact that, apparently, the Finance Minister of Iraq reduced that request from \$7.4 billion to \$4.9 billion, are you familiar with that?

General ODIERNO. I am, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Did you weigh in on that issue?

General ODIERNO. We did. I would just say that, as all budgets are formed, I believe that the Defense Minister's request was an unconstrained requirement. It was reviewed with the rest of the requirements in Iraq, and decisions were made in order to establish the budget.

I would say that the defense spending has gone up every year since 2004. It went up again in 2010 from 2009. As we look at the defense budget within Iraq, we look at both the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense budgets, since they both contribute significantly to the internal security. In 2010, that was \$11 billion, approximately 17.5 percent of the total budget. I think that's a significant amount, and they continue to contribute immensely to building the Iraqi security forces, police, and army.

Chairman LEVIN. Did you support the Minister's request of \$7.4 billion?

General ODIERNO. What we did is, we looked at what we thought were mission-central capabilities and we thought that \$7.4 billion was what would be necessary to help them attain that capability.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I mentioned in my opening statement and I'm sure you heard this, the majority on the committee decided to take \$1 billion out of the administration's request and substitute items such as \$1 million for foreign language correlation and transition, \$3 million for plant-based vaccine development, and other very vital national security programs, i.e., the earmark and pork barreling goes on despite the dissatisfaction of the American people.

General Odierno and General Austin, if this committee's \$1 billion cut to the Iraqi security forces is enacted, what impact do you think that will have on the Iraqis military and police capabilities and effectiveness, and on the security and stability of Iraq as the U.S. troops withdraw?

General ODIERNO. Senator McCain, let me answer first.

I did submit the request through CENTCOM for \$2 billion in Iraqi security force funding for fiscal year 2011. That was based on developing mission-essential capability for the Iraqi security forces in preparation for our departure in the end of 2011. That request was based on getting them to a certain capability, which we thought would mitigate and reduce the risk of U.S. forces leaving Iraq by the end of 2011.

This money, we'd all be cost-sharing. That money would be added to what the Iraqi security forces have available within their budget. In order to continue to develop their strategic logistics, intelligence collection integration, foundational external security items, such as air sovereignty, and continued improvements in the Navy in order to protect the oil infrastructure, as well as other key enablers, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and others, that they are just beginning to develop. We think all of those are important as we move forward, and get them to a minimum capability. This does not, by any means, complete what they absolutely will need in the long run. That will take several more years. But we think it would give them initial capability that would mitigate the risk in reduction of the U.S. forces by the end of 2011.

Senator MCCAIN. General Austin?

General AUSTIN. Thank you, sir.

If confirmed, I would assess the impact of the loss of these resources once I'm on the ground, but generally speaking, as we try to conduct our responsible drawdown, and by the end of calendar year 2011, what we're trying to do is stand up capability with the Iraqi security forces as efficiently and effectively as possible. Certainly, we're balancing risk as we do that. If confirmed, as I go into theater, I would take a hard look at what the loss of those resources would do to either increase or not increase that risk.

Senator MCCAIN. Maybe we could hear again, and I think you partially answered this question from the chairman, as we took this billion dollars and put it into earmark and pork barrel projects—one of the arguments used by the majority was that the

Iraqi Government is not committing sufficient resources to its own security and that it has surplus resources to direct to its military and police.

How do you respond to that, General, again?

General ODIERNO. Senator, as I stated, I know that in 2010, \$11 billion has been dedicated to the security forces, which is about 17.5 percent of the total budget.

In addition, the Iraqi budget for 2010 is \$77 billion. We believe revenue will be around \$52 billion. They have \$10 billion in excess cash which will be used to take care of part of the \$25 billion deficit, and then they are planning on borrowing \$2 to \$3 more million from the International Monetary Fund—

Senator MCCAIN. Billion.

General ODIERNO.—billion—and that still would leave them about \$12 billion deficit in 2010.

For 2011, they have a \$79 billion budget. They are predicting a revenue of about \$62 billion, which would be an increase, obviously, over 2010, based on the fact that they hope to increase oil exports in 2011. But it's unclear, yet, whether they'll be able to do that or not, but it will still leave them at a deficit in their spending.

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, and I just don't see, very frankly, how our side of the aisle, could agree to an authorization bill moving forward where we've substituted \$1 billion of badly needed help to finish up our conflict in Iraq, pursuing a successful strategy which was opposed by the same individuals who want to spend \$1.5 million for an acoustic search glider and \$1 million for a permafrost tunnel. I don't think that I could support moving forward with an authorization bill that would cut \$1 billion from our ability to succeed in our mission in Iraq. Too much American blood and treasure has been expended to allow it to be undermined, because earmark and pork-barrel spending seems to be the top priority.

I thank both of the witnesses, I look forward to confirming them, and I thank them both for their service to our country.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to both of you. I was thinking as I looked around the room that there's not a big crowd here, today, it's not the size of the crowds that we used to get in hearings on Iraq, and that's good news. Crowds tend not to turn out for good news, and a lack of controversy. That's the result of a, really, extraordinary effort by the American military, and the military and people of Iraq, as well. Both of you have played a critical leadership role in that. I think this has been one of the great chapters in the proud history of the American military. The results, as both of you testified to them today are—I'd use the word miraculous. The Iraqi military really is in charge, has been since last summer, in the major population centers. The Iraqi people turned out in a democratic election, in great numbers. While they're struggling with the parliamentary process of putting the government together, that's a lot better than what they experienced under Saddam Hussein for a long time. The economy is improving, we're going over there next week, but last time we were there in January, this is a country really coming alive and moving forward.

It's really a remarkable accomplishment. I know we talk about it, but we can't talk about it too much or thank you enough for the role that the both of you have played, and General Austin, you will continue to play.

General Odierno, as you depart Iraq, I wanted to ask you to take us to a kind of bigger picture look at this because clearly there's broader strategic implications of a stable and secure democratic Iraq, pro-American, anti-terrorist in the Middle East. I wanted to give you an opportunity to talk for a moment or two about the significance—and, of course, we always know we have to hold that, but if we continue along this path, what's the significance to America's broader national security interests in a region of the world where we have always felt that we had a very important national security interest?

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Senator. I believe we have an opportunity that we might never have again with such an important country in Iraq. We just look at where it is geographically inside of the Middle East, and the important position that it has where it's in the center of the many different Middle Eastern religions, many of the different Middle Eastern populations, and the impact that Iraq can have on that.

The fact that Iraq is developing economically and moving a little bit towards a capitalist system, the fact that Iraq has now implemented a democracy and has had a successful election run completely by the Government of Iraq is something that is unique in the Middle East.

I think as they continue to build their security depth, their economic depth and their political depth, I think what that means is more stability in the Middle East. For a very long time, Iraq contributed to stability, but in the wrong way—it created more instability. Where it is, the importance to the rest of the Middle Eastern nations allows us an opportunity, here, to develop the Middle East economically, diplomatically, and from a security standpoint.

The Iraqi people have rejected al Qaeda, they have rejected the ideology of al Qaeda, they are fighting al Qaeda themselves. That example is tremendous. The way ahead is, we now have to get them working with other regional neighbors in order to continue this fight against extremism, of all kinds, that is all around the world, and that we can become long-term partners with them, in my mind, could add significantly to the security of the United States.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that.

Let me bring General Austin in on this. As you look around, I know the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) moves us to, essentially, zero troops at least at the end of 2011, although, I think there's been a presumption that the democratically elected Government of Iraq might ask us to maintain some presence there in the future.

As you look around the Middle East, the truth is in just about every country, we have some military presence—training, prepositioning, our troops on the ground, our military alliances. I wanted to ask you your thoughts, going forward as you take command, particularly if the Iraqis do ask us to stay in some way after 2011, are we prepared to continue to help them?

General AUSTIN. Senator, as you pointed out, this region is important to the United States of America, and the country of Iraq is important to the region.

I think that what we want and what we're working towards is a healthy, long-term relationship with the country of Iraq, and that relationship will be centered on a number of issues—economic issues, political issues, and certainly if, in terms of the way forward, I think it's incumbent upon the government and the leadership of Iraq to engage the leadership of the United States at the highest levels, and at the highest levels whatever our future will be will be worked out at that level. We, in the military, stand ready to support whatever the decision is made.

But, whatever we do in the country of Iraq should be a whole-of-government approach, and we should look to establish great relationships with them along a number of dimensions, here.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

General Odierno, let me ask you about Iran. It's true that we understand that Iraq's in the neighborhood, it has to have relations with its neighbors, but my impression is that Iran continues to try not to just have good bilateral relations, but in some sense, to exercise undue influence over political activities in Iran. What's the status of that at this point, as you depart?

General ODIERNO. I would say that Iran continues to be extremely active in attempting to influence the outcome of the formation of the government inside of Iraq. I think it's important to know that they're doing that and just make sure that we ensure that the Iraqis get to decide what their government is and that we don't allow external influence to decide what the next Iraqi Government will be.

I am confident that the Iraqis are nationalists, they want Iraq to run Iraq. They do not want to be influenced by other regional powers, they do not want Iran meddling inside of their activities. I think, again, it's important for us to support Iraq and the process that they have for Iraqis to choose the next government. I think that's how we're trying to go about our business today as we move forward.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, General Odierno.

My time is up, I just wish you well at JFCOM. I must say that when General Mattis testified before the committee and we talked to him about the role that command has in developing doctrinal concepts that apply across the Military Services, he indicated, I thought, that JFCOM has too often been a bystander to the actual decisions made by the Services, and that his greatest power was the power of persuasion. I think you come with such credibility and stature, and I hope you use it all to push, not yourself, but really, the JFCOM approach into the center of the decisionmaking about what our military is going to look like in the future.

I thank you very much for taking on this next assignment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

To both of you, once again, thanks to you, thanks to your families for your continued service to our country. You are certainly great

leaders and you provide the kind of quality leadership that is needed in a very difficult time for our country, and a very complex time for the world.

Mr. Chairman, I have to qualify my support for General Austin by saying that he and my wife are from the same hometown, and his high school football coach was also my son's coach. They were champions in both instances, and as a result, I have several General Austin stories that I think I'll probably save for another day, General. But needless to say, we're all very proud of you down our way.

General Odierno, let me start with you. One of the great success stories with Iraq under General Petraeus as well as under you was the conversion of the Iraqi people and their support for the American soldier and our effort and the mission there. Where does that stand right now? What do you see from the standpoint of the attitude of the Iraqi people towards the American soldier?

General ODIERNO. I would say, Senator, this is always a very difficult issue. I would just say, first, they understand what the U.S. mission is, there, but Iraqis are tired of forces outside Iraq inside of Iraq. Been there a long time, they appreciate the progress that they're seeing, they want to move forward and they want to take over their own country.

What we've done lately which I think has really been very good is the fact that we are supporting Iraqi security forces and allowing them to do more. They are starting to see that future, and that's helping them to appreciate the role of the U.S. soldiers even more, because they realize that they need our support in order to get to where they want to be—an Iraq that can be run by Iraqis, Iraq that can be secured by Iraqis.

Because of that, I'm starting to see this improvement in relationships among Iraqi leaders and U.S. leaders as well as our soldiers and their soldiers. There's links that will never be broken, between Iraqi security forces and U.S. forces, because we've stood by each other, now, through some extremely difficult times, and shared some common sacrifices. It doesn't matter where you come from, when you work together and share those sacrifices, there will be a bond that will be always linked between the two. I think we'll continue to see that as we move forward, Senator.

Senator CHAMBLISS. General Austin, you and I discussed briefly, yesterday, the fact that General Cucolo and the 3rd Infantry Division are leading the effort along Iraq's northern border to bring some—or to mitigate some issues between the Arabs and the Kurds. I know that U.S. assistance is a critical component in this area. Could you give us your thoughts about your confidence in the fact that we'll be able to solve this issue. Is it going to continue to be necessary to devote brigade combat team to that region?

General AUSTIN. Senator, I think the Arab-Kurd tension issue is an issue that the Iraqis must take on, and they must solve for themselves.

I think that we can do a tremendous amount of work, and a tremendous amount of good by advising, assisting, any way we can, building confident measures to bring some of the parties closer and closer together. We've already done that in the north, the 3rd In-

fantry Division has been an instrumental part of that, and we'll continue to work that as we, if confirmed, if I go back into theater.

But, I think that this will take some time, it's a very complex issue, and again, I think it's an issue that the Iraqi Government must fully embrace and work hard at.

Senator CHAMBLISS. General Austin, as we look to the withdrawal of troops, as I told you yesterday, I think your leadership may be coming at the most critical time, because of the fact that it's going to be necessary to get an awful lot of equipment moved around, as well as our troops out in a safe and secure manner. I think your comment to me was that you're prepared for them to take a swing at you as you come out. I'd appreciate your comments relative to what your thoughts are regarding safety and security of our troops as you transition out.

General AUSTIN. I have every reason to believe, Senator, that as our footprint decreases, there will be extremist elements that will try to place additional pressure on us. We'll be prepared for that, we'll make sure that all of our intelligence systems are working, we'll work with the Iraqi security forces to make sure that we continue to approach these issues as partners.

But the Iraqi security forces really have to play a big part in providing for our security. The security of our forces is foremost in my mind. If, as conditions change on the ground, I need resources to accomplish a particular mission, I won't hesitate to let my chain of command know that. But I'll assess that every day as in theater, if I'm confirmed.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Lastly, General Odierno, you mentioned yesterday the number of incidents in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, it decreased in a significant way. But yet when something does happen it's all over the news. I wish you'd comment on that, because I think that's a point that the American people need to understand, relative to casualties that we're seeing there.

General ODIERNO. I would just say, as I said in my opening statement, Senator, incidents are down significantly from the height, they're down over 90 percent from what they were in 2006 and 2007. But, more importantly, they've continued to go down since the Iraqi security forces have taken over responsibility in the cities in June 2009.

What's interesting is as security has gotten better, we're starting to see life come back to all of the cities in Iraq, each event gets more publicity, every single individual event, which is important, and good. But, I think sometimes we tend to focus so much on these incidents, we really forget to put it in perspective, to once where we were and where we are today. It's really pretty significant.

As you fly over Baghdad today, compared to just a year ago, it is a significantly different place. Traffic jams all over, markets exploding, private investments coming in—that would not be occurring if you did not have security. You see that in other cities around Iraq, as well.

I don't want to give the impression that there is not violence in Iraq—there is still violence, there is still work that has to be done, but it is at a level where I believe the Iraqi security forces are capable of handling that level of violence. As we continue to develop

the police and the army for our departure at the end of 2011, I believe they will be ready to protect the people of Iraq.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thanks to both of you, again, for your service. I hope as you assume these new commands, that you will take a moment to express to those men and women that serve under you how much the American people appreciate their great commitment, and their great service.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my appreciation for your service to our country and your families for their support.

One thing that I've looked for from almost the beginning of my time, here, is about stovepipes, and whether Services are duplicating their efforts or truly enhancing overall mission effectiveness. With regard to the unmanned platforms, both the Army and the Air Force are making substantial investments in relatively similar platforms—MQ-1 and MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As the lead for joint capabilities development, JFCOM, General Odierno, I know you're responsible for trying to find a way to make sure that there's interoperability and that we don't end up with stovepipes.

In your response to the committee's advance policy questions, you state that you would like to continue efforts that allow, "Services to develop Service-specific," systems and capabilities after joint review. How will you ensure that the coordination is occurring as opposed to discoordinating, going separate directions with respect to comparable equipment?

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Senator. It's about integration, it's about how these systems are integrated into joint warfare and the joint fight, and it's how we get them in the hands of all of our soldiers, sailors, and marines and they understand the capabilities that are there and how they use these different capabilities to integrate them together to get the best results.

What we've learned over the last several years is one of the key things that we have to be able to do better is manage information. We now have systems available that collect an enormous amount of information at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. One of the things I want to focus on is how do we best manage that information around the world with our joint forces.

We still have issues, sometimes, of moving information from one Service to another, or in some cases even within the Service from one stovepipe to another, and I think that's the key. I think I can focus that through doctrinal work, through simulation experimentation work that we can do in working very carefully with the combatant commanders in the Services and integrating these capabilities. That what will help us in fighting this unique threat that I foresee over the horizon of regular warfare, that we have to continue to be adaptive and show agility as we continue to improve our capacities.

Senator BEN NELSON. Another area where I am concerned about stovepiping is how we process the information that's collected by ISR. During the Air Force posture hearing, I asked General

Schwartz about the manning of the ISR mission, and he stated that the current manning structure to support UAV operations was “unsustainable” in light of projected growth. I wonder what your view at JFCOM would be in ensuring that the Services aren’t necessarily duplicating investments in that area, because we’re obviously going to have limited capabilities?

General ODIERNO. I think, again, we have to separate the strategic operational, tactical fight, we have to understand what are the capabilities we have in each and are needed in each, and how we integrate those together to ensure that want a little bit of redundancy, but not too much redundancy.

What I think in JFCOM, what we can do is reach out to the combatant commanders to understand what their needs are and then react to those needs and then work the doctrinal piece as well as the simulation experimentation piece, and really the staff training piece, in order to understand what capabilities we have and how we’ll integrate those. If confirmed, I’ll focus myself on that.

Senator BEN NELSON. In regard to that, if we’re struggling, let’s say, to have sufficient personnel and/or the cost of sufficient personnel. If we don’t do what you’re talking about doing, we’ll have an avalanche of information and will be unable to utilize any of it for our own benefit.

General Austin, according to the President’s plan for withdrawing troops, obviously the success of that depends on our ability to train Iraqi security forces to secure Iraq. As General Odierno has said, that security system seems to be working much better with the reduction in the events that have cost us so many of our own troops.

Secretary McHugh stated that, “In terms of training, a major lesson is that versatile and agile units that are fundamentally competent can adapt to any threat from across the spectrum of conflict.” I’m interested in what your thoughts are about the progress of Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs) that we’ve trained, and that would now be mentoring Iraqi units. Can you speak to the particular type of training that we’re giving to the AABs, versus traditional combat brigade teams? Is there a difference?

General AUSTIN. Senator, first of all, I’m pleased to see that the AABs are doing so well. When I was last in Iraq, I worked with General Odierno to help develop that concept. The foundation for the AABs is a brigade combat team. What we’ve done is added some additional capability to that brigade combat team to help them be able to engage at the brigade and division level and help train those staffs.

All of the indications that I’ve seen to date have been very positive. That we, just taking a brigade combat team and augmenting it with the right things, we’ve done the appropriate thing, in this case.

In terms of the impact on the Iraqi security forces, I think, as I look at where they are now, versus where they were 3 years ago, the change is remarkable. I think that change was brought about, in large measure, because of the fact that we partnered with the Iraqi security forces and really worked side-by-side with them and developed them as quickly as we possibly could to reach a certain

level. Now we need to continue to focus on those brigade and division staffs to complete their training.

Senator BEN NELSON. Do we have enough AABs, or are we planning to increase the number of AABs to be certain that the conditions on the ground will support our direction in departing?

General AUSTIN. My assessment, and again, I'll continue to refine this assessment, if confirmed, as I go in, is that we absolutely have the right amount of AABs on the ground, and certainly we're going down to 50,000 troops by 1 September. From all that I've seen of the plans that U.S. Forces-Iraq and General Odierno have put together, they have shaped this 50,000 force exactly right and that has all of the capability in terms of training and force protection that it needs to be successful.

Senator BEN NELSON. If conditions change, because conditions are always fluctuating, will you be certain to let us know if you need more AABs to facilitate that withdrawal?

General AUSTIN. I will not hesitate to inform my supervisors, Senator, in the event that things change and I need to ask for additional capability.

Senator BEN NELSON. Again, thank you.

General AUSTIN. You have my word on that. Thank you, sir.

Senator BEN NELSON. General?

General ODIERNO. Senator, if I could just add on the AABs, I've been very pleased with the work of the AABs, we have six on the ground today. The way they've been trained, we have passed lessons learned back to the Army, the Army is the one whose developed these, and they've changed how they operated the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center. They have prepared them to deal with the specific environ that we've asked them to work in, and I've been very pleased with the outcome. It shows the flexibility of the Brigade Combat Team of the Army that they're able—with some adjustments—to meet different mission requirements. I think that's the important piece, and that gets to the flexibility and adaptability that Secretary McHugh talked about, and I think that's important to understand because as I go to my new job in JFCOM, you want forces that are flexible and adaptable and can meet the requirements of many different mission sets. That's what we're going to need in order to have an efficient armed services here, as we move forward, and continue to look at doing things with maybe less resources in the future.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you both for your comments, and good luck to both of you.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congratulations to both of you on the job you have done and the new jobs you're going to undertake, here.

General O—I always butcher your name, I'm just going to call you General O—there must be a height requirement for these jobs. [Laughter.]

We mentioned yesterday the World Cup is going on and it's fun to watch, and I'm pulling for the U.S.A., but I have really no idea what they're doing when they play soccer. So, we're going to talk

football. I think you indicated, we're probably on the 10-yard line when it comes to Iraq?

General ODIERNO. I did, Senator. I do think we are on the 10-yard line. I think the next 18 months will determine whether we get to the goal line, or really give the Iraqis an opportunity to get the goal line beyond 2011.

Senator GRAHAM. But, from our national perspective, we're on the 10, and I think you said we probably have four downs? It's first and 10 on the 10, we have a new quarterback coming in.

General ODIERNO. That's right.

General AUSTIN. I'll take the ball, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. I couldn't have found a better guy to be the new quarterback.

Now, the Sons of Iraq, how is that going, General O, in terms of getting those people integrated in the Iraqi security forces?

General ODIERNO. We started out with about 103,000 Sons of Iraq. About 40,000 have been transitioned into other Government of Iraq jobs. They actually stopped the transition because they were starting to realize the value in many areas of what they were providing in terms of intelligence and other things, so they've slowed that down, and they're now doing some reevaluation of the Sons of Iraq program, and how they want to transition that.

Senator GRAHAM. Are they still getting paid?

General ODIERNO. They are.

Senator GRAHAM. One thing that we need to watch for, General Austin, is you have thousands of young Sunnis that are receiving a government paycheck, I think it's like \$90 a month, is that right?

General ODIERNO. Three hundred.

Senator GRAHAM. Three hundred? Okay, \$300 a month. We have to make sure that if that pay stops that we have a plan, do you agree with that, General Austin?

General AUSTIN. I absolutely agree with that, Senator. I was there, again, in the early days we begin to transition the Sons of Iraq to working for the government and work along with the Prime Minister to outline a plan to effectively transition them. I think they've done a pretty good job, and we need to continue to do that in the future.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, who's paying? Is that coming from the Iraqi budget?

General AUSTIN. Absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay.

Now, Article 140 boundary dispute issues, I think there are a couple of trip wires left in Iraq and one of them that stands out to me is how do you resolve the Arab-Kurdish conflict in Kirkuk and the boundary dispute. If you could both give me, maybe, a 30-second overview of where we're at and what could we do in Congress to help you?

General ODIERNO. We have established a tripartite security architecture in the disputed areas for about 6 months now, and it's been very successful in reducing tensions. It's Pesh Merga, Iraqi Army and U.S. forces manning checkpoints and joint security areas where they do patrolling in these areas, and it has calmed things down considerably. The United Nations (U.N.) is now taking on the

role of now mediating the long-term issues of the border issues and the status of Kirkuk and other issues.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think that will get resolved for this new government in a year?

General ODIERNO. It depends. My guess is, some of that will be discussed during the governmental formation process. How well that goes could determine how quickly it could happen. I do believe though, to solve the whole problem, it will be longer than a year.

Senator GRAHAM. General Austin, do you agree that is one of the big outstanding issues that the Iraqi people have to resolve?

General AUSTIN. Senator Graham, I absolutely do.

I think that, I would be delighted if it could be resolved in a year but—

Senator GRAHAM. Probably not.

General AUSTIN. I really believe that it's going to take awhile.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you feel like we have enough resources and focus to help them get it resolved?

General AUSTIN. I think that we're doing the right things in terms of working with the government to help them build confidence—bring about confidence-building measures to bring the two sides closer together. I think, again, it's encouraging to see that the U.N. is continuing to try to help, we'll require their help in the future.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay.

General AUSTIN. But this is going to take a lot of work.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay.

The hydrocarbon law. Have you had to pass the hydrocarbon law, is that right, General O?

General ODIERNO. That's correct, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. From my point of view, for what it's worth, is that until the Iraqis have a statute that divides the oil up between each group where everybody feels like they're getting the resources of the country fairly shared, it's going to be a tough go. Do you see a breakthrough in the hydrocarbon law any time soon?

General ODIERNO. I think the hydrocarbon law, itself, probably might not get passed. But, I think there are other alternatives.

Senator GRAHAM. They do it year-by-year, budgeting-wise, don't they?

General ODIERNO. Yes, year-by-year, but also they get a revenue-sharing agreement.

Senator GRAHAM. Right.

General ODIERNO. I think it would be important. I think that's something that people are looking at now, and I think that would help significantly.

We've had some thawing, there was an argument about whether the Kurdistan Region could develop their own oil, they have solved that problem. They have now begun to develop that. The Government of Iraq, the central government is helping them, so that's a breakthrough. We're starting to see small breakthroughs in the overall resolution of this. But again, there's still work that has to be done in that area.

Senator GRAHAM. The rules of engagement—as I understand it, we're partnering with the Iraqi security forces, we have right of

self-defense, obviously, but when you make a raid, now, at night, do you have to get a warrant?

General ODIERNO. Under the security agreement, all operations must be warranted.

Senator GRAHAM. Is that working okay?

General ODIERNO. It is working very well.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you have good confidence in your judicial system, there are no leaks?

General ODIERNO. It's not perfect.

Senator GRAHAM. Not perfect.

General ODIERNO. No system is perfect. But our ability to present evidence and get warrants, we absolutely have the ability to do that. That's working well.

Senator GRAHAM. That's very encouraging.

One last question to both of you. General O, we're talking about the consequences to the United States of winning in Iraq, and I think they're enormous. Probably a good time now, given Afghanistan and where we are at in the world—if, for some reason, we didn't make it into the end zone, what would be the consequences of Iraq failing?

General Austin, if you could tell this committee, what are the one or two things that keep you up at night when you think about Iraq?

General ODIERNO. First, if we had a failed state in Iraq, it would create uncertainty and significant instability, probably, within the region. Because of the criticality of Iraq, its relationship to Iran, its relationship to the other Arab states in the region, if it became unstable, it could create an environment that could continue to increase the instability. If it becomes unstable and ungoverned, it opens the area, potentially, for terrorists, in order to allow Iraq to become a place where terrorism could be exported.

Now, I don't believe we're close to that. I believe we're far away from that happening. I think we're definitely on the right path. But those are the kinds of things that would happen if we had a complete breakdown inside of Iraq.

General AUSTIN. Senator Graham, we will be successful in Iraq, we will get the ball into the end zone. I believe that because of all of the great work that our young men and women continue to do on a daily basis and the commitment of this entire country to accomplishing that in the right way.

You mentioned the thing that keeps me awake at night, the one thing that is foremost in my mind is that if their leadership is unable to transfer power in a peaceful manner, that would create conditions that would cause us to, perhaps, revert to sectarian behavior and people to lose confidence in their ability to be properly represented. That is one of the major things.

But I am confident that, based upon what we've seen thus far, this peaceful transition will occur. It will just take some time for them to form a government.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator Hagan.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I did want to tell our nominees today, not only are you nominees, but you certainly are American heroes, and we thank you for your commitment and your service.

I also want to thank Mrs. Odierno and Mrs. Austin, because I too have been married around 30 years. We all chose great partners, but I really appreciate your support of these two excellent individuals before us today. Thank you for all that you have done over the years for our troops and their families, because I know how critically important that is.

General Odierno, I'm delighted that you've been nominated to replace General Mattis as Commander of JFCOM and you are extremely well-qualified to lead the joint integration effort. You effectively established a coherent and integrated joint force in Iraq, you know what it takes to fight jointly in an irregular warfare environment, and you are also one of the primary architects of the surge in Iraq and the Sunni-Anbar Awakening. I appreciate the time you spent with me and several of our other Senators this past March, and your team. I thank you for that time.

General Austin, I'm also incredibly proud that you have been nominated to replace General Odierno as the commander of the U.S. forces in Iraq. You, too, are extremely well-qualified to lead our forces in Iraq as we draw down our military presence there and develop a long-term relationship with the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces. I'm proud of your outstanding work as the Commander of the 18th Airborne Corps, and the Multi-National Corps-Iraq. You did a tremendous job in planning and executing all of the military operations in Iraq, and fighting alongside the Iraqi Army, and our coalition partners.

General Odierno, among your expected duties as the Commander of JFCOM will be to serve as the joint conventional force provider and oversee joint military concept and doctrinal development, joint training, and joint interoperability and integration. How will you work with the Military Departments, geographical combatant commanders, and intergovernmental agencies to resolve gaps in joint warfighting capability, and how do you plan to respond to overseas contingencies utilizing the whole-of-government approach?

General ODIERNO. Thank you, ma'am, very much.

I would say a couple of things. The first thing I have to be able to do is reach out to the combatant commanders themselves, have a discussion with them of what their needs and requirements are, whether it be U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), associated with our internal defense and work with Department of Homeland Security and what we need there, or whether it be CENTCOM and all of the things associated with that. I have to be able to help us to understand how we can use and integrate all of the capacities and capabilities we have within the Services in order to meet those requirements, and I have to understand what those requirements are.

Then I have to work with the Services, with the Service providers within the Services, as well as the Service doctrinal leaders in order to ensure that we are integrating all of the efforts that are going on to meet the future needs, whether it be irregular warfare or homeland defense requirements that we have. We will continue to dedicate ourselves to that to include a training program that al-

lows us to continue to train with our interagency partners. We continue to build relationships with the interagency as we go after this whole-of-government approach, which applies whether it be in NORTHCOM for internal U.S. security, or whether it is in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), or the PACOM AOR in Korea, as we have to work with all of our interagency partners, and how we better utilize that, and gain efficiencies in using this whole-of-government approach, which is the way ahead for us.

Senator HAGAN. Let me take that one step further, how will you synchronize concepts for joint warfighting with the President's national security strategy, the Secretary of Defense's Force Employment guidance, and the combatant commanders' theater security cooperation strategy?

General ODIERNO. Clearly what we have to do is we have to—I have to personally go out and first talk with them, understand those concepts, and then figure out how I—through working with the Services—can help to develop the right capacities and capabilities to meet those needs. What we have to do is, in addition to that, through our simulation experimentation, come up with new ideas, come up with better ways to integrate these requirements and integrate the solutions that are being developed by the Services to meet the requirements of the national security strategy, of the guidance I get from the Secretary of Defense, and the combatant commanders' requirements.

This is a very complex process. But we have to figure out a way to do it as efficiently as possible, and yet have the right capabilities at the right place at the right time. That's what I have to focus on, ma'am.

Senator HAGAN. Okay.

General Austin, I know that the U.S. military drawdown in Iraq should not be equated with disengagement from Iraq. We have to define our relationship to reflect a strategic partnership between both countries across economic, political, security and developmental sectors, and assist the Iraqi Government in transitioning to full management and funding of its own security and governance programs.

The U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement does that, laying out the contours for a long-term bilateral strategic relationship. The challenge is to translate the Strategic Framework Agreement into programs that will ensure Iraq's security, stability and development, while respecting Iraqi sovereignty and acknowledging that the Iraqis are in charge of shaping their future. A long-term, strategic relationship with Iraq is fundamental in achieving lasting security and stability in the country and in the region.

As Commander of the U.S. forces in Iraq, how will you work with the State Department to translate the Strategic Framework Agreement into programs that will ensure Iraq's security and stability?

General AUSTIN. Thanks, Senator. I believe that the relationship between Commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq and the Ambassador is a very important relationship. Going into Iraq, if I'm confirmed, I'll do everything within my power to, number one, establish a great relationship and nurture that relationship each and every day.

I think that the both of us, engaging the Iraqi leadership routinely, and shaping the way ahead, along all lines of operation—

economic, political, cultural—I think we certainly can build towards a very strong relationship and sustained relationship.

This will take a whole-of-government approach. We often focus solely on the military, but it's clear to me that as we continue on, the Iraqis want to have a good relationship along a number of dimensions with the U.S. Government, and not just solely the military.

I think that relationship between myself and the Ambassador and then between the both of us and the leadership of the Government of Iraq is really important and we'll work hard at that as we go in, Senator.

Senator HAGAN. How do the current election results and the timing and the leadership in Iraq affect this?

General AUSTIN. Certainly, Senator, we'd like to see a government formed as quickly as possible. Having said that, we want it done right, and not necessarily quick, but the Iraqis will form their government on their own time, and they will make their own choices.

The longer it takes, of course, it creates space for other events to occur, it also creates the space for people to feel as if they won't be properly represented, they've been disenfranchised. We are concerned about that. But, I think whoever is the leadership when the government's formed, we'll move out and engage that leadership and develop a strong partnership with them, and shape the way ahead for a lasting relationship.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan.

Senator LeMieux.

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to start by echoing the comments of my colleagues and thank you, both of you, for your service and your wives for their support of you. I know how difficult it is for families of people in the military, and we are all supported by our spouses, but especially those in the military, so a special thank you for both of your wives.

I want to talk to you about the neighbors that surround Iraq. In looking at a map, it occurs to me that Iraq's in a pretty tough neighborhood.

Recently we've read reports about Iran conducting military attacks again Kurdish villages inside Iraq. There's also been incursions by Turkey, as I understand it, with the Kurdish section of Iraq.

If you could give, General Odierno, an update to us about the relationship between Iran and Iraq, and Turkey and Iraq, and I want to talk to you, then, afterwards also about Syria, and give us an overview and then I'll have some specific questions for you.

General ODIERNO. On the northern areas and the border issues that are going on, these are generated by the Kurdish terrorist organizations that have been operating up in Northern Iraq for a very long time who, in the spring, has conducted offensive operations into both Iran and Turkey to kill Iranian as well as Turkish military forces. This has caused a response back, both from Iran and Turkey into the Northern mountains of Iraq.

We have set up with Turkey a trilateral intelligence collection organization, coordination element between the Government of Iraq, Turkey, and with some support from the U.S. Government, in order for Turkey to help and respond against this threat.

Iran, although they have come close to the border, there's no indication that Iran has actually conducted any ground-crossed border operations into Kurdistan.

Overall, with the relationship with Iran to the Government of Iraq—many people have many different opinions. Mine is that Iran would like to see an Iraq that is weak, that does not have strong relations with its other Arab nations, therefore would leave a larger void for Iran to have more influence inside of Iraq.

In addition, Iran does not want to see a long-term strategic relationship with the United States. They want to have that relationship. There's many reasons why they want that. But, in my view, that's why it's so important for us to execute the strategic framework agreement, and build strong bilateral ties with the Government of Iraq for the future.

Turkey has huge investments inside of Iraq, in Northern Iraq, Central Iraq. They have been working extremely hard to help build the economies in both Kurdistan and Northern Iraq. They have a lot of equities inside of Iraq, they're trying to build a strong relationship, there's been quite a bit of political engagement between the leaders of Turkey and the leaders of Iraq, and I think that's something that we will, hopefully, continue to see.

We've seen the strongest relationships we've seen in a very long time between President Barzani and the Prime Minister in Turkey in trying to work together to solve some of this Kurdish terrorist issues that occur up in Northern Iraq. We've seen some good meetings, agreements to assist each other with these problems, and also agreements for the first time that the Government of Turkey would recognize Kurdish rights inside of Turkey. I think those are all positive developments. There's still a lot more work that has to be done in that area, but it is a positive development.

Senator LEMIEUX. Is Iran still trying to actively destabilize Iraq?

General ODIERNO. Iran still funds smaller groups, they still fund, train smaller groups inside of Iraq to destabilize—for two reasons. One, to go after U.S. forces inside of Iraq. Second, in order to, I believe, intimidate in some cases, in order for political reasons inside of Iraq, with the Government of Iraq.

Although the movement is smaller, the size of the elements are smaller than they once were, they are still active.

Senator LEMIEUX. Are they providing weapons?

General ODIERNO. They provide training and weapons to these groups.

Senator LEMIEUX. Can you speak for a moment about Syria, and what the Syrians are doing? Are they providing weapons? I was reading that there was a recent attack along the border area between Syria and Iraq.

General ODIERNO. I do not believe that the Government of Syria is providing weapons to groups to conduct attacks inside of Iraq. However, we continue to see foreign fighter facilitation occur through Syria, although it is lower than it's been before, they are still able to move through Syria. We would like to continue to see

them take action against these facilitation networks that originate in many other places—Northern Africa and many others—in order to attempt to conduct operations inside of Iraq.

In addition, there still is a large ex-Ba'ath Party element inside Syria who continues to be very active and boisterous against the Government of Iraq, which appears to be somewhat destabilizing to the Government of Iraq, and we'd like to see them take action against that, as well.

Senator LEMIEUX. Okay.

General Austin, can you speak to how you envision the troop drawdown going? I mean, that's obviously going to be a big issue during your time of leadership and how will that process work, and how will you be able to maintain the stability that the U.S. forces, as well as the Iraqi Government have been able to achieve in recent months, with less troops?

General AUSTIN. First of all, Senator, I think that U.S. Forces-Iraq and General Odierno have laid out a really good plan to accomplish the drawdown and get us to where we need to be by the end of calendar year 2011. As I go in, I'll assess where we are with that plan, if I'm confirmed, and adjust, as needed.

But, I think that the current plan takes us to where we need to be, we're ahead of schedule in terms of the retrograde of a rolling stock, our vehicles and a vast amount of other equipment that we've moved out. There have been good control mechanisms and oversight mechanisms that have been put in place to manage and monitor the flow of equipment and people and so we'll make sure that that remains on track.

The key to executing a responsible withdrawal is ensuring that the Iraqi security forces have the capability to provide for their own internal security as we transition. Certainly, it will be this continual balancing act of making sure that they have a level of proficiency and required equipment and the resources to do what needs to be done to continue to secure the people, the country as a whole, as we draw down.

I'm confident, right now, we're well on the way to accomplishing that. Again, if there are any changes that need to be made, certainly we'll evaluate and adjust on target.

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, both.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Odierno, General Austin, I would like to begin by thanking you for the clarity and the careful precision of your answers today. A lot of issues here have a lot of nuance to them, and I think it's been very helpful to listen to how precise you have been answering some questions that could have taken you one place or another.

I have read the Strategic Framework Agreement and the SOFA. There are a lot of implications in those documents that are a bit vague, and we've been hearing your answers today with respect to what might happen if we leave too soon, and quite frankly, what might happen if we stay too long. I think both of those concerns need to be addressed.

I wanted to ask you a question about this withdrawal plan, but before I do, I don't want to forget, or lose the time, General Odierno, on the mentor program, to follow-on a comment of the Chairman, I hope you'll take a really hard look at that. I don't think that there's anyone up here who would deny the value of mentor programs. There was a lot of mentoring that went on in the United States military well before this specific type of program came into place, and there are, I think, legitimate concerns about, in some cases, the amount of compensation that has been provided, and in others the lack of transparency, quite frankly, with individuals who are retired, receiving retirement pay, also working for defense industry and not required, because of the form of these contracts, to disclose potential conflicts of interest and these sorts of things. There's a lot of concern up here on that.

Also, out in the retired community at large, I think there's a lot of concern from people who are not involved in the mentor program. I just hope you'll take a look at that.

With respect to the transition in Iraq, this is not a classical military retrograde. This is not the shrinking perimeter that you've seen in historical cases of a military disengaging from a country. It's a very complicated set of issues involving funding and involving transfers of missions, involving the longevity of intermediate programs. Some of them involve transfer of functions to the Iraqi Government, which has been discussed. Some of them involve transfer of functions to civilian contractors, as we discussed briefly yesterday. Some of them involve transfer of responsibilities and functions to the Department of State.

What I would like to hear from you, is in a form that is now taking place, what is this going to look like at the end of 2011? What's the U.S. military going to be doing at the end of 2011 and where will these other overlaps have occurred?

General ODIERNO. Senator, thank you very much for the question. It is a very important one. It is the key to what we need to do here between now and the end of 2011. How we transition and how we do this will have a long-term impact, I think, on our relationship with the Government of Iraq, and that's why this is such an important time.

I call it a thinning of the lines. I've called it that for a while. As we slowly withdraw our forces, we don't leave any areas, but we think our presence there and we give more and more responsibility over to the Government of Iraq. But it's more complex than that, that's from a security perspective. Overall, our relationship with Iraq will be determined by how we transition the many tasks that U.S. Forces-Iraq does now to other entities. General Austin mentioned a couple of these, how we transfer to the U.S. Embassy, what we transfer to the Government of Iraq as a task. Then some will be transferred to CENTCOM, because many of the things we do as we plan the future of regional security architecture and a long-term engagement with Iraq, will be run by CENTCOM. It's our responsibility to build a plan, to determine which of these tasks gets transitioned to which entity, and who is best qualified to do that.

We have gone through and done this. We have looked at over 1,200 different tasks. Some will be terminated because they're no

longer necessary, some will be turned over to the embassy, some will be turned over to CENTCOM, and some will be given to the Government of Iraq. It's important which tasks go where, who has the capacity to execute which tasks, and who will be the ones who will be able to best engage with the Government of Iraq on these tasks.

Although I won't get into any specifics, I want to assure you that we're spending an awful lot of time on this. A part of this is contractors. We have been working very hard to reduce the size and number of contractors in Iraq to make sure we only need those that are necessary. As we transition, we will continue to do this analysis, because fundamentally, as you all know, contractors are very expensive on the battlefield. We will continue to look at this very carefully.

We're also working with the State Department to transition what we have that can be reasonably transitioned to them, in order to support their missions beyond 2011. We're looking at this in a lot of detail, Senator.

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much for that comment.

General Austin, we only had a brief period to meet yesterday because of overlapping schedules, but I hope we can count on having this Wartime Contracting Commission make another visit soon into Iraq and come out with an idea on the contracting side of how this is going to look like. They've been very valuable to us.

General AUSTIN. Senator, if confirmed, you have my guaranty that we will embrace them as they come back into theater. You also have my guaranty that I will work hand in hand as a partner with the embassy to ensure that we don't just hand off tasks, but we work to develop and shape the capability that's required to accomplish those tasks. I know that's the road that General Odierno has started down, and I'll pick up from where he left off and continue to make sure that we have a great relationship working with the embassy.

Senator WEBB. Needless to say, it's a very tedious task that you are going to take on and that, General Odierno, you have done so well on. We don't often pay enough attention to it up here. Once the casualty numbers went down in Iraq, we haven't focused on this, but it's clearly the most vital thing we have left to do in Iraq, is defining the nature of how all these components fit together. I wish you all the best.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. If Senator Sessions is ready, it goes to him.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Being ranking member on the Senate Judiciary Committee is a full-time job. I have conflicts around here a lot, but I want to express my admiration for both of these individuals. I have great confidence in you and would sincerely wish to express my appreciation for your fabulous service. Anybody who's traveled into Iraq or Afghanistan and seen the hours and the dedication of our leaders and all of our personnel know how fabulous they are, and we appreciate you and salute you.

One of the things, General Odierno, I don't want you to repeat maybe what you've been asked before, but from my conversation yesterday, you believe that we can meet our goals of troop reduc-

tions in Iraq as of September. How would you advise the American people as to what risks remain? Should we be very confident or should we feel good about where we are, but risks remain, or are there great risks? How would you evaluate what you are leaving onto General Austin?

General ODIERNO. Senator, I would say we have continued to make steady progress inside of Iraq. On the date of 1 September or 31 August and the change of mission that is going to occur and the reduction to 50,000 transition forces is quite significant. But I think it is time for us to do that and it shows another point of progress. The fact that the Iraqi security forces have taken over responsibility, the fact that the Government of Iraq is increasing its ability to function. They still have a ways to go, but they are getting better in their ability to function. That's allowing us to transition and end combat operations and move to stability operations, where we can assist them and helping them to sustain long-term stability. I think it's another step.

The next step is, how do we establish that long-term relationship? How do we implement the strategic framework agreement that allows us to have a long-term relationship with Iraq, in order to sustain stability not only inside of Iraq, but add to the stability in the region? I think that's what we have to gain. What do I worry about? I worry about not so much security, but the impact of the political progress and economic progress on security.

We've talked a long time about buying time and space. They've done some work with that time and space, but we're now at a critical juncture of time in Iraq, the formation of a new government that will set the stage for Iraq for the next 4 years. The letting of 12 oil contracts in 2010, which will start to come to fruition over the next several years. How well that goes will say a lot and how economically Iraq starts to move forward. I think all of those points is really what's important, and how that goes will determine Iraq's future, in my mind, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. You and your predecessor, General Petraeus, had fabulous relationships, as I understand it, with the ambassador. You will have a new ambassador coming into Iraq soon.

General ODIERNO. It has not been officially announced yet, Senator. Ambassador Hill is currently the ambassador. I don't know how much longer he'll be there. He's been a great teammate.

Senator SESSIONS. General Austin, in September, what do you understand how the relationships may change between you as combatant commander or the general at least in Iraq, with the State Department? Will they take on a greater leadership role and has that been sorted out? Have you worked that out before you get there or what's your thinking?

General AUSTIN. It's being worked out as U.S. Forces-Iraq gets smaller, the footprint decreases. I think, as General Odierno said, there's a great working relationship right now with Ambassador Hill. Certainly the ambassador is the senior person in country and I look forward to working with whoever the ambassador is.

But I think that partnership, Senator Sessions, is absolutely critical. I think the example that we set flows down to all the folks in the State Department and in the military throughout the commands and directorates.

I was there when Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus were there, and was there with General Odierno worked with Ambassador Crocker as well. I was, and so I saw the great working relationship that they had and I look to create the same kinds of conditions for our troops and our State Department officials as we go back into country, if I'm confirmed.

Senator SESSIONS. I think that's true and it's my understanding you've already discussed the importance of making sure we adequately apply our resources to the top priorities in Iraq, and that one of those is the Iraqi army and security forces. I really feel strongly that at this point in history, and I guess you both agree, that we shouldn't short change the immediate need and make sure that the Iraqi army gets the training and support to take on the higher level of responsibility we expect of them. Would you comment on that or have you already?

General ODIERNO. Senator, we've talked our way through that already. I would just say that it is important that we set them up for success in order to mitigate the risks that are ahead. I've been very pleased with how the Iraqi army and police continue to perform. They still have some key things that they do not yet have that I think are necessary for them to be prepared to take on full responsibility at the end of 2011 when we leave, and that's what we're working towards now.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you both, thank you for your service.

General Austin, I'm glad you have your masters as an Auburn War Eagle, that's another good thing in your training that's going to help you, I'm sure.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing, and I just recall when you and I and others were in Iraq at the worst possible time, how discouraged and worried we were, but you should never count out the U.S. military in the efforts that they executed that turned that around, and now we're in such a better glide path that a lot of people would not have thought it possible. Our prayers are that we'll be able to do some of the same things in Afghanistan. It's looking difficult now, but perhaps we're seeing all the negatives now, and I think that we have to believe that we can put that on the right glide path too.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.

Senator Kaufman.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your service and thank you to your wives and your family, and I feel totally inarticulate in trying to express how much I do appreciate how much more, as I travel around this country, how much the American people appreciate what you're doing.

General Austin, you have literally big shoes to fill, and I'm sure you're going to fill them, and I'm sure you're going to do very well at it. The reason I came over here, because most of the questions when they get to me have already been asked, is I just couldn't pass up the opportunity to say, General Odierno, how much I appreciate, not just your service, not just the fact that you were there, but the quality of your service. I mean, just sitting here listening today, and we've embarked on a new counterinsurgency

strategy, and requires a lot of new skills for our military. It's amazing how they've risen to it.

But when you look back at the history of Iraq, your grasp on not just the military, but the economic and the political issues and how they interact, just like you were talking about a few minutes ago, about how the oil contracts are going to be important. I don't think people thought that's the way you fought a war 10, 15, 20 years ago. It's really key, and how the coalition works, and how you work with the secretary. I think Iraq is—when we look back in history—will be the place where we finally figured out how to deal with the bad guys in a new and creative way, and I think Iraq will be the thing, and I think one of the key players will be you. I just wanted to thank you for that.

General ODIERNO. Thank you, Senator.

Senator KAUFMAN. One of the things I wanted to talk about a minute, I've used this example of what a good job you do, is what you did with the problems between the Kurds and the Iraq army. When I was over there last year, I left Kirkuk pretty well convinced that they were going to be shooting at each other very shortly. I think your solution to go there and begin these joint checkpoints and the joint groups going into the cities and the rest of it worked real well. Is that continuing to work well?

General ODIERNO. It is and, in fact, it's starting to expand. We now have agreement from the Prime Minister and President Barzani to now incorporate four brigades of the Pesh Merga to the Iraqi army, and that's an incredible step forward that we are now working.

Senator KAUFMAN. Yes.

General ODIERNO. We're now working at figuring how we can help to train and equip them as they now are able to be integrated into the Iraqi army.

Senator KAUFMAN. General Austin, do you think—I know you're not going to know all the details of this—we're going to be able to continue to have U.S. forces after September 1st along that border to help keep bad things from happening?

General AUSTIN. Certainly, Senator, and I do believe that there will be a requirement to continue to work with the elements up there for some time. Again, what we want to see is the Iraqi Government, the leadership of the Iraqi Government embracing this issue to a much greater degree in the future. As time goes along, they have to establish a national vision so that we can unify the country. That's going to take some time, but I think it certainly can be done. We'll do everything we can to work with the ambassador and work with the leadership of both elements to ensure that they're making progress.

Senator KAUFMAN. General Odierno, in your new position, how do you feel about Secretary Gate's effort to rebalance the military, to get more emphasis put on these counterinsurgency efforts as we move forward?

General ODIERNO. I think the concept of regular warfare counterinsurgency are keys to the future. As I look back over the last 7, 8, 9 years, it's the complexity of the environment that we now have to operate in. There's so many different things that impact on military operations and the success that we have to have,

is that we have to rethink how we do business and how we operate in this environment.

People learn and watch what's gone in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they will try to take those lessons, if they ever have to come up against U.S. forces anywhere in the world, and we have to be able to be prepared in order to feel how we would deal with that and make ourselves more prepared than they ever will be. That takes some intellectual capacity and it takes thought and it takes experience and it takes thinking out of the box in some cases.

But I think more importantly, that Secretary Gates has pointed out, is that we have to be efficient in what we do. We have to become more efficient, and I think that's the key. How can we become more efficient and make our forces more adaptable? That's what I think is important for me to focus on, if I'm confirmed and assume my new position.

Senator KAUFMAN. This is my final question. One of the things I've been interested in more and more is nonlethal weapons; to give the warfighter an opportunity, if a bus is coming up to the back of the convoy, to either let them come and blow you up or having to shoot in there and kill women and children, or if you're at a forward operating base and there's a car coming at you at a high rate of speed or individuals. I went down to Dahlgren and I was impressed with where we're going. Can you just talk a little bit on your feeling about nonlethal weapons in terms of here?

General ODIERNO. This kind of warfare is about precision and it's about collateral damage, it's about eliminating collateral damage, and it's actually killing innocent people that's really what this is about. What we've learned is, if we're not careful and we get careless, even though it's for our own force protection, if we kill innocent people, the negatives to the mission are significant. We have to continue to think of ways of how we can stop this. Nonlethal weapons is one.

We've learned a lot about that and the importance of nonlethal weapons and other ways for us to do other things besides fire first. I think we've learned that over time, but those are very difficult decisions these young soldiers, sailors, or marines have to make on the ground. Sometimes you don't have a lot of time to make it, so you want to be able to provide them the capacity of something a little bit different than having to maybe fire live rounds. Maybe there's something else they can do to protect themselves and protect those innocent people that are in a situation they don't quite understand.

Senator KAUFMAN. Thank you.

Thank you both for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kaufman.

I have just a few additional questions. General Odierno, the current readiness reporting systems in the process of being implemented to a system called Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), which has been slow to come into operation, since a decision was made now, I think 8 years ago or so to switch from a previous system called Status of Resources and Training. Now, do you know or do you have an opinion as to why full implementation of this DRRS is taking so long?

General ODIERNO. Senator, I don't know why it has taken so long. I think there's many nuances within the system that people are trying to work out, but I will take a look at it, Mr. Chairman, and find out more information.

Chairman LEVIN. All right, will you give us, after you're confirmed, a chronology or timetable more accurately to complete that transformation? Will you do that?

General ODIERNO. Absolutely, Senator.

[The information referred to follows:]

I am not familiar enough with the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to speak with confidence about this topic. However, if confirmed, I will assess DRRS and Joint Forces Command's role in it, and answer your question within 90 days of assuming command of Joint Forces Command.

Chairman LEVIN. General, let me make sure I understand something that you said about the Iraq budget. When it was adopted, the budget that they're currently operating on had a deficit, and since then, as I understand what you said, because of an increase in oil prices and therefore in oil revenues, the projected deficit in Iraq under this budget is \$10 billion less than when the budget was adopted.

General ODIERNO. What I said was, there was a budget of—

Chairman LEVIN. In other words, there's no surplus.

General ODIERNO. There's no surplus.

Chairman LEVIN. But the deficit that was projected has been reduced because of the increase in oil prices.

General ODIERNO. Because of a \$10 billion surplus, of cash that they had.

Chairman LEVIN. Is that the result of the increase in oil prices?

General ODIERNO. No, I don't know. I need to get you an answer on that.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, but it was something that they didn't count on.

General ODIERNO. They had \$10 billion in cash reserves from last year. I think it had to do with their expenditures from 2009.

Chairman LEVIN. Were less than they expected.

General ODIERNO. Were less than they expected.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, so they had \$10 billion more in cash than was projected in that deficit.

General ODIERNO. That's right.

Chairman LEVIN. Excuse me, in that budget.

General ODIERNO. That's correct.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay.

General Austin, I have one additional question for you and that has to do with the situation on the ground of religious minorities in Iraq. It continues to be very fragile in some places, and it's sometimes bleak. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom concluded in their May 2010 report that systemic ongoing and egregious religious freedom violations continue in Iraq, and that the religious freedom situation in Iraq remains grave, particularly for the country's smallest, most vulnerable religious minorities. I've been very much involved in trying to find ways to give greater protection to those minorities, particularly the Iraqi Christian community, and I'm wondering if you, when you are confirmed, will you keep this committee apprised of the security situa-

tion in the Ninevah area, particularly, but any other area where there are religious minorities. Also, on the conditions of those minorities in those regions, and will you take all reasonable steps to increase the security for those people?

General AUSTIN. I will, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

We thank you both again. We thank your wives, your families for their great support. We hope that we can get these nominations confirmed in the next few days, hopefully by the end of next week surely. We'll do everything we can to speed up these confirmations both before these votes, both in this committee, but also on the floor of the Senate.

We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon at 11:34 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. The Department has made great progress in the joint arena since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols. The changes to the Joint Officer Management process enacted by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 have corrected some longstanding shortfalls. I don't believe there is a need for any major modifications to the act; however, as we learn more about ourselves given the current world environment and the challenges we face, it is important that we continue to refine and review joint and interagency operations and requirements.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. We have learned the absolute necessity for strong civil-military cooperation. Congress should consider means to increase integration of all U.S. Government agencies in appropriate training and force readiness environments in order to build the foundation for more effective "whole-of-government" approaches to crisis prevention or crisis resolution.

Continue Departmental efforts, such as Capability Portfolio Management, to integrate acquisition and resource allocation processes in meeting joint capability requirements. In other words, Services develop 'Service-Specific' systems and capabilities after joint review and authorization to ensure joint/interoperability issues are addressed.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command?

Answer. The Unified Command Plan focuses the command on two main missions: (1) providing conventional forces trained to operate in a joint, interagency, and multi-national environment, and (2) transforming the U.S. military's forces to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) serves as the chief advocate for jointness and interoperability, championing the joint warfighting requirements of the other combatant commanders. As such, he is responsible for five major areas:

- Serves as the Primary Joint Force Provider for conventional forces. In this role, JFCOM analyzes conventional forces worldwide to identify the

most appropriate and responsive sourcing solutions that are then recommended to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet combatant commander requirements. Commander, JFCOM provide those forces under its combatant command authority as trained and ready joint capable forces to the other combatant commanders when directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the Department's Joint Deployment Process Owner, it maintains the global capability for rapid and decisive military force projection and re-deployment.

- Serves as the lead Joint Force Integrator, responsible for recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to integrate Service, defense agency, inter-agency, and multi-national capabilities. As the Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio Manager responsible for leading the Department of Defense's (DOD) effort to improve interoperability, minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness.
- Serves as the Executive Agent for Joint Concept Development and Experimentation. In this role, JFCOM leads and coordinates the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCDE) efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies. Additionally, the Commander of JFCOM integrates multi-national and interagency warfighting transformation and experimentation efforts to support joint interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities.
- Serves as the lead agent for Joint Force Training. This effort is focused at the operational level with an emphasis on Joint Task Force (JTF) Commanders and their staffs and the ability of U.S. forces to operate as part of a joint and multi-national force. Additionally, JFCOM is responsible for leading the development of a distributed joint training architecture and developing joint training standards.
- Provides operational joint enabling capability packages that deploy on short notice to assist combatant commanders to rapidly form, organize, and operate a joint force headquarters. Additionally, assists combatant commanders in the planning, forming, training, and operation of their designated JTF-Capable headquarters.

BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. I'm very fortunate to have had the opportunity to not only serve for 34 years in uniform, but also to have commanded troops from the platoon level up to my present assignment as Commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq. Commanding in a joint, combined, interagency environment for almost 6 years, mostly in combat, at the division, corps, and force-level has provided me a unique perspective on joint inter-agency operations. I have conducted full-spectrum operations, counterinsurgency operations, and stability operations and have been on the leading edge of ground-breaking Army and Marine Corps doctrine. In every assignment I was fortunate to serve for, and lead, brave, innovative, and hardworking people, both in uniform as well as senior civilian leadership. Above all, I have tried to learn, mentor, and lead at every chance. All of this has prepared me for this opportunity.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, to the following:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and is directly responsible to him to carry out its assigned missions.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in accordance with established authorities, and except as expressly prohibited by law, has the full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense upon any and all matters concerning which the Secretary of Defense is authorized to act pursuant to law. If confirmed, I will keep the Deputy Secretary of Defense informed on appropriate matters.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense for:

Answer. The Under Secretaries of Defense, as the principal staff assistants, provide advice, assistance, and support to the Secretary of Defense in managing the Department and in carrying out such duties as prescribed by the Secretary or by law. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretaries in the areas of their responsibilities.

Question. Policy.

Answer. The Under Secretary for Policy is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

Question. Personnel and Readiness.

Answer. The Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for Total Force management; National Guard and Reserve affairs; health affairs; readiness and training; military and civilian personnel; language; dependents' education; equal opportunity; moral, welfare, recreation; and quality of life matters.

Question. Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Answer. The Under Secretary for Policy is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the DOD Acquisition System; research and development; modeling and simulation; systems integration; logistics; installation management; military construction; procurement; environment, services; and nuclear, chemical, and biological programs.

Question. Intelligence.

Answer. The Under Secretary for Intelligence is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Chairman is established by title 10 as the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman serves as an advisor and is not, according to law, in the operational chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary to each combatant commander. The President directs communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This keeps the Chairman fully involved and allows the Chairman to execute his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the Chairman is to speak for the combatant commanders, especially on operational requirements. If confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, I will keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which I am personally accountable.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs duties as prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When necessary, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and shall perform the duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I will keep the Vice Chairman informed on matters as appropriate.

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned to the combatant commands. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command coordinates closely with the secretaries to ensure the requirements to organize, train, and equip forces assigned to JFCOM are met. Close coordination with each Service Secretary is required to ensure that there is no infringement upon the lawful responsibilities held by a Service Secretary.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure preparedness of his assigned forces without the full cooperation and support of the Service Chiefs. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. The experience and judgment of the Service Chiefs provide an invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, I will continue the close bond between the command, the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard in order to fully utilize their service

capabilities, and to effectively employ those capabilities as required to execute the missions of U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Question. The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).

Answer. SACT is one of two co-equal Strategic Commanders within NATO's command structure. SACT supports NATO in the education, training and transformation of functional commands and staff elements that plan for and conduct operations, with multi-national and joint forces, over the full range of Alliance military missions authorized by the North Atlantic Council/Defense Planning Committee. I believe the vision to place NATO's North American Strategic Command in Norfolk alongside U.S. Joint Forces Command was exactly correct. Our current enemy mandates that we continue to build and support the symbiotic relationship between Joint Forces Command and Allied Command Transformation. Currently there is great synergy, collaboration, and support between the two Commands, and it is very much a two-way street that benefits both NATO and the United States.

Question. The other combatant commanders.

Answer. In general, JFCOM is a supporting command—its job is to make the other combatant commands more successful. If confirmed, I will continue the close relationships with other combatant commanders to increase the effectiveness we've created, and continue to build mutual support. The joint capabilities required by combatant commanders to perform their missions—today and in the future—forms a large basis of JFCOM's mission. Today's security environment dictates that JFCOM work very closely with the other combatant commanders to execute our national military strategy.

Question. The commanders of each of the Service's training and doctrine commands.

Answer. JFCOM's relationship with each of the Service's training and doctrine commands is marked by close cooperation and routine collaboration. U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command are key partners in training and doctrine issues given their close proximity to JFCOM in the Hampton Roads area. JFCOM participates with all Service Doctrine Centers in Joint Doctrine Community conferences and the JFCOM doctrine staff is in daily contact with Service doctrine centers. DOD training programs that JFCOM manages such as the Joint National Training Capability and Joint Knowledge Online could not function without the direct support of the Services.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems confronting the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command?

Answer. From my present view, the most significant challenge is meeting the combatant commander's (COCOM) force sourcing requirements. The task of providing trained and ready joint forces on a predictable and stable schedule that is reactive to combatant commanders and minimizes stress on families while providing adequate time for training, will continue to be a challenge for anyone with the Global Force Provider mission.

The second challenge is the continued implementation of Irregular Warfare competencies in the General Purpose Force and maintaining the appropriate level of balance between conventional and irregular capabilities.

With my unique combat experience over the past 7 years, it will provide an opportunity to review and institutionalize joint warfighting and civil-military lessons learned and ensure the Joint Force is proactive and adaptive to the complex environment we will face today and in the future.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing them?

Answer. Certainly, if confirmed, I will continue to work with the other combatant commanders, as well as the Services through JFCOM's component commands, to shape JFCOM's ability to provide the most logical and effective sourcing solutions for the Joint Warfighter. With respect to Irregular Warfare, I will continue to follow the Secretary of Defense's guidance and seek balance between our conventional, irregular, and nuclear capabilities. Finally, I will develop a mechanism to capture and implement joint and interagency operational and strategic lessons learned.

JOINT FORCE PROVIDER

Question. What is your understanding of the role of Joint Forces Command as the joint force provider to meet combatant commander requirements?

Answer. As the conventional Joint Force Provider (JFP), it is JFCOM's goal to source all validated rotational and emergent force requirements in support of the combatant commanders. To accomplish this, JFCOM provides DOD leadership with

recommended force sourcing solutions to make proactive, risk-informed force management and allocation decisions. JFCOM works to source these force requirements by collaborating with JFCOM Service components, each of the Services (both Active and Reserve) and combatant commands to meet combatant commands' force requirements.

Question. From your experience as Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, what are your observations and evaluation of the performance of Joint Forces Command in meeting your command's force requirements?

Answer. Overall, JFCOM, along with the other stakeholders in the Global Force Management process are doing a good job in supporting the combatant commands' force requirements. But demand is currently outpacing force supply in specific capability areas and the current systems are not perfect. Problems remain: force stress, persistent shortfalls, use of In-Lieu-Of (ILO) forces, etc. At times, the force providing processes have not proven agile enough to keep up with the pace of change and unplanned requirements. This is the source of some frustration. To their credit, however, JFCOM and other stakeholders in the Global Force Management Process are reviewing their processes: determining how to streamline procedures and increase visibility in order to increase responsiveness to combatant command force requirements.

Question. In this regard, include your observations and evaluations of the use of 'in lieu of forces to meet theater requirements.

Answer. In my judgment, ILO forces have provided effective solutions to meet theater requirements. ILO solutions are, by definition, substitutions of force when the standard force is unavailable. As such, ILO solutions provide capability to meet theater requirements that would otherwise go unfilled. I have been extremely pleased with the ability of the Joint Force to adapt to the needs of the theater commander. Of critical importance as ILO forces are continued to be employed is ensuring that they have received the proper training and equipment in order to enable their effectiveness. The quality of preparedness has been outstanding.

Question. Based on your evaluation, what in your view are the most urgent challenges requiring Joint Forces Command attention and how would you propose to meet these challenges or improve the command's efficiency or effectiveness as the joint force provider to our combatant commands?

Answer. The most urgent challenge impacting Joint Forces Command's effectiveness as Primary Joint Force Provider is access to high quality force readiness and force availability data. JFCOM is teaming with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, Service headquarters and technical organizations (DISA) in several initiatives that will integrate policy, processes, authoritative databases and technology that affect Joint Force sourcing and Global Force Management.

JOINT FORCE READINESS

Question. Joint Forces Command's current mission statement acknowledges its responsibility to provide "trained and ready joint forces" to our combatant commanders. The readiness of our non-deployed forces, especially our ground forces, for worldwide commitment has been impacted by the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

What is your unclassified assessment of the readiness of our non-deployed land, air, and sea forces in general, and specifically with respect to homeland defense and counter-terrorism missions?

Answer. That portion of the armed services making up the ground force is essentially either deployed forward supporting our Overseas Contingency Operations or is in some stage of resetting for future deployment. Those units that are in reset are challenged in their readiness by equipment needs, rotation of manpower and time to train. The Services have proven adaptive in preparing ground forces for their next deployment—but in many cases, they achieve a deployment ready state just in time for their next deployment rotation. The air and maritime forces are more ready across the board, but specific skill sets within those forces are also stressed due to deployments (e.g., Military Intelligence, EOD). As forces draw down in Iraq and the Army begins to realize some relief from its current high operational tempo (except in high demand skill sets), it is important we develop mechanisms to increase readiness of our non-deployed ground forces and develop ready force packages to meet worldwide needs.

Question. What policies, programs, or actions would you specifically propose to strengthen the readiness of our non-deployed air, land, and sea forces?

Answer. Continued support of current joint training and readiness programs that prepare our forces and joint headquarters to be ready when called upon by a com-

batant commander. Additionally, I will look to support initiatives such as inserting joint enabler into the immersive training environment, as well as continuing civil-military cooperation in a training environment.

READINESS REPORTING SYSTEMS

Question. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) measures unit readiness for combat missions at the high end of the spectrum of war rather than counterinsurgency, stabilization or other contingency missions. The Department has developed and begun fielding the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to replace GSORTS.

Based on your years of command experience, both in garrison and while deployed, what are your views of the importance of a comprehensive, objective, accurate, reliable, adaptable, and timely readiness reporting system?

Answer. A readiness reporting system as you have described is obviously important. Such a system should incorporate both resource assessments as well as mission assessments. This will provide the basis for force analysis that underpins JFCOM's recommended sourcing solutions to meet the geographic combatant commander's force needs.

Question. What in your view should be the requirements of a readiness reporting system capable of meeting Joint Forces Command's mission as joint force provider?

Answer. In general terms, the readiness system should reflect objective readiness metrics and subjective assessments of a force's ability to carry out specific mission tasks or a spectrum of military missions.

Question. In this regard, is it more important for Joint Forces Command to have a clear picture of available Service capabilities or the readiness data on specific units and systems, or both?

Answer. JFCOM would require both to perform its Joint Force Provider role. JFCOM currently works with its Service components and each Service to generate the shared understanding of what Service capabilities are available and why they are available—based on unit readiness data. In its effort to improve Joint Force Provider processes, JFCOM has defined needs for information including:

- Force availability
- Force capabilities
- Force structure
- Force readiness
- Global Force Management (GFM) strategic guidance (priorities)
- Force location
- Force apportionment
- Common operating picture
- Works in progress (pending changes in the force)

Question. What weight would you assign to each of the requirements you identify?

Answer. High priority items include: force availability, force capabilities identifier, force structure, force readiness. GFM strategic guidance, force location and force apportionment are medium priority. Common operating picture and works in progress are low priority.

Question. What is your understanding of, or experience with, the new DRRS?

Answer. I have very little experience with this system. Theoretically, I believe this system will be an improvement over the current Joint Readiness System, although I need to discuss DRRS with the Service components to determine their confidence in the system before declaring my own overall assessment.

Question. How would you evaluate this new system's ability to assess the personnel, equipment, and training readiness of forces and its utility in support of Joint Forces Command's joint force provider process?

Answer. My brief understanding is that DRRS includes a subjective readiness reporting system that focuses on evaluation of a force's ability to execute mission essential tasks rather than just measuring equipment, supply, manning and training levels as a means of assessing readiness.

Question. One of the concerns about the GSORTS and DRRS is the use or misuse of the commander's "subjective upgrade." Commanders are authorized to raise or lower their reported level of readiness in a more subjective fashion than is otherwise required in a strict application of objective standards as defined in the readiness reporting regulation.

During your years of command, in general have you used this authority to subjectively upgrade or downgrade your readiness reports? If so, what philosophy has guided your use of subjective upgrade or downgrade?

Answer. I have used subjective reporting in the past within the parameters of the reporting system at the time. If the reporting system directs an assessment of a

units full spectrum combat mission, then the full suite of equipment, manning and training is necessary to ready that unit to the full spectrum level. If the unit is tasked with a less demanding mission, for example, disaster relief—then a subjective report of readiness against that lesser mission is helpful to reflect that the unit is capable of success with the current state of manning, equipment and training. It's important to keep in mind that readiness reports are intended for senior headquarters consumption and their information needs and intents are key variables in defining any readiness system. I have never hesitated to apply my military judgment in assessing the readiness of units I commanded. No one understands the capabilities or shortfalls of a unit better than a commander and his chain of command. Quantitative assessments alone cannot adequately articulate a unit's readiness and I strongly endorse holistic appraisals by commanders.

Question. How have you mentored your subordinate commanders in their use of subjective upgrade in their readiness reporting to and through you?

Answer. The Army trains leaders to be honest, forthright, critical thinkers and they are selected to leadership positions based, in large part, on their demonstration of good judgment. I have relied on the good judgment of my subordinate commanders to reflect accurately their unit's capabilities within the parameters of the readiness reporting system. The readiness of their units has been a subject of frequent discussion with my subordinate commanders. I expect them to apply their judgment and report their honest assessment, even in open-ended environments where current readiness reporting does not apply.

Question. What in your view are the benefits and dangers of the use of subjective upgrades or downgrades?

Answer. The obvious danger is an overestimation of capabilities that may be used as the basis for a decision to commit a unit to a mission that it is not prepared to undertake. But commanders as well as their chain of command have a firsthand understanding that allows reflection of capabilities that are not measured in an objective based system (e.g., a unit with a great deal of leadership experience, but has not yet completed all training may be more capable than objective assessment reveals).

Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the use of subjective upgrades or downgrades in the readiness reporting system to ensure that Joint Forces Command has the most accurate, reliable, and timely information necessary to meet its responsibilities as joint forces provider?

Answer. I will monitor reports of force readiness through my Service component commanders who are in the best position to continually assess the accuracy and reliability of readiness reports. I will also travel and observe unit training and share Joint training lessons learned.

JOINT FORCE TRAINER

Question. Joint Forces Command also serves as a major joint force trainer. In this role, the command certifies the training readiness of Joint Task Force headquarters to plan, organize and manage the execution of joint force operations at all levels of conflict. The command supports combatant commander joint exercises and mission rehearsal exercises prior to deployment of major headquarters. However, Joint Forces Command does not certify the training readiness of deploying forces at the unit or "tactical" level.

Based on your experience as Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, what is your evaluation of the readiness of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units as they are arriving in Iraq?

Answer. Overall, the readiness of units arriving in Iraq has been high. The strain on the force after 9 years of conflict is significant but I believe the Services have done a good job in resetting units and getting them ready to deploy.

There will always be issues with manning, equipment, and training, but the Services have been adaptive and incorporated feedback from the theater by making necessary adjustments in their force preparations. There has been constant dialogue with JFCOM and the Service training centers to provide immediate feedback in order to adjust training and the training environment.

Question. Based on your observations and evaluations, should U.S. Joint Forces Command be assigned a greater role in setting standards and the certification of the training readiness of tactical units prior to their deployment?

Answer. I believe the supported combatant commander should set the requirements for what units need to be trained in, and in what conditions, and to what standard, if a standard can be determined. If there is something we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan it is that this enemy is adaptive and does not follow doc-

trine. Trying to set a standard for everything that a unit must do is challenging but it should be done where possible.

I also believe that the Services understand their role in providing trained and ready forces based on the supported commander requirements. When a unit commander states to his boss that he has conducted the required training then we must take that commander at his word.

What JFCOM can do is facilitate the articulation of the supported commander's requirements to the Services. This can be done with the annual Joint Training Plan which provides training guidance to the Service components. JFCOM should also support the Service training programs in replicating the environments of Iraq and Afghanistan in their training.

CONTRACTING SENIOR MENTORS

Question. The number of contractors working under U.S. Joint Forces Command currently exceeds the number of uniformed military personnel assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command. Those contractors who are hired as Senior Mentors can earn upwards of \$1,600 per day for their services.

In your view, what value do contracted Senior Mentors provide to U.S. Joint Forces Command and do you believe they are being overpaid?

Answer. Senior mentors bring years of experience and expertise and they are vital to how we train, teach and mentor our commanders to lead complex, joint and combined operations. I have personally experienced the advantage of senior mentors as I prepared for combat operations as a Division, Corps, and Force Commander. They provide unique perspective and experience to manage large organizations and help solve complex problems. Not everyone is qualified to provide these unique insights.

Our senior mentors are a key component of a training team that includes mid-grade active duty officers who act as Observer-Trainers. The senior mentor provides credibility for this training team due to his many years of experience.

The impact of senior mentors on our exercise program and in senior leader education programs such as Capstone, Keystone, and Pinnacle cannot be overstated.

It is difficult to put a price on the value of our senior mentors but the amount of time they spend mentoring a commander and staff during an exercise can often be significant. Their duties sometimes take them to locations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Djibouti where they might log significant amounts of time in austere locations.

Question. In your view, is the Senior Mentor Program transparent enough with respect to potential conflicts of interest?

Answer. I have not been involved in monitoring the program to provide an absolute yes. In all the years I have benefitted from senior mentors, did I ever experience or believe there was a conflict of interest. I understand that as part of the transition from senior mentor to a highly-qualified expert position, these flag and general officers will undergo ethics and conflict of interest training/counseling and be required to file an Office of Government Ethics Form 450.

Question. How can the current process be made more cost-efficient and effective?

Answer. My understanding is that JFCOM has been working with Department of the Navy, their Executive Agency, over the last 2 months to develop a quality senior mentor program at JFCOM that is fully in line with the Secretary of Defense's intent while ensuring they don't risk ongoing or planned mission support. It will be important to develop a risk mitigation plan phasing SM HQE transitions to ensure continued mission support during this time period. We will work to ensure every senior mentor has transitioned as soon as practicable and have a management process that will be in place to manage and support their mission activities.

Question. Given the decision by Secretary Gates to convert and in-source contractors into government employees, could U.S. Joint Forces Command also benefit from such a shift given the high percentage of contractors currently residing in U.S. Joint Forces Command?

I believe JFCOM is currently striving to do this. JFCOM is currently working on a plan to transition many of the Senior Mentors used in the past, to government employees in the form of highly-qualified experts. In addition, JFCOM will comply with the President's directive to reduce the portion of work performed by contractors and to hire government employees.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. One of Joint Forces Command's missions is to conduct lessons learned studies that can result in changes to joint tactics and doctrine. These efforts are informed by the command's wargaming experimentation program, as well as a num-

ber of advisors, including retired general officers, who have been sent to Iraq to review the operational situation.

Based on your experience as Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, what are your observations and evaluation of the Joint Forces Command's lessons learned efforts?

Answer. JFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) embeds collection teams with the supported combatant commands and Joint Task Forces to conduct lessons learned collection during the course of operations. This approach is a great leap forward over conducting interviews to collect information after the fact as we've historically done. It provides a level of timeliness, fidelity and impact that has not been achieved in previous lessons learned programs. Service teams also use this approach. From these collection efforts, JFCOM not only improves tactics and doctrine, but improves Joint warfighting across the full doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. This has permitted rapid adaptation and sharing of "best practices" among our various services and units. Lessons learned are a proven force multiplier in making us a truly adaptive force.

Question. What are your observations and evaluation of how these lessons learned impacted the conduct of operations in Iraq?

Answer. I observed two types of impacts: the first is the immediate impact provided by forward collectors' observations to the operational commanders, and the second is the result of subsequent analysis and recommendations being shared with senior DOD, U.S. Government, and coalition leadership. JCOA analysis identified lessons and derived recommendations that were fed into multiple efforts. As a result of the sharing of joint and Service lessons learned, training has been re-oriented in real time, organizations have been modified, and doctrine rewritten to strengthen our intellectual approach to this form of war. We have also on several occasions asked JCOA to conduct specific assessments of our ongoing programs such as Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, and Joint-Combined Staff Integration.

Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to improve the command's lessons learned systems?

Answer. Key to the collection of needed data is trust in the purpose and concept of JCOA's embedded missions. I intend to work with my fellow combatant commanders to set positive conditions at the highest level for JCOA's employment as a tool for analytical support. We will continue to infuse a sense of urgency in disseminating best practices uncovered by sharing lessons learned.

Additionally, the ability of U.S. forces to turn world-wide collected lesson observations into knowledge has reached a new level with the implementation of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). JLLIS is the DOD Program of Record for Lessons Learned managed by the Joint Staff J-7. It allows for transparency among all the service and combatant commands' lessons learned databases. The key for JFCOM will be the development of business models to process this large amount of information into knowledge, which we can then use to guide improvements for the Joint Warfighter.

Finally, if confirmed, I intend to engage the Secretary of Defense and Chairman on methods for ensuring resource allocations to the recommendations that go forward.

NATIONAL GUARD READINESS FOR CIVIL SUPPORT MISSIONS

Question. An issue of concern to the Congress is the apparent low levels of readiness of the National Guard for its domestic or civil support missions. The reality is that we do not know with great confidence the true "readiness" of the Guard for its domestic support missions because there is no national readiness reporting system that objectively captures the Guard's personnel, equipment, or training requirements or their status relative to those requirements.

What is your assessment of the Guard's current readiness to respond to the range of domestic contingencies that our states may face?

Answer. I believe the National Guard maintains a good level of readiness to respond to the range of domestic contingencies normally faced by a State in a given year. This year National Guard forces have responded, or are expected to respond under state control, to floods, fires, hurricanes, oil spills and tornadoes. Governors and their The Adjutant Generals (TAGs) generally will not offer National Guard forces for deployment if they believe that offering will negatively impact the state's ability to respond to its citizens needs. The National Guard forces that have returned from deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan generally are at lower readiness levels and the Army is working diligently to reset these forces.

Question. What in your view is the role or responsibility of Joint Forces Command, as the joint force provider, in developing a readiness reporting system that monitors the Guard's readiness for civil support missions?

Answer. I believe once the DRRS is fully evolved and National Guard units are reporting readiness via DRRS, the mission essential task based readiness system could reflect Guard readiness for civil support missions.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

Question. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has the responsibility to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements to meet the national military strategy and alternatives to any acquisition programs that have been identified.

How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the Department's acquisition process?

Answer. As the Multi-National Forces-Iraq and now the U.S. Forces-Iraq Commander, I am the end user of capability requirement and development decisions the JROC makes. I believe the JROC is effective at engaging the acquisition and programming communities early on by validating COCOM, Service, and Agency requirements/capability gaps. The JROC has approved a streamlined method for managing requirements achieved through information technology. This requirements governance process allows the operational user more flexibility in prioritizing delivery of requirements as operational needs change and will synchronize well with the proposed changes in the information technology acquisition process. The JROC is very effective in assessing and conveying the COCOMs' needs to the acquisition process through a rigorous Capability Gap Analysis process.

Question. Do you see the need for any change in the organization or structure of the JROC?

Answer. I think the Department is already pursuing necessary changes to improve the process and I strongly support the VCJCS and JROC efforts to include an "upfront" assessment of cost, schedule, and performance as part of the requirements process; including the evaluation of trade-off alternatives. The JROC provides independent military advice to our senior leaders regarding which issues become validated military requirements and which do not. I think the JROC is organized and structured effectively to provide that independent military voice. I also believe the combatant commanders need a voice through the JROC to influence the resource and acquisition processes as they relate to joint requirements. If confirmed, I look forward to investigating options that include combatant commander representation in the JROC.

Again, the JROC has already taken steps in this direction by delegating Joint Capability Board (JCB) authority to several of the functional combatant commands. This delegation included naming the Deputy Commander of JFCOM as the Chairman of the Command and Control (C2) JCB addressing all command and control requirements. This puts JFCOM very much in the role of primary advisor to the JROC on command and control issues. Similarly, the Deputy Commanders of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) have been delegated JCB Chairmanship for their respective functional areas.

Further, the SASC has proposed in the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act to allow the Commander or Deputy Commander of any combatant command to participate in a JROC which has topics that significantly impact their operations and requirements. This will also enhance the ability of the combatant commanders to influence the JROC decisions.

Question. In your view, should the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, have a seat on the JROC?

Answer. I do not believe it is necessary for the JFCOM Commander to have a seat on the JROC in order to be effective at influencing the direction and types of joint force capabilities. In October 2008, the JROC delegated the chairmanship of the command and control Joint Capabilities Board to the JFCOM Deputy Commander. In that role, JFCOM is the primary advisor to the JROC on command and control capabilities.

Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to interact with the JROC in pursuing the development of improved joint force capabilities?

Answer. I would offer the JROC as it is chartered is sound, and I am confident that General Cartwright will continue to lead us in the right direction. I will continue in the path set forth by General Mattis to bring significant issues to the attention of the JROC and leverage the JFCOM Chairmanship of the Command and Con-

trol JCB to the maximum extent possible to influence the development of joint force capabilities.

Question. Do you feel that the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, should have a larger role in the activities of the JROC, given the unique JFCOM mission to support joint warfighting?

Answer. In my view, we must continue to “operationalize” the JROC and acquisition processes to respond with agility when Warfighter Challenges are presented and validated. The Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is designed to impact mid- to far-term capabilities and funding (3 years and beyond). The process has less flexibility to quickly respond to emerging requirements within the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process in the near-term budget years (1–2 years). I strongly support initiatives such as the Information Technology Oversight and Management process that provides the required flexibility to take full advantage of evolving commercial information technology and incorporate it throughout a program’s lifecycle. U.S. JFCOM’s expanded role as the Chair of the C2 JCB provides a stronger voice in the JROC process.

The Joint Urgent Operational Needs process has been used effectively over the last several years. However, there still exists a gap in our ability to deliver joint warfighting capabilities that are needed in the 1–3 year range due to issues with all three core processes: requirements, acquisition and programming. I will be working with the VCJCS to identify ways to bridge this gap, potentially through changes in the JROC/JCIDS process that will then influence how we can acquire these capabilities in a timelier manner.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS

Question. Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, is responsible for advocating for the interests of combatant commanders in the overall defense requirements and acquisition process.

From your perspective has the U.S. Joint Forces Command effectively represented the requirements and needs of combatant commanders to the JROC and the Military Services?

Answer. Yes, U.S. Joint Forces Command has well represented the requirements and needs of the combatant commanders to the JROC.

Question. In your view, are combatant commanders capable of identifying critical joint warfighting requirements and quickly receiving needed capabilities?

Answer. Yes, as one of the component commanders for U.S. Central Command it is my belief that the combatant commander, in working with their component commanders is perfectly and uniquely suited to identify those joint urgent needs for adjudication by the JROC. Enhanced representation by the combatant commanders on the JROC will ensure that these needs are given the appropriate priority for delivery.

Question. What suggestions, if any, do you have for improving the requirements and acquisition process to ensure that combatant commanders are able to quickly receive needed joint warfighting capabilities?

Answer. The combatant commanders often face issues that require new capabilities in the near-term that cannot be supported by the traditional requirements, acquisition and programming processes. While the Services have some flexibility to adapt to these needs, current processes are often too bureaucratic and focused on the long-term to meet these needs. I will work with the JROC to advocate improvements to the existing requirements process that will accelerate our ability to provide the required joint warfighting capabilities. Flexibility and adaptability of our processes is essential as we continue to operate in a dynamic and changing operations and strategic environment.

JOINT CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Question. In your view, how successful has U.S. Joint Forces Command been in developing and delivering new joint capabilities to the warfighter?

Answer. I think very successful. JFCOM continues to work with the COCOMs to determine warfighter gaps and challenges and look for solutions. JFCOM develops new capabilities, often partnering with the Services, and leverages experimentation expertise, Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations, and interim joint capability development efforts to find solutions that can be operationally tested and fielded. In response to a CENTCOM Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) JFCOM partnered with the Services to develop and field test the Joint Airborne Communication System (JACS). The JACS systems have evolved under the JFCOM Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) from a 1,000 lb. package that required aircraft support to a 100 lb. package that is currently undergoing final testing for ulti-

mate integration on existing Service unmanned aircraft system (UAS) platforms. The JACS system more than triples the communication range capability of ground forces operating at extended ranges from forward bases. The early versions of JACS have been successfully tested in the Iraq AOR.

Question. What steps would you take to improve JFCOM's efforts in this area?

Answer. The ability to expeditiously develop new capability hinges not only on identifying the right technology, but also on having access to the resources (manpower and funding) to effectively pursue solutions that meet the warfighter's needs. In addition to Research and Development (R&D) funding, interim solutions also require temporary Operation and Maintenance (O&M) to ensure sustainability. If confirmed, I will work with my staff to ensure that JFCOM in partnership with OSD AT&L and others as appropriate, are adequately funded and provided the authorities necessary to enable the development and fielding of interim solutions, until a Service Program of record is available to meet COCOM urgent needs.

BUDGET AND RESOURCES

Question. Since 2001, the U.S. Joint Forces Command budget authority has risen considerably because of additional functional mission responsibilities assigned to the command.

Have the increases kept pace with the JFCOM taskings and do you foresee the need for future growth?

Answer. As any organization reacts to changes in organizational priorities, customer demands (DOD and COCOMs), and other external influences, that organization is forced to reassess the resources available to it and the resource structure in place to meet the demand. I understand building the resources to support JFCOM missions and functions has been a departmental effort over 10 years, and the informed allocation of those resources is intended to provide for that mission in support of delivering the appropriate tools to the warfighter. At this point in time, I can only assume that the resources have kept pace with the growing mission responsibilities.

I do not believe the JFCOM headquarters has any excess capacity, and a recent DOD COCOM Management Headquarters Analysis bears that out. So, as Joint Warfighting capability gaps are identified, it will be critical for the department to assess the risk as it relates to the overall ability of the force to complete its mission, and then determine the appropriate allocation/reallocation of resources as required to mitigate or accept that risk. We must seek efficiencies and constantly assess and adjust within the resources we have been given. However, with the current economic condition of our country, and the expected downward pressure on the overall budget, I view the near-term opportunity for growth unlikely.

Question. In what specific areas do you see the need for future growth?

Answer. Without having the opportunity to assess and evaluate JFCOM, I am not able to provide an informed answer to that question.

Question. Do you believe that JFCOM has adequate staff to efficiently manage this increase in budget authority and mission responsibilities?

Answer. I believe the answer is yes, but once again, that is something I will have to assess for myself. Anytime an organization experiences rapid growth like JFCOM, there is always concern about failure to address the management and oversight elements.

Question. Approximately two-thirds of JFCOM headquarters staff is composed of government civilians or contractors.

In your view, what explains this large civilian and contractor workforce?

Answer. From the recently completed COCOM Baseline Review, I understand JFCOM's management headquarters staff is the leanest of any COCOM. Like every COCOM HQ, the civilian and contractor components of the workforce augment the military component. Taken together, I expect the components operate as a team to execute the unique missions and functions assigned by the Unified Command Plan and other directives. JFCOM's government civilians generally perform duties that are inherently governmental in nature, such as financial and program management, while our military personnel provide the essential element of recent and relevant operational experience and perspective. I expect to find the contractor component of JFCOM's workforce to be lean and well-managed by a trained cadre of government acquisition professionals and held accountable to specific and rigorous performance standards.

Question. Do you believe that JFCOM has an appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel?

Answer. I simply do not know at this time. This is something I will have to review and assess once I am there. I understand significant workforce rebalancing is occur-

ring in response to the legislative enablers, and the Department's guidance, on acquisition reform and in-sourcing. Hopefully, these initiatives will lead to a workforce that is both more effective and less expensive.

JOINT FORCES COMMAND LIMITED ACQUISITION AUTHORITY

Question. Congress has provided Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, with the authority to develop and acquire equipment for battle management command, control, communications, and intelligence and other equipment determined to be necessary for facilitating the use of joint forces in military operations and enhancing the interoperability of equipment used by the various components of joint forces.

What is your assessment of the benefits of this authority?

Answer. Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA), which was delegated by the Secretary of Defense to U.S. Joint Forces Command from 2004 through 2008, proved to be a useful and flexible tool for JFCOM to support other combatant commands. LAA to JFCOM was discontinued at the end of fiscal year 2008.

Question. Do you concur with the findings and recommendations of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its April 2007 report which were somewhat critical of JFCOM's use of limited acquisition authority?

Answer. I am not familiar with the results of the GAO report.

Question. What internal changes, if any, would you recommend to improve the execution of the authority?

Answer. If confirmed I would commit to studying this more thoroughly.

Question. Do you believe that an increase in acquisition staff size is necessary?

Answer. I am not in a position to speak for USD(AT&L) on makeup or organization of the Defense Acquisition Work Force in DOD. I understand that JFCOM has no acquisition staff and none is required at this time, but we will study this more thoroughly.

Question. Do you believe this authority should be made permanent?

Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to studying this more thoroughly.

Question. What additional acquisition authorities, if any, does U.S. Joint Forces Command require to rapidly address such joint warfighting challenges?

Answer. If confirmed I will review. My initial reaction is none at this time.

Question. Do you believe similar acquisition authority should be extended to other combatant commands, and, if so, which commands and why?

Answer. SOCOM already has acquisition authority to meet specific needs of their special operations mission. It is my understanding that LAA was given to JFCOM to meet the unique interoperability and C2 missions assigned to the command under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and reinforced recently by the Joint C2 CPM mandate of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. For those missions, JFCOM should be the single entity determining the joint solutions to interoperability and C2 problems faced by all the COCOMs.

Question. Will you recommend that the Department directly fund JFCOM to support the authority—which has not occurred to date?

Answer. No. Again, if the LAA statute was extended, or made permanent, and JFCOM was empowered by USD(AT&L) to execute all aspects of acquisition authority, I would recommend funding by way of an acquisition contingency fund (Program element) made up of RDT&E, O&M and OP subheads available to USD(AT&L) to fund LAA approved projects.

Question. What role, if any, should oversight officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology play in the utilization of JFCOM's acquisition authority?

Answer. If the LAA statute was extended, and JFCOM was empowered by USD(AT&L) to execute LAA, I strongly believe approval of LAA projects should remain the decision of Commander, JFCOM. USD(AT&L) should have a responsibility to arrange funding for the LAA projects and continue to perform an oversight role in ensuring JFCOM doesn't violate acquisition regulations in the execution of the LAA mission.

DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

Question. The Department's Science and Technology (S&T) programs are designed to support defense transformation goals and objectives. These programs are intended to ensure that warfighters—now and in the future—have superior and affordable technology to support their missions and to give them war-winning capabilities.

Do you believe there is an adequate investment in innovative defense science and technology activities to develop the capabilities the Department will need in the future?

Answer. The Department's current S&T investment level is probably about right. If confirmed, I must continue JFCOM efforts to steer that investment on solutions to debilitating capability gaps and on the future warfighter enablers. That requires continuing to work closely with OSD and Joint Staff, other COCOMS, and the Services to ensure we are making the most effective and efficient use of the funding we currently receive. I know JFCOM has developed partnering relationships with the Services, Agencies, other Federal labs as well as with large and small private sector companies which need to be embraced to help speed capability development at reduced costs and promote that necessary future capability development.

Question. Do you believe the Department's investment strategy for S&T programs is correctly balanced between near-term and long-term needs?

Answer. This is an area where I plan to review and analyze more closely should I be confirmed. The challenge is ensuring that we have a proper S&T portfolio that allows us to invest in the more risky, revolutionary technologies; yet, sustain our investments in technologies that are needed for the current fight and programs of record in the POM. I intend to continue working closely with OSD, Joint Staff, other COCOMs, and the Services to ensure we maintain the proper balance to develop future capabilities while addressing the gaps identified in the Science and Technology Integrated Priority Lists and the identified Joint Warfighter Challenges.

Question. What is the role of JFCOM's modeling and simulation program in the development of new warfighting capabilities for DOD?

Answer. I believe JFCOM modeling and simulation (M&S) should focus on developing new warfighting capabilities, and facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the national and global security environment of the 21st century. It needs to replicate the complexity and terrain of the security environment without placing soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in harm's way. In addition, JFCOM M&S should enable complete integration of the other key players in national security, such as multi-national and interagency partners, with little attendant risk (politically and operationally). Distributed operations allow participants greater access to joint venues through the network, and from their home stations, thus driving down costs and encouraging participation.

Modeling and simulation not only enables development of new warfighting capabilities, but constitutes a new, emerging warfighting capability in itself. For instance, an experimental modeling and simulation capability that permitted the rapid assessment of enemy transportation routes through mountainous areas during laboratory experiments has been fielded and is in active use in Afghanistan. Other M&S transformational capabilities developed through experimentation and demonstration may be useful capabilities in planning, mission rehearsal, mission execution, and assessment in direct support of operators.

Question. How would you characterize JFCOM's relationship between DARPA and the Services on S&T programs and how could those relationships be improved?

Answer. My understanding is JFCOM has enjoyed a good relationship with DARPA and the Services. JFCOM supports a DARPA intern program, and also recently appointed the DARPA Director as a member of the JFCOM Transformation Advisory Group. This provides the JFCOM senior leadership with key strategic insight. I understand actions are ongoing to more fully embrace DARPA's capability and strengthen collective efforts. The Services' involvement with JFCOM appears healthy with a program that has Service officers at JFCOM to understand Joint and coalition needs, work on JFCOM's mission areas, and pull in Service equities and capabilities. JFCOM, in coordination with OSD and Joint Staff, leverages the Services S&T efforts to find opportunities for tighter integration of S&T programs in Joint capability development activities, such as Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD). I will look to strengthen these relationships by keeping DARPA and the Services continuously informed of Joint and coalition needs, thus allowing them to address these needs within the Department's budget cycle.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The Department's efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.

What are your views on the success of JFCOM programs in transitioning new technologies into use to confront evolving threats and to meet warfighter needs?

Answer. JFCOM has an established track record of identifying Joint capability gaps and then developing solutions to meet the Joint Warfighter need. I have seen the results of these efforts first hand in Iraq. I do believe we need to work harder at fielding solutions faster using off-the-shelf technology and leverage private sector

best practices. As the threat in the Irregular Warfare arena continually evolves at a quickening pace, we must be proactive in meeting the warfighters needs in a timely manner.

Question. Do you believe there are improvements that could be made to transition critical technologies more quickly to warfighters?

Answer. I believe our process for identifying capability gaps and joint warfighter requirements is solid—in the past I have made my fair share of recommendations. However, the solution development process under Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS) is overly complex, burdensome and unable to respond quickly to urgent warfighter needs. All critical Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) require expediting within the existing Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC). Increased resourcing and empowerment of the JRAC to address these needs would ensure quicker solution delivery.

Question. What are your views on the current balance of activities in the Joint Experimentation portfolio across battlespace awareness, building partnerships, command and control, force application, logistics, and protection?

Answer. A balanced joint experimentation portfolio is an important element of the Departments comprehensive approach to address the operational requirements of the warfighters. The UCP tasks JFCOM to lead and coordinate JCD&E efforts across the Department. JFCOM does this through an enterprise approach in order to balance the varied experimental needs of the combatant commands and Services.

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL (JC2) CAPABILITY PORTFOLIO MANAGER

Question. DOD recently assigned JFCOM the acquisition oversight role of JC2 Capability Portfolio Manager. Note: DOD recently assigned JFCOM as the military lead for the C2 Capability Portfolio.

As you understand it, what does this responsibility entail and do you believe it is consistent with the overall JFCOM mission and funding levels?

Answer. Given the UCP responsibilities assigned by the President to U.S. Joint Forces Command, specifically in the area of joint integration and interoperability, I think our assigned role as the military lead for the Department's Command and Control (C2) capability portfolio is consistent with our mission and appropriately resourced. Command and Control is obviously a critical military capability, at every echelon and across the Services. We fight and operate as a joint force, which in turn requires that our C2 capabilities are integrated and interoperable. Our ability to manage information and present it to commanders in order to make decisions is imperative for success. The information environment becomes more complex every day. How we manage information to improve integrated Battle command must be a top priority.

Question. What do you see as the major challenges towards the development and deployment of joint, interoperable command, control, and communications systems?

Answer. The major challenge is trying to integrate all the C2 capabilities developed and fielded by title 10 Service providers. This may sound like a simple task, but C2 requirements vary across the Services and Joint Force. There are also technical challenges associated with trying to integrate complex systems of systems, networks, data, C2 software interfaces and communications/delivery (space, aerial and surface layers). My preference is obviously for the Services to develop joint, interoperable C2 capabilities on the "front-end" rather than the Joint Force Commander having to integrate these capabilities in theater. We are not there yet. We must work together to develop joint warfighting concepts, doctrine, requirements, training, and integrated joint architectures and standards.

JOINT EXPERIMENTATION

Question. How would you rate the success of the joint experimentation activities of JFCOM, and the Department as a whole, in supporting the development of new concepts of operations?

Answer. I understand that significant improvements in relevance and impact have been achieved in joint experimentation over the past few years. JCD&E results are delivering real change across DOTMLPF for the joint warfighter in response to DOD's most pressing problems. JFCOM's joint experimentation activities are an important element of the Department's efforts to ensure we remain superior in the future threat environment. JCD&E efforts generate solutions for the combatant commands' and Services' most significant challenges and provide a framework to understand the challenges of the future joint operating environment and the ways in which the joint force will operate. Warfighters are directly involved in developing and validating concepts, and transitioning solutions across the full spectrum of doc-

trine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities.

Question. What changes would you recommend to increase the effectiveness of joint experimentation activities?

Answer. The joint experimentation community must continue to improve the relevance and impact of concepts and capabilities for the warfighter, while ensuring focus on the most pressing warfighter challenges while ensuring visibility and transparency of concept development and experimentation. Projects must focus on precisely defined military problem statements and produce results in 12 months or less. We must formalize partnerships between experiment sponsors, subject matter area experts and transition agents to ensure the accuracy and rapid transition of results to drive enduring change for the joint warfighter.

Question. Based on your experience, do you believe that the overall Department commitment and investment in joint experimentation is adequate to ensure the effective integration and interoperability of our future forces?

Answer. We are better, but we still have much work to do. The integration and interoperability of joint forces is improving; however, security challenges we face now and in the future mandate a comprehensive approach to include interagency and multi-national partners. My guess is that additional funding for joint experimentation would be needed to facilitate this broadened body of work.

Question. What do you believe to be the appropriate role for JFCOM in determining how the respective Services should invest their experimentation dollars?

Answer. The UCP assigns JFCOM responsibility to lead joint concept development and experimentation (CDE) and coordinate the CDE efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies to support joint interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities. The Commander of JFCOM is also tasked with leading the development, exploration, and integration of new joint warfighting concepts and serving as the DOD Executive Agent for joint warfighting experimentation. This does not require strict JFCOM control of how Services invest their experimentation dollar, but does require a clear communication of the planned activities of Service experimentation and the ability to develop a common vision of the course of experimentation with the CJCS and Joint Chiefs.

JFCOM must be the proponent that creates an awareness of experimentation activities in the department and serves to synchronize the efforts of the JCD&E Enterprise. Services can then exercise their appropriate fiscal authorities under title 10, guided by that common vision of the course of experimentation.

URBAN OPERATIONS

Question. JFCOM's experimentation and lessons learned efforts have had significant recent activity dedicated to understanding and development of urban operations concepts.

What is your assessment of current DOD capabilities to conduct urban operations?

Answer. We are much better today than we were 8 years ago because our troops and their leaders are more experienced, truly adaptive and superbly trained. But we must now develop realistic training environments combined with simulations to continue to improve our ability to operate in an urban environment. If the enemy adapts, we must have the ability to think and constantly adapt. We must be able to confront an adaptive enemy that simultaneously combines irregular and conventional tactics, weapons and organizations.

Question. What major issues need to be addressed to improve those capabilities?

Answer.

- Increased capacity for human intelligence.
- Greater urban operations reconnaissance and surveillance to assist in the counter-IED fight. This includes C-IED organization and doctrine.
- Joint command and control systems that enable the integration not only of military capability, but also of interagency capability in a coalition environment that enables true information sharing with our partners.
- Precise and non-lethal weapons that minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties.
- Strategic communications capabilities that improve our ability to help the population understand the truth about what we are doing and gain their support. Additional investment in language and cultural awareness for our troops who interact on a daily basis with the population we hope to positively influence is also essential.
- The ability to better visualize the urban operating environment, including the ability to sense through the massive structures of the city.

- Force tracking in the urban environment to ensure we know exactly where all of our forces are located.
- Abilities to Process, Exploit, and Disseminate the tremendous ISR capabilities that we possess to the lowest tactical levels.
- Creation of processes and simulation that enable the development of our small units to perform at increasingly higher levels.

Question. Based on results from the JFCOM Urban Resolve 2015 experiment last year, efforts are being made to promote the concept and fielding of airborne persistent surveillance assets such as Angel Fire.

What is your assessment of the value of the development of improved sensors, aircraft, and downlink technology and the field testing and integration of these assets with feeds from other battlefield sensors?

Answer. It is incredibly valuable. My experience in Iraq tells me that one of the keys to success in counterinsurgency is a focus on the environment that allows commanders to gain a view of the enemy that enables timely decisionmaking. The increase in numbers of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms does not ensure that the information derived from those sensors is properly fused. A critical component in implementing this approach is the development/implementation of capabilities to combine the information from these ISR platforms in a form accessible by the commander at the lowest operational level. If confirmed, I intend to continue to emphasize the development of improved sensors and to ensure processes are jointly synchronized and focused to enhance ISR integration with warfighting capabilities. ISR is working in Iraq because tactical leaders are maximizing the effectiveness of a limited resource. The optimal use of ISR is enabled through decentralized control that provides the greatest flexibility at the lowest levels within the command.

IRREGULAR WARFARE

Question. The Secretary of Defense has stated that irregular warfare (IW) must become a Department core competency.

What, in your view, does it mean to make irregular warfare a core competency and how will we know if that has been achieved?

Answer. In my opinion, this means enhancing our ability to conduct a variety of missions such as: train, advise, and assist foreign security forces; create a safe secure environment in fragile state; provide essential government services and humanitarian relief as necessary; and identify and defeat irregular threats from both state and non-state actors. We will know that irregular warfare has been achieved as a core competency when we have institutionalized many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan into our joint training and doctrine. We must define the role of conventional and unconventional forces and broaden the spectrum of operations so that we can routinely conduct operations in a variety of complex physical and mental environments.

Question. What is your evaluation of the Department's efforts to date to achieve this objective?

Answer. Significant lessons have been learned from recent operations, and the Services have made progress adapting force structure and fielding necessary capabilities to succeed in these complex environments. Modular Brigades, Human Terrain Teams, expanded Counter-IED capabilities, revised doctrine and concepts, enhanced pre-deployment training are among many of the relevant, necessary adaptations that have been made. Nevertheless, U.S. forces must continue to adapt to stay ahead of determined adversaries intent on exploiting our weaknesses.

Question. What, in your view, is the role of U.S. Joint Forces Command in achieving this objective for the Department and with each of the Services?

Answer. U.S. Joint Forces Command is uniquely positioned to assist the Department in developing the right concepts and capabilities required to ensure irregular warfare becomes a core competency of the joint force. Specifically, JFCOM can assist the Department in establishing joint standards for IW relevant training and readiness, recommending mechanisms for increasing interoperability and integration of SOF and GPF related activities. Furthermore, JFCOM can assist in developing joint IW relevant doctrine and concepts, and regularly assessing the readiness and proficiency of the joint force to conduct Irregular Warfare related operations.

Question. What, in your view, are the most important challenges to overcome in making irregular warfare a Department core competency?

Answer. The challenge as we forge ahead is to improve our ability to be agile and responsive enough to stay ahead of an irregular enemy. This requires balance and agility. Additionally, to obtain a balanced force we must gain irregular warfare proficiency without forfeiting our conventional and nuclear dominance and do this in

a resource constrained environment while engaged in two major contingencies. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to increase our flexibility and adaptability for fielding capabilities on the battlefield in the present warfight as well as further institutionalize irregular warfare in military doctrine, training, capability development and operational planning.

Question. What initiatives or improvements would you recommend, if any, to overcome these challenges or accelerate the achievement of this objective?

Answer. Adoption of institutional education for noncommissioned officers and officers is absolutely critical to developing adaptive leaders with the understanding and skills necessary to overcome our future challenges. What quickly became clear to me from my deployments to Iraq, is that in war, human beings matter more than any other factor. We must equip our leaders with an education that gives them the understanding of the political, strategic, historical and cultural framework of a more complex world as well as a deep understanding of the nature of war. In addition, we must include our interagency partners in our training and education programs. Irregular warfare must include all of our interagency partners and their unique skills.

“WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT” APPROACH IN JOINT OPERATIONS

Question. The Secretary of Defense has emphasized a “whole-of-government approach” to national security policies, programs, and operations.

What, in your view, does a “whole-of-government approach” in joint operations mean?

Answer. A “whole-of-government approach” to joint operations is applying all potential resources available within the U.S. Government to solve complex problems. It implies working with our civilian interagency partners throughout the process of assessing the situation on the ground, planning to address the challenges, executing strategies, and developing assessment tools to monitor our progress. In Iraq we have developed a comprehensive Joint Campaign Plan that integrates the unique capabilities of our interagency partners, the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, and other governmental agencies.

Question. What is your evaluation of the Department’s efforts to bring a “whole-of-government approach”?

Answer. At all levels, departmental, Service, COCOM and in the field DOD is making an all out effort to improve our ability to coordinate and collaborate with our civilian agency teammates. In the field, civilian counterparts are imbedded with military units, like Provincial Reconstruction Teams. At the Service level, we use civilian consultation in the development of capabilities to address our security force assistance responsibilities. COCOMs have aggressively sought to improve civilian agency coordination and outreach functions and OSD and Joint Staff have taken steps to include civilian agency input in the development of our plans. But we must continue to break down interagency barriers to more effectively deal with the complexity of the modern security environment.

Question. What, in your view, is the role of U.S. Joint Forces Command in developing and implementing a “whole-of-government approach” to joint doctrine, training, planning, and operations?

Answer. JFCOM is in a supporting role for an overall DOD effort. Its particular niche is ensuring that all Joint doctrine, training, planning and approach to operations use a whole-of-government and comprehensive approach. Additionally, JFCOM’s UCP charter makes it responsible for the conduct of interagency and multi-national experimentation and concept development. Joint leadership training programs from Capstone to Pinnacle must provide a forum for our senior leaders to grow, adapt, and forge interagency relationships.

Question. What, in your view, are the important challenges to overcome in making a “whole-of-government approach” a central part of joint doctrine, training, planning, and operations?

Answer. JFCOM is and has been addressing this challenge for a number of years, and I am told that the term “whole-of-government” approach was coined in a JFCOM experimentation effort. I think the most important challenge in making a “whole-of-government” approach a reality is to get buy-in from our interagency partners. This will build their capacity so that we can consistently train together, encourage them to participate in and consult with us on the development of improved methods and capabilities for planning and operations thru experimentation, and the revision of Joint doctrine.

Question. What initiatives or improvements would you recommend, if any, to overcome these challenges or accelerate the achievement of this objective?

Answer. I believe an assessment focused on the advantages and disadvantages of increasing their capacity would be the key to accelerating the achievement of this objective.

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Question. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and support operations in DOD planning and guidance in order to achieve the goal of full integration across all DOD activities.

What is your assessment of the Department's current emphasis on planning for post-conflict scenarios?

Answer. The Department has made great progress in its emphasis on military planning for post-conflict scenarios. These efforts have helped to codify the best practices and procedures that the recent experiences have taught us. Additionally, Department planning guidance now emphasizes activities associated with both precluding contingency plan execution as well as post-conflict requirements comparable to what we have historically placed on preparations for major combat operations.

However, these activities require a whole-of-government effort. Typically during a crisis, those in military and civilian agencies have come together with the best intentions and eventually respond in a unified manner. The lack of integrated planning can make the initial efforts awkward, uncoordinated, and inefficient. The Department is an active participant in the executive branch's efforts to improve the integration of U.S. Government efforts.

Question. How can the new directives on post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations be better implemented?

Answer. The DOD Instruction on Stability Operations (16 Sep 2009) provides comprehensive guidance to the Department to ensure the development of both the capability and capacity to conduct stability operations. One of the most important highlights is the need to institutionalize and expand the Department's efforts towards integrated, "whole-of-government" planning and execution. If confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, I will keep the emphasis on matters for which I am personally accountable such as:

- Capturing the Joint lessons learned and improving our ability to share them with our interagency partners
- Developing Joint concepts in collaboration with interagency partners
- Supporting the continued expansion of Interagency partner participation in both the planning and execution of joint training and experimentation events
- Integrating Interagency partners into Joint Command and Control solutions.

Question. What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. Most lessons learned from our experiences of planning and training for post-conflict operations are related to the importance of integrating our interagency, multi-national, and host nation partners. The integration issues emphasize the need to invest in:

- Defining the lead and supporting roles and responsibilities in the planning process
- Developing collaborative decisionmaking processes
- Developing compatible information systems to include interface controls, data sharing and disclosure processes

Continuing to expand opportunities to train with our interagency and multi-national partners in order to improve planning, execution and enhance mutual understanding.

RESPONSES TO WMD THREATS AND NATURAL AND MANMADE DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES

Question. The responses of Federal, State, and local agencies to Hurricane Katrina and, more recently, to the catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, have generated debate about the appropriate role for military forces in responding to national crises.

In your view, what is the appropriate role, if any, for U.S. Joint Forces Command in supporting civil authorities responding to natural and manmade disasters or WMD threats within the United States?

Answer. JFCOM's role is that of the Primary Joint Force Provider to Commander, NORTHCOM, or any other designated Supported Commander, following a WMD in-

cident. JFCOM is tasked to develop sourcing solutions to meet force requests of the Supported Commander in a timely manner. JFCOM does not generally provide forces to Governors or TAGs who have purview over their own State National Guard forces. However, if those forces are Federalized by the President, they could be provided to the supported commander by JFCOM. It is generally assumed that in case of a WMD incident the President would choose to use forces under title 10, but there is no guarantee of that eventuality. Should the response be limited to title 32 forces, JFCOM would have a limited role in the response.

Question. Hurricane Katrina has demonstrated the importance of joint and inter-agency training in preparation for support disaster operations.

In your view, how could U.S. Joint Forces Command influence joint and inter-agency training to enable better coordination and response for natural and man-made disasters operations?

Answer. There are probably two high-impact approaches JFCOM can use to enable coordination and response during natural disaster operations: experimentation and training. The first discovers best practices and the second trains the entire interagency and nongovernmental partners in those best practices.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION RESPONSE UNITS

Question. What role do you believe U.S. Joint Forces Command should play in the training, assessment of readiness, and employment of units with WMD response missions, such as the Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams and the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force?

Answer. JFCOM, in its role as Primary Joint Force Provider, will develop sourcing solutions for the Defense CBRN Response force and two Command and Control CBRN Response Elements as defined in the QDR 2010 and the most recent Guidance for Development of the Force. JFCOM ensures that Service training plans are aligned with NORTHCOM Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMET) for consequence management units, and will also assess readiness against those JMETs and report that assessment to DOD leadership monthly. JFCOM will not employ those units, but will provide them in a timely manner to a supported combatant commander following the Secretary of Defense allocation decision.

JOINT QUALIFIED OFFICERS

Question. How do you assess the necessity for and effectiveness of the current joint qualification system for military officers, including requirements for promotion to general/flag officer rank and professional military education?

Answer. The fundamentals of the Department's professional military education programs that provide joint qualifications are sound, but there are areas that need improvement. As the Secretary articulated in his policy for the Department's Joint Qualified Officer program (DODI 1300.19), today's joint force requires the largest possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities. Officer career management plans that identify, develop, and track high-potential officers for joint qualifications are crucial to ensure our best officers are prepared for joint duty assignments and eventual promotion to general/flag officer rank.

Question. In your opinion, does the existing framework for joint qualification contribute sufficiently to producing military leaders who possess the skills, intellect, and motivation to succeed in modern warfare, including counterinsurgency and stability operations?

Answer. As confirmed by the recent House Armed Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Report on in-residence officer Professional Military Education, the Department's PME system is still basically sound. However, there are areas of PME that need improving. A significant challenge is that capacity limitations preclude every officer from completing this Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) requirement within traditional in-residence institutions. One way in which the Department is addressing this challenge is by developing paths for officers to earn joint qualification through alternative joint education, training and experience. These alternatives include online training and broader opportunities for officers to earn points toward joint qualification through operational experience. Another challenge that was confirmed by the HASC study is that curricula change is too often reactive rather than anticipatory. This reactive nature of PME curricula is particularly challenging in the dynamic mission areas of modern warfare such as counterinsurgency and stability operations.

Question. What is your understanding of the role U.S. Joint Forces Command currently plays in overseeing the professional development of joint qualified officers, and do you think that role should change?

Answer. I understand that U.S. Joint Forces Command works closely with the Joint Staff in overseeing the professional development of joint qualified officers. U.S. Joint Forces Command actively supports the Chairman and the Joint Staff in development of both the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) and Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education Policy (EPMEP). U.S. Joint Forces Command is actively engaged with the Joint Staff and Offices of the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a sustainable individual joint education and training program with the capacity to meet the Chairman's intent to ensure the largest possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities.

ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION

Question. Joint Forces Command is responsible for leading the transformation of joint U.S. forces in the areas of providing joint forces to combatant commanders, joint training, joint interoperability, and joint innovation and experimentation. Until September 2009, the Commander of Joint Forces Command was dual-hatted as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).

What role, if any, does Joint Forces Command currently have in assisting SACT in accomplishing his mission of leading the transformation of NATO's military structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines to improve interoperability and military effectiveness of the Alliance and its partner nations?

Answer. Similar mission sets and geographic co-location, provides both JFCOM and ACT an excellent opportunity for U.S. and NATO collaboration on joint and coalition warfighting issues. The work JFCOM accomplishes in the areas of Joint Experimentation and Joint Training directly complements similar efforts being undertaken by ACT. The expansion of the NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan has increased the frequency of cooperation between the two commands. Lesson learned in Afghanistan by NATO can be applicable for U.S. forces in Iraq and the Horn of Africa.

Question. What actions would you anticipate taking, if confirmed, to assist the SACT and his command in improving the capabilities of NATO?

Answer. The co-location of NATO's Transformation Command with JFCOM has already proven to be an invaluable resource to the militaries of all NATO countries, including the United States. I believe SACT and JFCOM enjoy a transparent and collaborative relationship. Within all appropriate authorities, my intent is to build upon that positive relationship. Additionally, where our missions are complementary, I intend to fully support SACT to improve our Alliance warfighting capabilities.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH

JOINT PACIFIC ALASKA RANGE COMPLEX

1. Senator BEGICH. General Odierno, the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC) is the largest instrumented air, ground, and electronic combat training range in the world. Last year, the JPARC was accredited and certified by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as a Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) for command post exercises and field training exercises. There are only 33 JNTC certified sites and JPARC. If confirmed, please describe the importance of JPARC to training our forces and how you see the JPARC utilized in the future.

General ODIERNO. I am not familiar enough with the JPARC to speak with confidence about this topic. However, if confirmed, I will assess the JPARC and answer your question within 90 days of assuming command of JFCOM.

2. Senator BEGICH. General Odierno, the accreditation and certification process also identifies improvements needed in range capabilities and identifies measures to mitigate any shortfalls. If confirmed, please describe how JFCOM will work with Alaska Command to make improvements to the range to mitigate shortfalls identified in the accreditation process.

General ODIERNO. I am not familiar enough with the JPARC and the accreditation and certification process to speak with confidence about this topic. However, if confirmed, I will assess the JPARC, and all processes, and answer your question within 90 days of assuming command of JFCOM.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

JOINT FORCES COMMAND MISSION

3. Senator BURRIS. General Odierno, the JFCOM mission is to provide joint forces, training, experimentation, and capabilities for all of the unified commanders and joint commands. The requirements for joint capable forces will continue to grow as we work to meet our defense priorities. What priority will you place on joint qualification and education?

General ODIERNO. I believe that joint qualification and education of our servicemembers is critical to our long-term development, growth, and success as a fighting force.

JFCOM is actively engaged with the Joint Staff and Offices of the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a sustainable individual joint education and training program with the capacity to meet the Chairman's intent to ensure the largest possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities. As Commander of JFCOM, I plan to assess all of the education programs that fall under my area of responsibility to ensure that these programs meet the intent of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman.

Additionally, I will assess the effectiveness of the programs, with regards to current and future threats and battlespaces to ensure that we are spending our money and our time wisely. I'll make recommendations for changes based on that assessment.

4. Senator BURRIS. General Odierno, do you see a major role for Reserve component forces to assist you in accomplishing your mission?

General ODIERNO. In my time as Commanding General of all U.S. forces in Iraq, I can speak to the importance of the reserve fighting force to our continued success. Thousands of reservists came to the fight with a multitude of skill sets that were vital to our ability to solve the complex issues facing Iraq. While I still need to become better acquainted with the mission of JFCOM, I can say that I do believe in the importance of our Reserve component and am sure it will help us accomplish our mission there.

[The nomination reference of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 24, 2010.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General.

GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, 8425.

[The biographical sketch of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:

Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
U.S. Naval Command and Staff College
U.S. Army War College

Educational degrees:

U.S. Military Academy - BS - Engineering
North Carolina State University - MS - Engineering, Nuclear Effects
U.S. Naval War College - MA - National Security and Strategy

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

Promotions	Dates of appointment
2LT	2 Jun 76
1LT	2 Jun 78
CPT	1 Aug 80
MAJ	1 Dec 86
LTC	1 Feb 92
COL	1 Sep 95
BG	1 Jul 99
MG	1 Nov 02
LTG	1 Jan 05
GEN	16 Sep 08

Major duty assignments:

From	To	Assignment
Oct 76	Jan 78	Support Platoon Leader, later Firing Platoon Leader, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jan 78	Aug 78	Survey Officer, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Aug 78	Oct 79	Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 56th Field Artillery Brigade, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Nov 79	Jul 80	Student, Field Artillery Advanced Course, Fort Sill, OK
Aug 80	Dec 80	Liaison Officer, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC
Dec 80	Dec 82	Commander, Service Battery, later A Battery, 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC
Dec 82	May 83	Assistant S-3 (Operations), 1st Battalion, 73d Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC
Jun 83	May 84	S-3 (Operations), 3d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC
Jun 84	Aug 86	Student, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC

From	To	Assignment
Sep 86	Jun 89	Nuclear Research Officer, later Chief, Acquisition Support Division, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, VA, later detailed as Military Advisor for Arms Control, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC
Jun 89	Jun 90	Student, U.S. Naval Command and Staff Course, Newport, RI
Jul 90	Dec 90	Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Dec 90	Jun 91	Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia
Jun 91	May 92	Executive Officer, 42d Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jun 92	Jun 94	Commander, 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, CA, (relocated to Fort Lewis, WA)
Jun 94	Jun 95	Student, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
Jun 95	Jun 97	Commander, Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX
Jun 97	Aug 98	Chief of Staff, V Corps, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Aug 98	Jul 99	Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany to include duty as Deputy Commanding General for Ground Operations, Task Force Hawk, Operation Allied Force, Albania
Jul 99	Jul 01	Director, Force Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, U.S. Army, Washington, DC
Oct 01	Aug 04	Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
Aug 04	Oct 04	Special Assistant to Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, DC
Oct 04	May 06	Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC
May 06	Feb 08	Commanding General, III Corps/Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
Feb 08	Sep 08	Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, TX
Sep 08	Dec 09	Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
Jan 10	Present	Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq

Summary of joint assignments:

	Dates	Rank
Nuclear Research Officer, later Chief, Acquisition Support Division, Defense Nuclear Agency, Alexandria, VA, later detailed as Military Advisor for Arms Control, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.	Sep 86–Jun 89	Captain/Major
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.	Oct 04–May 06	Lieutenant General
Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq/Commanding General, III Corps.	Dec 06–Feb 08	Lieutenant General
Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq	Sep 08–Dec 09	General
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq	Jan 10–Present	General

Summary of operations assignments:

	Dates	Grade
Executive Officer, Division Artillery, 3d Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia.	Dec 90–May 91	Major
Deputy Commanding General for Ground Operations, Task Force Hawk, Operation Allied Force, Albania.	Apr 99–Jun 99	Brigadier General
Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.	Apr 03–Mar 04	Major General
Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq/Commanding General, III Corps.	Dec 06–Feb 08	Lieutenant General
Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq	Sep 08–Dec 09	General
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq	Jan 10–Present	General

U.S. decorations and badges:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)

Bronze Star Medal
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Combat Action Badge
Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF
NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
Raymond T. Odierno.
2. **Position to which nominated:**
Commander, Joint Forces Command.
3. **Date of nomination:**
May 24, 2010.
4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]
5. **Date and place of birth:**
September 8, 1954; Dover, NJ.
6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Linda Marie Odierno (Maiden Name: Burkarth).
7. **Names and ages of children:**
Anthony, 31; Kathrin, 29; Michael, 23.
8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.

9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.
None.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

American Legion (Member), Association of the U.S. Army (Member), 4th Infantry Division Association (Member), 8th Field Artillery Regimental Affiliation (Member), the 9th Infantry Regiment Association (Member), and the 1st Cavalry Division Association (Member).

11. **Honors and awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes, I do.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes, I do.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, GENERAL, U.S. ARMY.

This 24th day of May, 2010.

[The nomination of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 29, 2010, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2010.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. Not at this time. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been a success. The integration of our military forces continues to improve and we are more interoperable today than ever in our Nation’s history. This achievement has been remarkable. The next step is to ensure the abil-

ity of military and civilian departments to work closely together to foster whole-of-government approaches to address concerns of national interest.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. Not at this time. However, I do believe that there are key principles of teamwork, cohesion, and interoperability that could be applied to enhance a whole-of-government approach to today's challenges.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq?

Answer. U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) is the military component of the U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationship, responsible for defense and security cooperation. Its mission is to strengthen security and stability in Iraq and to support Iraq's continued development as a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant strategic partner and thereby contribute to peace and stability in the region.

The Commanding General of USF-I commands the U.S. military forces within Iraq and is responsible for all military activities in Iraq conducted in support of the U.S. Ambassador and U.S. objectives. He provides the political-military interface with the U.S. Embassy and Government of Iraq and is responsible for strategic and operational issues affecting security and stability in Iraq. USF-I is under the Operational Control of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). USF-I conducts operations in support of the Government of Iraq, U.S. Mission, and other international organizations.

Question. What are the differences between the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq and the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I)?

Answer. When I served as the Commander of MNC-I, an operational headquarters, it fell under Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), a strategic headquarters. Since that time MNF-I, MNC-I, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq headquarters have been combined to form the USF-I Headquarters. The USF-I Commander's responsibilities are substantially broader than those of the Commander of the former MNC-I and include national and regional strategic and political-military issues. The USF-I Commander also has direct responsibility for the missions previously performed by subordinate headquarters under MNF-I. This includes operations, training and assistance, and strategic engagement which now reside directly within the USF-I headquarters.

Question. What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. My professional military education, operational experience, and assignment history over 35 years of service provides a broad knowledge and experience base and thorough understanding of what is needed to command USF-I in support of the strategic goals outlined by the President for the mission in Iraq. Multiple tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with service at U.S. CENTCOM and on the Joint Staff, have provided invaluable experiences and insights on this mission and enabled an appreciation for what is needed to accomplish our Nation objectives in Iraq during this transitional time in our bilateral relationship.

A summary of key joint and operational assignments includes:

- Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
- Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division (Light) with duty as Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-180, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan
- Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command
- Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps/Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
- Director, Joint Staff

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq?

I believe I am fully qualified and positioned to assume this important position. If confirmed, I would take steps to establish or re-establish relationships across the U.S. and Iraqi Governments, academia, and the business world to ensure full access to the most current information and diversity of perspectives on the strategic issues affecting Iraq and the region.

IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq?

Answer.

Overall:

Iraq is generally secure and a return to levels of violence seen in the 2006/2007 timeframe is unlikely as long as all communities continue to pursue their goals through the political process. The Iraqi Government continues to improve its capability to provide security, essential services, effective governance, and a functioning legal system.

Security:

Security incidents are the lowest on record and continue to decline. Although Iraqi and U.S. operations have eroded the strength and capability of most insurgent and terrorist groups, extremist groups still retain the will and a capability to conduct attacks. In particular Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) remains capable of high-profile attacks that damage public perceptions of stability in Iraq; however, the group lacks sufficient popular support to achieve its strategic goals of toppling the Iraqi Government and establishing a base for a new caliphate. The Iraqi security forces are continuing to develop their capability and capacity but remain reliant on U.S. enabling capabilities such as logistics, intelligence, and advisory and training assistance.

Governance:

Iraq conducted a successful national election in March 2010, but political accommodation remains uneven. Mutual distrust among ethno-sectarian groups limits progress in resolving major issues such as control of hydrocarbon resources, revenue sharing, and the relationship between Baghdad and the regions and provinces. An inclusive, popularly accepted new government would be a key indicator of Iraq's ability to eventually overcome these challenges, while prolonged government formation would likely perpetuate policy paralysis.

Unresolved Arab-Kurdish issues, including the status of Kirkuk, remain a primary concern. Ongoing dialogue among Arab and Kurdish leaders, international mediation, the presence of U.S. forces in disputed territories and the deferral of controversial issues are important factors in helping prevent these disputes from escalating to violence.

Development:

Economic conditions have stabilized but remain dependent on current oil prices and levels of production. I am encouraged by recent agreements with major international oil companies to expand the development of some of Iraq's largest oil Reserves. Such contracts have the potential to create jobs and stimulate growth. However, corruption, inadequate infrastructure and essential services, and a poor business environment remain obstacles to investment and hinder economic diversification.

Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?

Answer. We need to address the primary areas of risk to stability in Iraq. A key to this effort will be support for the transition of the national leadership resulting from the recent elections and the establishment of effective relationships with the new Iraqi Government. The results of this election and the potential for an inclusive coalition government offer an opportunity to help Iraq move toward national unification and a national vision. We need to assist in the continued development of effective ministries to enable the Iraqi Government to appropriately meet the needs of the people and maximize their economic potential. We need to support efforts to develop positive strategic relationships between the Iraqi Government, its regional neighbors, and the United States. We need to support efforts to implement enduring solutions to Arab-Kurd issues. Security and stability are foundational requirements and necessary conditions for progress in these areas. Capable, professional Iraqi security forces are a prerequisite and our ability to effectively train, advise, and equip them is key.

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that confront the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq?

Answer. The Commander USF-I will be faced with supporting the establishment of a new government and establishing relationships with new national leaders. The government formation process will span a period of months and potentially create a significant lapse in governing functions. This will undoubtedly create some degree of degradation in services to the people and legislative actions.

The issues along the disputed internal boundary with the Kurdish Regional Government remain unresolved and the associated Arab-Kurd tensions remain a significant challenge. The underlying economic, social, and security issues must be addressed to achieve an enduring solution.

The establishment of constructive relationships between Iraq and its regional neighbors is required for long term regional stability. Diplomatic efforts to foster these relationships and counter malign external influences will be key to U.S. interests in the region.

The major challenge is managing and communicating risk during the responsible drawdown and transition to full Iraqi sovereignty thereby ensuring that internal and external violent forces do not threaten the security environment.

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish and what actions would you initially take as Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq?

Answer. If confirmed, my priorities and initial actions would center around the essential elements of the mission and the key areas of risk. This would include sustaining the gains in security and stability, mitigating Arab-Kurd tensions, continuing the development of effective, professional Iraqi security forces, establishing positive relationships with the Iraqi Government, maintaining a whole-of-government approach and productive integration with U.S. Embassy-Baghdad efforts, protecting U.S. forces and activities, and managing the responsible drawdown of U.S. forces in accordance with the President's guidance.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What were the major lessons that you learned from your experience as Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, that are most applicable to the duties you would assume if confirmed?

Answer. A major lesson is that our counterinsurgency doctrine is sound and that the true center of gravity is the Iraqi people. To hold our gains we needed to stay among the people. To achieve long-term success we needed to have Iraqi security forces capable of holding those gains. This requires partnership based on mutual trust. That partnership had to extend across the Iraqi security forces, into the ministries, and throughout the Government of Iraq.

A second lesson is that there must be a whole-of-government approach to operations in Iraq. A purely military approach is inadequate. Unity of effort amongst the interagency must be a top priority. Establishing effective relationships and partnerships are critical to accomplishing our national objectives. It is through military to military partnership that we maximize the development of the Iraqi security forces' capabilities, maintain situational awareness, and achieve common operational objectives.

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the United States has made to date in Iraq?

Answer. We did not recognize and address the reasons for the rapid growth in the level of political disenfranchisement of the Iraqi people that led to the insurgency. This allowed extremist groups to establish themselves and gain support of the population.

We failed early on to appreciate the requirements and adequately resource our forces and civilian agencies in Iraq with the appropriate capabilities that would enable them to work government formation and reconstruction tasks.

We began to transition missions and responsibilities to the Government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces before they had adequate capacity to effectively govern and secure the population resulting in significant instability and ethno-sectarian violence that was exploited by extremist groups.

Question. Which of these mistakes, if any, still impact U.S. operations, and what corrective action, if any, will you take if confirmed?

Answer. I believe the evolution of our resourcing, force posture, doctrine, and operating procedures have effectively addressed these issues over time.

U.S. FORCE REDUCTIONS IN IRAQ

Question. By the end of August 2010, U.S. forces are expected to number at or below 50,000 troops primarily involved in training and equipping Iraqi security forces, force protection, and targeted counter terrorism operations. All U.S. forces are scheduled to depart by the end of December 2011.

Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?

Answer. Iraq requires a U.S. whole-of-government effort in support of our strategic relationship. The capabilities U.S. Government civilian agencies and international organizations provide are essential to progress in national unification, development of Iraq's Government, and the establishment of normalized strategic relations within the region and the rest of the international community.

Question. In your view, what conditions on the ground in Iraq would allow for a recommendation to make further reductions in U.S. forces?

Answer. If confirmed I would continually assess the operational environment and based on this assessment, I would shape the size of the force. It is possible that the environment could change allowing a recommendation for early troop reductions to occur. Examples of such conditions are:

- Regional diplomatic progress that helps Iraq secure its borders and decreases malign external influence.
- The beginnings of a resolution of Arab-Kurd issues including disputed internal boundaries, status of Kirkuk, and hydrocarbons revenue distribution.
- A significant increase in the capability and capacity of national, provincial and local Iraqi Governments that results in a marked increase in stability and the provision of essential services.
- An increase in the capability of Iraqi security forces ahead of programmed development.

Question. In your view, what is the risk, if any, associated with the delay or inability of the Iraqi's to form a government after certification of this year's election results?

Answer. I am encouraged by recent signs of progress in the seating of the government and it appears that all sides are committed to a political resolution of the stalemate. Prolonged government formation is likely to delay movement on major policy issues and, over time, diminish Baghdad's capacity to improve the delivery of services. However, as long as all groups remain engaged in negotiations, Iraqis will probably tolerate a protracted government formation period. An inability to form a government, or marginalization of the Sunni Arabs or Sadrists in the new government, could result in broad cynicism about the political process and halt or reverse the generally positive trajectory of political accommodation in Iraq.

Question. Do you believe that compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?

Answer. Yes. I think that an overwhelming majority of Iraq's political leaders are committed to compromise and realize that in order for the new government to be accepted it must be inclusive.

Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the compromises necessary for a political solution?

Answer. Political leaders appear dedicated to peaceful government transition in accordance with their constitution. Diplomatic engagement encouraging adherence to constitution procedures reinforces political leaders obligations to the people and the Nation. Key leaders of all Iraqi political blocs recognize, and have publicly called for, inclusiveness in the next government. This recognition is the key for Iraqi political leaders to make the compromises necessary for a political solution.

Question. What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?

Answer. Our strategic relationship with the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people, and our continued commitment and support for their development is a key lever. Iraqis perceive the U.S. to be an honest broker among all the players in government formation and value our role. The U.S. has and will continue to advocate for an inclusive and representative government that works on behalf of all the Iraqi people. In the longer term, our commitment to developing a broad strategic relationship with Iraq through the U.S.-Iraqi Strategic Framework Agreement sustains our credibility as a strategic partner in Iraq's future.

Question. Earlier this year, current U.S. Forces—Iraq commander General Raymond Odierno stated that, based on the reasonably high voter turnout and low-level of violence during the Iraqi elections, U.S. forces are still on track to end its combat mission and continue the withdrawal of troops. According to General Odierno, "Only a catastrophic event would keep us from doing that now."

Do you agree with General Odierno's assessment that the U.S. troop drawdown plan remains on track for August and beyond?

Answer. Yes. I agree with General Odierno's assessment.

Question. What, in your view, are the greatest remaining risks to the successful transition of the mission in Iraq and withdrawal of U.S. forces as planned and required by the Security Agreement, and what would you do, if anything, to mitigate these risks?

Answer. The greatest remaining risks to the successful transition include continued communal rivalries across sectarian lines, the insufficient capacity of the Iraqi Government to provide for its people, violent extremist organizations, and malign influence from external countries. These risks cannot be mitigated by USF-I alone. They will require a whole of U.S. Government and Iraqi Government approach. This would include adequate funding for the continued development of the Iraqi security forces and the tasks associated with the transition to a State Department lead in Iraq.

INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT

Question. Over the last 2 years, civilian and military leaders in Iraq have noted that the conflict there has evolved and that, although there is still terrorism and insurgency, the greatest current threat is the potential intercommunal conflict over power.

In your view, what have been the most important aspects of the enduring and changing fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq?

Answer. The absence of a shared national vision and development of a new political culture compatible with democracy represent enduring challenges to stability in Iraq. While there currently is not an effective insurgency that immediately threatens the survival of the Government in Iraq, a lingering Sunni Arab insurgency remains and will rise or further recede based upon political successes of the next government in integrating the Sunni Arabs into the system. Today, the vast majority of Iraqi people want peace, and they want effective governance and prosperity. The Iraqi people and their leaders increasingly see political accommodation and inclusion as the approach for peaceful unification. Some progress has been made in Northern Iraq, but Arab-Kurd tensions over Kirkuk and other disputed internal boundaries as well as hydrocarbons and revenue sharing remain key problems that could trigger violent conflict in the next year.

Question. How would you recommend that military strategy adapt, if any, to the evolving nature of the conflict?

Answer. I believe the current military approach is sound. As always, the commander must continuously assess the situation on the ground and adjust operational procedures accordingly. Based on current conditions the force is postured to transition its focus from combat to stability operations on 1 September 2010. We will partner with, enable, advise, train and equip the Iraqis to ensure the continued development of their capabilities. The development of effective government institutions and the Iraqi security forces is critical for lasting stability and security in Iraq. Confidence building measures like those we are promoting to ensure peaceful resolution of the disputed internal boundaries between the Iraqi Government and Kurdish Regional Government are also a key component.

Question. What is the appropriate role of U.S. forces in response to the threat and conduct of intercommunal violence among militant groups vying for control, particularly in northern Iraq?

Answer. The appropriate role of U.S. forces is to partner with the Iraqis to develop a non-sectarian army and police force capable of maintaining internal security and preventing intercommunal violence and a functioning legal system based on the rule of law. Additionally, USF-I should continue to develop trust and interoperability between the Iraqi security forces and those of the Kurdish Regional Government through the combined security mechanisms established in northern Iraq. Assistance to the Iraqi Government to enhance situational awareness of conditions on the ground will reduce the probability of violent encounters.

Question. Recent months have seen an increase in kidnappings and murders of non-Muslim religious leaders.

In your opinion, are non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq at greater risk?

Answer. Non-Muslim minorities are vulnerable to the same sectarian tensions that exist throughout Iraq. Insurgent and militant groups continue to attempt to ignite ethno-sectarian violence though recent attacks and have failed to this point. The Iraq Constitution affords minorities the right of protection, and I believe that the Iraqi Government has made efforts to ensure their protection and that many Iraqis recognize minority rights.

Question. Are there any groups that are particularly vulnerable?

Answer. I believe non-Muslims, particularly Yazidis and Chaldean Christians are more vulnerable in certain distinct areas of Iraq, primarily in the central and northern portions of the country. Christians remain a target for AQI and historically they have been targeted in Mosul. The bombing of a bus with Christian students in 2010 highlights the persistent threat posed by AQI. AQI has also attacked members of Iraq's Yazidi minority using suicide vests and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices. It is important to note, however, that every ethnic group in Iraq has been the victim of kidnappings and murders.

Question. If so, what is the appropriate role, if any, for the U.S. military in addressing their vulnerability?

Answer. This requires an Iraqi solution and commitment. We would advise and assist the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi security forces to provide equal protection and enforce minority rights of protection under the rule of law. As the institutions of the Iraqi Government strengthen and grow increasingly capable of providing se-

curity for all of its citizens, the threats to non-Muslim religious minorities will diminish.

CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS

Question. Based on your understanding, is the Iraqi Government taking the steps it must to confront and control the militias?

Answer. Through a combination of security operations and engagement policies, the Iraqi Government is working to manage the challenges presented by Sunni and Shia militia groups. Programs like the Sons of Iraq aim to integrate former Sunni Arab insurgents into the government or security forces or retrain them for other professions. Reconciliation initiatives have also contributed to Muqtada al-Sadr's decision to suspend his Jaysh al-Mahdi militia. However, some terrorist groups, such as Kataib Hizballah, are more difficult for the Iraqi Government to target because they operate covertly and are backed by Iran.

Question. What role would you expect to play on this issue, if confirmed?

Answer. I believe our role would be to support the Iraqi Government's anti-militia policies, and improve the stability of Iraq in order to negate the conditions which generate support for militia groups. We would do this by continuing to develop the capabilities and professionalism of the Iraqi security forces and by encouraging inclusive political processes. Our intelligence capabilities also contribute significantly to this effort as Iraq's capabilities continue to grow. I would continue to monitor militia groups and provide recommendations to the Iraqi Government to address this issue.

LONG-TERM SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to ensure an effective and efficient transition from the current military mission through December 2011 to a long-term security relationship with Iraq?

Answer. Along with the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, we will continue to work with the Iraqi Government, via the Strategic Framework Agreement, to build a long term security relationship with Iraq. In the short-term, I would continue the progress made in developing the Iraqi security forces through our training and foreign military sales. As leadership for the U.S. mission in Iraq transitions from USF-I to Embassy Baghdad, I will continue to support planning for a robust Office of Security Cooperation under Chief of Mission authority. The Strategic Framework Agreement serves as the cornerstone of our partnership with Iraq and I would continue efforts through the Joint Coordinating Committees to solidify our long-term security relationship with Iraq.

Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take immediately or in the near-term to build a standard security cooperation relationship with Iraq for long-term military sales and support such as the United States has with many other nations in the region and around the world?

Answer. After I have made an assessment I will work with the Ambassador, CENTCOM, and our Iraqi partners to develop a security relationship based on U.S. interests which contributes to regional security and stability.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. In your view, what are the minimum essential capabilities required by the Iraqi security forces in order to assume full and independent responsibility for the internal security of their nation?

Answer. It is essential that the Iraqi people feel safe and believe that their police, army, and border forces provide them with an acceptable level of security. The Iraqi security ministries, institutions, and forces must be able to work together to secure the population and critical infrastructure; conduct basic manning, training, and equipping functions; support and enforce the rule of law; conduct operational level command and control; and sustain their respective forces.

Question. What is your understanding of the level of agreement or disagreement, if any, on the definition of these minimum essential capabilities between the Government of Iraq, Ministry of Defense, and U.S. Forces-Iraq?

Answer. I believe there is common understanding and agreement by all parties of what the Iraqi security forces must be able to do in order to assume full and independent responsibility for the internal security of their nation.

Question. If there is disagreement between Iraq and the United States on the minimum essential capabilities required for Iraqi security forces, how would you propose to resolve this challenge if confirmed?

Answer. We would routinely assess capabilities and maintain an ongoing dialog with the Iraqi leadership on missions, threats, readiness, and requirements.

Through this partnered process, I would convey my assessments and best military advice. Experience has shown they have an appreciation for our capability assessment methodologies and understand the process to be very mature, based in a regional security context, and not a direct U.S. force comparison.

Question. What is your understanding of the state of training and equipping of Iraqi security forces?

Answer. Due in large part to USF-I's tremendous efforts to date, I believe the Iraqi security forces are now functioning well as an internal security force, and all organizations are striving to reach their minimum essential capability objectives. Within the MoD, the Iraqi Army is functioning well as a counterinsurgency force. The Iraqi Navy is providing point defense for both of the country's off-shore oil terminals and is on track to achieve its objectives. The Iraqi Air Force has shown significant improvements in accessions, training, and ground support. Within the MoI, both the Federal Police and Oil Police are assessed as operationally capable while the Provincial Police and Border Police have shown progress in performing their security functions.

Question. What is your assessment of Iraqi security forces progress toward assumption of full responsibility for internal security?

Answer. While we are witnessing Iraqi security forces that are increasingly independent and capable of providing internal security much work remains to be done. Continued U.S. efforts to train, advise and equip the Iraqi security forces will be required to meet the President's guidance and vision for a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. Without the continued support of the entire U.S. Government, including Congress, we put the achievement of our Nation's objectives for Iraq at risk.

Question. In your view, what is the importance, relative priority, and urgency, if any, of the Iraqi security forces developing the capability to defend its borders and airspace from external threats?

Answer. In order to establish its legitimacy, both with its own population as well as with its neighbors, a sovereign nation must be able to defend and enforce its own borders and airspace from external threats. Iraq is no exception to this, as such, I consider this issue to be vital. Iraq is particularly vulnerable to border violations due to the malign intentions of some of its neighbors. We also recognize that there will be gaps in Iraq's ability to enforce its own airspace for some time to come. Both of these issues will require our continued attention and assistance to mitigate.

Question. What is the appropriate role of U.S. forces, if any, in supporting the development of this capability with training, equipment, or other resources?

Answer. Through training, advising, and assistance efforts, USF-I has and will continue to play a critical role in the development of the Iraqi security forces' capacity and capability. While we recognize that some gaps will exist when we withdraw, particularly in their ability to defend against external threats, we will make every effort to mitigate the risks associated with those gaps.

Question. How would you characterize the performance of Iraqi forces in the conduct of security operations during and since the elections earlier this year?

Answer. We are seeing Iraqi security forces that are increasingly capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations and providing internal security for the population of Iraq—a fact that was highlighted by their performance during the March elections. Their actions since the elections have also been critical to maintaining the relatively low level of violence that we have witnessed during the critical period of government formation.

Question. As U.S. forces are withdrawn, are Iraqi Army units assuming the areas and missions of these units?

Answer. Iraqi units have the lead for security throughout the country. U.S. forces and Iraqi Army units work together to ensure that as U.S. units move the Iraqi Army is prepared to assume responsibility.

Question. If so, are gains in reduced violence and increased stability achieved by U.S. forces being effectively maintained in the areas for which Iraqi Army forces have assumed responsibility?

Answer. Yes. Iraq's security environment remains stable at historically low levels of violence. The Iraqi security forces continue to lead the security efforts in Iraq and to disrupt the violent extremists networks.

Question. What is your understanding of the ability and commitment of Iraqi security forces to adequately maintain the readiness of the equipment they have been given or purchased?

Answer. My understanding is that over the past year, the two security ministries have made some progress in developing both infrastructure and capacity, but logistics and sustainment remain areas for continued focus. Supporting the maturation of the Iraqi supply and maintenance system, training a cadre of Iraqis to sustain and maintain their own equipment, and working to increase emphasis across the

Iraqi leadership will ultimately result in an effective force. I believe the Iraqi security forces' leadership has an increasing appreciation for their shortfalls and will want our continued assistance to improve their strategic, operational, and tactical logistics systems.

Question. If confirmed, what action would you take, if any, to expand the development of logistics capabilities and a commitment to a culture of maintenance within the Iraqi security forces to ensure that the equipment they have been provided is maintained and ready to meet their security needs and protect the investment of billions of U.S. and Iraqi dollars over the years?

Answer. I would continue with our detailed efforts, and fully support the priority the Iraqis have placed on getting their logistics capability to a higher level. The U.S. has the best military logisticians in the world, and our example and mentorship for the Iraqi security forces' leaders have been key to improving Iraqi capabilities and leader competency. As commander of MNC-I, I took on the task of emphasizing the importance of logistics competency with the senior Iraqi security forces leadership during visits to Iraqi units, in senior commander forums, and with the national leaders. I would continue this effort if I return as the commander of USF-I.

ADVISE AND ASSIST BRIGADES AND MILITARY/POLICE TRANSITION TEAMS

Question. In your view, does the size, structure, number, and operating procedures for U.S. Advise and Assist Brigades and Military and Police Transition Teams embedded with Iraqi security forces need to be changed in any way? If so, what would you recommend?

Answer. As the MNC-I Commander I played a key role in the development of the size, structure, number, and operating procedures for U.S. Advise and Assist Brigades and am pleased to see that they are performing well. These organizations as well as the embedded Transition Teams provide the appropriate flexibility, partnership capacity, mobility, and force protection for the evolving conditions in Iraq. Adaptations will be addressed as conditions on the ground and feedback from tactical leaders dictate. Part of my responsibility is to recognize when change is needed and convey that to our Service institutions so they can responsively adapt to meet USF-I requirements.

Question. What is your view of the potential transition of this mission to contractors?

Answer. If confirmed, I would thoroughly assess the viability of contractors doing these type missions but I think this could be a viable option. I believe the best approach would be military led, managed, and directed training teams in which contractors provide instruction, subject matter expertise, and team/individual skills training.

Contractors in a supporting versus lead role is appropriate in many if not most cases for military/police training. Based upon our department's recent experience, we utilize highly skilled, former and retired U.S. military and U.S. law enforcement personnel as contractors who are (often) Operation Iraqi Freedom experienced and have the requisite military and police skills. We can leverage contracts and contractors to accomplish this training mission by keeping a military to military or military to police relationship as the organizing and leadership principle that directs the training goals and objectives.

The key to success in this effort as in almost all contracted support efforts is oversight. Oversight starts with adequate numbers of well trained contracting officer representatives. If we were to pursue this, ensuring we have the right oversight personnel and processes in place to monitor contractor performance would be one of my biggest priorities.

Question. What in your view is the appropriate distribution of responsibility and resources for the security assistance, train, advise, and equip mission between special operations forces and general purpose forces in Iraq?

Answer. I think the distribution is based on the nature of the security environment and the current capability of the Iraq special operations and general purpose forces. USF-I's Deputy Commanding General for Advise and Training has responsibility to assess both of these Iraqi forces, and provide recommendations to the USF-I Commander on any re-distribution. From my understanding, the current plan for distribution of resources is effective and producing good results. I do foresee the potential to adjust the "distribution" in the future, but I am not in a position now to give specific recommendations.

Question. What is your understanding of how the Army is ensuring that general purpose forces are properly trained for the advise and assist or transition team mission, to include dissemination of "lessons learned" to incoming brigades and teams?

Answer. Our Army is doing a tremendous job in providing trained and ready forces for Iraq. The Army adapted quickly to these requirements and is meeting USF-I's requirements and continuously working to improve their procedures based on deployed unit feedback and USF-I requirements and recommendations. If confirmed, I would maintain the active ongoing dialog with our Military Services to make sure we properly train our servicemembers and their units for our remaining military tasks in Iraq.

Question. If confirmed, what would you recommend in this regard?

Answer. I foresee a potential requirement to better integrate our Transition Teams with the Advise and Assist Brigades. We started this initiative when I was last in Iraq, and I suspect we can always improve our integration efforts as we learn more lessons and reduce our presence. I also believe we can do the same for the integration of U.S. civilians into the construct. The civilian transition is a key component of our strategy and we must work together by sharing our military experiences and best practices with our civilian team members.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Question. What is your understanding of the lessons learned about U.S.-Iraqi command and control of combined operations over the last year and especially since the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraqi urban areas?

Answer. Iraq is an extremely challenging environment in which to command control, but over the last several years we have learned valuable lessons and instituted many interoperable procedures. The most significant of these, which we began in earnest during 2008 and 2009, was working hand in hand with our Iraqi counterparts at their national and provincial operations centers, as well as in combined joint tactical operation centers and outposts throughout Iraq. As we reduce our presence at the tactical operations centers we must ensure that we maintain or increase our presence at the national and provincial centers.

Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about command and control relationships with Iraqi forces in combined operations, and if confirmed, what actions would you take, if any, to mitigate challenges or improve capabilities in this regard?

Answer. I do not have any major concerns over the command and control relationship with Iraqi forces, but I do foresee the need to routinely assess where we are and adjust accordingly as we draw down. It is imperative to maintain situational awareness and an active advisory capacity as force levels decline.

BURDEN SHARING

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role for the United States, and particularly of U.S. Force-Iraq, in reconstruction activities in Iraq going forward?

Answer. In my view the role of USF-I and the United States in reconstruction activities needs to remain focused on Iraq's efforts and expenditures to improve essential services and infrastructure. USF-I plays a role in advising Iraqi counterparts on security implications, critical infrastructure protection, and security and support for U.S. Government and other international civil development efforts. I am encouraged by reports that the Government of Iraq is currently spending a significant portion of this year's budget on infrastructure and essential services improvements. I think this indicates the effectiveness of U.S. advice and that the Iraq Government recognizes its importance.

Question. In your view, what capabilities or support should be the highest priorities for U.S. financial assistance to the Iraqi security forces?

Answer. I believe the highest priority for U.S. financial assistance to the Iraqi Government should go towards those requirements directly related to the establishment of the minimum essential capabilities for the Iraqi security forces. Once that effort is complete, we should focus our long term security assistance efforts on building a credible capability to deter external threats.

Question. In your view, what capabilities and support for the Iraqi security forces should be the sole financial responsibility of the Government of Iraq?

Answer. I believe we should view this as a partnered effort that involves a variety of cost-sharing options that eventually leads to a long-term security relationship. The Iraqi Government funds the preponderance of the Iraqi security forces' costs, but U.S. financial assistance is still critical for ensuring that there is no degradation of progress.

READINESS OF U.S. FORCES

Question. What is your assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces that have been deployed and are deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom? Have you ob-

served any significant trends or gaps with respect to personnel, equipment, or training readiness in units in theater?

Answer. All forces I observed, inspected, and fought with on multiple tours to Iraq were well trained, led, and prepared for the mission.

In my experience in Iraq, any significant gaps in readiness are proactively addressed by the Service Chiefs to ensure trained, equipped, and prepared forces. If confirmed, I will stay engaged with the Service Chiefs to ensure no lapse during our responsible drawdown.

Question. What are your views on the growing debate over whether the Army is putting too much emphasis on preparing for counterinsurgency operations and/or too little emphasis on preparing for high intensity force-on-force conflict?

Answer. I believe our current force is very capable of prevailing in other conflicts and contingencies that may arise. I believe our Nation has the intellectual capital, and institutional and industrial capacity to maintain the force we have, and to adapt that force to meet future defense and contingency requirements. I think we have adapted our Department of Defense and whole-of-government approaches to win the wars we are currently fighting with an eye on what the future may portend, and with the type capabilities our Nation will require in order to meet the security challenges of the future. At the tactical level the counterinsurgency fight is equally a force on force, controlled violence activity. We have the best trained and equipped military in the world, and we have the best, most adaptive and seasoned combat leaders in our Nation's military.

TRANSITION TO LEAD U.S. AGENCY

Question. As the mission of U.S. military forces in Iraq changes and large numbers of troops begin to redeploy, responsibility for leading the planning and management of U.S. assistance to the Government of Iraq has begun to transition from the Department of Defense (DOD) to the Department of State.

What is your understanding and assessment of the theater's plans for this transition?

Answer. Considerable work has been done over the past year in both Washington and Baghdad to ensure the smooth transition from military to civilian lead in Iraq. I believe the transition plans, developed through the interagency process, are executable. The key to the plan in my mind is to synchronize the State Department's assumption of lead responsibility with our military troop withdrawal, and for our Government to resource the Department of State to accomplish the task. A close civil military partnership with the Ambassador and the interagency will be critical. If confirmed I would work closely with U.S. Embassy Baghdad in the coming months as these plans are put in motion.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the progress being made toward the completion of this transition?

Answer. I believe this will be a tough but essential effort. I understand that progress is being made, and Department of State and other U.S. agency capacity shortfalls are being identified and addressed by the administration and Congress. Substantial planning and coordination for this transition is ongoing. As an example, more than 1,000 tasks currently being conducted in Iraq by members of USF-I have been analyzed to determine whether they should transition to Embassy Baghdad, transition to the Iraqi Government, or be terminated. It is this level of detailed planning that will ensure our transition success.

Question. In your view, what are the most significant challenges to the efficient and effective transition of these agency roles?

Answer. Our strategy depends on the development of Iraqi security forces that are capable of defending their population against internal threats and a robust civilian effort that can sustain the positive momentum gained over the last 2 to 3 years. Inadequate resourcing of either could have profoundly negative impact on our partnership with Iraq and their re-integration into the region. The challenge is seamlessly transferring these tasks without degradation in mission performance. This requires that the recipient of the transfers has sufficient capacity to perform the task.

Question. If confirmed, what action would you recommend or take, if any, to deal with these challenges and ensure an efficient, effective, and timely transition?

Answer. I would maintain constant interaction by teaming with the Ambassador and the embassy staff to ensure that all of our transition objectives are met in an effective and timely manner. I would provide my best military advice on how we can complete the transition effectively and efficiently within the scope of U.S. goals for a sovereign Iraq.

RULE OF LAW TRAINING

Question. How important do you consider continued U.S.-supported training to Iraqi leaders in establishment of the “rule of law”?

Answer. I believe that U.S. supported training to Iraqi leaders in establishing the rule of law is critical to the success of the mission in Iraq. Establishment of the rule of law is key to providing domestic legitimacy to the Government of Iraq. The Iraqi Government must have this continued U.S. support to succeed, and I believe this model is an example for the entire region.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the impact of previous rule of law training initiatives and the current organization of U.S. Government-led efforts to foster commitment to the rule of law in Iraq?

Answer. Achieving U.S. objectives in Iraq hinges on advancing gains made over the last several years. As a result of previous initiatives, the Iraqis have made progress in the development of the rule of law. There is still much work to do to ensure that mature, professional judicial and criminal justice institutions are in place to complement an increasingly capable police force. It will be critical to our success in Iraq that the U.S. Government allocates the necessary resources to sustain further progress in this area.

Question. Do you believe that additional effort is needed by U.S. military forces and through an interagency approach to develop doctrine and resources for rule of law training?

Answer. I believe sustained effort by U.S. military forces through an interagency approach to continue developing doctrine and resources for rule of law training is important to our overall objectives and that our interagency approach is effective. This type of U.S. sponsored activity increases our democratic credentials in the world, and the application of this program affords the United States the opportunity to improve and refine our doctrine and resources for “rule of law” training efforts in Iraq, the region, and internationally.

SUSTAINMENT OF U.S. COMMITMENT

Question. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of readiness, how long do you believe the Army can sustain U.S. troop levels in Iraq of approximately 50,000 troops at their projected operational tempo?

Answer. I have tremendous confidence in the Army leadership and the American people to sustain the force requirements of the drawdown plan. All indications to date project a continued withdrawal of our forces in Iraq under the current timeline. This drawdown also supports our Army’s initiative to put the force more in balance and within desired dwell rate ratios in order to improve readiness and Army Soldier and Family support programs.

FORCE PROTECTION

Question. What is your understanding of the status of U.S. forces’ distribution in partnership with Iraq forces and to small local bases throughout the area of operations?

Answer. Force distribution and force disposition plans focus on transferring responsibility to Iraqi Forces, and consolidating and protecting U.S. forces at larger bases as we withdraw. The plan is being executed under the guidelines that leaders ensure U.S. servicemembers are adequately trained and resourced for the mission, that they have the authorized rules of engagement that allow for their right of self-defense and unit protection, and that leaders implement thorough risk assessment and risk mitigation procedures. Also, stringent safety procedures for U.S. forces are being practiced and strictly enforced by leaders at all levels. Regardless, U.S. forces must maintain the logistical capability to conduct independent resupply operations throughout the theater.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the protection of those forces and the forces which would have to resupply them on a daily basis?

Answer. Protecting U.S. personnel would be one of my overarching priorities. I have confidence in USF–I’s base and route consolidation plan because it was developed in large measure to provide for protection of U.S. forces while we transition responsibility to Iraq, and conduct our withdrawal. Equally, the plan focuses on providing security to the U.S. civilians who will work in some of these locations. The “hub and spoke” bases and routes will require appropriate resourcing, and constant assessment, adaptation and adjustment to maximize force protection of U.S. personnel and conduct an effective transition and withdrawal.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES

Question. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. Special Operations Command and the national intelligence agencies have developed effective equipment, tactics, and intelligence dissemination practices to target al Qaeda personnel and personnel from other related terrorist networks. The effectiveness of these tools and their utility for regular ground forces in battling militias and improvised explosive device networks are now more widely recognized. As a result, some of these tools and capabilities are migrating to Army and Marine Corps general purpose ground forces.

Do you believe that regular Army general purpose ground forces can replicate the capabilities developed by special forces?

Answer. Yes. Our U.S. general purpose forces have adopted many of the same technologies and procedures developed by Special Forces. For example, our Special Operations Forces developed an intelligence gathering, analysis, targeting, exploitation and dissemination process that our general purpose forces follow. We also have a greater level of integration and sharing at our combined fusion centers that provides enhanced intelligence and geo-location capabilities for special and general purpose forces.

Question. What is your understanding of how commanders within U.S. Forces-Iraq are attempting to accomplish this?

Answer. The sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures is active in Iraq, and reinforced by our Service institutions and agencies through a variety of web-based information initiatives, and with forward deployed support elements in theater. Experience within both communities has increased dramatically in the last several years, and our forces in the field are receiving the benefit of growing institutional knowledge of threats and threat capabilities. An example is the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Organization's and their deployed Task Force Troy in Iraq. Commanders and leaders at all levels are aggressively gathering information and collaborating with deployed support agency elements to maintain a qualitative edge in the fight. As Commander of MNC-I, we benefited enormously from these efforts, and we were able to counter serious threats to our forces. We have also shared a tremendous amount of this knowledge and capability with our Iraqi partners so they can be more capable and independent. If confirmed, I would want to make sure the focus and support is commensurate with our withdrawal and the transition to the Department of State.

Question. In your view, has DOD provided the resources necessary to acquire the equipment and intelligence dissemination support to enable Army and Marine Corps general purpose ground forces to adopt or adapt these tactics, techniques, and procedures?

Answer. Yes, DOD has been committed to acquiring and fielding these resources to our general purpose ground forces. However, as U.S. Forces in Iraq continue their drawdown I expect there will be challenges meeting USF-I's intelligence needs. If confirmed, I would continually assess those needs and the ability to meet them with the capabilities available.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes, I agree with the policy set forth in Deputy Secretary of Defense England's memorandum of July 7, 2006.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes, I support the standards of detainee treatment specified in the revised FM 2-22.3 and DOD Directive 2310.01E. I believe those standards and procedures are correct guidelines and were developed based on the hard lessons our forces learned early on in Iraq. They are consistent with our American national values.

Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Answer. I believe the rationale for prohibiting inhumane and degrading treatment goes far deeper than reciprocity. It is an important consideration and I agree it is an element that should guide us in the standard of treatment for detainees.

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes, I believe that it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3. The joint doctrine for counterinsurgency operations explains the benefits of complying with the standards of the Geneva Conventions and risk associated with failure to comply.

IRAQI STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the status of DOD efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to increase employment in Iraq?

Answer. The Strategic Framework Agreement establishes the foundation for building a prosperous, diversified, and growing economy in Iraq. These principles are fundamental to achieving both short and long-term stability and security. On the tactical level, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), and on the strategic level, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) are utilized toward this end.

The TFBSO is a great example, and one I am intimately familiar with from my last assignment in Iraq. TFBSO was dedicated to revitalizing Iraq's economy and creating jobs for Iraqis. TFBSO placed civilians with expertise in industrial operations and factory management on the ground in Iraq—skills previously absent from the American presence there. TFBSO provided training for employees, upgraded equipment, and prepared the factories for large-scale private investment, and provided the example for greater private investment in Iraq. Other efforts like Texas A&M University's in-country agricultural development teams improved Iraqi agricultural diversity, capacity, and environmental protection responsibilities.

Programs like these proved vital for commanders at all levels, and were a key component in establishing the conditions for our withdrawal, and can continue to be a contributor to Iraq's stability and development during and after our transition. If confirmed, I will take a personal interest in these programs to make sure they are effective.

IRAQI REFUGEES

Question. The United Nations estimates that over 2 million Iraqis have been displaced, of which 1.8 million have fled to surrounding countries while some 500,000 have left their homes to find safer areas within Iraq.

What is your assessment of the refugee problem in Iraq? Are more Iraqis returning home?

Answer. The refugee problem from the Iraq war is a regional problem, drawing interest from Syria and Jordan among others. There are over 200,000 Iraqi refugees registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and it is likely that there are a significant number of unregistered refugees.

Approximately one million Iraqis remain displaced in Iraq from the Saddam era. I do not believe the refugees who are returning home are being supported by a mature Iraqi system that fully reintegrates them back to their homes, and provides for their basic needs. Ultimately, the solution to the problem of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons is a stable, secure environment where these displaced people can reintegrate into Iraqi society and obtain employment.

Question. Beyond working to improve the security environment in Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in addressing this issue?

Answer. USF-I can directly help in this effort by encouraging the Iraqi security forces to provide a safe and secure environment. Continued U.S. and international effort under the United Nations is needed to emphasize to the new Iraqi Government that the successful return and reintegration of Iraqi refugees is the Iraqi Government's responsibility, in their national interests, and a key component for normalized relations with their neighbors.

Question. What should the role of the U.S. military be, in your view, with respect to those Iraqis who are returning to find their homes occupied by others?

Answer. USF-I, in conjunction with Embassy Baghdad, will continue to assist the Government of Iraq in addressing the issue of displaced persons. It is important to remember that with the implementation of the Security Agreement in 2009, the Iraqis assumed sovereignty of their country and people. We will continue to advise and assist them as they handle these complex issues.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducts comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations which are valuable to Congress.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to support the audits, inspections, and investigations conducted by the SIGIR?

Answer. The reports of the SIGIR provides valuable insights to the Force Commander, the Ambassador, officials in Washington, and to the Government and people of Iraq. I fully supported the activities of the SIGIR as the MNC-I Commander and, if confirmed, I would continue to embrace this important Congressional body.

TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

Question. Recent press reports allege that there is a lack of leadership and policy with respect to the evaluation of and treatment for traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) in theater.

What is your understanding of the policy or policies in place that address the needs of deployed servicemembers who have experienced an event which could result in TBI or a concussion?

Answer. I acknowledge traumatic brain injury as a very real medical condition, and one that is adversely affecting many of our servicemembers who have served in Iraq. I know that our military services and medical professionals in and out of the military are aggressively pursuing strategies and treatments for this type injury. I understand that we are developing clinical care instructions for all levels of TBI severity to cover both the deployed, and the non-deployed environment which includes mandatory concussion screening. I believe the Department's protocol for diagnosing, evaluating, treating, and following up on combat related concussion injuries is based on the best scientific evidence available, which is being enhanced through ongoing research efforts. Emerging DOD guidance on mandatory evaluations and rest times after a defined event will help to better address these incidents. If confirmed, I would maintain constant attention on this issue, and the other issues that affect the health and well being of our servicemembers.

Question. In your view, are these policies effective?

Answer. In my view, we need to improve compliance with our protocols, encourage reporting of signs/symptoms, and stay ever vigilant for further improvements in procedures. Clearly in the past, we have missed servicemembers that sustained concussions or TBI whether because they didn't want to leave their unit or because they or their leadership did not understand the importance of being checked out and treated early. New DOD guidance will help as it mandates evaluations close to the injury and establishes policy, assigns responsibility and provides procedures on the medical management of traumatic brain injury in a deployed setting. Services and COCOMs have already begun to implement this guidance. If confirmed I would be committed to ensuring they are effective in Iraq.

MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS IN THEATER

Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made six separate assessments over the past several years detailing the immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT VI, found that "soldiers on their third and fourth deployment report lower morale and more mental health problems," and that stigma continues to prevent some soldiers from seeking mental health care. These types of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops are returning from duty in Iraq with post traumatic stress, depression, and other mental health problems.

What is your understanding of the key findings of this and previous MHAT assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings, and the effect of such actions?

Answer. The MHAT is a great Army program. The results of MHAT VI reported that psychological problems and combat exposure in maneuver units are significantly lower than every year except 2004 in Iraq. It was also reported that multiple deployments and dwell time are correlated to mental health issues. There remain barriers to care and stigma associated with seeking care although some improvement in stigma was documented. The Army has augmented mental health staffing in both theaters, particularly Afghanistan where the need was shown to be high. In response to the observed need for resilience, in 2008, the Army established the Directorate of Comprehensive Soldier Fitness to correct the observed gaps in resilience capability. If confirmed, I would focus on effective implementation of corrective

actions and procedures to address the underlining findings, and improve the mental health of our servicemembers in Iraq.

Question. If confirmed, what measures would you support to ensure ongoing mental health assessments of U.S. forces in Iraq?

Answer. I would support all DOD health assessment programs and emphasize leaders' roles in creating resilient units through leadership training and resiliency training. I would stress access of medical assessment teams to all our servicemembers. I would specifically work to decrease the perceived stigma of reporting one's own mental health concerns to medical personnel.

Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?

Answer. I have great trust and confidence in our dedicated medical professionals. I would stay abreast of these issues and recommendations, and would work on how to best implement them in Iraq. I would emphasize leaders' roles in providing for the mental health needs of their servicemembers. I would work to ensure adequate staffing, increase access to mental health services, stress the importance of resiliency, and insist on positive, proactive leadership.

Question. Do you believe that mental health resources in theater are adequate to handle the needs of our deployed servicemembers?

Answer. I currently have not had an opportunity to assess all the resources available in theater. In previous tours in Iraq I found resources to be adequate and effective, but with room for improvement. My combat experience also showed me it wasn't necessarily about how many medical resources we had, but whether they were at the right locations, doing the right procedures. I would follow this approach but would not be hesitant to request more mental health resources if warranted.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, you will be responsible for ensuring compliance with DOD policies on prevention of and response to sexual assaults involving U.S. military and civilian personnel in Iraq.

What lessons did you learn, if any, while implementing sexual assault training, reporting protocols, and command awareness while serving as Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps and Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq that can help improve any of these policies or their implementation in theater?

Answer. I believe that our policies are effective but this remains a core leadership responsibility. Leaders at all level must ensure that there is a culture and climate in place that allows victims to come forward and that each allegation is taken seriously and investigated thoroughly. The implementation of the "I Am Strong" campaign will help to address the concerns victims have about coming forward.

Question. What are the unique issues, if any, that you believe need to be addressed to ensure that policies on prevention, reporting, medical treatment (including mental health care), and victim support are available in the operational environment of Iraq?

Answer. There are several environmental issues in Iraq that have bearing on this issue. Forces and bases will be in a fairly continuous state of transition. The regular turnover of units and personnel could affect the continuity of and quality of care for servicemembers in theater. Maintaining the necessary capabilities to address sexual assault as we reduce our force structure must be carefully planned for to ensure our servicemembers' needs are being met.

Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of sexual assault prevention and response resources currently available in the U.S. CENTCOM area of responsibility?

Answer. I currently have not had an opportunity to assess all the resources available, but during all my previous combat tours in CENTCOM, I found it to be adequate and effective, but with room for improvement. This is also being addressed in all Service programs like the Army's "I Am Strong" campaign.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes. I welcome congressional oversight and I look forward to a continued relationship.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes. I will always give my best military assessment to our Nation's leadership.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

ADVISE AND ASSIST IN IRAQ

1. Senator BURRIS. Lieutenant General Austin, as you are aware our U.S. Forces will complete the drawdown by December 2011 and transition to an advise and assist role. It is critical that we accomplish this with the utmost efficiency to minimize risks to our military personnel. What do you feel is the biggest risk that must be mitigated to ensure that the drawdown goes well?

General AUSTIN. U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) continues partnered operations as we conduct a responsible drawdown to no more than 50,000 forces by August 31, 2010. Assigned forces are currently conducting stability operations and will continue to do so until the end of mission and drawdown of all forces by December 2011. During that time we will continue to train, advise, and equip Iraqi security forces (ISF); provide force protection for U.S. military and civilian personnel and facilities; assist the ISF in conducting counterterrorism operations; and support civilian agencies and international organizations in their capacity building efforts. By the end of 2011, enduring functions will transfer to the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the Government of Iraq (GoI), and other international organizations and agencies.

Current risk is anything hindering the political and economic development that is essential for Iraq to become a stable, sovereign, self-reliant nation that contributes to the peace and security of the region. Iraq must develop an inclusive government that represents the Iraqi people, provides essential services and security, and demonstrates the capacity to address national unity challenges such as Arab-Kurd disagreements over disputed internal boundaries. At the same time, the country needs to recapitalize its infrastructure while developing a business climate that encourages economic development and foreign investment, including the establishment of rule of law.

I am confident that our whole-of-government approach will mitigate these risks as we transition to a civilian-led effort. I will work closely with the U.S. Ambassador to encourage a smooth and effective transition to ensure continued progress in meeting our national objectives.

2. Senator BURRIS. Lieutenant General Austin, how will you measure mission success for the advise and assist units?

General AUSTIN. Our advise and assist brigades (AABs) directly assist ISF as they become increasingly capable of providing for Iraq's internal and external security.

A key measure of mission success for AABs includes their successful partnership with the ISF to provide effective security and development of the essential capabilities they will require before the end of 2011. Another measure is the critical role AABs play in the U.S. interagency process with their support of Department of State (DOS)-led provincial reconstruction teams. Finally, they provide connectivity as they engage with various echelons of Iraqi provincial and regional governments. Their capability to maintain situational awareness, support stability operations, operate in combined security areas, support counterterrorism operations, and maintain training and readiness improves as every day goes by. In addition, our AABs work with the ISF to enable them to independently manage shortfalls in Iraqi

sustainment and logistics. We have seen great progress in the ISF's ability to perform these functions and I am confident this progression will continue.

3. Senator BURRIS. Lieutenant General Austin, do you envision a larger or smaller role for Reserve component forces?

General AUSTIN. The Reserve components are key players in U.S. military operations in Iraq and around the world. In order to meet our national objectives, the Defense Department considers all Services and components when responding to Joint Staff and combatant commander requests for forces. I envision the role of our reservists and guardsmen remaining fairly consistent as we conduct our responsible drawdown of forces in Iraq.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

STATE DEPARTMENT REQUEST

4. Senator VITTER. Lieutenant General Austin, last week, the Associated Press released an article outlining State Department plans to form a security force for their continued operations in Iraq following our military drawdown. This article cites documents which say the State Department wants 24 of the Army's Black Hawk helicopters, 50 bomb-resistant vehicles, heavy cargo trucks, fuel trailers, and high-tech surveillance systems. As I'm sure you are aware, this article raises concerns about the full transition from military presence to civilian presence in Iraq, and whether conditions are such that it can be accomplished as planned in 2011. As the nominee for Commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq, please describe your thoughts about this State Department request.

General AUSTIN. I believe we are on track to meet the President's stated objective of a responsible drawdown of forces by December 2011, with a successful transfer of responsibilities to the Government of Iraq, the Department of State, and other international organizations. A critical part of accomplishing these objectives is a strong partnership between myself and the U.S. Ambassador, something to which I am wholly committed.

We have already accomplished a considerable amount of work to ensure the transfer of responsibilities will be a smooth one. We must take a whole-of-government approach to transition not just responsibilities, but the resources required to execute them. It is imperative for the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad to be properly resourced for the U.S. mission in Iraq to be successful.

5. Senator VITTER. Lieutenant General Austin, based on your previous experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, do you feel that this military/security capability is appropriate for State Department?

General AUSTIN. DOS has a well established capability for providing diplomatic security for U.S. missions around the world. That said, the Department will face an unprecedented security challenge in Iraq after the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

I believe unique capabilities required to successfully continue the mission after departure of U.S. forces should be carefully considered and fully resourced using a whole-of-government approach. Such resourcing will allow our partners at DOS to pursue sustained political engagement and regional diplomacy in support of a peaceful and prosperous Iraq.

6. Senator VITTER. Lieutenant General Austin, will you concur with the request?

General AUSTIN. I believe the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad must be fully resourced in order to successfully perform its mission as Iraq becomes an increasingly stable, self-reliant sovereign nation. The Department of Defense is carefully reviewing the request from DOS to transfer military equipment, transportation, convoy support, base life support and core logistics services. We will work closely with them to find a feasible, whole-of-government approach to fulfilling these requirements.

7. Senator VITTER. Lieutenant General Austin, should this committee be concerned that this request represents a veiled assertion that U.S. military forces are being withdrawn too quickly, and as such will be leaving State Department personnel at risk?

General AUSTIN. The responsible drawdown of forces currently taking place is consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement and gives us sufficient capability as we approach the transition to a civilian-led mission in December 2011. I believe this drawdown is taking place at an appropriate pace and will not leave U.S. Embassy personnel with an inappropriate level of risk.

In addition, the security situation in Iraq has vastly improved; security incidents are the lowest on record and continue to decline. Since assuming full responsibility for planning and executing internal security in June 2009, Iraqi security forces have continued to improve their capability to maintain situational awareness, support stability operations, operate in combined security areas, support counterterrorism operations, and improve training and readiness of their personnel.

USE OF CONTRACTORS

8. Senator VITTER. Lieutenant General Austin, what are your views on the use of contractors in roles customarily left to the military?

General AUSTIN. I believe it is appropriate to use contractors in roles complementing the Defense Department's effort to provide support and services to the mission. Doing so allows commanders to allocate more forces for combat and other inherently military operations. This has been a critical component of our effort to achieve U.S. objectives in Iraq. However, the key to success in this effort, as in almost all contracted support efforts, is oversight. As conditions in theater evolve I will continually monitor not only force levels but also the role of contractors in support of the mission.

9. Senator VITTER. Lieutenant General Austin, is this a risk in Iraq as the draw-down continues?

General AUSTIN. I do not believe our use of contracted personnel leads to an unacceptable level of risk as we conduct our responsible drawdown of forces. As USF-I Commander, I will continually evaluate the conditions on the ground to determine what composition of forces (including contracted personnel) is appropriate for us to achieve our national objectives.

[The nomination reference of LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 18, 2010.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General.

LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, 5848.

[The biographical sketch of LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LTG LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Educational degrees:

U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
Auburn University - ME - Educational Administration
Webster University - MA - Management

Military schools attended:

Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
U.S. Army War College

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

Promotions	Dates of appointment
2LT	4 Jun 75
1LT	4 Jun 77
CPT	18 Nov 79
MAJ	1 Jun 86
LTC	1 Jul 92
COL	1 Aug 97
BG	1 Jan 02
MG	1 Jan 05
LTG	8 Dec 06

Major duty assignments:

From	To	Assignment
May 76	Jan 78 ..	Rifle Platoon Leader, A Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jan 78	Feb 79 ..	Scout Platoon Leader, Combat Support Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Mar 79	Sep 79 ..	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA
Oct 79	Apr 81 ..	Commander, Combat Support Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 508th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC
Apr 81	Oct 81 ..	Assistant S-3 (Operations), 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC
Oct 81	Oct 82 ..	Operations Officer, U.S. Army Indianapolis District Recruiting Command, Indianapolis, IN
Oct 82	Dec 84 ..	Company Commander, U.S. Army Recruiting Battalion, Indianapolis, IN
Jan 85	Dec 85 ..	Student, Auburn University, Auburn, AL
Dec 85	Jun 88 ..	Cadet Counselor, later Company Tactical Officer, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY
Jul 88	Jun 89 ..	Student, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS
Jun 89	May 91 ..	S-3 (Operations), later Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, NY
Jun 91	Oct 92 ..	Executive Officer, 1st Infantry Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, NY
Oct 92	Apr 93 ..	Director, Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security, U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Drum, NY
May 93	Mar 95 ..	Commander, 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC, and Operation Safe Haven, Panama
Mar 95	Jun 96 ..	G-3 (Operations), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC
Aug 96	Jun 97 ..	Student, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
Jun 97	Jun 99 ..	Commander, 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC
Jun 99	Jul 01 ...	Chief, Joint Operations Division, J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Jul 01	Jun 03 ..	Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
Sep 03	Aug 05 ..	Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division (Light) and Fort Drum, Fort Drum, NY, to include duty as Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-180, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan
Sep 05	Dec 06 ..	Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL
Dec 06	Feb 08 ..	Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, NC
Feb 08	Apr 09 ..	Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps/Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq
Apr 09	Aug 09 ..	Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, Fort Bragg, NC
Aug 09	Present	Director, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC

Summary of joint assignments:

	Date	Grade
Chief, Joint Operations Division, J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Jun 99-Jul 01	Colonel
Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division (Light) with duty as Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-180, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan (No Joint Credit).	Sep 03-Apr 04	Brigadier General/ Major General
Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL	Sep 05-Dec 06	Major General
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps/Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.	Feb 08-Apr 09	Lieutenant General
Director, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Aug 09-Present ...	Lieutenant General

Summary of operations assignments:

	Date	Grade
Commander, 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Operation Safe Haven, Panama.	Nov 94–Feb 95	Lieutenant Colonel
Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.	Mar 03–Apr 03	Brigadier General
Commanding General, 10th Mountain Division (Light) with duty as Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-180, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan (No Joint Credit).	Sep 03–Apr 04	Brigadier General/ Major General
Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps/Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.	Feb 08–Apr 09	Lieutenant General

U.S. decorations and badges:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Silver Star
 Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Defense Meritorious Service Medal
 Meritorious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Joint Service Commendation Medal
 Army Commendation Medal (with six Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Combat Action Badge
 Expert Infantryman Badge
 Master Parachutist Badge
 Ranger Tab
 Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Room SR-228

Washington, DC 20510-6050

(202) 224-3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF
NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
Lloyd J. Austin III.
2. **Position to which nominated:**
Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq.

3. Date of nomination:

May 18, 2010.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:

August 8, 1953; Mobile, AL.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)

Married to Charlene Denise Banner Austin (Maiden name: Banner).

7. Names and ages of children:

Reginald Hill (stepson), 41.

Christopher Hill (stepson), 38.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

Association of the U.S. Army.

National Infantry Association.

Rocks Incorporated.

555 Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

Patriot Award, October 2009, Awarded for exceptional service to country, Patriot Foundation, Pinehurst, NC.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

LLOYD J. AUSTIN III.

This 18th day of May, 2010.

[The nomination of LTG Lloyd J. Austin III, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 29, 2010, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2010.]